Alan Knight - Populismo y Neopopulismo en América Latina PDF
Alan Knight - Populismo y Neopopulismo en América Latina PDF
Alan Knight - Populismo y Neopopulismo en América Latina PDF
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to Journal of Latin American Studies
ALAN KNIGHT
'In all matters of importance, stle and not content is the importa
Oscar Wilde, The Importance of Being Earnest.
perdurability is evident not only in the real world of politics, but also in
the rarefied atmosphere of academic debate. Not for the first time,
academics distrust the concept- maybe also the phenomenon - of
populism, but they seem reluctant to ditch it.3 At a stimulating I995
session of the Conference on Latin American History, which gathered
several of the leading analysts of populism, there was, it seemed to me, a
pervasive unease - and certainly no theoretical consensus - concerning
the concept of populism; yet there was also a residual reluctance to boot
it unceremoniously out the back door.4 Experts cling to the concept, even
if they cannot agree what it means. Maybe the experts are wrong: there
is, in the world of social science, no surefire system of natural selection
guaranteeing the survival of fittest concept/theory/paradigm. Plenty of
conceptual dodos have flourished (some, indeed, have been born) in
defiance of rigorous natural selection. Nevertheless, the fact that populism
lives on, in both theory and practice, gives pause for thought.5 Maybe its
staying power suggests some inherent qualities, some affinity with the
Latin American reality, some genetic material which would repay further
analysis.
All of this begs the question of what Latin American populism is, or
was. If, for some, it is an empty concept,6 for others it retains an elusive
utility. Laclau, departing momentarily from his usual stance of Cartesian
rationality, proclaims his 'intuitive' grasp of what populism means.7 He
also resorts to an equally uncharacteristic empiricism, attempting a
headcount of definitions and meanings culled from a variety of scholars.8
On this basis it is possible to collect perceived common characteristics:
these would include (a) an inner core of' consensual' attributes, and (b) an
outer ring of 'contested' attributes- those imputed by some scholars,
ignored or rejected by others. (Such a procedure would produce, as I
understand it, a 'radial' category of analysis).9 A round-up of the usual
3 On intellectual and academic distrust and dislike of populism, see Margaret Canovan,
Populism (London, 1 981), p. i.
4 Panel chaired by Jeremy Adelman, American Historical Association conference,
Chicago, January I995. John D. Martz, 'The Regionalist Expression of Populism.
Guayaquil and the CFP, I948-60', Journalof Interamerican and World Affairs, 22/3 (Aug.
1980), p. 289, notes the concept's 'stubborn resilience in refusing to disappear'.
5 As Peter Worsley observed, given the recurrent use of the term, 'the existence of the
verbal smoke might well indicate a fire somewhere': 'The Concept of Populism', in
Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner, (eds.), Populism (London, I970), p. 219. Emilio de
Ipola, 'Populismo e ideologfa', Revista mexicana de sociologia, 4I/3 (julio-set., I979),
p. 928, makes a similar point.
6 Ernesto Laclau, Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London, 1977), pp. 145-6.
7 Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. I43. 8 Laclau, Politics and Ideology, p. I64.
9 Kenneth M. Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the Transformation of Populism in Latin
America. The Peruvian Case', World Politics, 48 (Oct. 1995), p. 88, n. 21, citing David
Collier and James E. Mahon Jr.
10 Wirth, 'Foreward', p. ix; Alistair Hennessy, 'Latin America', in Ionescu and Gellner,
Populism, pp. 28-6i; Torcuato di Tella, 'Populism and Reform in Latin America', in
Claudio Veliz, (ed.), Obstacles to Change in Latin America (Oxford, 1969), pp. 47-74;
Sagrario Torres Ballesteros, 'El populismo: un concepto escurridizo', in Jose Alvarez
Junco, (ed.), Populismo, caudillajey discurso demagogico (Madrid, 1987), pp. I59-80.
n Canovan, Populism, p. 5.
a nod and a wink. (Indeed, such an approach would have the advantage of
stripping the concept of connotations which impair its constructive use:
for many, populism retains strongly negative connotations, hence it is
often more readily used in a pejorative than a positive sense).12 However,
that would be excessively cute. The one relatively clear conclusion which
emerges from the scholarly headcount - and, though it is not much, it is
something - is the etymological derivation of 'populism' from populus,
hence the connotation of a movement, regime, leader, or style which
claims some affinity with 'the people'.13 That is not much, since the claim
may be unwarranted; 'affinity' can mean many things'; and 'the people'
is another notoriously vague term. (Engels reacted brusquely to a
reference to 'the people in general' in the I891 Erfurt Programme,
asking: 'who is that?').14 However, it is something to go on; it possesses
an elementary etymological logic; and, if pursued, it does, I think offer a
way to make sense of 'populism' such that the concept retains some
utility, without losing all specificity.15
Populism therefore connotates a political style, what Weffort refers to as
its external features.16 It does not- I shall argue- relate to a specific
ideology, period, or class alliance; although, I shall also argue, the style
becomes more politically effective and historically relevant in some times,
places, and periods than others. The style may also be gimcrack: failed,
phony populisms are a good deal more common than successful,
'genuine' variants. Hence Paul Cammack rightly stresses the need to link
discourse- often the easiest thing to research - to structures and
institutions.17 The populist style implies a close bond between political
leaders and led (I am not keen on 'elites' and 'masses'). 'This people
whose slave I was will no longer be slave to anyone', as Vargas declared
12 Michael L. Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 192f-4y (Pittsburgh,
1981), p. 25; Canovan, Populism, p. ii; Di Tella, 'Populism and Reform', p. 47.
