G.R. No.

92416 October 13, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JEFFREY LOGRONIO, accused-appellant.
(By Jocelyn Abot)

DOCTRINE: Custodial Investigation refers to the questioning initiated

by law enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom
of action in a significant way.
FACTS:

On the evening of December 8, 1986, Jeffrey Logronio robbed a

total of Php. 15,000 in assorted articles and cash, and on said occasion
caused the death of Felisa Daen by inflicting physical injuries. Upon
investigation, the police were told Jeffrey was in the mountains with
Allan Magayanes. They went to the mountains where Jeffrey was found
and he subsequently confessed to the crime and led them to the loot.
Jeffrey was brought to the police station for investigation, and was
assisted by counsel from the time he was advised of his constitutional
right to remain silent and to counsel, including the fact that his
testimony can be used as evidence against him, and Jeffrey gave him
consent to proceed with the investigation. Jeffrey then executed an
affidavit admitting to the crime, which he signed with his lawyer. The
statement though was left unsubscribed.

The prosecution’s facts (view of) were presented to the court and
were accepted. However during his direct testimony, Logronio
presented his own version of the facts where he claimed to have been
a witness to a crime actually perpetrated by a certain Frederico Dadu
Sr. and was assisted by Allan Magayanes, he also claimed that he
executed the extrajudicial confession because Magayanes threatened
him and his family. The trial court was not persuaded and Logronio
was found guilty of the crimes. Hence the appeal to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Was the written confession of the accused admissible, given the

following circumstances:
1. He did not voluntarily execute the extrajudicial confession.
2. He was not assisted by counsel during his custodial
investigation.
3. He was not meaningfully appraised of his rights during
custodial investigation, and
4. His extrajudicial confession had not been subscribed or sworn
to before an officer authorized to administer oaths.

1
RULING:

The Court affirmed the Decision of the trial court dated 12

December 1989, and that the indemnity to be paid by accused-
appellant to the heirs of the victim Felisa Daen was increased to
P50,000.00

DISCUSSION:

The Court ruled that Jeffrey’s claims that he was threatened to

execute the extrajudicial affidavit has no basis since he was not beaten
or maltreated by the police officers, nor was Allan Magayanes, whom
he claims to be well connected was present during the investigation.
His contention that he was not meaningfully assisted by counsel has
no bearing as well since both he and his counsel both signed the
extrajudicial confession.

Further, the appellant’s claim that the custodial investigation

began at the mountains does not persuade the court. In People vs.
Caguioa, the Court defined “custodial investigation” to refer to
“questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has
been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way.” Therefore at the time of the police inquiry in
the mountains, Logronio and Magayanes were neither persons under
investigation nor suspects under investigation, as there was nothing to
tie them to the crime until Logronio’s confession and voluntarily led to
the police to the location of the loot.

Finally, the contention that the extrajudicial confession is

inadmissible because it had not been sworn holds no bearing, as there
are no provisions in the law that requires confessions or admissions to
be subscribed and sworn, otherwise they would be inadmissible.

2
 PEOPLE vs. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 110290. January 25, 1995
(By Donnabee Kathryn Maylem)

DAVIDE, JR., J.

DOCTRINE: The right to be informed carries with it the correlative

obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates
effective communication which results in the subject understanding
what is conveyed.

FACTS: In five separate informations filed, Agustin, et. al were

charged with murder, frustrated murder and with attempted murder.
The crimes were allegedly committed in Baguio City and resulted in
the deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and
the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny
Ancheta.

Accused Quiaño, an alleged former military agent or “asset”

confessed during the investigation that he was the triggerman in the
fatal shooting. He implicated three other people engaged in the
incident, including Agustin. During the investigation, he was assisted
by Atty. Cajucom and Ms. Napeñas, IBP representative and
stenographer, respectively. The sworn statement was signed and
swore before City Fiscal Balajadia.

In the next day, Agustin was apprehended and investigated.

He insisted that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of
his rights under Section 11, Article III of the Constitution. He argues
that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was not of
his own choice but was foisted upon him by the City Fiscal. Worse, the
said lawyer is a law partner of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur
Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he
understood only Ilocano. He then concludes that his extrajudicial
confession is inadmissible and his conviction cannot stand, there being
no other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicted him for two (2)
counts of murder. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether the extrajudicial admission—not extrajudicial

confession—of Agustin is wholly inadmissible.

3
HELD: Yes, the extrajudicial admission and not extrajudicial
confession of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the
prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is
wholly inadmissible because it was taken in violation of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution.

The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to

counsel contemplates “the transmission of meaningful information
rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an
abstract constitutional principle.” It is not enough for the investigator
to merely repeat to the person under investigation the provisions of
Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III
of the present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of
such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person under
investigation may or may not do and in a language the subject fairly
understands.

