Compiled Cases Strikes and Lockout
Compiled Cases Strikes and Lockout
Compiled Cases Strikes and Lockout
FILFLEX INDUSTRIAL AND WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the respondents guilty of an
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION and BIFLEX (PHILS.), INC., illegal strike. Consequently, their following officers are declared to have lost their
December 19, 2006 employment status:
Petitioners were officers of Biflex (Phils.) Inc. Labor Union. And Filflex Industrial and SO ORDERED.[9]
Manufacturing Labor Union.
Respondents thereupon terminated the employment of petitioners.
The two petitioner-unions, which are affiliated with National Federation of Labor Unions
(NAFLU), are the respective collective bargaining agents of the employees of corporations. NLRC:
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the ruling of
the Labor Arbiter, it holding that there was no strike to speak of as no labor or
Respondents Biflex (Phils.) Inc. and Filflex Industrial and Manufacturing Corporation industrial dispute existed between the parties.[10] It accordingly ordered respondents
(respondents) are sister companies engaged in the garment business. Situated in one big to reinstate petitioners to their former positions, without loss of seniority rights, and with full
compound along with another sister company, General Garments Corporation (GGC), they backwages from the date of their termination. [11]
have a common entrance.
CA:
On October 24, 1990, the labor sector staged a welga ng bayan to protest the On respondents’ petition for certiorari, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of May 28, 2002,
accelerating prices of oil. On even date, petitioner-unions, led by their officers, herein reversed that of the NLRC and reinstated that of the Labor Arbiter.
petitioners, staged a work stoppage which lasted for several days, prompting respondents
to file on October 31, 1990 a petition to declare the work stoppage illegal for failure to
comply with procedural requirements. In finding for respondents, the appellate court discredited petitioners’ claim of having
been illegally locked out, given their failure to even file a letter of protest or complaint with
the management,[12] and their failure to comply with the legal requirements of a valid
PETITIONERs CONTENTION: strike.[13]
On November 13, 1990, respondents resumed their operations.[5] Petitioners, claiming
that they were illegally locked out by respondents, assert that aside from the fact that the
welga ng bayan rendered it difficult to get a ride and the apprehension that violence would The appellate court further noted that while petitioners claimed that they filed a notice of
erupt between those participating in the welga and the authorities, respondents’ workers strike on October 31, 1990, no copy thereof was ever produced before the Labor Arbiter.
were prevented from reporting for work. [14]
Petitioners further assert that respondents were “slighted” by the workers’ no-show, and as Hence, the instant petition which faults the appellate court to have:
a punishment, the workers as well as petitioners were barred from entering the company
premises. ISSUES:
1. WON petitioners were guilty of illegal strike
2. WON respondents committed illegal lock out
On their putting up of tents, tables and chairs in front of the main gate of respondents’ 3. WON the union officers were illegally dismissed from employment
premises, petitioners, who claim that they filed a notice of strike on October 31, 1990,
explain that those were for the convenience of union members who reported every HELD: The petition fails.
morning to check if the management would allow them to report for work.
1. There was illegal strike.
RESPONDENTS CONTENTION:
Respondents, on the other hand, maintain that the work stoppage was illegal since the That petitioners staged a work stoppage on October 24, 1990 in conjunction with the welga
following requirements for the staging of a valid strike were not complied with: (1) filing of ng bayan organized by the labor sector to protest the accelerating prices of oil, it is not
notice of strike; (2) securing a strike vote, and (3) submission of a report of the strike vote disputed.
to the Department of Labor and Employment.[7] Stoppage of work due to welga ng bayan is in the nature of a general strike, an
extended sympathy strike. It affects numerous employers including those who do not have
a dispute with their employees regarding their terms and conditions of employment.[15]
LABOR ARBITER:
The Labor Arbiter, by Decision of December 15, 1992, finding for respondents, held that
the strike was illegal.[8] The decretal text of its decision reads:
Employees who have no labor dispute with their employer but who, on a day they are
scheduled to work, refuse to work and instead join a welga ng bayan commit an illegal
work stoppage.[16]
2. NO ILLEGAL LOCKOUT
If there was illegal lockout, why, indeed, did not petitioners file a protest with the
management or a complaint therefor against respondents? As the Labor Arbiter observed,
“[t]he inaction of [petitioners] betrays the weakness of their contention for normally a
locked-out union will immediately bring management before the bar of justice.”[20]
Even assuming arguendo that in staging the strike, petitioners had complied with legal
formalities, the strike would just the same be illegal, for by blocking the free ingress to and
egress from the company premises, they violated Article 264(e) of the Labor Code which
provides that “[n]o person engaged in picketing shall … obstruct the free ingress to or
egress from the employer’s premises for lawful purposes, or obstruct public
thoroughfares.”
. . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for
termination of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer
during such lawful strike.
In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. National Labor Relations
Commission,[22] this Court, passing on the use of the word “may” in the immediately
quoted provision, held that “[t]he law . . . grants the employer the option of declaring a
union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.”
