book review

Freudian unconscious and cognitive neuroscience

Freudian Unconscious and Cognitive Neuroscience. By Vesa Talvitie. of various skills and relies on changes to the domain-specific neural
London: Karnac Books Ltd, 2009. processors involved in that skill, so that, for example, motor regions
will be involved in the learning of a finger sequencing task. Amnesics
‘... [T]he psychological unconscious documented by latter-day exhibiting a deficit in explicit memory continue to retain their ability
scientific psychology is quite different from what Sigmund Freud and to learn new skills and habits, so that although they may not recall the
his psychoanalytic colleagues had in mind in fin de siècle Vienna. learning event, their performance is influenced by this experience.
Their unconscious was hot and wet; it seethed with lust and anger;
it was hallucinatory, primitive, and irrational. The unconscious of The psychoanalytic idea that a memory may be stored in the
contemporary psychology is kinder and gentler than that and more unconscious, only to emerge intact at a later stage, has however been
reality bound and rational, even if it is entirely cold and dry.’ challenged by neuroscience. Cognitive neuroscience has revealed
that our memory processes are highly subject to error. As we grow
Kihlstrom, Barnhardt and Tataryn (p. 789),1 quoted in Talvitie (p. 2)2 older, source memory or our memory of the context in which an
event took place begins to fail. As Martha Weinman Lear (p. 106)3
It was this ‘hot and wet’ perception of Freud’s notion of the explains, various emotions such as guilt or desire, associated with a
unconscious that first attracted me to psychoanalysis. However, particular memory, may affect our recollection of it. ‘We are always
the question regarding whether, when neuroscientists speak of dealing with (A) the event as it actually happened, overlaid by (B)
unconscious processing, they are speaking in the same terms as how we think it might have happened, further modified by (C) how
psychoanalysts or not, has become of increasing interest to me. It we believe that it should have happened, and additionally burdened
was, therefore, my sense that Talvitie’s work served as something of a by (D) how we wish that it had happened or (E) how we fear that it
bridge between the two paradigms that drew me to it. actually happened.’ Furthermore, the accretive nature of memory
formation ensures that other factors such as language may play tricks
As is the case with all mental phenomena, the questions about just on our recollections. For example, it has been shown that the act of
how and where the unconscious might be are associated with the repeating a false statement over and over leads people to believe
mind-body problem that distinguishes monists and dualists. For increasingly in its veracity.4
monists, mind emerges from brain activity. Dualists hold that mind
and brain are separate and cannot be reduced to each other. Dualism Elizabeth Loftus5 has produced an impressive amount of research
has largely fallen out of favour with most neuroscientists, and Talvitie2 showing how easy it is to create false memories of past events. In one
himself is clearly a monist. At the same time, while there is consensus study, participants watched a film of a car accident. Researchers asked
that mind or consciousness emerges from neurophysiological some subjects how fast the cars were going when they ‘smashed
processes, there remains a lack of clarity as to how this is achieved. into’ each other and others how fast the cars were going when they
Talvitie (p. 50)2 goes as far as to make the point that cognitive science ‘hit’ each other. The subjects who heard the word ‘smashed’ gave
has little doubt that unconscious matters determine our behaviour. significantly higher estimates of the speed than those who heard
Rather, it is the role and emergence of consciousness that is in the word ‘hit’. In another experiment, subjects were fed incorrect
question. information about an accident after watching a film of it. For example,
they were asked whether a traffic light had turned yellow before the
At the same time, the two are clearly related. It would seem that collision, when in fact the light was green. This resulted in many then
consciousness is a limited product of the functioning of the mind. remembering a yellow light that had never existed (p. 868).5
We know we can hold only seven units of information in working
memory, and most people are able to retain only four units of With regard to memory consolidation, however, matters are rather
visuospatial information. What happens to other information? Is there more complex. On the one hand, it appears that stress-related
other information? If there is, is it processed unconsciously? hormones and the activation of the amygdala will produce strong
memories in animal and human subjects who are victims of isolated
These questions have been asked for a long time now, and various acts of trauma, so that such emotion-laden memories tend not to be
routes have been utilised by neuroscientists in their quest to answer forgotten. If a person rapes or attacks you, inspiring strong emotion
them. Benjamin Libet (Talvitie,2 p. 50) has shown that readiness in you, the chances are good that you will remember the experience
potential occurs 220 - 550 milliseconds before the conscious decision and not repress it. At the same time, as happens with people who are
to move one’s finger. In addition to subliminal priming, split-brain repeatedly under extreme stress, such as soldiers in heavy war zones
studies have been used to show that subjects presented with sensory or victims of extended sexual abuse, excessive exposure to these very
input to one hemisphere do not perceive this input from the other same stress hormones damages neurons and thus leads to trauma-
hemisphere. Another route has related to analyses of memory inspired memory impairment.6
processes. We know that explicit or declarative memory, which is
the memory for facts and events, depends on the hippocampus Talvitie2 garners data regarding a cognitive neuroscientific
and is stored in a distributed network throughout the brain. understanding of unconscious processes and structures it according
Implicit or procedural memory, on the other hand, is the learning to a four-level model, the starting point of which is the cognitivist

