SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 218418. November 8, 2017.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the REGIONAL

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR, REGION IV, MANILA , petitioner, vs. THE
HEIRS OF MEYNARDO CABRERA, as herein represented by
MEYNARDO CABRERA, JR. and ALMA RODRIGUEZ CABRERA, THE
HEIRS OF CONSOLACION DIMACULANGAN CABRERA, as herein
represented by ALEXANDER CABRERA, MANIBI CABRERA,
MILAGROS CABRERA GARA, AND RAUL CABRERA, JACKSON CINCO
DY, LORETA AGBAYANI, GLORIA SORIANO, CRIS CALMA, NORA
LIWANAG and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF ORIENTAL MINDORO ,
respondents.

DECISION

CAGUIOA , J : p

The Case

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 (Petition) led under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court against the Decision 2 dated July 18, 2014 (Assailed Decision) and
Resolution 3 dated May 20, 2015 (Assailed Resolution) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120
rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) Eleventh Division and Special Former Eleventh
Division, respectively.
The Assailed Decision and Resolution stem from an appeal from the Decision 4
dated December 5, 2005 rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental
Mindoro, Branch 43 (RTC) in Civil Case No. C-358, dismissing the complaint for
cancellation of free patent and reversion led by the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic) against the Heirs of Meynardo Cabrera (Heirs of Meynardo), the Heirs of
Consolacion Dimaculangan Cabrera (Heirs of Consolacion), Jackson Cinco Dy (Dy),
Loreta Agbayani (Agbayani), Gloria Soriano (Soriano), Cris Calma (Calma), Nora
Liwanag (Liwanag), and the Register of Deeds of Oriental Mindoro (ROD) (collectively,
Respondents). 5