I discuss the pejorative notion of 'economic populism', now much in vogue, below.
13 De Ipola, 'Populismo e ideologfa', p. 934; Paul Cammack, 'What Populism Was, What
Neo-populism Is', paper presented at the conference on 'Old and New Populism in
Latin America', Institute of Latin American Studies, London, Nov. I995, p. i.
14 Adam Przeworski and John Sprague, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism
(Chicago, 1986), p. 49. On the polysemic quality of 'pueblo' in Spanish: Norberto
Rodriguez Bustamante, 'Sociologia del populismo', in Jos6 Isaacson, (coord.), El
populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, I974), pp. I23-4.
15 Etymological logic can be a false guide; it would not help much, for example, in
divining the significance of 'fascism'; and those who preface analyses of modern
revolutions with erudite references to wheels-in-motion do not necessarily advance our
knowledge. In this case, however, the etymology is sufficiently clear, recent, and
compelling for us to take it seriously.
16 Francisco Corr6a Weffort, 0 populismo na politica brasileira (Rio de Janeiro, 1980), p. 25.
17 Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 2.
27 Like many of the criteria used by analysts of populism, 'mediation' (like 'crisis',
'mobilisation', 'charisma') is not amenable to measurement; hence analysts trade
comparisons without, it seems to me, sharing an agreed methodology which would
help advance the debate; and the debate therefore assumes a distinctly circular and
assertive character (my contribution included).
28 Menendez-Carri6n, 'Estructura y dinimica de la articulaci6n electoral en las barriadas
de Guayaquil', p. 433; Knight, 'Cardenismo', p. 80; Dulles, Vargas, pp. 318, 346;
Robert M. Levine, The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-38 (New York, 1970),
p. 37 quotes Oswaldo Aranha on Vargas: 'a Christ among thieves'.
29 Michael L. Conniff, 'Populism in Brazil, 1925-45', in Conniff, (ed.), Latin American
Populism p. 85.
30 By the same token, I would hesitate to equate populism with 'exceptionalism', as in the
familiar formula, 'the exceptional capitalist state' (e.g., the fascist, Bonapartist, or
Peronist state: e.g., Laclau, Politics and Ideology, pp. 57, 197-8). The chief problem with
this formula is the assumption of a 'normal', 'unexceptional' capitalist state
(presumably, a liberal-democratic bourgeois-capitalist state). But late-Victorian Britain
is hardly a yardstick of historical normality. On Bonapartism, see n. 8i below.
31 ' Since the advent of mass political mobilisation, virtually any modern regime, however,
repressive, needs to have some populist elements, even if these do not go beyond
rhetoric': Canovan, Populism, p. 148.
Aires) ;32 political vested interests (a common pattern seems to pit populist
executives against vested interests in the legislature); the pals politico - the
political establishment - as against the pais nacional (the real country);33
'pointy-headed intellectuals' (or variants on this populist theme: recall the
slogans of Per6n's descamisados: 'alpargatas si, libros no!'; 'menos
cultura y mas trabajo !'); foreign powers, foreign representatives ('Braden
or Per6n'), and/or 'foreign' groups resident within the borders of the
nation-state, against whom the interests of the ('real') people can be set
- be they multinational corporations, like the oil companies expropriated
by Toro in 1937 and Cardenas in 1938, or immigrant communities, like
the Chinese run out of Mexico by the Sonorans in early '30s.34
Accordingly, populism - proclaiming the worth of the common man (it
rarely champions the common woman)35 -easily spills over into
xenophobia and chauvinism; although again, of course, it is not alone in
this. It also readily adopts both an anti-intellectual and anti-institutional
cast: the populist leader/movement represents a repudiation of both
entrenched vested interests (e.g., meritocratic bureaucracies or long-
serving legislatures) and also effete intellectuals (Cardenas had no love for
intellectuals, or vice versa). Hence the relationship of intellectuals to populist
movements tends to be unusually problematic: some populist movements
spurn intellectuals; critics of populism often point to its crass lack of
culture; but some intellectuals, espousing populism, over-compensate,
becoming more populist than the populace.36
32 Menendez-Carri6n, 'Estructura y dinamica de la articulaci6n electoral en las barriadas
de Guayaquil', p. 433; George I. Blanksten, Peron's Argentina (Chicago, 1974, first
pubd., I953), pp. 272-3.
33 Braun, The Assassination of Gaitdn, pp. 1oo-1oI; John Green, "'Vibrations of the
Collective": The Popular Ideology of Gaitanismo on Colombia's Atlantic Coast,
1944-48', Hispanic American Historical Review, 76/2 (I996), p. 305.
