SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 224936. September 4, 2019.]

PNOC ALTERNATIVE FUELS CORPORATION , petitioner, vs. NATIONAL

GRID CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondent.

DECISION

CAGUIOA , J : p

Before the Court is an appeal via a Petition for Certiorari 1 (Petition) under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court led by petitioner PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation
(petitioner PAFC), assailing the Order 2 dated February 11, 2016 (assailed Order of
Expropriation) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mariveles, Bataan, Branch 4 in SCA
Case No. 104-ML entitled National Grid Corporation of the Philippines v. PNOC
Alternative Fuels Corporation, et al.
The Facts and Antecedent Proceedings
The instant case stems from a Complaint 3 for Expropriation (Complaint) led by
respondent National Grid Corporation of the Philippines (respondent NGCP) on
February 9, 2011 against petitioner PAFC, Orica Philippines, Inc. (Orica), Edgardo P.
Manieda, Winy P. Manieda, Mercedes P. Manieda, Nemy Manieda Amado, Danilo P.
Manieda, the Heirs of Leonardo Serios, 4 and Cresencia Toribio Soriano, represented by
Imelda S. Villareal.
In the Complaint, respondent NGCP claims that it is a private corporation
engaged in the business of transmitting electric power from generating plants of
power producers to distributors. 5 Respondent NGCP was granted a "franchise to
operate, manage and maintain, and in connection therewith, to engage in the business
of conveying or transmitting electricity through high voltage back-bone system of
interconnected transmission lines, substations and related facilities, system
operations, and other activities that are necessary to support the safe and reliable
operation of the transmission system and to construct, install, nance, manage,
improve, expand, operate, maintain, rehabilitate, repair and refurbish the present
nationwide transmission system of the Republic of the Philippines" 6 under Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9511.
Respondent NGCP likewise alleged that, in order for it to construct and maintain
the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project, it sought to expropriate, upon
payment of just compensation, a certain area of a parcel of land situated at Barangay
Batangas II, Mariveles, Bataan and Barangay Lamao, Limay, Bataan, having a total area
of 101,290.42 square meters, more or less (the subject property). The subject property
is part of the Petrochemical Industrial Park. 7
The Petrochemical Industrial Park was originally part of a parcel of land of the
public domain having an approximate area of 621 hectares reserved by the government
for the Lamao Horticultural Experiment Station through Executive Order (E.O.) No. 48,
series of 1919. 8
Subsequently, in 1968, Presidential Proclamation (P.P.) No. 361 was issued,
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 withdrawing 418 out of the 621 hectares of land of the public domain from the
coverage of E.O. No. 48, and declaring the same as an industrial reservation to be
administered by the National Power Corporation (NPC). 9
In 1969, P.P. No. 630 was issued amending P.P. No. 361. P.P. No. 630 enlarged
the area covered by P.P. No. 361 and reserved the same for industrial purposes,
including the establishment of an industrial estate under the administration of the
National Development Company (NDC) or a subsidiary thereof organized for such
purposes. 1 0
In 1976, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 949 was issued, which transferred the
administration, management, and ownership of the parcel of land of the public domain
located at Lamao, Limay, Bataan covered by P.P. No. 361, as amended by P.P. No. 630,
to the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC).
According to P.D. No. 949, the PNOC shall manage, operate and develop the
parcel of land as a petrochemical industrial zone and will establish, develop and
operate or cause the establishment, development and operation thereat of
petrochemical and related industries by itself or its subsidiaries or by any other entity
or person it may deem competent alone or in joint venture. 1 1
Subsequently, in 1981, P.D. No. 1803 was issued, enlarging the area reserved for
the Petrochemical Industrial Zone established under P.D. No. 949. 1 2
In 1993, petitioner PAFC, which originally had the name PNOC Petrochemicals
Development Corporation (PPDC), was incorporated as a subsidiary of PNOC for the
primary purpose of administering and operating the Petrochemical Industrial Zone. In
2006, the articles of incorporation of PPDC were amended, changing the name of PPDC
to PNOC Alternative Fuels Corporation. 1 3
