Falcis vs. Civil Registrar
Falcis vs. Civil Registrar
Falcis vs. Civil Registrar
EN BANC
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Court does not have a monopoly in assuring this freedom. With
the most difficult political, moral, and cultural questions, the
Constitution requires that we share with the political departments of
government, especially with Congress, the quest for solutions which
balance interests while maintaining fealty to fundamental freedoms.
Judicial wisdom is, in large part, the art of discerning when courts
choose not to exercise their perceived competencies.
Given the factual context of this case, this Court declines, for now, to
grant the broad relief prayed for in the Petition.
Falcis further argues that his Petition complied with the requisites of
judicial review: (1) actual case or controversy; (2) standing; (3) was
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) that the constitutional
question is the very lis mota of the case.13 As to standing, he claims
that his standing consisted in his personal stake in the outcome of the
case, as he "is an open and self-identified homosexual"14 who alleges
that the Family Code has a "normative impact"15 on the status of
same-sex relationships in the country. He was also allegedly injured by
the supposed "prohibition against the right to marry the same-
sex[,]"16 which prevents his plans to settle down in the Philippines. 17
Finally, Falcis claims that Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code deny the
existence of "individuals belonging to religious denominations that
believe in same-sex marriage"27 and that they have a "right to found a
family in accordance with their religious convictions." 28 He claims that
the religious weddings conducted by these denominations have been
denied civil recognition "unlike the religious convictions of Catholics
and Muslims."29
On June 30, 2015, this Court ordered the Civil Registrar General to
comment on the Petition.30
Perito further points out that Falcis is estopped from questioning the
validity of the Family Code, it having been effective since 1987.35 He
also extensively cites the Christian Bible as authority for defending
Articles 1 and 2's limitation of marriage as between a man and a
woman.36
The Civil Registrar General, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam)40 on March 29, 2016. It prays that
this Court deny due course to or dismiss the Petition. It notes that the
Petition was not in the nature of a class suit, but was instead personal
only to Falcis.41 Because of this, it claims that Falcis failed to show
injury-in-fact and an actual case or controversy, but was rather
seeking an advisory opinion that this Court cannot issue. 42
The Civil Registrar General also faults Falcis for not impleading
Congress, as his Petition actually challenged the current legislative
policy on same-sex marriage, and not any act committed by the Civil
Registrar-General.43 Finally, it claims that Falcis has not proven that
the issues in this case are of such transcendental importance, there
being no law or facts contained in his Petition to determine any
principles concerning the constitutionality of same-sex marriage in the
Philippines.44
On April 7, 2016, LGBTS Christian Church, Inc. (LGBTS Church),
Reverend Crescencio "Ceejay" Agbayani, Jr. (Reverend Agbayani),
Marlon Felipe (Felipe), and Maria Arlyn "Sugar" Ibañez (Ibañez)—
collectively, petitioners-intervenors—whose counsel was Falcis himself,
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and Admit Attached Petition-in-
Intervention.45 They ask this Court to allow them to intervene in the
proceedings, claiming that: (1) they offer further procedural and
substantive arguments; (2) their rights will not be protected in a
separate proceeding; and (3) they have an interest in the outcome of
this case. They adopt by reference the arguments raised by Falcis in
his Petition.46
On August 10, 2016, Falcis filed a Motion to Set the Case for Oral
Arguments.58 He also filed a Reply59 to the Comment (Ad Cautelam),
again reiterating his procedural arguments.
On March 28, 2017, this Court granted the Motion for Leave to
Intervene and Admit Petition-in-Intervention and required the Civil
Registrar General and Perito to comment on the Petition-in-
Intervention.63
The Civil Registrar General filed its Comment (Ad Cautelam) on the
Petition-in-Intervention,64 which this Court noted in its August 8, 2017
Resolution.65 The Civil Registrar General claims that the issues raised
in the Petition are political questions, saying that marriage's legal
definition is a policy issue for Congress to determine, 66 and that any
amendment to the definition in Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code
should be addressed to Congress.67
Considering that petitioner Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III was attired with
a casual jacket, cropped jeans and loafers without socks, Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen directed him to show cause by June 6,
2018, why he should not be cited in direct contempt for his failure to
observe the required decorum during the preliminary conference which
is a formal session of the Court. Petitioner was likewise advised to
request a briefing from his former professors, or the law firm he is
going to retain, on the proper protocols to be observed inside the
Court, to facilitate an orderly and smooth proceeding during the oral
argument.71
Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under
Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall
not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Atty.
Falcis' appearance and behavior during the preliminary conference
reveal the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory
for Oral Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior
to the preliminary conference, it was inexcusably careless for any of
them to appear before this Court so barely prepared.
Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even uttering
a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with this Court. His bearing and
demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human rights
advocacy he purports to represent.74 (Citation omitted)
The Civil Registrar General filed its Supplemental Comment with Leave
of Court84 on June 14, 2018. Addressing the substantive issues of the
Petition, it claims that since the Constitution only contemplates
opposite-sex marriage in Article XV, Section 2 and other related
provisions, Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code are constitutional. 85
On July 25, 2018, both the Civil Registrar General 89 and intervenors-
oppositors90 filed their respective Memoranda, which were noted in this
Court's July 31, 2018 Resolution.91
On July 26, 2018, rather than file their memoranda, Falcis and
petitioners-intervenors, through counsels Atty. Angeles, Atty.
Guangko, and Atty. Christoper Ryan R. Maranan (Atty. Maranan) of
Molo Sia Dy Tuazon Ty and Coloma Law Offices, filed a Motion for
Extension of Time to File Memorandum.92 Without this Court's prior
favorable action on their Motion for Extension, they filed their
Memorandum93 on August 3, 2018.
In the same Resolution, Falcis, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty.
