txt-v1

The
Bankers’ Secret
A True Story
Kenneth Trent
Copyright © 2020 Kenneth Trent
All rights reserved
First Edition
Fulton Books, Inc.

Meadville, PA
First originally published by Fulton Books 2020
ISBN 978-1-64952-214-6 (Paperback)

ISBN 978-1-64952-216-0 (Hardcover)
ISBN 978-1-64952-215-3 (Digital)
Printed in the United States of America

My life as a defender of homeowners at the core
of the foreclosure crisis, the stunning secrets I have
learned, and what they mean for the American people.
Kenneth Eric Trent, attorney-at-law,

also known as
the Foreclosure Destroyer
3
C h a pte r 1
Let’s begin by defining a key term:
doppelgänger (‘däplgaNGr’/
noun: an apparition or double of a living
person.
mid 19th century: from German, literally
“double-goer”
—Oxford
In 2009, I had been a lawyer for about five years. Naive, still, although
less so than when I started. I was more successful than most GED
graduates; I was doing pretty well out of the gate, but I was nowhere
near famous.
I could never have imagined that I was about to encounter a
manufactured multitude of multifaceted financial facsimiles, a.k.a.
doppelgängers.
In the course of what was then a solo general civil litigation
practice, I came to be hired by a simple county maintenance man to
defend a foreclosure. The man’s name was Bennus Down (not really).
Our foundling allegiance ultimately grew into something I will never
forget. It was a humble and innocent foray toward a dawn of com-
prehension: comprehension of a next-gen scientifically engineered
virus called MERS.
Nope, this original MERS virus (Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems Inc.) did NOT come from the Middle East.
My signing on to help Mr. Down was a rather inauspicious
beginning to a revolution.
It was also my very first foreclosure.
5
Kenneth Trent
In a foreclosure, of course, a bank is trying to take someone’s

home or, in legal speak, their “real property and appurtenances.” In
Florida and many other “judicial foreclosure” states, the bank must
file an ordinary civil lawsuit wherein it is the plaintiff and the bor-
rowers and whoever else has a legal interest in the property are named
as defendants.
Like most people in 2009, I didn’t figure there were too many
defenses available to me with which to defeat a foreclosure.
On the surface of things, the bank (here CitiMortgage Inc.) had
brought suit, claiming that the Downs had failed to make all their
payments. As a result, the bank claimed it had the right to foreclose,
evict the homeowners, and sell the property at public auction to
recover its investment. Upon nonpayment, the bank is contractually
entitled to do so, subject to certain minor conditions. My clients had
stopped paying. That’s, of course, the main point in a foreclosure.
Where a borrower hasn’t paid, for the most part, the rest is window
dressing, or so I thought!
The bank, if challenged, does have to prove it sent a written
warning to the borrower at least thirty days prior to filing suit. That’s
about it—the bank’s case consists of nonpayment and a demand
notice. Doesn’t sound difficult, does it?
Although initially not optimistic, I tried to do my job. One ele-
ment that seemed to be missing was the relationship of the plaintiff
to the loan. Along those lines, I noticed something odd.
The bank described as the “lender” in the loan documents,
ABN Ramrod Inc., I believe it was, was not the plaintiff named
in the court papers. That was CitiMortgage Inc. I call them Chiti.
There must be some explanation, I imagined, but I wanted to hear
it. Grasping, as I thought I was, at straws, but intending to make
the bank check the boxes, I sent its lawyer a request for production
of documents, formally demanding whatever paperwork gave Chiti
the right to collect on a promissory note payable to ABN Ramrod. I
asked for the transfer documentation, which usually takes the form
of an “assignment of mortgage.”
Enter the now-infamous Law Offices of David J. Stern. As you
may have guessed, the said law firm was the attorney of record for
6
The Bankers’ Secret
Chiti. At the time, I didn’t know Stern from the proverbial hole in
the wall. After sending my routine request, I heard from the Stern
firm…well…crickets.
Formal follow-up was followed by more of the same—a redun-
dancy of silence. I went to court a couple of times to see the judge
and obtained orders that the evidence be provided. Despite the
orders, Chiti continued to dally.
“I don’t trust ’em, Mr. Trent,” said my client, Mr. Down.
Meanwhile, still thinking our legal defense prospects rather
doubtful, I repeatedly instructed my client to post his mortgage pay-
ments to my trust account, so that when the time came, we could
hopefully negotiate a reinstatement of his loan. I anticipated this
would cost money up front, given the fact that by this time, my cli-
ent had not made a mortgage payment in about fifteen months. He
complied, although not to the extent I would have wished, and the
months flew by without any real activity in the case.
In December of 2009, it was time for mediation. That, strictly
speaking, is where the two sides meet in a room with their attorneys
and a neutral person whose job is to encourage the sides to reach a
settlement. This mediation was like a walk through the twilight zone
in the shadow of a nameless beast—while being guided by a submis-
sive substitute librarian.
I was not sure what to expect going in, although I mentally
prepared myself to be obsequious. To put it bluntly, I was ready to
kiss some ass. Myself, Mr. Down, and his wife appeared for the medi-
ation. Also in attendance on December 14, 2009, was the “bank’s
attorney” and a “bank rep.”1 The attorney was a milquetoast from
Stern’s office by the name of Gregg Dreilinger.
Once the mediation began, our singularly nonthreatening,
moderately professional, and at all times unremarkable opponent
was so very kind as to admit that there had been an error in the appli-
cation of my client’s payments, such that the Downs were entitled to
a small credit against the ever-mounting debt.
1
Not too many days later, I realized that there had not been a bank in sight!
7
Kenneth Trent
Mr. Dry-linger presented us with reinstatement terms. To my

surprise, the offer did not include a requirement that my client pay
a lump sum up front to catch up. The proposal, however, slightly
increased the Downs’ monthly nut, I mean, note [sic].2 In other
words, their monthly payments would increase by about $50.
Mr. Down was having none of it. According to his logic, since
the so-called bank admitted it had improperly applied his payments,
no way should his monthly payment increase! I couldn’t disagree.
Accordingly, I asked the other lawyer, “Why the payment
increase?” The answer, “To keep the loan maturity date unchanged.”
Dry-linger dourly informed us that the date of the last payment pro-
vided for in the existing loan documents could not be altered.
Why the hell not?
The answer was the first hint that something was just not right.
It was my introduction to the beast. The answer to my predictable,
unimaginative question, sans profanity, was the first “ODDITY” of
many, the combined effects of which would take over my life. Literally,
in Mr. Down’s case, and more figuratively in a grand, universal, spir-
itual, and lifelong sense, I was about to get my ASSIGNMENT.
In response to my inquiry as to WHY the maturity date was set
in stone, Dry-linger replied that it was “due to the investor’s rules.”
Come again? Something called the “investor’s rules” is going to keep
us from settling this case?
Last I checked, there was a plaintiff and its lawyer, and the
defendants and their lawyer, and then the judge. But as far as I
know, we ain’t got any “investor” running around here, do we, in this
court-ordered mediation in which all parties, having full settlement
authority, are required to be physically present with their counsel?
In response to my challenge, “Ahem, ummhmm,” demurred attorney
Dry-linger, he then, to my continuing puzzlement, stepped outside
for some sotto voce cell phone machinations with someone or some-
thing of alien provenance. Could it have been the invisible man?
2
That’s what Mr. Down called it.
8
Turns out there was no flexibility at all on the loan’s maturity

date—for no reason other than “rules” pronounced by some myste-
rious “investor.” The mediation was declared an impasse. UH-OH!
As we departed, my clients and I faced the prospect of a loom-
ing trial date, one at which we would not be entitled to a jury and
instead would face the judge.
Now, I would have to figure out some legal defense to the fore-
closure, and I would have to do so fast—all because of something I
had never heard of before: the “investor’s rules.”
A secret force, an invisible man of sorts, was acting behind the
scenes to crush my client’s prospects, to bring their American dream
to a nightmarish conclusion. That force, without even having to
identify itself, was putting the screws to me in the process. I was
pissed and starting to get nervous, and I hauled tail back to my office
for some late-night file review.
As I drove, I was trying to remember if I had ever gotten that
assignment of mortgage from Mr. Dry-linger.
It turned out I had…
<<insert picture here>>
9
C h a pte r 2
I don’t recall much about my drive after leaving our Wellsian medi-
ation. I can tell you that it did not end up at home. I drove straight
from the mediation to my office, very, very worried, not to men-
tioned mystified. I could not wait to find out whether I had ever
received the twice-compelled response to my request for produc-
tion—the one in which I had demanded copies of all documents
demonstrating that the plaintiff, Chiti, had acquired the loan from
the original lender, ABN Ramrod. I needed to know whether Dry-
linger had ever responded, and if so, what the response was.
Soon as I arrived at my office, I rummaged through my over-
flowing file box in the case. At the bottom of the box, what did I
come across in the waning hours but that instrument of destruction
pictured in figure 1.
I noticed that the document entitled “Assignment of Mortgage”
was signed by one “Cheryl Salmons” on behalf of a company called
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. or MERS. For the
sake of clarity, at this point, just think of MERS as the bank. For
the sake of having fun, we’ll call the lady who signed the assignment
“Several Salmons” from now on.
The assignment seemed to be evidence that MERS, acting on
behalf of ABN Ramrod Inc., had legally transferred the loan and the
right to receive payments to Chiti. If true, this would give Chiti the
right to foreclose on my client’s home.
It stands to reason that the person who executes a legal docu-
ment of such importance has knowledge of the truth of its contents
and has the authority to bind the transferor (in this case, the original
lender) with her signature.
10
The assignment reflects that Several Salmons signed as an

“ASSISTANT SECRETARY” of MERS. Truth be told, Salmons (or
whoever scribbled that loopy loop around her signature line) signed
as a lot of things! If you haven’t noticed, take a look at the signatures
in figure 1 again.
Back to the story. That December night, upon reading the
assignment, I simply typed Salmons’s name into a convenient search
engine, and what came up right at the very top? Nothing less than
a link to the “Full Deposition of the Soon-to-be-Infamous Several
Salmons!” To say the least, I was a tad intrigued. I began reading, and
lo and behold, what a miracle of darkness did I find.
The deposition had been taken by an attorney from West Palm
Beach who had received a similar assignment of mortgage from the
plaintiff in a foreclosure case he was defending. His too was signed
by Several Salmons. This badass barrister, one Thomas E. Ice, asked
her some highly pertinent questions about her authority to bind the
bank with her signature:
Q. The question was, you have no job duties as an assistant

secretary of MERS, correct?
A. I do not have any job duties other than signing the assign-
ments and mortgage. Does that help?
Q. Yes. Here, I’ll try to rephrase this. Do you attend any board
meetings at MERS?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you attend any meetings at all at MERS?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you report to the secretary of MERS?
A. No, sir.
Q. Who is the secretary of MERS?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Are you involved in any governance of MERS?
A. No, sir.
Q. [Y]ou can also sign as a vice president of MERS, correct?
A. Yes.
11
Kenneth Trent
Q. And in that capacity, you don’t report to the president of

MERS, correct?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have any MERS employees who report to you?
A. No, sir.
Q. Do you have any vote or say in any corporate decisions of
MERS?
A. No.
Q. Where are the MERS offices located?
A. I can’t remember.
Q. How many offices do they have?
A. I have no idea.
Q. Do you know where their headquarters are?
A. Nope.
Q. How many employees do they have?
A. I have no idea.
Wow! This is mind-blowing testimony! Salmons went on to

admit, in response to further questioning by this very fine attorney,
that she regularly signed assignments of mortgage for at least two
hours per day, at least five days per week, and that she spent “very
little” time per document.
Each assignment of mortgage pertained to a different family’s
home, and each assignment of mortgage was utilized in a single fore-
closure lawsuit. The woman admitted she knew nothing about the
bank (actually, banks) for which she was signing and further con-
ceded that she was not employed by MERS or any other financial
entity.
Instead, she was an employee of the Law Office of David J.
Stern, one who was making a six-figure yearly salary despite the fact
that her education ended at twelfth grade.
The signer having no relation to the financial institutions
whose assets were being transferred with each stroke of her pen, the
assignment in Mr. Down’s case, and those the Stern firm filed in
over 100,000 other Florida foreclosures, were fabricated, fraudulent,
12
and felonious. They didn’t even qualify as toilet paper, except maybe
during the coronavirus outbreak!
I would eventually be blessed to understand that my first
“assignment” was neither an anomaly nor an aberration. It was no
more or less invalid than all the other assignments of mortgage pre-
sented in uncountable big-bank foreclosures—nationwide! They
were ALL garbage.
Remarkably, the Law Office of David Stern wasn’t an outlier
either. Instead, I would learn that there was a group of ten to fifteen
law firms in the nation which sued homeowners for foreclosure on
behalf of the big banks, and that each and every one of them engaged
in robo-signing en masse in a manner almost identical to that of the
Stern firm.
As I suggested earlier, by the time I became fully aware of what
they were doing, Stern and his minions had obtained final judgments
of foreclosure based upon robo-signed documentation, a.k.a. fabri-
cated evidence, against more than 100,000 Americans in Florida
alone!
Robo-signing is one of the many nasty offspring of MERS.
The assembly-line manufacturing of fake assignments of mortgage
is a symptom of the original MERS virus—one which, by “commu-
nity spread,” infected the titles to properties from sea to shining sea
and metabolized due process into screw process. MERS, spread by
Doppelgänger & Co.
Although my immediate concern was saving the Downs’ home,
I started to believe that there was more I could do. I began to cook
up a formula to make things right, one that would result in at least
some compensation for the tens of thousands of Florida homeowners
whose properties had been stolen by David J. Stern.
At last, I thought I found a chemistry class that I could pass!
13
C h a pte r 3
In case there are any stragglers, I have a simple little story to tell you.
This story illustrates in the most basic terms the nature of the con-
flict which arises in virtually every foreclosure trial nowadays. Let’s
lighten things up a bit with… the Foreclosure Fairy Tale.
In this story, a car is the same as a house. Imagine this.
Hulk Hogan and Michael Jackson have made a deal. Hulk is
going to sell Michael a certain very fine, special-edition chartreuse
Yugo for twelve monthly payments of $600. Michael drives away in
the flashy and pitifully underpowered Yugo and starts making his
payments.
As part of the deal, of course, the parties signed a written agree-
ment, which provides that if Michael fails to make all the payments,
Hulk can repossess the car. “Diff!” says Hulk to himself.
Michael spends too much time with his doctor and forgets to
make some payments on the Yugo.
Because the deal was made in Louisiana, where the rules are jus’
diff ’rent, Hulk couldn’t backhand MJ to the deep end and take the
car back. He was required to go to court and make a minimal show-
ing to be authorized to move ahead with the repossession.
Problem is, Hulk never did go to court, and no one can find
him. Sometime later, Britney Spears files a lawsuit against the King
of Pop[ping alprazolam], accusing MJ of failing to make all the pay-
ments, demanding return of the car, money damages, interest, late
fees, and so on.
At trial, each side represents itself. Britney calls Michael to the
stand and asks him three questions, all of which he answers truth-
fully, unlike the bankers:
14
Q: Isn’t it true, Michael, that you agreed to pay twelve monthly

payments of $600 to purchase that certain special-edition
chartreuse Yugo?
A: Yes.
Q: Isn’t it true, Michael, that you failed to make all the payments?
A: Yes.
Q: Didn’t you sign this agreement right here which says that if
you don’t make all the payments, the car will be repossessed?
A: Yes.
Britney rests her case.

Michael Jackson, our defendant, asks the judge to dismiss the
case because no evidence has been presented to show that Britney,
who changed her name to “BankHer” during the trial, has the right
to stand in Hulk Hogan’s shoes and enforce the contract.
Judge turns to BankHer for a response. She repeats herself sev-
eral times, making the same argument over and over, while chang-
ing a few words back and forth for variety. Singing, dancing, doing
gymnastics, falling down while attempting the moonwalk to a chorus
of boos, she tells us over and over that “Michael ADMITS he didn’t
make all the payments!”
Ohhh-kayy. That’s like, a Daffy Duck argument or something—
that birds don’t hunt in the field of justice, if ya know what I mean.
Michael shuts down the Daffy Duck argument with one smooth
statement: “She proved I owe money, but she didn’t prove I owed the
money to HER.”
Who’s bad?
In the simplified world we envision here, the result would be
that Michael gets to keep the pretentious miniature jalopy until Hulk
Hogan appears and lays claim to his contractual rights.
Our fictitious little trial has a lot in common with a typical
foreclosure trial conducted in the real world. It takes a third grader
with a modicum of intelligence to see that what Britney was saying
has nothing whatsoever to do with the question of her identity in
relation to the loan contract.
15
Kenneth Trent
Tragically, over the last decade, if not century, the Daffy Duck
argument, that is, the repetition of the undisputed fact that the bor-
rowers have not made a payment for months or even years carries the
day and is treated as if it changes the fact that no money whatsoever
is owed to the plaintiff!
To take our fairy-tale scenario to the next level, imagine that
after the case is dismissed, Britney comes up with a document which
shows that Hulk transferred or assigned the loan to Britney, such
that she would have the right to do anything Hulk could have done
under the loan agreement. But when Michael looks at the signatures,
all he sees are strange-looking signatures of persons not named Hulk
Hogan. Britney says those people were authorized by Hulk to sign
for him. Even though the assignment was dated last week, it was later
discovered that the Hulk went home to Jesus some three years back.
The judge reverses his previous ruling and gives Britney the
Yugo and everything else she could dream of. So in the end, the
complete stranger to the deal blows through the door, waving a man-
ufactured document and—wham bam—thank you, ma’am, that’s it,
game over.
Is it? Not if I can help it.
Just another day at the courthouse—courtesy of MERS.
16
C h a pte r 4
Again acting contrary to the way one would expect, the Chiti-Stern
team moved for a postponement of the January foreclosure trial,
which the court granted. I promptly arranged for my own appoint-
ment with Salmons, and as part of the invitation, I asked for random
samples of other assignments in which Salmons was named. I also
requested samples of Shannon Smith’s signature. The assignment
reflects that Smith notarized it and signed it in her notarial capacity.
I eagerly anticipated my opportunity to ask questions to
Salmons. The deposition was finally convened on April 29, 2010.
Here is how it went:
Q: State your name for the record please.

A: Several Salmons.
Q: Can you spell that?
A: S-E-V-E-R-A-L last name Salmons, S-A-L-M-O-N-S.
Q: Do you have your driver’s license here with you today? Let
me see it please.
MR TRENT: Let the record reflect that she is handing me her
driver’s license.
Q: I see that you signed your driver’s license. Is that the way you
normally sign your name?
A: That was signed approximately ten years ago. It has been
renewed via e-mail. So yes, back then, that was the way I
signed my name.
Q: Back then when you signed your name, you actually wrote
out your name in a manner that everybody could pretty
much see—
A: Read it.
17
Kenneth Trent
Q: And read it?

A: Yes.
Q: Did there came a time that you started signing your name
in a different way?
A: I do sign my name in a different way many times. Yes.
Sometimes in my personal business, I actually spell my
name out so it is readable. But more often, at work, I
don’t. It is my initials because I sign a lot of documents.
Q: Are you a notary public?
A: Yes.
Q: As a notary public, is there one of your signatures that you
use more than you use the others?
A: I would venture to say that more often than not it is my ini-
tials at this point in time.
Q: Has it ever occurred to you that a person’s signature is
expected to be somewhat consistent so that if an issue ever
arises with regard to the legitimacy of a signature, it can be
compared with others?
A: To be honest with you, no, it did not occur to me. I know my
signature, so if it were ever in question, I would be able to
tell you if I signed something.
Q: How many different signatures do you use?
A: Probably two. One if I am writing maybe a check. I may spell
my name out a little bit more coherently. But more often
than not, it is my initials.
*****
Q: How long have you worked for David Stern’s office?

A: Approximately twenty years.
Q: And during that time, have you become familiar with corpo-
rations in Florida and the ways that they generally operate?
A: It is not part of my day-to-day job requirements, no.
Q: But have you become familiar with corporations as legal
entities?
A: I guess I don’t understand the question.
18
Q: Tell me everything you know about corporations.

A: In respect to what a corporation is?
Q: Yes.
A: In respect to what a corporation does?
Q: Yes. Both.
A: They can be lots of different things. I don’t really have a
general knowledge. I guess I am still a little confused as to
what you are asking me.
*****
Q: I am now going to hand you the assignment of mortgage.

I will ask you to look that over and tell me when you are
finished.
A: I am finished.
Q: Have you seen this before?
A: I signed it.
Q: That wasn’t my question. Do you recognize it?
A: I do not recognize this particular one piece of paper.
Q: How do you know that you signed it?
A: Because that is my signature.
Q: Show me on this page where your signature appears. Any
other places?
A: No.
Q: You see down on the left-hand side where it says, “witness:
Shannon Smith”?
A: Yes.
Q: You see her signature there?
A: I do.
Q: And you also see her signature down at the bottom in the
Notary section?
A. Yes.
Q: Can you tell us how it is that you can distinguish between
your signature above your name and the signature above
Shannon Smith’s name?
19
Kenneth Trent
A: Well, the first difference is that this one, Shannon’s, is entirely

too neat to be my signature.
Q: What other differences do you see between the signature
that is supposedly yours and the signatures that are sup-
posedly Shannon’s?
A: There is a second loop in my signature because I put C-L-S,
which is my initial. She appears to be using like an S-S.
But if you look at this loop, this is an L. It is C-L-S.
Q: You would agree with me that her signature looks pretty
similar to yours, wouldn’t you?
A: On this document, yes, it does. But I know that is not my
signature.
*****
Q: So is it your position, then, at the time you allegedly signed

this assignment of mortgage, you had authority to assign
the subject mortgage and promissory note to CitiMortgage
Inc.?
A: Yes.
Q: When did you sign this?
A: February 5, 2009.
Q: As of February 5, 2009, did the Law Office of David J. Stern
represent MERS?
A: Yes.
Q: As of February 5, 2009, did the Law Office of David J. Stern
represent CitiMortgage Inc.?
A: Yes.
Q: As of February 5, 2009, were you an assistant secretary for
MERS?
A: Yes.
Q: Tell me what duties you performed, at or about that time, as
assistant secretary for MERS.
A: My duty was to sign assignments.
Q: How would you know when you needed to sign an
assignment?
20
A: Because the file—the assignment would be prepared and the

file laid out for my signature.
Q: Would you speak with someone from MERS who would
give you authority to sign a document like this?
A: No.
*****
Q: I will ask you to take a look at, I guess, it’s the third line
down. It is the start of the first full paragraph. It says
“residing or located at: c/o PO Box 790014, St. Louis,
Missouri, 63179.” Do you see that?
A: Yes.
Q: First of all, whose address is that?
A: CitiMortgage.
Q: Doesn’t this say that Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems, MERS, resides or is located there?
A: It says “care of.”
Q: Care of who?
A: Care of PO Box 790014, which is CitiMortgage. MERS
doesn’t hold anything in their office.
Q: So PO Box 790014, you are telling me is like a d/b/a or a
fictitious name for CitiMortgage?
A: No. CitiMortgage is one of many servicers that actually ser-
vices the loan on behalf of MERS. MERS doesn’t actually
have any loans in their office.
*****
Q: If you could go back please to the assignment of mortgage,

we are on the first sentence of the first paragraph. You see
where it says, “For and in consideration of the sum of one
dollar” on the second line of that paragraph?
A: Yes, I do.
Q: Did you pay that dollar, or did you receive that dollar?
21
Kenneth Trent
A: I did not have anything to do with any money changing

hands on these assignments.
Q: So when you executed this assignment, did you take any
steps to determine whether or not this one dollar had actu-
ally changed hands?
A: No.
Q: Who would I ask to find that out?
A: I have no idea.
Q: It says, “Other good and valuable consideration.” Do you
see that?
A: I do.
Q: In executing this document, for and on behalf of MERS, can
you tell me what other good and valuable consideration
there was that gave rise to this assignment?
A: No, I cannot.
Q: Do you have any idea who I could contact to find out?
A: No.
Q: It says, “The receipt of which is hereby acknowledged.” Do
you see that?
A: Yes. I do.
Q: Did you acknowledge receipt of that one dollar and other
good and valuable consideration when you signed this
document?
A: No.
Q: Can you tell me where, on here, any person signed to
acknowledge receipt of that one dollar and other good and
valuable consideration?
A: No.
Q: So when it says, “The receipt of which is hereby acknowl-
edged,” is that an error?
A: I have no idea.
Q: Is there anybody who would have more information about
this transaction reflected in this assignment than you?
A: No.
*****
22
Q: Is there anyone who signed this assignment who was, at the

time they signed, attesting to or approving all the terms
in it?
A: I do not have an answer to that question.
Q: Why don’t you have an answer?
A: Because I do not know what you are thinking needs to be
attested to, other than the fact that MERS was not the
proper plaintiff, and there needed to be an assignment
into CitiMortgage to foreclose the mortgage.
Q: What I am thinking needs to be approved or ratified are the
terms that are written in this document.
A: Okay.
Q: So did anyone, to your knowledge, approve and agree with
all those terms in signing this document?
A: I do not have an answer to that question.
Q: If you don’t know, then the answer would be no.
A: Okay. No.
*****
Q: Is it your testimony that, that is Shannon Smith’s signature

on that line?
A: I cannot testify that—how Shannon signs her name. I know
it is not my signature.
Q: So you are not familiar with Shannon’s signature?
A: I have seen Shannon’s signature. But can I swear, you know,
that I saw her sign that? No, I cannot. But that looks like
Shannon’s signature.
Q: How many different signatures—sorry if I asked this
before—do you have?
A: I have two or three.
Q: How many different signatures does Shannon Smith have?
A: I do not know.
23
C h a pte r 5
Ultimately, on June 16, 2010, Chiti dismissed its foreclosure lawsuit
against Mr. and Mrs. Down. That freed me up to pursue the plan
I had been formulating: to file a class action lawsuit against David
J. Stern and his law office to obtain redress for all the people whose
properties had been stolen through the use of fabricated evidence.
One of the people I reached out to as I was planning the class
action was a man by the name of Ignacio Damian Figueroa, known
as Damian or D. Damian was the creator of the website www.
StopForeclosureFraud.com, which was where I had found the “Full
Deposition of the Soon to be Infamous Several Salmons.” Damian
was a local realtor who had gotten suspicious when he reviewed a
complaint filed by Stern’s office, seeking to foreclose upon his home.
This was before I knew anything about Stern, MERS, or robo-sign-
ing. Simply by talking to people and conducting Internet research,
Damian became convinced that something was very, very wrong
with the way Stern foreclosures, and foreclosures in general, were
being conducted, thus, the website.
Damian became a good friend, and he agreed to serve as class
representative in my lawsuit against Stern.
In planning for the lawsuit, I needed to figure out who I was
going to sue, other than Stern and his law firm. MERS, of course,
was a good place to start since it was named in the vast majority
of fabricated assignments of mortgage I had found in the official
records. For Broward County alone, where I live and where Stern’s
office was located, I had found more than 1,000 before I stopped
counting.
24
I spent some time reviewing certain clauses in the standard

mortgage contract, ones which reference MERS. First, in the defini-
tions section of the MERS mortgage, it states as follows:
“MERS” is Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc.
MERS is a separate corporation that is acting solely as nominee for
lender and lender’s successors and assigns [huh?]. MERS is the mort-
gagee under this security instrument.
On page 3, there is a paragraph which describes the role of
MERS, sort of,
This security instrument secures to lender: (i) the repayment of
the loan, and all renewals, extensions, and modifications of the note;
and (ii) the performance of borrower’s covenants and agreements
under this security instrument and the note.
So far, it makes some sense. The major wonkiness starts with
the next line:
For this purpose [what purpose?], borrower does hereby mort-
gage, grant, and convey to MERS (solely as nominee for lender
and lender’s successors and assigns)[who?]and to the successors and
assigns of MERS [who?] the following described property located in
the County of Broward [country of, I’m guessing…Greece?]
Thereafter, the strange verbiage continues:
Borrower understands [yeah, right] and agrees that MERS
holds only legal title to the interests granted by borrower in this secu-
rity instrument, but if necessary to comply with law or custom [it
could never be], MERS (as nominee for lender and lender’s succes-
sors and assigns) [¿quien?] has the right to exercise any or all those
interests, including, but not limited to, the right to foreclose and sell
the property.
MERS folks, whoever they may be, are really, really good at
writing sophisticated-sounding sentences which have little to no
actual meaning. In conducting my research, I found a decision of the
Supreme Court of Nebraska in which the court said that listening to
the various lawyers attempting to explain what a “nominee” is in rela-
tion to MERS is like listening to the blind men in the ancient fable
attempting to explain an elephant while each one of them is holding
on to a different part of the animal. As I later wrote, “Upon reading
25
Kenneth Trent
the standard mortgage clauses pertaining to MERS, even persons of

high intelligence will have a sense that they should, but do not quite,
comprehend them.”
I learned that Several Salmons was one of approximately 20,000
persons, spread from sea to shining sea, who signed legal instruments
such as assignments of mortgage on behalf of MERS and any or all
of its “member institutions,” to be used as evidence in foreclosure
proceedings. These office staffers, most of whom worked for the fore-
closure mill law firms, had no education or experience that would
have qualified them to be a vice president of one financial institution,
much less a dozen of them at one time.
Who is a part of MERS, you ask? Here’s a list of its shareholders
taken from the MERS website in August of 2011:
American Land Title Association

Bank of America
CCO Mortgage
Chase Home Mortgage Corp.
CitiMortgage Inc.
Commercial Mortgage Securities Association
Corinthian Mortgage Corp.
EverHome Mortgage Company
Fannie Mae
First American Title Insurance Corp.
Freddie Mac
GMAC Residential Funding Corp.
Guaranty Bank
HSBC Finance Corp.
Merrill Lynch Credit Corp.
MGIC Investor Services Corp.
Mortgage Bankers Association
Nationwide Advantage Mortgage Company
PMI Mortgage Insurance Company
Stewart Title Guaranty Company
SunTrust Mortgage Inc.
AIG United Guaranty Corp.
26
Washington Mutual Bank

Wells Fargo Bank, NA
Suspicious yet? As a test, I would like you, the reader, to com-

plete the following:
One member of MERS who is not listed above is
a. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

b. Federal Mortgage Assistance Group
c. Federal Home Lawn Mowing Co.
d. None of the above
You guessed it. The answer is “d) None of the above.” The
name which belongs in the blank can be found by referring to fig-
ure 2. *One member of MERS who is not mentioned above is the
Federal…BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.*
Perhaps even more important than the question of who is the
question of why. WHY do the bankers need to use fabricated, made-
to-order evidence in every single foreclosure, so much so that they set
up a network of twenty thousand people to manufacture the docu-
ments? The answer to that question, ladies and gentlemen, is the epic
“bankers’ secret” revealed in this book. Actually, it’s one of the TWO
secrets blown wide open in this book.
No, please don’t skip to the end. I want you to see the entire
picture, bit by bit, as it comes into focus. These particular secrets are
so large that they can only be digested one bite at a time.
27
C h a pte r 6
In New Jersey, another attorney who was trying to defend a foreclo-
sure took the deposition of the “person with the most knowledge”
concerning the operations of MERS. The man who came out from
behind the curtain and sat down to explain the mysterious organi-
zation identified himself as one William Hultman. According to his
public profile, he has a bachelor’s degree in physics, a master’s in
statistics, and a law degree. Even a man such as Hultman, who is
“the one with the most knowledge” and who touts academic and
intellectual credentials of the highest order, struggled just a bit when
called upon to identify and explain MERS. Of course, there is an
alternative interpretation: that he was trying to confuse the lawyer.
You be the judge.
Q: Did the company that was formed in 1995, Mortgage

Electronic Registration Systems Inc., go out of existence
at some point?
A: Yes.
Q: When did it go out of existence?
A: June 30, 1998.
Q: And was there a successor company that took over its
responsibilities?
A: Yes.
Q: And what was the successor company?
A: Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. that was
incorporated on June 30, 1998.
Q: Am I correct that this, for purposes of clarity, this is the
second entity created with the name Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems, Inc.?
28
A: Yes.
Q: And did that entity, the one that was formed on June 30,
1998, go out of existence at some point?
A: No.
Q: And can you explain to me, a noncorporate lawyer, how
two companies with identical names can exist at the same
time?
A: It can’t.
Q: I’m sorry?
A: They cannot.
Q: They cannot. So can you explain to me, for purposes of
clarity, I’m going to ask you, was the company that came
into existence on January 1, 1999, the third company with
the identical name of Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems Inc.?
A: Yes.
Q: You told us the first company went out of existence at some
point. What happened to the second company around the
time the third company was formed?
A: It changed its name and gave us consent that the new corpo-
ration take its name.
Q: Okay. And when did this name change take place?
A: January 1, 1999.
Q: And what was the name change, please?
A: The name was changed to Merscorp Inc.
Here is where the poor lawyer gets hit with some of the symp-
toms of the original MERS virus: extreme confusion and lots of
self-doubt:
Q: I’m sorry, that was—that’s the name of the third—I’m sorry.