Subsequently, in 2011, respondent NGCP led its Complaint seeking to
expropriate the subject property from petitioner PAFC. According to respondent NGCP,
it sought to exercise its right of eminent domain over the subject property because
negotiations conducted between petitioner PAFC and respondent NGCP on the
establishment of transmission lines on the subject property were unsuccessful.
Respondent NGCP invoked its general authority to exercise the right of eminent domain
under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, which reads:
Section 4.  Right of Eminent Domain. — Subject to the limitations
and procedures prescribed by law, the Grantee is authorized to exercise the right
of eminent domain insofar as it may be reasonably necessary for the
construction, expansion, and e cient maintenance and operation of the
transmission system and grid and the e cient operation and maintenance of
the subtransmission systems which have not yet been disposed by TRANSCO.
The Grantee may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for the
realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted: Provided, That
the applicable law on eminent domain shall be observed, particularly, the
prerequisites of taking of possession and the determination and payment of
just compensation.
Orica led its Answer 1 4 on April 25, 2011, alleging that it is a lessee of a portion
of the Petrochemical Industrial Park, where it put up a manufacturing plant that
produces commercial blasting explosives and initiating systems products. In its
Answer, Orica raised several special a rmative defenses to oppose respondent
NGCP's Complaint. For its part, petitioner PAFC led its Answer 1 5 on May 3, 2011,
alleging, in sum, that several statutes and issuances limit respondent NGCP's right to
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 expropriate and that "the land sought to be appropriated is already devoted to a public
purpose, speci cally to petrochemical and petrochemical related industries which is
considered as essential to the national interest" 1 6 and that "[i]t is only the Congress of
the Philippines which has the power to exercise the right of eminent domain over the
subject property as it is already devoted for a public purpose." 1 7 Respondent NGCP
led its Reply 1 8 on May 12, 2011, defending its authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain over the subject property.
During the pendency of the expropriation case, in 2013, R.A. No. 10516 was
passed by Congress. The said law expanded the use of the Petrochemical Industrial
Park to include businesses engaged in energy and energy-allied activities or energy-
related infrastructure projects, or of such other business activities that will promote its
best economic use.
On June 6, 2013, the Department of Energy (DOE) issued Department Circular No.
DC2013-06-0011 or the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 10516.
The said IRR stated that the PNOC, pursuant to its duty to manage, operate and develop
the subject parcel of land as an industrial zone, had organized petitioner PAFC and
assigned ownership of the property to petitioner PAFC via Deed of Assignment dated
August 11, 1994. Further, petitioner PAFC, as owner of the property, was mandated to
manage, operate and develop the property in accordance with R.A. No. 10516 and its
IRR.
Subsequently, the RTC issued the assailed Order of Expropriation and ruled that
respondent NGCP has a lawful right to expropriate the subject property upon payment
of just compensation. The dispositive portion of the assailed Order of Expropriation
reads:
WHEREFORE , the a rmative defense of defendants PNOC-AFC and
Orica Philippines, Inc. are hereby denied for lack of merit. Parties are hereby
directed to submit the names of the three (3) Commissioners to be appointed by
the Court. Set this case for the reception of evidence to establish defendants'
valid claim of ownership to be entitled for the payment of just compensation.
SO ORDERED. 1 9
In issuing the assailed Order of Expropriation, the RTC held that "[n]owhere in the
annals of legislation and jurisprudence is it stated that a property already devoted to
public use or purpose is invulnerable to expropriation. Neither has it once been held by
the Constitution (sic) any law or particular jurisprudence that a property already
expropriated, (sic) may no longer be subject to another expropriation. Justice Isagani
Cruz, one of the foremost constitutionalists in the country holds that property already
devoted to public use is still be (sic) subject to expropriation provided that it is done
directly by the national legislature or under a speci c grant of authority to the delegate."
20