Maranan were all required96 to show cause why they should not be
cited in indirect contempt for failing to comply with this Court's June
26 2018 Order.97
On August 9, 2018, Atty. Angeles, Atty. Guangko, and Atty. Maranan
filed their Manifestation with Motion for Leave to Admit
Memorandum.98 They, along with Falcis, filed their Manifestation and
Compliance with the August 7, 2018 Resolution on August 13, 2018. 99
For this Court's resolution is the issue of whether or not the Petition
and/or the Petition-in-Intervention are properly the subject of the
exercise of our power of judicial review. Subsumed under this are the
following procedural issues:
First, whether or not the mere passage of the Family Code creates an
actual case or controversy reviewable by this Court;
First, whether or not the right to marry and the right to choose whom
to marry are cognates of the right to life and liberty;
Finally, whether or not the parties are entitled to the reliefs prayed for.
From its plain text, the Constitution does not define or restrict
marriage on the basis of sex,100 gender,101 sexual orientation,102 or
gender identity or expression.103
The more appropriate and more effective approach is, thus, holistic
rather than parochial: to consider context and the interplay of the
historical, the contemporary, and even the envisioned. Judicial
interpretation entails the convergence of social realities and social
ideals. The latter are meant to be effected by the legal apparatus,
chief of which is the bedrock of the prevailing legal order: the
Constitution. Indeed, the word in the vernacular that describes the
Constitution — saligan — demonstrates this imperative of
constitutional primacy.107
[T]he right to own land and pass it on to heirs meant that women's
childbearing abilities and male domination became more important.
Rather than kinship, marriage became the center of family life and
was increasingly based on a formal contractual relationship between
men, women, and their kinship groups. The property and gender
implications of marriage are evident in the exchange of gifts between
spouses and families and clearly defined rules about the rights and
responsibilities of each marital partner. During the Middle Ages,
economic factors influenced marital choices more than affection, even
among the poor, and women's sexuality was treated as a form of
property (Coltrane and Adams 2008:54). Wealth and power
inequalities meant that marriages among the elite and/or governing
classes were based largely on creating political alliances and producing
male children (Coontz 2005). Ensuring paternity became important in
the transfer of property to legitimate heirs, and the rights and
sexuality of women were circumscribed. Ideologies of male domination
prevailed, and women, especially those who were married to powerful
men, were typically treated like chattel and given very few
rights.109 (Emphasis supplied)
II
In a proper case, a good opportunity may arise for this Court to review
the scope of Congress' power to statutorily define the scope in which
constitutional provisions are effected. This is not that case. The
Petition before this Court does not present an actual case over which
we may properly exercise our power of judicial review.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
To be sure, courts here and abroad, have tried to lift the shroud on
political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of legal
minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political
question doctrine which rests on the principle of separation of powers
and on prudential considerations, continue to be refined in the mills of
constitutional law. In the United States, the most authoritative
guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out
by Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr, viz:
III
This Court does not issue advisory opinions.126 We do not act to satisfy
academic questions or dabble in thought experiments. We do not
decide hypothetical, feigned, or abstract disputes, or those collusively
arranged by parties without real adverse interests. 127 If this Court were
to do otherwise and jump headlong into ruling on every matter
brought before us, we may close off avenues for opportune, future
litigation. We may forestall proper adjudication for when there are
actual, concrete, adversarial positions, rather than mere conjectural
posturing:
Even the expanded jurisdiction of this Court under Article VIII, Section
1 does not provide license to provide advisory opinions. An advisory
opinion is one where the factual setting is conjectural or hypothetical.
In such cases, the conflict will not have sufficient concreteness or
adversariness so as to constrain the discretion of this Court. After all,
legal arguments from concretely lived facts are chosen narrowly by the
parties. Those who bring theoretical cases will have no such limits.
They can argue up to the level of absurdity. They will bind the future
parties who may have more motives to choose specific legal
arguments. In other words, for there to be a real conflict between the
parties, there must exist actual facts from which courts can properly
determine whether there has been a breach of constitutional
text.128 (Emphasis in the original, citation omitted)
IV
Lest the exercise of its power amount to a ruling on the wisdom of the
policy imposed by Congress on the subject matter of the law, the
judiciary does not arrogate unto itself the rule-making prerogative by
a swift determination that a rule ought not exist. There must be an
actual case, "a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and
enforced on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."133
IV (A)
IV (B)
There are instances when this Court exercised the power of judicial
review in cases involving newly-enacted laws.
....
"As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases, it
will not shirk, digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to
uphold the Constitution in matters that involve grave abuse of
discretion brought before it in appropriate cases, committed by any
officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government."
In the same vein, the Court also held in Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy:
". . . Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not there has
been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the
inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law.
Where the statute violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but
the duty of the judiciary to declare such act unconstitutional and void."
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously alleged to
have infringed the Constitution and the laws, as in the present case,
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of the
courts.142 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In Spouses Imbong, this Court found that there was an actual case or
controversy, despite the Petition being a facial challenge:
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the
subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.
IV (C)
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for instance mount
a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of a statute even if he
claims no violation of his own rights under the assailed statute where
it involves free speech on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the
statute. The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling
effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes violating free
speech. A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a
crime under an overbroad or vague law may simply restrain himself
from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a crime. The
overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence. 157 (Citations
omitted)
In [that] case, the Court rejected the argument of the Solicitor General
that there was no justiciable controversy that was ripe for
adjudication. . . . The Court ruled that "[w]hen an act of a branch of
government is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to
settle the dispute." Moreover, in the MOA-AD case, the Executive was
about to sign the initialed MOA-AD with the MILF in Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia in the presence of representatives of foreign states. Only the
prompt issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining order
stopped the signing, averting the implications that such signing would
have caused.
In the present case, however, the Court agrees with the Solicitor
General that there is no actual case or controversy requiring a full-
blown resolution of the principal issue presented by petitioners.