The Facts

Sometime in 1971, Meynardo led an Application for Free Patent concerning an

8,072 square-meter parcel of land situated in Pining, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro. 7 In said
6
application, Meynardo alleged that he had been in possession of such parcel of land
since 1936, through his predecessor-in-interest Marcelo Cabrera. 8
In the same year, the Bureau of Lands (BOL) issued Free Patent No. 516197 in
favor of Meynardo, covering two (2) lots denominated as: (i) Lot 1 with an area of 3,591
square meters, and (ii) Lot 2, with an area of 4,481 square meters. 9 On the basis of
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 said patent, the ROD issued Original Certi cate of Title (OCT) No. RP-132 (P-9193)
covering both lots in Meynardo's name. 1 0
Thereafter, a 2,445-square-meter portion of Lot 1 (Lot 1-A) 1 1 was transferred to
Consolacion. 1 2 Thus, on April 6, 1982, Transfer Certi cate of Title (TCT) No. 16580
covering Lot 1-A was issued in Consolacion's name. 1 3 Later still, Consolacion sold
portions of Lot 1-A to several purchasers namely: Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, Calma, and
Liwanag. 1 4
Learning of the issuance of TCT No. 16580, Jose and Leticia De Castro (De
Castros), claiming to be the actual possessors of Lot 1-A, led before the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) a petition urging DENR to conduct an
investigation to determine Lot 1-A's land classification status. 1 5
Consequently, in the DENR Final Investigation Report 1 6 (DENR Final Report)
dated November 9, 1994 issued by Erwin D. Talento of the DENR Land Management
O ce (LMO), Free Patent No. 516197, covering Lots 1, 1-A, and 2 (collectively, Roxas
Properties), was declared null and void for having been issued over land forming part of
the public domain. The pertinent portions of the DENR Final Report read:
Sensing that they don't have any chance in the court to prove their better right to
occupy and possess [Lot 1-A] x x x the [De Castros] addressed their petitions to
the DENR basing their claim on the weight of a certi cation of [the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA)] x x x. The [De Castros]
are now seeking administrative remedies for the issue which they have already
brought to the attention of the court and wherein they have failed to prove their
priority right to occupy and possess [Lot 1-A]. Granting that [the Roxas
Properties constitute] forest land and [Free Patent No. 516197] issued
in favor of [Meynardo] be (sic) rendered null and void [ab] initio , it (sic)
doesn't warrant that they have better right to possess and occupy [Lot 1-A]
because [Meynardo, through his predecessors-in-interest] have entered [Lot 1-A]
since the year 1943 and have exercised their ownership over the same x x x.
In view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the petition
of [the De Castros] be dismissed x x x and appropriate legal action be
instituted for the cancellation of Free Patent No. 516197 issued in
favor of Meynardo x x x for the same covers land of the public domain
which is certi ed by the proper authority as public forest . 1 7 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thereafter, Antonio G. Principe, the DENR Regional Executive Director of Region
IV, issued an Order 1 8 dated August 8, 1997 declaring Free Patent No. 516197 null and
void.
Later, on November 15, 1999, the Republic led against the Respondents a
complaint (Complaint) for the annulment and/or cancellation of Free Patent No.
516197, OCT No. RP-132 (P-9193), and TCT No. 16580. The Complaint also prayed for
the reversion of the Roxas Properties in the State's favor. 1 9
The Republic based its claim on the (i) DENR Final Report; and (ii) NAMRIA
certi cations dated January 31, 1994, February 1, 1994, and October 3, 1994, all stating
that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A) had been reclassi ed as forest land as
early as November 24, 1949. The statements in these documents were, in turn, based
on the inscriptions appearing on Land Classi cation Map No. 209 (LC Map 209) dated
March 6, 1924 covering the Roxas Properties. The Republic reasoned that while LC Map
209 indicates that the parcels of land thereunder were classi ed as alienable and
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 disposable at the time it was prepared, a subsequent annotation made thereon
indicates that they were reclassi ed as forest land sometime thereafter, and had thus
become inalienable. 2 0
In their respective answers, the Respondents averred, among others, that: (i) Lot
1-A forms part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, as evidenced
by the original statements appearing on LC Map 209; (ii) the annotations appearing on
LC Map 209 do not serve as su cient proof of reversion; and (iii) the land area which
had been purportedly reclassi ed as forest land was not properly identi ed since the
Republic failed to present the technical description corresponding thereto. 2 1 In
addition to these common assertions, respondents Dy, Agbayani, Soriano, and Liwanag
further averred that they acquired portions of Lot 1-A from Consolacion in good faith,
and have, since then, been in actual, exclusive, open, and continuous possession of their
respective portions as owners. 2 2
On December 5, 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the instant
complaint for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED. 2 3
The RTC found that the Republic failed to present proof that the Roxas Properties
(including Lot 1-A) have been reclassi ed as forest land. Citing Republic v. Animas , 2 4
(Animas) the RTC held that in order to prove reversion of alienable and disposable land
to forest land, a positive government act evincing the same is necessary. 2 5
The Republic led a motion for reconsideration (MR), which was denied in the
RTC's Order dated October 18, 2011. 2 6
CA Proceedings

Aggrieved, the Republic elevated the case to the CA via petition for review under
Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 (Appeal).
In the Appeal, the Republic argued that the Court's ruling in Animas cannot be
applied to the present case, since, in the former, the fact sought to be established was
the classi cation of forest land to alienable and disposable land, and not the other way
around, as in this case. 2 7 Further, the Republic averred that fraud must have necessarily
attended the issuance of Free Patent No. 516197, OCT No. RP-132 and TCT No. 16580,
owing to the status of the Roxas Properties as forest land. 2 8
On July 18, 2014, the CA rendered the Assailed Decision dismissing the Appeal.
The dispositive portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Appeal is DISMISSED . The
Decision dated December 5, 2005 of the [RTC] x x x is AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED. 29

