Procter and Gamble Philippines Manufacturing Corp. vs. Municipality of Jagna G. R. No.

L-24265 the oil content of the copra when ignited is difficult to put under control by water and the use of chemicals
28 December 1979 is necessary to put out the fire, the same is under Section 2238 of the Administrative Code.

FACTS: Petitioner Procter and Gamble Philippines Manufacturing Corp. is a consolidated corporation of Plaintiff's averment that the Ordinance, even if presumed valid, is inapplicable to it because it is not
Procter and Gamble Trading Company engaged in the manufacture of soap, edible oil, margarine and other engaged in the business or occupation of buying or selling of copra but is only storing copra in connection
similar products. Petitioner maintains a “bodega” in the municipality of Jagna, where it stores copra with its main business of manufacturing soap and other similar products, and that to be compelled to pay
purchased in the municipality and ships the same for its manufacturing and other operations. In 1954, the the storage fees would amount to double taxation, does not inspire assent. The question of whether
Municipal Council of Jagna enacted Ordinance 4, imposing storage fees of all exportable copra deposited in appellant is engaged in that business or not is irrelevant because the storage fee, as previously mentioned,
the bodega within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Jagna, Bohol. From 1958 to 1963, the company paid is an imposition on the privilege of storing copra in a bodega within defendant municipality by persons,
the municipality, allegedly under protest, storage fees. In 1964, it filed suit, wherein it prayed that the firms or corporations. Section 1 of the Ordinance in question does not state that said persons, firms or
Ordinance be declared inapplicable to it, and if not, that it be declared ultra vires and void. corporations should be engaged in the business or occupation of buying or selling copra. Moreover, by
plaintiff's own admission that it is a consolidated corporation with its trading company, it will be hard to
ISSUE: Whether the Ordinance is void, as it amounts to double taxation. segregate the copra it uses for trading from that it utilizes for manufacturing.

Thus, it can be said that plaintiff's payment of storage fees imposed by the Ordinance in question does not
RULING: The validity of the Ordinance must be upheld pursuant to the broad authority conferred upon
amount to double taxation. For double taxation to exist, the same property must be taxed twice, when it
municipalities by Commonwealth Act 472 (promulgated 1939), which was the prevailing law when the
should be taxed but once. Double taxation has also been defined as taxing the same person twice by the
Ordinance is actually a municipal license tax or fee on persons, firms and corporations exercising the
same jurisdiction for the same thing. Surely, a tax on plaintiff's products is different from a tax on the
privilege of storing copra within the municipality’s territorial jurisdiction. Such fees imposed do not amount
privilege of storing copra in a bodega situated within the territorial boundary of defendant municipality.
to double taxation. For double taxation to exist, the same property must be taxed twice, when it should be
taxed but once. A tax on the company’s products is different from the tax on the privilege of storing copra in Procter and Gamble vs. Jagna GR L-24265, 28 December 1979
a bodega situated within the territorial boundary of the municipality.
First Division, Melencio Herrera (J): 8 concur
PROCTER & GAMBLE PHL. MANUFACTURING CORPORATION vs. THE MUNICIPALITY OF JAGNA,
PROVINCE OF BOHOL. G.R. No. L-24265 28 December 1979 Facts: Procter and Gamble Philippines Manufacturing Corp. is a consolidated corporation of Procter and
Gamble Trading Company. It is engaged in the manufacture of soap, edible oil, margarine and other similar
FACTS: The CFI of Manila upheld the validity of Ordinance No. 4, Series of 1957, which imposed “storage products; and maintains a “bodega” in the municipality of Jagna, where it stores copra purchased in the
fees on all exportable copra deposited in the bodega of the Municipality of Jagna.” Plaintiff-appellant is municipality and therefrom ships the same for its manufacturing and other operations. In 1954, the
engaged in the manufacture of soap, edible oil, margarine and other similar products, and for this purpose, Municipal Council enacted Ordinance 4, imposing storage fees of all exportable copra deposite in the
maintains a bodega in Jagna where it stores copra purchased in the Municipality. It further claims that bodega within the jurisdiction of the municipality of Jagna, Bohol. From 1958 to 1963, the company paid the
Ordinance No. 4 is ultra-vires and void for being beyond the power of the Municipality to enact and that it municipality, allegedly under protest, storage fees. In 1964, it filed suit, wherein it prayed that the
be allowed to refund to it the amount of Php42,265.13 it paid in protest.  Moreover, it claims that subject Ordinance be declared inapplicable to it, and if not, that it be declared ultra vires and void.
Ordinance is inapplicable to it as it is not engaged in the business or trade of storing copra for others for
compensation or profit. Issue: Whether the Ordinance i s void, as it amounts to double taxation

ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of Jagna was authorised to impose and collect the storage fee provided for Held: The validity of the Ordinance must be upheld pursuant to the broad authority conferred upon
in the challenged Ordinance. municipalites by Commonwealth Act 472 (promulgated 1939), which was the prevailing law when the
Ordinance is actually a municipal license tax or fee on persons, firms and corporations exercising the
RULING: privilege of storing copra within the municipality’s territorial jurisdiction. Such fees imposed do not amount
to double taxation. For double taxation to exist, the same property must be taxed twice, when it should be
YES. The validity of the ordinance must be upheld pursuant to the broad authority conferred upon
taxed but once. A tax on the company’s producs is different from the tax on the privilege of storing copra in
municipalities by CA No. 472, Section 1. Under the foregoing provision, a municipality is authorised to
a bodega situated within the territorial boundary of the municipality.
impose (1) a license for regulation of useful occupation; (2) a license for restriction or regulation of non-
useful occupation or enterprises; and (3) license for revenue. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Company of the Phils, Inc v Tanauan GR No. L-31156, February 27, 1976

The storage fee imposed under the question Ordinance is actually a municipal license tax or fee on persons, FACTS: Pepsi Cola Bottling Company commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the Court
firms and corporations, like plaintiff, exercising the privilege of storing copra in a bodega within the of First Instance of Leyte for the court to declare Section 2 of RA 2264 (Local Autonomy Act)
Municipality's territorial jurisdiction. For it has been held that a warehouse used for keeping or storing unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos 23 and 27
copra is an establishment likely to endanger the public safety or likely to give rise to conflagration because of municipality of Tanauan, Leyte. Municipal Ordinance No. 23 (9/25/1962) levies and collects from
softdrinks producers and manufacturers a tax of 1/16 of a centavo for every bottle of softdrink corked.
Municipal ordinance no. 27 (10/28/1962) levies and collects on softdrinks produced or manufactured HELD: No. On the issue of undue delegation of taxing power, it is settled that the power of taxation is an
within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of 1 centavo on each gallon of volume capacity. essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter of right to every independent
The taxes imposed are denominated as “municipal production tax”. CFI-Leyte dismissed the complaint. government, without being expressly conferred by the people.  It is a power that is purely legislative and
Hence, this petition. which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or judicial department of the
government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The exception, however, lies in the
ISSUES: case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply. Legislative powers may be delegated
to local governments in respect of matters of local concern. By necessary implication, the legislative power
 Is Section 2 of RA 2264 an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and oppressive? to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on
 Do ordinances nos. 23 and 27 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes? such local governmental agencies the power to tax.
 Are ordinance nos. 23 and 27 unjust and unfair?