....
....
Even if there were today an existing bill on the Bangsamoro Basic Law,
it would still not be subject to judicial review. The Court held
in Montesclaros v. COMELEC that it has no power to declare a
proposed bill constitutional or unconstitutional because that would be
in the nature of rendering an advisory opinion on a proposed act of
Congress. The power of judicial review cannot be exercised in vacuo.
As the Court in Montesclaros noted, invoking Section 1, Article VIII of
the Constitution, there can be no justiciable controversy involving the
constitutionality of a proposed bill. The power of judicial review comes
into play only after the passage of a bill, and not before. Unless
enacted into law, any proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law pending in
Congress is not subject to judicial review.160 (Citations omitted)
....
V(A)
V(B)
Parties coming to court must show that the assailed act had a direct
adverse effect on them. In Lozano v. Nograles:173
VI
This Court exists by an act of the sovereign Filipino people who ratified
the Constitution that created it. Its composition at any point is not the
result of a popular election reposing its members with authority to
decide on matters of policy. This Court cannot make a final
pronouncement on the wisdom of policies. Judicial pronouncements
based on wrong premises may unwittingly aggravate oppressive
conditions.
VI (A)
VI (B)
It was not until the research of biologist Alfred Kinsey and other
scientists challenged the orthodoxy that homosexuality was delisted as
a mental disorder in the next iteration of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual:
In any event, the events of 1973 did not immediately end psychiatry's
pathologizing of some presentations of homosexuality. For in
'homosexuality's' place, the DSM-II contained a new diagnosis: Sexual
Orientation Disturbance (SOD). SOD regarded homosexuality as an
illness if an individual with same-sex attractions found them
distressing and wanted to change. The new diagnosis legitimized the
practice of sexual conversion therapies (and presumably justified
insurance reimbursement for those interventions as well), even if
homosexuality per se was no longer considered an illness. The new
diagnosis also allowed for the unlikely possibility that a person
unhappy about a heterosexual orientation could seek treatment to
become gay.
Social forces have likewise shaped the use of penal laws to further
discrimination and persecution of the LGBTQI+ community:
....
This is not to say that there is a universal experience for the LGBTQI+
community. To do so would be to "provide homogenized and distorted
views"220 of the community, "advancing the interest of more privileged
individuals."221 As first noted by American professor Kimberlé Williams
Crenshaw:
VI (C)
[F]rom the earliest encounters between the Spanish and the natives,
gender-crossing was already very much a reality in a number of
communities across the entire archipelago. Local men dressed up as—
and acting like—women were called, among others, bayoguin, bayok,
agi-ngin, asog, bido, and binabae. The Spanish thought them
remarkable not only because they effectively transitioned from male to
female, but also because as spiritual intermediaries or babaylan, they
were revered figures of authority in their respective communities. It's
important to remember that their taking on the customary clothes of
women—as well as their engagement in feminine work—was of a piece
with a bigger and more basic transformation, one that redefined their
gender almost completely as female. More than mere cross-
dressers, these "men" were gender-crossers, for they didn't
merely assume the form and behavior of women. Their culture
precisely granted them social and symbolic recognition as
binabae ("womanlike").226 (Emphasis supplied)
Aside from this fluidity in gender expression, it has also been observed
that "the local concept of matrimony was not imprisoned into male-
and-female only."229 According to various cronicas y relaciones,
the bayoguin, bayok, agi-ngin, asog, bido, and binabae, among others,
"were "married" to men, who became their maridos ("husbands"), with
whom they indulged in regular sexual congress."230
It was only during the arrival of the Spanish colonizers in the Philippine
islands that these activities previously engaged in by the asog,
bayoguin, and binabayi became suppressed:
The right of men to wed their fellow men was suppressed, and the
tradition of the asog wearing long skirts and feminine clothes
vanished. More than these, men were banned from having sexual
relations with fellow men for this ran contrary to the dominant religion
anointed by the Spanish. The church had a corresponding punishment
for the natives who violated this rule. All sinners had to go through the
sanctity of confession, for confession was the spring that cleansed
man's sins (Rafael, 1988).231
....
However, discrimination remains. Hence, the call for equal rights and
legislative protection continues.
For instance, the following bills were filed in the 17 th Congress: (1)
House Bill No. 267, or the Anti-SOGIE (Sexual Orientation and Gender
Identity or Expression) Discrimination Bill,233 which was eventually
consolidated, along with other bills, into House Bill No. 4982 234; (2)
House Bill No. 79, which focused on the same subject as House Bill No.
267;235 (3) House Bill No. 2952, which aims to establish LGBT help and
protection desks in all Philippine National Police stations
nationwide;236 House Bill No. 5584, which aims to define domestic
violence against individuals, including members of the LGBTQI+
community other than women and children;237 and Senate Bill No.
1271, otherwise known as the Anti-Discrimination Bill. 238
(a) Catcalling refers to unwanted remarks directed towards a person, commonly done in the
form of wolf-whistling and misogynistic, transphobic, homophobic, and sexist slurs;
....
Meanwhile, the San Juan City Government passed Ordinance No. 55,
which provides for anti-discrimination of members of the LGBT
community.245 The Mandaluyong City Government passed Ordinance
No. 698 in 2018 to "uphold the rights of all Filipinos especially those
discriminated by reason of gender identity and sexual
orientation."246 In 2019, during the Metro Manila Pride March and
Festival, the Marikina City Government announced the enactment of
City Ordinance No. 065, its anti-discrimination ordinance. 247
VII
Here, petitioner has no actual facts that present a real conflict between
the parties of this case. The Petition presents no actual case or
controversy.