34 In fact, there may be considerable differences between these phenomena - roughly,
'economic nationalism' on the one hand and popular 'xenophobia' on the other: Alan
Knight, 'Peasants into Patriots: Thoughts on the Making of the Mexican Nation',
Mexican Studies/Estudios Mexicanos, Io/ (winter 1994), pp. 5 I-3. Both, however, are
consonant with populist mobilisation. On Peronist anti-intellectualism, see James,
'October seventeenth and eighteenth', p. 452, and the same author's Resistance and
Integration, p. 27, which, noting the tangoesque discourse of (early) Peronism, quotes
Discepolo's 'great tango', Cambalache: 'It's better to be a jackass than a great
professor'.
35 The role of patriarchy and gender relations within populism would no doubt repay
further consideration, although I doubt that I am the person to do it. With the obvious
exception of Eva Per6n, the Latin American populist pantheon is notably lacking in
women; but then so, too, is the Latin American political pantheon in general. In this,
as in other respects, populism may not be particularly exceptional.
36 Blanksten, Peron's Argentina, pp. 274-5, on populist (i.e., Peronist) ignorance, typified
by a cabinet minister's statement that I950 was the year of the three S's: el afio Santo,
the anniversary of the death of San Martin and the number Sincuenta. Intellectual
populism appears to have been rarer in Latin America than, say, Russia: cf. Canovan,
Populism, pp. 104-5. Some Latin American intellectuals - e.g., Mexican and Andean
indigenistas - exalted popular, Indian, folkloric values and traditions; but they did so
'from above', paternalistically, aiming to integrate Indians into a mestizo nation state
(forjando patria, as Gamio put it); they did not envisage Indianising the nation, or
transposing popular ways and customs to the elite. No more did porteno populist/
nationalists start dressing like gauchos or eating raw beef.
37 Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-j2 (Urbana, I978), pp. 2, 7.
38 Canovan, Populism, pp. 3, I 38. Thus, the Mexican and Argentine variants of populism
tend to get separated; a point to which I will return.
39 That is, 'charisma' does not reside, an innate quality, in the bosom of the 'charismatic'
leader; it denotes a relationship between leader and followers. Similarly, populism must
be understood as a reciprocal relationship, not a top-down imposition.
40 Samuel Farber, Revolution and Reaction in Cuba, 1933-I960 (Middletown, 1976), pp. 20-i;
Jeffrey L. Gould, To Lead As Equals, Rural Protest and Political Consciousness in
Chinandega, Nicaragua, 1912-1979 (Chapel Hill, I990), ch's 2, 3, especially p. 8i.
41 Luiz Carlos Bresser Pereira, 'Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil', Journal of
Interamerican and World Affairs, 33 / 2 (summer, 99 ), p. 7.
42 James, Resistance and Integration, ch. i.
43 For example, the extension of rural schooling, which could have a decisive (but often
non-quantifiable) effect on local communities: Eyler Simpson, The Ejido: Mexico's Way
Out (Chapel Hill, 1937), p. 108; Mary Kay Vaughan, Cultural Politics in Revolution.
Teachers, Peasants and Schools in Mexico, 1930-I940 (Tucson, I997), pp. I93-8.
44 Knight, 'Cardenismo: Juggernaut or Jalopy?', develops this argument. John French,
The Brazilian Workers ABC. Class Conflicts and Alliances in Modern Sao Paulo (Chapel Hill,
1992), argues for the relative autonomy of the greater Sao Paulo working class during
the process of supposed 'populist incorporation'. Joel Wolfe, Working Women, Working
Men, Sdo Paulo and the Rise of Brazil's Industrial Working Class, I9oo-igf9 (Durham,
1993), dissents from (some of) French's analysis (see pp. 262-3, n. I3), but Wolfe also
depicts the Sao Paulo working class as rationally aware of the benefits, opportunities
- and costs - of Varguismo: see pp. 10- 114.
45 Jorge Basurto, 'The Late Populism of Luis Echeverria, in Conniff, (ed.), Latin
American Populism, pp. 10 3-III .
46 Roger Bartra, Agrarian Structure and Political Power in Mexico (Baltimore, I993),
pp. ii8-I26, offer an interesting analysis.
second. Readers may disagree with some of the pairings; they may note
striking omissions.51 The key question, however, is not the membership
of the two clubs, but the supposed criterion by which membership is
established. Does it make sense?
51 Or they may wish to strike some names from the list. Two additional points bea
mention: first, we again note the tendency for some leaders to progress (?) over tim
from populism to non-populism (usually conservatism): e.g., Alessandri and Batista
Movements in the other direction appear to be rarer, at least in Latin America. It
easier - or, at least, more tempting - to foreswear a populist past than to build a belate
populist following (though Vargas may be an example of the latter: Wolfe, Workin
Women, Working Men, pp. 119-24). Secondly, emblematic populists spring to min
more readily than non-populists; the latter, in fact, tend to be less celebrated - or le
notorious - than their populist counterparts (note the discrepancy in stature between
say, Obreg6n and Ortiz Rubio, Cardenas and Rodriguez, Vargas and Dutra). Maybe
this tells us something about 'mass politics' in general and Latin American politics
particular ?