In relation to the foregoing, the RTC stressed that under R.A. No. 9511,
respondent NGCP "has a legislative franchise to engage in the business of conveying or
transmitting electricity throughout the country. Under this law, [respondent NGCP] was
given the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. Hence, and pursuant to
Sec[.] 4[,] Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court, the Court believes that [respondent
NGCP] has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just compensation." 2 1
Petitioner PAFC led its Motion for Reconsideration 2 2 of the RTC's assailed
Order of Expropriation, which was denied by the RTC in its Order 2 3 dated April 18,
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 2016.
Hence, the instant appeal before the Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Petitioner PAFC prays that the Court set aside the RTC's Orders dated February 11,
2016 and April 18, 2016 and "hold that [respondent] NGCP's expropriation of
[petitioner] PAFC's property is improper and without legal basis." 2 4
Respondent NGCP led its Comment 2 5 dated January 26, 2017, alleging, in sum,
that the issues raised in the Petition are not considered legal questions because their
determination requires the ndings of facts, that petitioner PAFC's direct recourse
before the Court is improper, and that land already devoted to public use can still be
expropriated for another public purpose.
In response, petitioner PAFC led its Reply 2 6 dated July 14, 2017, reiterating its
argument that R.A. No. 9511 clearly limits respondent NGCP's right of eminent domain
to private property.
Issue
Stripped to its core, the instant Petition presents two main issues for the Court's
disposition: (1) whether petitioner PAFC was correct in ling its Rule 45 Petition
directly before the Court, and (2) whether the RTC was correct in issuing the assailed
Order of Expropriation, which held that respondent NGCP is empowered to expropriate
the subject property under R.A. No. 9511.
The Court's Ruling
In deciding the merits of the instant Petition, the Court resolves the
aforementioned issues ad seriatim.
I.  The Appeal of an Order of
Expropriation
According to Section 4, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, if the objections to and the
defenses against the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the property are overruled, the
court may issue an order of expropriation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right
to take the property sought to be expropriated, for the public use or purpose described
in the complaint, upon the payment of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.
In the assailed Order of Expropriation, the RTC denied the objections and
defenses raised by petitioner PAFC and Orica for lack of merit. The RTC held that
respondent NGCP "has a lawful right to take the property sought to be expropriated for
the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon payment of just
compensation." 2 7 The RTC also ordered the parties to submit the names of three
Commissioners to be appointed by the RTC, and set the case for reception of evidence
with respect to payment of just compensation.
Section 4 of Rule 67 further states that a nal order sustaining the right to
expropriate the property, such as the assailed Order of Expropriation, may be appealed
by any party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from
determining the just compensation to be paid. It is clear from the foregoing that the
proper remedy of a defendant in an expropriation case who wishes to contest an order
of expropriation is not to le a certiorari petition and allege that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of expropriation. The remedy
is to file an appeal of the order of expropriation .
Hence, under the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, petitioner PAFC
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 had the right to appeal the assailed Order of Expropriation. The Court holds that the
instant appeal, although mistakenly worded by petitioner PAFC as a "Petition for
Certiorari," is for all intents and purposes a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45. It must be noted that petitioner PAFC repeatedly invoked Rule 45 in ling the instant
appeal, alleging that the instant appeal is "pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
raising a pure question of law to set aside or nullify the [assailed Order of
Expropriation]." 2 8
It can be surmised from the instant Petition that petitioner PAFC resorted to
ling its appeal directly before the Court instead of the Court of Appeals (CA) because
it believed that the instant Petition only involved pure questions of law. Under Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court, in all cases where only questions of law are raised or involved, the
appeal shall be led directly before the Court, not via a notice of appeal or record on
appeal, but through a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45.
The critical question, therefore, is whether the instant Petition raises pure
questions of law, which warrants the direct filing of the appeal before the Court.
Contrary to the view of respondent NGCP, the Court holds that the instant
Petition may be decided by dealing purely with questions of law.
The Court has previously held that "a question of law arises when there is doubt
as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when
the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts." 2 9 The Court further
explained that for a question to be one of law, "the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of