Petitioner made no such effort. He did not explain why this Court
should adopt the separate opinion of retired Chief Justice Puno. It is
not enough, as petitioner has done, to merely produce copious
quotations from a separate opinion. Even more curious, petitioner
would eventually betray a lack of confidence in those quotations by
ultimately saying that he "disagrees with the former Chief Justice's
conclusion."251 From his confused and disjointed reference to retired
Chief Justice Puno, petitioner would arrive at the conclusion that
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code must be examined through the lens
of the strict scrutiny test.
This rudimentary, but glaring, flaw was pointed out by Chief Justice
Lucas P. Bersamin during the oral arguments:
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor. We believe that it is proper to implead the Civil
Registrar-General because when it comes to Rule 65 Petitions, Your
Honors, in the way that petitions, petitioners invoked it, it's in the
expanded . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
Yeah. I understand. Now, the expanded jurisdiction under the Second
Paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII, refers to abuse of discretion.
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honors.
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
The Civil Registrar has no discretion. Meaning, it has only a ministerial
duty to issue you a license or to deny you that license. So, could you
not ever resulted (sic) to mandamus in the Regional Trial Court of
where you have a refusal? You should have done that.
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honor, with this Court's indulgence, we are of the submission
that in other laws that were questioned, other, the constitutionality of
other laws that were questioned . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE BERSAMIN:
No, you cannot make your case similar to those other laws because
those other laws were against other branches of government. They
were seeking genuine judicial review. Here, you are asking us to
perform a very ordinary task of correcting somebody's mistake which
was not even a mistake because there was no instance where you
asked that official to function as such.256 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner himself admitted that he has not suffered from respondent's
enforcement of the law he is assailing:
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Have you actually tried applying for a marriage license?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, because I would concede that I do not have a
partner and that even if I do have a partner, it is not automatic that
my partner might want to marry me and so, Your Honors, I did not
apply or I could not apply for a marriage license.257
VIII
Aware of the need to empower and uphold the dignity of the LGBTQI+
community, this Court is mindful that swift, sweeping, and
indiscriminate pronouncements, lacking actual facts, may do more
harm than good to a historically marginalized community.
VIII (A)
Despite seeking access to the benefits of marriage, petitioner
miserably fails to articulate what those benefits are, in both his filed
pleadings and his submissions during oral arguments.
VIII (A)(1)
Although the Family Code does not grant the right to compel spouses
to cohabit with each other,270 it maintains that spouses are duty bound
to "live together"271 and to "fix the family domicile."272 This is
consistent with the policy of promoting solidarity within the family. 273
The Civil Code also covers the successional rights granted to spouses.
This includes the division and partition of the deceased spouse's estate
among the surviving spouse and other surviving descendants,
ascendants, and collateral relatives.
In cases where the deceased spouse left a will, the surviving spouse is
entitled to one-half of the testator's entire estate. 284 If the spouse
survives with legitimate or illegitimate children or descendants and/or
acknowledged natural children, he or she receives a share equivalent
to the share of a legitimate child.285
If either spouse dies without any will and the surviving spouse is the
sole heir of the deceased, the spouse is entitled to the entire estate
"without prejudice to the rights of brothers and sisters, nephews[,]
and nieces"286 of the deceased. If the spouse survives with the
legitimate or illegitimate children or descendants of the deceased then
the spouse is entitled to receive the same amount of share that a
legitimate child is entitled to receive. 287
The Civil Code also covers situations where the spouses were married
in articulo mortis, and one (1) of them died three (3) months after
such marriage. In these cases, the surviving spouse is entitled to one-
third of the deceased's estate. However, where the spouses were living
together as husband and wife five (5) years before a spouse dies, the
surviving spouse is entitled to half of the estate. 288
Aside from the rights and privileges between married spouses, the
Civil Code also provides for the relationships between the spouses, as
parents, and their children. Consistent with the constitutional provision
on the "right and duty of parents in rearing the youth," 289 the Family
Code states that spouses shall exercise joint parental authority, 290 legal
guardianship,291 and custody over common children.
The Family Code likewise provides that spouses shall exercise legal
guardianship over the property of the minor child by operation of
law.293 This entitles the spouses to a right over the fruits of the child's
property, which shall be used primarily for child support and
secondarily for the family's collective needs. 294
Meanwhile, Republic Act No. 8552 covers the rights and privileges
attached to adoption. One (1) of the significant rights granted by this
law is the legitimate spouses' right to jointly adopt a child. Spouses
who jointly adopt shall exercise joint parental authority and custody
over the adoptee.295
VIII (A)(2)
For instance, anyone who, after having suddenly come upon his or her
legitimate spouse in the act of committing sex with another, kills any
or both is only liable to suffer destierro. Should the offending spouse
inflict physical injuries upon his or her spouse or the other person, he
or she shall be exempt from criminal liability.299
Marital relations also influence the imposable penalty for crimes. Any
person's criminal act in defense of his or her spouse is a justifying
circumstance,300 while immediate vindication of a grave offense to
one's spouse is a mitigating circumstance. 301 That the victim is the
spouse of the offender is considered an alternative circumstance,
which may be considered as aggravating or mitigating depending on
"the nature and effects of the crime and the other conditions attending
its commission."302 Commission of the crime in full view of the spouse
of the victim-spouse is also an aggravating circumstance in the crime
of rape.303 The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003, as amended,
also qualifies trafficking if the offender is a spouse of the trafficked
person.304 Further, a spouse who is an accessory to a crime is
generally exempt from criminal liability.305
VIII (A)(3)
VIII (A)(4)
Even the Labor Code and other labor laws are influenced by the
institution of marriage.