Withdrawn. Withdrawn. So there’s an entity that comes
into existence on January 1, 1999, known as Merscorp
Inc.?
A: No.
Q: I’m sorry, straighten me out. I’m confused.
29
Kenneth Trent
A: Are you asking me a question?
*****
Q: Now, I’m trying to follow the path taken by the entity that
held a meeting on April 9, 1998. Is the entity that met on
April 9, 1998, now known as Merscorp Inc.?
A: No.
Q: Is the entity that met on April 9, 1998, now known as
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc.?
A: If you mean the corporation incorporated in 1999, no.
Q: What is the entity, if anything, that met on April 9, 1998,
known as?
A: It doesn’t exist.
Q: I think I’m getting a better understanding. [Yeah, right!]
When did this entity that met on April 9, 1998, cease
existing?
A: June 30, 1998.
Q: I’m sorry, I have to go offline.
[Caller disconnects.]
*****
Q: Now, when MERS 3 was created, you’ve indicated there was

a division of responsibilities between MERS 3 and the
entity that became Merscorp Inc., is that correct?
A: There is no Merscorp Inc. Oh, excuse me, I’m sorry, yes. I
wasn’t listening carefully.
A little later on during the deposition, the traumatized attorney

began asking the witness about an attorney named Mr. Hellion, as in
“Phelon, Hellion, and Snide.” Apparently, Mr. Hellion had signed an
assignment of mortgage relevant to the case in which the deposition
was being taken. The attorney wanted the witness, Mr. Hultman,
to explain exactly how it was that this foreclosure mill partner, Mr.
Hellion, had become an assistant secretary of MERS:
30
Q: Did they give you any indication of what documents if

anything they had looked at before advising you that Mr.
Hellion was an officer of MERS?
A: I don’t recall.
Q: Do the assistant secretaries of the corporation report to the
secretary of the corporation?
A: Yes.
Q: How often does Mr. Hellion report to you?
A: I don’t believe I’ve ever spoken to or heard from him.
Q: Do the assistant secretaries—first off, are you a salaried
employee of MERS?
A: No.
Q: Are you a salaried employee of Merscorp Inc.?
A: Yes.
Q: Are any of the employees of MERS Inc. salaried employees?
A: I don’t understand your question.
Q: Does anyone get a paycheck—if they are an employee of
MERS Inc., do they get a paycheck from MERS Inc.?
A: There is no MERS Inc.
Q: I thought, sir, there is a company that was formed January
1, 1999, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc.
Does it have paid employees?
A: No, it does not.
Q: Does it have employees?
A: No.
Q: Just so there’s not any confusion [BAHAHAHAHAH!], I
have been using MERS, but I thought we had an agree-
ment earlier today that [that] would be a shorthand for
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. Have you
been confused?
A: I was confused because you were using MERS Inc. There is
no [one behind the curtain] MERS Inc.
Q: Thank you. Does MERS have any salaried employees?
A: No.
Q: Does MERS have any employees?
31
Kenneth Trent
A: No. [So who were all those people wandering around in the
background during the PBS interview of RK Arnold at
what was supposedly MERS headquarters?]
Q: In the last five years, has MERS had any employees?
A: No.
Q: To whom do the officers of MERS report?
A: The board of directors.
Q: To your knowledge, has Mr. Hellion ever reported to the
board?
A: He would’ve reported through me if there was something to
report.
Q: So if I understand your answer, at least, the MERS officers
reflected on Hellion exhibit 4, if they had something to
report, would report to you even though you are not an
employee of MERS. Is that correct?
A: That’s correct.
Q: And in what capacity would they report to you?
A: As a corporate officer. I’m the secretary.
Q: As a corporate officer of what?
A: Of MERS.
Q: So you are the secretary of MERS, but you are not an
employee of MERS?
A: That’s correct.
Q: How many assistant secretaries have you appointed pursuant
to the April 9, 1998, resolution, how many assistant secre-
taries of MERS have you appointed?
A: I don’t know that number. [He said he has a bachelor’s in
physics!]
Q: Approximately?
A: I couldn’t even begin to tell you right now.
Q: Is it in the thousands?
A: Yes.
Q: Have you been doing this all around the country in every
state in the country?
A: Yes. [What did I tell you? The epidemic is indeed nationwide!]
32
Q: And all these officers I understand are unpaid officers of

MERS?
A: Yes.
Q: And there is no live person who is an employee of MERS
that they report to. Is that correct?
A: There are no employees of MERS. [Only doppelgängers!]
Having apparently gotten at least some portion of his sea legs

under him, the attorney moved on to questioning the witness about
whether MERS actually owns any mortgages at all.
Q: What is the value of the mortgage to MERS when it’s

recorded?
A: I don’t understand what you mean by that.
Q: Well, doesn’t it have some value to MERS that MERS can
sell it for?
A: If you mean can we sell the mortgage and receive consider-
ation or monetary value, no.
Q: Does MERS report the mortgage as an asset?
A: No.
Q: Does MERS pay any taxes [ever?] on the mortgage?
[Anything? Nope!]
A: Well, there are recording taxes paid in certain jurisdictions by
the borrower. [Good one, guy. Now MERS is “nominee”
for the borrower too?]
Q: Other than those recording taxes, does MERS pay any taxes
on it as if it were a property asset?
A: No.
Q: When an assistant secretary assigns a mortgage, does MERS
receive any money?
A: No.
Q: When a certifying officer [assistant secretary] assigns a mort-
gage, and this is where MERS is the mortgagee of record,
does the certifying officer request permission of MERS
before assigning the mortgage interest?
A: No.
33
Kenneth Trent
Q: When the certifying officer assigns a mortgage in MERS’

name, does the certifying officer provide a copy of the
assignment to MERS?
A: No.
Q: Do the MERS officers from the Phelon, Hellion, and Snide
firm receive compensation or a remuneration or consid-
eration of any kind for performing duties on behalf of
MERS?
A: I don’t understand your question.
Q: Well, they are performing a service. The lawyers from Phelon,
Hellion, and Snide, when they act as certifying officers of
MERS, are they performing a service for MERS?
A: Are they providing a service to MERS, is that your question?
Q: Yes.
A: They are carrying out the authority granted to them under
the corporate resolution.
Q: And is that authority to do something on behalf of MERS?
[Here comes humongous!]
A: To the extent that the servicer or investor has asked them to
assign an instrument, taking that security interest out of
legal title from MERS to someone else, that’s what they
are doing.
Q: Do they receive any consideration, remuneration, salary,
benefits, bonuses, anything of value from MERS for per-
forming that service?
A: No.
Q: If the servicer gave instructions to the law firm to bring a
foreclosure action in the name of MERS, would that be
consistent with MERS’ terms and conditions or in viola-
tion of MERS’ terms and conditions?
A: So long as it wasn’t in the state of Florida. Investors or ser-
vicers are the ones [oooooh!] who make the election [one
day, my valued readers will make an election!] to decide
whether to foreclose in the name of MERS or in the name
of some other party, and if they choose to do it in the
34
name of MERS, they just need to follow our rules and

procedures. [The title of which is “Lie, Cheat, and Steal!”]
Whew! That’ll be enough of that for me, thanks! All that drivel
finally paid off at the end—did you catch that? He is testifying in
these last dozen lines or so that foreclosures are brought in whatever
name the so-called servicer may select for use as the plaintiff.
Hmmm.
If you are wondering to yourself right now in reading this some-
thing to the effect of, “Isn’t it supposed to be the bank who owns
your loan that is named as the plaintiff in the case?” you are right on
point.
I’m not sure whether I have mentioned this yet, but in many,
many instances, the name of the plaintiff in the foreclosure court papers
with which the homeowner is allegedly served is something along the
lines of “THE BANK OF NEW YORK F/K/A THE BANK OF
NEW YORK FELON, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CERTIFICATE
HOLDERS CWABS, INC. ASSET-BACKED CERTIFICATES,
SERIES 2005-AB3.” Names like this ostensibly include the name of
the “trust” into which a particular homeowner/defendant’s loan was
deposited or, ironically, “securitized.” The trustee of the acquiring
trust should be named as the plaintiff in any foreclosure action. Yet
the MERS “secretary,” Hultman, just informed us that the name of
the plaintiff is whichever old one the “servicer” selects.
Could it be that the name of the trust into which a particular
loan was allegedly placed is “whichever old one the servicer selects”?
After hearing what Hultman had to say, I felt ready to get started
on the class action complaint!
35
C h a pte r 7
I decided that the best legal theory to be asserted against Stern
and MERS was a civil RICO claim. RICO is an abbreviation for
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act. It is a federal
law which allows aggrieved persons (victims) to sue for three times
the amount of their actual damages plus attorney’s fees. It seemed
to fit. Lord knows we had no shortage of “corrupt organizations”!
When I wrote the first version of the class action complaint, I sat
down at the keyboard and banged it out in one seating, from start
to finish. I was taught in law school to write in short basic sentences
when drafting legal documents. But in this case, I was totally fired
up, so I let it all hang out. Here is my initial complaint, with a small
amount of editing to eliminate technical allegations and unnecessar-
ily dense legal verbiage.
A Subtle Stranger Orchestrates a Paradigm Shift
In and about the years 2001 and 2002, the mortgage industry
introduced new “products” into the American marketplace. These
products included “nondocumentation loans” and adjustable rate
mortgages, known as ARMS. Mortgage lenders, acting in coordi-
nation with one another, relaxed their standards for lending, which
made an entirely new class of lower-income individuals eligible to
receive loans. This, in turn, drove up property “values.” The banks
“accepted” appraisals, “documenting” the new higher values and
approved hundreds of thousands of applications for financing, many
of which were almost laughably fraudulent in their representations
concerning the financial profiles of the applicants. It was all a part of
their plan.
36
Unbeknownst to the borrowers and the public, the billions of

dollars spent to finance these loans were used simply to “prime the
pump.” The big institutions and the conspirators were making an
investment, but the expected return was NOT the interest the lend-
ers pretended to expect from the mortgages. The lenders knew that
the new loans were “bad paper”; this was of little concern to them,
however, because they believed that their sophisticated and grandiose
conspiracy would result in profits so great as to be beyond the imagi-
nation of average persons. Similarly, beyond the imagination of most
persons is and was the scope and sophistication of the fundamental
DISHONESTY of the lenders. Through the present time, persons
now operating within the ambit of this conspiracy, most particularly
including the defendants herein, have continued to operate consis-
tent with the core principles of dishonesty and obscurantism engen-
dered by the original conspirators. These dark influences have spread
throughout the financial services, lending and banking industries,
into the national economy and beyond, threatening the economic
stability of the United States and the world as a whole.
This court is urged in the strongest possible way to apply a pre-
sumption of FALSITY when reviewing any documentary evidence
filed in this court by one or more of the defendants. Such a presump-
tion is not just warranted; it is indeed compelled by the extent to
which the defendants and those with which they are associated have
long acted in a malicious and wanton manner, evincing complete
contempt for the judicial process and the rights of persons having
interests contrary to their own. This is particularly true because the
defendants’ contempt for due process is compounded by their spe-
cific intention to obviate the requirement that documents prepared
for legal use be truthful, authentic, and legitimate.
There is one sort of lie that, when later discovered, constitutes
the strongest possible proof of a person’s malicious intentions. What
is it? A lie about one’s name or identity. Many such lies are present in
this instance. The whole purpose of MERS is to allow “servicers” to
pretend as if they are someone else: the “owners” of the mortgage or
the real parties in interest. In fact, they are not. In the years leading
up to the introduction of these new types of loans, the conspirators
37
Kenneth Trent
laid the groundwork, which would grow into a new mortgage lending
infrastructure: a new paradigm in which the allocations of risk and
reward were dramatically altered in favor of these monied interests
and to the detriment of common consumers. One material bulwark
in the support for this new paradigm was the routine inclusion in
new mortgages of intentionally ambiguous and infinitely malleable
provisions pertaining to MERS. As is the case with most of the writ-
ten documents routinely used in the scheme, such as “assignments”
and complaints for foreclosure, each word concerning MERS is care-
fully crafted so as to allow those relying upon it to infinitely recede
in their positions and to be moving targets unreachable by standard
legal means. Upon reading the standard mortgage clauses pertaining
to MERS, even persons of high intelligence will have a sense that
they should but do not quite understand exactly what they mean.
Throughout this series of events, the conspirators behind
MERS took new and better steps to make their activities impossible
to trace. The lenders promptly sold the loans, in secretive transac-
tions, to “investors” for some percentage or fraction of what had been
the alleged value of the mortgage and the property by which it was
secured just days or weeks earlier. By constantly changing “servicers”
on these loans and by sending out notices of such changes drafted in
their characteristically ambiguous verbiage, the bankers behind the
scenes began to take more and more advantage of the borrowers. In
this new order, words had new meanings.
The revolutionary ways in which words were utilized all shared
one characteristic: they made it more difficult to determine who
had the right to receive and utilize for their own purposes the pay-
ments made on the loan by the borrower. For example, “mortgagee”
began to have a meaning other than “lender.” “Servicer” arose to
prominence and was subtly utilized to blur the distinctions further.
Sometimes, the “servicer” is the real party in interest, and sometimes,
it is not, and the borrower has no right to know which is the case as
to their own mortgage.
MERS evolved into an “ultrafictitious” entity, a “metacorpo-
ration.” To cover their tracks and prevent the truth about the mas-
sive scheme from being revealed, MERS and other artifices were
38
used so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, could

never determine who or what was ultimately receiving the benefits
of their payments. The conspirators set about to confuse everyone
as to who owned what so that the true perpetrators of any illegal act
could never be identified. They created a truly effective smokescreen,
which has left the public and most of the judiciary operating “in the
dark” through the present time.
Although not an element of the plaintiff ’s cause of action, the
truth of the matter is that reasoned contemplation of the available
facts leads to a stunning realization: the mortgage crisis and result-
ing economic downturn with which the United States is currently
afflicted was planned in advance by certain scions of Wall Street.3 In
addition to the other incriminating facts set forth in this complaint
and documented in the exhibits hereto, consider this: On its web-
site, www.mersinc.org, Defendant Merscorp lists the shareholders of
MERS. Among the shareholders of MERS, according to the site, are
the following institutions: Bank of America, Chase, CitiMortgage
Inc., Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, HSBC, SunTrust, and Wells Fargo.
These are many of the same institutions the defendant firm rep-
resents. This is no coincidence as these entities are coconspirators
in the MERS scheme herein described. The conspirators intended
to maintain an absolute stranglehold on the American economy for
many decades, if not centuries, into the future. This could only be
accomplished if the scheme was able to evolve over time in a chang-
ing regulatory and consumer environment. The point is that the con-
spirators adjusted the American lending system and the legal system,
governing it in a way designed to most effectively gratify their greedy
interests over the longest time.
Through this revolution in the use of words and ephemeral
concepts such as the “corporation,” the conspirators, including the
present defendants, have by and large been successful in changing the
paradigm so that the rights of individuals are no longer afforded the
safeguards which have been carefully maintained in place since the
time of the Magna Carta. As the conspirators and present defendants
3
No, this isn’t the bankers’ Secret. Relax.
39
Kenneth Trent
have long intended, certain important terms in the mortgages and

other legal documents are devolving into a state of meaninglessness.
Even the names of the mortgage and lending institutions are tinkered
with and interchanged so often that it is difficult to keep track of the
constantly shifting parameters of the series of alleged mergers, asser-
tions of subsidiary relationships, “divisions,” and the like with which
the American economy and consumer populace are deluged in adver-
tisements and mortgage documents. This is not some random trend
which resulted from the mortgage crisis. It is, instead, just another
tactic in the vast scheme which ultimately caused it.
The conspirators, of course, did not want there to be any docu-
mentation, which could later potentially be used as evidence of their
crimes. They did not want to pay the fees associated with recording
mortgages, and they did not want to be bothered with the trouble
of keeping track of the originals. That is the significance of the word
electronic in Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc.
The conspirators, through this exceptionally sophisticated leg-
erdemain, made over the American judicial system’s long-honored
requirements for mortgages and foreclosures to serve their own self-
ish interests and to minimize the possibilities of the victims obtain-
ing any meaningful redress through the courts. They undermined
long-established rights and sabotaged the judicial process itself by
deemphasizing the importance of, and eventually eliminating, “trou-
blesome” documentation requirements. While conversion to elec-
tronic loan documentation will eventually be implemented, it is the
people, by and through their elected representatives, who will ulti-
mately bring about this transition through duly enacted legislation.
In the cases in which the class members asserted a “standing”
defense,4 whether on their own or through counsel, the defendant
firm and defendant Merscorp Inc. relied upon MERS to obscure the
truth and illegally obtain final judgments of foreclosure. If pressed
on the standing issue, the defendant firm would generate fraudulent
4
“Standing” is the requirement that the plaintiff in the foreclosure be the bank
that is actually entitled to receive payments and foreclose. My request to pro-
duce documents in Chiti v. Down was directed to the issue of standing.
40
“assignments,” which, like all the other documents used to perpet-

uate the scheme from its inception, were intentionally ambiguous.
[A collection of “assignments” created and filed by the defendant
firm was attached.] In these remarkable and totally fraudulent instru-
ments, the following irregularities usually appeared:
a. The assignor, MERS, had the same address as the

assignee (the plaintiff ).
b. They were executed by a person having the title of
“assistant secretary.”
c. The document would have an “effective date” well
prior to the date upon which it was executed, so as to
retroactively give standing to the plaintiff.
Incredibly, since 2009, it has come to light that the persons

signing these assignments as “assistant secretary” and, occasionally,
as “vice president” of MERS are actually NOT officers or employees
of MERS. Instead, these persons, such as a woman by the name of
Several Salmons, actually are and were employees of the defendant
firm and other “foreclosure mill” law firms across the nation.
In May of 2009, an attorney who questioned the validity of such
an assignment took the deposition of Ms. Salmons at the defendant
firm’s office in Plantation, Florida. He inquired of Ms. Salmons how
she could possibly have acted on behalf of MERS and the meaning
of the label “assistant secretary.” [Here, I inserted the excerpt from
Salmons’s first deposition reprinted earlier in this book.]
The plaintiffs represented by the defendant firm simply had no
standing whatsoever. Even in the cases in which, due to a challenge
by the defendant(s), one of these bogus, fraudulent assignments was
fabricated and filed, the plaintiffs were not the real parties in interest.
The attorneys of the defendant firm filed these assignments
with the courts while being fully aware that they were misleading
fabrications designed specifically to disenfranchise the borrower-de-
fendants without due process.
The assignments, in addition to being fraudulent, were not
competent to convey any interest in the property or to bestow stand-
41
Kenneth Trent
ing upon the straw man assignee/plaintiffs. As detailed below, defen-

dant Merscorp Inc. allowed the defendant firm to use its “name” in
creating and utilizing these assignments.
The defendants, by working in concert through the use of the
MERS artifice, succeeded in obtaining final judgments of foreclosure
against the class members and in favor of plaintiffs whose standing
was nil, both substantively and technically. These final judgments led
to foreclosure sales pursuant to which the class members were dispos-
sessed of their properties. While each case proceeded along different
routes, depending on whether the homeowners attempted to defend
on their own, hired counsel, or simply allowed default to be entered,
the result was the same: the class members were robbed of their prop-
erties. The RICO enterprise herein complained of was the proximate
cause of these damages.
Defendant Merscorp Inc. maintained (and is believed to still
maintain) a relationship with the defendant firm including written
contracts and alleged corporate resolutions designed to assist the
defendant firm in effectuating the goals of the criminal enterprise
through use of the assignments. [I attached an Agreement for Signing
Authority and associated Merscorp resolution purporting to authorize
Ms. Salmons and other employees of the defendant firm to sign legal
documents as if they had actual authority to act for Merscorp and as
if Merscorp or MERS had any actual interest in the properties.] This
document is an example of the relationship between the defendants,
and it typifies the defendants’ sophisticated approach. By using one
untruth to lay a foundation and then utilizing additional lies to add
to it, the defendants sought to obtain acceptance for entire constructs
of deceit designed to serve their illegal purposes. The Agreement for
Signing Authority follows this blueprint: it establishes a false baseline
and then adds on with new falsehoods. Since Merscorp Inc. at no
time possessed any true beneficial interest in the properties, it could
not dispose of them even if it acted on its own behalf because it had
no interests to convey.
The Agreement for Signing Authority presumes that Merscorp
owns beneficial interests in the subject properties and then purports
to grant autonomy to an employee of the defendant firm to alienate
42
its nonexistent interests. Even if Merscorp Inc. had actually owned

some interest, execution of the assignments by employees of a law firm
having no personal knowledge of the transactions described therein
could not have, and cannot, attest to the veracity of the assignments
or bestow sufficient trustworthiness on the documents to qualify
them as legally competent evidence of standing to foreclose. Each
and every final judgment of foreclosure entered in favor of one of
these Stern/MERS straw men plaintiffs was obtained illegally.
The preparation, filing, and prosecution of the complaints to
“foreclose mortgage and to enforce lost loan documents” were each
predicate acts in the pattern of racketeering activity herein com-
plained of and were actions taken in furtherance of the MERS enter-
prise. The actions could not have been brought by the defendant firm
without the MERS artifice and the ability to generate any necessary
“assignment” which flowed from it. Just like MERS, the assignments
were meaningless shells designed to pull the wool over the eyes of
the judiciary and ease the burden upon the unknown real parties in
interest.
The conspiracy, as planned, took on a life of its own such that
the conspirators hoped to maintain an absolute stranglehold on
the American economy for many decades, if not centuries, into the
future. This could only be accomplished if the scheme was able to
evolve over time in a changing regulatory and consumer environ-
ment. The conspirators adjusted the American lending system and
the legal system governing it in a way designed to most effectively
gratify their greedy interests over the longest time.
The practice of “nondocumentation” can be seen as a common
thread weaving all the complained-of conduct into an undeniable
tapestry of a criminal enterprise proscribed by RICO.
The class members have the following in common:
a. Each owned Florida real property which was encum-

bered by a mortgage listing “MERS” as “mortgagee.”
b. Each suffered the loss of all right, title, and interest
in his or her property by operation of an adverse final
43
Kenneth Trent
judgment in a civil action for foreclosure in which the

plaintiff was represented by the defendant firm.
c. The foreclosure actions brought against the class
members were fraudulently prosecuted in the name of
plaintiffs which were NOT the real parties in interest
and which had no legal right to bring suit to foreclose
or to obtain final judgment.
Joinder of class members as individual plaintiffs would be totally

impractical as their number is believed to be in the tens of thousands.
This, and the other applicable criteria, support the certification of
this class by the court.
Count 1. Violation of 18 USC §1962 [c]-

Law Office of David J. Stern, PA, and David J. Stern
By engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity, specifically

“mail or wire fraud,” the defendants subject to this count partici-
pated in a criminal enterprise affecting interstate commerce. In addi-
tion to the altered postmarks described below, the mail fraud is the
sending of the fraudulent assignments and pleadings to the clerks of
court, judges, attorneys, and defendants in foreclosure cases. These
defendants intentionally participated in a scheme to defraud others,
including the plaintiff and the other class members, and utilized the
US Mail to do so.
The criminal enterprise was and is MERS, which affects inter-
state commerce in numerous ways. It is used to conceal the true own-
ership of mortgage loans from the general public, including investors,
borrowers, and the courts. Were it not for MERS, investors would be
enabled to have a clearer picture of the assets and debts of large bank-
ing and financial institutions in which they may consider investing.
Furthermore, the entire American economy has been affected by the
conspiracy described in this complaint, which is exemplified by the
MERS enterprise. The foreclosure crisis and larger economic down-
turn were substantially contributed to and are believed to have been
caused by the MERS enterprise and underlying conspiracy.
44
The “predicate acts” of fraud, which were accomplished through

the US Mail and which are specifically attributable to the defendants
subject to this count, are as follows:
a. Bringing suit on behalf of entities which were not the

real parties in interest and which had no standing to
sue. This involved, and involves, the use of the MERS
artifice.
b. Actively concealing the plaintiffs’ lack of standing in
their standard complaints for foreclosure, usually enti-
tled, “Complaint to Foreclose Mortgage and to Enforce
Lost Loan Documents.” It is believed that in 80 per-
cent or more of these complaints filed by the defendant
firm, it was asserted that the original loan documents
had mysteriously been “lost.” The defendant firm
slightly adjusted the standard complaint over time, as
problems and obstacles arose, to improve its chances
for success and perfect or improve the concealment of
the real party or parties in interest. The defendant firm
attached to these fraudulent complaints the mortgage
containing the MERS provisions quoted above. While
the title of the standard complaint makes reference to
“lost loan documents,” in the body of the standard
complaint, the defendant firm alleges that the plaintiff
is the “owner and holder” of the note and mortgage.”
Both cannot be true unless the words used are given
new meanings. Sometime after March 13, 2008, but
before February 12, 2009, the defendant firm changed
the standard complaint so that it now reads: “Plaintiff,
as servicer for the owner and acting on behalf of the
owner with authority to do so, is the present desig-
nated holder of the note and mortgage with authority
to pursue the present action.” Yet in the latest version,
the Stern Firm describes an assignment of the mort-
gage which has already occurred, with the “assignee”
being the plaintiff in the case—the same plaintiff who
45
Kenneth Trent
is simultaneously described as a “designated holder,”

who is “acting on behalf of the owner.” This is a con-
tradiction: either the plaintiff is designated to act on
behalf of the real party in interest, or it is itself the real
party in interest pursuant to the alleged “assignment.”
c. Providing misleading authorship information and
omitting the dates of foreclosure complaints. Normally,
state court complaints filed in Florida contain the date
they were signed by the plaintiff ’s attorney on the last
page, in the vicinity of the attorney’s signature. The
foreclosure complaints filed by the defendant firm
usually contained no date on the last page to signify
when they were signed and usually appeared to be
signed by some person, whose signature was illegible,
on behalf of the attorney whose name appeared in the
signature block.
d. Convincing pro se defendants to agree to a “sale date”
sometime far in the future, thereby obtaining summary
judgment from the court without any opposition. At
the date and time for the hearing on a foreclosure
plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment, attorneys
employed by the defendant firm often pull the home-
owners aside in the hallway outside the courtroom and
speak in seemingly conciliatory and reasonable terms.
They act as if they are assisting the homeowner. They
inform the unrepresented defendant something along
the lines of, “If you like, to give you time, I can ask the
court for an extended sale date.” (The amount of time
offered is usually 90–120 days). The attorney indicates
that this is a concession to allow the homeowner time
to continue his or her efforts to “modify” the mortgage
with the “lender.” The attorney then often goes into
the courtroom and informs the court that “we have
reached agreement on the motion, and the defendants
are asking for a 120-day sale date, and we have no
objection.” Almost inevitably, modification is rejected
46
by the bank, and the defendants’ properties are sold at

foreclosure sale.
e. Creating, executing, and filing fraudulent “assign-
ments.” These documents were executed by an “assis-
tant secretary” or “vice president,” apparently of MERS.
In reality, the person executing the assignments had no
knowledge whatsoever of the truth of their contents
and was simply an employee of the defendant firm.
f. Altering common hardware and/or software used by
the defendant firm so that envelopes used to mail
important legal documents, such as final judgments,
to defendants contain no date of mailing in the post-
mark and intentionally delaying in sending the mail
until defendants have lost their rights. [See figure 3].
These predicate acts constitute “mail fraud.”
g. These predicate acts are related. They share the com-
mon purpose of defrauding the class members and
other borrowers of their money and property. They
share the common themes of “nondocumentation”
and concealment of the real parties in interest.
The predicate acts satisfy the RICO continuity requirement:

they extend from in or about 1998 through today and continue
unabated, which meets the definition of “open-ended” continuity.
The threat of continued criminal activity as part of this enterprise is,
without question, still looming over the American economy. Here
is an explanation from David J. Stern of the continuing foreclosure
rout:
One of my favorite questions from one of my believers, one of
my investors on the first call-in, “What inning are we in? If this was
a baseball game, what inning are we in?” And my response is, we’re
only in the second inning. We still have three innings of foreclosures
left, and after the foreclosures, we have three innings of REO liquida-
tion, and as the REO liquidations pan out, we get into the refi, and
we get into the origination.
47
Kenneth Trent
So yeah, we’re in the second inning, but guess what, when we

get to the ninth inning, it’s going to be a doubleheader, and we got
a second game coming. So when people say, “Oh my god, the econ-
omy is bad!” I’m like, “Oh my god, it’s great.” I mean, I hate to hear
people are losing their homes, and credit isn’t available, and credit is
such that they can’t refi, but if you are in our niche, it’s what we do,
and it’s what we want to see.
As the result of the RICO enterprise of which these actions
were part, the class members have suffered damages, in that they have
lost their homes. The measure of the damages for the class members
is the average of the accelerated amounts demanded from the class
members by the defendant firm in the subject complaints “to fore-
close mortgage and to enforce lost loan documents.” Since the real
parties in interest had already been paid, the mortgages were truly
not subject to being foreclosed upon, and the fair market value of the
properties at the time of foreclosure is for this reason the measure of
the damages suffered by the class members. To provide an example,
if the average value of the properties was $250,000, and the class is
comprised of 10,000 persons, the initial damages to which the class is
entitled by law would be $2,500,000,000, or 2.5 billion dollars. This
amount is then tripled by operation of the RICO law, so that, with-
out reference to attorney fees and costs, the total damages awarded
would be $7,500,000,000, or 7.5 billion dollars.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, on behalf of the class members,
demands judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for
the total damages sustained by the class, plus costs, attorneys’ fees,
and such additional relief as the court or jury may deem just and
proper, including imposition of liability on the members of the con-
spiracy not presently named as defendants in this action. PLAINTIFF
DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY ON COUNT 1.
48
Count II-Violation of 18 USC §1962 [c]-

Defendant Merscorp Inc.
Merscorp Inc. was created in or about 1998, and its purpose,

from the outset, was to enact the fraudulent scheme/RICO enter-
prise herein complained of. Its overt acts include the following:
a. Creation of the MERS artifice

b. Planning, designing, and enacting the MERS criminal
enterprise of which plaintiff complains herein
c. Arranging for the use of the MERS as “mortgagee” in
the standard mortgages at issue
d. Drafting of the standard MERS language to be
included in such mortgages
e. Entering into one or more “agreements for signing
authority,” which purported to allow employees of
the Stern firm to execute assignments in which the
“assignor” and “assignee” are straw men actually not
possessed of the capacity stated and of which the per-
son executing the document has no knowledge
f. Creation and maintenance of an acceptable public
image for MERS
g. Owning and maintaining the registration and licensure
of the MERS entity, Mortgage Electronic Registration
Systems Inc., with the necessary state agencies, plus
other ministerial acts designed to maintain the corpo-
rate shield and to mimic the actions expected of nor-
mal corporations so as to fraudulently disguise its true
nature
h. Facilitating the use of the MERS artifice by other par-
ticipants in the scheme
These predicate acts are related. They share a common purpose,

defrauding the class members and other borrowers of their money
and property. They share the common themes of “nondocumenta-
tion” and concealment of the real parties in interest.
49
Kenneth Trent
The predicate acts satisfy the RICO continuity requirement:

they extend from in or about 1998 through and continue unabated
at the present time, which meets the definition of “open-ended” con-
tinuity. In the alternative, the participants in the RICO enterprise
engaged in a pattern of racketeering activities continuously for a time
exceeding ten years in duration, which as a matter of law suffices to
establish “closed-ended” continuity.
WHEREFORE, the plaintiff, on behalf of the class members,
demands judgment against the defendants, jointly and severally, for
the total damages sustained by the class, plus costs, attorneys’ fees,
and such additional relief as the court or jury may deem just and
proper, including imposition of liability on the members of the con-
spiracy not presently named as defendants in this action.
PLAINTIFF DEMANDS TRIAL BY JURY ON COUNT 2
respectfully submitted by:
KENNETH ERIC TRENT, PA Attorney for plaintiff

831 East Oakland Park Blvd. Fort Lauderdale, FL, 33334
(954)567-5877; (954)567-5872 trentlawoffice@yahoo.com
By: /s Kenneth Eric Trent

Fla. Bar No. 693601
On July 26, 2010, I filed this complaint in the United States

District Court in and for the Southern District of Florida. At the
same time, Damian posted it on the front page of www.stopforeclo-
surefraud.com, which by that time was getting thousands of visits
per day.
I sat back and waited. I was so CURIOUS as to what the
attorneys for Stern and MERS were going to say. In my mind, pos-
sibilities included something to the effect of “This Trent guy is a
lunatic GED graduate with his office next to the fetish factory” and
“HAHAHAHAH, Congress passed a law last year, which says banks
are allowed to use fake evidence in court, didn’t you know?”
50
C h a pte r 8
The first thing that happened was an attorney from the West Coast
of Florida posted the following on his website, about four days after
I filed the class action complaint:
BOMBSHELL—CLASS ACTION OPEN

FOR EVERY CONSUMER WHO HAS
BEEN SUED BY DAVID J. STERN
First reported by 4closurefraud, I post below a

stunning and mind-blowing class action lawsuit
that was just filed against the Law Offices of
David J. Stern, David J. Stern individually and
MERSCorp. The lawsuit is stunning both in the
allegations made and the detail that describes the
collapse of the entire American financial markets
and the widespread destruction of property rights
across this country.
More will be detailed about this lawsuit in
months to come. For now, I encourage everyone
to read this complaint carefully and share this
lawsuit with judges, reporters and policy makers.
The lawsuit articulates many of the suspicions
and the greatest fears held by many but who are
unable to put those fears into words. I give real
credit to the courageous attorney who took on
this effort and encourage all those who are in the
fight to protect and defend our courts to support
this effort.
51
Kenneth Trent
What an awesome guy! Attorney Matthew Weidner was way

ahead of me in getting himself established and sought after in the
field of foreclosure defense in Florida. He had already begun actually
putting up a fight and calling the fraud when he saw it, and the blog
posting above shows that Mr. Weidner placed the interests of the
cause and the potential gain to victimized homeowners above his
own financial interests. I was potentially serious competition for Mr.
Weidner, and he didn’t give a green rat’s ass. Gotta love the man for
that!
On August 3, 2010, the following article appeared on the front
page of the business section of the Palm Beach Post:
Lawsuit Claims That Florida’s Largest

Foreclosure Firm Faked Documents
Florida’s purported largest foreclosure law firm

filed thousands of documents to take people’s
homes that contain deceptive and intentionally
ambiguous information, according to a proposed
class action lawsuit.
The suit, filed last month in the US District
Court in the Southern District of Florida, says
David J Stern and his Plantation-based legal
team violated the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act by generating fraud-
ulent mortgage assignments when pursuing fore-
closures. An assignment is held by the entity
that has the right to receive mortgage payments.
Stern’s practice, which the lawsuit claims filed up
to 7,000 new foreclosure cases in Florida every
month last year, is also alleged to have pursued
foreclosures for lenders that didn’t own the debt
on the homes. “There really is no proper plaintiff
to sue and foreclose and that’s what this charade is
designed to cover,” said Fort Lauderdale attorney
Kenneth Eric Trent, who is seeking class action
52
status and filed the suit on behalf of Oakland

Park resident Ignacio Damian Figueroa. “There
is no real holder of the note and the mortgage
anymore because they broke it up and sold it to
10, 12, 20 people.”
During the real estate boom, loans traded
hands often, sometimes being bundled or split
up and sold to investors. Tracking the true owner
of the debt sometimes can be a challenge. When
pressed for proof of debt ownership, Trent said
Stern’s firm would create an assignment signed
by a Stern employee instead of a representa-
tive of the lender attempting to foreclose. “The
assignments were meaningless shells designed to
pull the wool over the eyes of the judiciary and
ease the burden upon the unknown real parties
in interest,” the lawsuit states. Miami attorney
Jeffrey [we’ll call him Pew] of the Pew [Uranus]
law firm is representing Stern. He said Stern and
his company have done nothing wrong and that
it is accepted practice for a firm employee to be
given power to approve assignments. [Oh, is that
what they were doing?] “This foreclosure crisis
was not created by David Stern but it is so huge
and a lot of people are in very bad shape so some
of the finger-pointing goes to him,” Pew said.
Trent also named the Mortgage Electronic
Registration Service Corp. as a defendant. The
private entity known as MERS was created by
banks in 1995 to track mortgage ownership elec-
tronically and reduce paper documents. Trent
says MERS helps hide the identity of loan owner-
ship and that it conspired with Stern to “confuse
everyone as to who owned what.” Pew called that
claim “fantastical.” He did acknowledge, how-
ever, that errors can happen.
53
Kenneth Trent
West Palm Beach foreclosure defense attor-

ney Thomas Ice [woo-hoo!] found 21 examples
last year of assignments from Stern’s office that
had been executed with a date before the notary’s
commission was issued. In a deposition, a Stern
employee agreed with Ice that “sloppiness” was to
blame for the irregularities. [Not exactly.] Palm
Beach County circuit judge Meenu Sasser [her
actual name, oh my] who handles the county’s
foreclosures said she’s dismissed cases when she
found problems with assignments. She wasn’t
speaking directly about cases filed by Stern and
said it’s only happened a few times. “I haven’t
seen any widespread problem,” Sasser said. [Look
again, then!]
The attention to the case was ratcheting upward on a daily basis.