52 On the notion of nineteenth-century populist caudillos (Alvarez, Artigas, Carrera), see
John Lynch, Caudillos in Spanish America, I8oo-i8/o (Oxford, I992), pp. 38, 41-4, 87,
128-9, 217-24, 364-40I; and cf. pp. 201-5, 431-3.
53 I am not trying to resuscitate the moribund myth of the Mexican Revolution (although
I do think that myth has more to it than some recent revisionist critiques allow). The
Revolution did not usher in an era of benign social-democratic - still less socialist -
reform. It did, however, change Mexican politics and society in profound ways -
sometimes less by virtue of planned legislation than of defacto, unplanned, haphazard
events/processes (migration, inflation, demographic shifts, class and communal
mobilisation). Hence the move towards populist politics referred to here.
- and much more populist - than the Porfiriato had ever been.54 This was
evident at the grassroots, where new elites - like the 'peasant borgeoisie'
of the Huasteca Hidalguense described by Frans Schryer - squabbled for
power, capitalising on their supposedly humble backgrounds, rustic
appearance, and rapport with the local peasantry.55 Close by, the Huasteca
Potosina fell under the sway of a classic populist ranchero cacique, Gonzalo
N. Santos, who was equally at home managing the Federal Congress in
Mexico City or engaging in the crude, violent, demagogic politica cochina
of the Huasteca.56 Old-style politicos had to learn new ways; intellectuals
- like Vasconcelos - had to 'go to the people': an experience which, like
the Narodniki of nineteenth-century Russia, they sometimes found trying.
When Vasconcelos ran for the Governorship of Oaxaca in 1924 he
confronted the 'uncultured serrano', Onofre Jimenez, who - Vasconcelos
complained - guaranteed his election with a populist one-liner: 'the
Licenciado is too big a candidate for Oaxaca; the Licenciado drinks
champagne; I drink mezcal; I ought to be Governor'.57 Sure enough,
Jimenez won.
So, too, at national level. Alvaro Obreg6n, the first great post-
revolutionary president, cut his political teeth in Sonoran municipal
politics (where his command of Mayo - the language of the local Indian
communities - had helped). He mobilised the Yaquis for the Revolution
and the nascent labour unions for his 1920 presidential bid. Throughout,
he displayed a bluff, gregarious, wisecracking manner,58 and a talent for
54 Diaz began his political career as a local caudillo with populist leanings, and these did
not instantly disappear when he assumed the presidency. Over time, however, he went
the way of many later populists, shifting to the right, spurning his popular
constituency, cutting deals with Church, oligarchs and businessmen. The contrast
between the populist Revolution and the oligarchic Porfiriato is therefore stronger if we
compare the late Porfiriato (c. I890-I910) with the early Revolution (190I-40). The
early Porfiriato was a different matter; so, too, was (is?) the 'late Revolution' (since
1940), which many commentators now see as an increasingly 'neo-Porfirian' regime.
55 Frans J. Schryer, The Rancheros of Pisaflores. The History of a Peasant Bourgeoisie in
Twentieth-Century Mexico (Toronto, 1980), pp. 7-9 and ch. 4.
56 Pending the publication of Wil Pansters' study of Santos, the best source is Santos' own
remarkable autobiography, Memorias (Mexico, 1986).
57 Ross Parmenter, Lawrence in Oaxaca (G. M. Smith, 1984), p. xxx, quoting Vasconcelos.
58 Linda B. Hall, Alvaro Obregdn. Power and Revolution in Mexico, 1911-I20 (College
Station, 198 ), pp. 19-26 on Obreg6n's character and origins. One of many Obreg6n
jokes captures something of his 'populist' manner: in I926 the retired President,
dressed 'in peasant garb' (i.e., loose pyjama-style cotton shirt and drawers), welcomed
the Japanese ambassador to his Sonoran hacienda: 'surprised, the Japanese
commented: "I had difficulty in recognising you, General, in your peasant disguise",
to which Obreg6n replied: 'No, your excellency, this is my real self (verdaderaforma de
ser). The one in disguise was the Obreg6n you met in the National Palace"': Jorge
Mejia Prieto, Ah, que risa me dan los politicos (Mexico, 1992), p. 44. Vargas, too, 'never
put on airs as president; frequently he met visitors to his Petr6polis summer residence
in his pajamas, an old rural Brazilian custom': Levine, The Vargas Regime, pp. 37-8.
I am not, however, proposing a new pyjama-populism paradigm.
59 Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution (2 vols., Cambridge, 1986), II, pp. 314-I6.
