Case: 20-16932, 10/06/2020, ID: 11850014, DktEntry: 5-1, Page 1 of 20

No. 20-16932
______________________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
______________________

MI FAMILIA VOTA; ARIZONA COALITION FOR CHANGE; ULISES

VENTURA,
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
v.
KATIE HOBBS, in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary of State,
Defendant-Appellee,

REPUBLICAN NATIONAL COMMITTEE; NATIONAL REPUBLICAN

SENATORIAL COMMITTEE
Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants
and
STATE OF ARIZONA,
Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant.
______________________
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA
Case No. 2:20-cv-01903-SPL
______________________
STATE OF ARIZONA’S EMERGENCY MOTION UNDER CIRCUIT
RULE 27-3 TO INTERVENE
______________________
MARK BRNOVICH
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Joseph A. Kanefield
Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff
Drew C. Ensign Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III
Michael S. Catlett Solicitor General
Deputy Solicitors General 2005 N. Central Avenue
Jennifer J. Wright Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Robert J. Makar Telephone: (602) 542-8958
Assistant Attorneys General Beau.Roysden@azag.gov
Dated: October 6, 2020 Counsel for the State of Arizona
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CIRCUIT RULE 27-3 CERTIFICATE

Pursuant to Circuit Rule 27-3, Proposed Intervenor-Defendant-Appellant the

State of Arizona (the “State”) respectfully submits this certificate in connection with

its emergency motion to intervene in this appeal.

This case involves the State’s statutory voter registration deadline for voting in

an upcoming election, which has been established under Arizona law since 1990.

Specifically, to vote in an upcoming election, a person must register to vote “before

midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.” Ariz. Rev. Stat.

(“A.R.S.”) 16-120(A). This year, the deadline that applies to the upcoming November

3, 2020, General Election (“General Election”) fell on Monday October 5, 2020 (the

“Deadline”).

Plaintiffs waited until a mere three business days before the Deadline to bring suit

in District Court, and they sought the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory injunction

to alter the deadline. On October 5, 2020, the District Court granted, as modified, the

Plaintiffs’ request for mandatory injunction, and further ordered that Defendant is

enjoined from enforcing the A.R.S. § 16-120 October 5, 2020, voter registration

cutoff. The Court set a new deadline of October 23, 2020. The Court’s order (the

“Order”) is a final judgment.

Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants Republican National Committee and

National Republican Senatorial Committee (“Appellants”) filed a notice of appeal to

this Court the same day as the Order.

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Defendant-Appellee Katie Hobbs in her official capacity as Arizona Secretary

of State publicly announced that she “will not appeal” the Order. This means that no

Arizona official is actively defending the constitutionality of the State’s statutory

deadline for voter registration, even though this deadline has been on the books for

30 years up until the very day it applied to the upcoming General Election.

To ensure that the State of Arizona (“State”) is able to defend the

constitutionality of its laws, the State now files this emergency motion to intervene in

the appeal of the District Court’s final judgment that is pending in this Court.

A. Contact Information Of Counsel

The office and email addresses and telephone numbers of the attorneys for the

parties are included below as Appendix A to this certificate.

B. Nature Of The Emergency

It is well-established that “a state suffers irreparable injury whenever an

enactment of its people or their representatives is enjoined.” Coalition for Economic

Equity v. Wilson, 122 F.3d 718, 719 (9th Cir. 1997). Accord Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct.

1, 3 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers) (“[A]ny time a State is enjoined by a court

from effectuating [its] statutes … it suffers a form of irreparable injury.”). Indeed,

enjoining a “State from conducting [its] elections pursuant to a statute enacted by the

Legislature… would seriously and irreparably harm” the State. Abbott v. Perez, 138 S.

Ct. 2305, 2324 (2018).

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The State is thus suffering irreparable harm already as it cannot enforce the

election laws enacted by its duly enacted representatives. The State therefore seeks

expedited treatment of its motion to intervene and attaches as Exhibit A its joinder in

Intervenor-Appellants’ Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 For

Administrative Stay, so that these harms can be mitigated as much as possible.

