Angara vs.

Electoral Commission 63 Phil 139

DOCTRINE OF SUPREMACY OF THE CONSTITUTION

FACTS:

In the elections of Sept. 17, 1935, petitioner Jose A. Angara and the respondents Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo, and
Dionisio Mayor were candidates for the position of members of the National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas.

On Oct. 7, 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the National Assembly and on
Nov. 15, 1935, he took his oath of office.

On Dec. 3, 1935, the National Assembly passed Resolution No. 8, which in effect, fixed the last date to file election
protests.
On Dec. 8, 1935, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission a "Motion of Protest" against Angara and praying, among
other things, that Ynsua be named/declared elected Member of the National Assembly or that the election of said position
be nullified.

On Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission adopted a resolution (No. 6) stating that last day for filing of protests is on
Dec. 9.  Angara contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the Electoral Commission solely as
regards the merits of contested elections to the National Assembly and the Supreme Court therefore has no jurisdiction to
hear the case. 

    ISSUES:

Whether or not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy upon the foregoing related facts, and in the affirmative,

RULING:

In the case at bar, here is then presented an actual controversy involving as it does a conflict of a grave constitutional
nature between the National Assembly on one hand, and the Electoral Commission on the other. Although the
Electoral Commission may not be interfered with, when and while acting within the limits of its authority, it does not
follow that it is beyond the reach of the constitutional mechanism adopted by the people and that it is not subject to
constitutional restrictions. The Electoral Commission is not a separate department of the government, and even if it were,
conflicting claims of authority under the fundamental law between departmental powers and agencies of the government
are necessarily determined by the judiciary in justiciable and appropriate cases.

The court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the character, scope, and extent of the constitutional grant to the Electoral Commission as "the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly."

The Electoral Commission was created to transfer in its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in
matters pertaining to contested elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. The express lodging
of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied denial in the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
And thus, it is as effective a restriction upon the legislative power as an express prohibition in the Constitution.

Therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by
necessary implication to have been lodged also in the Electoral Commission.

It appears that on Dec. 9, 1935, the Electoral Commission met for the first time and approved a resolution fixing said
date as the last day for the filing of election protests. When, therefore, the National Assembly passed its resolution of
Dec. 3, 1935, confirming the election of the petitioner to the National Assembly, the Electoral Commission had not yet
met; neither does it appear that said body had actually been organized.

While there might have been good reason for the legislative practice of confirmation of the election of members of the
legislature at the time the power to decide election contests was still lodged in the legislature, confirmation alone by the
legislature cannot be construed as depriving the Electoral Commission of the authority incidental to its constitutional
power to be "the sole judge of all contests...", to fix the time for the filing of said election protests.

The Electoral Commission was acting within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent, Pedro Ynsua against the election of the herein petitioner, Jose A.
Angara, and that the resolution of the National Assembly on Dec. 3, 1935, cannot in any manner toll the time for filing
protest against the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of
protests within such time as the rules of the Electoral Commission might prescribe.

The petition for a writ of prohibition against the electoral commission is hereby denied, with cost against the petitioner. 
 BIRAOGO V. TRUTH COMMISSION

Facts:

Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC).

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President, which is tasked to investigate reports of graft and
corruption and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of
an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners filed a case alleging the constitutionality of E.O. No. 1 for it violates the equal protection clause as it selectively
targets for investigation and prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable. It does
not apply equally to all members of the same class such that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its
sole object makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.
They argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft and corruption must encompass acts committed
not only during the administration of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the “same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have been committed against the Filipino people.
They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall under the recognized exceptions because
first, “there is no substantial distinction between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and second, the selective classification is
not germane to the purpose of Executive Order No. 1 to end corruption.”
Issue:

WON E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.

Held:

Yes, E.O No. 1 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth “concerning the reported
cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration” The intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.
the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness and selective retribution.
While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck down for being unconstitutional.
 MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS, G.R. No. 88211 September 15, 1989

FACTS:

In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from precidency via the non-violent “people power” revolution and
forced into exice.

Corazon Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Her ascension to and consolidation of power have not been unchallenged. The failed Manila Hotel coup in 1986 led by
political leaders of Mr. Marcos, the takeover of television station Channel 7 by rebel troops with the support of “Marcos
loyalists” and the unsuccessful plot of the Marcos spouse to return from Hawaii awakened the nation to the capacity of
the Marcoses to stir trouble even from afar and to the fanatism and blind loyalty of their followers in the country.

Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philippines to die.

President Aquino, considering the dire consequence to the nation of his return, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the
return of Marcos and his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the Constitution, the President may prohibit the
Marcoses from retyrning to the Philippines.

RULING:

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only
of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be
considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the
land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different
protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof
[Art. 12 (4).]

Faced with the problem of whether or not the time is right to allow the Marcoses to return to the Philippines, the
President is, under the Constitution, constrained to consider these basic principles in arriving at a decision. More than
that, having sworn to defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the obligation under the Constitution to
protect the people, promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It must be borne in mind that the
Constitution, aside from being an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the people have surrendered their
sovereign powers to the State for the common good. Hence, lest the officers of the Government exercising the powers
delegated by the people forget and the servants of the people become rulers, the Constitution reminds everyone that
"[s]overeignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them." [Art. II, Sec. 1.]

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-
organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban
terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The
documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this
ponencia bolsters the

conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against
the State and instigate more chaos.

The President has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses would wipe away the gains
achieved during the past few years and lead to total economic collapse. Given what is within our individual and common
knowledge of the state of the economy, we cannot argue with that determination.

WHEREFORE, and it being our well-considered opinion that the President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present
circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
 Lambino Vs. Comelec

Facts: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987
constitution, they filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA
6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of
the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7
and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral- presidential form of government to
unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative petitions and
invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

Issue:
Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete,
inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions” to implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group’s petition.

Held:

According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for
conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion
on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct
Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the
signing of the nature and effect, failure to do so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the
initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through
Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is
intended that the third mode of stated in sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only
amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical change,
therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition
violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must first comply with the constitution before complying
with RA 6735

Petition is dismissed.