31.

ELSA DEGAYO vs. CECILIA MAGBANUA-DINGLASAN et. al.

G.R. No. 173148 April 6, 2015

FACTS:

Sometime in the 1970’s the Jalauad River steadily changed its course and
moved southwards towards the banks of Pototan, where Lot No. 7328 lies, leaving its
old riverbed dry. Degayo and the tenants believed that the area was an accretion to Lot
No. 861. The respondents, on the other hand, argued that the disputed property was an
abandoned riverbed, which should rightfully belong to them to compensate for the
erstwhile portion of Lot No. 7328, over which the Jalaud River presently runs.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the area was an accretion to Lot No. 861.
RULING:

No. Notably, the ownership of the disputed parcel of land has been unequivocally
settled in Civil Case No. 16047.In ruling that the subject parcels of land belong to the
respondents, the RTC Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 16047 opined that the claim of
accretion has no valid basis. What really happened was that the Jalaud River naturally
changed its course and moved southward. As a result, it abandoned its previous bed
and encroached upon a portion of Lot No. 7328. It further held that the claim of
accretion could not be sustained because the 26,419 sqm. portion is ostensibly within
the metes and bounds of Lot No. 7328, owned and registered in the name of the
respondents. On the other hand, the 26,106 sqm. portion refers to an abandoned river
bed, and is thus governed by Article 461 of the Civil Code, which states that River beds
which are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters ipso facto
belong to the owners whose lands are occupied by the new course in proportion to the
area lost.
32.

BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS SECURITIES CORPORATION vs. EDGARDO

V. GUEVARA

G.R. No. 167052 March 11, 2015

FACTS:
33.
ANTONIETTA GARCIA VDA. DE CHUA vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special Eight
Division), HON. JAPAL M. GUIANI, RTC, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region,
Cotabato City, and FLORITA A. VALLEJO, as Administratrix of the Estate of the
late Roberto L. Chua

G.R. No. 116835 March 5, 1998

FACTS:

During his lifetime, Roberto Lim Chua lived out of wedlock with private
respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970 up to 1981. Out of this union, the couple begot
two illegitimate children, namely, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo. On
28 May 1992, Roberto Chua died intestate in Davao City.

On 2 July 1992 Florita A. Vallejo filed a Petition for Declaration of Heirship,

Guardianship over the Persons and Properties of Minors Robert Rafson Alonzo and
Rudyard Pride Allonzo, ann surnamed Chua and Issuance of Letters of Administration.
On July 21, 1992 Antonietta Garcia Vda. De Chua, representing to be the surviving
spouse of Roberto Chua, filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue.
Petitioner alleged that at the time of the decedent's death Davao City was his residence,
hence, the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is the proper forum.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Antonietta Garcia Vda. De Chua has a legal standing to file the
motion to dismiss.

RULING:

No. Petitioner was not able to prove her status as the surviving wife of the
decedent. The best proof of marriage between man and wife is a marriage contract
which Antonietta Chua failed to produce. The lower court correctly disregarded the
photostat copy of the marriage certificate which she presented, this being a violation of
the best evidence rule, together with other worthless pieces of evidence.

Be that as it may, petitioner has no legal standing to file the motion to dismiss as
she is not related to the deceased, nor does she have any interest in his estate as
creditor or otherwise. The Rules are explicit on who may do so:

Sec. 4. Opposition to petition for administration — Any interested person, may by

filing a written opposition, contest the petition on the ground of incompetency of
the person for whom letters of administration are prayed therein, or on the
ground of the contestant's own right to the administration, and may pray that
letters issue to himself, or to any competent person or persons named in the
opposition..

Only an interested person may oppose the petition for issuance of letters of
administration. An interested person is one who would be benefited by the estate such
as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; his interest is
material and direct, and not one that is only indirect or contingent.
34.

GEN. AVELINO I. RAZON, JR., Chief, Philippine National Police (PNP); Police
Chief Superintendent RAUL CASTAÑEDA, Chief, Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG); Police Senior Superintendent LEONARDO A. ESPINA,
Chief, Police Anti-Crime and Emergency Response (PACER); and GEN. JOEL R.
GOLTIAO, Regional Director of ARMM, PNP vs. MARY JEAN B. TAGITIS, herein
represented by ATTY. FELIPE P. ARCILLA, JR., Attorney-in-Fact, Respondent.

G.R. No. 182498               December 3, 2009

35.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF AMPARO

IN FAVOR OF LILIBETH O. LADAGA: LILIBETH O. LADAGA, PETITIONER, VS. MAJ.
GEN. REYNALDO MAPAGU, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE
ARMY'S 10TH INFANTRY DIVISION (ID); COL. LYSANDER SUERTE, CHIEF OF
STAFF, 10TH ID, LT. COL. KURT A. DECAPIA, CHIEF, 10 TH ID, PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICE; COL. OSCAR LACTAO, HEAD-TASK FORCE-DAVAO; SR. SUPT. RAMON
APOLINARIO, DAVAO CITY POLICE OFFICE DIRECTOR; AND SEVERAL OTHER
JOHN DOES, RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 189689 November 13, 2012