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and monistic idea that conscious states are always the end-products is a form of dissociation, in that it too is context-dependent.6 Hence,
of several neural and conscious processes. His first level is, therefore, what might be repressed in one situation may become conscious in
that of neurophysiological processes, which lead to the second level, another.
that of consciousness (p. 93).2 While, according to Talvitie (p. 94),2 the
Freudian view concerning consciousness and the unconscious tends Similarly to Freud, Talvitie2 appears to view defences as referring to a
to be digital, in that ideas and mental states are either conscious or difficulty with assimilating emotionally valent information. So, should
unconscious (the term preconscious does not change the picture we hear tragic news, we may respond inappropriately by staying
very much), his four-level model delineates consciousness and calm, laughing hysterically or denying it, until such time as we are able
unconsciousness as a continuum. Hence, we are not either conscious to process the emotional significance of the facts we are presented
or unconscious on matters, but rather less or more conscious. with and so integrate them within our personal narrative, memories,
feelings and self-consciousness.
The brain with its orchestration of neural activity gives rise to ideas,
feelings and associations. As this happens, it makes a considerable This may be a good explanation of denial, but what about the
difference to awareness whether an idea or feeling takes part in the repression of unacceptable impulses that also form a part of
stream for 200 milliseconds, for a minute, or for hours or days (p. 24).2 Freud’s model of the mind, the inhibitory capacity that gave Freud’s
So, when an idea or feeling appears and disappears rapidly in the ego executive control over the otherwise automatic, biologically
scope of consciousness, it is probably not remembered later. From the determined functions of the mind?7 Talvitie2 does not pay sufficient
perspective of one’s self-understanding or self-narrative, it makes no attention to this type of defence, and it becomes necessary to fill
difference whether an idea has never appeared in consciousness, or if the vacuum with the work of Solms and Turnbull,8 who show how
it appeared there for one fleeting moment. repression is intimately linked to the functioning of the prefrontal
lobes. These parts of the brain integrate information streaming
The mechanism that picks up particles from the stream of into the brain from the body and its environment with information
consciousness for closer examination is attention. Attention may derived from previous experiences stored elsewhere in the brain.
also be directed to one’s bodily reactions, and affairs taking place in They then act to calculate the best course of action before executing
the surrounding world, bringing us to the third level of the model, a motor response. Solms and Turnbull (p. 287)8 argue that ‘repression’
namely self-consciousness. In Talvitie’s view (p. 96),2 a fish is conscious is therefore consonant with a short-circuiting of this process, so
of another fish swimming in front of it and an infant is conscious of that repressed information is information that is excluded from the
the light being switched off. Both fish and infants possess conscious overarching network of executive control exercised by the prefrontal
states, but they are not self-conscious because they do not possess lobes (p. 287).7 Patients who reveal ego deficits, who are unable
ideas regarding their personal characteristics, i.e. their sex, age, unique to identify contradictory beliefs and whose perception of reality is
life history, idiosyncratic ways of reacting to stimuli, and so forth. submerged in their wishful fantasies have suffered bilateral deep
frontal lobe lesions, as noted by Solms and Turnbull (p. 260).8
Essential to an understanding of self-consciousness are two terms.
The first, ‘phenomenal consciousness’, refers to the particular content However, this is not the whole story; not only do the lesions noted
and quality of a state of consciousness, i.e. whatever pains, pleasures above affect the individual’s capacity to modulate his or her behaviour,
and other feelings might be associated with it. they also affect his or her inner speech, the speech or overt thought
with which we regulate our behaviour in terms of verbal programmes,
The second term is ‘access-consciousness’. This refers to the extent to such as ‘first I must do this, then when it is finished, do that’. This ‘inner
which we are aware of a particular state. For example, when we are in speech’ fits into Damasio’s9 autobiographical self and Talvitie’s (p. 98)2
one conscious state, we might or might not be aware of other states. fourth level, which is that of narrative self-consciousness. The fish and
Restriction of access to consciousness is a common phenomenon. the infant, described earlier with regard to the third level, are unable to
When concentrating on writing, we may not be aware of feelings identify what their current feelings are compared with those they had
of hunger; a soccer player trying to score a goal might not notice yesterday; and they do not understand that life is finite. These ideas
an otherwise painful leg injury. Many competencies are indeed are generally coded and stored by means of language. Language
facilitated by restricting access to other competing sensations in also gives rise to abstract thinking, so that we become able to create
consciousness, making us unaware of them in our perception of fictional worlds and to work with ideas. Language helps to make it
the flow of our experiences. We are only able to attach meaning and possible for us to understand ourselves and others as possessing
significance to a particular state if it is accessible to us. certain mental characteristics and a unique personal history.