them. The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence
presented, the question posed is one of fact." 3 0
Here, petitioner PAFC raises the argument that the expropriation of the subject
property by respondent NGCP is invalid because such exercise of eminent domain was
neither done directly by Congress nor pursuant to a speci c grant of authority. It is
readily apparent that this primary argument is legal in nature. To be sure, the Court will
be able to decide on the validity of the assailed Order of Expropriation by merely
looking at the applicable law and jurisprudence on eminent domain, as well as the law
granting respondent NGCP the right of eminent domain, i.e., R.A. No. 9511. The Court
need not review the evidence on record to assess the correctness of the assailed Order
of Expropriation.
In ne, the Court rules that petitioner PAFC did not commit a procedural error in
filing the instant appeal via a Rule 45 petition directly before the Court.
II.  The Validity of the RTC's
Assailed Order of Expropriation
Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court now resolves the substantive
merits of the instant Petition.
The Concept of the Right of Eminent
Domain
The power of eminent domain, which is also called the power of expropriation, is
the inherent right of the State to condemn private property for public use upon payment
of just compensation. 3 1
The right of eminent domain has been described as "'the highest and most exact
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 idea of property remaining in the government' that may be acquired for some public
purpose through a method 'in nature of a compulsory sale to the State.'" 3 2 The right of
eminent domain is an ultimate right of the sovereign power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for a public purpose. The exercise of this power,
whether directly by the State or by its authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of
private rights. Hence, it is considered to be one of the harshest proceedings known to
the law. 3 3
Because the right of eminent domain is a power inherent in sovereignty, it is a
power which need not be granted by any fundamental law. 3 4 Hence, Article III, Section
9 of the 1987 Constitution, which states that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation" is not a grant, but only a limitation of the State's
power to expropriate. 3 5
The expropriation of property consists of two stages. The rst stage is
concerned with "the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power
of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved
in the suit." 3 6 The second stage is concerned with "the determination by the court of
'the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.' This is done by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners." 3 7
Who Wields the Power to
Expropriate
Considering that the right of eminent domain has been described as one of the
great, inherent powers of the State, is the exercise of this right exclusive to the State?
It has been held that, as an inherent sovereign prerogative, the power to
expropriate pertains primarily to the legislature. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of government. 3 8
However, the power to expropriate is not exclusive to Congress. The latter may
delegate the exercise of the power to government agencies, public o cials and quasi-
public entities. 3 9 According to eminent constitutionalist and one of the framers of the
1987 Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., "[t]he authority of the legislature to
delegate the right of eminent domain to private entities operating public utilities has
never been questioned." 4 0
In the hands of government agencies, local governments, public utilities, and
other persons and entities, the right to expropriate is not inherent and is only a
delegated power. In fact, even as to municipal corporations, it has been held that they
can exercise the right of eminent domain only if some law exists conferring the power
upon them. 4 1
Hence, with the right of eminent domain not being an inherent power for private
corporations, whose right to expropriate is granted by mere legislative fiat, the
delegate's exercise of the right of eminent domain is restrictively limited to the confines
of the delegating law. The scope of this delegated legislative power is necessarily
narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in strict
compliance with the terms of the delegating law. 4 2
Respondent NGCP May Only
Expropriate Private Property.
Therefore, with respondent NGCP's power to expropriate being a mere delegated
power from Congress by virtue of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's exercise of the
right of eminent domain over the subject property must conform to the limits set under
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 the said law. What then is the type of property that may be expropriated by respondent
NGCP under R.A. No. 9511?
Upon a simple perusal of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, it states in no equivocal
terms that "[t]he Grantee (referring to respondent NGCP) may acquire such private
property as is actually necessary for the realization of the purposes for which this
franchise is granted[.]"
The Court has previously held that under the principles of statutory construction,
if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning
and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis
derived from the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) "rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute
correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently."
43

Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 is clear, plain, and free from any ambiguity.
Respondent NGCP is allowed to exercise the right of eminent domain only
with respect to private property . Therefore, this unequivocal provision of the law
must be given its literal meaning and applied without any other interpretation.
Land of Public Dominion v. Private
Property
Considering that respondent NGCP is empowered to expropriate private
properties exclusively, the concept of private property vis-à-vis land of the public
dominion must be distinguished.
Article 419 of the Civil Code classi es property as either of (1) public dominion
(dominio publico) or (2) of private ownership (propiedad privado). 4 4
Article 420, in turn, identi es lands of public dominion as either (1) those
intended for public use , such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; or
(2) those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for
some public service or for the development of the national wealth .
Hence, based on Article 420 of the Civil Code, there are three kinds of property of
public dominion: (1) those for public use, which may be used by anybody, such as roads
and canals; (2) those for public service, which may be used only by certain duly
authorized persons, although used for the bene t of the public; and (3) those used for
the development of national wealth, such as our natural resources. 4 5
There are certain de ning characteristics of properties of the public dominion
that distinguish them from private property.
Land of the public domain is outside the commerce of man and, thus, cannot
be leased, donated, sold, or be the object of any contract , except insofar as they
may be the object of repairs or improvements and other incidental things of similar
character. 4 6 Hence, they cannot be appropriated or alienated . 4 7 Inalienability is
an inherent characteristic of property of the public dominion . This
characteristic necessarily clashes with an express declaration of alienability and
disposability, in that when public land is explicitly declared by the State to be subject to
disposition, it ceases to be land of the public dominion. Necessarily, as lands of public
dominion are inalienable, they cannot be acquired through prescription and cannot be
registered under the Land Registration Law and be the subject of a Torrens Title. 4 8
Properties owned by the State which do not have the aforementioned
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 characteristics of a land of public dominion are patrimonial properties of the State .
4 9 Patrimonial properties are properties owned by the State in its private or
proprietary capacity . 5 0
As explained by recognized Civil Law Commentator, former CA Justice Eduardo
P. Caguioa, "[o]ver this kind of property[,] the State has the same rights and has the
same power of disposition as private individuals in relation to their own property, but of
course, subject to rules and regulations. The purpose of this property is in order that
the State may attain its economic ends, to serve as a means for its subsistence and
preservation and in that way to be able to better ful ll its primary mission." 5 1 Examples
of patrimonial property of the State are those properties acquired by the government in
execution or tax sales and mangrove lands and mangrove swamps. Even public
agricultural lands that are made alienable and disposable by the State are considered
patrimonial properties. 5 2 In fact, in our jurisprudence, despite dealing with the
management of water, which is a natural resource and an essential public utility,
waterworks have been categorized as property owned by municipal corporations in
their proprietary character. 5 3
Even if patrimonial property refers to land owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities, such is still deemed private property as it is property held by the
State in its private and proprietary capacity, and not in its public capacity, in order to
attain economic ends. As recently explained by the Court in Republic v. Spouses
Alejandre, 5 4 the Civil Code classi es property of private ownership into three
categories: (1) patrimonial property of the State under Articles 421 and 422 of the Civil
Code; (2) patrimonial property of Local Government Units under Article 424; and (3)
property belonging to private individuals under Article 425. 5 5
Hence, the mere fact that a parcel of land is owned by the State or any of its
instrumentalities does not necessarily mean that such land is of public dominion and
not private property. If land owned by the State is considered patrimonial property, then
such land assumes the nature of private property.
As further held in Republic v. Spouses Alejandre , 5 6 patrimonial property are
either: (1) "by nature or use" or those covered by Article 421, which are not property of
public dominion or imbued with public purpose based on the State's current or
intended use; or (2) "by conversion" or those covered by Article 422, which previously
assumed the nature of property of public dominion by virtue of the State's use, but
which are no longer being used or intended for said purpose.
Furthermore, the aforesaid case holds that "upon the declaration of
alienability and disposability x x x the land ceases to possess the
characteristics inherent in properties of public dominion that they are outside
the commerce of man, cannot be acquired by prescription, and cannot be registered
under the land registration law, and accordingly assume the nature of patrimonial
property of the State that is property owned by the State in its private
capacity ." 5 7 Simply stated, land of the public dominion expressly deemed by the State
to be alienable and disposable, susceptible to the commerce of man through sale,
lease, or any other mode of disposition, assumes the nature of patrimonial property.
I n Sps. Modesto v. Urbina , 5 8 the Court held that private persons can claim
possessory rights over a particular property once it is declared alienable and
disposable. This illustrates that once property of public dominion is declared by the
State as alienable and disposable, it becomes subject of private rights, such as
possessory claims, since such declaration operates to convert property of public