Bonuses — The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of -----------------------------------------------------------
Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the latter is On February 26, 1982, the NFSW — by passing the NLRC — filed the instant
required by law. Petition for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial
Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the February
The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-½ months' salary. 20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the petitioner, and praying for
preliminary injunction:
2. On November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the
13th month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration 1. Restraining implementation or enforcement of the Decision of February 20,
bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. 1982;
2. Enjoining respondents to refrain from the threatened acts violative of the rights of
3. To settle the strike, a compromise agreement was concluded between CAC and strikers and peaceful picketers;
NFSW on November 30,1981. Under paragraph 4 thereof — 3. Requiring maintenance of the status quo as of February 20, 1982, until further
orders of the Court;
The parties agree to abide by the final decision of the Supreme Court in any case
involving the 13th Month Pay Law if it is clearly held that the employer is liable to and on the Main Petition, judgment be rendered after hearing.
pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses already given. 1. Declaring the Decision of February 2O, l982 null and void;
2. Making the preliminary injunction permanent;
4. After the Marcopper decision had become final, NFSW renewed its demand that 3. Awarding such other relief as may be just in the premises.
CAC give the 13th month pay. CAC refused.
Hearing was held, after which the parties submitted their memoranda. No restraining order
5. On January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment was issued.
(MOLE) Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the
13th month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. II ISSUES —
6. One day after the commencement of the strike, or on January 29, 1982, a 1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal, the resolution of which mainly
report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with MOLE. depends on the mandatory or directory character of the cooling-off period and the 7-day
strike ban after report to MOLE of the result of a strike-vote, as prescribed in the Labor
7. On February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition with the Regional Arbitration Code.
Branch at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal, principally for being violative of 2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to
Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was declared before the expiration of the 15- give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and amelioration
day cooling-off period for unfair labor practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the disputed 13th month pay.
before the lapse of seven days from the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike- (See petitioner's memorandum of April 12, 1982, p. 2; CAC memorandum of April 2, 1982,
vote. pp. 3-4.) Resolution of this issue requires an examination of the thrusts and application of
PD 851.
LABOR ARBITER:
LA Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal. The dispositive part of his decision HELD:
1. Declaring the strike commenced by NFSW on January 28, 1982, illegal, (e) NFSW strike is illegal. — The NFSW declared the strike six (6) days after filing
a strike notice, i.e., before the lapse of the mandatory cooling-off period. It also failed to
2. Directing the Central to resume operations immediately upon receipt hereof; file with the MOLE before launching the strike a report on the strike-vote, when it
should have filed such report "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike."
Under the circumstances, we are perforce constrained to conclude that the strike staged stressed that the requirements of cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be
by petitioner is not in conformity with law. This conclusion makes it unnecessary for us to complied with, although the labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within
determine whether the pendency of an arbitration case against CAC on the same issue of the statutory cooling-off period.
payment of 13th month pay [R.A.B No. 512-81, Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI-A,
NLRC, Bacolod City, in which the National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the It would indeed be self-defeating for the law to imperatively require the filing on a
Philippines (NACUSIP) and a number of CAC workers are the complainants, with NFSW strike notice and strike-vote report without at the same time making the prescribed
as Intervenor seeking the dismissal of the arbitration case as regards unnamed CAC rank waiting periods mandatory.
and file employees] has rendered illegal the above strike under Art. 265 of the Labor Code
which provides: (b) Purposes of strike notice and strike-vote report.— In requiring a strike notice and
a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is to provide an opportunity for
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE "to exert all efforts at mediation and
the President or the Minister, or after certification or submission of the dispute to conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement" during the cooling-off period .
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the same
grounds for the strike or lockout. (Emphasis supplied.) So, too, the 7-day strike-vote report is not without a purpose. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General —
Articles 264 and 265 of the Labor Code, insofar as pertinent, read:
264 Many disastrous strikes have been staged in the past based merely on the insistence of
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized bargaining minority groups within the union. The submission of the report gives assurance that a
representative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and Employment) at strike vote has been taken and that, if the report concerning it is false, the majority
least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practices, of the members can take appropriate remedy before it is too late. (Answer of public
the period of notice shall be shortened to fifteen (15) days; ... respondents, pp. 17-18.)
(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary settlement. So it has been held that, when a statute is founded on public policy [such as the
Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from policy to encourage voluntary settlement of disputes without resorting to strikes],
the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the employer may declare a those to whom it applies should not be permitted to waive its provisions. (82 C.J.S.
lockout. 873-874. Emphasis supplied.)
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3) of (c)Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right to strike.
the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots in
meetings or referenda. The decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute based The cooling-off period and the 7-day strike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, as
on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was taken . prescribed in Art. 264 of the Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is
The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any affected party, supervise essential to attain the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they
the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union of the employer shall constitute a valid exercise of the police power of the state.
furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least seven (7) days before the
intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period herein provided. (2) The Second Issue.
(Emphasis supplied).
This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of exemption:
ART. 265. Prohibited activities. — It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or "Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not
employer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in covered by this Decree." (P.D. 851.)