Therefore, the accused-appellant Agustin was acquitted.

4
 G.R. No. 138045, March 14, 2001

PEOPLE vs. PATUNGAN

(By Reginald Pinca)

DOCTRINE:

The presence of a lawyer alone, will not suffice to fulfill the

requirement of the constitutional provision. The assistance of counsel
must be independent and competent that is, providing full protection
to the constitutional rights of the accused.

FACTS:

On August 16, 1994 an Information was filed against Marietta

Patungan for parricide and against Elmerto Pulga and Edgar Acebuche
for murder of victim ALEJANDRO PATUNGAN Y RANGEL. On September
6, 1994 the three accused pleaded "not guilty" to the offense
charged.5

In addition to the testimonies of Antonio and Antonia, the

prosecution presented the extra-judicial confession of the accused
Elmerto Pulga, the testimonies of the police officers who took the
statement, of the lawyer from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Quezon City Chapter, Atty. Pedro Rudio, who allegedly assisted the
accused Elmerto Pulga during the custodial investigation and of the
medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy. The extra-judicial
confession6 of accused Elmerto Pulga dated August 11, 1994 linked
Marietta to the killing of her husband. The trial court upheld the
validity of the extra-judicial confession and rendered judgment
convicting the three accused guilty of the crime charged. The case
reached the Supreme Court on automatic review.

Counsel for the appellants assigns as error the trial court's

appreciation of the testimonies of the-prosecution witnesses and its
finding in favor of the validity of the extra-judicial confession executed
by Elmerto Pulga.

ISSUE:

Whether the extra-judicial confession of appellant Elmerto Pulga

is inadmissible in evidence.

RULING:

An extra-judicial confession to be admissible in evidence must be

express and voluntarily executed in writing with the assistance of an
independent and competent counsel16 and a person under custodial

5
investigation must be continuously assisted by counsel from the very
start thereof.17 The presence of counsel is intended to secure the
voluntariness of the extra-judicial confession. 18 The presence of a
lawyer alone, will not suffice to fulfill the requirement of the
constitutional provision. The assistance of counsel must be
independent and competent that is, providing full protection to
the constitutional rights of the accused. 19 A lawyer who simply
goes through the motion of reciting the rights of the accused, or acts
as a witness to a pre-prepared document containing the extra-judicial
confession of the accused or holds an interest contrary to that of the
accused does not qualify as independent and competent counsel.

In this case, it was only after appellant Pulga verbally confessed

at the police precinct, without the assistance of counsel, when he was
brought to the IBP office allegedly for the actual transcription of his
confession in writing in the presence of a lawyer. It would appear that
whatever statement Pulga allegedly gave to the police for transcription
in the presence of counsel is the product of two and a half days of
coercive and uncounselled custodial investigation. Not only was Pulga
subjected to custodial investigation without counsel, he was likewise
denied effective assistance of counsel during the actual taking of his
extra-judicial confession.

For the reasons above stated, the extra-judicial confession of

appellant Elmerto Pulga is inadmissible in evidence for having been
obtained without effective assistance of counsel.

6
 FACTS NEEDED TO PROVE RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESS
People of the Philippines,
vs.
Silvestre Liwanag alias “Linda Bie”
G.R. No. L-27683: 19 October 1976.
(By Dave Jonathan Morente)

CONCEPCION J.:

Facts: In June 1942, accused Silvestre Liwanag alias Linda Bie, Nene,
Bets, Apong Iro, Silver, Pet, Apong Pedro, Agustin, and Seniong joined
the “Hukbo ng Bayan Laban sa Hapon” (Hukbalahap) as commander of
Squadron 16-E and was later promoted as military inspector to resist
Japanese occupation. Before the 1946 election, the accused was
designated as provincial commander and later vice-commander of
Central Luzon Regional Command.

In 1948, Liwanag was nominated by members of the Communist

Party of the Philippines (CPP) to the post of Central Committee to their
military arm now called “Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan”. He also
became the supervisor and advisor to Squadron 18 FC in Bulacan until
1958. From 1956-1958, he became chief of RECO Military
Department of RECO 2. In 1958, he suffered from an ailment and
retreated to recuperate to Bataan after an encounter with the PC.
During his leave, his advice was sought after. In June 1961, PC patrol
led by Major Wilfredo Encarnacion captured appellant and his wife
Rosita Manuel in Orion Bataan.