I couldn’t wait to see what would happen next. Every day, Damian
was posting the latest on the website, and his traffic was increas-
ing daily. He started to get site visitors from the US Department
of Justice and State Department, as well as the office of Florida’s
then-attorney general, Bill McCollum.
The next thing I knew, I got an e-mail from his office:
re: Suit against David Stern

Theresa Edwards <theresa.edwards@myfloridale
gal.com>
To: TrentLawOffice@yahoo.com
Thu, Aug 5, 2010 at 1:31 pm
Good afternoon,
Please forward a copy of your complaint in the
Figueroa vs. Stern case, with exhibits, to me as
soon as possible.
Thanks for your help.
TBE
54
Theresa Bland Edwards Assistant Attorney

General Economic Crimes Division Office of the
Attorney General BILL McCOLLUM
I decided to go ahead and do that. Then, on August 10, some

five days later, the AG’s office made an announcement. The website
of the American Bar Association described it like this:
Fla. AG Probe: Did 3 Law Firms Get 1,000s of

Foreclosure Judgments by Possible Wrongdoing?
The economic crimes division of the Florida
attorney general’s office is investigating whether
possible wrongdoing by three law firms may have
played a role in obtaining thousands of mortgage
foreclosure judgments.
“On numerous occasions, allegedly fab-
ricated documents have been presented to the
courts in foreclosure actions to obtain final judg-
ments against homeowners,” says a press release
from Attorney General Bill McCollum announc-
ing the investigation.
“Thousands of final judgments of foreclo-
sure against Florida homeowners may have been
the result of the allegedly improper actions of the
law firms,” it continues.
The AG’s office is also investigating whether
the law firms may have “created affiliated compa-
nies outside the United States where the allegedly
false documents are being prepared and then sub-
mitted to the law firms for use.”
The three firms are the Law Offices of
Marshall C. Watson in Fort Lauderdale; Shapiro
& Fishman; David J. Stern’s firm in Plantation.
I am sure upon reading this I was ecstatic. It looked like the

establishment was going to come on board and join our fight to
55
Kenneth Trent
avenge the egregious crimes committed against uncountable work-

ing Americans.
Once Florida’s governor changed from Charlie Crist to Rick
Scott, the AG changed from Bill McCollum to Pam Bondi. Another
thing that changed was the job status of the two assistant attorneys
general, Theresa Edwards and June Clarkson, who had taken the ball
and run with it, and made Florida, for once, the leader among the
state in exposing and attacking corruption. They went from highly
favored high-ranking professionals to unemployed without warning
or remotely coherent explanation.
Thereafter, I got to see them practicing foreclosure defense in
much the way they had learned of from myself and a few others.
Hall of Fame, both. On the surface, a tragedy for me. Not so fast,
my friends.
56
C h a pte r 9
Shortly after filing the initial complaint in the class action, I took
advantage of a rule which allows a plaintiff to amend its complaint
one time without having to ask the court for permission. I did exactly
that. I amended our complaint to include all the MERS shareholders
as defendants. That’s right. Li’l’ old GED grad and local realtor sued
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Aunt Beatrice [that’s a joke], WAMU, and
Shamu. [That is too.] All twenty-four of the names listed as MERS
shareholders have identified THEMSELVES as being the “investors”
who funded and supported, to this very day, the MERS/robo-signing
criminal enterprise.
One thing all the parties are required to do in a federal case
is file their own “Certificate of Interested Persons and Corporate
Disclosure Statement.” Come to Papa.
Think about how many spin-offs there are from most, if not
all, the entities listed as MERS shareholders. Now multiply that by
thousands, and that’s how many corporate entities they are working
with. The only problem is that they have to come up with names
for these newly commissioned tax-free corporate creatures ironically
known as “TRUSTS.”
Officially, the scientific classification, so to speak, of corporate
creature to which I refer is “real estate mortgage investment conduit.”
Unsurprisingly, they are called REMICs.
They are TAX EXEMPT.
Several of the big defendants in the class action blew off the
corporate disclosure statement. One, Wells Farto, [sic], seemed to
take it at least somewhat seriously. Farto’s was more than forty pages
in length, and it listed about forty-three entities per page. Here are
57
Kenneth Trent
but a few examples of colorful names these wonderful human beings

came up with:
Alternative Strategies Managed Futures &

Commodities Platform, LLC BAFSC/WLC CX
HUP II Trust
Wachovia Defeasance BSCMS 2002-TOP6,
LLC
Wachovia Defeasance BSCMS 2003-TOP10 III,
LLC
Wachovia Defeasance FUNB-BOA 2001-C1
(CRIT NC) LLC
Wachovia Defeasance Greenwich 2002-C1
Landmark IV LLC
Wachovia Defeasance MLMI 2005-MCP1 PVA
III LLC
Wachovia Defeasance PSSFC 2003-PWR1 PAL-
MED LLC
Wachovia Defeasance WACHOVIA 2004-C12
III LLC
Wachovia Defeasance Wachovia 2004-C14
Amstar LLC
Wachovia Guaranteed Middle Tier IV-P/NC,
LLC
Wachovia Guaranteed Middle Tier IV-U/NC,
LLC
Wachovia Guaranteed Tax Credit Fund-WF/CA,
LLC
Wachovia Guaranteed Tax Credit Fund-WF/
CA-2, LLC
WDC KW America Member, LLC
WDC Triad Parent, LLC
Wells Fargo Financial Massachusetts 1 Inc.
Wells Fargo Financial Massachusetts Inc
WG-5278 MO, LLC
58
Wheat First Butcher Singer Private Equity Fund,

Limited Partnership
These names are reprinted here exactly as they appear in Wells

Farto’s corporate disclosure statement—grammar, capitalization, and
all. It really is incredible that one of these banks would use “defea-
sance” to name itself and not just once either. Appearing at the top of
the Internet search results for defeasance is the following:
de·fea·sance /defezens/
noun (LAW): the action or process of render-
ing something null and void. a clause or con-
dition which, if fulfilled, renders a deed or
contract null and void.
To my count, Wells Farto lists 435 corporate entities which

contain the word “defeasance.” What does that tell ya?
59
C h a pte r 10
I was absolutely tickled pink when my complaint, after having been
picked up by the Florida AG, was adopted as a primary foundation
for the opening of investigations by the other forty-nine state attor-
neys general as well as the District of Columbia. The bankers, as is
their practice when confronted with administrative or law enforce-
ment investigations or accusations, initially deflect and divert. They
ultimately agree to pay what to everyone else seems like a large
amount of money. Their inside men do what is necessary within and
without the judicial, executive, and legislative branches of our gov-
ernment. The bankers are also masters at neutering whatever ineffec-
tual agency is set up to regulate and oversee them. The same is true
for any whistleblower-reward system.5 I would know! Bankers are
masters at gaming the system ahead of the opening tip-off so that
when the shit hits the fan later on, their people are already in place,
and the system is already rigged so that whistleblowers, like myself,
get nowhere.
Here’s a selection from an article dated December 1, 2011, by
Gretchen Morgansen entitled “Massachusetts AG Sues Banks Over
Faulty Foreclosures.”
Citing extensive abuses of troubled borrowers

across Massachusetts, the state’s attorney general
sued the nation’s five largest mortgage lenders
on Thursday, seeking relief for consumers hurt
5
Crimestoppers is one example of a whistleblower-reward system business
practices.
60
by what she called unfair and deceptive business

practices.
In addition to creating a new and signif-
icant legal headache for the banks named in
the suit—Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase,
Citigroup, Wells Fargo and GMAC Mortgage—
the Massachusetts action diminishes the likeli-
hood of a comprehensive settlement between the
banks and federal and state officials to resolve
foreclosure improprieties.
Also named as a defendant in the
Massachusetts suit was the electronic mortgage
registry known as MERS, an entity set up by
lenders to speed property transfers by circum-
venting local land recording officials.
The attorney general, Martha Coakley, and
her investigators contend that the banks improp-
erly foreclosed on troubled borrowers by relying
on fraudulent legal documentation or by failing
to modify loans for homeowners after promising
to do so. The suit also contends that the banks’
use of MERS “corrupted” the state’s public land
recording system by not registering legal transfers
properly.
“There is no question that the deceptive
and unlawful conduct by Wall Street and the
large banks played a central role in this crisis
through predatory lending and securitization of
those loans,” Ms. Coakley said at a news confer-
ence announcing the lawsuit. “The banks may
think they are too big to fail or too big to care
about the impact of their actions, but we believe
they are not too big to have to obey the law.”
Ms. Coakley has been among the most
aggressive state regulators in her pursuit of finan-
cial institutions involved in the credit crisis. In
61
Kenneth Trent
addition to her inquiry into foreclosure impro-

prieties in Massachusetts, she has also conducted
far-reaching investigations into predatory lend-
ing and securitization abuses.
Since 2009, Ms. Coakley has extracted
more than $600 million in restitution and pen-
alties from lawsuits against mortgage originators
like Option One and Fremont Investment and
Loan and Wall Street firms like Goldman Sachs
and Morgan Stanley, which bundled loans into
mortgage securities.
Officials at all of the banks issued state-
ments saying they would fight the suit. Most of
them also indicated dismay that Massachusetts
had taken action during negotiations to reach a
settlement over the types of practices highlighted
in the case.
“We are disappointed that Massachusetts
would take this action now,” said Tom Kelly,
a Chase spokesman, “when negotiations are
ongoing with the attorneys general and the fed-
eral government on a broader settlement that
could bring immediate relief to Massachusetts
borrowers rather than years of contested legal
proceedings.”
Martha Coakley, with her staff in Boston,
accused lenders of “deceptive and unlawful
conduct.”
Lawrence Grayson, a Bank of America
spokesman, said: “We continue to believe that
collaborative resolution rather than continued
litigation will most quickly heal the housing mar-
ket and help drive economic recovery.”
And Vickee [VD] Adams of Wells Fargo
said, “Regrettably, the action announced in
Massachusetts today will do little to help
62
Massachusetts homeowners or the recovery of

the housing economy in the Commonwealth.”
But as Ms. Coakley made clear during the
news conference, her office had come to view as
unacceptable the negotiating stance taken by the
banks in the protracted settlement talks.
“When those negotiations began over a year
ago, I was hopeful that we would be able to reach
a strong and effective solution,” she said. “It is
over a year later and I believe the banks have
failed to offer meaningful relief to homeowners.”
[Shocker!]
Delaware, Nevada and New York have also
objected to the direction the settlement negotia-
tions were taking.
Kurt Eggert, a professor at Chapman
University School of Law in California who is
an expert in mortgages and securitization, said
the Massachusetts lawsuit was a significant step
because it opened the banks’ practices to far
greater scrutiny than they had been subject to.
“So far the servicers have escaped any real
review or punishment for their bad practices
because federal regulators have by and large given
them a pass on whether they followed the law
in foreclosures,” Mr. Eggert said. “This lawsuit
argues that they haven’t followed the law and that
they can’t just fix all their problems after the fact.”
Among the misconduct cited in the
Massachusetts complaint were 14 cases of fore-
closures by institutions that had not shown proof
that they had the legal right to seize the under-
lying properties when they did so. All the banks
also deceived troubled borrowers, the complaint
said, about the loan modification process. For
example, some banks incorrectly advised borrow-
63
Kenneth Trent
ers that they would receive priority treatment if

they were more than 90 days delinquent on their
loans. Other borrowers were misled when told
that they must be more than two months’ delin-
quent to receive a loan modification, it said.
Although Mr. Eggert said that the banks
were likely to argue that a state like Massachusetts
had no right to bring such a case against federally
regulated institutions, he said that the Dodd-
Frank legislation restricted the ability of federal
authorities to bar states from acting in such cases.
“If the state can go forward and do real dis-
covery, it will be the first time that anyone has
really dug into the servicers’ files to see what they
have done,” he added. “The feds conducted an
investigation where they looked at very few files,
and here the state could demand to see a lot.”
Somewhat ironic in light of the last paragraph the fact is the

“discovery” has already been made. We don’t need a single shred of
documentation from any of these financial institutions to bring our
investigation to a close. In fact, documentation from financial insti-
tutions ought to be illegal.
So while I was toiling away before some of our lesser lights in
the constellation of robe wearers, the attorneys general of all fifty
states took my discoveries and declarations of evildoing and ran with
them…smack into the Barack Obama administration and its con-
cierge of secretly bank-sponsored administration officials…most par-
ticularly in the form of one [very suitably named] “Eric Holder.” [Sic!]
Yes, I’m saying that Obama and crew, particularly “Holder,” put
the smackdown on any potential criminal charges against the bank-
ers. He sought at all times to minimize the extent of their wrong-
doing and to offer excuses for the types of reprehensible conduct
described in this book. Such conduct was no mere sloppiness. When,
by the end of 2011, there were still a number of open investigations,
64
all of which seemed to be dragging out ineffectually, certain pundits

began to break out their verbal fire.
One article I like came from the Politico website, with Matt
Stoller as the author. It came out December 15 of 2011 and is enti-
tled, “Treat Foreclosure as a Crime Scene”:
Bubbling under the surface of politics is the fore-

closure crisis—where the power of big finance is
brushing up against the rule of law. The party
leaders seem to have decided it is essentially a
giant—but unavoidable—tragedy. GOP presi-
dential candidate Mitt Romney said foreclosures
have to clear for the housing market to reset. The
Obama administration, meanwhile, has spent
only about $2 billion of the $75 billion autho-
rized for the Home Affordable Modification
Program.
But the foreclosure crisis is not only a few
million personal tragedies. It is a few million
crime scenes.
Massachusetts Attorney General Martha
Coakley recently filed the first broad civil suit
against five major banks and the Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems for foreclosure
fraud. Her suit alleges that mortgage servicers
routinely backdated and falsified documents to
expedite foreclosures. In many cases, they fore-
closed on loans they did not even own.
This is one of a series of suits that state
officials are bringing against leading financial
institutions. Nevada Attorney General Catherine
Cortez Masto last month indicted two employ-
ees of the foreclosure specialist Lender Processing
Services, which works with the big banks, on 606
felony and misdemeanor counts of fraud. [Lender
Processing Services is now called “Black Knight.” It
65
Kenneth Trent
continues through this day with the same criminal

practices.]
Delaware Attorney General Beau Biden
is also suing MERS—as I recently wrote in
POLITICO—for unfair and deceptive practices.
New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman
successfully intervened to stop a whitewash set-
tlement of Countrywide’s ostensible fraud in
packaging and selling mortgage-backed securities
it knew to be poisoned.
These attorneys general have changed the
legal environment around the mortgage and fore-
closure mess—refocusing the core issue on jus-
tice. They are reframing the problem as a crime
scene.
What is behind these suits? Simple: Crime
by mortgage servicers and their contractors. And
this is more than just the crime of these foreclo-
sures themselves—it’s the residual tail end of a
housing bubble based on fraud. The reason these
bank servicers must now routinely employ nota-
ries using false documentation is because they
never established a clear chain of the property
title upfront.
The attitude during the go-go days of the
housing bubble was “here today, gone tomor-
row,” as Joe Nocera and Bethany McLean make
clear in their book “All the Devils Are Here.” This
was a refinement of the financial deal makers’
code, “IBG-YBG,” meaning “I’ll be gone, you’ll
be gone,” described by Jonathan Knee in “The
Accidental Investment Banker.”
In this environment, why bother getting
your paperwork in order when the goal is to put
someone into a predatory loan, reap fees and dis-
appear tomorrow?
66
Now that these homes are in foreclosure,

however, the lack of paperwork is a serious
problem. And, since no one has yet been held
accountable for the fraud perpetrated during the
housing bubble, the business model of financial
institutions is often still predatory.
This fraud is now coming back to haunt our
courts—for example, in the falsified foreclosure
paperwork required to cover up the corner-cut-
ting of the subprime lenders and the banks that
funded them. The banks themselves have con-
fessed to breaking the law. The Veterans Affairs
Committee held a hearing early this year when
JPMorgan was found to be illegally foreclosing
on 18 U.S. military families—a violation of the
Service member Civil Relief Act. This law bans
foreclosing on active duty troops. Knowingly
violating the ban carries up to one year in prison
for each count. JPMorgan apologized for its
violations, because for banks, being sorry when
caught is what really counts. The families were
compensated by JPMorgan financially, but no
one at the bank got jail time or had to plead
guilty. Bank regulators have now found that up to
5,000 military families may have been foreclosed
on illegally, as The Financial Times reported
last month. Yet the Justice Department settled
with Bank of America for alleged violations of
the service member act. BofA, like JPMorgan,
doesn’t have to admit to wrongdoing—but it
says it is very sorry anyway. “The SCRA is not
some obscure legal technicality,” said Rep. Brad
Miller (D-N.C.), who wrote the law, “that might
just have escaped the attention of mortgage ser-
vicers. Those servicers are all affiliates of the big-
gest banks. … Servicing mortgages is all they do,
67
Kenneth Trent
and they really don’t have that many laws to keep

up with. They have got to have known what the
law required and consciously decided that they
could just ignore it, the same way they apparently
decided it was OK to file false affidavits in legal
proceedings.”
President Barack Obama has argued, as
recently as last Sunday on “60 Minutes,” that
what happened on Wall Street wasn’t criminal.
“Some of the most damaging behavior on Wall
Street,” the president told Steve Kroft, “in some
cases, some of the least ethical behavior on Wall
Street, wasn’t illegal. That’s exactly why we had to
change the laws.”
Obama is wrong. Fraud was illegal before
the crisis; it’s illegal now. The Servicemember
Civil Relief Act was signed in 2003. So it was
already on the books. During the savings and
loan crisis, the George H.W. Bush administra-
tion sent about 3,000 white-collar criminals to
jail. This administration has yet to send one.
And it is for lack of trying. Attorney General
Eric Holder and his network of U.S. attorneys
haven’t brought one criminal suit on illegal mili-
tary foreclosures or foreclosure fraud. There have
been enough books and investigations revealing
rampant criminality in the housing bubble and
now in foreclosure crisis. Yet Holder’s DOJ is still
settling with banks to let them off the hook for
illegal foreclosures on active duty troops.
The administration is now attempting to
quash state-level officials by fiercely lobbying for
a 50-state settlement to paper over the foreclosure
fraud scandal. Obama may talk about his fealty
to the “99 percent,” but his administration is
engaged in an aggressive coverup of bank crimes.
68
The administration’s response to Coakley’s

suit is perhaps the most revealing, for the
Massachusetts case against the banks was partic-
ularly sweeping.
The banks’ press release response has largely
been “we’re disappointed” boilerplate, and only
the taxpayer-owned lender Ally Financial (for-
merly GMAC) pushed back hard. The company
declared that it plans to cease all mortgage lend-
ing in Massachusetts.
Coakley’s response was simply that this is
proof that Ally is not interested in following the
laws regarding rules of evidence. In other words:
good riddance.
After this dispute, Rep. Barney Frank
(D-Mass.) and Coakley called for congressional
hearings into Ally’s behavior.
Ally’s action is an attempt at what is known
as a capital strike—a threat by financial interests
that they will cease financing critical social activ-
ities unless their legal demands are met.
Gretchen Morgensen and Josh Rosner
detail a similar case in “Reckless Endangerment,”
their history of the housing bubble. In 2003,
before the bubble, Georgia lawmakers noticed
that mortgage lending was riddled with fraud
and predation. So the Legislature passed a law
clamping down on fraud with a state consumer
protection law.
The response was devastating—Standard
& Poor’s declared it would no longer rate mort-
gage-backed securities with loans originated in
Georgia. The agency made enormous profits by
rating subprime mortgages, so a predatory lend-
ing law may well have proved a threat to this
profit stream. The state quickly reversed the law
69
Kenneth Trent
for fear that there would be no more housing

finance in the state.
Other states and localities took notice—and
we saw what happened next.
The housing bubble, in other words, was
not just due to tragic herding behavior. It also
involved the financial sector’s aggressive responses
to democratic attempts to rein in creditor abuses.
Now Ally, a bank 74 percent owned by taxpayers
and controlled by the administration, is continu-
ing this abusive trend.
Turning our markets into playpens for
predatory behavior didn’t happen overnight, and
it will not be fixed overnight. But until we have
public servants strongly focused on justice for all,
we can expect the crime spree to go on. After all,
what we’re all learning is that, at least for large
banks, crime pays.
Matt Stoller worked on the Dodd-Frank
financial reform law and Federal Reserve trans-
parency issues as a staffer for Rep. Alan Grayson
(D-Fla.). He is now a fellow at the Roosevelt
Institute.
70
C h a pte r 11
President Lincoln was a wise man.
The money powers prey upon the nation in

times of peace and conspire against it in times of
adversity.
It is more despotic than a monarchy, more
insolent than autocracy, and more selfish than
bureaucracy.
It denounces as public enemies, all who
question its methods or throw light upon its
crimes.
I have two great enemies, the Southern
Army in front of me and the Bankers in the rear.
Of the two, the one at my rear is my greatest foe.
Corporations have been enthroned and an
era of corruption in high places will follow, and
the money powers of the country will endeavor to
prolong its reign by working upon the prejudices
of the people until the wealth is aggregated in the
hands of a few, and the Republic is destroyed.
—Abe Lincoln
Lincoln’s prediction is manifest today in the reflexive

name-changing and fraudulent-contradictory mass-filing mischar-
acterizations of relationships among alleged “parties” contained in
the foreclosing plaintiffs’ paperwork. The bankers have some serious
nerve, always crowing about the dangers of identity “theft”!
71
Kenneth Trent
Of course, whatever “party” they pretend to attend along with

their pseudonymical and inbred brethren, all of which share a certain
tendency for mimicry of legitimacy, is happening behind that their
iron curtain of BULLSHIT one of us regular folks can see past.
Curtain? Maybe “wall,” as in “Wall” Street, is a better descrip-
tion. All this shimmery hocus-pocus reminds me of the Wizard of
Oz.
Speaking of straw men…
Let me see if I can make up a name the way the bankers do—
one designed to intimidate and confuse homeowners on the brink.
How about this one?
BANK OF NEW YORK FELON, AS TRUSTEE FOR
THE CIRCUMLOCUTIUS DEFALCATIONER IDIOPATHIC
SCHADENFREUDEISH INDENTURED CERTIFICATE
HOLDERS OF THE SPERMINIFEROUS INDIFFIDENT
TRUST 5-dub 2006-1 JACQUNCLATURAL ENIGMA SERIES
AVOIRDUPOIS ANATHEMA CE-DIVISION 3, XV, LLC.
Jack Borrower, you’ve been profiled. By MERS. The name of
your opponent has been announced. No need to do a thing. Our
buddies here will take care of everything from cradle to grave. For
starters, they have made up a name specifically tailored to maximize
the success of their exploitation. Using this nom de plume, they will
engage in numerous transactions with themselves, all of which you
will be billed for. They will use a creative and alien-sounding name
to bring suit against you for foreclosure, and they will act under its
auspices when besieging you with demand letters and disgustingly
insincere offers of resolution.
Here’s our devious doppelgänger miscreant, acting as plaintiff
in a foreclosure suit against the hapless borrower clan:
TRUST 5-dub 2006-1 JACQUNCLATURAL ENIGMA SERIES
AVOIRDUPOIS ANATHEMA CE-DIVISION 3, XV, LLC.
Plaintiff,
72
v.
Jack Borrower a.k.a. Jack A. Borrower, the unknown spouse of
Jack A. Borrower; Jill Borrower, the unknown spouse of Jill Borrower;
Unknown Tenants 1, Unknown Tenant 2, Welfare Tenant 1,
and so on and so forth,
Defendants.
COMPLAINT FOR MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND

TO REESTABLISH LOST LOAN DOCUMENTS
Jack’s ass is grass, and the Sperminiferous Trust and its alleged
lawyers, Dewey, Cheatham, and Howe, are the lawn mowers.
On June 6, 2006, Jack A. Borrower executed a promissory note
in the amount of $310,000 and a mortgage securing payment of
same to Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. as nominee
for Clowning Out Mortgage Lenders, NA, but only as nominee, etc.,
etc., so and so forth, gobbledygook and gobbledy gag, keep it comin’,
and then I need to know…WHERE’S MY MOMMA? A.k.a. NA,
a.k.a. NA, a.k.a. MANA. Ma ma ma ma ma!
Meanwhile, back at the ranch, Jack and Jill are getting a lot of
weird phone calls, and random people keep pulling up and photo-
graphing the hell outta their house. They get FedEx envelopes con-
taining FedEx envelopes, purporting to require the originals of the
“settlement documents” to be returned and received by the “bank”
no later than a date that has already passed. Every few weeks, some-
one rings the doorbell and claims to be “from the bank” and tries to
rush J & J into signing paperwork “for your modification.” They’re
constantly asking the homeowners, “What are your intentions with
regard to this property?” Like they care!
Somebody at one of the mills sees my name, and yep, you
guessed it. Out pops a very promising-looking identity egg. It’s the
empty shell, like the empty set in statistics. Or maybe there’s a phan-
tom inside.
I can almost hear the Texan announcer voice somethin’ about
getting ready to rumble, loook right heeeere, good brothers and sis-
ters, who is that wraithlike string bean in a dark hoodie insinuating
73
Kenneth Trent
himself between two ropes and entering the ring, with the bankers
are paper rapers bein’ his team? Born of an identity egg not so very
long ago, welcome in the substitute for BANK OF NEW YORK
FELON, AS TRUSTEE FOR THE CIRCUMLOCUTIOUS
DEFALCATIONER IDIOPATHIC SCHADENFREUDEISH
INDENTURED CERTIFICATE HOLDERS OF THE
SPERMINIFEROUS INDIFFIDENT TRUST 5-dub 2006-1
JACQUNCLATURAL ENIGMA SERIES AVOIRDUPOIS
ANATHEMA CE-DIVISION 3, XV, LLC.
Yes, that’s right.
TRUST 5-dub 2006-1 JACQUNCLATURAL TARDIGRADE
CONFABULATORY ENIGMA SERIES AVOIRDUPOIS
ANATHEMA CE-DIVISION 3, 8-V8 PINTO VEGA &
COMPANY.
Sound legitimate? Apparently, it does to some people in high
places as the MERS conspirators were flat busted over a DECADE
ago, and yet they continue to sail along in their blissful recrimina-
tion-free dance of deceit.
Nobody in authority seems to care.
I’m increasingly getting a sense, however, that the PEOPLE
do… They SHOULD after reading this book!
74
C h a pte r 12
From the moment I filed the class action on July 26, 2010, I was
caught up in an exhilarating yet at the same time very challenging
whirlwind of activity. It seemed to grow at a fantastic rate—it picked
up my words and carried them from sea to shining sea. First, the virus
spread, and then the cure. The tempest expanded across the finan-
cial “servicing” and lending industries, the governments of numerous
states, and the government of our nation.
Regarding my own personal whirlwind, it started with being
sought after by uncountable numbers of homeowners facing foreclo-
sure, not only in Florida, but in several other states as well. I took on
a couple of lawyer associates and hired two or three more secretarial
types and was retained by homeowners from Pensacola to the Florida
Keys. I was, and am, only licensed to practice in Florida, so I couldn’t
take on cases, at least officially, in other states. That’s okay. I had
PLENTY to do here.
In addition to fighting the big money of the big banks and
their dirty lawyers, I confronted a tremendous amount of BIAS from
the majority of judges before whom I appeared. Not only did 90
percent of the judges seem to be severely prejudiced against my side,
the courts and the clerks of court were apparently suffering from a
similar affliction.
Reporters and news networks described what came to be known
as rocket dockets. Those were quite common across the state and the
country, especially in 2010 and 2011, and involved a single judge
being assigned dozens of foreclosure trials to be conducted in one
business day, minus a ninety-minute lunch break. That could mean
that the fraudulent foreclosure lawsuits were getting dismissed en
masse, but alas, that was not the case. Instead, on the rocket dockets,
75
Kenneth Trent
the judges did not even want to HEAR from homeowners or their
attorneys. They appeared as highly motivated to sign unjust final
judgments of foreclosure as Several Salmons was to sign fake assign-
ments of mortgage.
Choo-choo, here comes the no-brain train down the track,
stealing the American dream, even little shacks. Railroad central,
folks! All that railroading reminds me of a Monopoly game. Sadly,
the monopoly described in this book is not a game at all. It is reality.
76
C h a pte r 13
Don’t get it twisted. I do not claim to have been the only contributor
to the exposure of the robo-signing racket, nor is it my story that I
am the only guy to ever put up a fight against a big bank foreclosure.
To the contrary, there were dozens, if not hundreds, of substantial
contributors to the discoveries recounted in this book. A thousand
points of light as it were.6
So in case you are tired of hearing me talk, let me hand you
off to one of those points of light whom I have gotten to know and
respect since 2010. He’s a youngish Florida attorney, originally from
Pennsylvania, who has no lack of balls, cojones, stones, chutzpah,
or whatever you want to call it. His name is Joshua Bleil, and on
December 16, 2011, he went to a rocket docket in Miami, Florida,
and appeared before a judge who was, let’s say, no shrinking violet
himself. I am lucky enough to be in possession of the transcript of
the showdown between Attorney Bleil and Jues Gendern. It exempli-
fies the bias homeowners faced (and still face). It will also give you,
my blessed readers, more information about the way banks operate
which will help you, at the end of this book, fully comprehend the
secret. It may also make you laugh—I know it does me!
PROCEEDINGS
THE COURT: And finally, Deutsche [Douche] v. Cuenca.

MS WEASEL: Good morning, Your Honor.
6
My list of substantial contributors, although certainly not exhaustive, comprises
the Hall of Fame appearing in the appendix located at the end of this book. You
can also find my Wall of Shame there.
77
Kenneth Trent
THE COURT: Hi.

MR. BLEIL: Joshua Bleil from the Bigben Law Group on
behalf of the defendant. I suggest maybe taking some of
the uncontested ones [cases].
THE COURT: Why?
MR BLEIL: Because I would need to set up. I would also like
to offer—
THE COURT: We’re all—we’re done.
MR BLEIL: Oh, it’s the last one?
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR. BLEIL: Oh perfect, Judge. Can I get a couple minutes to
grab one of the tables?
THE COURT: What is it? What are you doing?
MR BLEIL: We’re going to try the case, Judge.
THE COURT: Yeah, I know. But what—are you the law firm
where this gentleman told me you have an expert?
MR BLEIL: Oh, Mr. Almaguer. Yeah, he’s my associate, yes.
THE COURT: Yeah, well, tell me what kind of expert we’re
talking about.
MR. BLEIL: Sure, you want me to proffer?
THE COURT: No, I want you to tell me—
MR BLEIL: Sure.
THE COURT: Because I’m the trier of fact, and I’m also the
judge of what gets heard, what evidence gets heard. So I
want to know, how do you—why do I need an expert in a
foreclosure case? [Because you have no idea what’s going on
with these banks!]
MR. BLEIL: I’d be happy to answer Your Honor’s question.
THE COURT: That’s good.
MR BLEIL: But I think it would be better addressed in the
course of the litigation [trial] whenever I call my witness.
As opposed to me, I’m just kind of—
THE COURT: Okay, let me see, let me see, maybe I just started
practicing law, and I just got on the bench. So let me take
a moment. When I was a lawyer, when a judge asked me a
78
question, I answered it [using a respectful persona far differ-

ent from this one].
MR BLEIL: Sure thing, Judge.
THE COURT: So tell me, because this came up the other day
with this gentleman who was nice enough to admonish
me, warn me, alert me, whatever word you want to—that
our cases take a long time because we bring in an expert.
So I’ve been, I’ve just been, I’ve had two sleepless nights
wondering what kind of expert do I need, or you need, or
I want to listen to in a foreclosure.
THE COURT: Thank you.
MR BLEIL: Give me a moment, and what I will do is get my
expert’s report.
THE COURT: Take five moments.
MR BLEIL: And I’ll proffer for the record out of the report
since we have a court reporter here now.
THE COURT: Where’s your expert?
MR BLEIL: Right there, but, Judge, can I, can I get a table?
THE COURT: I am sorry. I don’t have a lot of tables.
MR BLEIL: I know, but can I—
THE COURT: The way this works—
MR BLEIL: May I ask Mr. Phillips to—
THE COURT: Yeah, of course.
MR. BLEIL: To provide the defense a table?
(Brief conversation off the record.)
MR BLEIL: Judge, usually it’s a table for the plaintiff and one
for the defendant, I mean—
THE COURT: Well, usually, you have one plaintiff, one defen-
dant, one trial. I’ve been in that rut for four years.
MR BLEIL: Correct.
THE COURT: But ever since this mortgage foreclosure bubble
busted, we have like forty cases set for trial, and unfortu-
nately, I can’t get a courtroom for every single lawyer [did
he ask for a courtroom?] and every single claim [a separate
79
Kenneth Trent
courtroom for each claim?], so you’ll have to do as best you

can.
MR BLEIL: Oh, we will. I can definitely bear with that, Judge.
MS WEASEL: In the meantime, Judge, would you like the file?
[Of course not, that would involve looking at the evidence
and reading some of the papers.]
THE COURT: I’m just dying to know what an expert is going
to tell me.
THE COURT: Allegedly. [He’s right about that, the expert is not
going to tell him a damn thing because he will never allow
the person to speak!]
THE COURT: Okay, I want to hear from Mr. Mateo.
MR BLEIL: Bleil, Judge.
THE COURT: Mister who?
MR BLEIL: Bleil, B-L-E-I-L.
THE COURT: I’m sorry.
MR BLEIL: It’s okay. I work for the Bigben Law Firm.
THE COURT: Okay, so tell me, Mr. Bleil, this is—let me tell
you my thinking, so you can address my concerns.
THE COURT: My concern is, did you sign the note? Did you
sign the mortgage? Did you get the loan? Did you default?
Did you owe the money? Is it your signature, or is it some-
body else’s signature? [Whose signature is on the assignment
of mortgage?] Beyond that, tell me why I need an expert.
MR BLEIL: Sure thing, Judge. [It’s a sure thing you aren’t going to
win this trial in front of this man, Josh!]. And what I would
do is, I also have a copy of the expert disclosure. Would
you like to look at that while—
THE COURT: Yeah.
MR BLEIL: I have another copy. We also have an extra copy of
the expert report if Your Honor would like to see that also.
THE COURT: What report?
80
MR BLEIL: The expert report.

