Formal Requisites of Holographic Will (Articles 810 – 814)

Ajero v. Court of Appeals

Facts: In the will, decedent named as devisees, the following: petitioners Roberto and Thelma Ajero,
private respondent Clemente Sand, Meriam S. Arong, Leah Sand, Lilia Sand, Edgar Sand, Fe Sand, Lisa
S. Sand, and Dr. Jose Ajero, Sr., and their children. On January 20, 1983, petitioners instituted Sp. Proc.
No. Q-37171, for allowance of decedent's holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution,
she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every
respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will.

Private respondent opposed the petition on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the signature
therein was in decedent's handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed
by decedent; and, the will was procured by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence.

RTC: The trial court admitted the decedent's holographic will to probate. While the fact that it was
entirely written, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix has been disputed, the petitioners,
however, have satisfactorily shown in Court that the holographic will in question was indeed written
entirely, dated and signed in the handwriting of the testatrix. Three (3) witnesses who have convincingly
shown knowledge of the handwriting of the testatrix have been presented and have explicitly and
categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the
genuine handwriting and signature of the testatrix.

Likewise, no evidence was presented to show sufficient reason for the disallowance of herein holographic
will. While it was alleged that the said will was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence
on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person, the evidence adduced have not shown any instance
where improper pressure or influence was exerted on the testatrix.

CA: The CA dismissed the petition for probate of decedent's will. The Court of Appeals found that, "the
holographic will fails to meet the requirements for its validity." It alluded to certain dispositions in the
will which were either unsigned and undated, or signed but not dated. It also found that the erasures,
alterations and cancellations made thereon had not been authenticated by decedent.

Held: The SC reversed the CA.

In a petition to admit a holographic will to probate, the only issues to be resolved are:

(1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent's last will and testament;
(2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law;
(3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed;
and,
(4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedent.

In the case of holographic wills, on the other hand, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they
be totally autographic or handwritten by the testator himself, as provided under Article 810 of the New
Civil Code, thus: A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and
signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the
Philippines, and need not be witnessed. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the
disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionably handwritten by the testator.

A reading of Article 813 of the New Civil Code shows that its requirement affects the validity of the
dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date
some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however,
does not render the whole testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate,
notwithstanding non-compliance with the provisions of Article 814. Thus, unless the unauthenticated
alterations, cancellations or insertions were made on the date of the holographic will or on testator's
signature, 9 their presence does not invalidate the will itself. The lack of authentication will only result in
disallowance of such changes.

Kalaw v. Relova

Facts: On September 1, 1971, private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be the sole heir
of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw, filed a petition before the CFI of Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa
City, for the probate of her holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.

The holographic Will, as first written, named ROSA K. Kalaw, a sister of the testatrix as her sole heir.
Hence, on November 10, 1971, petitioner ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance, that
the holographic Will contained alterations, corrections, and insertions without the proper authentication
by the full signature of the testatrix as required by Article 814.

After trial, respondent Judge denied probate. The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the National
Bureau of Investigation for examination. The NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the
insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by one and the same person. Consequently, Exhibit
"C" was the handwriting of the decedent, Natividad K. Kalaw. The Court finds, therefore, that the
provision of Article 814 of the Civil Code is applicable to Exhibit "C". Finding the insertions, alterations
and/or additions in Exhibit "C" not to be authenticated by the full signature of the testatrix Natividad K.
Kalaw.

Issue: Whether or not the original unaltered text after subsequent alterations and insertions were voided
by the Trial Court for lack of authentication by the full signature of the testatrix, should be probated or
not, with her as sole heir.

Held: Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and interlineations made by the testator in a
holographic Will litem not been noted under his signature, the Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole,
but at most only as respects the particular words erased, corrected or interlined.

However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in dispute had only one substantial provision, which
was altered by substituting the original heir with another, but which alteration did not carry the requisite
of full authentication by the full signature of the testator, the effect must be that the entire Will is voided
or revoked for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will after that which could remain valid. To
state that the Will as first written should be given efficacy is to disregard the seeming change of mind of
the testatrix. But that change of mind can neither be given effect because she failed to authenticate it in
the manner required by law by affixing her full signature.
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to such insertions, cancellations, erasures or
alterations in a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the altered words themselves but not
the essence and validity of the Will itself.

Rodelas v. Aranza

Facts: On January 11, 1977, appellant filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal for the probate of the
holographic will of Ricardo B. Bonilla and the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor. The
Appellees Amparo Aranza Bonilla, Wilferine Bonilla Treyes Expedita Bonilla Frias and Ephraim Bonilla
on the ground that the deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise, executed and attested as
required by law.

The appellees moved again for the dismissal of the probate on the ground that the alleged holographic
was not a last will but merely an instruction as to the management and improvement of the schools and
colleges founded by decedent Ricardo B. Bonilla; and lost or destroyed holographic wills cannot be
proved by secondary evidence unlike ordinary wills.