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice required in
the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote first having The term "its equivalent" ... shall include Christmas bonus, mid-year bonus, profit-sharing
been obtained and reported to the Ministry. payments and other cash bonuses amounting to not less than 1/12th of the basic salary
but shall not include cash and stock dividends, cost of living allowances and all other
allowances regularly enjoyed by the employee, as well as non-monetary benefits. Where
(a) Language of the law. — The foregoing provisions hardly leave any room for an employer pays less than 1/12th of the employee's basic salary, the employer shall pay
doubt that the cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote the difference." (Italics supplied.)
report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
The Marcopper decision is therefore a Court decision but without the necessary eight votes
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain unsettled to be doctrinal. This being so, it cannot be said that the Marcopper decision "clearly held"
until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from the filing of the that "the employer is liable to pay a 13th month pay separate and distinct from the bonuses
notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not strike before the lapse already given," within the meaning of the NFSW-CAC compromise agreement. At any rate,
of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character of the 7-day strike ban after in view of the rulings made herein, NFSW cannot insist on its claim that its members are
the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the provision that "in every case," the union entitled to a 13th month pay in addition to the bonuses already paid by CAC.
shall furnish the MOLE with the results of the voting "at least seven (7) days before WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. No costs.
the intended strike, subject to the (prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be
NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTELS, RESTAURANTS AND ALLIED likewise ordered that the notice of strike be reduced to a preventive mediation case to be
INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN) — THE PENINSULA MANILA CHAPTER (Interim Union subjected to conciliation and mediation proceedings. 11
Junta), MELVIN COWAN, SERAFIN TRIA, JR., PORPERIO YAPE, LINDA GALVEZ,
BENJAMIN ESTEVES, LUTHER ADIGUE and RAYMUNDO VANCE, petitioners, Meanwhile, the Union, headed by Genato, filed a petition for injunction in the DOLE
vs. to enjoin the Junta from usurping the functions of the rightful officers. On the other
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE PENINSULA hand, the Hotel filed a petition for interpleader and declaratory relief so that it may be
MANILA, respondents., REGALADO, J.: G.R. No. 125561 March 6, 1998 properly guided on which of the two sets of officers, the Genato group or the Cowan group,
it should recognize and deal with in matters pertaining to the CBA. 12
The principal parties involved in this labor dispute are petitioner National Union of Workers
in Hotels, Restaurants and Allied Industries (NUWHRAIN) — The Peninsula Manila Despite the dismissal of the first notice of strike and the pendency of the aforestated
Chapter (the Junta, for brevity); the NUWHRAIN — The Peninsula Manila Rank and File conciliation proceedings and cases, the Junta filed a second notice of strike on September
Chapter (the Union, for short); and private respondent, The Peninsula Manila (hereafter, 9, 1993. 13 Additional grounds were set forth therein, including the suspension of an
the Hotel). alleged Junta officer, one Sammie Coronel, which the Junta claimed constituted an
unfair labor practice. This notice of strike was likewise dismissed by the NCMB as the
The rank and file employees union, representing approximately 800 employees of the grounds were found to be mere amplifications of those alleged in the preceding
Hotel, was the herein Union which entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) notice, 14 hence, likewise non-strikeable.
with the Hotel on December 15, 1991. 4 Petitioners claim that the signing of that CBA by
the Union officers, headed by one Rudolpho Genato, and representatives of the Hotel was Coronel was eventually dismissed from employment and allegedly because the Junta
tainted with irregularities, prompting the Union to file a notice of strike on the ground of a believed that said dismissal was a ULP act, 15 it staged a wildcat strike on October 13 and
CBA deadlock. It was further asserted that instead of proceeding with said strike, the Union 14, 1993, notwithstanding the prohibition to strike issued by the NCMB, thereby disrupting
officers and the officers of its national office thereafter mysteriously signed the CBA without the operations of the Hotel. 16 The officers of the Junta and 153 of its members were
consulting the general membership of the local chapter. 5 These anomalies created anxiety involved in the strike.
in the Union which continued to prevail in the following years.
The DOLE Secretary certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
On February, 1993, some of the union members submitted a letter-petition for the arbitration. 17 In the meantime, an order was issued by the med-arbiter in the interpleader
resignation of the incumbent union officers on the ground that they were abusive and and injunction cases declaring illegal the formation of the Junta, the impeachment of the
neglectful of their duties. 6 Because the demands went unheeded, a faction of the Union union officers led by Genato, and the subsequent election of officers led by Cowan. It
conducted what was ostensibly an impeachment proceeding, causing the removal from acknowledged the incumbency of the Genato group as officers and ordered the Hotel to
office of the incumbent officers headed by Genato. 7 The faction proclaimed itself as the recognize them as representatives of the rank and file employees. 18 Said order of the
Interim Union Junta, now the petitioners in this case. med-arbiter was appealed by the Junta to the DOLE Secretary who, as earlier noted,
affirmed the same in a resolution dated December 22, 1994.