THE COURT: I want you to just answer my question.
MR BLEIL: Sure thing. [Is it?]
THE COURT: Experts are [nothing compared to him] import-
ant in lawsuits whether they’re jury trials or not nonjury
trials. [A double negative for a quadruple negative kind of
dude.]
MR BLEIL: Uh-huh.
THE COURT: To help the trier of fact understand testimony
that the normal person, i.e., a juror or judge [not this one],
would not ordinarily understand [he doesn’t]. So what is
it that an expert in a foreclosure case is going to help me
understand [a lot of things] so that I can make a determi-
nation as to whether or not a foreclosure judgment should
be entered [he already made his determination].
MR BLEIL: Sure thing, Judge, and to go back to your first
question. Yes, the elements of the issues that you raised
regarding, is there the note? Is there a signature? Those are
generally prima facie issues that would need to be shown
or proven by the plaintiff through competent testimony to
prove their most basic case. And there are also some other
issues there, particularly regarding standing at the time
the lawsuit was filed. But there are other issues that when
these cases are litigated because—I wouldn’t say the face of
the matter, but these at first appear to be very simple cases
as Your Honor indicated. But when you start to further
dig deeper into what actually transpired and what did not
transpire, particularly regarding whether the calculations
on the truth in lending [Truth in lending is an oxymoron
in the age of MERS] were done appropriately, were there
any technical violations or violations of statutes there that
would be indicative of “unclean hands?” [Indeed.]
THE COURT: Why do I need an expert for that?
MR BLEIL: Well, Judge…
THE COURT: Why isn’t that just legal argument that every
lawyer argues [not in front of you, they’re terrified] on sum-
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Kenneth Trent
mary judgments, motions to, why is that the subject of

expert testimony? Am I going to have an expert tell me
that a law has been violated? Is that what you’re suggest-
ing? [He’s suggesting he would really like a table right about
now!]
MR BLEIL: No, what an expert—I don’t mind if Your Honor
inquires of the witness herself.
THE COURT: I don’t want to inquire [oh, we know] because I
first have to do the determination.
MR BLEIL: Sure.
THE COURT: Whether or not I’m going to let her testify.
MR BLEIL: Sure, Your Honor.
THE COURT: That’s a preliminary issue.
MR BLEIL: Right, and it is—
THE COURT: It has to be—stop talking.
MR BLEIL: I hear you.
THE COURT: Well, I hear you too, that’s the problem. [He may
be hearing, but he damn sure isn’t listening.] Now, just give
me a moment [take five moments], and you can respond.
Before experts testify, and I’ve been a judge nineteen years
in about a week and a half, it will be nineteen years. I
have been a trial lawyer for forty-two before—altogether.
Before, if somebody, if the court considers somebody not
competent to testify as an expert, it’s a preliminary matter.
That’s why I want to know before I start going down that
road. [No need to worry, he turned the opposite way a long
time ago.] What is it that this expert is going to testify
about?
MR BLEIL: Sure thing, Judge. The expert is going to test…
the expert is going to testify [no, she isn’t, Josh] about the
process of the origination of this particular loan and the
defects in the origination [for example, telling numerous lies
on the truth-in-lending form]. The expert is going to opine
as set forth in the report that I’ve provided to you, where
the problems are [right up there on the bench] in this trans-
action. Of note in this particular case is like many other
82
cases that are before this court and around the country, it’s
[allegedly] a securitized [yeah, right] trust [bankers should
never use that word again]. The expert is going to be able
to provide [some other judge on some other day] testimony as
to how the assignment, which is purportedly executed to
transfer the loan, does not comport with [entirely contra-
dicts] the Pooling and Servicing Agreement, which I have
printed out here. There are particular requirements in the
PSA, and this is where the expert assists the trier of fact
[you betcha, but not today]. Because I understand that Your
Honor has been on the bench for a long time, in fact my
senior partner has had many cases before you. But what
the issue—
THE COURT: Would that be Stephen?
MR BLEIL: No, Mr. Bigben.
THE COURT: Okay. Okay, so why do I care? [You clearly
don’t]. Shouldn’t I just be concerned about whether or not
they’re the holder of the note [they aren’t, but they have a lot
of fake evidence showing that they are] at the time that I try
this case? [Nope. Wrong again!]
MR BLEIL: That is part of it, Judge, but—
THE COURT: Do I care [see above]?
MR BLEIL: Yes.
THE COURT: How somebody got to the intersection on
Twenty-Seventh Avenue and US 1 and where they started?
Or do I just care about what happened at the corner when
the accident occurred?
MR BLEIL: Generally, we only care about how the accident
occurred. But here, it is important how they got here. And
here’s why.
THE COURT: Why? Yeah, tell me why.
MR BLEIL: And this is the proffer.
THE COURT: Okay. I’m listening.
MR BLEIL: There are requirements, like any trust, basic trust
law [is DO NOT TRUST THEM]. They have to comply
with the requirements of the trust. And you know, any
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Kenneth Trent
other trust you have res [the property in trust], you have
trustees, you have assets [that’s the res, Josh], this is the
trust that purportedly owns and holds this note.
THE COURT: Okay.
MR BLEIL: The trust has certain requirements that say, all the
loans have to be transferred into this trust by X date. If
they’re not transferred into the trust by X date, the trust
does not own or hold that note. [Damn straight! It’s called
“the closing date!”]
THE COURT: Oh, okay, so what, let me get to the bottom of
this. [The bottom is apparently far too deep!]
MR BLEIL: Yes, Judge.
THE COURT: So if I follow your thinking, your client should
be able to live in this house forever, free and clear. Is that
what you’re suggesting?
MR BLEIL: That may be the ultimate outcome.
THE COURT: Ah…
MR BLEIL: But, Judge, but, Judge, here’s where the—
THE COURT: Good luck to you, sir.
MR BLEIL: Thank you.
THE COURT: Good luck to you.
MR. BLEIL: Thank you.
THE COURT: Do you think I am going to sit here after some-
body has been lent hundreds of thousands of dollars, and
you have the standing [plaintiffs have to prove standing, not
defendants] to complain that the trust documents were not
properly obtained, so your client who got—how much
was this loan?
MS. WEASEL: $216,000. [That’s the price of a lower-end house
in South Florida.]
THE COURT: $216,000, I get to live there forever. You think
a court of [in]equity which is what I am sitting as[s] is
going to allow that to occur. [You? I’m guessing…no?]
MR BLEIL: Judge, that has yet to be determined. I don’t know.
But here’s where the court of equity happens. [Not here].
84
The party that seeks equity to be done needs to come to

the court with clean hands. [Judge, better start scrubbing!]
THE COURT: Why is this unclean hands? [Unclean souls, if
you ask me!] What did they do?
MR BLEIL: Judge…
THE COURT: Unclean hands usually is—
MR BLEIL: Right.
THE COURT: The two parties [Republican and Democratic]
have unclean hands. One person claims that a particular
party did something wrong. And the other party in defense
says, “Yes, but you did something wrong as it applies to
me.” Not as it applies to somebody else.
MR BLEIL: Correct. But there are two pillars here that I’m
presenting, and I and they are related but distinct. But
what isn’t even unclean hands, if the document purport-
ing the transfer shows it happened in 2012, and the PSA,
the trust’s governing document, says it must be transferred
by 2010, how does that give them standing? If the trust
doesn’t acquire it by the closing date, it does not become
a part of that trust. And their own document proves it did
not get transferred by the closing date.
THE COURT: Right, but may. Here’s my problem. [Attitude.]
My problem is [apparently the same one 90 percent of
the judges have, but he has a particularly serious case] it
would seem to me that somebody whose trust assets have
been affected might have the ability to come in and say,
this has an effect on me. What standing does your cli-
ent have [much more than Douche Bank as trustee] to come
along and say, somebody down the line got screwed over?
[He’s letting the same people screw additional people over!]
Your client received hundreds of thousands of dollars [of
imaginary money from someone other than the plaintiff!], has
been in this house, I assume, for three or four years not
paying a dime. [The plaintiff did not pay one cent of the
money allegedly lent!] Have you found one judge in this
state that has said, “You know what, I buy your argument
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Kenneth Trent
[can’t do it since the bank bought the judge], and your cli-
ent can live there forever rent-free, mortgage-free because
they violated the pooling agreement.” Have you found one
judge that has—
MR BLEIL: I have found no judge based upon the pooling
agreement, but I have had judges determine at trials that
either the plaintiff failed to prove its prima facie case or the
testimony proffered by the expert or by the fact witness
was indicative of unclean hands, which barred the plain-
tiff from receiving the relief of foreclosure. Yes, that has
occurred.
THE COURT: So and so, they’ll never be able to foreclose on
your client?
MR BLEIL: Depending on how the case comes out [we already
know about this one], yes.
THE COURT: So what you’re suggesting eventually is that
your client should be able to stay in this house forever?
[No, only for life!]
MR BLEIL: That has been the result. And, Judge, yes—
THE COURT: No, no, no, Mr. Bigben.
MR BLEIL: Bleil.
THE COURT: Mr. Bleil or Bile? [Wowzers! So professional!]
MR. BLEIL: [Sure thing, Judge—just kidding!] Bleil, yes.
THE COURT: I think this is a very interesting issue. I think
the Third District [his direct superiors] is going to have to
tell us that under these circumstances, we should listen to
this testimony, and if this testimony proves what you’re
purported to prove, that a person who borrowed hundreds
of thousands of dollars should never have to repay it [to
anyone other than the one she owes it to] and should be able
to live in the house, for free, forever [only for life].
MS. WEASEL: Your Honor, may I—
THE COURT: Because I’m not doing it.
*****
86
CYNTHIA THIEVENS, called as a witness by the plaintiff,

was duly sworn by the clerk, and in answer to the questions posed,
testified as follows:
MS. WEASEL: Please state your full name for—

MR. BLEIL: Judge, may I ask that the witness be asked to sit
in the witness stand? I mean, I really don’t want to try this
case on my feet. I mean, can the witness be on the stand?
THE COURT: If she wants to stand, she can stand. If you want
to sit down, sit down.
MR. BLEIL: That’s okay. I’ll stand to observe what the witness
is looking at.
THE COURT: Go ahead, sit in the witness stand. Make your-
self comfortable, ma’am. I guess it’s hard to hover when
the witness is standing. You there?
MS. THIEVENS: I’m there.
THE COURT: Go ahead.
MS. WEASEL: I’m sorry, Judge, I’ll have to move over so that
I can see her.
MR. BLEIL: I’ll be happy to stand.
THE COURT: Maybe she doesn’t want you standing—
MS. WEASEL: Maybe I’d rather not have you looking over my
shoulder. You asked my witness to sit here. I need to be
able to see her and talk to her.
MR. BLEIL: Counsel, I’d ask you to present from the table.
Judge, I mean—
MS. WEASEL: This is a circus. [It is, but Bleil isn’t the bozo!]
THE COURT: I’ve never seen anything like this. Why don’t
you do me a favor? Why don’t you stand a little bit further
away from her so she can breathe?
MS. WEASEL: Thank you.
MR. BLEIL: Sure, Judge. I can do this.
*****
87
Kenneth Trent
MS. WEASEL: Do you know how that document came to the

court?
MR. BLEIL: Same objection, Judge.
THE COURT: Same ruling.
MS THIEVENS: According to the servicing records, the prior
servicer, Citi Residential Lending, forwarded the original
documents to the prior foreclosure attorney on July 14,
2008.
MR. BLEIL: I move to strike the testimony for lack of foun-
dation and because it is hearsay. Judge, the witness has—
THE COURT: Is it coming in for the truth of the matter
asserted? Or is it coming in to show why, how the docu-
ment came, got to be here?
MR. BLEIL: I think regardless, it’s hearsay.
THE COURT: You know what? I’m going to tell you some-
thing. If you think you’re doing your client a favor when
this goes up on appeal, and the judge is up there saying,
as he objected to every single question, you’ll have a lot of
credibility. Overruled. See, I don’t care what they do. But
you’re objecting to everything, and it’s like, it’s like throw-
ing tacks in front of a bicycle tire. Let’s see, one of those
tacks will make the bicycle tire explode. Keep going. Keep
going. We’ll just do this little exercise.
MS. WEASEL: And when did that—
MR BLEIL: Move to strike. Objection, Your Honor. Foundation
and hearsay.
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead.
MS. WEASEL: When did the transfer to AHSMI occur?
MS. THIEVENS: February 2009.
MS. WEASEL: Are you able to tell from looking at the note
whether it’s ever been transferred?
MR. BLEIL: Objection, Your Honor, foundation and hearsay.
The document has not been admitted into evidence. This
witness has essentially testified for the truth of the matter
asserted from a document which has not been introduced
into evidence.
88
THE COURT: Oh my god.
*****
MS. WEASEL: Did the complaint contain a copy of the orig-

inal note?
MR. BLEIL: Objection, Your Honor, foundation, hearsay. Also,
she asked for her opinion.
THE COURT: She asked her if she reviewed the complaint.
She said yes. She’s asking her, “Did it contain something?”
She said, “I just reviewed it.” You know what? [Something
good, I bet]. I’m going to give you a standing objection to
every question they ask: foundation, hearsay. Just put on
the record what you want to object to. This court is going
to [repeat itself] give you a standing objection to every sin-
gle question. [He’s got a standing objection in support of his
standing objection.] Think of every objection you could
ever make, and I’ll allow you to have a standing objection
[another one?] because I am not going to sit here and go
into my next hearing because every single—let the record
reflect that every single question has been objected to. [Let
the record reflect that that’s not true.]
MR. BLEIL: I request a standing objection to this line of
questioning.
THE COURT: You got it.
MR. BLEIL: Judge, but I, is Your Honor giving every objec-
tion? Or would you like me to narrow what objections I
think would be applicable?
THE COURT: I am going to give you every objection known
to man. I will actually give you my copy of Ehrhardt. So
that if you’re lacking some of them, you can find as many
as you want. [Has he popped the bicycle tire?]
MR. BLEIL: Thank you, Judge.
THE COURT: Thank you. Standing objection to every one of
your questions.
MS. WEASEL: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
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Kenneth Trent
THE COURT: And they’re all overruled.
*****
The judge informed everyone that the trial would have to be

adjourned in a few minutes, to be resumed at an agreed-upon date
a few weeks into the future. The court then allowed Ms. Weasel to
wrap up her direct examination of Ms. Thievens:
MS. WEASEL: Can you please tell the court what the principal
amount due is?
MS. THIEVENS: $216,000.
MS. WEASEL: All right, and adding in advancements, would
you please testify for the court what the total judgment is
that we’re seeking here today?
MS. THIEVENS: $350,782.99.
MS WEASEL: Thank you. No further questions, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay, we’ll pick this up.
MR. BLEIL: May I ask, just since we’re continuing, can I have
a copy of what the witness used to refresh her recollection?
THE COURT: Sure.
MR BLEIL: But—but that’s not what the witness is looking at.
That one had check marks on it and stuff, Judge.
MS WEASEL: Yes, it’s the same document.
MR. BLEIL: I just want to be very clear, Judge. It looks like
that one has check marks on it. And I don’t think the one
Ms. Weasel was giving me does. I just want what the wit-
ness was using to refresh her recollection. It’s that simple,
Judge.
THE COURT: Mr. Bleil, you remind me of Don Quixote. You
know why you remind me of Don Quixote?
MR. BLEIL: How’s that?
THE COURT: Because you want to fight with windmills. You
just want to joust with a windmill. [The windmill is using
fabricated evidence to steal his client’s house. Wouldn’t you
fight?]
90
MR BLEIL: No.
THE COURT: She just gave her the judgment. This lady as an
officer of the court said, “I’m showing you a copy of the
proposed judgment.”
MR. BLEIL: Judge…
THE COURT: If she lied and she gave me something that it’s
not what she purported to be, I’m going to report her to
the Florida Bar. [(850)561-6600!]
MR. BLEIL: Judge, this document has check marks on it. I
just want this notation of the check marks. That’s all I’m
asking for.
MS. WEASEL: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: She’s just checking the figures.
MS. WEASEL: She hand checked the figures and made a little
check mark.
MR BLEIL: I would like the check mark, Judge. It comes in
my cross-examination. It’s all I wanted. It’s simple. It’s not
that difficult.
THE COURT: The check, those are her check marks.
MR. BLEIL: Correct, and she used that document to refresh
her recollection. All I ask is that I be provided a copy of
the document.
THE COURT: She used, not the check mark. She used the
figure on the document. [Yeah, the one with the check mark
next to it. How does the judge know anyway?]
MR. BLEIL: She used the document with the check mark
though, Judge. I just want to be clear.
THE COURT: What was it you looked at to refresh your
recollection?
MS. THIEVENS: This document [with the check marks] and
the servicing system [which is not there in court].
THE COURT: Did the check marks help you to testify, or was
it the numbers?
MS THIEVENS: The numbers [with the check marks next to
them].
THE COURT: Okay. Denied.
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Kenneth Trent
This is an example of exactly the type of treatment foreclosure

defendants and their attorneys were getting all across the state of
Florida, and probably across the whole nation. What made it partic-
ularly difficult to stomach was that, at the same time, the press was
reporting more and more on the scandalous conduct by the banks.
One would think, based upon all the revelations that were being
made, that if anything, the judges would be biased against the banks.
Unfortunately, the opposite was true.
I noticed that in most Florida cities and towns, there had arisen
leaders from groups of locals attempting to fight their foreclosures.
Many times, I received calls from people in different places telling me
that the caller had six or eight or twenty-five foreclosure defense cases
for me to take. I met a man named Alexis Mesa from this country
estate/ranch-type area in South Miami-Dade. I’ve seen people riding
nice horses down the paved street of his neighborhood. He and his
mother were realtors. I swear at one point at least 50 percent of the
population of South Florida worked in real estate in some capacity.
So apparently, Alex’s mom was a very successful and respected
realtor in South Dade during the boom years, say from 2002 to
2007; after the rug was jerked, lots of people to whom she had sold
homes were being foreclosed upon as was she. She led them to a man
named Jacob-Franz; Dyck [yes, with the semicolon!] This particular
silver-tongued snake-oil salesman was a perpetual spewer of sover-
eign-citizen gibberish. This man was conducting big rallies all over
this state and probably others, convincing dozens, if not hundreds of
people, that they could avoid foreclosure by transferring their prop-
erty to some trust of which he was the trustee, semicolon and all.
Well, everyone sort of eventually found out that there was
(and is) no such thing as a “land patent,” and the defense of their
respective foreclosure cases was not lookin’ like that of the ’85 Bears.
Suddenly, Alex’s mom felt even more obligated to all her former
buyers—the ones she had persuaded to give money and deed their
properties to Mr. Semicolon, all of whom were now in even worse
shape than before. So either Alex or his mom heard something about
me and directed the crew of homeowners on the brink to me. More
than a dozen hired me, and Alex and his family set about pursu-
92
ing the Semicolon all over the state, attempting to get him to sign
the properties back over to the homeowners. Due in large part to
his dogged determination, Alex was eventually successful in getting
the deeds returned, and I was largely successful in defending those
hapless folks. To this day, Alex and I are good friends, and I am still
defending Alex’s mom in her foreclosure case.
Something similar occurred when I was contacted by a woman
named Shannon Anderson, who had somehow come to be the
trusted leader of twelve to fifteen families facing foreclosure on the
West Coast of Florida. She brought me more than a dozen clients
from Fort Myers, Naples, and surrounding areas.
At that time, in early 2011, Fort Myers was running one of the
most infamous rocket dockets in the state, if not in the entire coun-
try. In my first few courtroom appearances there, I observed that
court was conducted in the following most suspicious manner:
Case name called by bailiff. Plaintiff ’s lawyer is already standing
right up in front of the bench. Defense counsel, if there is one, gets up
from the gallery, opens the little wooden gate separating the gallery
from the area occupied by the attorneys, several sheriff ’s deputies,
the judge and the judge’s staff, walks up to the front, and stands next
to the bank’s lawyer. Suddenly, a bevy of whispering would ensue
between the lawyers and the judge. After a few moments, the defense
counsel would walk back through the gate and into the gallery, at
which time, his clients would anxiously approach and begin asking
him what had happened. The lawyer would typically tell the clients
to come outside with him, into the hallway, so that he could explain.
Alternatively, where the homeowners were present without
counsel, the case name would be called by the bailiff. The home-
owners would rise from their seats and approach the little wooden
gate, only to be met there by three aggressive deputies and informed
that they could not go past the gate. Inevitably, there would again be
whispering between the judge and the bank’s lawyer. Next thing, the
bailiff or one of the deputies would tell the homeowners to “wait in
back for your paperwork.”
Locally famous movie producer/director Billy Corben heard
about the rocket docket in Fort Myers and called me (through an
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Kenneth Trent
uproariously funny glamorous, obscene, and hyperactive assistant)

to ask whether I had any cases in Fort Myers and whether I had any
clients that might be willing to challenge the practice of keeping the
homeowners in the gallery so as to prevent them from understanding
what is happening in their cases. I said, “Hell, yes,” and immediately
called a diminutive German immigrant housepainter client of mine
and explained the situation. He excitedly agreed to participate.
Corben obtained advance permission from the Twentieth
Judicial Circuit, and at the appointed day and time, while being
filmed, my client and I boldly strode toward that damnable little
gate. I tossed it haughtily aside, and my client and I stepped over
the line, shoulder to shoulder. Whereupon the triploid of deputoids
parted like the Red Sea and graciously extended their arms as if to
guide us forward, on toward the bench.
I was momentarily speechless! Needless to say, that wasn’t exactly
the clip that shock jock and coterie were anticipating.
Later, policy changed so that all foreclosure trials in Fort Myers
were heard by a magistrate, one whose professional profile, if truth-
ful, would include “nonnative speaker of English.” I have a transcript
of a hearing before this lady, occurring back in 2015. I kid you not,
here is the very first line:
[TIME NOTED: 1:55 pm]

THE COURT: Have the party had the opportunity to talk?
At the conclusion of the trial, after I completely exposed the

fraudulent nature of the evidence that was presented and quite
frankly blew the case out of the water, Her Wisdom announced her
decision:
THE COURT: Well, we are granting the final judgment of

foreclosure for the following reason: I consider that the
plaintiff has met the burden of proof for the foreclosure
action. I consider that the demand letter is sufficient to
please the defendant notice of the foreclosure action. The
note—the original note that was delivered to take to the
94
court is bearing a blank endorsement. And even taking the

assumption of the defendants that the copy of the note
that was attached to the complaint has no endorsement
and the original note that was submitted today is contain-
ing a blank endorsement, when you look who is the lender,
the lender is HSBC Mortgage Corporation. Who is the
plaintiff? The plaintiff is HSBC Mortgage Bank. [Actually,
“HSBC Bank USA, NA”]. And the witness testified that
both entities are the same. [The same bank uses multiple
names? Shocker.] So basically, we have that the lender is
the same of, it’s the same person or the same entity of the
plaintiff, so basically, no endorsement is necessary. [Why,
then, is there an endorsement and an assignment from one to
the other?]
The magistrate confused herself all on her own—no need for

MERS!
With all the outrageous practices in state court, I looked to fed-
eral court as the answer. I thought I had a good opportunity to strike
a blow for the regular folks with the class action, Figueroa v. Stern and
MERS, which I planned to and did file in the United States District
Court in and for the Southern District of Florida, which is part of
our federal court system here in the United States.
Regrettably, in the end, I would find the same outrageous bias
in the federal courts as homeowner advocates like myself, Josh Bleil,
and Matt Weidner experienced on a daily basis in the state courts.
There’s only one court left to which I can resort. What court is that,
you ask? The court of public opinion.
What’s your opinion so far?
95
C h a pte r 14
In August, September, and October of 2010, the class action was
moving quickly. By then, it was myself versus twenty big-name law
firms from all over the United States. The judge was Cecilia Altonaga.
She was supersmart and exceptionally mean. She was on the case like
stink on shit.
She ruled immediately on every motion that was filed. To be
precise, the action was filed on July 26, 2010. By October 14, same
year, she had entered twenty-one separate orders. Even though her
early rulings smacked of probank bias, she managed to toe the line in
such a way that she did not give me a good-faith basis to file a motion
to disqualify her. Plus, the way the press was reporting revelations
which were consistent with and which strongly supported the factual
allegations in our complaint, I could not imagine how she could jus-
tify rejecting our claims as fantastical or without basis. After all, both
the law and the facts were 99 percent-plus in our favor! Power to the
99 percent!
After October 14, I should have known the game was up. I
should have filed a motion to recuse, but I still held out a scintilla
of hope—an arguably sexist one—that she had been in a bad mood
under a bad moon when she wrote the following order:
THIS CAUSE came before the Court following

a review of the record. The Scheduling Order
[ECF No. 37] entered September 21, 2010 estab-
lishes the deadline for filing motions to amend
the pleadings as October 21, 2010. Presently
pending are seven motions to dismiss Plaintiff ’s
Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff ’s third
96
pleading to date. The Court has already sched-

uled the motions that have been filed for hearings
beginning October 22. On October 12, 2010,
Plaintiff responded to the first of the motions filed
with his Memorandum of Law In Opposition to
the Motion of Defendants David J. Stern, P.A.
and David J. Stern to Dismiss Second Amended
Complaint (“Response”) [ECF No. 81]. In that
Response, Plaintiff makes a baffling argument
by analogy, stating, “If the types of foreclosures
described in the Second Amended Complaint are
‘garden variety’ then it is incumbent upon this
Court to allow to [sic] Plaintiff every opportunity
to plow that garden under and start anew.” (Resp.
2). Plaintiff is wrong both as a matter of law and
agriculture.
October 21st is the last date for motions to
amend pleadings, and Plaintiff is now on notice
of several very legitimate issues the Defendants
and the authorities they cite have with his lat-
est “unconventional pleading.” (Sec. Am. Comp.
[ECF No. 21] 8, n.2). Consequently, this Order
aims to place the Plaintiff on heightened notice
that the Court will not allow Plaintiff “every
opportunity” to plow some unknown garden.
After so much replanting, the soil must be left
to lie fallow.
Should the Court grant the pending
motions to dismiss, such order[s] will not give
Plaintiff leave to re-plead. However, Plaintiff is
advised he should carefully consider the argu-
ments raised by those motions, and may file no
later than October 21 a final amended complaint
that (1) conforms to the Eleventh Circuit’s prohi-
bition against shotgun pleading; (2) states claims
of fraud with particularity under Federal Rule of
97
Kenneth Trent
Civil Procedure 9(b); (3) adheres to Local Rule

23.1(b) on pleading class action complaints; (4)
actually states a claim on behalf of the named
Plaintiff; and (4) states the elements for a RICO
claim as required by applicable law, Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009). Should Plaintiff
file a final amended complaint, the hearings pres-
ently scheduled will be cancelled, the pending
motions denied as moot, and further instructions
given to Defendants concerning filing a com-
prehensive response to Plaintiff ’s final amended
complaint.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida,

this 14th day of October, 2010.
_________________________________
CECILIA M. ALTONAGA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Where’s Mr. Bleil when I need him? Did she say “wrong as a
matter of law and agriculture,” directed to ME? Way to sniff out the
bad guys in the room there, Judge. D and me, oh yes, D who spent
thousands of hours of his time helping regular hardworking, salt-
of-the-earth-type folks, the people, from sea to shining sea, without
getting paid!
So in Cecilia Altonaga’s eyes, the persons being victimized by
Stern’s fake and take operation are the bad guys in this scenario? She
would be well advised to check in ASAP with her optometrist, if
that’s the case. Tens of thousands of people getting foreclosed on and
evicted by a machinelike behemoth, which has perfected the manu-
facturing of fake evidence doesn’t strike the judge as a tad improper?
Not only was she determined to throw the case out, she was so
self-righteous that she felt entitled to add insult to injury with acerbic
intellectual put-downs. Her perspective may be a bit off kilter, what
do you think? Is that what we want in our judges? LOL, UH-UH
98
HUH, what is THAT? Indeed, we are playing at Monopoly, but this

game’s in the twilight zone. Is the doppelgänger sitting right next to
Altonaga on her side of the desk? Or floating over it? Crawling under
it? Did she say sometimes the soil must be left to lie fallow?
LET’S PLOW THAT SOIL!
She knew we were RIGHT about everything we said in the ini-
tial complaint and its amended versions. All the theories espoused in
the complaint were being proven true on a daily basis, and there was
momentum toward a major change in the way foreclosures would be
allowed to proceed in this state and all over the country. Stories were
increasingly common in all major media outlets, and each day, there
would be a major development which made the banks’ robo-sign-
ing practices look more and more nefarious. Each day, there would
be a new announcement from some high-ranking law enforcement
agency or some major regulatory agency. The Occupy movement
sprang up and brought more and more attention to the conduct of
big banks in foreclosures and with regard to their mortgages and
their “trusts.”
In the face of all this, US District Court Judge Cecilia Altonaga
would ultimately dismiss the case on bogus grounds. “Too big to fail”
was probably the fallacy that hooked her.
I say the American PEOPLE are too big to fail!
Of course, I appealed her self-defeating thirty-five-page dis-
missal order to the next court, which was the Eleventh Judicial Circuit
Court, located in Atlanta, Georgia. They received transmission of the
MERS virus too, apparently, as they agreed with Altonaga’s flimsy,
overwrought, and transparently disingenuous nonsense.
In writing this book, I am appealing to the FINAL arbiter of
justice. Yep, that’s right: YOU THE PEOPLE! Help me reverse these
travesties by passing this book and its message to everyone you meet
in any kind of “space”!7
7
Bank of America sucks!
99
C h a pte r 15
October 2010 was an important month. While Altonaga was telling
us sometimes the soil must be left to lie fallow, PBS Newshour was
running the national false foreclosure/robo-signing scandal as one
of its top stories. Mr. Down and I got interviewed as did a man
identified as the president of MERS, R. K. Arnold. He presented
as a Southern cowboyish high-and-tight haircut-having gringo. He
speaks out of the right corner of his mouth; he’s allegedly a graduate
of the obscure South Texas School of Law, just like David Stern! We’ll
talk more about Arnold later. But first, here’s a sampling of news
reports from that period:
Bank of America Freezes Foreclosure Sales Nationwide
By: Alejandro Lazo and Alana Semuels, Tribune

Newspapers—October 4, 2010
With mounting calls for a national morato-
rium, Bank of America said Friday that it would
halt the sale of foreclosed homes indefinitely in
all 50 states as the nation’s largest lender widened
its investigation into how it seized homes from
troubled borrowers.
The freeze, which takes effect Saturday,
came after lawmakers, consumer groups and civil
rights organizations called for a moratorium on
bank seizures. State attorneys general across the
country have also called on lenders to prove they
are complying with state laws as they process
record numbers of repossessions.
100
Maryland’s attorney general, Douglas F.

Gansler, along with Gov. Martin O’Malley and
Rep. Elijah E. Cummings, sent letters to seven of
Maryland’s largest mortgage servicers this week,
urging them to stop foreclosing in Maryland
until they could be certain their procedures were
not violating state law.
Raquel Guillory, a spokeswoman for
Gansler, said Bank of America called Friday to
say it would stop foreclosing in Maryland.
“Of course that came as welcome news,”
she said. “It looks like we’re moving in a positive
direction, and hopefully the other companies will
follow suit.”
Bank of America could not say how many
homes would be affected. Nationwide, it had
420,000 properties in some stage of foreclosure
through the first half of the year, according to
Irvine, Calif.-based RealtyTrac.
In Maryland, lenders, including Bank of
America, were trying to foreclose on more than
40,000 homes during the spring, the most recent
figures from the Mortgage Bankers Association.
In the same period, Marylanders living in an
additional 100,000 homes were at least one
month behind on their mortgage payments but
were not yet in the foreclosure process.
The freeze comes as disclosures of alleged
irregularities, including mishandling of records
in the foreclosure process, have raised concerns
that lenders have been evicting homeowners
using flawed procedures.
Bank of America’s announcement is likely
to increase pressure on other big banks to declare
similar national moratoriums, analysts said.
101
Kenneth Trent
“It is going to give politicians more ammu-

nition to say, ‘If Bank of America can do it, don’t
tell us you can’t,’” said Guy Cecala, publisher of
Inside Mortgage Finance.
PNC Financial Services said Friday that it
was reviewing its foreclosure practices, and Litton
Loan Servicing, a mortgage servicer owned by
Goldman Sachs Group, said it had suspended
foreclosure proceedings in certain cases while it
completed a review.
Before Friday, three major banks—Bank
of America, Ally Financial Inc. and JPMorgan
Chase—had said they were suspending foreclo-
sures in the 23 states that process repossessions
through the courts.
Growing furor over the admission by banks
that they have been pushing thousands of homes
through the foreclosure process without follow-
ing correct procedures comes as nearly 1 in 10
people are out of work in the country. Many of
these out-of-work borrowers have struggled to
make payments on their mortgages, and com-
plaints about how banks process mortgage mod-
ifications are widespread.
The push to ensure that lenders are not
foreclosing on homeowners inappropriately has
ripple effects on more than just industry players
and borrowers. Many homes on the market are
foreclosures, in Maryland and nationwide.
Bank-owned properties represented nearly
one-third of homes sold in Baltimore from
January through August and between 10 percent
and 20 percent in the suburbs, according to the
Greater Baltimore Board of Realtors.
A foreclosure slowdown could help the mar-
ket, some analysts argue, especially if it results
102
in servicers offering loan modifications to more

borrowers so they can stay put.
“It could have a positive impact if it helps
reduce the amount of inventory that’s coming
onto the market,” said Joseph T. “Jody” Landers
III, executive vice president of the Greater
Baltimore Board of Realtors. “The more dis-
tressed properties that are out there, the more
depressed the prices. The more depressed the
prices, the more people are underwater.”
But some analysts contend that foreclosure
delays merely drag out the pain and make it harder
for the housing market to rebound. “There’s a
whole bunch of people who, through no fault
of their own, are now in God-knows-how-long
limbo,” said Guillory, with the Maryland attor-
ney general’s office.
David McIlvaine Sr., an Ellicott City real
estate agent whose business is predominantly
bank-owned properties, said a buyer working
with one of the agents in his office was about to
sign a contract for a foreclosure but pulled out
Friday.
“The buyer decided not to move forward
with it for fear that this would happen—that
things would get frozen,” he said. “They just
wanted to move on.”
Consumer advocacy groups said the move
by Bank of America suggests that the problems
mortgage servicers were facing with processing
foreclosures were more widespread than initially
thought.
“There is a serious problem with the reck-
less and careless way in which the banks and ser-
vicers are processing foreclosures and taking peo-
103
Kenneth Trent
ple’s homes,” said Kevin Stein, associate director

of the California Reinvestment Coalition.
But economists said a move to halt foreclo-
sures could hinder the housing market’s recovery,
essentially delaying the inevitable, because many
borrowers simply cannot afford to pay their
mortgages.
“It is highly likely that mistakes are being
made when you have that volume of paperwork
going through the system,” said Richard Bove,
a banking analyst with Rochdale Securities. “I
am sure there are a lot of people that are being
treated unfairly, but I think the vast majority of
them can’t pay their mortgage; and if they can’t
pay their mortgage, they are going to lose the
house anyway.” [They were set up to fail. They
weren’t “approved”; they were targeted!]
Bove estimated that the moratorium could
cost Bank of America about $400 million a quar-
ter. [Ooooh, they’re so scared!]
Banks have been repossessing homes at a
faster clip as they push homes through a process
that had been delayed by several state and national
moratoriums last year and by the Obama admin-
istration’s program to help troubled borrowers.
Another moratorium would serve only to push
the pain into the future, economists said.
In an open letter to Congress, two finan-
cial industry groups, the Mortgage Bankers
Association and the Financial Services
Roundtable, said that a national foreclosure mor-
atorium could be detrimental to the economy.
“Calls for a blanket national moratorium on
all foreclosures are a bad idea and would cause
significant harm to communities at risk, the
104
unstable housing market and the fragile econ-

omy,” the letter said.
While it will halt seizing and selling fore-
closed homes, Bank of America said it would
continue foreclosure proceeding against home-
owners who are late on their payments. If a bor-
rower is delinquent, the bank will still issue a
notice of default, the bank said.
On October 14, 2010, PBS featured a story about MERS and

the practice of placing loans in those “trusts” called “securitization.”
Here’s the official transcript of that segment:
Lehrer: NOW THE GROWING HOME FORECLOSURE

PROBLEM. BANKS FORECLOSED ON MORE
HOMES THIS SUMMER THAN IN ANY THREE-
MONTH STRETCH SINCE THE HOUSING
MARKET SOURED IN 2006. INDUSTRY GROUP
REALTY-TRAC REPORTED MORE THAN 288,000
PROPERTIES WERE LOST TO FORECLOSURE
IN THE JULY–SEPTEMBER QUARTER. THAT’S
UP FROM NEARLY 270,000 IN THE SECOND
QUARTER. BUT FEWER TAKEOVERS ARE
EXPECTED NOW THAT SEVERAL LENDERS
HAVE SUSPENDED FORECLOSURES. THEY’RE
WORKING TO SORT OUT PROBLEMS WITH
QUESTIONABLE DOCUMENTS. MEANWHILE,
ATTORNEYS GENERAL IN EVERY STATE AND THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA LAUNCHED A JOINT
INVESTIGATION YESTERDAY. “NEWSHOUR”
ECONOMICS CORRESPONDENT PAUL SOLMAN
HAS THE BACK-STORY ON THE FLAWED
PAPERWORK BEING USED TO CHALLENGE
FORECLOSURES IN COURT. IT’S THE FIRST
IN A PERIODIC SERIES ON THE MORTGAGE
105
Kenneth Trent
CRISIS. AND IT’S ALL PART OF HIS REPORTING:

“MAKING SENSE OF FINANCIAL NEWS.”
Reporter: PATRICIA ANTROBUS LIVES IN A TURN OF
THE 20th CENTURY HOUSE IN THE BED-STUY
SECTION OF BROOKLYN. THIS HOUSE, MY
FATHER BOUGHT ON THE G.I. BILL WHEN I
WAS ONE YEAR OLD. I LOVE THIS HOUSE, YOU
KNOW, IT’S MY SANCTUARY. IT’S MY TARA. IT’S
EVERYTHING TO ME.
Reporter: IT’S ALSO HER MONEY PIT. IN 2004,
ANTROBUS, A SCHOOL SECRETARY, GOT A
MORTGAGE SO SHE COULD BUY OUT HER
SIBLINGS. REPAIR BILLS SOON FORCED A
REFINANCE. WHEN THE ROOF GOES AND YOU
HAVE A $6,000 WATER MAIN BREAK AT THE
SAME TIME, YOU KNOW, I DID DO A COUPLE
OF REFINANCES JUST TO TRY AND KEEP THIS
PLACE TOGETHER.
Reporter: SHE WOUND UP OWING NEARLY HALF A
MILLION DOLLARS. HER PAYMENTS DEPENDENT
ON THE TENANTS UPSTAIRS PAYING RENT; HER
SON DOWNSTAIRS HELPING OUT. THEN CAME
THE GREAT RECESSION, LAYING THEM ALL OFF,
SAVE ANTROBUS. AND THAT JUST SKEWS THE
WHOLE THING BECAUSE I DON’T HAVE A LOT
OF ROOM AND WIGGLE ROOM, YOU KNOW, TO
PAY EVERYBODY.
Reporter: THREE YEARS AGO, ANTROBUS FELL
BEHIND; THE BANK MOVED IN TO FORECLOSE.
BUT AT THE 11th HOUR, IN WHAT MIGHT BE
EXHIBIT A OF THE CURRENT FORECLOSURE
FREEZE GRIPPING THE NATION, HER HOUSE
WAS SAVED BY A NEW YORK STATE SUPREME
COURT JUDGE WHO’D NOTICED SOMETHING
FISHY IN THE FORECLOSURE PAPERS. 1661
106
WORTHINGTON ROAD, WEST PALM BEACH,

