CASE 14

EN BANC

G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, Petitioner,

vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury
of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even
as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality
beyond which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual
spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to
social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of
rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is
justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor
to withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -

The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or

collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community,
against his will, is to prevent harm to others.

Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the

State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to
formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its
collective wisdom and inflict punishment for non-observance.

The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic

collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a
new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to
the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the
process, the web of rights and State impositions became tangled
and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors,
the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision,
between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the
zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and
dignity, inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted
against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest
test.

Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be

prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), 1 as amended by RA 7659, 2 wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens
rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code,  all
of which are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights
of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.

Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner

to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d),
2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property,

business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the
purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or
indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or
business associates by any combination or series of the following
means or similar schemes:

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation

of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public office concerned;

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets

belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions,
agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any

shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business
enterprise or undertaking;

(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies

or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or

(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship,

connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at
the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people
and the Republic of the Philippines.

Section 2.  Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public

officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family,
relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires
ill-gotten wealth through a  combination or series of overt or
criminal acts  as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who
participated with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be
punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree
of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-
gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets
including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the
deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State
(underscoring supplied).

Section 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the

crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove  each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy  (underscoring supplied).

On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the

Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a)
Crim. Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA
7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation
of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA
3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim.
Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713
(The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The
Revised Penal Code); and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use
Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).

On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand

of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with
respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of
the offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the
accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other
documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably,
the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation,
reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to
prove lack of probable cause. The purported ambiguity of the
charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged
were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus indicating the
explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause
for the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants
for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion
for reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.

On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in

Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein
did not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21
June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.

As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on

18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition
for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.

Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the

validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution. 3 Courts invariably train their sights on this
fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional
attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This
strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the
idea that it is forbidden for one branch of the government to
encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been
said that the presumption is based on the deference the judicial
branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.

If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may

firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has
passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose
of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature
are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with
judicial restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every
intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its
constitutionality, invalidity being a measure of last resort. In
construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first
ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the
question of constitutionality.

In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon 4 we held that as

long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the
case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient
law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the
law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the
organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive
commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.

Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily

on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there
can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-
founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To
doubt is to sustain." 5 And petitioner has miserably failed in the
instant case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption
of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.

As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards

and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit
in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable
certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in
connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons;

2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth

through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal
acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by
receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from
any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the
public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or
disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of
stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including
the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or
undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or
commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular
persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and
prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,

3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth

amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least  P50,000,000.00.

As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that

would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in
defending one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the
accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed,
it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or
accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a
series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the
Plunder Law.

In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language

of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements
of the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:

"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB,

Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,'
together with Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward
Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder,
defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12
of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:

That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY
AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING
UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION,
AUTHORITY, RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL
VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more
or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR
THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal
acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:

(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL

INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE
HUNDRED FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00),
MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with
co-accused CHARLIE 'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, in consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION
OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;

(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,

converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR
THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more
or less, representing a portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION
PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for
the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma
Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic
supplied).

(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL

GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) TO PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE
OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS),
329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE
BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS
ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND
FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS
SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY PESOS
(P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION
FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN
PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY
HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND
JANE DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM
THE BELLE CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT
NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'

(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS,

SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF
PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES
AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE
BILLION TWO HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND
SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS (P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING
THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as

there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense.
Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that
the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts.
Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed
of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the
statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found
in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.

The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not

rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them; 6 much less do we have to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command
requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an
enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of
its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute
will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law
so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.

Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that

words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, 7 unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. 8 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"

Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process

of combining. To combine  is to bring into such close relationship as
to obscure individual characters.

Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one

after another in spatial and temporal succession.

That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be

understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA
7080 or the Plunder Law:

DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON

JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder.
We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR
CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now
when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two
or more means, we mean to say that number one and two or
number one and something else are included, how about a series of
the same act? For example, through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, will these be included also?

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.

REP. ISIDRO: Series.

REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.

REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -

REP. GARCIA: Two.

REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.

REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.

REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?

REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two

acts.

REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say

combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition
of the same act.

REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.

REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are
two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.

REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we

say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?

REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes.

That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is
only one act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x

REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....

SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?

REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.

REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two

misappropriations....

REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be

combination. Series.

REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?

REP. GARCIA: Yes.

SEN. TANADA: Two different.

REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.

REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...

REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...

DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989

SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes

one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big
amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the words
a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED
by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of necessitating a series.
Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.

SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more

of the acts mentioned in this.

THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....

SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many;

two or more.

SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x

THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted

under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there
should be, at least, two or more.

SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by

existing laws, Mr. President.

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring

to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance
of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par.
(d), subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or

more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan 9 that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -

x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a

combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in
subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of
the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there
must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term
'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or
method' which the principal accused and public officer and others
conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In
the alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or
criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.

Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a
fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under
the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated
in various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a
statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can
understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be
invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by construction.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)
respects - it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying
out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the
Government muscle. 10 But the doctrine does not apply as against
legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but
which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or
to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable to
certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the
second whenever directed against such activities. 11 With more
reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is
clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.

The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for

uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice. 12 It must be stressed, however, that
the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will
not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit
in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where,
because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide
all the details in advance as in all other statutes.

Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr.

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court
that the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do
not justify a facial review of its validity -

The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either

forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process
of law."13 The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that
"a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which
sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms." 14 cräläwvirtualibräry
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to
one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon
protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or
proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a single
prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally
protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly
broad statutes with no requirement that the person making the
attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by
a statute drawn with narrow specificity."15 The possible harm to
society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others
may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.

This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes

have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence,
and, if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful
conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as
in the area of free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special

application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the
validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an
opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an
'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Amendment."16 In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 17 the Court ruled that
"claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained
at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal
laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this
reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act
is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the
challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under
which the Act would be valid." 18 As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in
some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the
vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others." 19 cräläwvirtualibräry

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness

are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in
free speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First
Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is
involved is a criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is
constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground
that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or
other situations in which its application might be
unconstitutional."20 As has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges
in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to
a particular defendant." 21 Consequently, there is no basis for
petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its
face and in its entirety.

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them

down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties
not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally
protected.22 It constitutes a departure from the case and
controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract
contexts. 23 But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger
v. Harris 24
cräläwvirtualibräry

[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its

deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the
statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the
judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy, the impact on the legislative process of the relief
sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the
required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily
results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been
described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort,"25 and is generally
disfavored. 26 In determining the constitutionality of a statute,
therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the
defendant is charged. 27 cräläwvirtualibräry

In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported

ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at
length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where
none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the
statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be
sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-
entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the
Plunder Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what
the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted
for its passage, petitioner must be aware that the law was
extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate
committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound
constitutional anchorage.

The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan 28 must be mentioned

if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed
to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so
imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others,
that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),
violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that
the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to
wit: (a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest
partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad
faith; and, (c) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross
inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official
function and that their right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against them was violated because they were left
to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.

In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest
partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable
negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the
offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be
committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same
Information does not mean that the indictment charges three (3)
distinct offenses.

The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate

or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third
International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without justification or
adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of
Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and Phrases,
Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part,
p. 19).

The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public
officer in:

x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,

advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3
[e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).

It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted

penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the
discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions, in giving
any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is
unjustified, unauthorized or without justification or adequate
reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.

In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood
in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the
section unconstitutional.

On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched

theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires
only proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful
scheme or conspiracy -

SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime

of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every
criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it
being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of
overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy.

The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic

mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes,
the accused always has in his favor the presumption of innocence
which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State
succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. 29 The use of
the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of
criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free
society that every individual going about his ordinary affairs has
confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a
criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt
with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has
acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it
gives life to the Due Process Clause which protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged. 30  The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano
and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations in the
floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -

DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA

7080, 9 October 1990

MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our

criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him
guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that
not work against the right of the accused especially so if the
amount committed, say, by falsification is less than  P100 million,
but the totality of the crime committed is  P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion,
theft?

MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information

needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to
be proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which
he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.

MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that

in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important,
I feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken
singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to
accumulate only  P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only
able to accumulate  P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the
other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on
the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now
convict him?

MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of

proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove
that element beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential
element of the crime is that the amount involved is  P100 million.
Now, in a series of defalcations and other acts of corruption in the
enumeration the total amount would be  P110 or  P120 million, but
there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up
the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved.
Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond
reasonable doubt, is  P100 million, then there is a crime of
plunder (underscoring supplied).

It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any
manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove
beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to
constitute the crime.

The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove
beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form
a combination or series which would constitute a pattern and
involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to
prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have
been committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. To illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged
in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids
on the public treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these
fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two
(2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they
amounted to at least P50,000,000.00. 31 cräläwvirtualibräry

A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the

logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts
of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated
otherwise, such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec.
1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and
common sense. There would be no other explanation for a
combination or series of

overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a

scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten
wealth." The prosecution is therefore not required to make a
deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily
follows with the establishment of a series or combination of the
predicate acts.

Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4

is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the
crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains
a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such
that without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be

convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the
Rule of Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?

ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes

enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the

crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section
4, can you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?

ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec.

4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays
down a substantive element of the law x x x x

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of

Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts
charged constituting plunder?

ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged,

it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element
of the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.

JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt

insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do
not have to go that far by applying Section 4?

ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a

very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution.32

We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential

elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition
in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of
them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear
and unequivocal:

SEC. 4.  Rule of Evidence.  - For purposes of establishing the

crime of plunder x x x x

It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the

prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right
in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a
remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law.
Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder
may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the
fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting for the sake of argument
that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by
petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the provisions
without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the
existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough.
Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -

Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or

the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid,
the remaining provisions of this Act and the application of such
provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected
thereby.

Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from
being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so,
all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated
independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives
of the statute can best be achieved.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza

that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -

x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the

element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It
is noteworthy that the amended information alleges that the crime
of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It
thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.

In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the

requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of Senator
Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:

SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to

convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual
criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy
or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.33 cräläwvirtualibräry

However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the

succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it
is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the
Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and faster process
of attending to this kind of cases?

SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .34 cräläwvirtualibräry

Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy
to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every
criminal act done to further the scheme or conspiracy, it being
enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or
ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however,
the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown.

Indeed, 2 provides that -

Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall
likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code,
shall be considered by the court.

The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the

Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law
indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of plunder since
the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his
criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any person who
participates with the said public officer in the commission of an
offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to
believe, however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer
as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all
the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."35 cräläwvirtualibräry

Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in

se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the
decision of Congress in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are
punished with death as a straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659.
Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held
in People v. Echegaray:36cräläwvirtualibräry

The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that
are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was
callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and utterly
dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or
her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light, the capital
crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom
resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured,
or subjected to dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in
death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death
of the victim in the case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or serious
physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him
were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or
intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the
owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or
raped, which are penalized by reclusion perpetua to death, are
clearly heinous by their very nature.

There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the

significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the
scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context in which
the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its
poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from decades of corrupt
tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished
the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and
syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the
structures of society and the psyche of the populace. [With the
government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most
basic services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to
the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous
are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery,
destructive arson resulting in death, and drug offenses involving
government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators
must not be allowed to cause further destruction and damage to
society.

The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a

heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts
punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala
in se37 and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a
special law, especially since in the case of plunder the predicate
crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat
prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an
ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent
wrongness of the acts.

To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the

amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to resurrect
this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned
by People v. Echegaray 38 to the archives of jurisprudential history.
The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally
valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral
part of it.

Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene

profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the
coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are
imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily
methodical and economically catastrophic looting of the national
treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to
disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-scale corruption which, if
left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately
consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The Plunder
Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to
ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the
avarice and other venalities in public office.

These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount
of interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall
from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under
a virginal statute. This continuing saga has driven a wedge of
dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only
by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the
midst of ferment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED , this Court holds that RA 7080

otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring

opinion of J. Mendoza.

Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring

opinion.

Kapunan, Pardo,  Sandoval-Gutierrez,  Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,

see dissenting opinion.

Mendoza ,  J., please see concurring opinion.

Panganiban  J., please see separate concurring opinion.

Carpio,  J., no part. Was one of the complainants before

Ombudsman.
Endnotes:
 Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.
1

 Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.

2

 Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
3

 G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.

4

 Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).

5

 82 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.
6

 Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.
7

 PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
8

 Resolution of 9 July 2001.

9

10
 See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.

11
 Ibid.

12
 State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.

 Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and
13

Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 (1967).

 NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed.
14

2d 231 (1960).

15
 Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707 (1987); see also People v. De la Piedra,
16

G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001.

17
 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).

18
 United States v. Salerno, supra.

 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369
19

(1982).

 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo &
20

Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).

21
 G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).

 Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000)
22

arguing that, in an important sense, as applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional
adjudication and that determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only as logical
outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular facts.

 Constitution, Art. VIII, 1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); "[T]he
23

power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of
argument by the parties, and limited further to be constitutional question raised or the very lis mota
presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities."

 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L. Ed. 2d
24

524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989).

 Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524
25

U.S. 569, 580 (1998).

 FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment
26

and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6 December 2000 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).

 United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
27

 G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.

28

 People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
29

 People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 94187, 4 November 1992, 215 SCRA 349, 360.
30

31
 Then Senate President Jovito R. Salonga construed in brief the provision, thuswise: If there are lets say 150
crimes all in all, criminal acts, whether bribery, misappropriation, malversation, extortion, you need not prove
all those beyond reasonable doubt. If you can prove by pattern, lets say 10, but each must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, you do not have to prove 150 crimes. Thats the meaning of this (Deliberations of
Committee on Constitutional Amendments and Revision of Laws, 15 November 1988, cited in the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of 9 July 2001).

 TSN, 18 September 2001, pp. 115-121.

32

 4 Record of the Senate 1316, 5 June 1989.

33

 Ibid.
34

 Roschen v. Ward, 279 U.S. 337, 339, 73 L.Ed. 722, 728 (1929).
35

 267 SCRA 682, 721-2 (1997) (emphasis added).

36

 Black's Law Dictionary 959 (1990); Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 324, 338 (1986).
37

 G.R. No. 117472, 7 February 1997, 267 SCRA 682.

38