RULING:    Also, there is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on
the theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and
 No. Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the autonomous authority to
enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has
create their own sources of exclusively reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not
revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI provides: “Each local government unit shall have
forbidden by our fundamental law, so that double taxation becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is
the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to such limitations as may be taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity or by the same jurisdiction for the same
provided by law.” Thus, legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of
purpose, but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by the city or municipality.
matters of local concern.    On the last issue raised, the ordinances do not partake of the nature of a percentage tax on sales, or other
 No. The intention of the Municipal Council of Tanauan in enacting Ordinance No. 27 is thus clear: it taxes in any form based thereon. The tax is levied on the produce (whether sold or not) and not on the sales.
was intended as a plain substitute for the prior ordinance no. 23 and operates as a repeal of the The volume capacity of the taxpayer's production of soft drinks is considered solely for purposes of
latter, even without words to that effect. The tax is not a percentage tax as the volume capacity of determining the tax rate on the products, but there is not set ratio between the volume of sales and the
the taxpayer’s production of softdrinks is considered solely for purposes of determining the tax amount of the tax.
rate on the products but there is no set ratio between volume of sales and amount of the tax. Nor
can the tax levied be treated as a specific tax. Softdrink is not one of those specified articles. PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF
 No. Municipal corporations are allowed much discretion in determining the rates of imposable TANAUAN, LEYTE, THE MUNICIPAL MAYOR, ET AL., defendant appellees. G.R. No. L-31156, EN BANC,
taxes. This is in line with the constitutional policy of according the widest possible autonomy to February 27, 1976, MARTIN, J.
local governments in matters of local taxation, an aspect that is given expression in the Local Tax
Code.  There is no validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the
theory of double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING CO. OF THE PHILS., INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN enumerates the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has
69 SCRA 460. GR No. L-31156, February 27, 1976 exclusively reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not
forbidden by our fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double
"Legislative power to create political corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the taxation found in the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union. Double taxation
power to confer on such local governmental agencies the power to tax. becomes obnoxious only where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity
FACTS: Plaintiff-appellant Pepsi-Cola commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction to declare or by the same jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State
and the other by the city or municipality. FACTS: On February 14, 1963, the plaintiff-appellant, Pepsi-Cola
Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an
undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 denominated as Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., commenced a complaint with preliminary injunction before the
Court of First Instance of Leyte for that court to declare Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264, otherwise
"municipal production tax" of the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void. Ordinance 23 levies and
collects from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tax of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo for every known as the Local Autonomy Act, unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing authority as well as to
declare Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27, series of 1962, of the municipality of Tanauan, Leyte, null and void. On
bottle of soft drink corked, and Ordinance 27 levies and collects on soft drinks produced or manufactured
within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each gallon (128 July 23, 1963, the parties entered into a Stipulation of Facts, the material portions of which state that, first,
both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 embrace or cover the same subject matter and the production tax rates
fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity. Aside from the undue delegation of authority, appellant contends that
it allows double taxation, and that the subject ordinances are void for they impose percentage or specific imposed therein are practically the same, and second, that on January 17, 1963, the acting Municipal
Treasurer of Tanauan, Leyte, as per his letter addressed to the Manager of the Pepsi-Cola Bottling Plant in
tax.
said municipality, sought to enforce compliance by the latter of the provisions of said Ordinance No. 27,
ISSUE: Are the contentions of the appellant tenable? series of 1962. Municipal Ordinance No. 23, of Tanauan, Leyte, which was approved on September 25, 1962,
levies and collects "from soft drinks producers and manufacturers a tai of one-sixteenth (1/16) of a centavo
for every bottle of soft drink corked." For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, firm, reserved the same for its own prerogative. Moreover, double taxation, in general, is not forbidden by our
company or corporation producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal Treasurer a monthly report, of fundamental law, since We have not adopted as part thereof the injunction against double taxation found in
the total number of bottles produced and corked during the month. On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance the Constitution of the United States and some states of the Union. Double taxation becomes obnoxious only
No. 27, which was approved on October 28, 1962, levies and collects "on soft drinks produced or where the taxpayer is taxed twice for the benefit of the same governmental entity or by the same
manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of this municipality a tax of ONE CENTAVO (P0.01) on each jurisdiction for the same purpose, but not in a case where one tax is imposed by the State and the other by
gallon (128 fluid ounces, U.S.) of volume capacity." For the purpose of computing the taxes due, the person, the city or municipality.
fun company, partnership, corporation or plant producing soft drinks shall submit to the Municipal
Treasurer a monthly report of the total number of gallons produced or manufactured during the month. The
tax imposed in both Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 is denominated as "municipal production tax.'