FLORIDA, SUITE 100.
Reporter: THAT’S THE ADDRESS GIVEN BY THREE
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS LISTED IN
ANTROBUS DOCUMENTS, AN ADDRESS JUDGE
ARTHUR SCHACK HAD SEEN FOR TWO OTHER
MAJOR FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, IN OTHER
COURT CASES. IT DIDN’T ADD UP. HOW DO
FIVE DIFFERENT BANKS OR ENTITIES END UP
IN THE SAME OFFICE? WHY DOES SOMEBODY
ONE WEEK IS THE VICE-PRESIDENT OF BANK
“X,” AND THE NEXT WEEK IS THE VICE-
PRESIDENT OF BANK “Y,” AND THEN THEY GO
BACK TO BANK “X” TWO WEEKS LATER? IT’S
JUST VERY QUESTIONABLE.
Reporter: WHEN HE LOOKED FURTHER, SCHACK
FOUND ENOUGH FLAWS TO BEGIN THROWING
NUMEROUS FORECLOSURES LIKE ANTROBUS’S
OUT OF COURT. THREE YEARS LATER, THE
FLAWS HE FOUND HAVE BECOME EMBODIED
IN ROBO-SIGNERS—EMPLOYEES OF GMAC,
JP MORGAN-CHASE, AND BANK OF AMERICA,
A “NEWSHOUR” UNDERWRITER, EACH OF
WHOM HAS ADMITTED, UNDER OATH, TO
SIGNING FORECLOSURE PAPERS LIKE ROBOTS,
AT THE RATE OF SEVERAL THOUSAND A
MONTH. LIKE ROBOTS. THOSE BANKS HAVE
NOW HALTED FORECLOSURES, IN SOME CASES
NATIONWIDE. AND JUDGE SCHACK CLAIMS
HE’S SEEN MORE ROBO-SIGNERS, AT OTHER
BANKS, THAT COULD MAKE MATTERS WORSE.
BUT BANK OF AMERICA, WHICH SERVICES 14
MILLION MORTGAGES, REBECCA MAIRONE
SAYS THEY’RE RESPONDING.
WE WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT ALL OF OUR
PROCESSES, WHETHER IT’S AFFIDAVIT SIGNING
107
Kenneth Trent
OR WHETHER IT’S NOTARY OR WHETHER ITS

OTHER FORECLOSURE PROCESSES, ARE MET
100% OF THE TIME ON REQUIREMENTS, BASED
ON OUR ASSESSMENT WE DO BELIEVE THAT THE
UNDERLYING FACTS OF THE FORECLOSURE
IN THE DECISIONS ARE ACCURATE. [Yeah, right!]
WE ARE WORKING TO ENSURE THAT OUR
PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES ARE FOLLOWING
THE GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS AT
THIS TIME.
Reporter: SO IT MEANS THAT YOU MIGHT HAVE
USED SO-CALLED ROBO-SIGNERS, BUT THAT
DOESN’T REALLY INVALIDATE THE PAPERWORK
ITSELF?
YEAH, THE UNDERLYING FACTS OF THE
FORECLOSURES AND THE DATA IS ACCURATE.
[So what are the papers for?]
Reporter: BUT “LEGALLY ACCURATE,” ASKS JUDGE
SCHACK. ALL OF THEM?
MY CONCERN IS IF YOU’RE GOING TO TAKE
AWAY SOMEBODY’S HOUSE, LET’S FOLLOW
THE LAW WHEN WE DO THIS, SO LET’S HAVE IT
DONE CORRECTLY.
BUT SO MUCH OF THIS IS LEGAL BOILERPLATE
ANYWAY. I MEAN, I PUNCH “AGREE” TO ALL
SORTS OF STUFF ONLINE THAT I NEVER READ.
BY SIGNING YOUR NAME, IT SAYS YOU DID,
YOU READ IT AND YOU AGREED TO IT. BUT THE
POINT IS WITH THESE DOCUMENTS, WHEN IT’S
AN AFFIDAVIT OF MERIT IT MEANS THAT THE
PERSON HAS SAID, IS SWEARING THAT THEY’RE
FAMILIAR WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE AND
IF THEY’RE NOT THEN IT BECOMES VERY, VERY
QUESTIONABLE AS TO WHETHER IT’S LEGALLY
CORRECT. [It’s unquestionably incorrect!]
108
Reporter: BECAUSE IF THEY DIDN’T DO THAT, THEN

ANY NUMBERS COULD BE IN THERE. OF COURSE,
WHY NOT HAVE MICKEY MOUSE SIGN THE
THING INSTEAD OF HAVING A HUMAN BEING
SIGN IT? I MEAN, IT BECOMES MEANINGLESS.
I MEAN, THAT’S THE WHOLE CONCEPT
BEHIND THIS GETTING A JUDGMENT, IS THAT
EVERYTHING IS TRUTHFUL. IF WE DON’T
KNOW IF IT’S TRUTHFUL, WHY ARE WE EVEN
SIGNING THIS STUFF?
Reporter: THE PROBLEMS JUDGE SCHACK SPOTTED
YEARS AGO HAVE SINCE SPAWNED THEIR OWN
INDUSTRY.
WE WANT TO SHOW YOU WHAT THE REAL
DEAL IS.
Reporter: FROM HIS SLEEPY HOME BASE IN SHELBY,
NORTH CAROLINA, MAX GARDNER RUNS
BARRISTER BOOT CAMPS. LAWYERS FROM
ALL OVER THE COUNTRY FLOCK TO THE
SHERLOCK OF SHELBY TO DEDUCE THE FACTS
OF FORECLOSURE, NO LONGER ELEMENTARY
IN THIS ERA OF COMPLEX SECURITIZED
MORTGAGES.
YOU’VE GOT THE ORIGINATOR, THE SPONSOR,
THE DEPOSITOR, THE TRUSTEE.
Reporter: IN THE PROCESS OF SECURITIZATION,
MORTGAGES WERE [theoretically] GATHERED
INTO A POOL, WHICH WAS THEN USED AS
COLLATERAL FOR THE NOW INFAMOUS
INVESTMENTS, MORTGAGE BACKED
SECURITIES. BUT IT TURNS OUT THAT, IN
THE SEVERAL STEPS OF THE PROCESS, A KEY
ONE MAY OFTEN HAVE BEEN NEGLECTED:
LEGALLY TRANSFERRING OR ASSIGNING THE
MORTGAGES FROM THE ORIGINAL LENDER,
ON THROUGH TO THE TAX-EXEMPT TRUST
109
Kenneth Trent
THAT ISSUED THE SECURITIES. [If this happens even

once, then by law the trust, worth billions of dollars, fails and
all of its assets go to the IRS as a 100 percent tax penalty!]
THERE WAS THIS GREAT DEMAND TO
GENERATE MORE MORTGAGES, AND I THINK
THAT WITH THAT DEMAND CAME A LACK OF
DUE DILIGENCE AND PROPER UNDERWRITING
AND PROPER COMPLIANCE WITH ALL THE
RULES THEY HAD SET UP. [Set up, indeed!]
Reporter: CALIFORNIA LAWYER WALTER HACKETT
SPENT 27 YEARS IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY.
WHEN THEY TRIED TO INDUSTRIALIZE THE LOAN
SECURITIZATION MARKET, THIS IS REALLY
WHAT THEY DID, THEY TRIED TO AUTOMATE
EVERYTHING THEY COULD. THEY STARTED
DIGITIZING LOAN DOCUMENTS AND
SHREDDING ORIGINALS. [They loaned you money,
and instead of sitting back and collecting their money with
interest, they deployed “industrialized securitization.” Where
is that in the loan documents?]
Reporter: MAKING IT HARDER, SAYS HACKETT, TO
TRACK THE TRANSFERS. [Coincidence? Ahh, no.]
AND, OF COURSE, WHAT THAT MEANS IS WE
HAVE NO CLUE WHO OWNS WHAT. [Could the
answer be that no one owns it?]
Reporter: WHAT’S EMERGING TODAY, SAY CONSUMER
LAWYERS, IS AN INDUSTRY TRYING TO COVER
ITS TRACKS ON LOANS GONE BAD. [No, no, no.
The loans are doing exactly what they were designed to do.]
WHAT WE’RE DOING IS USING THE DOCUMENTS
THAT THE SECURITIZED TRUST CREATED,
THE BUSINESS MODEL THAT THEY CREATED
THEMSELVES, AND WERE SAYING: DID YOU DO
THINGS THE WAY THAT YOU SAID YOU DID IT?
[No, nope, no, and no].
110
Reporter: IF NOT, THE OWNERSHIP OF THE

MORTGAGE IS IN QUESTION AND BANKS MAY BE
FORCED TO NEGOTIATE. CONSIDER THE CASE
OF SANDRA OROSCO, FACING FORECLOSURE
FROM A NEW BANK AFTER JUDGE SCHACK
THREW OUT HER CASE THREE YEARS AGO. SO
WHO OWNS THE LOAN NOW?
BANK OF AMERICA SUPPOSEDLY.
Reporter: BUT YOU’RE NOT SURE.
WELL, THE WHOLE THING IS REAL UNSURE
RIGHT NOW SINCE THE INFORMATION I GOT A
COUPLE OF DAYS AGO, SO I’M LIKE… [It changes
constantly!]
Reporter: OROSCO’S CASE IS ABSOLUTELY TYPICAL:
SHE DOESN’T KNOW WHO OWNS THE
LOAN, BANK OF AMERICA ONLY SERVICES IT.
AND INDEED, FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF
FORECLOSURES TRIGGERED BY BOOM-ERA
MORTGAGES, LEGAL OWNERSHIP IS NOW IN
LIMBO, SAYS LAWYER WALTER HACKETT.
JUST FROM WHAT I’VE SEEN IN CALIFORNIA I
WOULD SAY IT’S SOMEWHERE AROUND FOR
SURE 65% CONSERVATIVELY, THE NUMBER
MIGHT BE MUCH HIGHER. [99.99%!]
Reporter: APRIL CHARNEY,8 A JACKSONVILLE
FLORIDA LEGAL AID ATTORNEY, IS A PIONEER
IN THE FIELD OF FIGHTING FORECLOSURE.
WE HAVE CASE REVIEW ONCE A WEEK
FROM OUR INTAKE AND WE HAVE WALK-IN
INTAKE BASICALLY INTO OUR PROGRAM—
THOUSANDS, AND NOT ONE OF THEM HAS
SHOWN THE PAPERWORK. IN FACT, I CALL OUT
TO MY CLASSES OF THE LAWYERS THAT I TRAIN:
IF YOU CAN SHOW ME A PROPER TRANSFER
8
Hall of Fame member.
111
Kenneth Trent
FROM AN ORIGINATING LENDER TO THE FIRST

BANKRUPTCY REMOTE VEHICLE, I WILL EAT
THE PAPER. AND I HAVEN’T EATEN ANY PAPER
AT ALL. [Good one!]
Reporter: NORTH CAROLINA’S MAX GARDNER SAYS
THAT OF THE THOUSANDS OF CASES HE’S
BEEN INVOLVED WITH.
I HAVE NEVER SEEN A COMPLETE UNBROKEN
CHAIN. [Me neither!]
Reporter: BUT THE POINT ISN’T TO FREEZE ALL
FORECLOSURES, SAYS GARDNER. IT’S TO
FINALLY FORCE BANKS TO OFFER LOAN
MODIFICATIONS THAT CLIENTS CAN AFFORD.
[Good luck!]
Reporter: THAT’S WHAT PATRICIA ANTROBUS IS
HOPING FOR. AFTER JUDGE SCHACK RULED IN
HER FAVOR THREE YEARS AGO, HER MORTGAGE
WAS MODIFIED, MODESTLY. BUT WITH HER
TENANTS STILL OUT OF WORK, THE TERMS
PROVED TOO TOUGH. SHE’S FOUR MONTHS
BEHIND ON HER PAYMENTS; ANOTHER
MORTGAGE REDUCTION, HER ONLY SHOT.
THE WHOLE TIME THAT I’VE DEALT WITH THIS
WHOLE SITUATION I’VE ALWAYS FELT LIKE
THAT SMALL, YOU KNOW LIKE DAVID AND
GOLIATH BUT I DON’T HAVE A ROCK AND A
SLINGSHOT.
Reporter: WITH THE ADMISSION OF DOCUMENT
SHENANIGANS, LIKE MILLIONS OF
HOMEOWNERS MIGHT FINALLY HAVE THE
AMMUNITION THEY’VE SO LONG LACKED.
A few days later, it was myself, Mr. Down, and MERS CEO R.
K. Arnold on PBS Newshour. Here’s our day in the sun, reduced to
written word:
112
Suzanne, concerns accelerated again today about the nation’s

growing foreclosure mess. Big financial stocks really slumped as
investors worried about legal scrutiny over the foreclosure process.
Meanwhile, Bank of America CEO in Boston, Brian Moynihan, says
he is not so concerned as there is uncertainty arising from these prac-
tices in the United States real estate market. It was late last month
the government started taking a closer look at foreclosure docu-
ments. Banks repossessed more than 100,000 homes in September,
the first time a one-month total has exceeded that number. So we
have two stories this evening: looking at the foreclosure process and
the so-called robo-signing of foreclosure documents. We begin with
the mortgage industry’s controversial use of MERS or Mortgage
Electronic Registration Systems Inc. Its name is found in over half
of all home loans. It was formed in the late 1990s. The company is
owned by the giants of the industry: Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank
of America, GMAC, Washington Mutual, and Wells Fargo.
MERS CEO R. K. Arnold: The mortgage industry saw a need
for a database to house information. Home loans are packaged on a
regular basis so who owns what. What we track are the parties that
have those documents so we don’t have the documents, but we can
point to the companies that do have those documents.
MERS is coming into the crosshairs because it is foreclosing
on properties, but its right to do that is being challenged. Consumer
Attorney Ira Reinhorn says MERS has no right to foreclose.
Reinhorn: Courts are saying, “But wait a second, if you’re going
to take someone’s home, you have to establish you have the legal
right to their home.”
When asked what gives MERS the right to foreclose, Arnold
says, “The mortgage. It says that the borrower and the lender agree,
as a condition of the mortgage, that MERS will be placed in the land
records. The mortgage has a standard paragraph that is no differ-
ent from other mortgages, giving MERS the power to foreclose. But
MERS doesn’t make the decision to foreclose. That is made by the
people to whom the money is owed.”
113
Kenneth Trent
MERS claims its website shows who owns the mortgage on

your property, but the information is not disclosed. Without a clear
paper trail, there’s doubt about many foreclosures.
Reingold: Lenders should be able to retrace their steps. If in fact
they were transferred correctly, then the mortgage company should
be able to rebuild who owns what it should be in there, and if they
want to foreclose on somebody’s home, they can simply identify
themselves.
If they can’t do that, many homeowners may avoid foreclosure.
I’m Jeff Yastine in Miami with homeowner Bennus Down. He
says every single month, he was sending in his mortgage payment.
Yet somehow, the servicer of his loan, CitiMortgage, was not cred-
iting him for his payments. Even though he kept calling, nobody
could tell him why he wasn’t being credited or where the money was
going. “I send the money in, and we still haven’t gotten credit, so I
started sending them in two checks a month.”
Yastine: How much was that?
Down: What was that, I think it was sixteen hundred I believe
it was, and then I sent in another 1,600 somewhere up in there, and
then we start getting the same ordeal.
Eventually, CitiMortgage filed suit to foreclose. The Downs
hired a lawyer, Kenneth Eric Trent, to fight back. When Trent
requested a key piece of paper called a mortgage assignment, he
noticed something odd. The document, from Mortgage Electronic
Registration Systems or MERS, was signed and witnessed, but the
actual signatures of two supposedly different people were exactly the
same!
Trent: It’s not the kind of thing you can brush off. How do you
have two different people with the same signature on a document
with the importance of this one, which is essentially bestowing the
right upon the plaintiff, who is suing my client, to foreclose and take
his home?
Trent had stumbled onto [strode into and through] what we
now know as robo-signers—as in the robo-signing of key mortgage
documents.
114
Trent: Obviously, this is an important document—it’s the

essence of the case. If they hadn’t produced a document like this or a
similar instrument, I would be entitled to summary judgment, and
they would not be able to take my clients’ home.
It turns out the signers of the document weren’t MERS employ-
ees at all. They were workers at a law firm hired by CitiMortgage to do
the foreclosure. Trent has since found many examples of robo-sign-
ing. In one, the house was in Orange County, Florida, but the notary
indicated Orange County, California. In others, there hardly appears
to be a signature at all, or perhaps someone was doodling.
Trent: What you end up with is a person who has not the slight-
est knowledge of the underlying loan transaction, payments that
were made by the homeowner, or the right, title, or interest of any of
these corporate entities to actually go forward with the foreclosure or
collect payments, in other words, a person with no knowledge.
Trent and the Downs eventually won in court. The foreclosure
case was dismissed. But Down knows thousands of other homeown-
ers were not so lucky.
Downs: With the ordeal that I went through, I know it took
my blood pressure up so high, imagine what they went through, and
they lost their home. And not only that, they probably got caught up
with layoffs and other things of that nature so that’s double trouble.
It’s like they[’re] stealing from the blind.
Jeff Yastine, Nightly News, Fort Lauderdale, Florida.
115
C h a pte r 16
New Jersey was among the few states whose court systems took deci-
sive action against the robo-signers. It was spurred by an awesomely
detailed and extensively documented report on robo-signing. This
report is an eye-opener to anyone who still has doubts as to whether
the conspiracy goes to the very top:
LEGAL SERVICES OF NEW JERSEY

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT
CONCERNING FALSE STATEMENTS IN
FORECLOSURE PROCEEDINGS DATED
NOVEMBER 4, 2010
OVERVIEW
Most (reported to be at least 95%) of New

Jersey foreclosure actions involve unrepresented
or defaulting defendants. A great volume of
national information, corroborated by Legal
Services’ experience and anecdotal New Jersey
accounts, suggests a pervasive, industry-wide
pattern of false statements and certifications at
various stages of foreclosure proceedings. The
lack of representation for defendant homeowners
precludes appropriate and necessary adversarial
review and challenge to such practices, in twin
creating a greater burden upon both the forum
court and the judicial system generally.
116
This submission has three parts:
1. A description of the problematic certification

and evidentiary practices.
2. The national and New Jersey evidence of the
prevalence of false certification practices.
3. Recommendations for Supreme Court
action. [Omitted.]
While some of the recommendations could

perhaps be included as part of the relief ordered in
an individual case, we believe the recommended
steps should be considered for judicial adminis-
trative action for at least three reasons:
The urgency of protecting unrepresented
mortgagors, contrasted with the realistic time it
would take to reach such a relief point in actual
litigation.
Our recommendations are much more in
the nature of steps appropriately taken by the
Court in its administration and oversight of
the judicial system, rather than relief typically
granted to parties or classes in an individual case.
The breadth of the recommended action is
complex, with many interrelated parts, also mili-
tating toward a comprehensive judicial adminis-
trative response.
Common practices and characteristics.
Scope of the falsity commonly involved in
foreclosure proceedings
1. Lack of personal knowledge of an affiant

whose certification states that she has per-
sonal knowledge.
117
Kenneth Trent
2. Failure to review documents or other evi-

dence on which the certification is based and
which it may generally reference.
3. Actual false statements about when and how
a loan has been transferred since its origi-
nation, which are particularly significant to
whether a homeowner is entitled to affirma-
tive defenses such as set off and recoupment.
4. False identification of signatory (e.g., an
employee of a servicer will be identified as
a vice president, or similar title, of the fore-
closing mortgagee.)
5. Forged signatures.
6. Execution outside the presence of a notary,
who nevertheless notarizes the signature.
B. Points of occurrence
False testimony is endemic at the following

stages of a New Jersey foreclosure action. The
bracketed material highlights the importance of
the sworn item in the context of the foreclosure
proceeding.
1. The Notice of Intention to Foreclose: The

Notice of Intention to Foreclose is a unique
requirement under the New Jersey Fair
Foreclosure Act that must be satisfied before
initiating a foreclosure complaint. Among
other things jurisdictional, the Notice of
Intention to Foreclose must identify the
holder of the note and the amount due to
date. [The Fair Foreclosure Act confers an
important right on New Jersey Homeowners
that allows them to cure their mortgage if they
pay the amount due. As there can be disputes
118
about the amount due, having access to the

proper records and the ability to cure the impo-
sition of charges is critical to homeowners. After
a foreclosure judgment is entered (which often
disallows charges sought by lenders), the home-
owner no longer has the right to reinstate the
mortgage but instead must pay in full. Truth
and accuracy at this initial stage of foreclosure
is vital to homeowners.]
2. The complaint. Almost invariably, foreclo-

sure complaints in New Jersey will falsely
indicate that the named plaintiff is the
“holder and/or owner” of the note and mort-
gage without indicating how the note or
“evidence of indebtedness” traveled from the
originator to the current plaintiff. It is very
important to know when a note was legally
negotiated along the chain because entities
which acquire a note after default or with
notice of defects take the note subject to
the defenses that would be available against
the originator. Foreclosing plaintiffs nearly
always claim to be “holders in due course”
without setting out an allegation much less
proof of how they acquired the note.
a. The complaint rarely indicates that the entity

directing and controlling the foreclosure
action is actually a servicer acting pursuant to
a limited power of attorney on behalf of the
named plaintiff. This is important because
the true note holder is almost never
involved in the foreclosure proceedings,
including the mediation and loan modifi-
cation process.
119
Kenneth Trent
b. The complaint virtually never sets out the

complete chain of assignments of the mort-
gage to demonstrate the plaintiff ’s right to
foreclose. To the contrary, foreclosure com-
plaints will set out the name of the originat-
ing lender and the name of the foreclosing
mortgagee without any intervening transfers
of title—even though a review of any relevant
securitization documents will show usually
four transfers.
c. The complaint is often inconsistent with
other pleadings and evidence—the note sub-
mitted to the court is in the name of the orig-
inator and usually has no endorsements, the
Notice of Intention to Foreclose in usually in
the name of the servicer, and fails to identify
the holder of the note and mortgage (in vio-
lation of the Fair Foreclosure Act), and the
complaint is filed in the name of yet another
party claiming to hold the note and mort-
gage, albeit with incomplete allegations and
proofs showing standing.
3. Summary judgment motion

In contested matters, a plaintiff who moves
for summary judgment must supply a certi-
fication in support thereof. A proper certifi-
cation must set forth all of the facts entitling
the plaintiff to the relief sought.
Many summary judgment motions are
unsupported by any certification at all. Some
are supported only by the certifications of
counsel. If they are supported by someone
other than counsel that person is nearly
always someone who would fall into the
category of robo-signer, i.e., a person whose
120
sole job is to execute documents and who

has no knowledge of the underlying facts or
access to any records which would support
the motion. These motions are nearly always
brought prior to discovery, often being filed
simultaneously with or in lieu of an answer
to a germane counterclaim or very soon after
the homeowner has filed a contesting answer.
4. Application for Final Judgment

Ninety-five percent of foreclosures are
uncontested, and these uncontested foreclo-
sures are never subjected to any meaningful
judicial scrutiny. In these matters, a plaintiff
submits a certification or more often loose
documents stamped certified to be true and
signed by an attorney representing the plain-
tiff to the Office of Foreclosure in support
of a Motion for Entry of Final Judgment.
Pursuant to R. 4:642(a), proof may be sub-
mitted by affidavit “unless the court other-
wise requires.”
The affidavit “shall be made on personal
knowledge of all of the facts recited therein,
and if the affiant is not the plaintiff, it shall
also state that the affiant is authorized to
make the affidavit.” R. 4:64-2(c).
In addition to the affidavit that must be
filed at this time, the foreclosing mortgagee
must also “produce the original mortgage,
evidence of indebtedness, assignments…and
any other original document upon which the
claim is based. ln lieu of an original docu-
ment, the moving party may produce a leg-
ible copy of a recorded or filed document,
certified as a true copy by the recording or
121
Kenneth Trent
filing officer or by a New Jersey attorney, or

a copy of an original document, if unfiled or
unrecorded, certified as a true copy by a New
Jersey attorney.” R. 4:64-2(a). Very rarely has
an attorney certifying the copy as true ever
seen the original. Often a cursory inspection
of the copy shows it to be in the name of
someone other than the plaintiff.
5. Assignments of Mortgages
A foreclosing plaintiff must show 1) that it
holds the note, and (2) that the mortgage
was either made to it or assigned to it in
writing. N.J.5.A. 46:9-9. Lenders no longer
routinely execute or record Assignments of
Mortgage when a loan is transferred because
they regard it as unnecessary unless there is
a default and too costly and time consuming
to do in every case. See Exhibit Q in which a
foreclosure attorney explains in a submission
to the Court that; “The assignee performs its
due diligence, bulk transfer agreements are
executed, money is wired, and on a date cer-
tain the proverbial ‘switch is flipped’ wherein
the assignee takes over regardless of the exe-
cution of a formal, legal assignment for each
and every loan. By way of example, one large
national mortgage servicer recently pur-
chased 1.3 million loans from another large
servicer. Even if it took one minute per assign-
ment to execute (which itself is a stretch) it
would take over ten years to execute all the
resulting assignments is same were executed
at the rate of 40 hours per week.” So typi-
cally at the time the lender makes a decision
to foreclose it is not the record mortgagee.
122
To correct that defect, the attorney for the

foreclosing mortgagee or the servicer of the
loan will create an Assignment of Mortgage
for the purposes of litigation which is in
turn signed by a robo-signer. Documents
recorded with a public official are self-exe-
cuting and have special evidential status and
therefore are especially pernicious. Usually
the assignment purports not only to assign
the mortgage but also the note or underly-
ing obligation. The assignment of the note
nearly always contradicts other documents
which indicate that the note was transferred
at different times and in different manners
or not at all.
a. False Assignments. The assignments appear

to be created based on the need for them
rather than to memorialize an actual assign-
ment of an instrument. For example, see
Exhibit L, M and N describing the creation
of an assignment and its subsequent execu-
tion outside the presence of notary by a New
Jersey foreclosure attorney in three separate
matters. The attorney who prepared and
executed the assignments testified that he
prepares Assignments according to instruc-
tions that he receives from the foreclosing
mortgagee without reviewing the support-
ing documentation. The notary testified
that he notarized signatures on Assignments
of Mortgage that were signed outside of his
presence. He also testified that he is a notary
in the State of Pennsylvania, but not in New
Jersey, but that nevertheless he routinely
notarized signature in New Jersey.
123
Kenneth Trent
b. Conflict of interest—Assignments are pre-

pared (purportedly on behalf of the assignor)
and executed by the assignee.
c. Multiple assignments containing contradic-
tory information. Even, though there may be
an existing assignment, it is not uncommon
to see a new one produced and recorded.
The new assignment typically enhances the
plaintiff ’s claim to be a holder of the under-
lying obligation. See, for example Exhibit S,
in which there are two recorded assignments
of the same instrument by the same party
in Wells Fargo v. Ford on appeal. The first
assignment is dated March 11, 2005; the
second assignment, signed by the entity that
had already assigned the mortgage on March
11th is dated September 1, 2006. The March
2005 assignment was used in the state court
proceeding to support the plaintiff ’s content
ion that it was a holder in due course; the
September 2006 assignment was used later in
connection with a subsequent bankruptcy to
support the lender’s proof of claim.
d. Assignments which appear to have been exe-
cuted and notarized in blank. Many assign-
ments contain information such as the
recording date of the mortgage that purport
to be signed and notarized on a date earlier
than the recording date such that they were
obviously signed and notarized in blank. See,
for example, Exhibit S, in Wells Fargo v. Ford
on appeal in which the assignment executed
and notarized on March 11, 2005 contains
information about the recording of the mort-
gage with took place more than two weeks
later on March 28, 2005. The instrument was
124
obviously executed in blank. This is a typical

assignment in our experience.
e. Forged signatures
f. False identification of signatory
g. False Notarizations
C. Anonymity of servicers and subsequent holders.
1. Where a loan is sold after origination, until

very recently, no law required the seller
or purchaser to notify the homeowner of
the sale or of the identity of the purchaser.
Securitized loans are held in pools managed
by a trustee. No one entity has an individ-
ual interest in the undivided individual loan
rather they have an interest in a triage or
slice of the income stream produced by the
loan. No one informs the homeowner that
his or her mortgage has been securitized or
the name of the investment security pool.
The first time a homeowner might see the
name of the trustee or securitization pool is
as the plaintiff in a foreclosure complaint,
and sometimes not even then.
After loan origination, the homeown-
er’s point of contact is a loan servicer,
which collects payments and manages the
loan account. The Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Act requires a servicer to notify
the homeowner when servicing rights are
sold. Some servicers outsource foreclosure
work to entities known as default servicers.
The most notorious default servicer is
Lender Processing Services (LPS), discussed
in more detail below. Servicers do not notify
125
Kenneth Trent
homeowners when a default servicer is

retained to handle the foreclosure.
When a complaint is filed there is no
mechanism for the borrower, the court, or
any other interested party to identify the ser-
vicer or whether a sub-servicer is involved. As
context, homeowners pursuing loan modifi-
cation often complain that the servicer’s left
hand does not know what its right hand is
doing—a servicer may approve a loan mod-
ification, for example, and nevertheless pro-
ceed with a sheriff ’s sale. This problem may
stem from the servicer’s outsourcing of its
foreclosure function while retaining its loss
mitigation function. [Or could it be a part
of their plan?]
2. Misrepresentation of position and authority.

The signers do not identify themselves
by their true title or as being an agent or
employee of their actual employer. Instead
they hold themselves out as vice presidents
and assistant vice presidents of other enti-
ties of whose officer’s signature are required
by law. Even then the signatures are buried
deep within the pleadings on the file and are
not reflective of the name of the foreclosing
plaintiff or any other named party in the
case.
126
II. Evidence of Prevalence of False

Statements and Swearing
A. National
1. Prevalence of widely used default servicer.
Lender Processing Services (LPS), formerly

known as Fidelity National Foreclosure
Solutions is a default mortgage servicer to
which other servicers outsource their foreclo-
sures. We describe LPS operations in consid-
erable detail, because it both typifies the role
of default services generally and, by a wide
margin, it is the default servicer or platform
used in the most cases. Its practices incorpo-
rate a significant portion of false statement
and swearing. LPS’s practices, including
forged signatures, by apparently non-ex-
istent individuals, with documents refer-
encing a “bogus assignee,” [Figure 4] were
the subject of one PBS recent News Hour
foreclosure segment, referenced below. LPS
is extensively involved in New Jersey. On its
website, LPS describes its foreclosure-related
services as follows:
LPS Default Solutions offers administra-
tive support services to mortgage servicers
and attorneys nationwide. Through the
active monitoring by its experienced staff
of client established processes, LPS Default
Solutions enables servicers to manage multi-
ple vendors, control costs of servicing, drive
improvements in quality and improve value
for all stakeholders: attorney, servicer and
investor.
127
Kenneth Trent
As a result of its tremendous economies

of scale, LPS Default Solutions also affords
clients the opportunity [steal innumerable
houses] to realize significant improvements
in efficiency, cost savings, and performance.
Through integration with the Web-based
LPS Desktop, all information is managed
on a single platform, allowing servicers, their
attorneys and vendors to view and update
one centralized, comprehensive technology
system. System data is used to objectively
compare and summarize network perfor-
mance across multiple servicers.
By bringing greater efficiencies to the
default process, LPS Default Solutions
enables servicers to reallocate staff from fore-
closure and bankruptcy tasks to loss mitiga-
tion, collections, and borrower contact pro-
grams. The support services offered by LPS
Default Solutions also enables servicers and
law firms to focus on establishing consistent
pricing for default administration services
and achieving significant reductions in the
cost per loan serviced.
http://www.lpsvcs.com/DefaultSolu
tions/ForeclosureandBankruptcyOutsour
cing/Pages/default.aspx
Where LPS is involved, foreclosure attor-

neys receive information and instructions
not from a homeowner’s mortgage servicer,
but from a third party vendor who has out-
sourced the foreclosure. LPS personnel sign
certifications prepared by the foreclosure
attorney using data from the LPS computer
128
system. However, certifications executed by

LPS employees do not identify the source
of the data, and it impossible to ascertain
whether the data is accurate: where LPS is
involved, its records may not be the same as
those kept in the ordinary course of business
by the day-to-day loan servicer. The data at
issue are both the amount due and the holder
of the note and mortgage.
Certifications prepared by foreclosure
attorneys often do not specify that LPS is
executing the certification or that LPS is
involved at all. LPS employees or default ser-
vicers using the LPS platform will sign certi-
fications as if they are officers of the servicing
company or plaintiff or some intermediate
player.
A subsidiary of LPS called DOCX pre-
pares and executes assignments of mortgage.
LPS employees will sign the assignment of
mortgage on behalf of the assignee. The
LPS employee will sign as an officer of the
assignee, without identifying him- or herself
as an LPS employee. A DOCX assignment
can be identified by the record and return
name and/or address.
a. Description of services, including doc-

ument execution
The LPS business model is
described with some depth in the trial
level decision of a case currently on
appeal before the Third Circuit case
of In Re Taylor, 407 B.R. 618 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2009), reversed, 2010 WL
624909 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 18, 2010).
129
Kenneth Trent
Most striking, foreclosure attorneys

receive their instructions via an auto-
mated computer system, and have
virtually no ability to communicate
directly with the day-to-day mortgage
servicer. The agreement between the
servicer and LPS is also attached as
part of EXHIBIT A.
b. LPS Summit-Profile of Document

Execution Team
In the September 2006 issue of its
internal newsletter, “The Summit,”
LPS profiled its document execution
department, admitting: “The docu-
ment execution team is set up like a
production line, ensuring that each
document request is resolved within
24 hours. On average, the team will
execute 1,000 documents per day.”
c. LPS admission that employees executed

documents and allowed signature to be
signed by others
On October 4, 2010, in response
to media accusations of robo-signing,
LPS issued a Press Release admitting
executing affidavits, but claiming that
it stopped doing so in 2008. It further
claimed that its subsidiary DOCX
stopped preparing assignments of
mortgage in 2009. Since LPS issued
its press release, however, samples of
DOCX mortgage assignments exe-
cuted more recently have continued
to surface around the country.
130
One DOCX assignment pre-

pared in 2008 literally purports to
assign a mortgage from American
Home Mortgage Acceptance, Inc.
to “BOGUS ASSIGNEE FOR
INTERVENING ASSMTS.” [Figure
4].
d. LPS deposition transcripts-transcripts

of LPS employees describe the docu-
ment execution process, and make clear
that the goal of signing is efficiency
and not accuracy or truthfulness. For
example:
Greg Allen deposed in a mat-
ter arising in Washington state on
January 13, 2010. Mr. Allen is an
employee of LPS in Minnesota. He
is responsible for “document execu-
tion.” He is authorized to sign for
Everhome, EMC, JP Morgan Chase,
Wilshire and “potentially MERS.”
The documents are not reviewed for
accuracy by the person signing them.
LPS’s document execution services
help make things more efficient, i.e.,
take less time than if they were being
signed by the people actually review-
ing the documents.
2. Other servicers-national deposition

transcripts
Attached hereto are deposition transcripts by

employees of six different servicers, indicat-
131
Kenneth Trent
ing that robo-signing is not limited to LPS

or the three servicers prevalent in the media.
Specifically, the following transcripts are
attached:
a. GMAC
i. Jeffrey Stephan
ii. Judy Faber Robinson
b. Bank of America
i. Krystal Hall
c. JP Morgan Chase
i. Beth Cottrell. Deposed in Florida
on May 17, 2010, Cottrell testi-
fied that she signs allonges, lost
note affidavits and lost mortgage
affidavits. Her department signs
about 18,000 such documents
per month. The documents them-
selves are prepared by the foreclo-
sure attorneys. Ms. Cottrell has no
personal knowledge of the con-
tent of what she signs. She has no
knowledge of whether a Note was
signed or transferred or endorsed.
She doesn’t know if the transfer
was for value. In the case she was
being deposed on multiple notes
were produced; Ms. Cottrell could
not explain that or which was the
right one. She referred to a shared
database into which images can
be uploaded but testified there is
no way to identify who put what
in the database when. The fore-
132
closure attorneys have access to

upload documents to that sys-
tem. She later backtracks and says
that she can tell who uploaded an
image but not who saw the actual
note. She testified that they have
a “signing table” at the work-
place, and that people are called to
assemble there and just sign docu-
ments to be notarized.
ii. Angela Melissa Nolan, Florida.
January 29, 2010. Ms. Nolan
acknowledges that her elec-
tronic signature has been affixed
to an allonge. Ms. Nolan states
that allonges are separately pre-
pared and not affixed to the note.
Allonges are used if the note was
not endorsed at the time of trans-
fer. They do not take the note out
to have it endorsed. There is an
exhibit marked entitled “creating
an allonge.” When a loan goes into
foreclosure, the custodian checks
for endorsement and if it is not
present at the time an allonge is
created. The procedure distin-
guishes between creating allonges
for prime loans and for sub-prime
loans.
iii. Charles Herndon, Deposed in
New York on October 6, 2009.
d. Wells Fargo
i. Herman John Kennerty:
Deposition in a matter arising in
133
Kenneth Trent
Washington State on May 20th