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 dominion, which is inalienable property, to patrimonial property held by the State in its
private capacity.
The Subject Property is Patrimonial
Property that Assumes the Nature of
Private Property.
The next issue that must be resolved is the characterization of the subject
property.
Petitioner PAFC posits the argument that the subject property is a land of the
public domain as it is devoted to public use or purpose, i.e., the development of the
petrochemical industry which, it argues, is a matter of national interest. Thus, according
to petitioner PAFC, the subject property is not private property. Hence, since
respondent NGCP is only allowed to expropriate private property, necessarily, it has no
authority to expropriate the subject property.
The Court disagrees with petitioner PAFC. The subject property, though owned
by a State instrumentality, is considered patrimonial property that assumes the nature
of private property.
First and foremost, it is admitted by all parties that the subject property, sitting
within the Petrochemical Industrial Park, is an industrial zone . In fact, the crux of
petitioner PAFC's Petition is the argument that since the Petrochemical Industrial Park
has been declared by law as an industrial zone dedicated to the development of the
petrochemical industry, it should be deemed a land dedicated to public use, i.e., a land
of public dominion.
However, in Republic v. East Silverlane Realty Development Corp. , 5 9 the Court
held that when the subject property therein was classi ed by the government
as an industrial zone, the subject property therein "had been declared
patrimonial and it is only then that the prescriptive period began to run ." 6 0
Further, it is apparent from R.A. No. 10516 and its IRR that the industrial estate is
being owned, managed, and operated by the State, not in its sovereign capacity, but
rather in its private capacity. Simply stated, the management and operation of the
industrial estate is proprietary in character, serving the economic ends of the State.
P.D. No. 949, as amended by R.A. No. 10516, calls for the development of the
industrial estate by introducing "business activities that will promote its best
economic use ." 6 1 In addition, in the IRR of the said law, the Petrochemical Industrial
Park was described as an industrial and commercial estate , wherein private sector
investment is encouraged in the development of "industrial and commercial
activities/enterprises in said Industrial Estate . " 6 2 According to the IRR, the
industrial estate may be used in any manner to achieve its best economic use, allowing
"any activity or series of activities regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with
a view to pro t." 6 3 Hence, it is crystal clear that the management of the land where the
subject property is located is commercial in nature and that the State, through
petitioner PAFC, is operating the said property in its proprietary capacity in order to
serve economic, and not sovereign, ends.
Petitioner PAFC's insistence that the petrochemical industry is an industry
endowed with national interest is unconvincing. The sheer fact that one of the allowable
activities inside the industrial estate pertains to the development of the petrochemical
industry is not enough to characterize the subject property as land of the public
domain. To reiterate, the Court has previously characterized waterworks as patrimonial
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 property despite the fact that such properties deal with the management of an
important natural resource and an essential public utility, for the reason that the
operations of waterworks by municipal corporations are often in the nature of a
business venture. 6 4 In the instant case, it is apparent from P.D. No. 949, as amended
by R.A. No. 10516, that the Petrochemical Industrial Park is intended and accordingly
devoted by law as a commercial and business venture.
Furthermore, as already discussed at length, the de ning characteristic of land of
public domain is inalienability. To reiterate, upon the explicit declaration of alienability
and disposability, the land ceases to possess the characteristics inherent in properties
of public dominion, namely, that they are outside the commerce of man, cannot be
acquired by prescription, and cannot be registered under the land registration law, and
accordingly assume the nature of patrimonial property of the State, that is property
owned by the State in its private capacity. Hence, an express declaration of alienability
and disposability by the State negates the characterization of property as land of public
dominion.
Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the laws governing the subject
property have unequivocally declared that the subject property is alienable,
disposable, appropriable, may be conveyed to private persons or entities, and
is subject to private rights .
Under P.D. No. 949, the Petrochemical Industrial Park was explicitly made
alienable and disposable for lease, sale, and conveyance to private entities or
persons for the conduct of related industrial activities:
Section 2.  The Philippine National Oil Company shall
manage, operate and develop the said parcel of land as a petrochemical
industrial zone and will establish, develop and operate or cause the
establishment, development and operation thereat of petrochemical and related
industries by itself or its subsidiaries or by any other entity or person it may
deem competent alone or in joint venture; Provided, that, where any
petrochemical industry is operated by private entities or persons, whether or not
in joint venture with the Philippine National Oil Company or its subsidiaries, the
Philippine National Oil Company may lease, sell and/or convey such
portions of the petrochemical industrial zone to such private entities
or persons . 6 5
The alienable and disposable nature of the Petrochemical Industrial Park was
further expanded when P.D. No. 949 was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 10516.
The said law allowed the lease, sale, and conveyance of the Petrochemical
Industrial Park for purposes of commercial utilization by private sector
investors:
SECTION 2.  Purpose of Land Use. — The PNOC shall
manage, operate and develop the said parcel of land as an industrial zone and