60 Schryer, Rancheros of Pisaflores, p. 92.
61 For example, Luis Gonzalez, San Jose de Gracia, Mexican Village in Transition (Austin,
1983), pp. 204-5. Echoes of the cult of Tata Lazaro are to be found, fifty years on, in
Adolfo Gilly, Cartas a Cuauhtemoc Cardenas (Mexico, 1989). Such peripatetic populism
is quite common: consider Lula's 'Caravan of Citizenship', which covered 45,000 km
in 1994: Celi Regina Jardim Pinto, 'Neo-populism in Brazilian Politics: The Rapid
Exhaustion of a Model', paper presented at the LASA conference, Guadalajara, April
1997, p. 14.
62 Coastal Ecuador is a good example: Martz, 'The Regionalist Expression' and
Men6ndez-Carri6n, 'Estructura y dinamica de la articulaci6n electoral en las barriadas
de Guayaquil'.
63 Christopher Mitchell, The Legacy of Populism in Bolivia, From the MNR to Military Rule
(New York, I977).
64 E.g., Braun, The Assassination ofGaitdn, pp. 83-I03, 121-2; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the
Atlantic Coast', pp. 298-309; Steve Stein, 'Populism in Peru: APRA, the Formative
Years', in Conniff (ed.), Latin American Populism, pp. 113-34; and the same author's
Populism in Peru (Madison, I980), ch. 5, on Sanchezcerrismo.
65 Dulles, Vargas, pp. 9 ('cold, reserved, cautious, impersonal'), 18 ('no extrovert... and
apparently unemotional'). Osvald Bayer, 'Un movimiento popular en un gobierno
populista', in Isaacson, Elpopulismo en la Argentina, p. 17, notes that Hip6lito Irigoyen
- 'el ejemplo mas puro de un gobernante populista' - 'llega a ser un caudillo popular
sin saber hablar, sin tener balc6n'.
66 Paul Drake, 'Comment', in Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards, The
Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America (Chicago, 199I), pp. 38-9.
67 Adelman, 'Post-Populist Argentina', pp. 66-7.
revolution: 'we make the revolution before the people do', as Antonio
Carlos de Andrada put it).68 While this composite picture, culled from
several well-known sources, clearly embodies elements of the populist
political style which I have described, its attempts to connect (and
subordinate) style to social structure, class relations, and economic project
seem to me to be well-intentioned but unsuccessful. There are several
68 Weffort, O populismo, p. 15. Compare Per6n's wheedling of the Buenos Aires Bolsa
1944: Paul H. Lewis, The Crisis of Argentine Capitalism (Chapel Hill, 1990), p. 146.
69 On Somocista populism: Gould, To Lead as Equals, ch's 4, 5. Farber, Revolution a
Reaction in Cuba, p. 20, denotes (the early) Batista a 'Bonapartist Conservativ
Hennessy, 'Latin America', p. 48, refers to Batista's 'urban populism'; but a case co
also be made for a rural dimension, e.g., in light of Batista's protection of Cuba's colo
class. In general, Batista's 193os/4os populism remains a neglected topic.
70 Hence, Drake's 'requiem', Adelman's 'funeral' (both n. 2) and Gibson's 'last flexin
of [Peronism's] populist muscle' in I989: Edward L. Gibson, 'The Populist Road
Market Reform: Policy and Electoral Coalitions in Mexico and Argentina', Wo
Politics, 49/3 (April 997), p. 354.
71 Cf. Alan Knight, 'Viewpoint, Revisionism and Revolution: Mexico Compared
England and France', Past and Present, 34 (Feb. I992), pp. I76-7.
middle class vote to get elected, e.g., in 1945. German and Swedish social
democracy have similarly mobilised multiclass support. As early as I91 5,
Michels generalised, 'for motives predominantly electoral, the party of the
workers seeks support from the petty bourgeois elements of society....
The Labour Party becomes a party of the 'people'.72 Conversely,
Disraeli's 'angels in marble' - working class Tories - were a constant
reminder of class deviation in the other direction.73 Furthermore, the
'classness' of a political party does not depend solely on its class make-up
(consider, for example the enormous ideological range of parties-
conservative, Catholic, fascist, socialist, Communist - which have elicited
peasant support). 'Classness' also depends also on policies, programmes,
symbols and rhetoric; 'reform' and 'revolution' - those two imposters
who have bedeviled Latin American subaltern history - are often in the
eye of the beholder.
A good historical guide, as I have already suggested, might be the
reaction of 'bourgeois', propertied, conservative groups to the rise of a
'class' party - however vague, ad hoc, reformist and populist that party
might be. According to these criteria, 940s Peronism was - irrespective
of the mathematical percentage of working class votes which it attracted
-a party of the working class, vigorously opposed by 'bourgeois',
propertied, conservative groups. Gaitanismo, too, evoked strenuous
C/conservative opposition.74 In the case of Cardenismo there are no
reliable voting figures to serve as a guide; but ample 'impressionistic'
evidence indicates both the support Cardenas received from working class
and peasant groups and the odium which he and his government enjoyed
among the landed elite and the urban bourgeoisie.75 Recent labour history
also points to the genuine - i.e., autonomous - working class support
which accrued to Getulio Vargas; and Conniff, stressing the 'populist/
authoritarian' counterpoint which runs through Brazilian history since
the 1930s, similarly credits populism with the capacity to rally subaltern
support, while alarming elite interests.76 The contrast drawn between
72 Przeworski and Sprague, Paper Stones, pp. 41, 50-1, 6i-z.
73 R. McKenzie and A. Silver, Angels in Marble (London, 1968).
74 Braun, The Assassination of Gaitdn, pp. z12-4, 128-9; Green, 'Gaitanismo on the
Atlantic Coast', pp. 293, 298. 75 Knight, 'Cardenismo', pp. 80-4.