2010. Kennerty works for Wells
Fargo in South Carolina. He is
responsible for default document
execution and securing “collateral
files” which he says means origi-
nal documents. He doesn’t always
order the original documents
because many states are “copy
states” and they will accept a copy.
He has signing authority for Wells,
Citi, LaSalle, Douche and US
Bank. He describes the teams of
people whose job it is to sign par-
ticular types of documents includ-
ing mortgage assignments and
other documents needed to obtain
foreclosure sales. He doesn’t know
how or when endorsements of
notes take place. However, some-
times someone in his department
would sign or affix an endorse-
ment to a Note if a foreclosure
attorney asked for it.
ii. Xee Moua: Ms. Moua was deposed
on March 9, 2010 in Florida.
Moua leads a team of document
executors. Moua explained that
there is not enough time to go
around to all the departments you
would need to go to get documents
signed by people with knowledge
so Moua got the authority and can
sign documents cutting the time
frame in half. Moua signs hundreds
of documents each day including
134
affidavits for judgment and those

submitted in connection with
summary judgment motions with-
out verifying the numbers or the
facts stated therein, just signing.
iii. Tamara Savery: Ms. Savery was
deposed on July 15, 2009 in a mat-
ter arising in Texas. At the time of
her deposition, Ms. Savery worked
in the litigation default operation
support area at Wells Fargo. In
the course of being deposed, she
answered that she relied on the
expertise of others as it pertained
to the accuracy of answers to inter-
rogatories when signing verifica-
tions and admitted that she had
not written the answers herself.
Ms. Savery also explained that
she did not review claims or doc-
uments for accuracy when signing
verifications, again relying on the
preparation work by other people.
e. IndyMac/OneWest-Erica Johnson-Seck:
i. L Deposition taken in Maryland
Bankruptcy case in March 9,
2009. Describes her job as devel-
oping procedures so that foreclo-
sures happen quickly and with
“zero exposure” to the investor.
Ms. Johnson-Seck works for Indy
Mac [EmptySac]. Previously she
worked for World Savings Bank,
Wachovia, [Walkalovaia], Wells
Fargo. She discusses procedures
135
Kenneth Trent
in a non-judicial foreclosure state

and how she added fees to the
mortgage balance amount. She
discusses the inflation of partic-
ular charges including but not
limited to title insurance. She also
discusses the relationship between
the originator of the loan and the
default servicer First American
Default Services.
ii. Deposition taken July 9, 2009. Two
depositions taken back to back in
Florida. Erica Johnson-Seck now
works for OneWest. (OneWest
purchased assets or servicing rights
related to Indy Mac loans from
the FDIC on or about March 19,
2009). Ms. Johnson claims not be
an officer of but to have signing
authority for Indy Mac, Deutsche
Bank, US Bank, Bank of New York
and others whose names she cannot
recall. Ms. Johnson-Seck manages
foreclosure attorneys. She initiates
foreclosures if the investor won’t
cover her employers’ advances. She
still signs documents including Lost
Note affidavits but she doesn’t read
them first. It takes thirty seconds to
sign something now that she has an
e signature instead of using a pen.
E-signing is incorporated into the
LPS system. Notarizing of her sig-
nature is done later outside of her
presence. Ms. Johnson-Seck deals
with loans in all SO states. She
136
refers files to attorneys and LPS as

default servicer at the same time.
She says that a Deutsche bank loan
wouldn’t even be considered for a
HAMP modification.
f. Citi Residential Lending

i. Bryan Bly-Deposition taken
on July 2, 2010 in a matter in
which the plaintiff was named as
Deutsche Bank NA as trustee for
Ameriquest Mortgage Securities
Trustee 2005-R9. Mr. Bly is
employed by Nationwide Title
Clearing. Mr. Bly’s job description
is simply signer. He has held that
position for seven and half years.
Prior to signer, Mr. Bly was a gen-
eral laborer and envelope stuffer.
He has signed for many entities.
In this case as Vice President of
Citi Residential. He exhibits no
knowledge of the authority for
signing or the significance of the
documents he is signing or their
contents. He signs between 2000
and 5000 documents per day.
ii. Tamara Price-Deposition taken
April 21, 2008 in Florida. The
foreclosing plaintiff is Deutsche
Bank [Douche Bank] as trustee for
an Ameriquest securitized trust.
Ms. Price also signed documents in
the Hollis case that LSNJ handled
in New Jersey Bankruptcy Court.
Ms. Price describes her job as assis-
137
Kenneth Trent
tant foreclosure manager, but she

signs as Vice President of AMC
Mortgage Services. She acknowl-
edges that she has not reviewed any
books or records as stated in her
affidavit.
Her signature is notarized outside
of her presence, in other words the
notary does not observe her sign.
Ms. Price never saw the Note or
mortgage or loan history referred
to in her affidavit. She relies on
the Fidelity system. The figures
and statements are prepared by
the lawyers for her to sign and she
just accepts them. So for exam-
ple, Ms. Price does not know how
money is listed as being in sus-
pense or anything about the bona
fides of the charges. She does not
know who enters the data but
believes that the system is shared
by many users who can all access
the system and input data.
The deposition evidence dis-
cussed above and included reflects
false testimony submitted by way
of robo-signed affidavits executed
at each of the top five (and six of
the top 10) residential mortgage
servicers in the country—with a
combined market share of more
than 67%—according to the
list of Top Residential Servicers
at June 30, 2010, as reported
in the October 1, 2010 issue of
138
Mortgage Servicing News. There

is no basis to believe New Jersey
is in any way an exception to this
national pattern.
3. Sample documents
Attached hereto as are samples of documents
signed by people who admitted in deposi-
tions to signing documents without personal
knowledge or reviewing the underlying doc-
umentation. Also attached are similar docu-
ments executed by employees of two other
prolific servicers, PHH and Sand Canyon
f/k/a Option One, illustrating that the prac-
tices are not limited to instances where a
deponent has admitted to them.
a. Citi Residential Lending: Bryan Bly

and Tamara Price
b. JP Morgan Chase: Beth Cottrell
c. Wells Fargo: Herman John Kennerty
d. PHH: Tracy Johnson
e. Sand Canyon f/k/a Option One:
Christina Huang-a review of the sig-
natures of Christina Huang reveals
substantial variations, suggesting
that more than one person signs Ms.
Huang’s name.
4. Recognition of servicer misconduct by ulti-

mate investors Deutsche Bank memos.
Deutsche Bank is a trustee of numerous
securitized mortgage-backed trusts, and as
such is a plaintiff in numerous foreclosure
actions. Attached are copies of memos it has
issued to the companies servicing concerning
139
Kenneth Trent
widespread pleading and proof deficiencies.

Deutsche Bank sent a memo to the holders
of Residential Mortgage Backed Securities
on October 25, 2010. The memo stated that
it was sent in response to the media reports
of allegations of defects in the foreclosure
process. It reminds investors that holder of a
11 requisite principal amount” of the securi-
ties may direct the Trustee’s remedial activi-
ties and it attaches its communications with
the servicers dated August 30, 2007, July 28,
2008 and October 8, 2010.
The August 30, 2007 memo to “securi-
tization loan servicers” admonishes them to
always list Deutsche as a Trustee and to iden-
tify themselves and the capacity in which
they are acting.
In the July 28, 2008 memo Deutsche
Bank instructs securitization loan servicers
on how to deal with demands for proof of
“ownership” of the note. Deutsche Bank
actually places the word ownership in quotes.
Deutsche Bank does not suggest that they
become a holder in due course and that if
the servicer does not comply with state law it
may seek indemnification from the servicer
for any damages it suffers. It warns the ser-
vicer not to confuse transfer of title or the
mortgage with the ownership of the loan.
5. Scholarly writing
a. Katherine Porter-October 27, 2010

Testimony Before Congressional
Oversight Panel, Hearing on the TARP
Foreclosure Mitigation Program:
140
Katherine Porter is a Harvard law

professor with expertise in consumer
credit, consumer protection regula-
tion, and mortgage servicing who has
been conducting research on problems
with mortgage servicing practices since
2005. She testifies that the foreclosure
process lacks integrity in an unaccept-
able number of ways, including the
imposition and collection of improper
fees, a lack of standing to foreclose in
judicial foreclosure states, the pursuit
of foreclosure without rights in the
note and mortgage, mortgage origina-
tion fraud, or liability to investors for
poor underwriting or improper servic-
ing. She discusses near universal agree-
ment that at least some homeowners
have lost their homes. Without adher-
ence to legal procedures, that the valid-
ity of many pending foreclosures is in
question, and that servicers may face
much more extensive examination of
their grounds for future foreclosures.
Professor Porter argues that the allega-
tions of problems in mortgage servic-
ing should, if anything, only heighten
the due process afforded consumers.
She also contends that the structure of
the mortgage servicing industry and
the lack of accountability by financial
institutions in the securitization pro-
cess make it a fair inference that the
problems from flawed foreclosure are
not isolated incidents.
141
Kenneth Trent
b. Sheila Bair-October 25, 2010 key-

note address to the “Mortgages and
the Future of Housing Finance”
Symposium sponsored by the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Federal Reserve System: FDIC
Chairman Sheila C. Bair addresses
concerns that legal documents required
for foreclosure have in some cases been
improperly exercised or robo-signed
by mortgage servicers. She maintains
that foreclosure should be a last resort,
undertaken only where bona fide loan
restructuring efforts have not suc-
ceeded and all legal and procedural
requirements have been fulfilled. In
describing a possible global solution
to address the problem, Blair suggests
that all interested parties consider some
type of “triage” on foreclosures, perhaps
providing safe-harbor relief if the prop-
erty is vacant or if the servicer offered
a meaningful payment reduction and
the borrower could still not perform
on the loan. She acknowledges that in
too many instances, servicers have not
made meaningful efforts to restructure
loans for borrowers who have docu-
mented that they are in economic dis-
tress, and argues that timely and mean-
ingful loan restructuring efforts make
economic sense now more than ever.
6. Media
a. PBS NEWSHOUR
142
i. Faulty Paperwork Prompts

Deepening Foreclosure Problem
http://www. pbs.org/news-
hour/bb/business/iu1y-dec10/
makingsense 10-14.html
This segment discusses
mounting foreclosures and the
investigation launched by State
Attorneys General into claims of
faulty lender paperwork. Of note,
New York State Supreme Court
Judge Arthur Schack states that
he has seen robo-signers at banks
other than JP Morgan Chase,
GMAC and Bank of America.
This piece also looks at some of
the legal issues being raised about
the validity of foreclosure filings,
including fraudulent documenta-
tion, the use of robo-signing, and
proof of ownership of the note.
ii. The Road to “Robo-Signing”

http://www.pbs.org/newshour/
rundown/2010/10/faulty-paper-
work-lending-institutions-have.
html
This piece provides an exposition
on robo-signing.
iii. “Robo-signing” Paperwork Break

down Leaves Many Houses in
Foreclosure limbo
http://www.pbs.org/news-
hour/bb/business/iu1y-dec10/
foreclosures 10-06.html
143
Kenneth Trent
This segment includes inter-

views with Michael Calhoun,
the president of the Center
for Responsible Lending and
a Columbia economics profes-
sor regarding the practice of
robo-signing. Calhoun explains
“[This] a critical breakdown in
one of the most important safe-
guards in the foreclosure process.
Before a bank or lender goes to
court to take somebody’s home,
they’re required by law to have
someone individually review the
paperwork and the payment his-
tory to make sure that the person
is, in fact, behind on the mortgage,
has not been charged improper
fees. And then they certify, under
oath, under personality of perjury,
that they have done this individ-
ual review. We have now found
that, on an industry-wide basis,
that was totally ignored. And that
means there are a lot of people out
there who had foreclosure pro-
ceedings brought against them
when they shouldn’t have. And
we’re talking a lot of people. There
are about 2.5 million households
in foreclosure right now. Another
2.5 million people are at risk of
foreclosure because they’re behind
on their mortgages.”
144
iv. Would a US Foreclosure Ban Yield

“Catastrophic” Consequences?
[HELL, NO!]
hour/bb/business/july-dec10/
foreclosure 10-11.html
Amid allegations by the secu-
rities industry that a nationwide
ban on foreclosures would be cata-
strophic for America, this segment
features Ohio attorney general
Richard Cordray and a foreclosure
expert. Ohio Attorney General
Richard Cordray suggests that
where financial institutions have
submitted fraudulent evidence, it
would be well worth their while
to sit down and think about how
they can work those cases out,
reach a resolution, maybe a loan
mitigation to keep people in their
homes, rather than going forward
and seeking a court order, where
the court may well have to sanc-
tion them and they may be facing
severe exposure.
v. Homeowners Express Frustrations

with Government Loan
Modifications
hour/bb/business/iuly-dec10/
mortgage 10-25.html
This segment focuses on com-
mon experiences by struggling
homeowners who rely on loan
145
Kenneth Trent
modifications from government

programs to keep afloat on their
mortgages. It discusses many of
the problems with the Obama
Administration’s Making Homes
Affordable Program and spe-
cifically the Home Affordable
Modification Program (HAMP).
vi. TARP Watchdog: Foreclosure

Program Too Small, Too Slow.
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
politics/ian-iune10/tarp2 06-22.
html.
In this piece, Elizabeth Warren,
Chair of the Congressional
Oversight Panel discusses the
effectiveness of the TARP bank
bailout and a program aimed at
helping homeowners steer clear of
foreclosures.
b. WASHINGTON POST
i. JP Morgan Chase to Freeze

Foreclosures Over Flawed
Paperwork
h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g -
tonpost.com/wpdyn/con-
tent/artic1e/2010/09/29/
AR2010092907268.html
JP Morgan Chase, one of the
nation’s leading banks, announced
Wednesday that it will freeze fore-
closures in about half the country
because of flawed paperwork, a
146
move that Wall Street analysts said

will pressure the rest of the indus-
try to follow suit.
The bank’s decision will affect
56,000 borrowers in 23 states
where allegations of forged doc-
uments and signatures and other
similar problems are being used
to try to overturn court-ordered
evictions. Yet the impact may be
much broader, given JP Morgan’s
stature in the industry. If other
banks adopt the same approach,
the foreclosure process in many
parts of the country will grind to
a halt.
Officials at Fitch Ratings, a
credit-rating firm that measures
the health of companies, said
the “defects” found in foreclo-
sure documents at JP Morgan are
industry-wide. Underscoring that
concern, Fitch said it is consider-
ing whether to lower the grades
it gives to the mortgage servicing
divisions of the nation’s largest
lenders. Over the next few weeks,
we expect to see more and more
companies come out with simi-
lar announcements,” said Diane
Pendley, a managing director at
Fitch.
ii. Speed Equaled Money in

Foreclosure “Machine”
147
Kenneth Trent
h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n
post.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/10/15/AR2010l01
506350pdf.html
Millions of homes have been
seized by banks during the eco-
nomic crisis through a mass pro-
duction system of foreclosures that
was set up to prioritize one thing
over everything else: speed. With
2 million homes in foreclosure
and another 2.3 million seriously
delinquent on their mortgages
—the biggest logjam of dis-
tressed properties the market has
ever seen—companies involved in
the foreclosure process were paid
to move cases quickly through
the pipeline. Law firms competed
with one another to file the largest
number of foreclosures on behalf
of lenders—and were rewarded
for their work with bonuses.
These and other companies that
handled the preparation of doc-
uments were paid for volume, so
they processed as many as they
could en masse, leaving little time
to read the paperwork and catch
errors.
The law firm of David J. Stern
in Plantation, Fla., for instance,
assigned a team of 12 to handle
12,000 foreclosure files at once
for big financial companies such
as Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
148
Citigroup, according to court doc-

uments. Each time a case was pro-
cessed without a challenge from
the homeowner, the firm was paid
$1,300. It was an unusual arrange-
ment in a legal profession that
normally charges by the hour. The
office was so overwhelmed with
work that managers kept notary
stamps lying around for anyone
to use. Bosses would often scream
at each other in daily meetings for
“files not moving fast enough.”
Tammie Lou Kapusta, the senior
paralegal in charge of the opera-
tion, said in a deposition Sept. 22
for state law enforcement officials
who are conducting a fraud inves-
tigation into the firm. In 2009
alone, Stern’s law firm handled
over 70,000 foreclosures. The girls
would come out on the floor not
knowing what they were doing,”
Kapusta said. “Mortgages would
get placed in different files. They
would get thrown out. There was
just no real organization when it
came to the original documents.”
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
Citigroup said they no longer do
new business with Stern’s firm.
To keep up with the crush of
foreclosures, document processors
and mortgage service firms rushed
to hire anyone they could—hair
stylists, Wal-Mart clerks, assem-
149
Kenneth Trent
bly-line workers who made

blinds—and gave them key roles
in their foreclosure departments
without formal training, accord-
ing to court papers. A number of
these employees have testified that
they did not really know what a
mortgage was, couldn’t define
“affidavit,” and knew they were
lying when they signed documents
related to foreclosures, according
to depositions of 150 employees
for mortgage companies taken by
the law firm run by Bigben, the
Florida lawyer.
iii. Wells Fargo Erred in Thousands of

Foreclosures
h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g t o n
post.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2010/10/27/AR20101
02706202.html
Wells Fargo admitted
Wednesday it made mistakes in
the paperwork for thousands of
foreclosure cases and promised to
fix them.
The San Francisco-based bank
said it plans to refile documents in
55,000 of the cases by mid-No-
vember. The company said not
all those cases included errors but
didn’t say how many thousands
did.
150
iv. OneWest Bank employee: “Not

more than 30 seconds” to sign each
foreclosure document
http://voices.washingtonpost.
com/political-economy/2010/09/
OneWorst bank employee not
more.html
The recent announcements
by JP Morgan Chase and Ally
Financial that they were freez-
ing some foreclosures because of
paperwork irregularities raises a
key question: How many more
mortgage companies employed
“robo-signers?” In a sworn depo-
sition in July, Erica Johnson-Seck,
an Austin, Texas based vice pres-
ident for bankruptcy and fore-
closure for OneWest Bank, said
she and her team of seven others
sign 6,000 documents a week or
about 24,000 a month without
reading all of them. Johnson-Seck
estimated that she spent no more
than 30 seconds to sign each doc-
ument. Johnson-Seck also said in
the deposition that she had sign-
ing authority for Deutsche Bank,
Bank of New York and US Bank,
among others.
v. Bernanke says US regulators are

reviewing foreclosures
h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g -
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
151
Kenneth Trent
tent/article/2010/10/25/
AR2010102S03342.html
Regulators are likely to dis-
cover more problems related to
loan servicing by some of the big-
gest banks as they probe claims
that documents were mishandled,
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
Chairman Sheila Bair said at the
conference.
“We are going to get into
more and more problems with the
issues that are surfacing now on
servicing,” Bair said.
vi. In foreclosure controversy, prob-

lems run deeper than flawed
paperwork.
h t t p : / / w w w. w a s h i n g -
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/con-
tent/article/2010/10/06/
AR2010100607227.html
Millions of US mortgages
have been shuttled around the
global financial system—sold and
resold by firms—without the doc-
uments that traditionally prove
who legally owns the loans. Now,
as many of these loans have fallen
into default and banks have sought
to seize homes, judges around the
country have increasingly ruled
that lenders had no right to fore-
close, because they lacked clear
title. For big banks, “there’s a
possible nightmare scenario here
152
that no foreclosure is valid,” said

Nancy Bush, a banking analyst
from NAB Research. If millions of
foreclosures past and present were
invalidated because of the way
the hurried securitization process
muddied the chain of ownership,
banks could face lawsuits from
homeowners and from investors
who bought stakes in the mort-
gage securities—an expensive and
potentially crippling proposition.
B. Specific examples of Robo-Signing in New Jersey
1. In Re Rivera, 342 N.R. 435 (Bankr. D. N.J.

2006). In perhaps the most notorious exam-
ple of robo-signing in New Jersey, Bankruptcy
Court Judge Morris Stern sua sponte rec-
ognized and “exposed a long-standing and
regularized practice of creating documents
purported to be “certifications”; however,
pre-signed forms were kept on file by coun-
sel and simply, in case after case, attached
to the body of data-laden mortgage default
accountings, the composite being filed with
the court as if they were certifications.”
2. Bank of New York as Trustee for the

Certificate Holders CWABS Inc. Asset
Based Certificates Series 2005-AB3 v. Ukpe,
Docket No. F-10209-08. The Ukpe matter
involves an assignment of mortgage executed
by Francis Hallinan, [Hellion] a partner in
the foreclosure law firm that instituted the
foreclosure action. As attorney of record for
153
Kenneth Trent
the plaintiff, Bank of New York as Trustee

for a securitized trust, Hallinan essentially
robo-signs an Assignment of Mortgage pur-
porting to transfer ownership from Mortgage
Electronic Registration System (MERS) to
his client.
The Assignment was acknowledged by
a notary, Thomas St Rain. In his deposi-
tion (the transcript of which is attached),
he testified that he notarized signatures on
Assignments of Mortgage that were signed
outside of his presence. He also testified that
he is a notary in the State of Pennsylvania,
but not in New Jersey, but that nevertheless
he routinely notarized signatures in New
Jersey.
In a deposition in another matter, also
attached, Hallinan testifies that he pre-
pares Assignments according to instructions
that he receives from the foreclosing mort-
gagee without reviewing and supporting
documentation.
3. Bank of New York as Trustee for the Holders

of Structured Asset Mortgage Investments
Trust 2006-ARS Mortgage Pass Through
Certificates Series 2006-ARS v. William
Wolf, Docket No.
F-12418-08: Significantly, this matter
appears on the list of foreclosures identified
by Plaintiff ’s attorneys as affected by the
robo-signing issue. Here, final judgment
entered against the defendant supported by a
Note payable to Countrywide Bank NA but
never endorsed by the plaintiff. The unen-
dorsed note was rubber-stamped, “I certify
154
this to be a true copy,” and signed by plain-

tiff ’s attorney. An Assignment of Mortgage
was prepared only in connection with the
litigation, purporting to assign the mortgage
from MERS to the plaintiff, signed by an
employee of the servicer, BAC Horne Loan
Servicing.
After entry of judgment, Mr. Wolf con-
tacted LSNJ. LSNJ recognized a serious
predatory lending issue—i.e., that the loan
violated the New Jersey Home Ownership
Security Act—and moved to vacate the judg-
ment. In addition to alleging that the judg-
ment should be vacated as a matter of excus-
able neglect/meritorious defense, defendant
alleged that the judgment should be set aside
as void based on Plaintiffs inadequate proof
of ownership. Instead of vacating the judg-
ment, the trial court gave the plaintiff the
opportunity to produce an endorsed note.
Plaintiff did so without any certification
by his client or himself indicating how the
endorsement came to be placed on the note.
The court refused to vacate the judgment.
As an aside, the plaintiff ’s pleadings in Wolf
demonstrate that the foreclosure bar rou-
tinely asserts facts and produces documents
without any certification whatsoever, much
less the certification of a person competent
to testify about the issue. Worse, these sub-
missions are routinely accepted and relied
upon by the court.
4. LaSalle Bank, NA as Trustee v. Grizzle,

Docket No F-21567-07: Plaintiff ’s attorney
contends that mortgages are not routinely
155
Kenneth Trent
assigned despite securitization agreements

that purport to transfer ownership because
they are too voluminous and states:
“The assignee performs its due diligence,
bulk transfer agreements are executed, money
is wired, and on a date certain the proverbial
‘switch is flipped’ wherein the assignee takes
over regardless of the execution of a formal,
legal assignment for each and every loan. By
way of example, one large national mort-
gage servicer recently purchased 1.3 million
loans from another large servicer. Even if it
took one minute per assignment to execute
(which itself is a stretch) it would take over
ten years to execute all the resulting assign-
ments if same were executed at the rate of 40
hours per week.”
5. Orr and Hollis v. Ameriquest Mortgage Co.

et al. ADV. No. 07-02615 (Bankr.)-Discovery
motions replete with issues concerning
Tamara Price, an admitted robo-signer.
In Ms. Hollis’ case, we sought discovery
from the foreclosing entity Deutsche Bank.
The initial response by Deutsche Bank
asserted that Ms. Hollis’ 2006 promissory
note was sold by the originator Ameriquest
and the mortgage securing that note assigned
to Deutsche Bank as Trustee for AMC
Mortgage Securities, Inc. In support of
this they presented two contradictory doc-
uments: a pooling and servicing agreement
and a recorded assignment. The assignment
of mortgage is dated June 26, 2007 and is
signed by Tamara Price and purportedly
notarized.
156
6. Wells Fargo Bank, NA as Trustee v. Ford,

F-12259-06 (Docket on Appeal A-3627-
06Tl): Summary Judgment granted to plain-
tiff despite absence of any certification in
support of the allegations in its motion and
despite that only proof of plaintiff ’s right to
foreclose consisted of Note made payable to
loan originator and not endorsed by plaintiff
and an unrecorded Assignment of Mortgage
that is (a) unrecorded and unsupported by
certification; (b) prepared by the servicer
for the assignee and not by the assignor; (c)
backdated and contradictory to one later
filed with the Bankruptcy Court.
7. Bank of New York as Trustee for Equity One

Inc. Mortgage Pass Through Certificates
Series 2006-A v. Brena Docket No. F-27578-
08: Pro bono attorneys for the defendant
successfully showed that Mr. Brena’s loan not
was not in the pool of mortgages alleged by
Plaintiff. Despite plaintiff ’s refusal to dismiss
the complaint as frivolous prior to motion to
dismiss, Court nevertheless refuses to award
defendant’s attorneys counsel fees.
8. US Bank. NA. v. Guillaume. F-26869-08

(notice of appeal filed): After entry of final
judgment, upon defendant’s application
to vacate default to raise predatory lending
defenses, Plaintiff ’s attorney admits on the
record that the attorney who certifies the
note to be a true copy never inspects the
original note, but instead relies on a copy of
the note provided by the loan servicer. The
Court is not concerned about the false cer-
157
Kenneth Trent
tification, saying, “I’m not about to totally

change the over the foreclosure practice and
the industry. If the Civil Practice Committee
wants to impose that kind of a hurdle, then
I think it’s up to them to do so and revise
foreclosure rules accordingly.” Similarly, the
Court is not concerned that the Notice of
Intention to Foreclose falsely identifies the
servicer as the holder and owner of the mort-
gage, because the homeowner would not
recognize the name of the holder and might
get confused. Thomas Strain notarized the
Assignment in this matter, and a plaintiff
subsequently filed a corrective assignment.
The Court accepts the corrective assignment
without question.
As I have long said, “The epidemic is indeed nationwide.”
158
C h a pte r 17
At this point in our journey, let’s delve into the question of why the
courts were and are so unfair to homeowners. It is inane to talk about
who is getting a free house when you are an officer of the LAW, and
the law recognizes no such doctrine as “free house.” Similarly, “how
long has it been since you made a mortgage payment” is not legally
pertinent. It would be if we, like Mr. Down did at the beginning,
claimed that all payments had not been credited, but we almost never
do. By and large, these days, the primary issue is standing: whether
the plaintiff has the right to enforce the mortgage and collect on the
promissory note. The plaintiffs almost never truly have the right to
foreclose because they cannot prove, with authentic evidence, that
the money is owed to them.
Here’s what I witnessed when I first went to court on a foreclo-
sure case. I saw a not very bright but nice circuit court judge with a
single clerk and a single deputy. Maybe two deputies were there at
times, but in terms of a legal support staff, the judge had nil. Around
her, both high and low, I saw large piles of case files, to the point
where you had to step very carefully just getting in to and out of her
chambers. From certain vantage points, one could barely see Her
Honor’s forehead above the file piles.
The interesting part here is the timeline. We must ask ourselves
whether it is a coincidence that, at the moment all the robo-signed
foreclosure suits were filed in the courts, the court staff was signifi-
cantly slashed. Why did the glut of cases hit at the same time as the
staff reduction?
It was all a part of their plan!
In Florida, the courts are funded mostly from property tax
revenue.
159
Kenneth Trent
Property taxes are determined on a yearly basis by the assessed

values of the properties in that county. So the bankers flooded the
market with loans.
ALL ARE APPROVED! INTEREST ONLY!

NO DOCUMENTATION NEEDED! SIMPLY
STATE YOUR INCOME ON YOUR LOAN
APPLICATION
Those were real loan programs offered, usually to first-time

and/or minority home buyers, and more people, per capita, were
approved for mortgage loans than ever before. The standards for
approval were lower than ever before.
Under these circumstances, more people have money to make
offers on properties. The larger the number of people who bid or
make offers on a property and the greater their collective wealth,
the higher the eventual sale price. This holds true almost every time.
When getting a loan is easy, lots of people bid on properties, a large
percentage of the population earns its living in some spin-off of the
real estate and mortgage brokering businesses, and the bankers have
bought themselves a “boom.”
This goes on for a good while, and the politicians hire accoun-
tants and statisticians to project county revenues for the fiscal year or
years upcoming. The reports come back with good news. The politi-
cians conclude that the county can afford to build a large new county
facility, for example, a library/media complex or a new sports arena,
if they divide the payment for the project over many years. Politicians
love to put their names on buildings. The bankers know this well.
Some boring guy makes up a pie graph and presents it to the
county commission explaining his revenue projections. A certain size
slice of the budget is allocated to the courts, a different slice size to
law enforcement, and a chunk is allocated to the cost of the new
facility to be named after Commissioner Gonadoswich.
The bankers jerk the rug: “Due to unforeseen developments in
the international commodities markets, we have determined that a
reduction and limitation on our loan volume will be enacted.” No
160
more stated loans, no more adjustable rates, and very few new loans
of any type.
Can you see what will happen next? That’s right. Here comes
the bust! Properties are not being sold or are being sold at lower
prices because fewer people are bidding, and those who are have less
money to bid than before. A decline in property values ensues. How
does the property assessor assess? She relies heavily upon the previous
purchase prices for a given property. Most often, the assessed value is
80 percent of the most recent sale price.
When the bottom dropped out, most people’s adjustable rate
mortgages provided that their payments changed from interest only
to principal plus interest, which put them in an almost-unsalvageable
position—WAY underwater. The bankers unleash the foreclosure
tsunami one to two years after they jerk the rug, and by that time, the
county is feeling the pinch from a precipitous decline in property tax
revenue. The court budget is therefore necessarily cut substantially,
and while Gonadoswich’s media complex may remain his own “castle
in the sky,” it is never expressed in brick-and-mortar form.
The doppelgänger foreclosed on it.
In these ways, the bankers greased the skids and tamped down
the likelihood that anyone would ask questions about their fake evi-
dence. The MERS virus and its robo-signing regime controlled the
property values and, with it, the staffing of the courts. When the
time was right, the “servicers” filed tens of thousands of foreclosures
within a ninety-day period. They rushed everything through with
“sewer service,” where instead of handing the papers to you at your
front door, they tossed them in the sewer and filed affidavits attesting
to personal service. Twenty days pass, you as the homeowner have
not filed a response, and then boom, the guillotine drops and slices
clean through your connection to your brick-and-mortar American
dream. With their magical MERS chemistry, the bankers changed
“brick and mortar” to “trick ’n’ mortgage” and threw thousands out
of their homes before they knew what hit them.
The next dirty tactic deployed to reduce scrutiny on foreclosure
documents was and is a barrage of snail mail and telephonic solici-
tations directed to borrowers who are on the precipice. In these calls
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Kenneth Trent
and letters, the “servicers” present themselves as eminently reasonable

and inclined to give the borrowers every opportunity to stay in their
homes. “Your house is your home. We’d like to keep it that way,” said
letters from Chase, letters which on the next page would inform the
borrower in oblique language that he or she was in default on the
mortgage, and that the “bank” was accelerating the indebtedness,
that is, declaring the full amount of the loan immediately due and
owing.
I know this because many times, when I challenged a foreclos-
ing plaintiff for evidence that it had sent the borrower the required
demand notice, I was furnished a letter from Chase to my client
meeting exactly that description.
These seemingly conciliatory communications are designed to
induce borrowers into believing that there is no need to file a response
to the complaint with the court. Borrowers are led to believe that,
for example, they have worked it all out with their friend, “MR.
COOPER.” Many times, they are offered a “trial period plan,” which
requires them to make three consecutive monthly payments, usually
in an affordable amount. It is insinuated that so long as the home-
owners make all three of these payments, they will be awarded a
permanent loan modification. Most people in that situation make
the payments rather than hiring a foreclosure defense attorney to
respond to the lawsuit—the one they just happened to be served
with at the same time they were receiving all those friendly and con-
ciliatory communications. Ultimately, the hapless homeowners are
informed that the “investor” did not approve their loan modifica-
tion, and by then, because the homeowners filed nothing in response
to the foreclosure complaint, judgment has been entered, and a sale
is imminent.
Utterly unconscionable!
If you put all this together, you see that the bankers carefully
designed a plan for attacking the judicial system and rendering its
procedural safeguards impotent. They then flawlessly executed their
plan. This was an organized and deadly assault upon our judiciary
and courts which no one anticipated, and very few can even describe
to this day, more than a decade later.
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C h a pte r 18
Remember the mediation with Mr. Down? In the room with us that
day was an invisible but powerful presence—the one referred to by
Dry Milquetoast, a.k.a. Dry-linger, as “the investor.” As you, the
reader, most likely understand by now, it is yet another manifestation
of the doppelgänger.
Something similar can be said of every foreclosure case. The
bank, company, trust, or other corporate entity named as the plaintiff
is rarely the homeowners’ actual opponent. When I was first begin-
ning to understand it, the way I put it was, “That ain’t Citibank. It’s
two dudes in a trailer in Azerbaijan with a satellite phone.”
The person or entity that any homeowner in distress is up
against as they battle to stay in their home shall forever remain name-
less. The bankers sabotaged our judicial system to such an extent that
now, all parties are not even required to come before the court. Any
time someone pushes too hard and hits a nerve, the bankers simply
claim that there has been a change of “servicers,” and/or they fabri-
cate a bogus assignment to the next doppelgänger pseudonym.
I believe that the judicial branch is the third branch of the US.
Government that the bankers have rendered defenseless,
deluded, and impotent. They fed so much fake evidence into the
judicial machinery that now 95 percent or more of the judgments it
produces in foreclosure cases are legally incorrect travesties of justice.
Garbage in, garbage out.
It is absolutely preposterous that the plaintiffs or servicers or
whatever you want to call them bring to trial a “mortgage loan sched-
ule,” which supposedly shows that a particular loan was placed in a
particular trust. These things are farcical. I have provided for you
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Kenneth Trent
here a little excerpt from a trial in which I was counsel in 2014 before
the Hon. Barry Stone in Broward County:
MR. TRENT: Objection. Objection. I mean, Judge, I almost

wish that, you know, if we could all just come to it with a
blank slate. Imagine an imaginary court somewhere, imag-
inary people, and someone would walk up to the court
and present this item. Let the record reflect I’m showing
the court I guess the redacted page 2 of the redacted mort-
gage loan schedule. Is that correct, counsel? I mean, Judge,
this looks like a printout from an Atari game in 1982 at
best. What is it the rule says? Something about particu-
larized guarantees of trustworthiness? I would just object
based on the fact that any person looking at this, coming
at this with an open mind, is not going to find that it dis-
plays particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
THE COURT: What is it exactly?
MR. TRENT: It’s like a series of zigzagged lines…
CARMEN ELECTRA: It’s simply page 2 of our mortgage loan
schedule, Your Honor. Besides, what he says, some sort of
video game reference that I’m not getting—
MR. TRENT: It’s generational.
MS. ELECTRA: This document is showing that the plaintiff ’s
or the loan the plaintiff is foreclosing on, the defendant’s
loan, is in fact part of the trust. I’m sorry it’s not straight
black-and-white lines.
THE COURT: It could be black/white or anything else as long
as it shows their loan. What’s wrong with that?
MR TRENT: Well, Your Honor, because…because it’s fun-
damentally an inequitable competition when people can
come into court with—I mean, what is that? Who made
that? Before you can come in with something that looks
like this, that is outside the realm of ordinary experience,
I believe that a foundation needs to be laid, to have some-
body come into the court and be able to explain how
why does it look like this? It doesn’t pass the smell test,
164
Your Honor. Anyone can type out—let me hand you this.

