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Molo vs. Molo G.R. No. L-2538 September 21, 1951 (Art. 832) Facts

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Molo vs.

Molo

G.R. No. L-2538            

September 21, 1951

(Art. 832)

Facts

Mariano Molo y Legaspi died without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or
ascending line. He was survived, however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de
Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio Molo,
who were the legitimate children of the deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y
Legaspi left two wills, one executed on 1918, and another executed on 1939.

Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed a petition seeking the probate of the will executed by the
deceased on 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated. However, upon petition
filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate was set aside
and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the
court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed
to prove that the same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on 1939, the widow filed another petition
for the probate of the 1918 will executed by the deceased in the same court. The probate court
erred in not holding that the alleged will of 1918 was deliberately revoked by Molo himself
through the decedent's will of 1939.

Issues

Whether or not the revocatory clause in the 1939 will is valid and still has the effect of
nullifying the prior of 1918 despite the fact that its execution is not in accordance with law.

Ruling

No. A subsequent will, containing a clause revoking a previous will, having been
disallowed, for the reason that it was not executed in conformity with the provisions of the Code
of Civil Procedure as to the making of wills, cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous
will, inasmuch as said revocatory clause is void. There is no evidence which may directly
indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the original of the 1918 will because of his
knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he executed in 1939.

The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is usually applied where the testator
cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a present
intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The rule is established that
where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another will so as fairly to raise the
inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the efficacy of a new
disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a
substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force. The theory
on which this principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this
intention is clearly manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted
his wife as his universal heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying
testate.

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