VIII (A)(5)
VIII (A)(6)
Republic Act No. 6173 entitles spouses who are both public officials
and employees the right to jointly file their statement of assets,
liabilities, and net worth and disclosure of business interests and
financial connections.353
Republic Act No. 9505, or the Personal Equity and Retirement Act,
prescribes the aggregate maximum contribution of P100,000.00 per
contributor. The same law includes a provision in favor of married
contributors, such that each spouse may make a maximum
contribution of P100,000.00 or its equivalent in any convertible foreign
currency per year.355
Republic Act No. 8239, otherwise known as the Philippine Passport Act,
also grants diplomatic passports to legitimate spouses of "persons
imbued with diplomatic status or are on diplomatic mission[.]" They
include the president, vice president, members of Congress and the
judiciary, cabinet secretaries, and ambassadors, among
others.356 Moreover, an official passport shall be issued in favor of the
legitimate spouses of all government officials who are "on official trip
abroad but who are not on a diplomatic mission or delegates to
international or regional conferences or have not been accorded
diplomatic status" when accompanying them.357
VIII (B)
Further, Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, prohibits the spouse of any public official from
"requesting or receiving any present, gift, material or pecuniary
advantage from any other person having some business, transaction,
application, request, or contract with the government, in which such
public official has to intervene." 377 Spouses of the president, vice
president, senate president, and speaker of the House of
Representatives are also forbidden to intervene in any business,
transaction, contract, or application with the government. 378 Moreover,
in determining the unexplained wealth of a public official, the spouses'
properties, bank deposits, and manifestly excessive expenditures are
also considered.379
The moral atrophy that has kept us from recognizing the tragedy of
these strategies and outcomes is where more critical, and indeed
discomfiting, work needs to be done by theorists and activists alike.
This means rethinking the horizon of success. "Victory" in the sense of
gaining the state as a partner, rather than an adversary, in the
struggle to recognize and defend LGBT rights ought to set off a trip
wire that ignites a new set of strategies and politics. This must
necessarily include a deliberate effort to counteract, if not sabotage,
the pull of the state to enlist rights-based movements into its larger
governance projects, accompanied by an affirmative resistance to
conceptions of citizenship that figure nationality by and through the
creation of a constitutive other who resides in the state's and human
rights' outside.382 (Emphasis supplied)
Yet, petitioner has miserably failed to show proof that he has obtained
even the slightest measure of consent from the members of the
community that he purports to represent, and that LGBTQI+ persons
are unqualifiedly willing to conform to the State's present construct of
marriage.
VIII (C)
Limiting itself to four (4) specific provisions in the Family Code, the
Petition prays that this Court "declare Articles 1 and 2 of the Family
Code as unconstitutional and, as a consequence, nullify Articles 46(4)
and 55(6) of the Family Code."383 However, should this Court rule as
the Petition asks, there will be far-reaching consequences that extend
beyond the plain text of the specified provisions.
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code provide a definition and spell out
basic requisites, respectively. Without passing upon the validity of the
definition under Article 1, this Court nonetheless observes that this
definition serves as the foundation of many other gendered provisions
of the Family Code and other laws.
The Family Code also contains provisions that favor the husband over
the wife on certain matters, including property relations between
spouses. For one, the administration over the community property
belongs to the spouses jointly, but in case of disagreement, the
husband's decision prevails.388 Similarly, the administration over
conjugal partnership properties is lodged in both spouses jointly, but in
case of disagreement, the husband's decision prevails, without
prejudice to the wife's right to file a petition before the courts. 389 And,
in case of a disagreement between the spouses on the exercise of
parental authority over their minor children, the father's decision shall
also prevail.390
In labor law, Republic Act No. 8187, otherwise known as the Paternity
Leave Act of 1996, provides that "every married male employee in the
private and public sectors shall be entitled to a paternity leave 394 of
seven (7) days with full pay for the first four (4) deliveries of the
legitimate spouse with whom he is cohabiting." 395
VIII (D)
The litany of provisions that we have just recounted are not even the
entirety of laws relating to marriage. Petitioner would have this Court
impliedly amend all such laws, through a mere declaration of
unconstitutionality of only two (2) articles in a single statute. This
Court cannot do what petitioner wants without arrogating legislative
power unto itself and violating the principle of separation of powers.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So what is your prayer?
ATTY. FALCIS:
The prayer of the petitions, Your Honor, initially says that to declare
Articles 1 and 2 of the Family Code as null and void. However, we also
prayed for other just and equitable reliefs which we are of the position
that in relation with (sic) Republic vs. Manalo that there is an
alternative option for this Court in the exercise of its expanded power
of judicial review to, in the light that the provisions is (sic) found . . .
(interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Wait a minute. You are saying or claiming that the proper reading
of Republic vs. Manalo under the ponen[c]ia of Justice Peralta is that
there is an alternative consequence to a finding that a provision is
unconstitutional. Normally, if a provision is unconstitutional, it is
void ab initio. And you are now saying that the Court has created new
jurisprudence in Republic vs. Manalo that when we find a provision to
be unconstitutional that it can be valid?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honor. What petitioners are saying that our interpretations of
this Court's guide in Republic vs. Manalo is that . . . (interrupted)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So in essence you are asking the Court to find or to found new
jurisprudence in relation to situation (sic) like yours?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, we are only asking for a statutory interpretation that
was applied in Republic vs. Manalo that two interpretations that would
lead to finding (sic) of unconstitutionality the Court adopted a liberal
interpretation, did not declare Article 26 paragraph 2 as
unconstitutional. But because the Constitution is deemed written into
the Family Code as well (sic) interpreted it in light of the equal
protection clause.396
VIII (E)
VIII (F)
JUSTICE LEONEN:
What I'm asking you, Atty. Falcis, is other people, heterosexual
couples that go into marriage more second class than what you can
create.
