Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Fernando P. Cabrera
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Fernando P. Cabrera
Plaintiff-Appellee Vs Vs Accused-Appellant The Solicitor General Fernando P. Cabrera
SYNOPSIS
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 45, Urdaneta, Pangasinan convicted as charged the
accused-appellant Rolando Valdez for the complex crime of Multiple Murder with Double
Frustrated Murder and Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions (Presidential
Decree No. 1866) and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of death and the prison term of
reclusion perpetua, respectively. The conviction was based on the evidence presented by
the prosecution that on September 17, 1995 at around 8:00 o'clock in the evening, William
Montano, Randy Tibule, Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta, Sandra Montano and Ramon
Garcia, Jr. rode on a tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia in going to Sitio Cabaoangan to
attend the wedding party of Jean Marie's cousin. On their way, they met the appellant and
his companions who were armed with guns, and without any warning, they pointed their
guns and red at them which caused the instantaneous death of Jean Marie Garcia, Willie
Acosta, Sandra Montano, and Ramon Garcia, Jr. and fatal injuries to William Montano and
Randy Tibule. The appellant denied any participation in the said incident and he questioned
his conviction claiming, among others, that the trial court erred in failing to consider motive
on the part of Bernardo Castro to re at, as he actually red at the occupants of the
motorized tricycle.
Hence, the instant review.
Accused-appellant predicated his argument on the mistaken premise that he was
not positively identi ed in the case at bar although he admitted that it was established that
he was at the scene of the crime. This argument will not hold simply because accused-
appellant had been positively identi ed by eyewitnesses and victims William Montano and
Randy Tibule. It is basic and fundamental rule that proof of motive is necessary for
conviction only when there is doubt as to the identity of the accused, not when accused
has been positively identified as in the present case.
It was clear from the evidence that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a
single act but from several individual and distinct acts. Each act by each gunman pulling
the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons
constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of
multiple murder. The Court ruled that accused-appellant was guilty, not of a complex crime
of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this
case. In the same manner, accused-appellant was likewise held guilty for two counts of
frustrated murder.
The decision was MODIFIED.
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SYLLABUS
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ABSENCE THEREOF, DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONVICTION. —
Besides, it is also to be noted that lack of motive for committing the crime does not
preclude conviction, considering that, nowadays, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that
persons have killed or committed serious offense for no reason at all (People vs. Cabodoc,
263 SCRA 187 [1996]).
3. ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TRIAL COURT ARE
CONCLUSIVE. — After meticulously and carefully going through each and every piece of
evidence on record, the Court nds no reason to depart from the trial court's accord of
credence to the eyewitness accounts of William Montano and Randy Tibule who positively
identi ed accused-appellant as one of the persons who shot and red at them and their
companions that fateful night. We agree with the trial court that the evidence points
beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellant was one of those principally responsible
for the deaths of the four victims in this case and the wounding of two others.
4. CRIMINAL LAW QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE; TREACHERY; EXPLAINED. —
Under paragraph 16, Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, the qualifying circumstance of
treachery is present when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the
execution of the crime which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without
risk to himself arising from any defensive or retaliatory act which the victim might make
(People vs. Santos, 270 SCRA 650 [1997]). The settled rule is that treachery can exist even
if the attack is frontal if it is sudden and unexpected, giving the victim no opportunity to
repel it or defend himself against such attack. What is decisive is that the execution of the
attack, without the slightest provocation from the victim who is unarmed, made it
impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate (People vs. Javier, 269 SCRA
181 [1997]).
5. ID.; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCE; EVIDENT PREMEDITATION; NOT
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — After reviewing the evidence, however, we do not nd any
showing of evident premeditation on the part of accused-appellant. While there may be
testimonial evidence pointing to an altercation between Bernard Castro and a certain
Capistrano, it does su ciently prove the attendance of the aggravating circumstance of
evident premeditation. It is not enough that evident premeditation is suspected or
surmised, but criminal intent must be evidenced by notorious outward acts evidencing
determination to commit the crime. In order to be considered an aggravation of the
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offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation"; it must be "evident
premeditation" (People vs. Torejas, 43 SCRA 158 [1972]).
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ELEMENTS. — To establish the existence of evident premeditation,
the following have to be proved: (1) the crime when the offender determined to commit
the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination;
and (3) su ciently lapse of time between the determination and the execution to allow the
offender to re ect on the consequences of his act (People vs. Juan, 254 SCRA 478
[1996]).
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THIRD ELEMENT IS INDISPENSABLE TO AGGRAVATE THE
CRIME. — Establishing a basis or motive for the commission of the crime does not
constitute su cient ground to consider the existence of evident premeditation. At best, it
may indicate the time when the offenders determined to commit the crime (the rst
element). Their act of arming themselves with caliber .30 carbines and thereafter waiting
for their supposed victims at ambush positions may have also indicated that they clung to
their determination to commit the crime (the second element) More important than these
two elements is the proof that a su cient period of time had elapsed between the
outward act evidencing intent and actual commission of the offense (the third element).