Liwanag was charged with violation of R.A. 1700 (Anti-Subversion

Act) before the Court of First Instance Bataan. He was present during
the preliminary investigation with his counsel who cross-examined the
witnesses for the prosecution. The court found prima facie case and
issued a warrant of arrest and set the case for trial. During
arraignment, he pled not guilty. In 1961, appellant filed a Motion to
Quash information on the grounds that he was previously convicted of
rebellion with the same acts as subversion and that RA 1700 is an ex-
post facto law. The Court denied this motion. The fiscal moved to
adopt the testimony of the witnesses in the preliminary investigation
subject to cross. During the trial, these witnesses with the addition of
three other witnesses were presented and cross-examined. Appellant
admitted in court that he was still member member of Hukbalahap and
HMB and was not granted any amnesty. In March 1967, the trial court
of Rizal, since he was detained in Fort Bonifacio, Makati, Rizal,
promulgated the decision which found the accused guilty of the crime
of subversion.

7
Issue: 1. Whether appellant was deprived of his fundamental
right to confront the witnesses against him.

2. Whether the “two-witness” rule under Section 7 of RA

170 was not observed.

3. Whether the appellant’s previous conviction of rebellion

precludes the prosecution for subversion.

Ruling:

1. No. The Constitution guarantees an accused person the right

to meet the witnesses against him fact of face. The intention of this
provision is to prevent the conviction of the accused upon depositions
or ex-parte affidavits, and particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the witnesses in the exercise of the
right of cross-examination."

In the present case, the testimonies sought to include as

evidence are not ex-parte affidavits but testimony of witnesses taken
down by question and answer during the preliminary investigation in
the presence of the accused and his counsel who subjected the said
witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination. The inclusion of said
testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to further
cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be
reproduce and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to
the stand during the trial and again examined in the presence of the
appellant. Upon the fact, there was no curtailment of the constitutional
right of the accused to meet the witnesses face to face.

2. No. Santos Miguel, Melencio Guevara, Pablo Guintu, and

Lazaro Esteban, members of Communist Party of the Philippine (CCP)
and Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bansa (HMB) testified on appellant's
being an officer or ranking leader of the CPP and the HMB. Also
appellant’s own sworn statement admitted membership in the Central
Committee of the CPP and "Hukbalahap" and later HMB, as well as the
numerous armed clashed he and his men had with the Philippine
Constabulary and police forces. Pablo Guintu, Melencio Guevara, and
Sgt. Sales Cresencia also testified to the gun battle between a PC
patrol and a group of HMB men led by the appellant on June 8, 1960,
in Mt. Timak, Abucay, Bataan, and on June 21, 1960, in Calungusan,
Orion, Bataan, where the appellant was captured along with his wife.
Besides, where the appellant was captured along with his wife.
Appellant admitted in court his membership to "Hukbalahap" and
"Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" or HMB and fought against the
government.

3. No. Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, is a

crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. The crime of rebellion is
committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the
Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act (Republic Act No.
8
1700) punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization
as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and
the taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion,
mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the
taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against
the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be
imposed upon the offender. In the instant case, however, the accused
is prosecuted under Republic Act No. 1700 for having remained a high
ranking member of the Communist Party of the Philippines and its
military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without
having renounced his membership in said organizations; and, being a
member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms
against the Government.

Decision Affirmed.

9
Miranda v. CA

10
 HONOR P. MOSLARES
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 129744 June 26, 1998
(By Anna Ganado)

DOCTRINE: To deny petitioner's appeal is tantamount to denying

him due process. Although the right to appeal is a statutory, not a
natural right, it is an essential part of the judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of this
prerogative, but instead, afford every party-litigant the amplest
opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from
the constraints of technicalities

FACTS: Petitioner Mosrales ordered three vehicles from Toyota

being an officer in a corporation, who are the actual purchaser of cars.
Those aforementioned cars were named after his name, Manila
Development Construction Corporation and the last one under the
name of Austria Phil-homes Inc. In payment thereof, he presented a
check amounting to Php 1, 425,780 but was subsequently dishonored
by the bank for insufficient funds. As a result hereof, the petitioner
was charged with BP 22 or Bouncing Checks Law.
During the pendency of the case, the hearing was
postponed for several times. Thereupon, on the presentation of the
evidence, the petitioner failed to attend but was represented by a new
lawyer and asked for the re-schedule of the hearing. He then filed
Motion for Re Trial which was denied by the trial court as a result of
nineteen times that the presentation of evidence failed to commence.
In view thereof, the trial court rendered its judgement in absentia
finding the accused guilty of violation of Batas Pambansa 22.
The accused filed an appeal which was denied by the
lower court. Thus, he filed a petition for review on certiorari to the
court of appeals which was dismissed and also denied his petition to
post a bail.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming

that the accused has waived his right to appeal and in sustaining the
decision of the lower court of denying his right to bail thereby denying
his right to due process.