The harms at issue are particularly significant because, as the Supreme Court

has explained, “Court orders affecting elections, especially conflicting orders, can

themselves result in voter confusion and consequent incentive to remain away from

the polls. As an election draws closer, that risk will increase.” Purcell v. Gonzalez, 549

U.S. 1, 4-5 (2006). The district court’s injunction was issued on October 5—less than

one month before the general election—making these risks substantial. Indeed, just

today, this Court issued a published opinion in Arizona Democratic Party et al. v. Hobbs

and State of Arizona, No. 20-16759 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2020), granting the State’s

emergency motion for a stay pending appeal. This Court stated, “the Supreme Court

‘has repeatedly emphasized that lower federal courts should ordinarily not alter the

election rules on the eve of an election.’” Slip. Op. at 8 (collecting cases).

Here the harms are particularly acute because the potential for chaos is already

manifest. As the State’s Election Director stated in her declaration filed in District

Court, “this last-minute change” could “lead to administration problems for election

officials and may cause voter confusion.” Dul Declaration at ¶12. “Plaintiffs’

requested relief imagines that all county officials will be able to process voter

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registration forms that arrive during the early voting period, when counties must shift

resources to operating early voting locations and ensuring voters who have requested

a ballot-by-mail receive one. This may pose a significant burden on counties as they

have limited staff (especially during this time).” Id. ¶13. Indeed, the early voting

period begins in earnest tomorrow, October 7, 2020.1 In addition, there is no time

to update official correspondence and advertisements which all informed voters of the

October 5 deadline. See id. ¶14.

Every day that these issues remain open is therefore one in which voters may

be provided with either inaccurate or confusing information. The State therefore

requests a decision on intervention from this Court as soon as possible.

C. Notification Of Counsel For Other Parties and Proposed Schedule

The State notified the parties of its intent to intervene in this Court at 1:41 p.m

this afternoon. The State notified the emergency clerk by email this evening.

For the State’s Emergency Motion to Intervene, the State proposes a deadline

of Friday October 9 at 4:00 p.m. for any responses and Monday October 12 at 10:00

a.m. for the State’s Reply.

1
County recorders have already been sending early ballots out to overseas military
personnel.

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 Appendix A: Contact Information Of Attorneys

Ben Clements Jonathan S Abady
Gillian Cassell-Stiga Matthew D Brinckerhoff
John Bonifaz Nick Bourland
Ronald A Fein Zoe Salzman
Free Speech for People Emery Celli Brinckerhoff Abady Ward &
1320 Centre St., Ste. 405 Maazel LLP
Newton, MA 02459 600 5th Ave., 10th Fl.
617-244-0234 New York, NY 10020
ben@clementslaw.org 212-763-5000
gillian@freespeechforpeople.org jabady@ecbawm.com
jbonifaz@freespeechforpeople.org mbrinckerhoff@ecbawm.com
rfein@freespeechforpeople.org nbourland@ecbawm.com
zsalzman@ecbawm.com
Mary Ruth OGrady
Joshua David R Bendor
Osborn Maledon PA
P.O. Box 36379
Phoenix, AZ 85067-6379
602-640-9000
mogrady@omlaw.com
jbendor@omlaw.com
Counsel for Plaintiffs-Appellees
The Hon. Katie Hobbs, Arizona Secretary of State
c/o Sambo (“Bo”) Dul, Esq., State Elections Director
1700 W. Washington St., 7th Floor
Phoenix, AZ 85007
602-542-8683
bdul@azsos.gov
Defendant-Appellee2

2
Note that in District Court, the Secretary was represented by:
Kara Karlson
Linley Sarah Wilson
Office of the Attorney General
2005 N Central Ave.
Phoenix, AZ 85004-1592
602-542-8118
kara.karlson@azag.gov
linley.wilson@azag.gov