There must have been enough opportunity for the initial impulse to subside. This element
is indispensable for circumstance of evident premeditation to aggravate the crime. cIACaT
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — As early as in People vs.
Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had stressed the importance of su cient time
between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the criminal intent, affording such
opportunity for cool thought and re ection to arrive at a calm judgment. Obviously, this
element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the supposed heated argument between
Bernard Castro and Capistrano, Castro and company went home to get the rearms and
not long thereafter mounted the assault. There was no chance for the anger to subside.
The culprits in the case at bar had no opportunity for cool thought and re ection to arrive
at a calm judgment.
9. ID.; ID.; ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH; ABSORBED IN TREACHERY. — The
other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that of abuse of superior
strength. This contravenes the very basic and elementary doctrine in our jurisdiction that
the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery
(People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs.
Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
10. ID.; COMPLEX CRIME; NOT APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — It is clear from
the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes of murder resulted not from a single
act but from several individual and distinct acts. For one thing, the evidence indicates that
there was more than one gunman involved, and the act of each gunman is distinct from
that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there is but a single act of ring a single
firearm. There were also several empty bullet shells recovered from the scene of the crime.
This con rms the fact that several shots were red. Furthermore, considering the relative
positions of the gunmen and their victims, some of whom were riding the motorized
tricycle itself while the others were seated inside the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely
impossible for the four victims to have been hit and killed by a single bullet. Each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective rearms, aiming each particular
moment at different persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise
to the complex crime of multiple murder. We therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty,
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not of a complex crime of multiple murder, but of four counts of murder for the death of
the four victims in this case In the same manner, accused- appellant is likewise held guilty
for two counts of frustrated murder.
11. ID.; FOUR COUNTS OF MURDER AND TWO COUNTS OF FRUSTRATED
MURDER; PROPER PENALTY. — Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
provides the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without any
mitigating or aggravating circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the
medium penalty is the lower indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar,
accused-appellant, being guilty of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty
should be four sentences of reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts
of frustrated murder, accused-appellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence
ranging from a minimum of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor to a maximum of 12 years
and 1 day of reclusion temporal for each offense. cTIESD
DECISION
MELO , J : p
The inculpatory facts adduced by the prosecution during trial are succinctly
summarized in the People's brief as follows:
On September 17, 1995, at around 8:00 in the evening, William Montano
(16 years old), Randy Tibule (17 years old), Jean Marie Garcia, Willie Acosta,
Sandra Montano and Ramon Garcia, Jr. were at the house of Randy Tibule in
Manaoag, Pangasinan. They were discussing how to go to the wedding party of
Jean Marie's cousin in Sitio Cabaoangan (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-8; June 18,
1996, pp. 23-24).
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After discussion, they rode in the tricycle driven by Ramon Garcia going to
Cabaoangan. Behind Garcia were Tibule and Willie. Jean was seated inside the
side car with Sandra and William Montano (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 7-11; TSN
June 18, 1996, pp. 23-25).
After making a turn along the barangay road leading to Sitio Cabaoangan,
they met appellant Rolando Valdez and his companions who were armed with
guns. The tricycle's headlight ashed on their faces. Without warning, they
pointed their guns and red at Montano's group. Thereafter, after uttering the
words, "nataydan, mapan tayon" (They are already dead. Let us go), Valdez and
companions left (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 11-14).
The shooting incident left Ramon Garcia, Jean Marie Garcia, Sandra
Montano and Willie Acosta dead (TSN June 11, 1996, pp. 14-16). They sustained
the following injuries:
Jean Marie Garcia:
Sandra Montano:
— gunshot wound .6 cm. in diameter, point of entrance at the
temporal area left, penetrating the skin, skull minigas, brain substance
(right) temporal regis) where the slug lodge.
(Exhibit D)
Willie Acosta:
— gunshot wound, .5 cm. in diameter below coastal arch point
of entrance trajecting the upper 3rd of the stomach thru and thru trajecting
the upper third of the stomach of thoracic vein with the point of exit 1 cm.
in diameter at the level of the 7th thorasic vertebrae.
(Exhibit E)
On the other hand, William Montano and Randy Tibule survived the attack.
They suffered serious gunshot injuries that could have caused their death were it
not for the timely medical attention given them (TSN July 3, 1996, p. 6). Montano
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sustained several gunshot wounds on the left arm, two on the left upper back,
another on the left shoulder and middle right nger (TSN June 25, 1996, p. 608).
Tibule sustained two gunshot wounds, one at the fth upper quadrant (stomach)
and the other at the left periumbelical (TSN July 3, 1996, pp. 7-8).