According to the CA, the Public Land Act vests the power to classify (and
reclassify) lands of the public domain with the President. On this score, the CA held that
the annotations appearing on LC Map 209 anent the alleged reversion of the Roxas
Properties deserve scant consideration, as they do not appear to be based on any
executive directive. Consequently, the NAMRIA certi cations and DENR Final Report
relied upon by the Republic are insu cient to sustain its cause, as they are, in turn,
based solely on said annotations. 3 0
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 The Republic led an MR, which was denied by the CA in its Assailed Resolution
dated May 20, 2015. The Republic received a copy of the Assailed Resolution on June 8,
2015. 3 1
On June 19, 2015, the Republic led a Motion for Extension of Time to File
Petition for Review, praying for an additional period of twenty- ve (25) days from June
23, 2015, or until July 18, 2015 within which to le a petition for review on certiorari.
Subsequently, the Republic led a Second Motion for Extension, praying for a ve (5)-
day extension. 3 2
Finally, on July 22, 2015, the Republic led the present Petition, to which
Respondents filed their Compliance and Comment dated December 16, 2016. 3 3
Thereafter, the Republic led a Manifestation and Motion dated May 28, 2017,
adopting the Petition as its reply to Respondents' Compliance and Comment. 3 4

The Issue

The Petition calls on the Court to determine whether the CA erred when it held
that a positive act of government is necessary to evince the reclassi cation of land
from alienable and disposable to forest.

The Court's Ruling

In this Petition, the Republic maintains that the Court's ruling in Animas did not
have the effect of making a positive executive act a necessary requirement for the
purpose of proving the reclassi cation of alienable and disposable land. 3 5 Instead, the
Republic posits that Animas a rms its right to institute reversion proceedings in
instances where portions of forest land are erroneously included within the scope of
land patents. 3 6 Moreover, the Republic argues that in reversion proceedings, the State
should not be made to bear the burden of proving that the land in question constitutes
public domain (i.e., forest land). 3 7 In any case, the Republic posits that the
documentary and testimonial evidence it had presented su ciently proved such fact.
38

The Petition should be denied for lack of merit. The CA did not err when it
a rmed the RTC Decision, as the Republic failed to establish that the Roxas Properties
were classified as forest land at the time Free Patent No. 516197 was issued.
The Republic's Petition and
Respondents' Compliance and
Comment should be admitted in the
interest of substantial justice.

At the outset, the Court notes that the parties herein, albeit at different stages of
the proceedings, have both prayed for the relaxation of the Rules of Court (Rules).
For its part, the Republic led two (2) motions which sought for an aggregate
period of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the initial thirty (30)-day period
prescribed by the Rules for the ling of a petition for review on certiorari. The
Respondents, on the other hand, sought the admission of their Compliance and
Comment, filed more than seven (7) months after the filing of the Petition. 3 9

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 Considering the nature of the issues involved in the present Petition, and the lack
of evidence showing that neither the Republic's nor the Respondents' requests for
accommodation had been impelled by any ill-motive, the Court resolves to admit in the
interest of substantial justice the Republic's Petition and the Respondents' Comment
with Compliance.
The Court's ruling in Animas does not
apply to the present case.

The Republic's Petition primarily proceeds from the supposition that in ruling in
favor of Respondents, the RTC and the CA erroneously relied on Animas.
In Animas, the Republic led an action for reversion against respondent therein,
claiming that the Free Patent issued in the latter's favor covered forest land. The Court
of First Instance dismissed the Republic's action on the ground that the original
certi cate of title covering said land had become indefeasible, the same having been
issued more than one (1) year prior to the ling of the Republic's action. Hence, the
issue brought before the Court in Animas was whether the lapse of said one (1)-year
period had the effect of precluding the State from initiating reversion proceedings to
recover land which had been unlawfully registered, either through fraud or oversight.
Resolving the issue, the Court held that public land fraudulently or erroneously included
in the scope of patents or certi cates of title may be recovered by the State through
reversion proceedings, in accordance with the Public Land Act.
While the Animas ruling upholds the State's right to seek reversion with respect
to fraudulently or erroneously registered lands, it does not, in any manner, lay down the
facts that must be established for an action for reversion to prosper. Undoubtedly, the
RTC and CA's reliance on the Animas ruling is misplaced.
Nevertheless , such erroneous reliance on Animas , as will be discussed
below, does not advance the Republic's cause, since the principle which
serves as basis for the decisions of the RTC and CA remains correct, albeit
attributed to the wrong case .
The power to classify and reclassify
land lies solely with the Executive
Department.