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honors, . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
Because, well, it's a pre-packaged set of law. In fact, if you trace that
law it comes from the Spanish Civil Code. Okay, the Partidas and then
the Nueva Recopilacion and coming from the fuer sus fuegos before,
correct?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
And in sealed patriarchy, in fact there are still some vestiges of that
patriarchy in that particular Civil Code and there are a lot of
limitations, it is not culturally created. It's not indigenous within our
system. Can you imagine same-sex couples now can make their own
civil union, correct?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE LEONEN:
The idea of some legal scholars which is to challenge even the
constitutionality of marriage as a burden into their freedoms is now
available to same sex couples?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor, but that is not by choice, Your Honors. Same-sex
couples do not have the choice out of marriage because we're not
even allowed to opt thing (sic)...
JUSTICE LEONEN:
So isn't it accurate to say that you are arguing to get into a situation
which is more limited?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honors, there are some situations that would be limited under
marriage. But there are other situations that are . . .
JUSTICE LEONEN:
But you see, Atty. Falcis, that was not clear in your pleadings? And
perhaps you can make that clear when you file your
memoranda? What exactly in marriage, that status of marriage? So
that status of marriage creates a bundle of rights and obligations. But
the rights and obligations can also be fixed by contractual relations, is
that not correct? And because it can be fixed by contractual relations,
you can actually create a little bit more perfect civil union. In fact, you
can even say in your contract that we will stay together for ten years,
after ten years, it's renewable, correct? That cannot be done by
heterosexual couples wanting to marry. But if that is your belief then it
can be established in that kind of an arrangement, correct? You may
say not conjugal partnership or absolute community, you will specify
the details of the co-ownership or the common ownership that you
have of the properties that you have. You will say everything that I
make is mine, everything that you make because you're richer
therefore will be shared by us. That's more [egalitarian], correct?
That's not in the Civil Code, right?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.400 (Emphasis supplied)
In other words, words that describe when we love or are loved will
always be different for each couple. It is that which we should
understand: intimacies that form the core of our beings should be as
free as possible, bound not by social expectations but by the care and
love each person can bring.402 (Emphasis supplied)
During the oral arguments, petitioner asserted that the very passage
of the Family Code itself was the direct injury that he sustained:
JUSTICE BERNABE:
Now, what direct and actual injury have you sustained as a result of
the Family Code provisions assailed in your Petition?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Your Honors, we are of multiple submissions. The first would be that
as an individual I possess the right to marry because the right to
marry is not given to couples alone; it is individual, Your Honors.
Second, Your Honors, we are guided by this Court's pronouncements
in the case of Pimentel v. Aguirre that the mere enactment of a law
suffices to give a person either an actual case or standing. Because,
Your Honors, we are invoking the expanded power of judicial review
where in the most recent cases especially the one penned by Justice
Brion, Association of Medical Workers v. GSS, this Court said that
under the expanded power of judicial review, the mere enactment of a
law, because Article VIII, Your Honors, Section 1 says that "Any
instrumentality, the grave abuse of discretion of any instrumentality
may be questioned before the Supreme Court, Your Honor." And,
therefore, the direct injury that I suffer, Your Honor, was the passage
of a law that contradicts the Constitution in grave abuse of discretion
because of the disregard of other fundamental provisions such as the
equal protection clause, the valuing of human dignity, the right to
liberty and the right to found a family, Your Honors.417 (Emphasis
supplied)
It does not escape this Court's notice that the Family Code was
enacted in 1987. This Petition was filed only in 2015. Petitioner, as a
member of the Philippine Bar, has been aware of the Family Code and
its allegedly repugnant provisions, since at least his freshman year in
law school. It is then extraordinary for him to claim, first, that he has
been continually injured by the existence of the Family Code; and
second, that he raised the unconstitutionality of Articles 1 and 2 of the
Family Code at the earliest possible opportunity. 420
Petitioner has neither suffered any direct personal injury nor shown
that he is in danger of suffering any injury from the present
implementation of the Family Code. He has neither an actual case nor
legal standing.
Interventions are allowed under Rule 19, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure:
SECTION 1. Who may intervene. — A person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or
an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court or of an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to
intervene in the action. The court shall consider whether or not the
intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the
rights of the original parties, and whether or not the intervenor's rights
may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
X(A)
It does not escape this Court's notice that the Petition and Petition-in-
Intervention were prepared by the same counsel, Falcis, the petitioner
himself. The Petition-in-Intervention impleaded the same single
respondent, the Civil Registrar General, as the original Petition. It also
merely "adopt[ed] by reference as their own all the arguments raised
by Petitioner in his original Petition[.]"423 Notably, a parenthetical
argument made by petitioner that barely occupied two (2) pages 424 of
his Petition became the Petition-in-Intervention's entire subject: the
right to found a family according to one's religious convictions.
X(B)
Given these, this Court can only arrive at the conclusion that the
Petition-in-Intervention was a veiled vehicle by which petitioner sought
to cure the glaring procedural defects of his original Petition. It was
not a bona fide plea for relief, but a sly, tardy stratagem. It was not a
genuine effort by an independent party to have its cause litigated in
the same proceeding, but more of an ill-conceived attempt to prop up
a thin and underdeveloped Petition.
We stress that neither the OSG's filing of its Comment nor the
petition-in-intervention of PUMALU-MV, PKSK, and TDCI endowed De
Borja's petition with an actual case or controversy. The Comment, for
one, did not contest the allegations in De Borja's petition. Its main role
was to supply De Borja's petition with the factual antecedents detailing
how the alleged controversy reached the court. It also enlightened the
RTC as to the two views, the mainland principle versus the archipelagic
principle, on the definition of municipal waters. Even if the Comment
did oppose the petition, there would still be no justiciable controversy
for lack of allegation that any person has ever contested or threatened
to contest De Borja's claim of fishing rights.