Subsequent to the supposed impeachment of Genato and his group, the Junta requested
from the Hotel the conduct of a special election of officers. The Hotel referred the request On December 29, 1993, the Hotel filed in the NLRC a petition to declare the wildcat strike
to the NUWHRAIN-LMC-IUF, the Union's national office. The latter disallowed the holding illegal and to dismiss the employees who went on strike. 19 On January 13, 1994, the 15
of the election on the ground that it did not recognize the Junta because it was allegedly officers of the Junta involved in the strike were dismissed for alleged acts of union
constituted illegally. 8 disloyalty. Said employees and the Junta then filed a case for illegal dismissal before the
NLRC. 20
The Junta nonetheless conducted the election resulting in the choice of a set of officers led
by petitioner Melvin Cowan, but which the supposedly impeached employees, the Union's NLRC:
national office, and the Hotel refused to recognize. 9
The NLRC consolidated the foregoing cases and, in decision dated February 7, 1996, its
On August 10, 1993, a notice of strike was filed by the Junta before the National Second Division Declared the strike held on October 13 and 14, 1993 illegal as it was not
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) based on alleged acts of the Hotel consisting based on valid grounds pursuant to the ruling of the NCMB when the latter dismissed the
unfair labor practice (ULP), particularly, discrimination, undue interference in the exercise two notices of strike filed by the Junta. The NLRC held that the issue involving the
of the right to self-organization, and bias in favor of the impeached officers. 10 suspension and termination from employment of Coronel did not per se constitute ULP
which justified a strike, as the matter involved purely an exercise of management
The NCMB dismissed said notice on the ground that the imputed ULP acts were prerogative which petitioners should have questioned by filing the proper complaint and
mere conflicts between two sets of union officers or intra-union disputes, and, being not by staging a strike. 21
categorized under the nomenclature of "non-strikeable acts," fall under the jurisdiction
of the appropriate office of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). The NCMB
Consequently, the dismissal of the 15 officers of the Junta was declared to be valid. With Petitioners should have availed themselves of these alternative remedies instead of
respect to the 153 members whose illegal acts in the strike were in issue and whose resorting to a drastic and unlawful measure, specifically, holding a wildcat strike at the
dismissal was likewise sought by Hotel, the NLRC ordered the remand of the case to the expense of the Hotel whose operations were consequently disrupted for two days. Not
labor arbiter for further proceedings. 22 every claim of good faith is justifiable, and herein petitioner's claim of good faith shall not
be counternanced by this Court since their decision to go on strike was clearly
In a dissent from the decision of the majority, the opinion was advanced that the strike was unwarranted.
legal because it was premised on a valid ground, particularly, the belief of the workers in
good faith that there existed ULP acts constituting a cause to strike. 23 With respect to the claim of petitioners that additional acts of discrimination by the Hotel
generated their belief in good faith that ULP acts existed as to justify a strike, the Court
A motion for reconsideration was filed by the Junta but it was denied, 24 thus the instant deems it unnecessary to again scrutinize and expound on the same. The NLRC has
petition to set aside the abovementioned NLRC decision and denial resolution. already held that the alleged acts of discrimination are not "strikeable" grounds as
found and explained by the NCMB when it dismissed the two notices of strike filed
by the Junta. 33
The petitioners contend that public respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion
in declaring the October 13 and 14, 1993 strike illegal and in remanding to the labor arbiter
the matter of the allege illegal acts of the 153 Junta members for further proceedings. 25 The findings of fact of the NLRC, except where there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by it, are conclusive on this Court and it is only where said findings are bereft of
any substantial support from the records that the Court will step in and proceed to make its
SC: independent evaluation of the facts. 34 The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
aforestated findings of the NLRC in the present case.
This Court has carefully reviewed the records of this case and finds the petition at
bar to be unmeritorious. Besides, petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by the
NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike after finding that the alleged acts of
Generally, a strike based on a "non-strikeable" ground is an illegal strike; corollarily, a discrimination of the hotel were not ULP, hence not "strikeable." The refusal of petitioners
strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no such acts actually exist. As an exception, even if no to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith. In light of the foregoing
ULP acts are committed by the employer, if the employees believe in good faith that ULP circumstances, their claim of good faith must fall and we agree with the NLRC that there
acts exist so as to constitute a valid ground to strike, then the strike held pursuant to such was no justification for the illegal strike.
belief may be legal. 26 As a general rule, therefore, where the union believed that the
employer committed ULP and the circumstances warranted such belief in good faith, the We accordingly uphold the dismissal from employment of the 15 officers of the Junta who
resulting strike may be considered legal although, subsequently, such allegations of unfair knowingly participated in the strike. An employer may lawfully discharge employees for
labor practices were found to be groundless. 27 participating in an unjustifiable wildcat strike and especially so in this case, because said
wildcat strike was an attempt to undermine the Union's position as the exclusive bargaining
An established caveat, however, is that a mere claim of good faith would not justify the representative and was, therefore, an unprotected activity. 35 The cessation from
holding of a strike under the aforesaid exception as, in addition thereto, the circumstances employment of the 15 Junta officers as a result of their participation in the illegal strike is a
must have warranted such belief . It is, therefore, not enough that the union believed that consequence of their defiant and capricious decision to participate herein.
the employer committed acts of ULP when the circumstances clearly negate even a prima
facie showing to sustain such belief. 28 WHEREFORE, the petition at bar is hereby DISMISSED for lack of any grave abuse of
discretion imputable to public respondent. The assailed decision and resolution of
The Court finds that NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the respondent National Labor Relations Commission are consequently AFFIRMED. The case
subject strike was illegal, and accordingly holds that the circumstances prevailing in this is remanded to the labor arbiter a quo for further proceedings on the matter of the 153
case did not warrant, as it could not have reasonably created, a belief in good faith that the members of the Junta who participated in the strike.