will establish, develop and operate or cause the establishment, development
and operation thereat of petrochemical and related industries, as well as of
businesses engaged in energy and energy-allied activities or energy-related
infrastructure projects, or of such other business activities that will
promote its best economic use , as determined by the PNOC Board of
Directors, by itself or its subsidiaries or by any other entity or person it may
deem competent alone or in joint venture: Provided, That, where any
petrochemical or energy-related industry or any such other business
as determined by the PNOC is operated by private entities or persons,
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 whether or not in joint venture with the PNOC or its subsidiaries, the
PNOC may lease, sell and/or convey such portions of the industrial
zone to such private entities or persons. 6 6
Petitioner PAFC's argument that the subject property is strictly con ned and
restricted to the development of the petrochemical industry is manifestly erroneous.
The law itself unequivocally allows the establishment of businesses engaged in energy
and energy-allied activities or energy-related infrastructure projects, which obviously
includes the establishment of transmission towers. The law permits, and even highly
encourages, the conduct of commercial activities in the industrial estate by allowing the
transfer of the subject property to private investors.
Hence, with the subject property expressly declared by law, i.e., P.D. No. 949, as
amended by R.A. No. 10516, to be an industrial and commercial estate that may be
transferred or conveyed to private persons so that business activities may be
conducted therein, there is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the subject property
i s patrimonial property. In other words, respondent NGCP has the authority under
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511 to expropriate the subject property.
Reasonableness and Necessity of the
Expropriation
The determination of the validity of the assailed Order of Expropriation does not
stop with the identi cation of the subject property as patrimonial property. As
previously discussed at length, the delegated power to exercise the right of eminent
domain may only be exercised in strict compliance within the terms of the delegating
law.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9511, respondent NGCP's right to expropriate must
be "reasonably necessary for the construction, expansion, and e cient maintenance
and operation of the transmission system and grid and the e cient operation and
maintenance of the subtransmission systems." 6 7 The said provision likewise states
that "[respondent NGCP] may acquire such private property as is actually necessary for
the realization of the purposes for which this franchise is granted[.]" 6 8
Even without the foregoing provision of the law, considering that the
expropriation is done, not directly, but by another government agency or a municipal
corporation, and by virtue of an authorizing statute which does not specify the property
to be taken, jurisprudence holds that the courts may look into the necessity of the
taking. 6 9
In its Amended Complaint, respondent NGCP alleged that "[t]o enable plaintiff to
construct and maintain the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project, it is
both necessary and urgent to acquire, upon payment of just compensation, the above-
described portions of the subject property to ensure stability and reliability of power
supply in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales, and in the future, in other parts of the
country." 7 0 Respondent NGCP also alleged that during the negotiations conducted
between the parties, petitioner PAFC proposed another route (at the back portion of
the subject property), which was found to be not technically sound. 7 1
It must be stressed that in the instant Petition, petitioner PAFC does not allege
that the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project is unnecessary and
unreasonable. It only alleges that the subject property is already devoted by law for a
specific purpose and that it is a property devoted to public use.
The Court also observes that petitioner PAFC, in its Answer to Amended
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 Complaint, 7 2 did not make any speci c denial as to the allegations made by
respondent NGCP in its Amended Complaint that the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV
Transmission Line Project is necessary and urgent to ensure the stability and reliability
of power supply in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales, and that the alternative route
proposed by petitioner PAFC to respondent NGCP was not found to be technically
feasible.
It is an elementary rule in remedial law that material averments in the complaint,
other than those as to the amount of unliquidated damages, shall be deemed admitted
when not specifically denied. 7 3
It is also telling that after the Complaint was led in 2011, the parties entered
into a Tripartite Agreement 7 4 on August 17, 2012, whereby the parties, including
petitioner PAFC, acknowledged that it was necessary for respondent NGCP to
establish the Mariveles-Limay 230 kV Transmission Line Project due to the increased
demand for electricity in the provinces of Bataan and Zambales, and that the technical
teams of the parties already agreed on a revised route that provided for a safe and
viable route for the transmission lines, taking into consideration the safety and security
concerns of Orica. 7 5
Therefore, the Court is su ciently convinced that respondent NGCP's act of
expropriating the subject property was reasonably necessary for the realization of the
purposes for which its franchise is granted.
Premises considered, the Court upholds the assailed Order of Expropriation
issued by the RTC, considering that respondent NGCP validly expropriated the subject
property.
WHEREFORE , the instant appeal is DENIED . The Order dated February 11, 2016
of the Regional Trial Court of Mariveles, Bataan, Branch 4 issued in SCA Case No. 104-
ML is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, J.C. Reyes, Jr., Lazaro-Javier and Zalameda, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 12-27.