76 French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Michael L. Conniff, 'The National Elite', in
Michael L. Conniff and Frank D. McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical
Perspective (Lincoln, I989), p. 41. If 'populism' is, to a degree, a useful and discernible
phenomenon, it is logical to look for its elitist counterpart, 'anti-populism', that is, a
discourse/ideology/style which deplores the coarse, degenerate and feckless character
of 'the people': see, for example, Barbara Weinstein, For Social Peace in Brazil,
Industrialists and the Remaking of the Workiing Class in So Paulo, 20-64 (Chapel Hill,
1996), pp. 220-1, 227-8, 294-5; and Robert M. Levine, 'Elite Perceptions of the Povo',
in Conniff and McCann, Modern Brazil, Elites and Masses in Historical Perspective,
pp. 209-224.
81 This might be the moment to mention - if only to dismiss - the notion of Bonapartism,
which often rubs shoulders with populism (see, for example, Farber, Revolution and
Reaction in Cuba, pp. 16-27; Maximilien Rubel, et al., Criticas de la economia politica, Los
Bonapartismos [Mexico, 1985]). Scholars have laboured long and hard to convert some
of Marx and Engels' more confused and casual writings into the capstone of a general
theory; but the deficiency of the material, in my view, jeopardises the theory; and, in
this case, etymological logic is less help then hindrance.
82 James, Resistance and Integration; French, The ABC of Brazilian Workers; Wolfe, Working
Women, Working Men; Jonathan Brown, (ed.), Workers' Control in Latin America,
1930-I979 (Chapel Hill, I997).
83 Dornbusch and Edwards, The Macroeconomics of Populism.
84 Bresser Pereira, 'Populism and Economic Policy in Brazil'; Eliana Cardoso and Ann
Helwege, Latin America's Economy (Cambridge, I992), ch. 8.
85 Enrique Cardenas, La industriali.acidn mexicana durante la gran depresion (Mexico, 1987),
pp. 88-95; and the same author's 'La politica econ6mica en la epoca de Cardenas', in
Marcos Tonatiuh Aguila M. y Alberto Enriquez Perea, (coords.), Perspectivas sobre el
Cardenismo (Mexico, 1996), pp. 33-6I.
86 Philippe C. Schmitter, Interest Conflict and Political Change in Brazil (Stanford, 197),
p. 33, graphically depicts 'cartorialism' ('employment in the federal government'),
showing an upward move with the Estado N6vo, but then a levelling-off through the
1940S and early 95 os; the real take-off starts c. 1955, accelerating dramatically through
the I96os. On Vargas' fiscal prudence see also Dulles, Vargas, pp. 88, 246, 297, 306-7,
3Io: a story which starts with Vargas 'entering office with the conservative financial
ideas of one who had studied budgets and been Washington Luis's Finance Minister'
and ends with the deflationary measures of 9 5 2 which, Vargas boasted, 'freed [Brazil]
from the chronic evil of continuous deficits'.
87 Lewis, Crisis of Argentine Capitalism, ch's 9, o; Gary W. Wynia, Argentina in the Postwar
Era (Albuquerque, 1978), pp. 68-73.
88 Average annual inflation for the (boom) years 1945-5 0 was 20 %. Thereafter, pressured
by the IMF, Peronist policy was deflationary: I950-2 saw wage cuts, very modest
increases in public expenditure, and a switch from non-economic to economic public
investment (Per6n now 'spent the public revenues more intelligently', a critic
concedes). Indeed, the 'conventional wisdom' that Per6n 'wrecked the economy by
forcing or allowing a marked increase in wages, pensions, and welfare services at the
expense of capital accumulation and investment' is, the same critic points out, largely
mistaken: H. S. Ferns, The Argentine Republic (Newton Abbot, i973), pp. 150, i6o.
89 Collier and Collier, Shaping the Political Arena, pp. 47I-3; Stein, Populism in Peru,
pp. 212-5; Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 107;
Rosemary Thorp and Geoffrey Bertram, Peru 89o-Ig77. Growth and Policy in an Open
Economy (London, 1978), pp. 201, 257.