Hotel committed acts ULP as to justify the strike.
The dismissal of Coronel which allegedly triggered the wildcat strike 29 was not a sufficient
ground to justify that radical recourse on the part of the Junta members. As the NLRC later
found, the dismissal was legal and was not a case of ULP but a mere exercise of
management prerogative on discipline, the validity of which could have been questioned
through the filing of an appropriate complaint and not through the filing of a notice of strike
or the holding of a strike. 30 Evidently, to repeat, appropriate remedies under the Labor
Code were available to the striking employees and they had the option to either directly file
a case for illegal dismissal in the office of the labor arbiter 31 or, by agreement of the
parties, to submit the case to the grievance machinery of the CBA so that it may be
subjected to voluntary arbitration proceedings. 32
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE SSS CONTENTION:
ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioner, SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the employees of the SSS are
vs. covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not the Labor Code,
THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C. therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY, respondents., G.R. No. 85279July 28, jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from
1989 striking.
CORTES, J:
COURT OF APPEALS:
1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a complaint for damages Court of Appeals held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9, employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and baricaded the Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with
entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from reporting for their strike.
work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was
reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which ordered the strikers to ISSUES:
return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffered
damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary 1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?
injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be ordered to return to
work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay damages; and that the 2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the
strike be declared illegal. SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to
work?
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued RULING:
overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; etc.
While there is no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government
The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining order pending employees to organize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the
resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction In the meantime, right to strike.
petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating its prayer for the A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987
issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. Constitution would show that in recognizing the right of government employees to
organize, the commissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions or
RTC QUEZON CITY: associations only, without including the right to strike.
On July 22,1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss
and converted the restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after BASED ON DELIBERATIONS: the right to form an organization does not carry with it the
finding that the strike was illegal. right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. 1, p. 569].
As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid order was also At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing government employees to
denied on August 14, 1988 petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exercise of the right, they
preliminary injunction before this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6
a resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolved to and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, it must be stated that the validity of
refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].
Upon motion of the SSS on February 6,1989, the Court issued a temporary restraining But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes?
order enjoining the petitioners from staging another strike or from pursuing the notice of
strike they filed with the Department of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and to The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987
maintain the status quo . Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and
agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with
PETITIONER’S CONTENTION: original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the
The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear employees in the civil service are denominated as "government employees"] and that the
the case initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the National created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service [NASECO v.
Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are covered by the Civil
Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED. Petitioners' "Petition/Application
staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction" dated December 13,1988 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the nature of the public
employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard the
right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public
employees and civil service employees. It has been stated that the Government, in
contrast to the private employer, protects the interest of all people in the public service,
and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private labor relations
could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they employ.
If there be any unresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public Sector
Labor - Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in the civil service
may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work stoppages, like workers in
the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their demands. As now
provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the
Right of Government- Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the instant
dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including any
political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government- owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not
strike for the purpose of securing changes thereof."
2. The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union
being prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a
writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides
that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by
the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180
vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved
labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no
jurisdiction over the dispute.
This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction
over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for
therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been
granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction.
Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin
the strike is appropriate.
Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, for in fact it
had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining the
continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent
judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the unresolved controversies
emanating from their employer- employee relationship to the Public Sector Labor -
Management Council for appropriate action [Rollo, p. 86].
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the
instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated
G.R. Nos. 158786 & 158789 lack of manpower in its manufacturing and production lines, and was unable to meet its
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILS. CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), ED CUBELO production goals resulting in huge losses of PhP 53,849,991.
et. al Petitioners,
vs. Soon thereafter, on February 27, 2001, Toyota s ent individual letters to some
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, (NLRC-2ND DIVISION), HON. 360 employees requiring them to explain within 24 hours why they should not be
COMMISSIONERS: VICTORINO CALAYCAY, ANGELITA GACUTAN, and RAUL dismissed for their obstinate defiance of the company’s directive to render overtime work
AQUINO, TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, TAKESHI FUKUDA, and on February 21, 2001, for their failure to report for work on February 22 and 23, 2001, and
DAVID GO, Respondents, for their participation in the concerted actions which severely disrupted and paralyzed the
x – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – -x plant’s operations.[10]
G.R. Nos. 158798-99
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORPORATION, Petitioner, Meanwhile, a February 27, 2001 Manifesto was circulated by the Union which
vs. urged its members to participate in a strike/picket and to abandon their posts, On the next
TOYOTA MOTOR PHILIPPINES CORP. WORKERS ASSOCIATION (TMPCWA), day, the Union filed with the NCMB another notice of strike for union busting amounting to
Respondent. unfair labor practice.