2. Id. at 33-35. Issued by Presiding Judge Emmanuel A. Silva.

3. Records (Vol. 1), pp. 1-9.

4. Leonarda S. vda. de Serios, Rolando S. Serios, Maximo S. Serios, Herlina S. Francisco, Solita
S. Serios, Rosemarie S. Cotejar, Danilo S. Serios, and Luzviminda S. Fernandez.

5. Rollo, pp. 14-15.

6. Records (Vol. I), pp. 1-2.

7. Id. at 4-5.
8. Rollo, p. 15.

9. Id.

10. Id.
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 11. Id. at 15-16.
12. Id. at 16.

13. Id.
14. Records (Vol. I), pp. 54-65.

15. Id. at 201-212.

16. Id. at 207.

17. Id. at 208.

18. Id. at 222-234.

19. Rollo, pp. 34-35.

20. Id. at 34.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 36-42.

23. Id. at 43-44.

24. Id. at 23.

25. Id. at 47-58.

26. Id. at 63-68.

27. Id. at 34.

28. Id. at 13.

29. Briones v. People, 715 Phil. 638, 647 (2013).

30. Id. at 647.

31. Asia's Emerging Dragon Corp. v. Department of Transportation and Communications, 575
Phil. 59, 187 (2008).
32. Isagani A. Cruz, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2015 ed., p. 129, citing Black's Law Dictionary, 4th
ed., 616.

33. Jesus is Lord Christian School Foundation, Inc. v. Municipality (now City) of Pasig, 503 Phil.
845, 862 (2006).
34. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 2009 ed., p. 397.

35. Supra note 32 at 130.

36. Spouses Arrastia v. National Power Corp., 555 Phil. 263, 273 (2007).

37. Id. at 273.

38. Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M. Realty Corp., 354 Phil. 684, 691 (1998).

39. Metropolitan Cebu Water District v. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., 603 Phil. 471, 480 (2007).

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 40. Supra note 34 at 398.

41. City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil. 349, 358, (1919).
42. Heirs of Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, 384 Phil. 676, 689 (2000).

43. Victoria v. Commission on Elections, 299 Phil. 263, 268 (1994).

44. Edgardo L. Paras, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 17th ed., 2013, Vol. II, p.
40.

45. Id. at 41.

46. Id. at 47, citing Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, 30 Phil. 602 (1915).

47. Eduardo P. Caguioa, COMMENTS AND CASES ON CIVIL LAW, CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, 3rd ed., 1966, Vol. II, pp. 31-32, citing Meneses v. El Commonwealth de
Filipinas, 69 Phil. 647 (1940).
48. Supra note 44 at 47-48.

49. CIVIL CODE, Art. 421.

50. Supra note 44 at 61.

51. Supra note 47 at 36.

52. Id. at 36-37.

53. City of Baguio v. National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority , 106 Phil. 144, 153 (1959).

54. G.R. No. 217336, October 17, 2018.

55. Id.
56. Id.

57. Id., emphasis and underscoring supplied.

58. 647 Phil. 706 (2010).

59. 682 Phil. 376, 391 (2012).

60. Id. at 391; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

61. Section 2, P.D. No. 949, as amended by R.A. No. 10516; emphasis supplied.

62. Sections 2.1 and 2.2, Department Circular No. DC2013-06-0011; emphasis supplied.

63. Id. at Section 3.4.

64. National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. Dator, 128 Phil. 338, 342 (1967).

65. Section 2, P.D. No. 949; emphasis and underscoring supplied.

66. Section 2, P.D. No. 949, as amended by R.A. No. 10516; emphasis and underscoring
supplied.

67. Section 4, R.A. No. 9511.

68. Id.

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 69. Supra note 34 at 427-428, citing City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila, 40 Phil.
349 (1919) and Republic v. La Orden de PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, 111 Phil. 230
(1961).

70. Records (Vol. II), p. 280.

71. Id.

72. Id. at 338-348.

73. RULES OF COURT, Rule 8, Sec. 11.

74. Records (Vol. V), pp. 75-88.

75. Id. at 75-76.

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