X(C)
For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as
an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers
v. Ohio, the United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have
recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third
parties, provided three important criteria are satisfied: the litigant
must have suffered an 'injury-in-fact', thus giving him or her a
"sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in dispute;
the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there
must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or
her own interests."428 (Citations omitted)
XI
XII
XII (A)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was
created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary
performs its designated roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial
courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the
evidence presented before them. They are likewise competent to
determine issues of law which may include the validity of an
ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution. To effectively perform these functions, they are
territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs
generally reach within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they
mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the
evidence as these are physically presented before them. In many
instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which
properly present the 'actual case' that makes ripe a determination of
the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course,
would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where
resort to courts at their level would not be practical considering their
decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the
Court of Appeals.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new
ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in
the light of some confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents.
Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of
the Court of Appeals, this court promulgates these doctrinal devices in
order that it truly performs that role.440 (Citations omitted)
Time and again, this Court has held that the concurrent jurisdiction of
the Court of Appeals and the regional trial courts with this Court does
not give parties absolute discretion in immediately seeking recourse
from the highest court of the land.447 In Gios-Samar, we emphasized
that the power to issue extraordinary writs was extended to lower
courts not only as a means of procedural expediency, but also to fulfill
a constitutional imperative as regards: (1) the structure of our judicial
system; and (2) the requirements of due process.448
Accordingly, when litigants seek relief directly from the Court, they
bypass the judicial structure and open themselves to the risk of
presenting incomplete or disputed facts. This consequently hampers
the resolution of controversies before the Court. Without the necessary
facts, the Court cannot authoritatively determine the rights and
obligations of the parties. The case would then become another
addition to the Court's already congested dockets.449 (Citations
omitted)
If this Court were to burden itself with settling every factual nuance of
every petition filed before it, the entire judicial machinery would bog
down. Cases more deserving of this Court's sublime consideration
would be waylaid. In Gios-Samar, this Court further explained:
While the term "due process of law" evades exact and concrete
definition, this Court, in one of its earliest decisions, referred to it as a
law which hears before it condemns which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial. It means that every citizen shall hold
his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the
general rules which govern society. Under the present Rules of Court,
which governs our judicial proceedings, warring factual allegations of
parties are settled through presentation of evidence. Evidence is the
means of ascertaining, in a judicial proceeding, the truth respecting a
matter of fact. As earlier demonstrated, the Court cannot accept
evidence in the first instance. By directly filing a case before the Court,
litigants necessarily deprive themselves of the op[p]ortunity to
completely pursue or defend their causes of actions. Their right to due
process is effectively undermined by their own doing.451 (Citations
omitted)
In fine, while this Court has original and concurrent jurisdiction with
the RTC and the CA in the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus (extraordinary writs),
direct recourse to this Court is proper only to seek resolution of
questions of law. Save for the single specific instance provided by the
Constitution under Section 18, Article VII, cases the resolution of
which depends on the determination of questions of fact cannot be
brought directly before the Court because we are not a trier of facts.
We are not equipped, either by structure or rule, to receive and
evaluate evidence in the first instance; these are the primary functions
of the lower courts or regulatory agencies. This is the raison
d'être behind the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. It operates as a
constitutional filtering mechanism designed to enable this Court to
focus on the more fundamental tasks assigned to it by the
Constitution. It is a bright-line rule which cannot be brushed aside by
an invocation of the transcendental importance or constitutional
dimension of the issue or cause raised.452 (Citations omitted)
XII (B)
Still, it does not follow that this Court should proceed to exercise its
power of judicial review just because a case is attended with purely
legal issues. Jurisdiction ought to be distinguished from justiciability.
Jurisdiction pertains to competence "to hear, try[,] and decide a
case."459 On the other hand,
....
XII (C)
Even if this Court were to go out of its way in relaxing rules and
proceed to resolve the substantive issues, it would ultimately be
unable to do so, as petitioner himself failed to present even an iota of
evidence substantiating his case.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
. . . Now, did Thurgood Marshall go direct to the US Supreme Court?
ATTY. FALCIS:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
That is the point of Justice Bersamin. And my point, you should read, .
. . how the NAACP, . . . plotted/planned that case and they had a lot of
evidence, as in testimonial evidence, on the psychological effect of
separate but allegedly equal schools. So, do you get my point about
why you should be better off trying this case before the RTC?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
. . . And I'll give you another good example, that is why I asked
questions from Reverend Agbayani. Even if the church remains as a
party with standing, do you know why I asked that series of questions
of (sic) him?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Because, Your Honor, what he was saying were factual issues, Your
Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. And what does Escritor tell you?
ATTY. FALCIS:
In terms of religious freedom, Your Honor?
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Yes. What does Escritor with respect to hierarchy of courts tell you?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Estrada v. Escritor remanded back the case, Your Honor, to the lower
courts for . . .
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Escritor tells you that you should reread it carefully. The religious
claim is based on religious conviction, right?
ATTY. FALCIS:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
Just like a fundamental right, religious conviction. Bago ka dumating
sa conviction the first word is religious. That's why I was asking is
there a religion? Is there a religion, to start with? Now, what is the
difference between a religion and a sect? What, how many people
need/comprise a religion? Can you have a religion of one? That is
described in Escritor, that's one, is there a religion? No.
2, Escritor says, is the claim/burden being put by the government
something that impinges on a practice or belief of the church that is a
central tenet or a central doctrine. You have to prove that in the RTC,
that was I was (sic) asking, that's why I was asking what is the tenet
of MCC? What is the different tenet? And you have to prove that and
the question for example a while ago, you were asked by Justice
Leonen, "What is the history of marriage in the Philippines?" You have
your view, right? The government has a different view about the
history and if I just listen to you, you will give me your views and if I
just listen to the SOLGEN, he will give me his views. What I'm saying
is the Court needs a factual record where experts testify subject to
cross examination. Yun po ang ibig sabihin ng hierarchy of courts. . . .