ON SEPARATION PAY:
One exception where separation pay is given even though an employee is validly
dismissed is when the court finds justification in applying the principle of social justice well
entrenched in the 1987 Constitution. In Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. (PLDT) v.
NLRC, the Court elucidated why social justice can validate the grant of separation pay,
thus:
In the same case, the Court laid down the rule that severance compensation
shall be allowed only when the cause of the dismissal is other than serious misconduct
or that which reflects adversely on the employee’s moral character. The Court
succinctly discussed the propriety of the grant of separation pay in this wise:
In disposing of the Union’s plea for reconsideration of its February 27,
2003 Decision, the CA however performed a volte-face by reinstating the award of
separation pay.
The CA’s grant of separation pay is an erroneous departure from our ruling
in Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co. v. NLRC that serious misconduct forecloses
the award of separation pay. Secondly, the advertence to the alleged honest belief on
the part of the 227 employees that Toyota committed a breach of the duty to bargain
collectively and an abuse of valid exercise of management prerogative has not been
substantiated by the evidence extant on record. There can be no good faith in
intentionally incurring absences in a collective fashion from work on February 22
and 23, 2001 just to attend the DOLE hearings. Lastly, they blatantly violated the
assumption/certification Order of the DOLE Secretary, exhibiting their lack of obeisance to
the rule of law. These acts indeed constituted serious misconduct.
One last point to consider—it is high time that employer and employee cease to
view each other as adversaries and instead recognize that theirs is a symbiotic
relationship, wherein they must rely on each other to ensure the success of the
business. Even though strikes and lockouts have been recognized as effective bargaining
tools, it is an antiquated notion that they are truly beneficial, as they only provide short-
term solutions by forcing concessions from one party; but staging such strikes would
damage the working relationship between employers and employees, thus endangering
the business that they both want to succeed. The more progressive and truly effective
means of dispute resolution lies in mediation, conciliation, and arbitration, which do
not increase tension but instead provide relief from them. In the end, an atmosphere
of trust and understanding has much more to offer a business relationship than the
traditional enmity that has long divided the employer and the employee.
UNION OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES (UFE), MANUEL L. SARMIENTO et al. "WHEREFORE, in line with the Order of December 11, 1985, this Office hereby orders all
vs. the striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them under the same
NESTLÉ PHILIPPINES, INC., NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within forty eight (48) hours from
EDUARDO G. MAGNO, HON. ZOSIMO T. VASALLO and HON. EVANGELINE S. notice of this Order.
LUBATON,
Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a notice
MEDIALDEA, J.: caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986, advising all workers
to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the officers and members of UFE
This petition assails the decision of the NLRC, dated November 2, 1988 on the continued with the strike.
consolidated appeals of petitioners, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
In a lengthy and voluminous petition, dwelling largely on facts, petitioner Union of ON THE MR: denied
Filipro Employees and 70 union officers and a member (henceforth "UFE") maintain "The parties are further enjoined from committing acts that will disrupt the peaceful and
that public respondent NLRC had acted with grave abuse of discretion in its productive relations between the parties while the dispute is under arbitration as well as
affirmance of the decisions of the Labor Arbiters a quo, declaring illegal the strikes acts considered illegal by law for the orderly implementation of this Order like acts of
staged by UFE. coercion, harassment, blocking of public thoroughfares, ingress and egress to company
premises for lawful purposes or those undertaken without regard to the rights of the other
Respondent NLRC premised its decision on the following sets of facts: party.
1. In NCR 12-4007-85 and NCR 1-295-86: UFE defied the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle filed criminal charges
against those involved.
UFE filed a notice of strike on November 14, 1985,with the Bureau of Labor Relations
against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines, Inc., ["Nestle"]). On December 4, 1988, UFE filed
a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against Nestle and its officials for violation NEW Minister of Labor and Employment, Augusto B. Sanchez, issued a Resolution,
of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, non-implementation of the CBA provisions the relevant portions of which stated thus:
(Labor Management Corporation scheme), Financial Assistance and other unfair labor
practice (p. 381, Rollo).:- nad "This Office hereby enjoins all striking workers to return-to-work immediately and
management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing previous to
Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute or its the work stoppage except as qualified in this resolution. 385, Rollo)
certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor and
Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and issued the On March 17, 1986, the strikers returned to work.
following order on December 11, 1985:
On March 31, 1986, We granted UFE's Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Certiorari (G.R.
"WHEREFORE, this Office hereby assumes jurisdiction over the labor dispute at Filipino, No. 73129) (p. 385, Rollo)
Inc. pursuant to Article 264(g) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. In lime
with this assumption a strike, lockout, or any other form of concerted action such as On April 23, 1986, Minister Sanchez rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which
slowdowns, sitdowns, noise barrages during office hours, which tend to disrupt reads:
company operations, are strictly enjoined.
