[No. 12191.

 October 14, 1918.]

JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. MANILA RAILROAD Co., defendant and appellee.
1. 1.
MASTER AND SERVANT; CONTRACT; NEGLIGENCE..—Failure to perform a contract cannot
be excused upon the ground that the breach was due to the negligence of a servant of the obligor, and
that the latter exercised due diligence in the selection and control of the servant.
1. 2.
CONTRACTS; NEGLIGENCE; CULPA AQUILIANA; CULPA CONTRACTUAL.—The
distinction between negligence as the source of an obligation (culpa aquiliana) and negligence in the
performance of a contract (culpa contractual) pointed out.
1. 3.
CARRIERS; PASSENGERS; NEGLIGENCE; ALIGHTING FROM MOVING TRAIN.—It is not
negligence per se for a traveler to alight from a slowly moving train.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Del Rosario, J.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Ramon Sotelo for appellant.
Kincaid & Hartigan for appellee.
FiSHER, J.:

At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of the Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk,
769
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 769
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located
upon the line of the defendant railroad company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the
city of Manila where he worked, he used a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon
the company's trains free of charge. Upon the occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff was
returning home by rail from his daily labors; and as the train drew up to the station in San Mateo the plaintiff
arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was riding and, making his exit through the door, took
his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform
which begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends
along in front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train
slowed down another passenger, named Emilio Zufiiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off
the same car, alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground.
When the train had proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his
feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him. and he
fell violently on the platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving
car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the
train the car moved forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted
dimly by a single light located some distance away, objects on the
770
770 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
platform where the accident occurred were difficult to discern, especially to a person emerging from a
lighted car.
 The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found
in the fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to
the station for shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous tow sacks which had been piled on
the platform in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed that there
was a space of only about two feet between the sacks of melons and the edge of the platform; and it is clear
that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these melons at the moment
he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the darkness is readily to be
credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries
which he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of
Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was
unsatisfactory, and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed
and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff
expended the sum of P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection
with the process of his curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instanee of the city of Manila
to recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and in leaving them so placed
as to be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the
Court of First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above
771
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 771
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
stated, and drew therefrom his conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the
defendant by reason of the fact that the sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to
and from the cars, nevertheless, the plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the
coach and was therefore precluded from recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the
defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling
these sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he
alighted from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this
problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the
defendant company and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of
carriage, and that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from
the breach of that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That
is to say, its liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in the legal viewpoint from that
presumptive responsibility for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code,
which can be rebutted by proof of the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of
the Civil Code is not applicable to obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations
—or to use the technical form of expression, that article relates only to  culpa aquiliana  and not to  culpa
contractual.
772
772 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out
this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of  Rakes  vs.  Atlantic,
Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 (vol. 8, p. 30) Manresa clearly
points out the difference between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source
of an obligation between persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and  culpa  considered as an
"accident in the performance of an obligation already existing * * *."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that
article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a
contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
"The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another But where relations already formed
give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103 and 1104 of the same code." (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.
Rep., 359 at p. 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liabilitv which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain
cases imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to
persons to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the Endish Common Law, upon the
principle of respondent St-Tit were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally-but upon
the principle announced inLwl 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all Bersons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to ano he , The obUgation of making good the damage caused.
773
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 773
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
gence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence. The obligation to make good the
damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting within the scope of his
employment, causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if the master has not
been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and. direction of the servant, he is not liable for the
acts of the latter, whether done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage done by the servant
does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant
relieves the master from liability for the latter's acts—on the contrary, that proof shows that the
responsibility has never existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-
contractual  culpa  is always based upon a  voluntary  act or omission which, without willful intent, but by
mere negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in
the selection of his servant, taking into consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge
of the duties which it is his purpose to confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby
performs his duty to third persons to whom he is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability
whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his servants, even within the scope of their employment, such
third persons suffer damage. True it is that under article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates
a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or direction of his servant, but the presumption is
rebuttable and yields to proof of due care and diligence in this respect.
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rican Civil
Code, has held that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual  culpa  exclusively.
(Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto Rico Reports, 215.)
774
774 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of  Bahia  vs.  Litonjua and
Leynes, (30 Phil. Rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability
of the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within
the scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code,
said:
 "From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the
master or employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him, after the
selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently,
may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in
selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good f ather of a f amily, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
"This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the serVant is
conclusively the negligence of the master."
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual  culpa  based
upon negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant
personally, and that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in
complete accord with the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability
created by article 1903 is imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of
authority or superiority existing between the person called
775
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 775
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their
servants or agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contract, is
not based upon a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of
exercise of the utmost diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the
breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation
has its source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to
others, generally embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the
measure of the corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights
imposes upon all other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent
or to mere inattention, if productive of injury, gives rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The
fundamental distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon
the fact that in cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which
creates the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach
of the voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect—and our Legislature has so elected—to limit such liability to cases in
which the person upon whom such an obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the contrary, for
reasons of public policy, to extend
776
776 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
that liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence
of those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extracontractual liability—with certain well-defined exceptions—to cases in which moral culpability
can be directly imputed to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed
to exercise due care in one's own acts, or in having failed to exercise due care in the selection and control of
one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status, occupy a position of
dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another,
is wholly different from -that to which article 1903 relates. When the source of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence if he does not his action 'fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to wilful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his ,servants or agents.
Proof of the contract and of its nonperf ormance is sufficient prima facie to warrant a recovery.
"As a general rule * * * it is logical that in case of extra-contractual  culpa,  a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on the
contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if the creditor
shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove the