ISSUE: Whether Section 2 of Republic Act No. 2264 is an undue delegation of power, confiscatory and
oppressive. (NO)

RULING: The power of taxation is an essential and inherent attribute of sovereignty, belonging as a matter
of right to every independent government, without being expressly conferred by the people. It is a power
that is purely legislative and which the central legislative body cannot delegate either to the executive or
judicial department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. The
exception, however, lies in the case of municipal corporations, to which, said theory does not apply.
Legislative powers may be delegated to local governments in respect of matters of local concern. This is
sanctioned by immemorial practice. By necessary implication, the legislative power to create political
corporations for purposes of local self-government carries with it the power to confer on such local
governmental agencies the power to tax. Under the New Constitution, local governments are granted the
autonomous authority to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes. Section 5, Article XI
provides: "Each local government unit shall have the power to create its sources of revenue and to levy
taxes, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law." Withal, it cannot be said that Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2264 emanated from beyond the sphere of the legislative power to enact and vest in local
governments the power of local taxation. The plenary nature of the taxing power thus delegated, contrary
to plaintiff-appellant's pretense, would not suffice to invalidate the said law as confiscatory and oppressive.
In delegating the authority, the State is not limited 6 the exact measure of that which is exercised by itself.
When it is said that the taxing power may be delegated to municipalities and the like, it is meant that there
may be delegated such measure of power to impose and collect taxes as the legislature may deem
expedient. Thus, municipalities may be permitted to tax subjects which for reasons of public policy the State
has not deemed wise to tax for more general purposes. This is not to say though that the constitutional
injunction against deprivation of property without due process of law may be passed over under the guise
of the taxing power, except when the taking of the property is in the lawful exercise of the taxing power, as
when (1) the tax is for a public purpose; (2) the rule on uniformity of taxation is observed; (3) either the
person or property taxed is within the jurisdiction of the government levying the tax; and (4) in the
assessment and collection of certain kinds of taxes notice and opportunity for hearing are provided. Due
process is usually violated where the tax imposed is for a private as distinguished from a public purpose; a
tax is imposed on property outside the State, i.e., extraterritorial taxation; and arbitrary or oppressive
methods are used in assessing and collecting taxes. But, a tax does not violate the due process clause, as
applied to a particular taxpayer, although the purpose of the tax will result in an injury rather than a benefit
to such taxpayer. Due process does not require that the property subject to the tax or the amount of tax to
be raised should be determined by judicial inquiry, and a notice and hearing as to the amount of the tax and
the manner in which it shall be apportioned are generally not necessary to due process of law. There is no
validity to the assertion that the delegated authority can be declared unconstitutional on the theory of
double taxation. It must be observed that the delegating authority specifies the limitations and enumerates
the taxes over which local taxation may not be exercised. The reason is that the State has exclusively
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHIILIPPINES, INC. vs. MUNICIPALITY OF TANAUAN ISSUE:
G.R. No. L-31156 February 27, 1976 Whether or not the tax imposed by the ordinance falls within any of the exception provided in Section 2 of
the Local Autonomy Act, thus imposing a double taxation
FACTS: In February 1963, plaintiff commenced a complaint seeking to declare Section 2 of R.A. 2264 (Local
Autonomy Act) unconstitutional as an undue delegation of taxing power and to declare Ordinance Nos. 23 HELD:
and 27 issued by the Municipality of Tanauan, Leyte as null and void. It is necessary to determine the true nature of the tax. The appellees strongly maintain that it is a “property
tax” or “real estate tax,” and not a “tax on  persons engaged in any occupation or business or exercising
Municipal Ordinance No. 23 levies and collects from soft drinks producers and manufacturers one-sixteenth privileges,” or a license tax, or a privilege tax, or an excise tax. The tax in question is not a real estate tax. A
(1/16) of a centavo for every bottle of soft drink corked. On the other hand, Municipal Ordinance No. 27 real estate tax is a direct tax on the ownership of lands and buildings or other improvements thereon and is
levies and collects on soft drinks produced or manufactured within the territorial jurisdiction of the payable regardless of whether the property is used or not. The tax is usually single or indivisible, although