The Regalian Doctrine has long been recognized as the basic foundation of the
State's property regime, 4 0 and has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973,
and 1987 Constitutions; 4 1 it espouses that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, and that, as a consequence thereof, any asserted right of ownership over land
necessarily traces back to the State. 4 2
At present, Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classi es lands of the
public domain into ve (5) categories — forest lands, agricultural lands, timber lands,
mineral lands, and national parks. The Court's ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
Palanca v. Republic , 4 3 instructs that in the absence of any prior classi cation by the
State, unclassi ed lands of the public domain assume the category of forest lands not
open to disposition. 4 4
In turn, the classi cation of unclassi ed lands of the public domain, and the
reclassi cation of those previously classi ed under any of the categories set forth in
the 1987 Constitution (such as the Roxas Properties), are governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 141 4 5 dated November 7, 1936, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
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 Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide:
SEC. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the
public domain into —
(a) Alienable or disposable;
(b) Timber; and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one
class to another , for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
SEC. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of
alienable or disposable public lands, the President, upon recommendation by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, shall from time to time declare what
lands are open to disposition or concession under this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
These provisions are clear and leave no room for interpretation — the
classi cation and reclassi cation of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest land is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, 4 6 and is
exercised by the latter through the President, or such other persons vested with
authority to exercise the same on his behalf. 4 7
Since the power to classify and reclassify land are executive in nature, such acts,
effected without executive authority, are void, and essentially ultra vires.
In reversion proceedings, the State
bears the burden of proving that the
property in question was inalienable
at the time it was decreed or
adjudicated in favor of the defendant.

A land registration proceeding is the manner through which an applicant

con rms title to real property. In this proceeding, the applicant bears the burden of
overcoming the presumption of State ownership. 4 8 Accordingly, the applicant is bound
to establish, through incontrovertible evidence, that the land sought to be registered
had been declared alienable or disposable through a positive act of the State. 4 9
Conversely, reversion proceeding is the manner through which the State seeks to
revert land to the mass of the public domain; 5 0 it is proper when public land is
fraudulently awarded and disposed of in favor of private individuals or corporations, 5 1
or when a person obtains a title under the Public Land Act which includes, by oversight,
lands which cannot be registered under the Torrens system as they form part of the
public domain. 5 2
Owing to the nature of reversion proceedings and the outcome which a favorable
decision therein entails, the State bears the burden to prove that the land previously
decreed or adjudicated in favor of the defendant constitutes land which cannot be
owned by private individuals. The Court's ruling in Republic v. Development Resources
Corporation 5 3 is instructive:
Since a complaint for reversion can upset the stability of registered titles
through the cancellation of the original title and the others that emanate from it,
the State bears a heavy burden of proving the ground for its action . x x
x 5 4 (Emphasis supplied)

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 Thus, in Republic v. Espinosa 5 5 (Espinosa), the Court held that the dismissal of
the Republic's action for reversion is proper since the Republic failed to establish that
the land subject thereof was classi ed as forest land at the time the cadastral
decree in favor of the defendant was issued :
[I]t is undisputed that Espinosa was granted a cadastral decree and was
subsequently issued OCT No. 191-N x x x. Having been granted a decree in a
cadastral proceeding, Espinosa can be presumed to have overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. This means that Espinosa, as the applicant, was able to prove by
incontrovertible evidence that the property is alienable and disposable property
in the cadastral proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, the State, through the Solicitor General, alleges neither fraud
nor misrepresentation in the cadastral proceedings and in the issuance of the
title in Espinosa's favor. The argument for the State is merely that the property
was unlawfully included in the certi cate of title because it is of the public
domain.
Since the case is one for reversion and not one for land
registration, the burden is on the State to prove that the property was
classi ed as timberland or forest land at the time it was decreed to
Espinosa . To reiterate, there is no burden on [the present owner] to
prove that the property in question is alienable and disposable land.
At this stage, it is reasonable to presume that Espinosa, from whom
[the present owner] derive[s] her title, had already established that the
property is alienable and disposable land considering that she
succeeded in obtaining the OCT over it. In this reversion proceeding,
the State must prove that there was an oversight or mistake in the
inclusion of the property in Espinosa's title because it was of public
dominion . This is consistent with the rule that the burden of proof rests on the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts the
affirmative of an issue. 5 6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, to resolve this Petition, the Court must determine whether the
documentary and testimonial evidence offered by the Republic are su cient to sustain
its cause.
The Complaint should be dismissed as
the Republic failed to show that the
Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-A)
were classified as forest land at the
time Free Patent No. 516197 was
issued in Meynardo's favor.