(pp. 215-219, Rollo.)
In its decision dated October 24, 1996, the trial court rendered a judgment of
conviction in the two cases, finding and disposing:
IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. U-8747: —
the accused ROLANDO VALDEZ y LIPURDA, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of MULTIPLE MURDER WITH DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER defined
and penalized under Republic Act No. 7659 otherwise known as the Heinous
Crime Law, the offense having been a complex crime the penalty of which is in
the maximum, and with the attendant aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation and abuse of superior strength, hereby sentences him the ultimum
supplicum of DEATH to be executed pursuant to Republic Act No. 8177 known as
the Lethal Injection Law, to pay the heirs of the deceased RAMON GARCIA, JR.,
WILLIE ACOSTA, JEMARIE GARCIA and SANDRA MONTANO and the injured
victims WILLIAM MONTANO and RANDY TIBULE, as follows: cdasia
Hence, the instant review, with accused-appellant anchoring his plea for reversal on
the following assigned errors:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED FAILING TO CONSIDER THE MATERIAL,
SUBSTANTIAL, IMPORTANT AND SIGNIFICANT, DISCREPANCIES IN THE
AFFIDAVITS OF PROSECUTION WITNESSES AND THEIR TESTIMONIES IN
COURT;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE RECANTATIONS OF
PROSECUTION WITNESSES;
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE SERIOUS
DOUBTS ON THE IDENTITY OF ACCUSED, ROLANDO VALDEZ AS THE
GUNMAN;
IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER MOTIVE ON THE
PART OF BERNARDO CASTRO TO FIRE AT, AS HE ACTUALLY FIRED AT
THE OCCUPANTS OF MOTORIZED TRICYCLE;
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE AGAINST THE
PROSECUTION ITS DELIBERATE FAILURE TO PRESENT THE POLICE
INVESTIGATORS WHO INVESTIGATED THE INCIDENT AND IT WAS THE
DEFENSE WHICH PRESENTED SAID POLICE INVESTIGATORS;
VI. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DECLARING THAT ACCUSED ROLANDO
VALDEZ DID NOT DENY THE ACCUSATION AGAINST HIM FOR VIOLATION
OF P.D. 1866 BECAUSE HE DID NOT ALLEGEDLY TOUCHED IT IN HIS
MEMORANDUM.
(pp. 106-107, Rollo)
Q. Why?
A. When we were entering the road at Sitio Cabauangan at around ten to
fifteen meters, somebody plugged (sic) down the tricycle, sir.
Q. And what happened next after somebody plugged (sic) down your tricycle?
A. Somebody standing was lighted by the headlight of our motorcycle, sir.
Q. Now, what happened next, if any?
A. The one who was standing and was lighted with the headlight was
immediately recognized by me, sir.
Q. Who was that person whom you saw and you immediately recognized?
As early as in People vs. Durante, 53 Phil. 363 [1929], the Court had stressed the
importance of su cient time between the criminal act and the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent, affording such opportunity for cool thought and re ection to arrive at a
calm judgment. Obviously, this element is wanting in the case at bar. Right after the
supposed heated argument between Bernard Castro and Capistrano, Castro and company
went home to get the rearms and not long thereafter mounted the assault. There was no
chance for the anger to subside. The culprits in the case at bar had no opportunity for cool
thought and reflection to arrive at a calm judgment.
The other aggravating circumstance considered by the trial court is that of abuse of
superior strength. This contravenes the very basic and elementary doctrine in our
jurisdiction that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is absorbed in
treachery (People vs. Mobe, 81 Phil. 58 [1948]; People vs. Nierra, 96 SCRA 1 [1980];
People vs. Torrefiel, 256 SCRA 369 [1996]).
Notwithstanding the absence of any aggravating circumstances, if we were to
uphold the trial courts' premises on the complex nature of the crime committed, the death
sentence, being the maximum penalty for murder, would still have been the imposable
penalty under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court however, nds compelling
reasons to reduce the sentence from one death penalty (for the complex crime of multiple
murder with double frustrated murder) and one reclusion perpetua (for the crime of illegal
possession of rearms and ammunitions) to four counts of reclusion perpetua (for 4
murders) and two indeterminate sentences of prision mayor to reclusion temporal (for the
2 frustrated murders).
The recommendation of the Solicitor General in the People's brief that accused-
appellant should instead be convicted of four counts of murder and two counts of
frustrated murder is well taken.