FACTS:
Petitioners share the common circumstance of having their names included in
what is alleged to be a JCICC "AGILA" 3 rd Quarter 2007 Order of Battle Validation
Result of the Philippine Army's 10th Infantry Division (10th ID),[3] which is a list containing
the names of organizations and personalities in Southern Mindanao, particularly Davao
City, supposedly connected to the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its
military arm, the New People's Army (NPA).  They perceive that by the inclusion of their
names in the said Order of Battle (OB List), they become easy targets of unexplained
disappearances or extralegal killings a real threat to their life, liberty and security.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 189689, ATTY. LILIBETH O. LADAGA (Atty. Ladaga), first
came to know of the existence of the OB List from an undisclosed source on May 21,
2009.  This was after the PowerPoint presentation made public by Bayan Muna Party-
List Representative Satur Ocampo (Representative Ocampo) on May 18, 2009 during
the conclusion of the International Solidarity Mission (ISM) conducted by various
organizations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner must be granted a Writ of Amparo.
RULING:
No. The writ of amparo was promulgated by the Court pursuant to its rule-making
powers in response to the alarming rise in the number of cases of enforced
disappearances and extrajudicial killings. [36]  It plays the preventive role of breaking the
expectation of impunity in the commission of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, as well as the curative role of facilitating the subsequent punishment of
the perpetrators.[37]  In Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[38] the Court has previously held that the
writ of amparo is an extraordinary remedy intended to address violations of, or threats
to, the rights to life, liberty or security and that, being a remedy of extraordinary
character, it is not one to issue on amorphous or uncertain grounds but only upon
reasonable certainty.  Hence, every petition for the issuance of the writ is required to be
supported by justifying allegations of fact on the following matters:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;

(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat,
act or omission, or, if the name is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be
described by an assumed appellation;

(c)    The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of the respondent, and how such threat or
violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances,
and addresses of the investigating authority or individuals, as well as the manner and
conduct of the investigation, together with any report;

(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or
whereabouts of the aggrieved party and the identity of the person responsible for the
threat, act or omission; and

(f) The relief prayed for. The petition may include a general prayer for other just and
equitable reliefs (Underscoring supplied)

The sole and common issue presented in these petitions is whether the totality of
evidence satisfies the degree of proof required under the Amparo Rule.  Sections 17
and 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provide as follows:

SEC. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall
establish their claims by substantial evidence.

x x x x

SEC. 18.  Judgment. The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days from the time
the petition is submitted for decision.  If the allegations in the petition are proven
by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of the writ and such reliefs
as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied.

Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.  It is more than a mere imputation of
wrongdoing or violation that would warrant a finding of liability against the person
chargedThe summary nature of amparo proceedings, as well as, the use of substantial
evidence as standard of proof shows the intent of the framers of the rule to address
situations of enforced disappearance and extrajudicial killings, or threats thereof, with
what is akin to administrative proceedings.

Suitable to, and consistent with this incipiently unique and informal treatment
of amparo cases, the Court eventually recognized the evidentiary difficulties that
beset amparo petitioners, arising as they normally would from the fact that the State
itself, through its own agents, is involved in the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing that it is supposedly tasked by law to investigate.  Thus, in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis,
the Court laid down a new standard of relaxed admissibility of evidence to
enable amparo petitioners to meet the required amount of proof showing the State's
direct or indirect involvement in the purported violations and found it a fair and proper
rule in amparo cases "to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their
totality" and "to consider any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual
rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence adduced." 
Put simply, evidence is not to be rejected outright because it is inadmissible under the
rules for as long as it satisfies "the most basic test of reason i.e., relevance of the
evidence to the issue at hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced
evidence."
36.
ATCI OVERSEAS CORPORATION, AMALIA G. IKDAL and MINISTRY OF PUBLIC
HEALTH-KUWAIT  vs. MA. JOSEFA ECHIN

G.R. No. 178551               October 11, 2010

FACTS:

Josefina Echin (respondent) was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one (1)
year and are covered by Kuwait’s Civil Service Board Employment Contract No. 2.N
Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment
on February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

On July 27, 2001, respondent filed with the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) a complaint2 for illegal dismissal against petitioner ATCI as the local recruitment
agency, represented by petitioner, Amalia Ikdal (Ikdal), and the Ministry, as the foreign
principal.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that their principal, the
Ministry, being a foreign government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the
immunity extended to them; and that respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to
meet the performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil
Service Laws. Petitioners further contended that Ikdal should not be liable as an officer
of petitioner ATCI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ma. Josefa Echin was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the
performance rating within the one-year period as required under Kuwait’s Civil Service
Laws.
RULING:
No. In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a
dispute or case has the burden of proving the foreign law. The International Law
doctrine of presumed-identity approach or processual presumption comes into play.
Where a foreign law is not pleaded or, even if pleaded, is not proved, the presumption is
that foreign law is the same as ours. Thus, we apply Philippine labor laws in determining
the issues presented before us.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only
be alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must
present a copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court which reads:

SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in

paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the
record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any
officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (emphasis supplied)

SEC. 25. What attestation of copy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in
substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if
there be any, or if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.

37.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, represented by the HON. FELIX V.

OPLE, Municipal Mayor, and FELIX V. OPLE, in his personal capacity vs.
HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY; HON. CLERK OF COURT &
EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of CEBU CITY; HON.
CLERK OF COURT & EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF of the REGIONAL TRIAL COURT of
BULACAN and his DEPUTIES; and EMILY ROSE GO KO LIM CHAO, doing
business under the name and style KD SURPLUS

G.R. No. 168289               March 22, 2010

FACTS:
38.

KOPPEL, INC. (formerly known as KPL AIRCON, INC.) vs. MAKATI ROTARY CLUB
FOUNDATION, INC.

G.R. No. 198075 September 4, 2013

FACTS:
39.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS vs. BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

G.R. No. 210858 June 29, 2016