municipality a tax of one centavo (P0.01) on each gallon of volume capacity. The tax imposed in both the land and building or improvements erected thereon are assessed separately, except when the land and
Ordinances Nos. 23 and 27 is denominated as "municipal production tax.” building or improvements belong to separate owners. It is a fixed proportion of the assessed value of the
property taxed, and requires, therefore, the intervention of assessors. It is collected or payable at appointed
ISSUES: times, and it constitutes a superior lien on and is enforceable against the property subject to such taxation,
and not by imprisonment of the owner. The tax imposed by the ordinance in question does not possess the
1. Is Section 2 of R.A. 2264 an undue delegation of the power of taxation? aforestated attributes. Clearly, therefore, the tax in question is not a real estate tax. “The spirit, rather than
the letter, or an ordinance determines the construction thereof, and the court looks less to its words and
2. Do Ordinance Nos. 23 and 24 constitute double taxation and impose percentage or specific taxes? more to the context, subject-matter, consequence, and effect. Accordingly, what is within the spirit is within
the ordinance although it is not within the letter thereof, while that which is in the letter, although not
RULING: within the spirit, is not within the ordinance.” It is within neither the letter nor the spirit of the ordinance
that an additional real estate tax is being imposed, otherwise, the subject-matter would have been not
1. NO. The power of taxation is purely legislative and cannot be delegated to the executive or judicial merely tenement houses. It is plain from the context of the ordinance that the intention is to impose a
department of the government without infringing upon the theory of separation of powers. But as an license tax on the operation of tenement houses, which is a form of business or calling. Thus, there is no
exception, the theory does not apply to municipal corporations. Legislative powers may be delegated to double taxation.
local governments in respect of matters of local concern.
Villanueva v City v Iloilo
GR No L-26521, December 28, 1968
2. NO. The Municipality of Tanauan discovered that manufacturers could increase the volume contents of
each bottle and still pay the same tax rate since tax is imposed on every bottle corked. To combat this FACTS: On September 30, 1946, the Municipal Board of Iloilo City enacted Ordinance 86 imposing license
scheme, Municipal Ordinance No. 27 was enacted. As such, it was a repeal of Municipal Ordinance No. 23. In tax fees upon tenement houses. The validity of such ordinance was challenged by Eusebio and Remedios
the stipulation of facts, the parties admitted that the Municipal Treasurer was enforcing Municipal Villanueva, owners of four tenement houses containing 34 apartments. The Supreme Court held the
Ordinance No. 27 only. Hence, there was no case of double taxation. ordinance to be ultra views. On January 15, 1960, however, the municipal board, believing that it acquired
authority to enact an ordinance of the same nature pursuant to the Local Autonomy Act, enacted Ordinance
Villanueva v. City of Iloilo
11, Eusebio and Remedios Villanueva assailed the ordinance anew.
G.R. No. L-26521 December 28, 1968
ISSUE: Does Ordinance 11 violate the rule of uniformity of taxation?
FACTS: On September 30, 1946 the municipal board of Iloilo City enacted Ordinance 86, imposing license
tax fees as follows: (1) tenement house (casa de vecindad), P25.00 annually; (2) tenement house, partly or
RULING: No. The Court has ruled the tenement houses constitute a distinct class of property and that taxes
wholly engaged in or dedicated to business in the streets of J.M. Basa, Iznart and Aldeguer, P24.00 per
are uniform and equal when imposed upon all property of the same class or character within the taxing
apartment; (3) tenement house, partly or wholly engaged in business in any other streets, P12.00 per
authority.
apartment. The validity and constitutionality of this ordinance were challenged by the spouses Eusebio
Villanueva and Remedies Sian Villanueva, owners of four tenement houses containing 34 apartments. On
January 15, 1960 the municipal board of Iloilo City, believing, obviously, that with the passage of Republic
The fact that the owners of the other classes of buildings in Iloilo are not imposed upon by the ordinance, or
Act 2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, it had acquired the authority or power to enact an
that tenement taxes are imposed in other cities do not violate the rule of equality and uniformity. The rule
ordinance similar to that previously declared by this Court as ultra vires, thus enacted an “Ordinance
does not require that taxes for the same purpose should be imposed in different territorial subdivisions at
Imposing Municipal License Tax on Persons Engaged in the Business of Operating Tenement-Houses”.
the same time. So long as the burden of tax falls equally and impartially on all owners or operators of
tenement houses similarly classified or situated, equality and uniformity is accomplished. The presumption
that tax statutes are intended to operate uniformly and equally was not overthrown therein. 