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Kory A Langhofer
Thomas James Basile
Statecraft PLLC
649 N 4th Ave., Ste. B
Phoenix, AZ 85003
602-571-4275
kory@statecraftlaw.com
tom@statecraftlaw.com
Counsel for the Intervenor-Appellants

Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III

Solicitor General
Drew C. Ensign (No. 25463)
Michael S. Catlett (No. 25238)
Deputy Solicitors General
Jennifer J. Wright (No. 27145)
Robert J. Makar (No. 33579)
Assistant Attorneys General
2005 N. Central Avenue
Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Telephone: (602) 542-8958
Beau.Roysden@azag.gov
ACL@azag.gov

Counsel for the Proposed Intervenor State of Arizona

Anni Lori Foster

Office of the Governor
1700 W Washington St.
Phoenix, AZ 85007
602-542-1455
afoster@az.gov

//

//

//

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Brett William Johnson

Colin Patrick Ahler
Derek Conor Flint
William Jon-Vincent Lichvar
Snell & Wilmer LLP
1 Arizona Ctr
400 E Van Buren
Phoenix, AZ 85004-2202
602-382-6000
bwjohnson@swlaw.com
cahler@swlaw.com
dflint@swlaw.com
vlichvar@swlaw.com
Counsel for Amicus Curiae

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1

BACKGROUND...................................................................................................................... 1

LEGAL STANDARD ............................................................................................................. 3

ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................................ 4

I. THE STATE, REPRESENTED BY ITS DULY-ELECTED

ATTORNEY GENERAL, HAS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN
THIS ACTION AT THIS TIME TO DEFEND STATE LAW ......................... 4

A. The State’s Motion To Intervene Is Timely .................................................. 5

B. The State Has A Significant Protectable Interest In The Subject

Matter Of This Action, Which Would Be Affected By Any
Adverse Ruling That Stands ............................................................................. 7

C. Intervention By The State Now Will Ensure That The State’s

Interests Will Be Adequately Represented ..................................................... 8

II. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION IS WARRANTED HERE ............................ 8

CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 10

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INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24, the State of Arizona (the

“State”) respectfully moves to intervene in this action, both as of right and

permissively. Defendant-Appellee Secretary Hobbs indicated she takes no position

on the State’s intervention. Plaintiffs-Appellees have not conveyed their position to

the State, but have filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervernors’ Appeal.

Attached as Exhibit A to this Motion is a joinder in Defendants-Intervenors-

Appellants Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule 27-3 For Administrative Stay.

BACKGROUND

This case involves the State’s statutory voter registration deadline for voting in

an upcoming election, which has been established under Arizona law since 1990.

Specifically, to vote in an upcoming election, a person must register to vote “before

midnight of the twenty-ninth day preceding the date of the election.” A.R.S. 16-

120(A). This year, the deadline that applies to the upcoming November 3, 2020,

General Election (“General Election”) fell on Monday October 5, 2020 (the

“Deadline”).

Plaintiffs waited until a mere three business days before the Deadline to bring suit

in District Court, and they sought the extraordinary remedy of a mandatory injunction

to alter the deadline. Notably, the Plaintiffs did not name any of the 15 county

recorders, who are independent elected officials and who would be the officials most

directly affected by the relief Plaintiffs sought. Instead, they only named a single state

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official, the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State indicated her intent to defend

the State’s longstanding statutory requirement, and her State Election Director filed a

declaration supporting that defense.

On October 5, 2020, the District Court granted, as modified, the Plaintiffs’

request for mandatory injunction, and further ordered that Defendant is enjoined

from enforcing the A.R.S. § 16-120 October 5, 2020, voter registration cutoff. The

Court set a new deadline of October 23, 2020. The Court’s order (the “Order”) is a

final judgment.

Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants Republican National Committee and

National Republican Senatorial Committee (“Appellants”) filed a notice of appeal to

this Court the same day as the Order.

Defendant Hobbs publicly announced that she “will not appeal” the Order. See

Dkt. 4 at 2 n.1 (citing Secretary’s tweet). This means that no Arizona official is

actively defending the constitutionality of the State’s statutory deadline for voter

registration, even though this deadline has been on the books for 30 years up until the

very day it applied to the upcoming General Election.