Remember, Your Honor, the words of the Florida Supreme
Court in the Pino vs. Bank of New York Mellon case where
the Supreme Court told us that quote many, many fore-
closures appear tainted with suspect documents. Now on
its face, respectfully, that is a suspect document.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled.
MR. TRENT: Judge, I also need to object based on what went
on in discovery. This very form right here is the one we
asked them for. Free writing prospectus and mortgage loan
schedule. As you know, they need to establish that the
trust named as plaintiff does have authority over this par-
ticular loan, and that is the evidence that they are relying
upon as proof of that fundamental element, so it is not a
tangential matter, and it is something of great significance
to the plaintiff ’s case.
ELECTRA: It is publicly available on the SEC website [etc.,
etc.]
TRENT: I would love to speak to that, Judge. I need to respond
what she said. I don’t believe that the mortgage loan sched-
ule is 15,000 pages—that’s what this is purportedly an
excerpt of. Furthermore, why would it be privileged, the
descriptions of the loans that are allegedly in the trust? If
the court would like me to tell the court why I think they
claim it’s privileged, it probably would not be pleasant.
Why would it be privileged? There is no privilege in the
law for the names, well, it’s not even the names, it’s just
generic descriptions of the loans’ amounts and the ZIP
codes. It would never be privileged. I believe if I have it
correct this time, she’s—she’s trying to introduce a free
writing prospectus. Now, we specifically requested, in
number 2, free writing prospectus, and the response was
“plaintiff is not sure what defendant is referring to by ‘free
writing prospectus.’ This seeks irrelevant material. No
“prospectus” is relevant to this action.” So they objected
to our request, refused to provide the document, put it in
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Kenneth Trent
quotations to make it look like it doesn’t exist, and now,

they are looking to take one little page out of it, to take
99 percent of the data off that page. They’re not going to
tell you who created it, they’re not going to tell you why it
looks like something off the TV show Oddities, and they
expect this court to take that into evidence from them?
Again, it’s a suspect document. They broke the rules, and
they gave us dishonest responses to our good faith discov-
ery. I’m surprised they have the nerve to actually ask this
court to admit this into evidence.
The judge let the document into evidence but ended up rul-
ing for the defendant in that trial, so we ultimately obtained a good
result. The reason I include this particular trial excerpt is again to
emphasize the degree to which, well, to put it frankly, the bankers’
evidence is always trash. It’s noxious, infectious trash.
Can you, guys and gals, and whatever else you may be, help me
put this particular trash out FOR ONCE AND FOR ALL? Kind
of like you did a certain pack[et] of disreputable Minneapolis police
officers in the first week of June 2020?
Appreeesh.;-)
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C h a pte r 19
In law school, they teach you about the empty chair defense. That is
a term used in personal injury cases to describe a scenario in which
one defendant is blaming everything upon another defendant who
is absent. For example, in a three-car crash, one driver, who clearly
was not at fault, sues the other two drivers seeking compensation for
her injuries. Imagine the victim settles with the first defendant and
goes to trial against the second. It is quite common for the remaining
defendant to blame it all on the person who is not sitting there. He
will point at the chair next to him at the defense table and say, “It was
all that guy’s fault!” That’s the empty chair defense as it is commonly
known.
I found a better use for the term in foreclosure court. You know
how there are these shadowy people behind the scenes signing all
those assignments of mortgage? The robo-signers? Of course. You
know how there was an invisible participant in the Bennus Down
mediation? Well, guess what? In foreclosure trials, there’s also an
invisible presence seemingly in the room. Only this time, the dop-
pelgänger takes over the functions of an ordinary person and directs
its new subject to have a seat up there on the witness stand. The
Testizombie is programmed like this: “Tell them you work for, uhhh,
MR. COOPER, and that you are responsible for the business records.
Whenever you don’t know what to say, tell them that the documents
are kept in the ordinary course of business (never say which busi-
ness!) Read the numbers with little check marks next to them.”
Oh, how I have dreamed of walking down the long narrow hall-
way to the foreclosure courtroom pushing an empty chair beside me.
I fantasize about strolling along with my trusty chair and challenging
all those foreclosure mill attorneys (who are lining the walls while
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Kenneth Trent
seducing pro se defendants) and telling them that I will stipulate to

that damn judgment they keep trying to trick everyone into if they
will put somebody’s ass in this chair! The only rule is that in order to
get me to consent to judgment, the ass which alights must be con-
nected to a person who has actual authority over the conduct of the
named plaintiff in the foreclosure action.
Guaranteed from now until the end of time or at least until the
end of my life, not a single set of cheeks would ever materialize. What
does that mean? It means not only do the bankers have a phalanx of
robo-signers, they have an army of robo-witnesses.
Isn’t that great? It’s like in place of an actual participant, they
send a hologram or a holographic projection again, boys and girls.
It’s the empty damn chair.
You know how I told you that they committed an attack upon
our court system, the likes of which has never been understood?
Well, they fucked the courts up so substantially that even the most
basic requirements of all actually no longer apply to them. What
requirements am I talking about? Utterly fundamental, for centu-
ries, has been the requirement that the parties identify themselves.
You get to know who’s a party to the case and who isn’t. You know
who is the plaintiff and who isn’t. You get to know their real names.
This requirement that all persons and companies before the courts
be properly identified is a basic premise of American constitutional
justice. Too bad it passed away from the original MERS virus, isn’t it?
We need a cure and an inoculation for MERS. Big time!
I, and the words of this book, are the vaccine and the cure.
Share them all freely, my friends, for the good of humanity and the
US of A. Pass it on!
I should win every foreclosure trial by simply challenging the
plaintiff ’s witness to walk across the street with me, on the record with
the judge. Let’s go to the nearest branch of whatever bank the witness
purports to represent. Could be Chase, could be UnTrust, could be
Chitibank, could be Skank of America, could be Wells Farto; they’re
all bunched up right around the courthouse in most towns. We’ll
just go to whichever one you purport to work for, and we will have
a contest: we will see who has a better chance of getting behind the
168
counter: me or the witness? (You think a Skank of America witness

carries any Skank of America credentials? No chance!)
The bankers have trained humans without knowledge to parrot
certain language and read from ready-made business records. In Mr.
Bleil’s trial, Ms. Thievens read the figures with check marks over his
objection. That’s exactly what I’m talking about.
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C h a pte r 20
I’ve been to a lot of parties in my time, and I have not seen a single
elephant or donkey at any of them. The will of our politicians and
our judiciary has been broken, in many cases, without those in charge
even realizing it. Such skilled white-collar criminals are the bankers
that they actually tricked Republican and Democratic presidential
administrations of the last twenty years into buying stock in those
trusts, REMICs, etc., we have been describing in this book. Each
one of those so-called trusts, for example, “The JPMorgan Chase
Bank, NA Amortizing Residential Collateral Trust Pass-Through
Certificates, Series 2002-BC7,” theoretically owns hundreds or thou-
sands of loans and is entitled to all the proceeds of the homeowners’
payments of principal and interest over thirty years. The loans placed
in the trusts are supposed to be very highly rated for creditworthiness
and the likelihood the borrowers will pay in full and on time.
Yet, in truth, the supposed “lender” named in the loan docu-
ments didn’t give a red rat’s ass about one’s credit qualifications or
ability to pay back the loan. The bankers removed that as one of
the criteria. What does that mean? It means that they decided that
they can make much more money by setting everyone up, defaulting
them, and foreclosing than they could ever make in a reasonably
honest manner by collecting interest on loans.
Make no mistake. The bankers are all in this together. Their
identities are basically interchangeable, yet they’re constantly hitting
us with commercials warning us of the terrors of identity theft.
You remember the controversy between Josh Bleil and Jues
Gendern? You know, that delightful judge from Miami. The contro-
versy was about whether the existence of the trust and the technical-
ities of its business transactions are relevant in a foreclosure case. Of
170
course! The business transactions are relevant; they are the essence
of what is called the Uniform Commercial Code. The UCC is the
law which allows financial institutions to sell theoretical interests in
prospective revenue streams derived from homeowners making pay-
ments on their loans. At the very behest of the bankers, the UCC
is intended to simplify antiquated methods of proof so as to allow
them to buy and sell interests in those income streams. The UCC,
although in places written in the bankers’ characteristic impondera-
ble language, nonetheless describes the means by which a financial
institution which was not the original lender may still enforce the
promissory note and the mortgage. They may do so if they qualify
as a “holder.” To be a holder, there must be a physical transfer of the
note and certain paperwork, either an endorsement or an assignment,
signed by the original lender. Those rules apply whenever something
is transferred to the trust.
In addition, there are the rules defining the manner by which
trusts may acquire loans. These rules are written into the pooling and
servicing agreements—the very things which CREATE the trusts.
Those additional requirements impose a deadline by which if an
original promissory note with all the necessary endorsements, or an
accurate assignment of mortgage is not in the physical possession of
the trustee, then, as a matter of law, that negotiable instrument did
not become part of the trust, and the trust has no right to enforce it.
In the words of Chuck Nice and Flav’ o Flav’, “Can’t trust it!”
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C h a pte r 21
I have used the adjectival phrase “from sea to shining sea” more than
once in this book. My words, unlike those of our opponents, can
each be taken as literally true! Just so you know, our next sample of
the bankers’ smorgasbord of outrage will emanate from Cali. Sketchy
in Cali? No, never there. Right? Wrong.
Just as I encountered persons from all over who were human
suppositories—oops, repositories of the outrage and experience of
regular peeps fighting their foreclosures and attempting to alert the
authorities, for God’s sake, about the criminality going on in the
courtrooms every day right under their noses, I met victims. Of
course, all my clients were victims to some extent. You know, the
ones who brought me cases. And those sorts of people are not sup-
positories—that was just too good of a pun to pass up.
Undeniably, there is a certain personality type who will not back
down. These sorts of brothers and sisters will fight with all their might
when confronted with perceived injustice. Dozens and dozens of people
have told me their individual stories since I became the “Foreclosure
Destroyer,” and they have almost invariably been wrong about one thing.
They think their own personal experience is unique, and it is NOT.
Most thought the Stern firm was unique; instead, it exemplifies
the typical law firm which represents the bankers. One point of light
with whom I have become acquainted and have represented on and
off through the date this is written (5-20-2020) is James G. Beekman
from West Palm Beach, Florida.
Mr. Beekman’s loans were with the infamous IndyMac
[EmptySac] Bank out of California. James is a military veteran who
is an absolutely hardworking salt-of-the-earth kind of fella. He puts
me to shame in terms of work ethic. When he got involved with
172
“EmptySac,” he had $100,000 in savings solely from washing and

detailing cars!
Luckily for us, he gave his deposition, and I have a copy of
the transcript. Mr. Beekman is a man who knows right from wrong
and insists that right be done. I admire the sheer undeniable force
of his justifiable outrage and the simple and direct way in which he
expresses it. Every bit of it is deserved, believe me!
Q: And are there any other documents that would be

responsive to our request for production, besides the
documents included in Exhibit 4?
A: Yes, and to elaborate on it, the scope that I’m still find-
ing through my research is unimaginable, and it’s
still affecting us to this day.
Q: Okay. What documents are we talking about here that
you have?
A: Documents of settlements from IndyMac CEO, Dec.
15th, LA Times where the executive, Michael Perry,
was barred from banking for life.
Q: Okay.
A: Involved in a scam with Michael Dell and George Soros
to steal homeowners’ money and steal their money
by forcing them into fraudulent foreclosures in order
to gain profits through illegal insurance claims. And
they have hired attorneys like David J. Stern and the
biggest and the baddest they can find in order to try
to strip me of my property and my credit and my
life, my livelihood, so that they can gain personal
profit and recognition and notoriety through their
abilities to be able to be the best lawyer in town.
Q: Okay. Now, you generally describe these documents.
What are these? Newspaper articles, stuff you found
on the internet, what?
A: These are blogs, these are newspaper articles, these are
OTS reports, these are CCC reports, these are news-
paper clippings, these are witness statements, these
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Kenneth Trent
are just banks coming forth like Vikram Pandit and

John Corzine, people that have stolen large amounts of
money equivalent to Bernie Madoff. It doesn’t matter.
They’re all criminals. They deserve to be put in jail, and
they deserve to be banned from banking for life, just
like Michael Perry. [’85 Bears again? Da Bears!]
Q: So then sitting here today, are you aware of any infor-
mation that needs to be added to Interrogatory
number 7?
A: Yes.
Q: And what information is that?
A: That—I can give you one example. Michael Perry, Los
Angeles Times, headline news for a settlement on
December 15, 2012 that he was banned from bank-
ing for life and required to pay 168 million dollars,
okay, for filing and—fraudulent statements, for run-
ning that bank into the ground.
Q: What bank is that?
A: IndyMac Bank.
Q: IndyMac, FSB? [SOB!]
A: IndyMac. IndyMac Bank. Okay. And for running that
bank into the ground by just totally, blatantly disre-
garding the rule of law
Q: Okay.
A: And I don’t know how to say it any other way. The guy
is a criminal. He’s the likes of Bernie Madoff, David
J. Stern, and I’m starting to have a longer list, like
Benedict [RK!] Arnold and Judas for God’s sakes.
Q: Okay. And what did Benedict Arnold and Judas have to
do with the discovery responses?
A: They betrayed people. They betrayed people who put
their trust in them.
Mr. Beekman has that right. The bankers are so dishonest, they
betray the very essence of the word TRUST every time they use it.
Here’s a random bit of wisdom to conclude this chapter:
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C h a pte r 22
This book is part of a war for the history books about the so-called
great recession of 2008. Once we as humans stop striving for the
truth, in all things at all times, our heretofore dazzling amount of
progress will first slow its ascent and, later, turn back onto itself. We
must have the truths of this book written in the history books!
The perversion of truth has particularly pernicious effects when
it takes hold in the judicial system (the courts). As I hope you are
beginning to see, the bankers designed an incredibly ingenious attack
upon the foundations—and the mechanisms—of our truth-finding
process. It has been insidiously successful at leaving your typical fore-
closure courtroom utterly incapable of forcing the parties to identify
themselves, much less ferreting out the true facts of a case.
Once a court determines the facts of a case, it’s supposed to
apply the law to those facts and come up with a decision. Good luck
in that category! What’s really horrendous is the numerous transfor-
mations in the law which have been made to facilitate these same
foreclosures, all still to this date based upon false and fraudulent evi-
dence of transfer, assignment, and/or endorsement. Heaven forbid
some newly created “servicer,” which is about the eighth company
which has attempted to enforce the mortgage, get thrown out of
court! Come the proverbial “hell or high water,” the powers that be
appear bent upon avoiding such a result at all costs.
Although the Florida legislature did do the people a solid, to
some extent, with the new laws it enacted regarding foreclosure pro-
cedures and the necessity that every complaint be sworn to under
oath and contain a clear chain of all endorsements, assignments, or
transfers, the judge-made law plunges Lady Justice into a truly for-
bidding darkness.
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Kenneth Trent
For starters, no more statute of limitations for mortgage fore-

closures. That’s a hoot. Every type of case, except for murder, has
a statute of limitations. Those establish that a lawsuit or criminal
charge must be filed within X number of years after the events giv-
ing rise to the case. So in all times past, a mortgage being a written
contract, anyone wishing to sue someone else for violation of the
mortgage contract would have to do so no more than five years from
the date upon which she learned of the facts upon which her claim
is based. For a bank, that would be the date upon which a borrower’s
payments were at least 30 days or 90 days past due. That date would
begin the running of the limitations period. If more than five years
passed from a borrower’s “date of default” without the bank filing a
lawsuit, it would be barred forever from doing so “by operation of
the statute of limitations.”
The Supreme Court of Florida issued a decision called Bartram,
which, in confusing verbiage, apparently ruled that every time a per-
son misses a mortgage payment, it gives rise to an entirely “new cause
of action” which starts the time limitation over again.
Even worse, probably due to the rapid proliferation of lawsuits
by aggrieved homeowners against the foreclosure mill firms and
attorneys who were filing all the fake evidence, as well as the fact that
the attorneys general of the other forty-nine (some say forty-eight)
states had joined up with Bill McCollum, Theresa Edwards, and June
Clarkson and begun investigations of the use of fake evidence in fore-
closures, the courts came up with a particularly nasty little doctrine
they call the “litigation privilege.” I got so angry about that crap I
believe I made up a flyer of sorts to pass around. Let me see if I can
dig that up. While I’m looking, the outrageous so-called privilege was
giving immunity to everyone for any illegal act done in court.
Oh, yes, I remember. I called it “the penetration privilege.”
176
ELIMINATE THE “LITIGATION PRIVILEGE”!

KE Trent, the Foreclosure Destroyer. June 26, 2015.
Sometimes, when one (or Juan) is in a huge criminal operation

in the midst of perpetrating a particular criminal enterprise, one will
find oneself in COURT.
Because Juan is not the first criminal to exist, there are a wide
variety of remedial laws (statutes) designed to fight crime and to
allow victims to obtain redress. Normally, the legislatures make the
laws, and the courts apply them. But these days, there are judge-
made laws. One of those is a monster, which has the effect of neutral-
izing (by castration) many of these remedial laws. This judge-made
law is called the “litigation privilege.” Ugh! It is, in reality, a criminal
privilege, and we must stop it!
Under the “litigation privilege,” Juan canNOT be held liable for
illegal conduct if that conduct HAS ANYTHING TO DO WITH
COURT. When Juan rapes the court system by fertilizing it with
fraudulent evidence, thereby causing Lady Justice to miscarry, Juan
sails off into the sunset on the pirate ship Privilege. Juan is OFF THE
HOOK.
Juan is exempt or privileged from any type of prosecution or
lawsuit arising from any document he files and any lie he tells in
court. The way this “litigation privilege” is being applied, it trumps
even Florida’s criminal laws against PERJURY. So now, not only is
our boy Juan automatically exonerated, countless others who haven’t
have yet learned to steal using the court system are being told in
advance that they can do whatever they want in debt collection and
the like as long as it has SOMETHING TO DO WITH COURT.
Imagine…
Town crier: HEAR YE, HEAR YE, ALL FUTURE SCUMBAG
DEBT PREDATORS ARE GIVEN CARTE BLANCHE
to rape rob and steal, worry-free, for all eternity!
The funeral choir: For always and forever, exploiting together
Wake up, America! Surely, it is naught but a bad dream, no?
Alas, it is no dream. It is reality, albeit a very twisted, upside-
down version.
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Kenneth Trent
Contrary to the litigation privilege, the more someone’s fabri-

cated documentation approaches our legal process, the more harshly
any rational government must punish it. When fake evidence passes
through the appearance of a proper judicial process and comes out
the other side as a legally effective document, the bad guys are now
armed with a more dangerous weapon than they possessed when they
initially created it. The fake piece of evidence, such as the hundreds of
thousands of fabricated assignments of mortgage filed in Florida and
used to steal people’s homes in foreclosure court, is now on steroids.
[GRAPHIC SEXUAL LANGUAGE BELOW]
Defrauding people using the courts reminds me of rape. Some
rapes cause more physical and emotional damage than do others.
Some are what we used to call sexual assaults, which do not involve
penetration. Others involve penetration, ejaculation, and even preg-
nancy. When an evil alien seed is implanted inside a woman, that
rape is very damaging indeed.
Imagine if our government adopted a law to prosecute rapists
aggressively UNLESS they penetrated the victim or penetrated and
ejaculated. [Ugh!] Under such a scenario, the more serious the crime,
the less the punishment. That law would be called “the ejaculation
privilege” or the “penetration privilege.” Sound like a good idea to
you?
As they said in the old Guinness commercials, “Brilliant!”
When the womb of Lady Justice is impregnated with a fake
piece of so-called evidence, that rape is very damaging indeed. Will
we continue to allow these criminals to rape Lady Justice?
I say, just like we cannot ever have a “penetration privilege,” WE
MUST stomp out the “LITIGATION PRIVILEGE”!
178
C h a pte r 22
Ultimately, the bankers got their way, and they were able to settle
the investigation touched off by my class action lawsuit and prose-
cuted by the attorneys general of forty-nine states plus the District of
Columbia for an amount which to them was a pittance.
We needed penance, and they paid a pittance.
Only slightly more problematic for the bankers was the aspect
of the settlement which required them, in exchange for massive cred-
its in the form of taxpayer dollars paid to them by the government,
to provide many thousands of loan modifications to borrowers in
distress. Unsurprisingly, the bankers set up an entire separate struc-
ture to foil the authorities and to avoid fulfillment of their obliga-
tions—obligations for which they were paid many millions in tax-
payer funds.
In a manner of speaking, I am a whistleblower. I love whis-
tleblowers! I am going to share with you in this chapter two of the
many sworn statements given by former employees of Skank of
America who have taken on such a role. The two affidavits I’m about
to show you are from former workers in Skank of America’s “loan
modification” department. The first is by a person named Simone
Gordon:
I, Simone Gordon, declare under penalty of per-

jury that the following is true and correct to the
best of my knowledge:
1. I am over the age of 18, am otherwise com-

petent to testify, and could testify if called
179
Kenneth Trent
upon to the following facts that are based on

my own personal knowledge.
2. I was employed by Bank of America from
July 2007 until February 2012. I was a
Senior Collector of loss mitigation/mort-
gage. Beginning in 2009 a significant por-
tion of my job duties consisted of dealing
with homeowners that had applied for a
loan modification as part of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).
3. From the start of the HAMP program Bank
of America calculated the amount of the
trial payment in a trial period plan based on
a borrower’s monthly income and other fac-
tors including the borrower’s debt to income
ratio (DTI) and performed the net pres-
ent value (NPV) test that HAMP required
before issuing a trial period plan. Bank of
America calculated the borrowers DTI and
performed the NPV test by reviewing doc-
uments such as tax returns, pay stubs, bank
statements, a credit report and other finan-
cial information the borrower provided.
Bank of America required people applying
for a HAMP modification to document
their assets and income and would not issue
a trial period plan without full documenta-
tion. Throughout the time I worked there
including 2009 and 2010 Bank of America
did not issue trial period plans based on
oral representations or estimates regarding
income assets or debts. All such information
had to be fully documented.
4. In the course of my work I regularly spoke to
homeowners who were inquiring about the
status of their HAMP loan modifications. I
180
regularly pulled up information regarding

the borrower on Bank of America computer
systems such as HomeSaver and “AS/400.”
These computer systems allowed me to
view terms of a trial period plan including
amounts of trial payments and the dates
they were due, date and amount of each
payment the homeowner made to Bank of
America, and the date each payment was
logged as having been received. The com-
puter systems also allowed me to view each
document that had been requested from
the borrower and the date the borrower had
sent each document to Bank of America. If
needed I could also view the actual docu-
ment the borrower had sent electronically
using Bank of America’s i-portal computer
system.
5. Beginning in 2009 I regularly spoke to peo-
ple who had received HAMP trial period
plans, made their trial payments, and who
were calling to inquire about the status of
their expected permanent loan modifica-
tions. Using the Bank of America computer
systems I saw that hundreds of customers
had made their required trial payments and
sent the documents requested of them but
had not received permanent modifications.
I also saw records showing that Bank of
America employees have told people that
documents had not been received when in
fact the computer system showed that Bank
of America had received the documents.
This was consistent with the instructions my
colleagues and I were given. We were told to
lie to the customers and claim that Bank of
181
Kenneth Trent
America had not received documents it had

requested and that it had not received trial
payments when in fact it had. We were told
that admitting that the bank received docu-
ments would open a can of worms since the
bank was required to underwrite the loan
modification within 30 days of receiving
those documents and it did not have suf-
ficient underwriting staff to complete the
underwriting in that time.
6. My colleagues and I were supervised by team
leaders, who were in turn supervised by site
leaders. Site leaders readily told us that the
more we delay the HAMP modification
process the more fees Bank of America
would collect. We were regularly drilled
that it was our job to maximize fees for
the bank by fostering and extending delay
of the HAMP modification process by any
means we could. This included by lying to
customers. For example, we were instructed
by our supervisors at Bank of America to
delay modifications by telling homeowners
who called in that their documents were
under review when in fact there had been no
review or any other work done on the file.
7. Bank of America site leaders specifically
ordered my colleagues and me to hold
financial documents borrowers submitted
for at least 30 days. Once 30 days passed
Bank of America would consider many of
these documents, such as pay stubs or bank
statements, to be stale and the homeowner
would have to reapply for a modification.
8. These and other similar instructions often
came in monthly meetings that were con-
182
ducted by site leaders and attended by 60

to 70 employees. At these meetings my col-
leagues and I were also given performance
goals and quotas. Employees were rewarded
by meeting a quota of placing a specific
number of accounts into foreclosure includ-
ing accounts in which the borrower fulfilled
a HAMP trial period plan. For example, a
Collector who placed 10 or more accounts
into foreclosure in a given month received
a $500 bonus. Bank of America also gave
employees gift cards to retail stores like
Target or Bed Bath & Beyond as rewards for
placing accounts into foreclosure.
9. Bank of America Collectors and other
employees who did not meet their quotas by
not placing a sufficient number of accounts
into foreclosure each month were subject to
termination. Several of my colleagues were
terminated on that basis.
10. Bank of America monitored my colleagues
and me very closely. Team Leaders and Site
Leaders walked the call room floor through-
out the day wearing headsets that they would
use to plug-in and listen to calls without
warning. Employees who were caught not
carrying out the delay strategies that Bank
of America instructed were subject to dis-
cipline including termination. Employees
were caught admitting that Bank of America
had received financial documents or that the
borrower was actually entitled to permanent
loan.
Executed May 23, 2013 Orange New Jersey.
/s/ Simone Gordon
183
Kenneth Trent
The second affidavit is by a person named Theresa Terrelonge:
1. I am over the age of 18 and am otherwise

competent to testify to the following based
upon my own personal knowledge.
2. From June 2009 through June 2010 I was
employed by Bank of America as a collec-
tor. Most of my job consisted of speaking on
the telephone with homeowners who were
calling regarding a loan modification that
they had applied for as part of the Home
Affordable Modification Program (HAMP).
My job could be accurately described as a
loan level servicing representative.
3. I regularly review the HAMP require-
ments and procedures on the US Treasury
Department website HTTPS://making-
home affordable.gov. I did this on my own
as Bank of America provided no training
or information regarding HAMP and I
wanted to know what I was talking about
two homeowners calling in most if not all of
my colleagues and supervisors did not have
suitable training education or experience
in modifying mortgages and certainly not
regarding HAMP requirements and proce-
dures. Loan level service representatives had
to undergo some kind of training at least
every six weeks. Almost all of these train-
ings included written materials. Most of the
training I recall involved the use of systems
and other ministerial work. Bank of America
did not provide me or anyone I knew with
training regarding HAMP requirements,
applicable mortgage or lending laws, or the
184
substance of what we were talking to home-

owners about.
4. In the course of my work I regularly spoke
to homeowners who were inquiring about
the status of their HAMP loan modifica-
tions I reviewed information regarding the
borrower on Bank of America computer sys-
tems such as Homesaver [eek!] and AS/400.
These computer systems allowed me to
view terms of a trial period plan including
amounts of trial payments and the dates they
were due, date and amount of each payment
the homeowner made to Bank of America,
and the date each payment was logged as
having been received. The computer sys-
tems also allowed me to view the date the
borrower had sent each financial document
to Bank of America. If needed I could also
view the actual document the borrower had
sent electronically using Bank of America’s
i-portal computer system.
5. Although HAMP allowed a servicer to issue
a trial period plan based on unverified verbal
representation from applicants, this was not
Bank of America’s practice. Throughout the
time I worked there in 2009 and 2010, Bank
of America determines whether applicants
would receive a HAMP trial period plan and
calculated the amount of the trial payment
based on the borrower’s monthly income
and other factors including the borrower’s
debt to income ratio. Bank of America also
performed the net present value test that
HAMP required before deciding whether to
issue the borrower a trial period plan. Bank
of America calculated the borrower’s debt to
185
Kenneth Trent
income ratio and performed the net present

value test by reviewing financial documents
the borrower provided. Bank of America
required HAMP applicants to document
their assets and income it would not issue a
trial period plan without a borrower provid-
ing extensive financial documentation.
6. Based on what I observed Bank of America
was trying to prevent has me homeowners as
possible from obtaining permanent HAMP
modifications while leaving the public and
the government to believe it was making
efforts to comply with HAMP. It was well
known among managers and many employ-
ees that the overriding goal was to extend
as few HAMP loan modifications to home-
owners as possible.
7. Much of my job consisted of speaking to
people who received HAMP trial period
plans, made their trial payments and who
were calling to inquire about the status of
their expected permanent loan modifica-
tions. Using the Bank of America computer
systems I saw that hundreds of customers
had made the required trial payments and
sent in the required documents but had not
received permanent modifications.
8. My colleagues and I were called into group
meetings with our supervisors on a regular
basis. The information received in the group
meetings showed me that Bank of America’s
deliberate practice was to string homeown-
ers along with no intention of providing per-
manent modifications. We were instructed
to inform every homeowner who called in
that their file was “under review”—even
186
where the computer system showed that

the file had not been accessed in months or
when the homeowner had been rejected for
a modification.
9. My colleagues and I were instructed to
inform homeowners that modification
documents were not received on time, not
received at all, or that documents were miss-
ing even when in fact all documents were
received in full and on time.
10. One tactic Bank of America used to delay
the modification process involved telling
homeowners who applied for a HAMP
modification or who were in a trial period
plan to resubmit financial information each
time they called to inquire about a pending
modification. Bank of America then treated
any change in financial information as jus-
tification for considering the homeowner
to have restarted the HAMP process. Even
a small change to financial information or
correcting an error that Bank of America
may will cause Bank of America to restart
the application process under the pretext of
changed financial information.
11. When Bank of America purchased loans
from other services including when it bought
the servicer itself, as it did with Wilshire
Credit, Bank of America forced homeown-
ers to restart the modification process. When
a homeowner called regarding modification
started with another servicer my co-work-
ers and I were instructed to say that Bank
of America had no record of the modifica-
tion or of the payments owner already made
under the modification. We were instructed
187
Kenneth Trent
to make this statement even when Bank of

America’s system showed the homeown-
ers’ modification and previous payments,
and even when the system showed that the
homeowner had completed the trial process
with the previous servicer and should have
received a permanent modification.
12. Bank of America readily ignored completed
loan modifications and did not treat the loan
as having been modified in its computer
system even after homeowner signed and
returned modification documents, (both
trial and permanent modifications), Bank
of America’s system continued to show the
loan as delinquent. Bank of America con-
tinued to send delinquency notices, contin-
ued to report homeowners as delinquent to
credit reporting agencies, and pursued fore-
closure. I saw multiple instances of people
who lost their homes to foreclosure despite
having fulfilled all requirement of their trial
period plans.
13. When an account or attempted modifica-
tion was considered closed it meant that the
homeowner would not be receiving a modifi-
cation and would often be facing collections
or foreclosure. The production goals Bank of
America placed on its managers were based
on how many accounts they could “close,”
meaning how many homeowners they could
reject for the loan modifications rather than
how many modifications they could success-
fully complete. Managers received bonuses
if their teams met or exceeded production
goals.
188
14. Managers, in turn pushed their production

goals on the loan level employees. Employees
were awarded incentives such as $25 in cash
or a restaurant gift card based on the number
of accounts they could close in a given day
or week—meaning how many applications
for loan modifications they could decline.
15. I personally witnessed employees and man-
agers close loan accounts based on informa-
tion that was obviously wrong. This included
closing accounts, and declining loan modifi-
cations based on the homeowners failure to
provide certain documents or information
when, in fact, it was apparent from the loan
file and from the electronic system of record
(electronic databases including AS/400,
HomeSaver, HomeBase and others) that the
homeowner had provided the very informa-
tion claimed to be missing.
16. I witnessed employees and managers change
and falsify information in the systems of
record, and remove documents from home-
owners’ files to make the account here
ineligible for a loan modification. This
included falsifying electronic records so that
the records would no longer show that the
homeowner had sent in required documents
or had made required payments. This was
done so that the file could be closed, the
homeowner’s effort to obtain a loan modi-
fication could be rejected, and the manager
could meet Bank of America’s production
goal for the given week or month.
17. Bank of America often avoided extending
HAMP modifications by sending non-
HAMP modifications to homeowners who
189
Kenneth Trent
had applied for a HAMP modification.

These non-HAMP modifications were typ-
ically on worse terms for the homeowner
than what they were eligible to receive under
HAMP, but they were at higher interest rates
and more profitable for Bank of America.
I fielded dozens of calls from homeown-
ers who had waited months for a HAMP
modification and were confused, and often
in tears, when they received a modification
that appeared nothing like what they were
led to expect.
18. Bank of America used group meetings
to convey production goals, adjustments
to protocol for speaking to homeown-
ers, adjustments to information we were
expected to give (or not give) homeowners,
and other information regarding the jobs
of low level representatives. These group
meetings were conducted by manager. The
agenda and itinerary for the meetings were
sent to the manager via email. The man-
ager, in turn, conveyed the information to
low level representatives verbally, but often
showed us the email he received with a sum-
mary of the content he was supposed con-
vey in the meeting. In addition to group
meetings, loan level service representative
received information regarding general poli-
cies and procedures, new programs, and cer-
tain clarifications to programs via email.
19. Throughout my tenure at Bank of America,
loan level servicing representatives were
constantly being evaluated. We received
written evaluations known as “scorecards”
on a weekly basis via email. These score-
190
cards evaluated employees based on criteria

including the number of customer because
they took each day, the number of minutes
they spent on each call, and whether they
gave the homeowner too much information.
Employees received negative evaluations and
negative comments if they spent too much
time on the phone with a particular home-
owner in an effort to answer their questions
or if they gave what Bank of America con-
sidered to be too much information about
the modification process.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the
foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge.
Executed this 15th day of May 2013 at
Grand Prairie, Texas.
/s/ Theresa Terrelonge
Bank of America claims that it’s from Charlotte, North Carolina.