11
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the right of the
accused are given paramount importance in our laws and the rules of
criminal procedure. The Court also pronounced that while it is true that
the right to present evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it
cannot be said that petitioner had waived said right in this case. The
postponements sought by petitioner and counsel appear to be justified
and were not vexatious and oppressive as borne by the record of the
case. The intention and the willingness of petitioner to present
evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented
one witness and has other witnesses ready for presentation.
On the matter of bail, the Supreme Court provided
provisions of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court when a bail is a matter of
right. The Court posited that the accused was not found guilty of an
offense punishable by death or reclusion perpetua where bail is a
matter of right nor he has been convicted of an offense punishable by
imprisonment of six to twenty years where bail is a matter of judicial
discretion. In view of these, the petitioner has the right to post bail.

12
 People of the Philippines
vs.
De La Peña
G.R. No. 92534, July 9, 1991
(By Glaizel Marie Cantoria)

Melencio-Herrera, J.:

Facts:
Esmenio De La Peña was arrested in a buy-bust operation for
selling marijuana. The corresponding Information was filed and upon
arraignment, he entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution’s
evidence stated that on March 24, 1988 at about 02:00pm, Lt.
Eleuterio Salde of the Narcotics Command, Iloilo City received a phone
call from a concerned citizen informing him that a certain "Esmie" was
selling marijuana at Punta Baluarte, Molo, Iloilo City. He then led a
team to conduct a buy-bust operation. Arriving at the directed place at
about 05:00pm, Sgt. Francisco Allaga proceeded to a sari-sari store
and inquired from a child therein about one "Esmie". The child pointed
to De La Peña who was seated under a waiting shade. Sgt. Allaga
approached and asked De La Peña if he could "score". De La Peña
asked, "how much do you want" to which Sgt. Allaga replied "worth
P30.00". Asked to wait, Sgt. Allaga then gave the amount to De La
Peña, who left and returned after five minutes with a parcel wrapped
in a "Camel" cigarette pack. De La Peña handed the parcel to Sgt.
Allaga who opened it, and upon seeing that it contained marijuana,
arrested De La Peña. At the Narcom headquarters, Lt. Salde placed
identifying marks on the package which he kept in a padlocked steel
cabinet for safekeeping. He also issued a receipt for the property
seized which was witnessed by Sgt. Allaga and signed by De La Peña.
After the prosecution had rested its case, De La Peña filed a "Demurrer
to Evidence" with leave of Court on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence to produce conviction. The RTC denied dismissal.

On his part, De La Peña narrated that as he was washing clothes

at his aunt’s house, Sgt. Allaga arrived and inquired from him where
marijuana could be bought. He replied that he did not know but Sgt.
Allaga insisted. Then, Aris Magarse and Angeles Octavio passed by and
De La Peña informed them that the man needed marijuana. Magarse
volunteered to look for marijuana and upon returning, she handed the
marijuana to De La Peña which, in turn, gave to Sgt. Allaga who
apprehended him. Octavio corroborated De La Peña’s testimony.

13
 The RTC rejected De La Peña’s version for being replete with
inconsistencies and improbabilities and gave more credence to the
testimony of Sgt. Allaga. De La Peña alleged that the RTC erred in
giving credence to the prosecution evidence rather than to his
corroborated testimony and in not finding that the circumstances
leading to his apprehension constitute instigation rather than a valid
entrapment.

Issue:
Whether or not the allegations of De La Peña are correct

Held:
The RTC did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Sgt.
Allaga which, although uncorroborated, is credible and sufficient to
support conviction. De La Peña’s story pointing to Magarse as the
supplier of the prohibited drug is far from credible notwithstanding its
corroboration by Octavio. As found by the RTC, De La Peña had
inconsistencies in his version of the incident. In his Counter-Affidavit,
he stated that when he was approached by Sgt. Allaga, he was
watching his friends playing mahjong. However, his testimony in Court
was that he was washing clothes in the house of his aunt when so
approached. Contradicting both statements is the testimony of Octavio
that he was with Magarse when they passed by De La Peña in a
"footpath" conversing with Sgt. Allaga. Further, De La Peña stated in
his Counter-Affidavit that "I left him and later I returned with fifteen
sticks of marijuana cigarettes for him." However, in open Court, he
was attributing sole fault to Magarse.

The RTC aptly characterized De La Peña’s apprehension as

"entrapment" and not "instigation", the underlying difference being in
the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, mens rea originates
from the mind of the criminal. In instigation, the law officers conceive
the commission of the crime and suggest it to the accused, who adopts
the idea and carries it into execution. In this case, Sgt. Allaga’s inquiry
to De La Peña was far from a suggestion. De La Peña needed no
inducement, his reaction being natural to one who was already
engaged in the illicit trade of marijuana and all that Narcom did was to
catch him in the act. Therefore, De La Peña does not deserve acquittal.
In addition, De La Peña’s signature on the receipt of the property
seized is not a factor in his conviction. Said signature is inadmissible in
evidence against him since it was obtained without the assistance of a
counsel. De La Peña’s guilt has been adequately established by other
evidence of record.