The motion to dismiss was denied by the probate court. The court, upon motion for reconsideration,
dismissed the petition for probate of the will of Ricardo. It held that that the alleged holographic will was
executed on January 25, 1962 while Ricardo B. Bonilla died on May 13, 1976. In view of the lapse of
more than 14 years from the time of the execution of the will to the death of the decedent, the fact that the
original of the will could not be located shows to our mind that the decedent had discarded before his
death his allegedly missing Holographic Will.

Hence, an appeal to the Court of Appeals in which it is contended that the dismissal of appellant's petition
is contrary to law and well-settled jurisprudence.

Issue: Whether a holographic will which was lost or cannot be found can be proved by means of a
photostatic copy.

Held: Pursuant to Article 811 of the Civil Code, probate of holographic wills is the allowance of the will
by the court after its due execution has been proved. The probate may be uncontested or not. If
uncontested, at least one Identifying witness is required and, if no witness is available, experts may be
resorted to. If contested, at least three Identifying witnesses are required. However, if the holographic will
has been lost or destroyed and no other copy is available, the will cannot be probated because the best and
only evidence is the handwriting of the testator in said will. It is necessary that there be a comparison
between sample handwritten statements of the testator and the handwritten will. But, a photostatic copy or
xerox copy of the holographic will may be allowed because comparison can be made with the standard
writings of the testator.

Evidently, the photostatic or xerox copy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because then the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by the probate court.

Roxas v. De Jesus

Facts: After the death of spouses Andres G. de Jesus and Bibiana Roxas de Jesus, Special Proceeding No.
81503 was filed by petitioner Simeon R. Roxas, the brother of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus.
Petitioner was appointed administrator. Simeon R. Roxas then testified that he found a notebook
belonging to the deceased Bibiana R. de Jesus and that on pages 21, 22, 23 and 24 thereof, a letter-win
addressed to her children and entirely written and signed in the handwriting of the deceased Bibiana R. de
Jesus was found. The will is dated "FEB./61.”

The testimony of Simeon R. Roxas was corroborated by the testimonies of Pedro Roxas de Jesus and
Manuel Roxas de Jesus who likewise testified that the letter dated "FEB./61 " is the holographic Will of
their deceased mother, Bibiana R. de Jesus. Both recognized the handwriting of their mother and
positively Identified her signature. They further testified that their deceased mother understood English,
the language in which the holographic Will is written, and that the date "FEB./61 " was the date when
said Will was executed by their mother.

Respondent Luz R. Henson, another compulsory heir filed an "opposition to probate" assailing the
purported holographic Will of Bibiana R. de Jesus because it was not executed in accordance with law
and the alleged testatrix acted by mistake and/or did not intend, nor could have intended the said Will to
be her last Will and testament at the time of its execution.

The court allowed the probate of the will. Respondent Judge Colayco reconsidered his earlier order and
disallowed the probate of the holographic Will on the ground that the word "dated" has generally been
held to include the month, day, and year.

Issue: Whether or not the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana
Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code.

Held: In particular, a complete date is required to provide against such contingencies as that of two
competing Wills executed on the same day, or of a testator becoming insane on the day on which a Will
was executed (Velasco v. Lopez, 1 Phil. 720). There is no such contingency in this case.

The Court have carefully reviewed the records of this case and found no evidence of bad faith and fraud
in its execution nor was there any substitution of Wins and Testaments. There is no question that the
holographic Will of the deceased Bibiana Roxas de Jesus was entirely written, dated, and signed by the
testatrix herself and in a language known to her. There is also no question as to its genuineness and due
execution. All the children of the testatrix agree on the genuineness of the holographic Will of their
mother and that she had the testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of said Will. The objection
interposed by the oppositor-respondent Luz Henson is that the holographic Will is fatally defective
because the date "FEB./61 " appearing on the holographic Will is not sufficient compliance with Article
810 of the Civil Code. This objection is too technical to be entertained.

As a general rule, the "date" in a holographic Will should include the day, month, and year of its
execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue
influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not
the date "FEB./61" appearing on the holographic Will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil
Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.

Uy Kiao Eng v. Nixon-Lee

Petitioner denied that she was in custody of the original holographic will and that she knew of its
whereabouts. She, moreover, asserted that photocopies of the will were given to respondent and to his
siblings. As a matter of fact, respondent was able to introduce, as an exhibit, a copy of the will in Civil
Case No. 224-V-00 before the RTC of Valenzuela City.

The RTC heard the case. After the presentation and formal offer of respondents evidence, petitioner
demurred, contending that her son failed to prove that she had in her custody the original holographic
will. The RTC, at first, denied the demurrer to evidence. However, it granted the same on petitioners
motion for reconsideration.