WHEREFORE, the Union charge for unfair labor practices is hereby dismissed for want of
Notwithstanding the automatic injunction against any concerted activity, and an absence of merit. Nestle Philippines is hereby directed to make good its promise to grant an additional
a restraining order, the union members, at the instigation of its leaders, and in clear benefit in the form of bonus equivalent to one (1) month's gross compensation to all
defiance of Minister Ople's Order of December 11, 1986, staged a strike and employees entitled to the same in addition to the one-month weighted average pay granted
continued to man picket lines at the Makati Administrative Office and all of Nestle's by this office in the return-to-work Order." (p. 786, Rollo)
factories and warehouses at Alabang, Muntinlupa, Cabuyao, Laguna, and Cagayan
de Oro City. Likewise, the union officers and members distributed leaflets to employees On June 6, 1986, Minister Sanchez modified the foregoing decision as follows:
and passersby advocating a boycott of company products (p. 383, Rollo).
"WHEREFORE, our 23 April 1986 Decision is hereby modified as follows:
On January 23, 1986, Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal (NCR-1-295-86)
premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause and the "1. Nestle Philippines is directed to pay the Anniversary bonus equivalent to one
grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes. month basic salary to all its employees in lieu of the one month gross compensation
previously ordered by this office." (p. 787, Rollo)
On January 30, 1986, then Labor Minister Ople issued another Order, with this
disposition:
LABOR ARBITER AFTER TRIAL ON THE MERITS:
1. Declaring the strike illegal.: nad to disrupt the normal operations of the company. The company is directed to accept all
2. Declaring all the respondent union officers to have lost their employment status. employees and to resume normal operations.: nad
3. Declaring the union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
4. Dismissing the Union complaint for unfair labor practice." Parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts
that would aggravate the situation." (p. 394, Rollo)
2. In RAB-
(m) Despite the order, UFE staged a strike on September 11, 1987, without notice of
Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU, renewed a 3-year strike, strike vote and in blatant defiance of then Labor Minist er Sanchez's
contract, the union officers, together with other members of the union sent a letter to certification order dated November 23, 1986 and Secretary Drilon's return-to-work order
Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU), advising them "that henceforth we shall dated September 8, 1987." (p. 409, Rollo);
administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the Union of Filipro Employees
(UFE) to where we have allied ourselves." WATU disregarded the unions's advice, (n) Nestle sent individual letter of termination dated September 14, 1987 dismissing
claiming to be the contracting party of the CBA. UFE filed a petition for administration them from the service effective immediately for knowingly instigating and participating in an
of the existing CBAs at Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS illegal strike, defying the order of the Secretary of Labor, dated September 8, 1987, and
and WATU. other illegal acts (pp. 394-395, Rollo).
From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986, the rank and file employees of the company On September 22, 1987, UFE filed a complaint for Illegal Dismissal, ULP and
staged a strike at the instigation of the UFE officers, who had represented themselves as damages (NLRC NCR-00-03285-87). Labor Arbiter Evangeline Lubaton ruled on both
officers. issues of dismissal and strike legality, upon the premise that the issue on validity of the
dismissal of the individual complainants from employment "depends on the resolution of
Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that their strike the issue on whether or not the strike declared by complainants was illegal."
was legal because the same was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed by UFE on
November 14, 1985 of which they claim to be members, having disaffiliated themselves UFE appealed, the three appeals were ordered consolidated and elevated to the NLRC en
from CDO-FWU-WATU. banc (p, 95, Rollo)
Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his decision, disposing as follows: The NLRC affirmed the unanimous decisions of the three labor arbiters which
declared the strikes illegal, premised on the view that "the core of the controversy
1. Declaring the strike illegal; rests upon the legality of the strikes."
2. Declaring respondent union guilty of unfair labor practice; and
In the petition before Us, UFE assigns several errors (pp. 63-321, Rollo), which We have
"3. Declaring the following individual respondent Union officers namely: Roy Y. Baconguis summarized as follows:
ET AL, to have lost their employment status." (p. 388, Rollo)
1. that Articles 263 and 264 are no longer good laws, since compulsory arbitration has
3. In NCR-00-09-03285-87. been curtailed under the present Constitution.
On various dates, UFE, its officers and members staged a walkout from their jobs, 2. that the question on the legality of the strike was rendered moot and academic when
and participated in the Welga ng Bayan, sympathy strikes, illegal walkout and sit- Nestle management accepted the striking workers in compliance with the return-to-work
down strike which resulted to economic losses. order of then Minister of Labor Augusto Sanchez
(d) On December 4, 1986, UFE filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor 3. that the union did not violate the no-strike/no lock-out clause, considering that the
Relations (to protest the unfair labor practices of Nestle, such as hiring of contractual prohibition applies to economic strikes, UFE, it is claimed, premised their strike on a
workers to perform regular jobs and wage discrimination violation of the labor standard laws or non-payment of holiday pay, which is, in effect, a
violation of the CBA.