The trial court erred when it allowed itself to be carried away by the erroneous
Information led by the O ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan charging the
complex crime of multiple murder and double frustrated murder (p. 1, Record: Crim. Case
No. U-8747). It may be noted that in his Resolution dated September 26, 1995, the
investigating municipal trial court judge of Manaoag, Pangasinan, found a prima facie case
for four separate counts of murder (pp. 101-102, Ibid.) Too, the same investigating judge
in his Resolution dated October 31, 1995 found a prima facie case for two counts of
frustrated murder (pp. 43-44, Ibid.). It was upon reinvestigation by the O ce of the
Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan that a case for the complex crime of murder with
double frustrated murder was instead led per its Joint Resolution dated November 17,
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1995 (pp. 4-6, Ibid.). LLphil
The concept of a complex crime is de ned in Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,
to wit:
ARTICLE 48. Penalty for complex crimes — When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or when an offense is a
necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime
shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. (As amended by
Act No. 4000.)
The case at bar does not fall under any of the two instances de ned above. The
O ce of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pangasinan erroneously considered the case as
falling under the rst. It is clear from the evidence on record, however, that the four crimes
of murder resulted not from a single act but from several individual and distinct acts. For
one thing, the evidence indicates that there was more than one gunman involved, and the
act of each gunman is distinct from that of the other. It cannot be said therefore, that there
is but a single act of ring a single rearm. There were also several empty bullet shells
recovered from the scene of the crime. This con rms the fact that several shots were
red. Furthermore, considering the relative positions of the gunmen and their victims,
some of whom were riding the motorized tricycle itself while the others were seated inside
the sidecar thereof, it was absolutely impossible for the four victims to have been hit and
killed by a single bullet. Each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective
rearms, aiming each particular moment at different persons constitute distinct and
individual acts which cannot give rise to the complex crime of multiple murder. We
therefore rule that accused-appellant is guilty, not of a complex crime of multiple murder,
but of four counts of murder for the death of the four victims in this case. In the same
manner, accused-appellant is likewise held guilty for two counts of frustrated murder.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death for the crime of murder. Without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the crime, the medium penalty is the lower
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. In the case at bar, accused-appellant, being guilty
of four separate counts of murder, the proper penalty should be four sentences of
reclusion perpetua. In addition, he being guilty of two counts of frustrated murder,
accused-appellant must be meted out an indeterminate sentence ranging from a minimum
of 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor or to a maximum of 12 years and 1 day of reclusion
temporal for each offense.
Now, to the matter of accused-appellant's conviction for illegal possession of
unlicensed rearm under Presidential Decree No. 1866. It was recently held in the case
entitled People vs. Molina (G.R. Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998), and reiterated in People
vs. Feloteo (G.R. No. 124212, September 17, 1998), that there can be no separate
conviction of the crime of illegal possession of rearms under Presidential Decree No.
1866 in view of the amendments introduced by Republic Act No. 8294.
Instead, illegal possession of rearms is merely to be taken as an aggravating
circumstance per Section 1 of Republic Act No. 8294, which in part, provides:
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of unlicensed rearm,
such use of an unlicensed rearm shall be considered as an aggravating
circumstance.
Republic Act No. 8294 took effect on July 6, 1997, fteen days after its publication
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on June 21, 1997. The crimes involved in the case at bar were committed on September
17, 1995. As in the case of any penal law, the provisions of Republic Act No. 8294 will
generally have prospective application. In cases, however, where the new law will be
advantageous to the accused, the law may be given retroactive application (Article 22,
Revised Penal Code). Insofar as it will spare accused-appellant in the case at bar from a
separate conviction for the crime of illegal possession of rearms, Republic Act No. 8294
may be given retroactive application in Criminal Case No. U-8749 (for Illegal Possession of
Firearm) subject of this present review.
As a word of caution, however, the dismissal of the present case for illegal
possession of rearm should not be misinterpreted as meaning that there can no longer
be any prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of rearm. In general, all pending
cases involving illegal possession of rearm should continue to be prosecuted and tried if
no other crimes expressly indicated in Republic Act No. 8294 are involved (murder or
homicide under Section 1, and rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d'etat
under Section 3).
However, the use of an unlicensed rearm in the case at bar cannot be considered
as a special aggravating circumstance in Criminal Case No. U-8747 (for Complex Crime of
Multiple Murder), also under review herein, because it will unduly raise the penalty for the
four counts of murder from four reclusion perpetua to that of four-fold death. Insofar as
this particular provision of Republic Act No. 8294 is not bene cial to accused-appellant
because it unduly aggravates the crime, this new law will not be given retroactive
application, lest it might acquire the character of an ex-post facto law.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision with respect to Criminal Case No.
U-8747 is hereby MODIFIED. Accused-appellant is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of four counts of murder and hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of four sentences of
reclusion perpetua. He is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
frustrated murder and hereby meted two indeterminate sentences, each, ranging from six
(6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The appealed judgment relating to the civil
liabilities of accused-appellant towards the six victims is AFFIRMED.
Criminal Case No. U-8749 involving Presidential Decree No. 1866 is hereby
dismissed. cda