466
(Emphasis supplied)
JUSTICE JARDELEZA:
. . . Mr. Falcis, for example, adverted to Brown v. Board of
Education. And it should interest you and it is a fascinating history on
how a group of people spearheaded by the NAACP effected social
change "separate but equal is not constitutional". . . . And remember,
the question there was separate but equal schools for black children
and white children, "Was it causing psychological harm to the black
children?" Of course, the whites were saying "no" because it's equal,
they have equal facilities. The famous psychologist that they presented
there is named Kenneth Clark, who had his famous doll test, manika.
He was able to prove that to the satisfaction of the trial court that
indeed black children sometimes even think that, you know, when you
present them with dolls, that they are white. That is the type of
evidence I think that we need in this case. Now, very quickly and I will
segue to Obergefell, again, five cases four different states. They
presented the Chairman of the Department of History of Yale. We
heard a lot, the government is talking of tradition and history. But
again, for example, SolGen is citing Blair and Robertson, that, of
course, qualifies as a Learned Treaties, right? But again, for the
proposition that the history of this country is in favor of same sex, I
would love first to hear, as an expert, probably the Chairman of
History of Ateneo and UP. As in Obergefell, they also had the
Department of Psychology, Head of Washington and Lee
University. So, my plea to both of you, especially to the petitioner, at
this point in time, I am not willing to ask you in your memo to discuss
the merits because unless the petitioner convinces me that we have a
proper exception to the hierarchy of court rules then I think, for the
first time, this Court should consider that, when we say there is a
violation of the hierarchy of rules, we stop, we don't go to merits. And
that's why I'm, I cannot go, for the life of me, to the merits if you
have this question of fact in my mind. "Who, which couples can belter
raise a child?" Again I say, "That is a question of fact". I am not a trier
of fact, and my humble opinion is try it first.467 (Emphasis supplied)
25. Lastly, Petitioner submits that the instant petition raises an issue
of transcendental importance to the nation because of the millions of
LGBT Filipinos all over the country who are deprived from marrying the
one they want or the one they love. They are discouraged and
stigmatized from pursuing same-sex relationships to begin with. Those
who pursue same-sex relationships despite the stigma are deprived of
the bundle of rights that flow from a legal recognition of a couple's
relationship - visitation and custody rights, property and successional
rights, and other privileges accorded to opposite-sex relationships.468
XIII
Rule 18.02 A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without
adequate preparation.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him,
and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his
case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request
for information.
XIII (A)
XIII (B)
Lawyers must serve their clients with competence and diligence. Under
Rule 18.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer shall
not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation." Atty.
Falcis' appearance and behavior during the preliminary conference
reveal the inadequacy of his preparation. Considering that the Advisory
for Oral Arguments was served on the parties three (3) months prior
to the preliminary conference, it was inexcusably careless for any of
them to appear before this Court so barely prepared.
Atty. Falcis jeopardized the cause of his clients. Without even uttering
a word, he recklessly courted disfavor with this Court. His bearing and
demeanor were a disservice to his clients and to the human rights
advocacy he purports to represent.476
XIII (C)
In any case, as this Court has already stated in its July 3, 2018
Resolution:
XIV
Diligence is even more important when the cause lawyers take upon
themselves to defend involves assertions of fundamental rights. By
voluntarily taking up this case, petitioner and his co-counsels gave
their "unqualified commitment to advance and defend [it.]"484 The bare
minimum of this commitment is to observe and comply with the
deadlines set by a court.
Lawyers who wish to practice public interest litigation should be ever
mindful that their acts and omissions before the courts do not only
affect themselves. In truth, by thrusting themselves into the limelight
to take up the cudgels on behalf of a minority class, they represent the
hopes and aspirations of a greater mass of people, not always with the
consent of all its members. Their errors and mistakes have a ripple
effect even on persons who did not agree with or had no opportunity
to consent to the stratagems and tactics they employed.
One who touts himself an advocate for the marginalized must know
better than to hijack the cause of those whom he himself proclaims to
be oppressed. Public interest lawyering demands more than the
cursory invocation of legal doctrines, as though they were magical
incantations swiftly disengaging obstacles at their mere utterance.
Public interest advocacy is not about fabricating prestige. It is about
the discomfort of taking the cudgels for the weak and the dangers of
standing against the powerful. The test of how lawyers truly become
worthy of esteem and approval is in how they are capable of buckling
down in silence, anonymity, and utter modesty—doing the spartan
work of research and study, of writing and self-correction. It is by their
grit in these unassuming tasks, not by hollow, swift appeals to fame,
that they are seasoned and, in due time, become luminaries, the
standard by which all others are measured.
By failing to represent his cause with even the barest competence and
diligence, petitioner betrayed the standards of legal practice. His
failure to file the required memorandum on time is just the most
recent manifestation of this betrayal. He disrespected not only his
cause, but also this Court—an unequivocal act of indirect contempt.
A Final Note
This Court sympathizes with the petitioner with his obvious longing to
find a partner. We understand the desire of same-sex couples to seek,
not moral judgment based on discrimination from any of our laws, but
rather, a balanced recognition of their true, authentic, and responsive
choices.
Yet, the time for a definitive judicial fiat may not yet be here. This is
not the case that presents the clearest actual factual backdrop to
make the precise reasoned judgment our Constitution requires.
Perhaps, even before that actual case arrives, our democratically-
elected representatives in Congress will have seen the wisdom of
acting with dispatch to address the suffering of many of those who
choose to love distinctively, uniquely, but no less genuinely and
passionately.
This Court finds petitioner Atty. Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III, his co-
counsels Atty. Darwin P. Angeles, Atty. Keisha Trina M. Guangko, Atty.
Christopher Ryan R. Maranan, as well as intervenor-oppositor Atty.
Fernando P. Perito, all GUILTY of INDIRECT CONTEMPT OF COURT.
SO ORDERED.