In the domain of psychoanalysis, the restriction of access between Although Talvitie’s model emerges largely from the cognitive
conscious states is called dissociation, and it is often used to refer to tradition, it also shares Bion’s focus on language as a means through
cases involving extreme psychopathology. However, Talvitie2 notes which poorly elaborated experiences and sensations are transformed
that a degree of dissociation is a part of normal cognitive functioning. into thoughts than can be entertained and tolerated, despite the
He cites empirical research supporting the idea that repression too discomfort that may accompany them (see Ivey10). Talvitie (p. 93)2 also

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links it to Peter Fonagy and Mary Target’s work on mentalisation and However, ‘[w]hether or not subtle effective experiences can arrive
describes it as a possible elaboration and extension of this work. at awareness depends on the degree to which such experiences
are cultivated in a given culture’ (p 109).13 Drawing on Fromm,13 one
However, drawing on Habermas and Wittgenstein, Talvitie reminds might then think of an example where a family espouses an ideology
us (p. 99)2 that each language community has its own vocabulary that teaches that everything that father does is always right. Father’s
for mental matters, and we have all been socialised to adopt the folk actions are then prefaced in these terms, so that a child of the family
psychology of the surrounding culture. Language functions less to also believes initially that everything the father does is always right.
represent the state of things objectively, and more to make things If the father punishes the child unfairly, he or she will not be able
happen in the social world. Consequently, our verbal expressions to understand the father’s actions as cruel or misguided and if, for
of our mental states are not true or false at first hand. Instead, they an instant, the child doubts the wisdom of the father’s actions, it
are more or less realistic or appropriate given the data, and the is possible that he or she will not pay attention to this doubt and
conventions prevailing in one’s language community. Language is a it will exit awareness. This will be especially true if much of father’s
cultural phenomenon, and cultural conventions provide the frames, behaviour is benevolent and well-considered.
and also set the limits with which we represent our phenomenal
reality (p. 100).2 Talvitie2 does not explore how conceptual systems filter the social
world so that certain experiences enter awareness while others are
Our cognitions and narratives regarding ourselves may also be biased, turned away, and we are forced to turn to Fromm13 for an answer in
as humans have a tendency to see and narrate themselves in one this regard. He identifies language and the prevalent logic directing
way, and a resistance to seeing and narrating themselves in other the thinking of a culture as significant filters. The most important
ways (p. 101).2 Perhaps this is because, as Dennett (p. 418)10 puts it, filtering comes about through social taboos which declare certain
the self has to be controlled, protected and defined, and this occurs ideas and feelings to be forbidden, dangerous or improper (p. 114).2
through our telling stories of what we are like. The boundaries of the Whether social taboos act uniformly on all sectors of society is
self also change, so that sometimes we enlarge our boundaries and questionable, however. In Nazi Germany, most Germans surely found
at other times, in response to perceived challenges real or imaginary, it easier to repress information regarding the injustices committed
