Jessie D.

Fuentevilla
Case No. 53

BELGICA VS OCHOA
710 SCRA 1 92013

FACTS: Before the Court are consolidated petitions taken under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court, all of which assail the constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.

The so-called pork barrel system has been around in the Philippines since about
1922. Pork Barrel is commonly known as the lump-sum, discretionary funds of the members
of the Congress. It underwent several legal designations from “Congressional Pork Barrel,”
Countrywide Development Fund, to the latest “Priority Development Assistance Fund”
or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is integrated in the annual General
Appropriations Act (GAA).

The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby certain

cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their department provided
that the request for realignment is approved or concurred by the legislator concerned.

Presidential Pork Barrel: The president does have his own source of fund although not
included in the GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the  Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project, which has been around since
1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from the earnings of PAGCOR
which has been around since about 1983.

The pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of corruption. In July 2013, six
whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed that for the last decade, the corruption in
the pork barrel system had been facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been
helping lawmakers in funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGO’s (non-
government organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to “ghost” projects. An audit was then
conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results thereof concurred with the exposes
of Luy et al.

Motivated by the results COA findings, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
petitions before the Supreme Court questioning the constitutionality of the pork barrel
system.

ISSUES: 

I. Whether or not the congressional pork barrel system is constitutional.

II. Whether or not presidential pork barrel system is constitutional.

HELD: 

I. No, the congressional pork barrel system is unconstitutional. It is unconstitutional because

it violates the following principles:

a. Separation of Powers: As a rule, the budgeting power lies in Congress. It regulates the
release of funds. The executive, on the other hand, implements the laws, including the GAA
to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive may implement the law but under the
pork barrel system, what’s happening was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the
legislators themselves dictate as to which projects their PDAF funds should be allocated to –
a clear act of implementing the law they enacted, a violation of the principle of separation of
powers. In the older case of PHILCONSA vs Enriquez, it was ruled that pork barrel, then
called as CDF or the Countrywide Development Fund, was constitutional insofar as the
legislators only recommend where their pork barrel funds go.

This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive will still
have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.

b. Non-delegability of Legislative Power: As a rule, the Constitution vests legislative power in

Congress alone. Legislative power cannot be delegated by Congress for it cannot delegate
further that which was delegated to it by the Constitution.

Exceptions to the rule are:

(i) delegated legislative power to local government units but this shall involve purely
local matters;

(ii) authority of the President to, by law, exercise powers necessary and proper to
carry out a declared national policy in times of war or other national emergency, or fix within
specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as Congress may impose,
tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.

In this case, the PDAF articles which allow the individual legislator to identify the
projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on non-delegability
of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely lodged in Congress (in the two
houses comprising it) collectively and not lodged in the individual members. Further,
nowhere in the exceptions does it state that the Congress can delegate the power to the
individual member of Congress.

c. Principle of Checks and Balances: One feature in the principle of checks and balances is
the power of the president to veto items in the GAA which he may deem to be inappropriate.
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once the GAA is
approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he will appropriate his PDAF.
Under such system, how can the president veto the appropriation made by the legislator if
the appropriation is made after the approval of the GAA. Congress cannot choose a mode of
budgeting which effectively renders the constitutionally-given power of the President
useless.”

d. Local Autonomy: As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can develop their own
programs and policies concerning their localities. But with the PDAF, particularly on the part
of the members of the House of Representatives, what’s happening is that a congressman
can either bypass or duplicate a project by the LDC and later on claim it as his own. This is
an instance where the national government meddles with the affairs of the local government.
This is contrary to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. It’s good
if that’s all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF becomes
more of a personal fund on the part of legislators.

II. Yes, the presidential pork barrel is valid.

The main issue raised by Belgica et al against the presidential pork barrel is that it is
unconstitutional because it violates Section 29 (1), Article VI of the Constitution which
provides that money paid out of the Treasury must be in appropriation made by law.

Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings of the
Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a particular legislation.

The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the Malampaya
Fund, as well as PD 1869 (as amended by PD 1993), which amended PAGCOR’s charter,
provided for the appropriation, to wit:

(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected from certain
energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the Malampaya Fund) which shall
be used to further finance energy resource development and for other purposes which the
President may direct;

(ii) PD 1869, as amended: Section 12 thereof provides that a part of PAGCOR’s earnings
shall be allocated to a General Fund (the Presidential Social Fund) which shall be used in
government infrastructure projects.

These are sufficient laws which met the requirement of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution. The appropriation contemplated therein does not have to be a particular
appropriation as it can be a general appropriation as in the case of PD 910 and PD 1869.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. In view of the constitutional

violations discussed in this Decision, the Court hereby declares as UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
(a) the entire 2013 PDAF Article; (b) all legal provisions of past and present Congressional
 Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF Articles and the various
Congressional Insertions, which authorize/d legislators to intervene, assume or participate in
any of the various post-enactment stages of the budget execution (c) all legal provisions of
past and present Congressional Pork Barrel Laws, such as the previous PDAF and CDF
Articles and the various Congressional Insertions, which confer/red personal, lump-sum
allocations to legislators from which they are able to fund specific projects which they
themselves determine; (d) all informal practices of similar import and effect, which the Court
similarly deems to be acts of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction; and (e) the phrases (1) "and for such other purposes as may be hereafter
directed by the President" under Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 and (2) "to
finance the priority infrastructure development projects" under Section 12 of Presidential
Decree No. 1869, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1993, for both failing the
sufficient standard test in violation of the principle of non-delegability of legislative power.

Accordingly, the Court‘s temporary injunction dated September 10, 2013 is hereby
declared to be PERMANENT.

Finally, the Court hereby DIRECTS all prosecutorial organs of the government to,
within the bounds of reasonable dispatch, investigate and accordingly prosecute all
government officials and/or private individuals for possible criminal offenses related to the
irregular, improper and/or unlawful disbursement/utilization of all funds under the Pork Barrel
System.