To recall, the Republic presented the following pieces of evidence to support its
complaint for reversion: (i) DENR Final Report; (ii) NAMRIA certi cations; and (iii) LC
Map 209. However, these documents, whether taken individually or collectively, do not
evince a positive act of reclassi cation by the Executive Department. As aptly stated by
the CA:
In this case, the Republic presented the [NAMRIA certi cations], the
[DENR Final Report] and [LC Map 209] dated March 6, 1924, with an inscription
that the [Roxas Properties] [were] reverted x x x to the category of forest land on
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 November 24, 1949. However, it appears that the ndings of the CENRO and the
NAMRIA are based solely on such mapping [LC Map 209] where eighteen (18)
hectares, including the location therein of the [Roxas Properties], [were]
reclassified as forest land. Engineer [Mariano] Mendez 5 7 testified that:
xxx xxx xxx
Q: So you don't have the law or the order reverting that portion of land to
forest land on November 24, 1949?
A: Except only that it is a swamp land. And it is shown here in our map, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
PROS. MARCO:
x x x [W]hat is the basis, if any, of you (sic) in declaring that this portion of land
was reverted back from timber land to forest land on November 24, 1949?
A: Our files and records.
Q: What are these files and records?
A: As indicated in [LC Map 209].
Engineer Mendez admitted that there was no presidential order
or act reverting the classi cation of the subject property from
alienable and disposable to forest land , thus:
Q: Did you prepare the basis of the reversion of the land from disposable to
forest land on November 24, 1949?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What were the basis?
A: Yes, because when I studied that, I found out that the area was a swamp
land?
Q: Aside from that, that the area was a swamp land, what are your other
basis?
A: Nothing more, sir. As per records, that is the only basis.
Q: Did you not research any law, decree, presidential order or act as the basis
of reverting this parcel of land to forest zone on November 24, 1949?
A: I have even decrees or law reverting certain area to forest land
but not in this particular area .
Q: So, you know that before a certain parcel of land would be reverted from
alienable and disposable to forest zone, there should be a basis for the
same, like proclamation or law. From your experience, presidential
decrees?
A: Yes, sir. These are proclamation decrees regarding the reversion of certain
land use. But in this particular area, the land is swamp land.
Q: But in this particular case, did you encounter or did you see any law,
executive order, presidential proclamation declaring this parcel of land
from alienable and disposable to forest zone?
A: I have not encountered any decree or presidential proclamation or
order reverting this land to forest zone . x x x
Even Engineer Mendez of the NAMRIA agreed that a law or proclamation
is required before a certain parcel of land is reclassi ed from alienable and
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 disposable to forest land. His insistence that because the land was (originally)
swamp land that reclassi cation was made (sic) , is not supported by any
presidential or legal pronouncement or by practice and tradition x x x
Unfortunately, the Republic failed to present any law, presidential proclamation,
order or act to prove that the subject property was indeed within the area which
is reclassi ed as forest land. Even an administrative order from the Bureau of
Forestry was not presented to show that the subject property had been
reclassified as forest land. 5 8 (Additional emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The foregoing testimony, culled from the Assailed Decision, con rms that the
alleged reclassi cation of the Roxas Properties is bereft of basis, as it was done by
Engineer Mendez on his sole account, without any prior directive from the President, or
a duly authorized o cer from the Executive Department. In fact, the annotation
appearing on LC Map 209 upon which the Republic relies does not even state upon
whose authority the alleged reclassi cation had been made, 5 9 placing the annotation's
validity, veracity and worth in serious doubt.
Ultimately, the Republic failed to prove that the Roxas Properties (including Lot 1-
A) were classi ed as forest land when they were decreed in Meynardo's favor in 1971.
Thus, in accordance with the Court's ruling in Development Resources Corporation and
Espinosa, the present Petition must be, as it is hereby, denied.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is
DENIED . The Assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 18, 2014 and
Resolution dated May 20, 2015 in CA-G.R. CV No. 98120 are hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED.
Carpio, Peralta and Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.
Perlas-Bernabe, * J., is on official leave.
Footnotes
* On official leave.
1. Rollo, pp. 19-43.