In this Court, Appellants have filed an Emergency Motion Under Circuit Rule

27-3 For Administrative Stay. Dkt. 3. They have indicated that they are also planning

to file a Motion to Stay Pending Appeal by tomorrow, October 7, 2020. Dkt. 3 at 2.

Plaintiffs-Appellees filed a Motion to Dismiss Intervenors’ Appeal. Dkt. 2. The

primary argument contained in their Motion to Dismiss is that Appellants “lack

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standing as intervenors to prosecute this appeal when the Secretary of State has

declined to do so.” Id. at 2. They also argue that the District Court erred in

permitting both intervention as of right and permissive intervention by Appellants.

Id. at 11-15. Plaintiffs have also filed an Opposition to Intervenors’ Emergency

Motion for an Administrative Stay. Dkt. 4. Like their Motion to Dismiss, the

Opposition relies heavily on the notion that Appellants lack standing to appeal, and

they also argue that there is “no irreparable harm to intervenors.” Id. at 3 (emphasis

added). The State’s intervention is thus directly relevant, if not dispositive, to these

arguments by Plaintiffs.

LEGAL STANDARD

This Court’s consideration of a motion to intervene is governed by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 24. See Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement

Workers v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 217 n.10 (1965); Day v. Apoliona, 505 F.3d 963, 965

(9th Cir. 2007); see also Sierra Club, Inc. v. EPA, 358 F.3d 516, 517–18 (7th Cir. 2004)

(“[A]ppellate courts have turned to … Fed.R.Civ.P. 24.”); Mass. Sch. of Law at Andover,

Inc. v. United States, 118 F.3d 776, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (same).

The Court’s intervention analysis is “‘guided primarily by practical

considerations,’ not technical distinctions.” Sw. Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Berg, 268

F.3d 810, 818 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Wilderness Soc’y v. U.S. Forest Serv., 630 F.3d 1173,

1179 (9th Cir. 2011) (reiterating importance of “practical and equitable

considerations” as part of judicial policy favoring intervention). Courts are “required

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to accept as true the non-conclusory allegations made in support of an intervention

motion.” Berg, 268 F.3d at 819.

ARGUMENT

I. THE STATE, REPRESENTED BY ITS DULY-ELECTED

ATTORNEY GENERAL, HAS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THIS
ACTION AT THIS TIME TO DEFEND STATE LAW
Rule 24(a) authorizes anyone to intervene in an action as of right when the

applicant demonstrates that

(1) the intervention application is timely; (2) the applicant has a

significant protectable interest relating to the property or transaction that
is the subject of the action; (3) the disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the applicant’s ability to protect its
interest; and (4) the existing parties may not adequately represent the
applicant’s interest.

Prete v. Bradbury, 438 F.3d 949, 954 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2).

Rule 24(a) is to be construed “broadly in favor of proposed intervenors.” Wilderness

Soc’y, 630 F.3d at 1179.

As a preliminary matter, the Attorney General is empowered by Arizona law to

seek intervention in federal court on behalf of the State. See A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(3)

(empowering Department of Law to represent the State in federal courts); see also

A.R.S. § 41-192(A) (vesting Attorney General with direction and control of

Department of Law). This Court, sitting en banc, recently granted the State of

Arizona’s motion brought by its Attorney General to intervene to defend the

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constitutionality of its laws. Democratic National Committee v. Hobbs, No. 18-15845, Dkt.

137 (April 9, 2020) (Order granting State of Arizona’s Motion to Intervene).

Moreover, this Court has held in an unpublished decision that filing of a notice

of appeal “divest[s] the district court of its jurisdiction … to entertain [a] motion to

intervene.” Bryant v. Crum & Forster Specialty Ins. Co., 502 Fed. Appx. 670, 671 (9th Cir.

2012). The State accordingly is seeking to intervene in this Court, which plainly has

jurisdiction to consider the State’s motion to intervene.