are all populists now'90 that governments around the world indulge in
such stop-go policies. Economic populism, in Dornbusch and Edwards'
analysis, is an extreme form of stop-go; but it does not appear to be a
monopoly of populist governments (politically defined), thus it does not
deserve to lay particular claim - rather late in the day, and on the basis of
an economically reductionist premise - to the 'populist' label. It seems
even more misleading - and again reductionist - to equate populism with
generic packages which combine Keynesian policies of macro-economic
fine-tuning with measures to reform and regulate labour relations; for this
would give us a swathe of post-war European populisms, stretching from
Britain to Austria, France to Sweden.91
The importance of theories and concepts may often reside less in their
inherent analytical power than in their appeal to conjunctural fashion. The
old dictum -'nothing has the force of an idea whose time has come' -
may have some truth in it; but both force and timing may have little to
do with intellectual cogency. So, too, with Dornbusch and Edwards'
notion of'economic populism' which, in my view, carries some heavy
normative baggage, bolstering the idea that populism is a Bad Thing. For
the notion of 'economic populism' implies a defence of Gladstonian
financial rectitude; it tends to tar redistributionist policies with the ugly
brush of 'populism'; and it implies that populism is probably dead -
killed off not by the inexorable decline of ISI, but by the painful learning
process of recent 'populist' administrations. Populism is dead because
governments and electorate have seen the folly of their populist ways.
But is this not another premature demise? In conclusion, I will question
the 'economic populism' thesis and - recalling that 'classically' populist
governments were not necessarily financial profligates - suggest scenarios
which readmit populism to the contemporary political agenda, even under
a neo-liberal dispensation.92 In doing so, I retain the distinction between
90 Cammack, 'What Populism Was', p. 2; Canovan, Populism, pp. I48, 150, z6off.
91 Gibson, 'The Populist Road to Market Reform', p. 358, refers to 'decades-long
populist commitments to maintain employment and wage levels and to use state power
to bolster labour's bargaining position in the labour market and political arena': a
notion of 'populism' which, from a British perspective, would make Edward Heath
much more of a populist than Margaret Thatcher (compare my pairing above). It could
be objected, of course, that what goes for Europe does not go for Latin America:
'commitments to maintain employment and wage levels' are sound Keynesian policies
in Europe (at least, they were for a generation), but irresponsible economic 'populism'
in Latin America. This seems a dangerously partial argument; similarly partial
arguments have been made concerning representative democracy.
92 Kurt Weyland, 'Neo-populism and Neo-liberalism in Latin America: Unexpected
Affinities', paper presented at the panel on 'Neopopulism and Neoliberalism in Latin
America', nineteenth annual meeting of the American Political Science Association,
New York, September I994, was (to my knowledge) one of the first to question the
supposed 'basic divergence between populism and economic liberalism' and to note
story has now been much rehearsed. Salinas accelerated and deepened De
la Madrid's neoliberal economic project. The state sector was shrunk;
subsidies were slashed; Mexico cut tariffs and entered NAFTA; the ejido
- for years the victim of malign neglect -was offered the option of
euthanasia. 'Populism' became a dirty word, a criticism - implicit or
explicit - of Cardenismo and neo-Cardenismo.95 Yet Salinas - like other
neoliberal presidents - had his populist side. Like Menem, he broke with
the traditions of a nationalist, 'populist' party; but, like Menem (and
Fujimori), he elevated the power of the executive, rode roughshod over
political and economic vested interests, and adopted an arbitrary,
personalist and populist style of government.96 Fujimori staged his own
' unexpected affinities'; the latter have been further explored by Roberts, 'Neoliberalism
and the transformation of populism'; Kay, '"Fuji-populism"'; Catherine M.
Conaghan, James M. Malloy and Luis A. Abugattas, 'Business and the "Boys": The
Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes', Latin American Research Review (25/2),
I990, pp. 3-30.
93 This argument is reinforced by considerations of, say, contemporary Russian, Eastern
European, and United States populism, since in each case the economic correlates of
populist - including nationalist, xenophobic and 'fundamentalist' - attitudes are
hugely divergent. Populism may sometimes have an economic rationale - e.g., the free
silver movement of the I89os in the US - but, equally, it may not; an indeterminacy
which is the logical consequence of a broad 'politico-stylistic' definition.
94 Cammack, 'What Was Populism', p. 6.
95 Rolando Cordera, 'Solidaridad y su problematica', in Solidaridad a debate (Mexico,
1991), p. 142.
96 Guillermo O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa? Una entrevista a Guillermo
O'Donnell por Jorge Heine', LASA Forum, 23/2 (summer 1992), pp. 7-9, and
O'Donnell, 'Delegative Democracy?', Kellogg Institute Working Paper no. 172
(1992). Compare Conniff, 'The National Elite', p. 41, on the populist tendency to
'vault ahead in politics without following the usual paths ... ignoring the rules of the
game'; or Seymour Martin Lipset, Political lan (London, I963), on the 'dangers to
"due process" inherent in populist ideology' (dangers which, of course, will be
differently perceived by those for whom 'due process' remains a legal fiction; as a
Peronist worker responded to a (middle-class) questioner in I945: 'freedom of speech
is to do with you people. We have never had it': James, Resistance and Integration, p. 17).
On the 'democratic deficit' of Menem's Argentina - which, the author points out, is
common to many Latin American democracies - see Atilio A. Bor6n, 'El experimento
neoliberal de Carlos Saul Menem', in Bor6n et al., Peronismoy menemismo. Avatares del
populismo en la Argentina (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. I7ff.
