G. R. No. 5005, January 11, 1911: Supreme Court of The Philippines
G. R. No. 5005, January 11, 1911: Supreme Court of The Philippines
G. R. No. 5005, January 11, 1911: Supreme Court of The Philippines
18 Phil. 275
DECISION
MAPA, J.:
The judgment rendered in this case in first instance and which was appealed
by the defendant, is of the following tenor:
"The plaintiffs ask in this suit that the defendant be restrained from
preventing the plaintiffs from destroying the dam constructed by him on
their property, repairing the damage done to the property, and performing any
other act which may tend to protect the property from damage; the plaintiffs
further ask that the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this court be
made perpetual, and that the defendant be sentenced to pay more than
"P250 for loss and damage, besides the amount of the damage which may be
caused to the said property, pending the action, by the construction of the
dam, together with the costs of this suit.
"From the evidence adduced, we hold the following facts to have been
proved: (1) That the plaintiffs herein own the property described in the
complaint and which is crossed from west to east by the Panipuan estero;
(2) that in August, 1906, the defendant constructed a dam in the said
Panipuan estero within the plaintiffs' property and a canal or ditch to convey
the water from the said estero to his fields; (3) that Gregorio Dizon, the
husband of the plaintiff Eulogia Dayrit, opposed the creation of this
servitude, and the defendant answered (Exhibits G and H) by stating that he,
the defendant, had intercepted the water of an estero which belonged to
nobody, but formed the boundary line between the land of the said Gregorio
Dizon and that which he held under lease. In this answer of the defendant no
right by prescription is alleged; however, the defendant's principal defense is
that he has acquired a right to the servitude through a prescription of twenty
years.
"The witness Felix Urquico testified that he was the owner of the land held
by the defendant; that he acquired the said land from one Telesforo Pineda,
in June, 1878; that since its acquisition, and without opposition, he
annually constructed a dam in the same place where the defendant built one
in 1906; that he conveyed the property to Juan de los Santos, in 1905; that in
1904, Saturnino Aguas, a lessee of his of the said land, also constructed a
dam in the same place, without opposition; that the land previously
belonging to him, and afterwards sold to the defendant, is bounded on the
north by the said Panipuan estero, and that this circumstance was
recorded in the private instrument which was executed when he acquired the
said land from Telesforo Pineda; that prior to his occupancy of this land, it
was occupied by his brother-in-law, Mariano Pamintuan, and that already, at
the time it was held by the latter and by Telesforo Pineda, the said dam was
constructed each year in order that they might utilize the water from
the estero.
"There exists a private instrument, not shown to have been destroyed,
which would have been the best proof of the date when Felix Urquico,
according to his testimony, acquired the land in question, as well as the true
boundaries of the land now owned by the defendant. Mariano Pamintuan and
Telesforo Pineda are cited. These parties would have thrown much light on
this matter; but they did not testify and it is not known why these witnesses
were not summoned to give testimony. With respect to Saturnino Aguas, it
is true that in 1904 he constructed a dam in the same place where the
defendant constructed his; but he was sued by Gregorio Dizon and the matter
was settled by the defendant's agreement not to construct any more dams in
the same place; and, finally, according to the rough sketch, Exhibit A, the
area comprised between the dam, marked with the numbers 10 and 11, and
the boundary of the swamp land, marked 5 and 6, belongs to the plaintiffs.
"In the defendant's Exhibit No. 1 is shown a strip of land, letters A and C,
which he did not venture to state belonged to him. It appears unquestionable
to us that this strip, planted with canas espinas, belongs to the plaintiffs,
inasmuch as, according to Exhibit B, the plaintiffs' land does not adjoin the
Panipuan estero on the south. It is maintained by the plaintiffs that the
construction of the dam caused them some loss and damage. In regard to
this, there is no proof other than that some clumps of canas espinas, placed in
the middle of the estero, will now probably not grow on account of the
stagnant water. There is no proof that the said clumps of canas espinas were
destroyed, nor that it is now impossible for them to be utilized by their
owner.
"Therefore you (the defendant), your agents and representatives, are hereby
prohibited from repeating and again committing the acts above specified,
during the trial of this case and until final judgment shall have been rendered
therein."
In the counterclaim, from which the plaintiffs were absolved, the defendant
asked that they be sentenced to the payment of P500, the amount of the
damages caused to him by the issuance of the said writ of preliminary
injunction, on the ground that the said plaintiffs had no legal reason
whatever to apply for the same.
As grounds for his appeal, the appellant sets forth seven assignments of error
in his brief, of which the second and third refer only to questions of fact, and
the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh are mere conclusions drawn from the
premises established in the two former above mentioned. After a careful
study of the evidence, we decide that the findings of fact contained in the
judgment appealed from are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that
there is no preponderance of proof against the findings such as might
oblige us to modify the same, wherefore they must be sustained.
In the first ground of the appeal, the appellant maintains that the lower court
incurred error in overruling the defendant's demurrer to the plaintiffs'
complaint.
The demurrer is based on two grounds: (1) That the facts alleged in the
complaint do not constitute a cause of action; and (2) that the complaint is
ambiguous, unintelligible and vague. This last ground was abandoned in this
instance, and only the first was maintained, in support of which it is stated in
the appellant's brief that;
"The plaintiffs do not allege that the defendant is performing, or intends to
perform, or endeavors to perform or permits the performance of, any act
tending to prejudice any right of the plaintiffs in the land in question. They
only allege that the defendant did perform certain acts, and it is
unquestionable that a writ of injunction can not be issued to prohibit an act
or acts already performed."
The appellant's assertion is inexact with respect to his averment that, in the
complaint, only acts were alleged which were already completely performed
by the defendant. It is set forth in the complaint that the defendant entered
upon the land belonging to the plaintiffs, without permission and against the
latter's will, made excavations thereon, opened a ditch and built dams to
intercept the natural course of the water of the Panipuan estero which
crosses the said land, to divert such water to adjoining land held by the
defendant under lease, thereby causing detriment to the plaintiffs' said
property. The complaint further recites, textually, that "the defendant will
continue to perform the said acts on the plaintiffs' property * * * unless
he, his agents and other representatives are prohibited by the court * * *
from repeating and continuing to commit the acts above specified."
From this, it is very clear that the complaint alleges, not only acts already
effected, but also others which the defendant endeavored to effect by
repeating or continuing those already executed by him on the plaintiffs'
property. It being conceded that acts already consummated can not be the
subject of injunction, there is no doubt whatever that those acts which the
defendant is about to perform or intends to effect, whenever they infringe
the plaintiffs' rights and tend to render the judgment inefficacious, can be
enjoined. It is, moreover, to be noted that not only the commission or
execution of such acts, but also their continuation can be prevented or
prohibited by the said injunction, according to the express terms of section
164 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions. As a consequence derived
from the preceding premises, the facts alleged in the complaint constitute a
right of action, and the demurrer set up by the defendant under contrary
grounds was, therefore, very properly overruled.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
against the appellant. So ordered.
Batas.org