(e) On December 23, 1986, then Minister Augusto S. Sanchez certified the labor
dispute to the Commission for compulsory arbitration, strictly enjoining any 4. on the commission of illegal and prohibited acts which automatically rendered the strike
intended or actual strike or lockout (p. 392, Rollo); illegal, UFE claimed that there were no findings of specific acts and identifies of those
participating as to render them liable
(l) On September 8, 1987, Hon. F. Drilon issued the following order: We agree with the Solicitor General that the petition failed to show that the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in its affirmance of the decisions of the Labor
"All the workers are hereby directed to return to work immediately, refrain from resorting to Arbiters a quo.
any further slowdown, sitdown strike, walkout and any other kind of activities that may tend
At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g) of the is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while the
Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interests, or to determination is being made. Otherwise, the workers who contend that their strike is
certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that Arts. 263 and 264 are legal can refuse to return to work to their work and cause a standstill on the company
based on the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of Art. II thereof, the pertinent portion of operations while retaining the positions they refuse to discharge or allow the management
which reads: to fill. Worse, they will also claim payment for work not done, on the ground that they are
still legally employed although actually engaged in the activities inimical to their employer's
"Sec. 9. . . . The State may provide for compulsory arbitration." (p. 801, Rollo) interest. (Emphasis supplied)
UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the 1987 "This is like eating one's cake and having it too, and at the expense of the
Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now "unconstitutional and must management. Such an unfair situation surely was not contemplated by our labor laws and
be ignored." cannot be justified under the social justice policy, which is a policy of fairness to both labor
and management. Neither can this unseemly arrangement be sustained under the due
We are not persuaded. We agree with the Solicitor General that on the contrary, both process clause as the order, if thus interpreted, would be plainly oppressive and arbitrary.
provisions are still applicable.
We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the Secretary of
"Article 7 of the New Civil Code declares that: Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers, whether or not a
corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor. Thus, the striking workers
'Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non- erred when they continued with their strike alleging absence of a return-to-work order.
observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. Article 264(g) is clear. Once an assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are
enjoined, or if one has already taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to
x x x' work.
"In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly repealing The NLRC also gave the following reasons:
Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987 Constitution be
considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering that there is no 1. The strike was staged in violation of the existing CBA provisions on "No Strike/No
showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said Constitution. Moreover, no court Lockout Clause" stating that a strike, which is in violation of the terms of the collective
has ever declared that the said articles are inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. bargaining statement, is illegal, especially when such terms provide for conclusive
arbitration
"On the contrary, the continued validity and operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor 2. Instead of exhausting all the steps provided for in the grievance machinery
Code has been recognized by no less than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter provided for in the collective bargaining agreement to resolve the dispute amicably and
enacted into law R.A. 6715, otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of which harmoniously within the plant level, UFE went on strike (p. 398, Rollo)
amended paragraphs (g) and (i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
3. The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7-day strike and after submission
"At any rate, it must be noted that Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code have of the report of strike vote at Nestle's Makati Offices and Muntinlupa and Cabuyao Plants
been enacted pursuant to the police power of the State, which has been defined as were not complied with, while no notice of strike was filed by respondents when they
the power inherent in a Government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to staged the strike at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant
promote the order, safety, health, morals and general welfare of society (People vs. Vera
Reyes, 67 Phil. 190). The police power, together with the power of eminent domain and the 4. In carrying out the strike, coercion, force, intimidation, violence with physical injuries,
power of taxation, is an inherent power of government and does not need to be expressly sabotage, and the use of unnecessary and obscene language or epithets were committed
conferred by the Constitution. Thus, it is submitted that the argument of petitioners that by the respondent officials and members of either UFE or WATU. It is well-settled that a
Articles 263 (g) and 264 of the Labor Code do not have any constitutional foundation is strike conducted in this manner is illegal (United Seamen's Union vs. Davao
legally inconsequential." (pp. 801-803, Rollo) Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226). In fact, criminal cases were filed with the Makati
Fiscal's Office (p. 402, Rollo).
On the issue of the legality of the strike committed, UFE seeks to absolve itself by
pointing out qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of findings on specific Thus, the NLRC correctly upheld the illegality of the strikes and the corresponding
participation and/or liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to economic strikes. dismissal of the individual complainants because of their "brazen disregard of
successive lawful orders of then Labor Ministers Blas F. Ople, Augusto Sanchez and
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon dated December 11, 1985, January 30, 1986 and
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine February 4, 1986, respectively, and the cavalier treatment of the provisions of the
this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification Labor Code and the return-to-work orders of the Minister (now Secretary) of Labor
order is issued. and Employment, or Articles 264 and 265 (now renumbered Arts. 263 and 264),
providing in part as follows:
"One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued .
pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct to say
that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if the strike
On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clarified that the
question on the legality of strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter, not only
because the question is perfectly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue was not subsumed by the Order of Labor
Minister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the Notice of Strike dated
December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further clarifying that the issue of whether or
not the strike staged on September 11, 1987 by UFE and its officials and members was
illegal is a prejudicial question to the issue of whether or not the complainants were illegally
dismissed. We shall not belabor the issue any further.: nad
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED, and the decision of public respondent NLRC,
dated November 2, 1988, and its Resolution, dated March 7, 1989, are both AFFIRMED in
their entirety. No costs.
SO ORDERED.