we let our boundaries shrink (p. 417).11 Translated into the language against Jewish people than the latter themselves?
of psychoanalysis, we can say that we have an ideal self or self-image
that might become threatened, giving rise to resistance and the In conclusion, while Talvitie’s2 account contains many gaps that
activation of defences (p. 102).2 one needs to fill by looking elsewhere, for example in Solms and
Turnbull’s8 more comprehensive introduction to neuropsychoanalysis,
So, for example, to go back to the model, Talvitie2 explains how one it is nevertheless a thought-provoking work that provides
might understand Freud’s identification of repressed oedipal wishes a structure helpful to those interested in identifying bridges
as follows. A person has conflictual feelings in relation to his or her between psychoanalytic thinking and cognitive and neuroscientific
parents. On the one hand, there are fleeting sexual and aggressive approaches to our understanding of the mind.
feelings that the person in question does not attend to, and so
they become less accessible or remembered. At the same time, the Ethelwyn Eleonore Rebelo
person also has fantasies and fears regarding how a parent of the Department of Psychiatry
same sex might suffer an accident. In analysis, with the request that University of the Witwatersrand
the analysand mention everything that comes to his or her mind,
attention becomes directed on those sexual and aggressive feelings References
1. Talvitie V. Freudian Unconscious and Cognitive Neuroscience: From Unconscious Fantasies
that have hitherto been fleeting and unattended to. The analyst or to Neural Algorithms. London: Karnac, 2009.
analysand then draws together various feelings, fears and fantasies, by 2. Weinman LM. Where did I Leave My Glasses: The What, When and Why of Normal Memory
making use of an anticipated oedipal logic of association in order to Loss. London: JR Books, 2008.
3. Kihlstrom JF, Barnhardt TM, Tataryn DJ. The psychological unconscious: found, lost, and
claim the existence of repressed oedipal ideas (p. 98).2 regained. Am Psychol 1992;47:788-791.
4. Schacter DL. Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. New York: Basic
Books, 1996.
Unfortunately Talvitie2 does not sufficiently develop the implications
5. Loftus EF. Make-believe memories. Am Psychol 2003;8(11):867-873.
of language as playing a role in framing our experience of the world 6. Rofé Y. Does repression exist? Memory, pathogenic, unconscious and clinical evidence. Rev
and thus functioning as a conceptual system that determines to Gen Psychol 2008;12:63-81.

some extent what we choose to attend to or not. His ideas are, 7. Freud S. The Ego and the Id. Standard Edition, 1923:19:3.
8. Solms M, Turnbull O. The Brain and the Inner World. New York: Other Press, 2002.
nevertheless, clearly founded on Freud’s12 early conceptualisation of 9. Damasio A. The Feeling of What Happens. London: Heinemann, 1999.
the unconscious, where he argued that attaching words to thoughts 10. Ivey G, Bion W: Thinking, feeling and the search for truth. In: Watts J, Cockroft K, Duncan N,
makes it possible to bring those thoughts to consciousness, and of eds. Developmental Psychology. Cape Town: UCT Press, 2009:112-137.
11. Dennett D. Consciousness Explained. Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1991.
Fromm’s13 understanding of what he termed the social unconscious. 12. Freud S. The Unconscious. Standard Edition, 1915:14:161.
13. Fromm E. Beyond the Chains of Illusion: My Encounter with Marx & Freud. London: Abacus,
Fromm acknowledges that pain, sexual desire and hunger, as
13 1986.

sensations that are relevant to survival, have easy access to awareness.

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