14
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
v.
RODOLFO NICOLAS y DE LOS REYES, ROQUE DILAO y ADAYO
and GIL TAPONG y ESGUERRA, Accused, GIL TAPONG y
ESGUERRA, Appellant.
G.R. No. 88381, November 21, 1991
(By Charmaine Cayaban)

Gutierrez, Jr., J.
DOCTRINE:
A judgment of conviction must be predicated on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution and not on the weakness of the evidence
for the defense. An accusation can never be made synonymous with
guilt.

FACTS:
Rodolfo Nicolas, Roque Dilao, and Gil Tapong are being accused with
the crime of Robbery with Homicide. The accused allegedly opened a
steel vault and took and carried away all the cash that was inside,
amounting to P26,000.00, belonging to the victim, Ong Tai. On the
occasion of the Robbery, Ong Tai was attacked with knife and was
stabbed with an icepick, which resulted to Ong Tai’s death. The same
accused were charged with the crime of arson, for deliberately setting
fire to the storeroom owned by Ong Tai.

Herein accused was found to be an employee of the victim. Nicolas and

Dilao had a good relationship with Ong Tai, whom they even called to
as “Papa”. The morning after the incident, Nicolas and Dilao was
informed of the robbery, homicide, and the burning of the store. When
questioned by the police, they told them that they knew nothing about
it. Dilao, Nicolas, and Tapong was then brought to the headquarters
for further questioning. A certain Roberto Yap said that he saw three
persons outside the store but failed to identify them.

During the wake of Ong Tai, Gil Tapong did not attend. This has
caused the police to look for him. Gil Tipong admitted ownership over
the pants and money covered in blood inside his locker, which was

15
found in the store. When he was found Gil Tapong gave his statement
and confessed to the crime and he implicated Rodolfo Nicolas and
Roque Dilao. Dilao and Nicolas was not present when Tipong gave this
statement.

The Trial Court rendered a decision and found Tipong to be guilty

beyond reasonable doubt because of the circumstantial evidence found
in his locker and the admission given.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in considering the circumstantial
evidence and extrajudicial confession as sufficient to convict the
accused.

RULING:
Yes.

The rule is firmly entrenched that a judgment of conviction must be

predicated on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not
on the weakness of the evidence for the defense. It is incumbent on
the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies and the freedom of
the accused can be forfeited only if the requisite quantum of proof
necessary for conviction is in existence.

In the case at bar, the circumstantial evidence used when tested with
the standards prescribed by law, was not sufficient.

Also, the extrajudicial confession made was an uncounseled confession

before the investigating officer therefore it cannot be admissible as
evidence. Jurisprudence dictates, in the case of People v. Jara, the
Prosecution must prove with strongly convincing evidence to the
satisfaction of the Court that indeed the accused willingly and
voluntarily submitted his confession and knowingly and deliberately
manifested that he was not interested in having a lawyer assist him
during the taking of that confession. Such proof is missing in this case.

16
 Extrajudicial Confession
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MERCY SANTOS Y ENTIENZA, accused-appellant
(By Jocelyn Abot)

DOCTRINE: A confession is not admissible in evidence unless the

prosecution satisfactorily shows that it was obtained
within the limits imposed by the 1987 Constitution.

FACTS:

Mercy Santos was arrested for kidnapping and serious illegal

detention of Charmaine Mamaril, 7 years old, who went missing from
her school on March 8, 1993. She was later on returned to her family
on March 13, 1993. With the assistance of the PAO Lawyer, Atty. Noel
Ocampo, Santos pleaded “not guilty” to the charge during
arraignment. She was later on found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention.

Upon her testimony, Mercy Santos denied the allegation and

claimed that her extrajudicial confession was extracted in violation of
her constitutional rights. However, the trial court still considered her
extrajudicial confession as proof of her guilt.

ISSUE:

Should the extrajudicial confession have been admitted into

evidence despite the claims of violation of constitutional rights?

RULING:

The court ruled that the extrajudicial admission in this case is

inadmissible.