A. The State’s Motion To Intervene Is Timely

Whether a motion to intervene is timely is based on three considerations:

“(1) the stage of the proceeding at which the applicant seeks to intervene; (2) the

prejudice to the other parties; and (3) the reason for and length of delay.” See U.S. ex

rel. McGough v. Covington Techs. Co., 967 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1992). Based on

these considerations, this motion satisfies the timeliness requirement.

Most importantly, there has been no delay by the State in bringing its motion to

intervene. The underlying case was instituted in District Court last Wednesday,

September 30, 2020, a mere three business days before the statutory voter registration

deadline. Yesterday, the District Court entered its final judgment in that case and

Appellants filed their notice of appeal. Until yesterday, Secretary Hobbs had been

defending the State’s interest in this litigation. But with Secretary Hobbs’s recent

public decision declining to appeal the District Court’s adverse judgment, it is only

now provident that the State move to intervene to ensure its interest in retaining its

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“broad authority to structure and regulate elections is preserved.” Short v. Brown, 893

F.3d 671, 676 (9th Cir. 2018).

Further, this Court has repeatedly explained that “the ‘general rule is that a

post-judgment motion to intervene is timely if filed within the time allowed for the

filing of an appeal.’” McGough, 967 F.2d at 1394 (quoting Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d

727, 734 (9th Cir. 1991) (alteration omitted)). The Supreme Court has similarly held

that where a party “filed [its] motion within the time period in which the named

plaintiffs could have taken an appeal … the [party’s] motion to intervene was timely

filed[.]” United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385, 396 (1977). Federal Rule of

Appellate Procedure 4 gives parties 30 days to file an appeal. This motion is filed

within 1 day, well within that 30-day window.

This motion also poses no prejudice to the other parties at this stage given that

the District Court entered its final judgment concluding the proceedings below, and

this appellate proceeding is only commencing. See Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202,

1205 (5th Cir. 1994) (“requirement of timeliness is … a guard against prejudicing the

original parties”). Plaintiffs-Appellees’ position on the merits of their Anderson-Burdick

and Due Process claims will be “essentially the same as it would have been” had the

State intervened earlier in the proceedings. McGough, 967 F.2d at 1395.

For all of these reasons, “there [has been] no improper delay by the [State] in

bringing its motion to intervene.” Id. at 1396.

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B. The State Has A Significant Protectable Interest In The Subject

Matter Of This Action, Which Would Be Affected By Any Adverse
Ruling That Stands
The State has an unquestionable interest in defending the constitutionality of its

laws. “[A] State has standing to defend the constitutionality of its statute.” Diamond v.

Charles, 476 U.S. 54, 62 (1986); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(c) (permitting intervention

by state attorney general when constitutionality of state’s statutes is questioned). And

“because the Article III standing requirements are more stringent than those for

intervention under rule 24(a),” where a State has standing to defend a law, that

“standing under Article III compels the conclusion that they have an adequate interest

under” Rule 24. Yniguez, 939 F.2d at 735.

The State also has a compelling interest in structuring its elections. See Burdick

v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186, 197 (2010)

(“The State’s interest in preserving the integrity of the electoral process is

undoubtedly important.”). “The State’s interest is particularly strong with respect to

efforts to root out fraud, which not only may produce fraudulent outcomes, but has a

systemic effect as well: It ‘drives honest citizens out of the democratic process and

breeds distrust of our government.’” Reed, 561 U.S. at 197; see also Purcell v. Gonzalez,

549 U.S. 1, 4 (2006) (“Confidence in the integrity of our electoral processes is essential

to the functioning of our participatory democracy.”). Invalidation of any state

election procedure undoubtedly has an effect on the State sufficient to support

intervention.