VILLANUEVA v. CITY OF ILOILO collected under Ordinance No. 3358 is a license fee for the privilege of engaging in the sale of liquor. On the
G.R. No. 26521 December 28, 1968 other hand, what the three ordinances mentioned heretofore impose is a tax for revenue purposes based on
the sales made of the same article or merchandise. It is already settled in this connection that both a license
FACTS: The municipal board of Iloilo City enacted Ordinance 86, imposing license tax fees as follows: 1) fee and a tax may be imposed on the same business or occupation, or for selling the same article, this not
tenement house, P25.00anually; 2) tenement house, partly or wholly engaged in or dedicated to business in being in violation of the rule against double taxation.
the streets of J.M. Basa, Iznart Aldequer, and P24.00 per apartment; 3) tenement house, partly or wholly
engaged in business in any other streets, P12.00 per apartment. The Province of Bulacan vs Court of Appeals
299 SCRA 442 [GR No. 126232 November 27, 1998]
The validity and constitutionality of this ordinance were challenged by the spouses Villanueva, owners of 4
Facts: On June 26, 1992, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan passed provincial ordinance no. 3 known as
tenement houses containing 34 apartments.
“Ordinance Enacting The Revenue Code Of The Bulacan Province” which was to take effect on July 1, 1992
Section 21 of the ordinance provides as follows:
ISSUE: Does Ordinance 11 violate the rules of uniformity of taxation?
Sec 21. Imposition of Tax – There is hereby levied and collected a tax of 10% of the fair market value in the
RULING: No. This court has ruled that tenement houses constitute a distinct class of property. It has locality per cubic meter of ordinary stores, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources, such but not limited
likewise ruled that taxes are uniform and equal when imposed upon all properties of the same class or to marble, granite, volcanic cinders, basalt, tuff and rock phosphate, extracted from public lands or from beds
character within the taxing authority.” The fact, therefore, that the owners of other classes of buildings in of seas, lakes, rivers, streams, creeks and other public waters within its territorial jurisdiction.
the City of Iloilo do not pay the taxes imposed by the ordinance in question is no argument at all against
uniformity and equality of the tax imposition. Pursuant thereto, the provincial treasurer of Bulacan in a letter dated November 11, 1992, assessed private
respondent Republic Cement Corporation Php2,524,692.13 for extracting lime stones, shale and silica from
COMPAÑIA GENERAL DE TABACOS DE FILIPINAS vs. several parcels of private land in the province during the third quarter of 1992 until the second quarter of
1993. Believing that the province, on the bases of the above-said ordinance, had no authority to impose
CITY OF MANILA, ET AL taxes on quarry resources extracted from private lands, Republic Cement formally contested the same on
December 23, 1993. The same was, however, denied by the provincial treasurer on January 17, 1994.
G.R. No. L-16619 June 29, 1963 Republic Cement, consequently filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bulacan on February 14, 1993. The province filed a motion to dismiss Republic Cement’s petition which was
FACTS: Petitioner filed an action in the CFI Manila to recover from City of Manila(City ) the sum of granted by the trial court on May 13, 1993, which ruled that declaratory relief was improper, allegedly
P15,280.00 allegedly overpaid by it as taxes on its wholesale and retail sales of liquor for the period from because a breach of the ordinance had been committed by Republic Cement.
the third quarter of 1954 to the second quarter of 1957, inclusive, under Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301, and
3816. Issue: Whether or not provincial ordinance no. 3 is valid to allow the petitioner to impose taxes on ordinary
stones, sand, gravel, earth, and other quarry resources.
Tabacalera's action for refund is based on the theory that, in connection with its liquor sales, it should pay
Held: No. On the basis of section 134 of Republic Act No. 7169, the local government code, ruled that a
the license fees but not the municipal sales taxes; and since it already paid the license fees aforesaid, the
province was empowered to impose taxes only on sand, gravel, and other quarry resources extracted from
sales taxes paid by it — amounting to the sum of P15, 208.00 — under the three ordinances is an
public lands, its authority to tax being limited to by said provision only to those taxes, fees and charges
overpayment made by mistake, and therefore refundable.
provided in article 1, chapter 2, title I of Book II of the local government code.
The City contends that for the permit issued to it Tabacalera is subject to pay the license fees prescribed by As correctly pointed out by petitioners, section 186 of the same code allows petitioners to levy taxes other
Ordinance No. 3358, aside from the sales taxes imposed by Ordinances Nos. 3634, 3301, and 3816. than those specifically enumerated under the code, subject to the conditions specified therein.