DISCUSSION:

The admissibility of the extrajudicial confession hinges on the

following: (1) the person under investigation must be informed of their

17
rights such as right to remain silent and right to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. These rights cannot
be waived except in writing and in presence of counsel. Any confession
or admission that violates these rights shall be deemed inadmissible in
evidence against him. It is should also be tested for voluntariness, i.e.
if it was given freely- without coercion, intimidation, inducement, or
false promises; and credibility, i.e. if it was consistent with the normal
experience of mankind.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs.
RENE JANUARIO y ROLDAN
G.R. No. 98252
(By Alvin Capati)

Doctrine: Right to Counsel; Fruit of the Poisonous Tree; Verbal

Admission

Facts:
On or about September 4, 1987, at Barangay Bulihan,
Municipality of Silang, Province of Cavite, Rene Januario, together with
Efren Canape, Eliseo Sarita (alyas Toto), and Eduardo Sarinos (alyas
Digo) carnapped one Isuzu passenger type jeepney, with plate No.
DFB- 550, owned by Doris and Victor Wolf after stabbing to death the
driver Gernonimo (sic) Malibago and conductor Andrew Patriarca.
During interrogation at the NBI office, Januario was interviewed by one
Atty. Carlos Saunar, who, unbeknownst to Januario et al, was picked
by NBI Agent Atty. Magno Toribio to represent the said accused
because Atty. Saunar was “simply around & available”. Also
unbeknownst the accused, Atty. Saunar at that time was applying for a
position in the NBI. Assuming that Atty. Saunar will be representing
them as their counsel de officio, Januario divulged certain facts
regarding the case that could potentially incriminate them. Come the
day of their Trial, the accused were shocked to hear that all of the
information they provided to Atty. Saunar was laid down against them,
and ultimately led to them being adjudged guilty by the RTC.
Aggrieved, Januario et al argued that they did not receive a fair trial &
that their Constitutional right to Counsel has been violated since Atty.
Saunar, instead of representing them, appeared in the side of the
Prosecution.

Issue/s: To wit, the following case raises the following:

1.) Whether or not Januaro et al was correct in raising that the
trial procedure, particularly the presentation and admission of
the testimony of Atty. Carlos Saunar, was irregular and
prejudicial to the appellants

18
 2.) Whether or not Januario et al was correct in stating that the
extra-judicial confessions given by them are inadmissible as
evidence for having been extracted in violation of their
constitutional right to counsel

Held/ Ruling: The Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of Januario

et al & ACQUITTED him & Canape of the crime. As to the issues raised,
the Court decided as follows:
1.) As to the issue of the irregularity of Atty. Saunar’s testimony,
the Court ruled that YES, the presentation of Atty. Saunar’s
testimony is irregular & prejudicial to Januario et al, since
based on Rule 119, Atty. Saunario presented as an
ADDITIONAL PROSECUTION WITNESS & NOT A REBUTTAL
ONE. As such, it was clearly provided against Januario &
company.
The Court ruled that Januario et al was correct in stating that the
statements gleaned by Atty. Saunar is inadmissible as Evidence, given
that his independence & impartiality to the case is in question. As
such, his involvement may be considered as “Fruit of the Poisonous
Tree” and may not be admitted in any part of the proceeding.

19
People of the Philippines v. Aquilizab

20
 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
HERSON TAN y VERZO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 117321
February 11, 1998
(By Jerald Bofill)

ROMERO, J.:

DOCTRINE: It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an

uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence
against the confessant.

FACTS: On December 5, 1988, Freddie Saavedra, a tricycle driver

went to see his wife t at Our Lady of Angeles Academy in Atimonan,
Quezon to inform her that he will drive Lito Amido and Herson Tan to
Barangay Maligaya. It was the last time that Freddie was seen alive.
His lifeless body was later discovered on a diversion road with fourteen
stab wounds in different parts of his body.

Subsequently, Lt. Carlos Santos, Cpl. Numeriano Aguilar and Pat.

Rolando Alandy invited appellant Herson Tan in connection with the
instant case and with respect to two other robbery cases reported in
Lucena City. During their conversation, appellant allegedly gave an
explicit account of what actually transpired in the case at bar. He
narrated that he and co-accused Amido were responsible for the loss
of the motorcycle and the consequent death of Saavedra. Moreover,
he averred that they sold the motorcycle to a certain Danny Teves of
Barrio Summit, Muntinlupa for a sum of P4,000.00. With the help of
appellant as a guide, the Lucena PNP immediately dispatched a team
to retrieve the same.

Lt. Carlos, on cross-examination, testified that when he invited

appellant to their headquarters, he had no warrant for his arrest. In
the course thereof, he informed the latter that he was a suspect, not
21
only in the instant case, but also in two other robbery cases allegedly
committed in Lucena City. In the belief that they were merely
conversing inside the police station, he admitted that he did not inform
appellant of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to the
assistance of counsel; nor did he reduce the supposed confession to
writing.

On April 21, 1994, the trial court convicted appellant of Highway

Robbery with Murder.

ISSUE: Was the conviction by the trial could proper?

HELD: NO.

It is well-settled that the Constitution abhors an uncounselled

confession or admission and whatever information is derived therefrom
shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant.

Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by

law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner.
The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody,
and the police carries out a process of interrogations that tends itself
to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate.

Furthermore, not only does the fundamental law impose, as

a requisite function of the investigating officer, the duty to explain
those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly
be a meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the
accused. A mere perfunctory reading by the constable of such rights to
the accused would thus not suffice. Under the Constitution and existing
law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible must satisfy the
following requirements: (1) it must be voluntary; (2) it must be made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (3) it must
be express; and (4) it must be in writing.

The evidence for the prosecution shows that when appellant

was invited for questioning at the police headquarters, he allegedly
admitted his participation in the crime. This will not suffice to convict
him, however, of said crime. The constitutional rights of appellant,
particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are impregnable
from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere

22
invitation. "This Court values liberty and will always insist on the
observance of basic constitutional rights as a condition sine qua non
against the awesome investigative and prosecutory powers of
government."

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, appellant Herson Tan

is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime charged and his immediate release
from confinement is hereby ordered, unless there is any other lawful
cause for continued detention.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
LANIE ORTIZ-MIYAKE accused-appellant.
G.R. Nos. 115338-39. September 16, 1997
(By Emman Fernandez)

REGALADO, J.:

DOCTRINE:
“the accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of
confrontation. Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the
opportunity of cross-examination; and, second, to allow the judge to
observe the deportment and appearance of the witness while
testifying.”

FACTS:
Accused-appellant Lanie Ortiz-Miyake was charged with illegal
recruitment in large scale in the Regional Trial Court of Makati on a
complaint initiated by Elenita Marasigan, Imelda Generillo and
Rosamar del Rosario. In addition, she was indicted for estafa by means
of false pretenses in the same court, the offended party being Elenita
Marasigan alone.

In convicting appellant of illegal recruitment in large scale, the lower

court adopted a previous decision of Branch 78 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Parañaque as a basis for the judgment. Said previous
decision was a conviction for estafa promulgated on July 26, 1993, 23
rendered in Criminal Cases Nos. 74852-53, involving the same
circumstances in the instant case, wherein complainants Generillo and
Del Rosario charged appellant with two counts of estafa. This decision
was not appealed and had become final and executory.

23
In thus convicting appellant in the illegal recruitment case, the
decision therein of the Regional Trial Court stated that the facts in the
foregoing estafa cases were the same as those in the illegal
recruitment case before it. It, therefore, adopted the facts and
conclusions established in the earlier decision as its own findings of
facts and as its rationale for the conviction in the case before it.

The accused appellant submits that the adoption by the Makati court of
the facts in the decision of the Paraaque court for estafa to constitute
the basis of the subsequent conviction for illegal recruitment is
erroneous as it is a violation of the right of appellant to confront the
witnesses, that is, complainants Generillo and Del Rosario, during trial
before it.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a violation on the right of the appellant to
confront the witnesses under Rule 115 of the Revised Rule of Criminal
Procedure.

HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court Held that under the afore cited rules, the
accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right of confrontation.
Such right has two purposes: first, to secure the opportunity of cross-
examination; and, second, to allow the judge to observe the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying.

This right, however, is not absolute as it is recognized that it is

sometimes impossible to recall or produce a witness who has already
testified in a previous proceeding, in which event his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of
exception to the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made
admissible because it makes the administration of justice orderly and
expeditious.

Under these rules, the adoption by the Makati trial court of the facts
stated in the decision of the Paraaque trial court does not fall under
the exception to the right of confrontation as the exception
contemplated by law covers only the utilization of testimonies of
absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not include
utilization of previous decisions or judgments.

In the instant case, the prosecution did not offer the testimonies made
by complainants Generillo and Del Rosario in the previous estafa case.
Instead, what was offered, admitted in evidence, and utilized as a

24
basis for the conviction in the case for illegal recruitment in large scale
was the previous decision in the estafa case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

v.
CARLOS TRANCA Y ARELLANO
G.R. No. 110357. August 17, 1994
(By Maria Laya Lara)

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

FACTS:

On May 10, 1991, an information was filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Makati, charging accused Carlos Tranca y Arellano with
the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Sgt. Jose Latumbo and SPO1 Francisco Matundan of National

Capital Region NARCOM Unit (NCRNU) alleged the following facts:

On 6 May 1991 at 11:00 p.m., a "confidential agent" or informer

revealed that a certain "Jon-Jon", later identified as Tranca, was selling
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) along Kalayaan Avenue,
Makati, Metro Manila. Capt. Miano formed a buy-bust team with
himself as the team leader, Sgt. Latumbo as the poseur-buyer, and
others as forming the support group. The accused was spotted at the
corner of Kalayaan Avenue and J.B. Roxas Street and as planned, Sgt.
Latumbo and the informer approached the accused to buy shabu. Sgt.
Latumbo handed to the accused a P100.00 marked money, examined
the package he received, and upon ascertaining that it was really
shabu, gave signal for the arrest.