negligence." (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76].)
777
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14. 1918. 777
Cangco vs, Manila Railroad Co.
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was
due to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in f act the actual cause of
the breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or
agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of
servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that persons acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance
of their contracts, would be in a better position than those .acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch
to a watchmaker who contracts to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction,
he is unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract,
which involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was
his servant whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would
enjoy practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by
negligent acts of omission or commission on the part of their servants, as such juridical persons can of
necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be true in most instances that reasonable
care had been taken in the selection and direction of such servants. If one delivers securities to a banking
corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of .some clerk employed by the bank,
would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of Hability for the breach of its contract to
return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had been exercised in the
selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source
778
778 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNQTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere incident to the performance of a contract has frequently
been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.  (Sentencias  of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and
December 13, 1896.) In the decision of November 20, 1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose  ex
contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a
defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's contention, saying:
"These are not cases of injury caused, without any preexisting obligation, by fault or negligence, such as
those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's failure to
carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts * * *."
 A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done
by the negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the
negligence of the defendant's servants [has] been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for
breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not
liable for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact
that no evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the
employment of' the driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co.'s Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff
sued the defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get
adrift by the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The
court held, citing Manresa (vol 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract
made between it and the plaintiff * * we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are
applicable to the case."
779
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 779
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages
for personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's automobile
in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the negligence
of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at the time,
saying:
"* * * unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for such a length of time as to give the owner
a reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. * * * The act
complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner by his
acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own."
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it
is true that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the
facts disclosed that the injury complained of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out
of the contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in
dealing with the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between
private individuals and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of
negligence in the selection or direction of the servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of
negligence had not been overcome.
It is evident, therefore, that in its decision in the Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as
though founded in tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination
of the pleadings and of the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory.
Viewed from the standpoint of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The
proof disclosed beyond doubt that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that
780
780 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila, Railroad Co.
his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had
been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant
was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded
as constituting culpa aquilina or culpa contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether
negligence occurs as an incident in the course of the performance of a contractual undertaking or is itself the
source of an extra-contractual obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or
omission productive of damage due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently,
when the court holds that a defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either
directly, or in failing to exercise proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result
is identical in either case. Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the
Yamada case that the defendant was liable for the damages negligently caused by its servant to a person to
whom it was bound by contract, and made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the
selection and control of its servants, that in such a case the court would have held that it would have been a
good defense to the action, if presented squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant
to have proved that it did in fact exercise care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of
contractual and extra-contractual obligations. The field of noncontractual obligation is much more broader
than that of contractual obligation, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere
781
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 781
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
fact that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to
such person. When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have constituted the source of
an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in
safety and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (Civil Code, article 1258). That duty,
being contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the
fault was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of
its servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a -breach of its contractual obligation to
maintain safe means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury
suffered by plaintiff was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a
complete stop before alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes
case  (supra),  if the accident was  caused  by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon
defendant, whereas if the accident was caused by defendant's negligence and plaintiff's negligence merely
contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to ascertain if
defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are
not disposed to
782
782 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too broadly
stated and is at variance with the experience of everyday life. In this particular instance, that the train was
barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of persons alight from trains under these
conditions every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from
dangerous obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever
in alighting as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe
alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's
work on Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
"The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered whether an
ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have acted as the passenger
acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care
which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence
would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury." (Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3,
sec. 3010.)
Or, if we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this' court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. Rep.,
809), we may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at
the time he alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get
off the train under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the
783
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 783
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the
effect that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able
to discern clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the
situation thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintifF was, as we find, ignorant of the fact
that the obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the
defendant was bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe
egress from its trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to
the contrary, that the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted,
and-this also is proof of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to
the plaintiff; f or if it were by any possibility conceded that it had a right to pile these sacks in the path of
alighting passengers, the placing of them in that position gave rise to the duty to light the premises
adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the
following circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than
that of the roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the
alighting passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk
incident to stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to
the passenger a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the
vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was
784
784 PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co.
yet moving as the same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of
contributory negligence in performing such act—that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or
recklessly—the age, sex, and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the
safety of the passenger, and should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule, are less
capable than men of alighting with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel
obstructs the free movement of the limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the
plaintiff, as it was his daily custom to get on and off the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no
uncertainty in his mind with regard either to the length of the step which he was required to take or the
character of the platform where he was alighting. Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in
undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under way was not characterized by imprudence and
that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist
clerk, and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a
fair compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that
he is also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital
services, and other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of
P3,290.25, and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
     Arellano, C. J., Torres, Street, and Avancena, JJ., concur.
785
VOL. 38, OCTOBER 14, 1918. 785
Alpuerto vs. Perez Pastor and Roa.

MALCOLM, J., with whom concurs JOHNSON, J., dissenting:

With one sentence in the majority decision, we are of full accord, namely, "It may be admitted that had
plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the particular injury suffered by him
could not have occurred." With the general rule relative to a passenger's contributory negligence, we are
likewise in full accord, namely, "An attempt to alight from a moving train is negligence  per se."  Adding
these two points together, we have the logical result—the Manila Railroad Co. should be absolved from the
complaint, and judgment affirmed.
Judgment reversed.
_______________