2. Id. at 45-65. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices
Isaias P. Dicdican and Michael P. Elbinias concurring.
3. Id. at 67-69. Penned by Associate Justice Victoria Isabel A. Paredes, with Associate Justices
Isaias P. Dicdican and Maria Elisa Sempio Diy concurring.
4. See id. at 46. The RTC Decision does not form part of the records.

5. Id. at 47-48.
6. Stated as 8072 hectares, more or less, in the Petition and CA Decision; id. at 22 and 47.
7. Rollo, pp. 46-47.
8. See id. at 63.

9. Id. at 46-47.
10. Id. at 47.
11. Referred to as Lot 1-E in some parts of the records.

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 12. The relationship between Meynardo and Consolacion, as well as the manner through which
Lot 1-A was transferred by the former to the latter, cannot be determined from the
records of the case.
13. Rollo, p. 47.

14. The specific dates of conveyance cannot be ascertained from the records.
15. Rollo, p. 47.
16. Id. at 82-83.
17. Id. at 83.
18. Id. at 70-72.

19. Id. at 47.

20. See id. at 63. According to the CA, the annotation on LC Map 209 stated that "the subject
property was reverted (sic) to forest land on November 24, 1949." A copy of said map,
however, does not form part of the records of the case.

21. See id. at 49-50.

22. Id. at 48-49.
23. Id. at 53.
24. 155 Phil. 470 (1974).
25. Rollo, pp. 54-55.

26. Id. at 54.

27. Id. at 55.
28. See id. at 60-61.
29. Id. at 64.

30. See id. at 55-59.

31. Id. at 4.
32. Id. at 11-14.
33. Id. at 196-206.
34. Id. at 213-216.

35. See id. at 26.

36. Id. at 32.
37. Id. at 34-35.
38. Id. at 35.
39. The exact date on which Respondents received a copy of the Petition cannot be ascertained
from the records.
40. Republic v. Espinosa , G.R. No. 186603, April 5, 2017, p. 10, citing SAAD Agro-Industries, Inc.
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 v. Republic, 534 Phil. 648, 663 (2006).
41. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap , 589 Phil. 156,
176 (2008).

42. Id.
43. 531 Phil. 602, 616 (2006).
44. Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap , supra note 41,
at 196.
45. COM. ACT NO. 141, entitled "AN ACT TO AMEND AND COMPILE THE LAWS RELATIVE TO
LANDS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN" (1936).
46. Heirs of the Late Spouses Palanca v. Republic, supra note 43, at 618.
47. See COM. ACT NO. 141 (1936), Sec. 6.
48. Republic v. Espinosa, supra note 40, at 5.

49. Id.
50. See id. at 6.
51. Id.

52. Id.
53. 623 Phil. 490 (2009).

54. Id. at 493.

55. Supra note 40.

56. Id. at 5-6.

5 7 . Engineer Mariano Mendez was the designated Land Classi cation Veri er of NAMRIA
during the relevant period; rollo, p. 51.
58. Rollo, pp. 56-59.

59. Id. at 63.

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