The accused contended that he was framed by the police officers.

According to him, he was inside his house the whole day with his
family. At about 11:40 p.m., while he was fixing his videocassette
recorder, he heard a knocking at the front door and upon opening said
door, four men suddenly barged in. He contended that he was asked
to name drug dealers and was threatened to be killed should he refuse
25
to do so. He also alleged that the evidence, including the marked
money, was planted. The trial court found the accused guilty as
charged. Tranca appealed the decision to the Supreme Court.

Tranca avers that the constitutional presumption of innocence in

his favor was not overcome by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
He likewise contends that his Constitutionally granted right against
self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an
ultraviolet ray examination, and that Chemist Teresita Alberto failed to
inform him of his right to counsel before subjecting him to the
examination.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not Tranca’s Constitutionally granted right against

self-incrimination was violated when he was made to undergo an
ultraviolet ray examination.
2. Whether or not the subjection of the accused’s body to ultraviolet
radiation in order to determine the presence of ultraviolet
powder, is considered custodial investigation so as to warrant the
presence of counsel.

HELD:

No. What is prohibited by the constitutional guarantee against self-

incrimination is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communication from the witness, not an inclusion of his body in
evidence, when it may be material. Stated otherwise, it is simply a
prohibition against legal process to extract from the defendant’s own
lips, against his will, an admission of guilt. Nor can the subjection of
the accused’s body to ultraviolet radiation, in order to determine the
presence of ultraviolet powder, be considered a custodial investigation
so as to warrant the presence of counsel. Thus, the Court affirmed the
finding of the trial court that the accused was caught in flagrante
selling shabu to the members of the buy-bust team.

26
 Tickler: CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED; RIGHT
TO CROSS EXAMINE WITNESS; WAIVER OF RIGHT
RUPERTO FULGADO, substituted by his heirs, JULIANA, JOSE,
MAXIMO, PACITA and SEVERO all surnamed FULGADO,
petitioners, vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINO CUSTODIO, SIMPLICIA
CUSTODIO, ARSENIO PIGUING, ISMAEL PORCIUNCULA and
DOMINGA MACARULAY, respondents.
G.R. No. L-61570 February 12, 1990.
(By: Ezra Villar)

FERNAN, C.J.
Doctrine: The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing
witnesses in a judicial litigation… is a fundamental right which is part
of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation
of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the
opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony
given on direct examination of the witness will be received or allowed
to remain in the record.
Facts:
On September 9,1967, Ruperto Fulgado filed an action in the CFI of
Rizal against the respondents for annulment of certain contracts of
sale and partition with accounting. The latter group and their counsel
were not present in the pre-trial and the court allowed the elderly
petitioner to submit his evidence ex parte which led to the court ruling
in his favor.

The CA, however, ruled that the private respondents were deprived of
their day in court because of the CFI’s unjust denial of their motion to
lift the order of default and decided to remand the case. Before the
hearing of the new case which was postponed to January 15 and
February 15, 1976, Fulgado died and was substituted by his heirs and
his witness Jose Fulgado, already migrated to the US.

27
In lieu of the aforementioned circumstances, the respondents moved
to strike out the testimonies of Ruperto and Jose Fulgado, claiming
that they did not and will not have the opportunity to cross-examine
the witnesses. However, the counsel of Fulgado raised that the
respondents were already guilty of laches as they had all the
opportunity to do so. The CFI and the CA both ruled in favor of the
respondents. Thus, this case.

Issue:
Were the testimonies of Jose Fulgado and Ruperto Fulgado
inadmissible for being hearsay because the respondents were not able
to cross-examine the said witnesses?

Ruling:
No. The court cited Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang
Pilipino, wherein it was illuminated by Justice Muñoz Palma that:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a

judicial litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before
administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right
which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may
be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a renunciation of
the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity
to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily
forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the
record.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the

right to cross-examine may take various forms. But the common basic
principle underlying the application of the rule on implied waiver is that the
party was given the opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing
witness but failed to take advantage of it for reasons attributable to himself
alone.

Having had the liberty to cross-examine and having opted not to

exercise it, the case is then the same in effect as if private respondent
had actually cross-examined. The Court held that it was gross error for
both the trial court and the Appellate Court to dismiss the complaint in
Civil Case No. 10256 on the ultimate ground that there was an alleged
failure of cross-examination. The wholesale exclusion of testimonies
was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse because it
prejudiced the party whose only fault during the entire proceedings
was to die before he could be cross-examined. The Court remanded
the case to the trial court.

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