ISSUE: Whether or not the taxes imposed are valid The tax imposed by the province of Bulacan is an excise tax, being a tax upon the performance, carrying or
an excise of an activity. Under section 133 of the local government code, a province may not, therefore, levy
RULING: Ordinance No. 3358 is clearly one that prescribes municipal license fees for the privilege to engage excise taxes on articles already taxed by the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC).
in the business of selling liquor or alcoholic beverages. On the other hand, it is clear that Ordinances Nos.
3634, 3301, and 3816 impose taxes on the sales of general merchandise, wholesale or retail, and are The NIRC levies a tax on all quarry resources, regardless of origin, whether extracted from public or private
revenue measures enacted by the Municipal Board of Manila by virtue of its power to tax dealers for the land. Thus, a province may not ordinarily impose taxes on stones, sand,gravel, earth and other quarry
sale of such merchandise. resources, as the same are already taxed under NIRC. The province can, however, impose a tax on stones,
sand, gravel, earth and other quarry resources extracted from public lands because it is expressly
That Tabacalera is being subjected to double taxation is more apparent than real. As already stated what is empowered to do so under the local government code. As to stones, sand, gravel, earth and other quarry
resources extracted from private land, however it may not do so, because of the limitation provided by 4. Within the same taxing jurisdiction, which is the territory of City of Manila
section 133 of the code in relation to section 151 of the NIRC. 5. For the same taxing period, which is the same calendar year when both taxes were paid
6. For the same kind of character, which is a local business tax
Given the above disquisition, petitioners cannot claim that the appellate court unjustly deprived them of the
power to create their sources of revenue, their assessment of taxes against Republic Cement being ultra Considering these nature of taxes paid by the petitioner under both sections of the Code, the court held that
vires, traversing as it does the limitations set by the local government code. the petitioner is entitled to a tax refund for the tax it paid under Section 21.
Furthermore, section 21 of provincial ordinance no. 3 is practically only a reproduction of section 138 of the
local government code. A cursory reading of both could show that both refer to ordinary sand, gravel, stone,
earth and other quarry resources extracted from public lands. Even if we disregard the limitation set by
section 133 of the local government code, petitioners, may not impose taxes on stone, sand, gravel, earth
and other quarry resources extracted from private lands. Petitioners may not involve the regalian doctrine
to extend coverage of their ordinance to quarry resources extracted from private lands, for taxes, being
burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares, tax
statutes being construed strictissimi juris against the government.

Swedish Match Philippines, Inc. v. The Treasurer of City of Manila G.R. No. 181277, July 3, 2013

"What constitutes double taxation"

FACTS: This is a case filed by the petitioner for Refund of Taxes. In its letter to the City of Manila Treasurer,
the petitioner claimed double taxation when it paid business taxes under Sections 14 and 21 of Ordinance
No. 7794 which is the Manila Revenue Code. The respondent contends that both sections refer to two
distinct objects of tax, hence they are not the same in character and kind that will result in double taxation.
The RTC, CTA division and CTA en banc denied the petition for a tax refund filed by the petitioner.

ISSUE: Whether or not both sections of the Manila Revenue Code constitute double taxation

RULING: Yes, there is double taxation.

The ELEMENTS OF DOUBLE TAXATION ARE:

The taxes are imposed on

While the petitioner is liable for the payment of business taxes to the City of Manila, the fact that it already
paid under section 14 of the Manila Revenue Code, it is already precluded from paying the tax imposed
under section 21 of the same code.

As has been noted by the court, both sections are imposed for the following:
1. for the same subject matter,  which is for doing business in the City of Manila
2. for the same purpose, which his to contribute to the city revenues
3. By the same taxing authority, which is the City of Manila