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C. Intervention By The State Now Will Ensure That The State’s

Interests Will Be Adequately Represented
This Court has held that the “burden of showing inadequacy of representation

is ‘minimal’ and satisfied if the applicant can demonstrate that representation of its

interests ‘may be’ inadequate.” Citizens for Balanced Use v. Mont. Wilderness Ass’n, 647

F.3d 893, 898 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Arakaki v. Cayetano, 324 F.3d 1078, 1086 (9th

Cir. 2003)). The Court considers several factors, including

(1) whether the interest of a present party is such that it will undoubtedly
make all of a proposed intervenor’s arguments; (2) whether the present
party is capable and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether a
proposed intervenor would offer any necessary elements to the
proceeding that other parties would neglect.

Perry v. Proposition 8 Official Proponents, 587 F.3d 947, 952 (9th Cir. 2009).

As noted above, recent public statements by Secretary Hobbs have confirmed

that she will no longer defend the challenged State laws through appeal to this Court

or to the court of last resort here: the Supreme Court of the United States. This

change suffices to satisfy the minimal burden of showing potential inadequacy and

supports the Attorney General now moving to intervene on behalf of the State. On

that basis, the State, through the Attorney General, has grounds that can satisfy the

adequacy threshold.

II. PERMISSIVE INTERVENTION IS WARRANTED HERE

Even if the Court declines to grant the State’s timely motion to intervene as of

right, this is precisely the type of case where permissive intervention is warranted.

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Federal courts may permit intervention by litigants who have “a claim or defense that

shares with the main action a common question of law or fact.” Fed. R. Civ. P.

24(b)(1)(B). Where a litigant “timely presents such an interest in intervention,” the

Court should consider

the nature and extent of the intervenors’ interest, their standing to

raise relevant legal issues, the legal position they seek to advance,
and its probable relation to the merits of the case[,] whether changes
have occurred in the litigation so that intervention that was once
denied should be reexamined, whether the intervenors’ interests are
adequately represented by other parties, whether intervention will
prolong or unduly delay the litigation, and whether parties
seeking intervention will significantly contribute to full
development of the underlying factual issues in the suit and to the
just and equitable adjudication of the legal questions presented.
Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2011).

As explained more fully above, the State has a compelling interest in the

outcome of this action and has standing to defend the constitutionality of its laws. See

also A.R.S. § 41-193(A)(3) (granting authority to the Attorney General to defend the

State in federal court). Furthermore, the State’s motion is timely, and its participation

will not unnecessarily prolong, prejudice, or unduly delay the litigation. Indeed, the

State’s participation will “significantly contribute to … the just and equitable

adjudication of the legal questions presented.” Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d at 905.

* * *

The State has constitutional authority to regulate its election process. See U.S.

Const. art. I, § 4, cl. 1; Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581, 586 (2005). And “[c]ommon

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sense, as well as constitutional law, compels the conclusion that government must

play an active role in structuring elections[.]” Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433. Yet the

injunction from the District Court holds invalid a key provision that Arizona put in

place thirty years ago in order to do just that. Due to the recent statements of the

Arizona Secretary of State, the State, through Attorney General Brnovich, moves to

intervene in this matter in order to avoid any doubt as to the standing of Appellants

to prosecute this appeal, and ensure that all State interests will be adequately

represented.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court grant

this motion to intervene.

Respectfully submitted this 6th day of October, 2020,

MARK BRNOVICH
ATTORNEY GENERAL

s/ Brunn (Beau) W. Roysden III

Joseph A. Kanefield
Chief Deputy & Chief of Staff
Drew C. Ensign Brunn (“Beau”) W. Roysden III
Michael S. Catlett Solicitor General
Deputy Solicitors General 2005 N. Central Avenue
Jennifer J. Wright Phoenix, Arizona 85004
Robert J. Makar Telephone: (602) 542-8958
Assistant Attorneys General Beau.Roysden@azag.gov

Counsel for the State of Arizona

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 6th day of October, 2020, I caused the foregoing

document to be electronically transmitted to the Clerk’s Office using the CM/ECF

System for Filing and transmittal of a Notice of Electronic Filing to CM/ECF

registrants.

I also emailed a copy to the Secretary of State through her State Elections

Director.

s/ Brunn W. Roysden III

Brunn W. Roysden III

11