97 Jesds Velasco, 'Selling Ideas, Buying Influence: Mexico and American Think Tanks in
the Promotion of NAFTA', in Rodolfo 0. de la Garza and Jests Velasco, Bridging the
Border. Transforming Mexico-U.S. Relations (Lanham, i997), pp. 125-48 (especially
pp. 34-9) is a revealing analysis of orchestrated research-cum-lobbying.
98 Juan Molinar Horcasitas and Jeffrey A. Welcon, 'Electoral Determinants and
Consequences of National Solidarity', in Wayne A. Cornelius, Ann L. Craig and
Jonathan Fox, (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations in Mexico (San Diego, Center
for US-Mexican Studies, 1994), pp. 123-42.
99 Alan Knight, 'Solidarity: Historical Continuities and Contemporary Implications', in
Cornelius, Craig and Fox, (eds.), Transforming State-Society Relations, pp. 29-46.
100 Roberts, 'Neoliberalism and the transformation of populism', p. 104.
101 The 1988 election was highly contentious; probably Salinas won; but his formal
' victory' did not confer an unqualified legitimacy. In 1994, in contrast, levels of fraud
were certainly lower; hence Zedillo's victory was less disputed, more legitimate. It
does not appear to have helped him much.
102 Of course, politics and economics cannot be neatly separated. The Chiapas revolt -
a political problem which had deep economic roots - heightened the regime's
vulnerability to financial crisis. So did the political assassinations of 1994. However,
these political vicissitudes appeared to have been weathered by the autumn of I994,
hence the (PRIista) euphoria which surrounded Zedillo's inauguration in December.
The subsequent crash, it would seem, was an economic rather than political verdict.
103 Denise Dresser, Neopopulist Solutions to Neoliberal Problems: Mexico's National Solidarity
Program (San Diego, 1991).
104 At least in its centalised, presidential-populist form. Now decentralised and reduced
in scope, the programme has acquired a range of institutional personae, depending on
local (state) political alignments: see the perceptive analysis of Robert R. Kaufman
and Guillermo Trejo, 'Regionalism, Regime Transformation and PRONASOL: The
Politics of the National Solidarity Programme in Four Mexican States', Journal of Latin
American Studies, 29/3 (Oct. I997), pp. 717-46.
will show whether that tradition can also reconfigure itself within the
constraints of the neoliberal model.'05
As I mentioned at the outset, this article embodies arguments previously
deployed in a 1992 paper.106 Since both focus chiefly, though not solely,
on Mexico, and since Mexico's political rollercoaster has upset plenty of
political predictions (and reputations?) in the last two years, it is of
interest to compare then and now, thus to test, with benefit of hindsight,
the generalisations advanced in I992. Then I pointed to Salinas' successful
combination of neoliberalism and neo-populism: an example which, I
think, retains its significance despite Salinas' fall from grace. I did not get
too carried away: 'it is too early to say whether [Salinas'] popularity will
endure; it will no doubt depend on major imponderables - economic
performance, NAFTA, the presidential succession [sc. of I994]'.107 But I
concluded that a combination of neoliberalism and neo-populism was
possible and that, while it might result in a 'marriage fraught with
tension' - not least, tension between neoliberal fiscal restraint and
'populist' profligacy, this was a recurrent problem in modern polities
(witness Chirac) and it did not doom the experiment to inevitable failure.
Nor, as I have suggested, did Salinas' own debacle prove the inevitability
of failure; rather, it proved that Salinas, Aspe, and Serra Puche, heedless
of hubris, got their macroeconomic sums wrong. Salinas emerged a better
politico than tecnico.
Salinas' downfall does not therefore discredit neo-populism; it may
even nudge it forward. The PAN is now flirting with a more populist
style, seeking to capitalise on the PRI's perceived betrayal of'the people'.
(And we should recall that Christian-Democratic populism has chalked
up victories elsewhere in Latin America).'08 Elsewhere, too, in these
'times of unsettlement and dealignment', we see the phenomenon of
'delegative democracy' - of elected heads of the executive wielding
ample, arbitrary, even personalist power, cultivating a populist style, and
challenging supposedly anti-popular vested interests.109 In Peru, Fujimori
showed how rapidly traditional parties could be routed by a ('bait-and-
105 The potential of PANista populism may be inhibited by two factors: first, the lack of
material resources enjoyed by PANista state or municipal governments, especially in
times of austerity (a constraint now shared by regente Cardenas in Mexico City); and,
secondly, the reactionary, moralistic tone of some (conservative Catholic) PANistas
who, though they may appeal to a particular constituency, are unlikely to broaden the
party's regionally limited base. Banning mini-skirts for public employees does not
strike me as good populist politics.
106 Knight, 'El abrigo de Arturo Alessandri'.
107 Knight, 'El abrigo de Arturo Alessandri', p. 71.
108 Jean Grugel, 'Populism and the Political System in Chile - Ibanismo (I952-1958)',
Bulletin of Latin American Research, II/2 (May I992), p. 183.
109 O'Donnell, 'Hacia la democracia delegativa?' and 'Delegative Democracy?'