What’s that make them?
CHARLATANS.
191
C h a pte r 23
As a result of the nationwide investigation of robo-signing by the
fifty attorneys general, the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development commissioned something called the Office
of [the] Inspector General to investigate and report on the foreclo-
sure and document-signing practices of five large banks.
First, as to those consistent fraudsters, the original charlatans,
Skank of America, the report included the following:
As part of the Office of Inspector General’s (OIG) nation-
wide effort to review the foreclosure practices of the five largest
Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage servicers (Bank
of America, Wells Fargo Bank, CitiMortgage, JPMorgan Chase,
and Ally Financial Inc.), we reviewed Bank of America’s foreclo-
sure and claims processes. In addition to this memorandum, OIG
issued separate memorandums for each of the other four reviews.
OIG also plans to issue a summary memorandum reporting the
results of all five memorandums. OIG performed these reviews due
to reported allegations made in the fall of 2010 that national mort-
gage servicers were engaged in widespread questionable foreclosure
practices involving the use of foreclosure mills and a practice known
as “robo-signing” of sworn documents in thousands of foreclosures
throughout the United States. Bank of America is a supervised FHA
direct endorsement lender that can originate, sponsor, and service
FHA-insured loans. During federal fiscal years 2009 and 2010, it
submitted 36,095 FHA claims totaling $5 billion. Bank of America
acquired Countrywide [Doublewide] Home Loans Servicing, LP, in
2008 and processed claims using Countrywide’s FHA servicing iden-
tification number during the review period. Approximately 90 per-
192
cent of its claims during the review period, totaling more than $4.5
billion, were for loans previously serviced by Countrywide.
In early October 2010, Bank of America stated that it would
halt judicial foreclosures while it reviewed its policies and procedures.
On October 18, 2010, it issued a press release reporting that it had
completed its review of judicial foreclosures, and while it had iden-
tified no problems, it would resubmit 102,000 affidavits in judicial
foreclosure cases that had not yet gone to judgment. On October
22, 2010, the US Department of Housing and Urban Development
(HUD) issued a notice of violation informing Bank of America that
it was considering administrative actions and civil money penalties
based on findings identified in its July 2010 servicing review.
From the beginning of our review in October 2010, Bank of
America limited our access to employees and information. After
attempting to conduct interviews within Bank of America’s estab-
lished protocols without success, the US Department of Justice
(DOJ) assisted us by obtaining testimony through civil investigative
demands (CID). Because we identified potential False Claims Act
violations, in February 2011, we provided DOJ with our analyses
and preliminary conclusions as to whether Bank of America engaged
in the alleged foreclosure practices. DOJ used our review and anal-
ysis in negotiating a settlement agreement with Bank of America.
On February 9, 2012, DOJ and forty-nine state attorneys gen-
eral announced a proposed settlement of $25 billion with Bank of
America and four other mortgage servicers for their reported viola-
tions of foreclosure requirements. As part of the proposed settlement
agreement, each of the five servicers will pay a portion of the set-
tlement to the United States and must undertake certain consumer
relief activities. The proposed settlement agreement described tenta-
tive credits that each mortgage servicer would receive for modifying
loans, including principal reduction and refinancing, and established
a monitoring committee and a monitor to ensure compliance with
agreed-upon servicing standards and the consumer relief provisions.
Once the final settlement agreement has been approved by the court,
OIG will issue a separate summary memorandum detailing each of
193
Kenneth Trent
the five servicers’ allocated share of payment due as a result of the

settlement agreement.
During the course of our review and the drafting of this memo-
randum, Bank of America was actively engaged in negotiations with
DOJ in an attempt to resolve potential claims under the False Claims
Act or other statutes for the conduct we were reviewing. Accordingly,
OIG determined that our work product was privileged and not
releasable to Bank of America for any purpose, including the solici-
tation of written comments on our findings from Bank of America.
For this same reason, we did not provide Bank of America with a
copy of the draft memorandum. Both DOJ and HUD concurred
with our determination that the work product was privileged.
Our review generally covered Bank of America’s foreclosure
and claims processes for its FHA claims initially processed by HUD
between October 1 2008, and September 30, 2010, including its
procedures for signing and notarizing sworn judgment affidavits. The
review included both judicial and nonjudicial foreclosure states and
jurisdictions, which provided a comprehensive overview of Bank of
America’s practices and compliance with requirements. We expanded
the scope as needed to accomplish our objective. We initiated our
review on October 15, 2010, and performed onsite work at Bank of
America’s offices in Fort Worth, Plano, and Addison, Texas, and Simi
Valley, California, between October 2010 and January 2011.
Scope Limitation
Our review was significantly hindered by Bank of America’s
reluctance to allow us to interview employees. When interviews
were permitted, the presence or involvement of attorneys limited the
effectiveness of those interviews. On a number of occasions, Bank of
America’s attorneys refused to allow employees to answer questions,
stopped them in the middle of clarifying information already pro-
vided, or counseled them in private before allowing them to provide
a response. Further, Bank of America would not permit an effective
walk-through of its document execution process that would have
facilitated an understanding of its process.
194
In addition, we issued inspector general administrative subpoe-

nas because Bank of America did not provide information and data
in a timely manner or a point of contact who could explain and
clarify data. However, the information and data provided in response
to our subpoenas were not complete. For instance, Bank of America
provided only excerpts of subpoenaed personnel files, did not pro-
vide complete foreclosure documents for the items in the sample,
provided conflicting information regarding who its affiants were, and
could not identify all authorized notaries. As a result, it was not pos-
sible to know how much information Bank of America omitted that
was relevant to our review. For example, although several employees
described Bank of America’s foreclosure process, it was not until its
employees provided sworn testimony that they disclosed that per-
sonnel in India conducted the critical foreclosure function of ver-
ifying judgment figures. Further, Bank of America provided FHA
insurance claims data for only two of its five servicing identification
numbers. In another instance, it provided data that identified sign-
ers, notaries, and attorneys for each claim for only one-third of its
FHA claims records. These omissions impaired our review because
they prevented us from measuring the complete impact of Bank of
America’s foreclosure practices.
In an effort to mitigate the scope limitation, DOJ issued CIDs
to Bank of America and thirty-four current and former employees
to compel testimony. Of those, one corporate representative and
sixteen current and former employees gave sworn testimony about
their knowledge concerning Bank of America’s operation of and/
or reliance upon so-called foreclosure mills or robo-signers to pro-
cess foreclosures. In addition, DOJ facilitated discussions regarding
Bank of America’s response to our inspector general administrative
subpoenas.
Results of Review
Bank of America did not establish effective control over its
foreclosure process. This failure permitted a control environment
in which affiants routinely signed foreclosure documents, including
affidavits, certifying that they had personal knowledge of the facts
195
Kenneth Trent
when they did not. Specifically, affiants signed large volumes of fore-
closure documents without reviewing the supporting documentation
referenced in them. They also consistently failed to verify the accu-
racy of the foreclosure documents they signed.
Notaries public routinely notarized documents without witness-
ing affiant signatures. They also failed to keep required records of the
documents they notarized. It may have allowed attorneys to improp-
erly prepare documents and misrepresent the work they performed.
Review of 118 FHA claim files showed that Bank of America did
not consistently retain legal documents supporting the foreclosure.
Analysis of the mathematical accuracy of seven affidavits containing
judgment figures showed inconsistent per diem interest calculations
and discrepancies in accrued interest totals. Also, in one instance, it
conveyed a property to HUD with the incorrect legal description.
This flawed control environment resulted in Bank of America fil-
ing improper legal documents, thereby misrepresenting its claims to
HUD and may have exposed it to liability under the False Claims
Act.
Questionable Affidavit and Foreclosure Document Processes

Bank of America failed to follow HUD requirements for proper-
ties it foreclosed upon in judicial foreclosure states and jurisdictions.
These provisions required Bank of America to obtain and convey to
the secretary of HUD good and marketable title to properties. Bank
of America may have conveyed flawed or improper titles to HUD
because it did not establish a control environment which ensured
that affiants performed a due diligence review of the facts submitted
to courts and that employees properly notarized documents.
Judicial foreclosures were processed through the court system
beginning with Bank of America filing a complaint or petition regard-
ing a mortgage purportedly in default. The formal legal document
stated what the debt was and why the default should allow Bank of
America to foreclose on the property. In many judicial foreclosures,
an affidavit was part of the foreclosure documentation. Generally, a
representative of Bank of America swore in a notarized affidavit that
Bank of America owned or held the mortgage in question, and that
196
the borrower was in arrears. As judicial states and jurisdictions rou-

tinely resolved foreclosures through summary judgment, the accuracy
and propriety of the documents were essential to ensure the integrity
of the foreclosure process. Bank of America used a flawed process to
submit FHA conveyance claims for judicially foreclosed-upon prop-
erties and received FHA claim payments of more than $1.1 billion
during the review period.
Affiants Robo-Signed Foreclosure Documents

Because Bank of America would not provide us written foreclo-
sure policies and procedures in effect during the review period, we
relied on interviews and CID testimony to gain an understanding of
its foreclosure practices. Employees confirmed that affiants routinely
signed legal documents, including affidavits, without the support-
ing documentation and without reviewing and verifying the accu-
racy of the foreclosure information. Many affiants stated that they
only checked to determine whether the foreclosure documents listed
them as the signer. In an interview, a vice president in the document
execution group stated that her department only checked foreclosure
documents for formatting and spelling errors.
Further, Bank of America had no effective quality assurance
function. For example, employees who performed quality control
auditing and training for the document execution group testified
that their focus consisted of ensuring that name and title stamps on
foreclosure documents were straight and legible. In addition, while
giving sworn testimony, employees could not explain to DOJ the
process by which personnel in India verified the judgment figures
included in foreclosure documents.
When asked about the number of foreclosure documents they
signed, employees were unable to provide DOJ with accurate esti-
mates. However, they acknowledged that foreclosure document vol-
ume increased exponentially over time. For example, one notary tes-
tified that daily volume went from sixty to two hundred documents
per day to twenty thousand documents per day with half being
duplicates. One former employee described signing twelve- to eigh-
teen-inch stacks of documents at a time without review. Employees
197
Kenneth Trent
also admitted signing large volumes of foreclosure documents during

unrelated meetings without reading them. An employee testified that
she was instructed to send out an e-mail message recruiting affiants
because Bank of America needed more signers for foreclosure docu-
ments. In addition, a former vice president in an unrelated business
unit testified that he was required to sign foreclosure documents.
Many employees testified that they relied on a system to ensure
that documents they signed were accurate. However, none effectively
described the system. One manager testified that she was volunteered
to be an affiant. According to the manager, the vice president in
charge of foreclosure told her that the information had been verified,
and she “just simply needed to locate the sticky in which it had Sign
Here and sign my name…” When asked whether she verified the
information, the manager stated that she trusted that the informa-
tion had been verified because the vice president told her so. In addi-
tion, managers discussed in performance reviews an unprecedented
volume increase due to high foreclosures, which resulted in Bank of
America hiring additional contractors and new employees to prepare
foreclosure documents.
Information provided by Bank of America also reflected an
increased volume of foreclosure documents over the review period
and showed that it evaluated employee performance based in part on
metrics for processing high volumes of documents. The total monthly
volume of documents signed varied from 4,000 in November 2009
to more than 64,000 in April 2010, with a total of 809,000 docu-
ments during the review period. The most prodigious affiants signed
between 31,000 and 78,000 documents during the review period.
Bank of America’s foreclosure process during the review period did
not ensure that it properly executed foreclosure documents before
submitting them to courts or ensure that it conveyed good and mar-
ketable title to HUD.
Notaries Did Not Witness Signatures or Maintain Required Records

Bank of America did not establish a control environment that
ensured that its notaries met their responsibilities under state laws
that required them to witness affiant signatures on documents they
198
notarized. Bank of America employed notaries who notarized signa-

tures on foreclosure documents, but it could not provide a complete
list of these employees. Our sample included documents with notary
stamps from Texas and California. Both states required the notary
to authenticate the signer’s signature and maintain a notary logbook
detailing specific information, such as the name of the signer, docu-
ment notarized, and date. Employees stated that affiants did not rou-
tinely sign documents in front of a notary. There was no indication
that Bank of America required them to do so. If a notary did not wit-
ness the signature, the notarization of the document was improper.
Two employees specifically testified that they raised concerns about
the notary process to management, but management told them
to continue the process. In CID testimony, one of the referenced
managers said she did not recall any concerns about the notary pro-
cess being brought to her attention. One notary stated that Bank of
America set a target of notarizing 75 to 80 documents per hour, and
he was evaluated on whether he met the target. According to the data
provided, the most active notaries each notarized between 14,000
and 77,000 foreclosure documents during the two-year review
period. The data also showed that one notary, in violation of Texas
law, notarized her own signature on two documents.
Despite management representations to the contrary, employee
performance reviews demonstrated that Bank of America used
defined goals and metrics to evaluate performance based on pro-
duction in its document execution group. For instance, the manager
progress notes section of two document execution employees’ 2009
and 2010 performance reviews stated:
• Your Stats so far this year are as follows: Affidavits 46.97

per hour (standard is 49 per hour). Assignments 54.74 per
hour (standard is 51 per hour) and DocEx 49.67 per hour
(standard is 46 per hour.
• Your stats so far this year are as follows: Affidavits 40.11
(standard is 49.00 an hour). Assignments 43.12 (standard
is 51.00 an hour) and DocEx 36.91 (standard is 46.00 an
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Kenneth Trent
hour). Your numbers are low but I understand why so they

are acceptable.
• …maintains the production standards set by the Document
Execution group and has very few errors…numbers are
exceptional for department stats: Printing 140. 77%.
Prepping 148.08%. Stapling 148.02% and Notarizing
121.81%.
As one of the primary purposes of using a notary was to verify

the authenticity of the signer, Bank of America’s failure to ensure
that notaries witnessed signatures was a significant control weakness.
Because this type of deficiency undermined the integrity of the con-
trol environment, the affidavits and other foreclosure documents
submitted by Bank of America were unreliable and inauthentic and
may have exposed it to raise Claims Act liability.
Law Firms May Have Engaged in Improper Practices
Bank of America used law firms that may have engaged in

questionable practices to process FHA-insured foreclosures. These
practices ranged from allegations of robo-signing and unauthorized
practice of law to a judge’s ruling that in an attempt to collect on
questionable debt, a firm filed deceptive documents, and one [all] of
its lawyers lied in court.
For example, a high-level Bank of America official was referred
to in a complaint against Goldbeck, McCafferty, and McKeever,
PC (GMM), a law firm that conducted foreclosure work for Bank
of America. The complaint alleged that nonlawyers in the firm
engaged in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing foreclosure
complaints, signing lawyers’ names to those complaints, and filing
those complaints in county courts around the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. The plaintiff averred that Bank of America knew of,
directed, and profited from the conduct of the nonlawyers, and that
the high-level official, an attorney, was present in a courtroom when
Mr. McKeever testified that it was “standard practice” for nonlaw-
yers to engage in the unauthorized practice of law. The complaint
200
included transcript excerpts from the December 8–9, 2009, hearing

and twenty-seven exhibits containing signatures supporting the alle-
gation that nonlawyer defendants prepared, signed, and filed hun-
dreds of thousands of cases without attorney review.
GMM processed 469 foreclosure documents for Bank of
America in Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Of the 118 sample loans, 2
were processed by the firm. As figure 2 shows, it appeared that at least
5 different individuals signed 13 documents for Attorney Michael
McKeever for the 2 sample loans.
If nonlawyers, on GMM’s behalf, signed and filed documents

for FHA-insured foreclosures, these filings may not have been valid
and may have caused Bank of America to file false claims.
The complete report on Skank of America is included in the
appendix to this book. Unsurprisingly, the inspector general’s con-
clusions were similar for all five targets.
201
C h a pte r 24
Sometimes, the level of injustice simply becomes too high for any
conscientious soul to bear. Eventually, rational people come to the
irrefutable conclusion that working within the system has been noth-
ing but one massive fail. When that occurs, people will begin to work
outside of, or against, the system.
One timely example, as I write this in early June 2020, is the
ongoing protests, spearheaded by the Black Lives Matter movement
and touched off by the latest of innumerable deaths of black citizens
suffered at the hands of police. This particular one as my reader prob-
ably knows is the one involving poor George Floyd.
I support the protests, and I make no bones about it. Not only
do I support the protests because I have long been a civil rights kind
of guy and have been aware of and outraged by many cases in the past
including but not limited to that of Sandra Bland, but also because I
see a similarity between the present movement and the one I wish to
encourage in this book. The latter will be directed against the massive
corruption and abuses of regular Americans by America’s financial
system.
To be perfectly blunt about it, I would love it if this book con-
tributed to the American Revolution part two.
There is a cohesiveness and consistency between the Occupy
movement and Black Lives Matter. There is a relationship between
the abuse of black and brown Americans (and white Americans
for that matter but mostly those of color) by out-of-control per-
sons wearing badges and the abuse of upwardly mobile first-time
home-buying types of Americans and residents of this country by
the big banks. THEY ARE BOTH CONTRARY TO AMERICA’S
PROFESSED IDEALS! It’s not just because the schemes or conduct
202
or effects are similar; it’s also because one has an effect on the other.
The conduct of the banks does affect the conduct of police officers
on the street and the degree to which they can be held accountable
for their illegal and abusive behavior. In the June 7, 2020, edition of
the Miami Herald, on page 4, there is a discussion in an article about
the police and citizen review boards. Apparently, there was a citizen
review panel or board which was created and operated in Miami-
Dade County from approximately 1980 until 2009, at which time
“the county panel lost its funding during [the] budget crisis.”
I began to run out of synonyms for outrageous when, on June
3, I heard on the news that Bank of America has pledged one billion
dollars “to address racial and economic inequality in the US.”
Oh my. Leaving aside as too obvious the loophole of “economic
inequality,” this so-called pledge, first, betrays consciousness of guilt.
Second, it demonstrates the practically infinite proportions of the
Big Skank’s wealth. Third, it demonstrates the exploitative charla-
tan’s hyperawareness of its image. Finally, it demonstrates that the
amounts of the various mortgage, foreclosure, and securities fraud
settlements the Skank has agreed to pay are woefully inadequate.
On August 21, 2014, the US Department of Justice released
the following:
Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic

Justice Department Settlement for Financial
Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial
Crisis
Attorney General Eric Holder9 and Associate
Attorney General Tony West announced today
that the Department of Justice has reached a
$16.65 billion settlement with Bank of America
Corporation “the largest civil settlement with a
single entity in American history” to resolve fed-
eral and state claims against Bank of America
and its former and current subsidiaries, including
9
Wall of Shame member.
203
Kenneth Trent
Countrywide Financial Corporation and Merrill

Lynch. As part of this global resolution, the bank
has agreed to pay a $5 billion penalty under the
Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act (FIRREA) “the largest FIRREA
penalty ever” and provide billions of dollars of
relief to struggling homeowners, including funds
that will help defray tax liability as a result of
mortgage modification, forbearance or forgive-
ness. The settlement does not release individuals
from civil charges, nor does it absolve Bank of
America, its current or former subsidiaries and
affiliates or any individuals from potential crim-
inal prosecution.
“This historic resolution—the largest such
settlement on record—goes far beyond the
cost of doing business’,” said Attorney General
Holder. “Under the terms of this settlement,
the bank has agreed to pay $7 billion in relief
to struggling homeowners, borrowers and com-
munities affected by the bank’s conduct. [As if ].
This is appropriate [woefully inadequate] given
the size and scope of the wrongdoing at issue.”
This settlement is part of the ongoing
efforts of President Obama’s Financial Fraud
Enforcement Task Force and its Residential
Mortgage-Backed Securities (RMBS) Working
Group, which has recovered $36.65 billion to
date for American consumers and investors.
“At nearly $17 billion, today’s resolution
with Bank of America is the largest the department
has ever reached with a single entity in American
history,” said Associate Attorney General West.
“But the significance of this settlement lies not
just in its size; this agreement is notable because
it achieves real accountability for the American
204
people and helps to rectify the harm caused by

Bank of America’s conduct through a $7 billion
consumer relief package that could benefit hun-
dreds of thousands of Americans still struggling
to pull themselves out from under the weight of
the financial crisis.”
The Justice Department and the bank settled
several of the department’s ongoing civil investi-
gations related to the packaging, marketing, sale,
arrangement, structuring and issuance of RMBS,
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), and the
bank’s practices concerning the underwriting and
origination of mortgage loans. The settlement
includes a statement of facts, in which the bank
has acknowledged that it sold billions of dollars
of RMBS without disclosing to investors key
facts about the quality of the securitized loans.
When the RMBS collapsed, investors, including
federally insured financial institutions, suffered
billions of dollars in losses. The bank has also
conceded that it originated risky mortgage loans
and made misrepresentations about the quality
of those loans to Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and
the Federal Housing Administration (FHA).
Of the record-breaking $16.65 billion res-
olution, almost $10 billion will be paid to set-
tle federal and state civil claims by various enti-
ties related to RMBS, CDOs and other types of
fraud. Bank of America will pay a $5 billion civil
penalty to settle the Justice Department claims
under FIRREA. Approximately $1.8 billion will
be paid to settle federal fraud claims related to
the bank’s origination and sale of mortgages,
$1.03 billion will be paid to settle federal and
state securities claims by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC), $135.84 mil-
205
Kenneth Trent
lion will be paid to settle claims by the Securities

and Exchange Commission. In addition,$300
million will be paid to settle claims by the state
of California, $45 million to settle claims by the
state of Delaware, $200 million to settle claims
by the state of Illinois, $23 million to settle
claims by the Commonwealth of Kentucky, $75
million to settle claims by the state of Maryland,
and $300 million to settle claims by the state of
New York.
Bank of America will provide the remain-
ing $7 billion in the form of relief to aid hun-
dreds of thousands of consumers harmed by
the financial crisis precipitated by the unlawful
conduct of Bank of America, Merrill Lynch and
Countrywide. That relief will take various forms,
including principal reduction loan modifications
that result in numerous homeowners no longer
being underwater on their mortgages and finally
having substantial equity in their homes. It will
also include new loans to credit worthy borrow-
ers struggling to get a loan, donations to assist
communities in recovering from the financial cri-
sis, and financing for affordable rental housing.
Finally, Bank of America has agreed to place over
$490 million in a tax relief fund to be used to
help defray some of the tax liability that will be
incurred by consumers receiving certain types of
relief if Congress fails to extend the tax relief cov-
erage of the Mortgage Forgiveness Debt Relief
Act of 2007.
This, my friends, is another farce. Are you ready for the secrets?
206
C h a pte r 25
The first bankers’ secret is that there are no loans in any of those
trusts. Obama bought massive amounts of the securities for which
were allegedly to contain the proceeds as the homeowners/borrowers
paid the mortgages including interest over their thirty-year terms.
Obama bought air like the emperor wore air in “The Emperor’s New
Clothes.” Securities are insecurities.
Eric Holder in my opinion was the bankers’ man put in place
to stem the tide. Shit list.
Remember we considered the question of why the bankers
would have to have 20,000 robo-signers spread from seed assigning
CI mean sea to shining sea LOL. See, I can play their game with
words, only better. But on the real, the answer to the question is
because they need to be able to create a document saying that any
given trust owns any given loan at any given time. The trick is that
they never have to reveal all the loans that are in all the trusts all at
once. So it’s sort of like the loaves and fish. They can take a $300,000
mortgage obligation, put makeup on the pig, voilà, they have collat-
eralized debt obligations (CDOs), and then basically, they put it in a
“tranche” and change servicers eleven times, and good luck slowpoke
underfunded bureaucrat in pinning them down as to which loans
are in which trusts. In other words, that’s never going to happen
due to their ingenious design and pure dominance over the alleged
regulators. Since they can never be pinned down all at once as to the
identities of all the loans in all the trusts or even their own identities
or that of their successors and/or assigns, as long as they can come
up with documentation, they can divide one mortgage loan among
several different trusts in randomly varying amounts depending on
207
Kenneth Trent
their purposes in responding to a certain subpoena or other docu-

mentation demand. Thus, the loaves and fish comparison.
I told you I don’t like donkeys or elephants. They’re both on the
hook because Bush the dumber also purchased lots of those so-called
securities on behalf of the United States government. These alleged
assets of the United States government are in fact worthless.
208
C h a pte r 26
The second bankers’ secret is that because none of these trusts actu-
ally acquired any of the loans, if justice prevails, no one can ever be
foreclosed upon. There is no party which can legitimately, through
authentic evidence, prove that it has the right to collect on the loan
and foreclose.
Anyone who denies this, please debate me. Disprove my con-
clusions. You can’t. Remember the court of last resort is YOU, the
American people.
God bless you all. PASS IT ON!
209
Kenneth Trent
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211
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213
A p p e n d ix
Hall of Fame
Joshua Bleil
Mark Stopa
Matt Weidner
Kenneth Trent
April Charney
Damian Figueroa
Arthur Schack
Thomas Ice
June Clarkson
Theresa Edwards
Hall of Shame
Cecilia Altonaga
David Stern
Pam Bondi
Eric Holder
Steven Mnuchin
George Soros
Meenu Sasser
Michael Genden (“Guendern”)
Meenu Sasser
217
Kenneth Trent
OFFICE OF AUDIT REGION VI

FORT WORTH, TX
MEMORANDUM OF REVIEW
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

US DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVE-
LOPMENT
Bank of America Corporation Foreclosure and

Claims Process Review Charlotte, NC
MEMORANDUM NO. 2012-FW-1802

MARCH 12, 2012
218
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Kenneth Trent
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233
Kenneth Trent
Manager 1-Affiant and Notary
Manager 1 signed 12 foreclosure documents for 8 of our 118 sample

loans, 2 of which were potentially presented as evidence in judicial
state court proceedings.
Affiant Statistics
According to Bank of America’s shipping logs, manager 1 signed
46,936 and notarized 45 foreclosure documents during the two-year
review period.
Manager 1 routinely signed foreclosure documents, including

affidavits, certifying that she had personal knowledge of the facts
234
when she did not. She consistently failed to verify the accuracy of the
foreclosure documents she signed.
CID Testimony
Manager 1 testified that Bank of America’s process did not
require her to verify the information in foreclosure documents before
signing. She agreed that the standard industry practice was to execute
affidavits without reading documents. She did not specifically recall
reading documents. She also agreed that it was industry practice to
have documents notarized outside the presence of the signer. In her
testimony, manager 1 responded that her direct supervisor, a vice
president, was aware and approved of the industry standard being
followed. She assumed her supervisor’s boss would have approved
and been aware of the same.
When asked about a paragraph manager 1 signed stating that
she had personal knowledge, manager 1 said that she “didn’t read the
document to read personal knowledge. Again, the process was just
to sign the document.” When asked if she did anything to verify an
amount that was due and owing, manager 1 responded, “No. The
process at the time was just to sign the document.” Manager 1 gave
similar answers throughout her testimony. She was also a notary and
testified that she did not typically witness signatures.
Personnel File Excerpt

Manager l’s supervisor (manager 3) discussed goals, metrics,
and a reengineered document execution process in her 2010 perfor-
mance review:
• Your group “now has clear goals and metrics by which

to evaluate performance. There exists an opportunity to
address poor performance issues more rapidly.”
• “You have completed the re-engineering of the document
execution process [sic]. This was a significant initiative you
formulated that has enabled your group to rapidly scale up
to match increasing volumes as well as improve turnaround
time and communication.”
235
Kenneth Trent
Manager 2-Affiant and Notary
Manager 2 signed foreclosure documents for 4 of our 118 sample

loans, 1 of which was potentially presented as evidence in a judicial
state court proceeding. Manager 2 also notarized one judicial state
foreclosure document.
Affiant Statistics
67,908 and notarized 1,390 foreclosure documents during the two-
year review period. Bank of America’s records indicated that manager
2 notarized her own signature on two documents.
236

foreclosure documents she signed. Manager 2 also routinely nota-
rized documents without witnessing affiant signatures and failed to
keep required records of the documents she notarized.
CID Testimony
Manager 2 acknowledged that she did not have personal knowl-
edge when she signed foreclosure documents. Further, she would
not typically have additional case-related documents available to her
when she signed affidavits, but the information was available in Bank
of America’s computer system. However, she acknowledged that she
did not routinely inform herself by looking at the computer system.
Manager 2 testified that she would read the first paragraph of
the document before locating the “sign here” sticky directing her
attention to the particular place she would need to sign. She esti-
mated that she spent approximately one and one-half to two hours
per day signing documents and spent two to three minutes on each
document. Notaries were not present when manager 2 signed docu-
ments, and other signers in her group did not make a habit of sign-
ing with notaries present. Further, as a notary, she did not typically
witness the signing of documents and referred to Bank of America’s
shipping log as an electronic notary log.
Personnel File Excerpt

In her 2009 performance review, manager 2 and her supervisor
(manager 1) discussed volume increases and departmental growth:
• “Your team continues to grow through this time of unprec-

edented volume.”
• “When assumed the group late in 2006 had no idea, like
others, volume would result with a dramatic increase. Due
to the volume group has evolved from 15–20 associates to
30+ and continues to grow.”
237
Kenneth Trent
• “In order to assist the huge increase in the document request

volume, contractors were hired July–August to assist with
the prepping of documents… By 3rd quarter, document
request volume exceeded expectations due to high foreclo-
sure referral volume. To address increased volume, in addi-
tion to the four above new associates and [sic] additional
eight associates were hired.”
238
Manager 3–Affiant
Manager 3 signed 7 foreclosure documents for 6 of our 118 sample

loans, 1 of which was potentially presented as evidence in a judicial
state court proceeding.
Affiant Statistics
36,885 foreclosure documents during the two-year review period.

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Kenneth Trent
CID Testimony
Manager 3 testified that documents were checked before they
came to her for signature. However, she acknowledged that she did
not verify information or undertake a review of a specific loan file to
give herself “firsthand knowledge of the business records with respect
to an actual loan before signing a document.” She stated that she
looked at the document, looked at the investor, and signed it. While
manager 3 stated that sometimes notaries watched as she signed doc-
uments, she acknowledged that generally they did not watch her sign
the documents.
Manager 3 explained that as a vice president, she managed four
groups: foreclosure group, quality control group, reporting group,
and document execution group. These groups were managed by
three vice presidents and an assistant vice president. For the quality
control group, manager 3 did not recall any written quality control
policies or procedures, and she did not participate in the creation of
policies. She acknowledged an increase in document volume and an
expansion of the document execution group because of the increase.
She knew that there were a number of affiants who were not assigned
to the document execution group who signed foreclosure-related
legal documents. According to her, the preparation process simply
involved a stamp being placed on a particular document with a sticky
identifying the page to be signed.
Manager 3 also testified that recruiting new affiants was an
ongoing process and that managers made recommendations for
them. She was not familiar with the process for the review team in
India. In addition, she acknowledged that she understood that courts
relied on documents that she signed in deciding foreclosure cases.
240
Manager 4–Affiant
Manager 4 signed foreclosure documents for 13 of our 118 sample

Affiant Statistics
42,926 foreclosure documents during the two-year review period.
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Kenneth Trent

CID Testimony
When asked how she went about gaining an understanding of
what she was supposed to do with documents that were brought to
her, manager 4 testified, “I don’t recall if anybody—if my supervisor
spoke to me about it, I mean, you know, you just see it. You just,
you know.” Her standard process in signing documents was to scan
the document, ensure that her name was listed, and then sign it.
Manager 4 estimated that she would execute 100 documents per day
in one-half hour or less. She stated that notaries were not present
when she executed documents. Manager 4 stated that she under-
stood that the documents were verified before she signed them, but
she did not recall how she gained that understanding.
242
Notary 1
Notary 1 notarized 7 foreclosure documents for 6 of our 118 sample

state court proceedings. Notary 1 notarized the highest volume of
documents during the two-year review period.
Notary Statistics
According to Bank of America’s shipping logs, notary 1 nota-
rized 77,447 foreclosure documents, containing 94,167 signatures,
during the two-year review period.
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Kenneth Trent
Notary 1 routinely notarized documents without witnessing

affiant signatures and failed to keep required records of the docu-
ments she notarized.
CID Testimony
Notary 1 testified that she did not maintain a notary logbook,
but Bank of America had an Excel spreadsheet. She explained that
she knew she was required to keep a log as an individual, but as
an employee of the bank, she did not feel it was her responsibility.
Notary 1 also did not witness signatures or swear an oath for affiants.
She also testified that she observed affiants signing documents with-
out reading them.
Notary 1 testified that when she began her employment, her
department processed sixty to two hundred documents per day. It
increased to ten thousand to twenty thousand documents sitting
in an in-box. She stated that employees wondered how they were
going to process them. According to notary 1, half of the documents
were duplicates, and they had a twenty-four- to forty-eight-hour
turnaround time frame, which notary 1 believed was unreasonable.
Notary 1 stated that employees tried to relay the unreasonableness of
the turnaround time to team leaders and supervisors but were told to
continue with what they were doing.
Notary 1 also testified that she and others thought they should
be notarizing documents in front of the affiant. When she raised this
244
issue, she was told that it was acceptable not to be in the presence of
an affiant when notarizing a document if the notary knew the affiant
and his or her signature. Further, she was told by management to
stop checking the details on documents such as assignments, deeds,
and affidavits.
Review of Personnel File Excerpts

Although managers represented that Bank of America had no
quota system, it appeared that employees were evaluated based on
production. For example, in her 2009 evaluation, notary 1’s man-
ager made the following comment: “continues to meet the deadlines
and complying with the requirements of the attorneys. She meets
the production standards set by the Document Execution Group.”
In addition, notary 1 commented that she had “always been able
to meet or exceed required stats and deadlines,” and her manager
commented on notary 1’s understanding the need to meet the set
timelines.
245
Kenneth Trent
Notary 2
Notary 2 notarized foreclosure documents for 3 of our 118 sample

Notary Statistics
According to Bank of America’s shipping logs, notary 2 nota-

rized 27,585 foreclosure documents, containing 31,236 signatures,
during the two-year review period.
246
Notary 2 routinely notarized documents without witnessing

affiant signatures and failed to keep required records of the docu-
ments he notarized.
CID Testimony
Notary 2 testified that generally he was not present when affi-

ants signed documents, and he did not maintain a notary logbook.
He stated that this was the normal practice at Countrywide and Bank
of America. In cases of rush documents (approximately 1 percent
of the documents), he would witness signatures. Notary 2 testified
that supervisors were aware of his and other notaries’ practice of not
witnessing affiants signing documents. Productivity was monitored
by the team managers, and they would periodically change the per-
formance metrics.
According to notary 2, Countrywide’s instructions on how to
notarize documents was nothing more than where to place the notary
stamp and sign the document. He received no other notary training,
written materials, or oral instructions. When he became a Bank of
America employee, his process did not change. To his recollection,
Bank of America did not perform an operational review of his area
when it acquired Countrywide.
247
About the Author
Mr. Trent lives in Fort Lauderdale with his sons, Julian and Justice.
He admires Theodore Roosevelt, Martin Luther King Jr., Ronald
Reagan, Albert Einstein, and Jesus. His career as a foreclosure defense
attorney led him to write for a larger audience.

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What issues did Notary 1 raise about document processing?

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The

Fulton Books, Inc.

First originally published by Fulton Books 2020

ISBN 978-1-64952-214-6 (Paperback)

Printed in the United States of America

Kenneth Eric Trent, attorney-at-law,

the Foreclosure Destroyer

In a foreclosure, of course, a bank is trying to take someone’s

Mr. Dry-linger presented us with reinstatement terms. To my

Turns out there was no flexibility at all on the loan’s maturity

<<insert picture here>>

The assignment reflects that Several Salmons signed as an

Q. The question was, you have no job duties as an assistant

Q. And in that capacity, you don’t report to the president of

Wow! This is mind-blowing testimony! Salmons went on to

Q: Isn’t it true, Michael, that you agreed to pay twelve monthly

Britney rests her case.

Q: State your name for the record please.

Q: And read it?

Q: How long have you worked for David Stern’s office?

Q: Tell me everything you know about corporations.

Q: I am now going to hand you the assignment of mortgage.

A: Well, the first difference is that this one, Shannon’s, is entirely

Q: So is it your position, then, at the time you allegedly signed

A: Because the file—the assignment would be prepared and the

Q: If you could go back please to the assignment of mortgage,

A: I did not have anything to do with any money changing

Q: Is there anyone who signed this assignment who was, at the

Q: Is it your testimony that, that is Shannon Smith’s signature

I spent some time reviewing certain clauses in the standard

the standard mortgage clauses pertaining to MERS, even persons of

American Land Title Association

Washington Mutual Bank

Suspicious yet? As a test, I would like you, the reader, to com-

One member of MERS who is not listed above is

a. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation

Q: Did the company that was formed in 1995, Mortgage

Q: I’m sorry, that was—that’s the name of the third—I’m sorry.

A: Are you asking me a question?

Q: Now, when MERS 3 was created, you’ve indicated there was

A little later on during the deposition, the traumatized attorney

Q: Did they give you any indication of what documents if

Q: And all these officers I understand are unpaid officers of

Having apparently gotten at least some portion of his sea legs

Q: What is the value of the mortgage to MERS when it’s

Q: When the certifying officer assigns a mortgage in MERS’

name of MERS, they just need to follow our rules and

A Subtle Stranger Orchestrates a Paradigm Shift

Unbeknownst to the borrowers and the public, the billions of

used so that the average consumer, or even legal professional, could

have long intended, certain important terms in the mortgages and

“assignments,” which, like all the other documents used to perpet-

a. The assignor, MERS, had the same address as the

Incredibly, since 2009, it has come to light that the persons

ing upon the straw man assignee/plaintiffs. As detailed below, defen-