The CA initially denied the appeal for lack of merit. It ruled that the writ of mandamus would issue only
in instances when no other remedy would be available and sufficient to afford redress. Under Rule 76, in
an action for the settlement of the estate of his deceased father, respondent could ask for the presentation
or production and for the approval or probate of the holographic will.

Issue: Whether the petition for mandamus is the proper remedy for the production of the will.

Held: In the instant case, the Court, without unnecessarily ascertaining whether the obligation involved
herethe production of the original holographic willis in the nature of a public or a private duty, rules that
the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by respondent Lee because there lies another plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Let it be noted that respondent has a photocopy of the
will and that he seeks the production of the original for purposes of probate. The Rules of Court, however,
does not prevent him from instituting probate proceedings for the allowance of the will whether the same
is in his possession or not. Rule 76, Section 1 relevantly provides:

Section 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. Any executor, devisee, or legatee named
in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time, after the death of the
testator, petition the court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his
possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Codoy v. Calugay

Facts: On April 6, 1990, Evangeline Calugay, Josephine Salcedo and Eufemia Patigas, devisees and
legatees of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, a petition for probate of the holographic will of the deceased,
who died on January 16, 1990.

In the petition, respondents claimed that the deceased Matilde Seo Vda. de Ramonal, was of sound and
disposing mind when she executed the will on August 30, 1978, that there was no fraud, undue influence,
and duress employed in the person of the testator, and the will was written voluntarily.
On June 28, 1990, Eugenia Ramonal Codoy and Manuel Ramonal filed an opposition to the petition for
probate, alleging that the holographic will was a forgery and that the same is even illegible. This gives an
impression that a third hand of an interested party other than the true hand of Matilde Seo Vda. de
Ramonal executed the holographic will. Petitioners argued that the repeated dates incorporated or
appearing on the will after every disposition is out of the ordinary. If the deceased was the one who
executed the will, and was not forced, the dates and the signature should appear at the bottom after the
dispositions, as regularly done and not after every disposition. And assuming that the holographic will is
in the handwriting of the deceased, it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the
part of the beneficiaries, or through fraud and trickery.

Respondents presented six (6) witnesses and various documentary evidence. Petitioners instead of
presenting their evidence, filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that respondents failed to establish
sufficient factual and legal basis for the probate of the holographic will of the deceased Matilde Seo Vda.
de Ramonal. The petition for probate was denied. Respondents then filed a notice of appeal and presented
the same six witnesses. The CA granted the appeal citing Azaola v. Singson where it held that where the
will is holographic, no witness need be present, and the rule requiring production of three witnesses must
be deemed merely permissive if absurd results are to be avoided.

Issue: Whether the provisions of Article 811 of the Civil Code are permissive or mandatory.

Held: The Court is convinced, based on the language used, that Article 811 of the Civil Code is
mandatory. The word shall connotes a mandatory order. The Court have ruled that shall in a statute
commonly denotes an imperative obligation and is inconsistent with the idea of discretion and that the
presumption is that the word shall, when used in a statute is mandatory.

Laws are enacted to achieve a goal intended and to guide against an evil or mischief that aims to prevent.
In the case at bar, the goal to achieve is to give effect to the wishes of the deceased and the evil to be
prevented is the possibility that unscrupulous individuals who for their benefit will employ means to
defeat the wishes of the testator. The paramount consideration in the present petition is to determine the
true intent of the deceased. An exhaustive and objective consideration of the evidence is imperative to
establish the true intent of the testator.

It will be noted that not all the witnesses presented by the respondents testified explicitly that they were
familiar with the handwriting of the testator. In the case of Augusto Neri, clerk of court, Court of First
Instance, Misamis Oriental, he merely identified the record of Special Proceedings No. 427 before said
court. He was not presented to declare explicitly that the signature appearing in the holographic was that
of the deceased.

The will was found not in the personal belongings of the deceased but with one of the respondents, who
kept it even before the death of the deceased. In the testimony of Ms. Binanay, she revealed that the will
was in her possession as early as 1985, or five years before the death of the deceased.

There was no opportunity for an expert to compare the signature and the handwriting of the deceased with
other documents signed and executed by her during her lifetime. The only chance at comparison was
during the cross-examination of Ms. Binanay when the lawyer of petitioners asked Ms. Binanay to
compare the documents which contained the signature of the deceased with that of the holographic will
and she is not a handwriting expert. Even the former lawyer of the deceased expressed doubts as to the
authenticity of the signature in the holographic will. A visual examination of the holographic will
convince us that the strokes are different when compared with other documents written by the testator.
The signature of the testator in some of the disposition is not readable. There were uneven strokes,
retracing and erasures on the will.

Comparing the signature in the holographic will dated August 30, 1978, and the signatures in several
documents such as the application letter for pasture permit dated December 30, 1980, and a letter dated
June 16, 1978, the strokes are different. In the letters, there are continuous flows of the strokes,
evidencing that there is no hesitation in writing unlike that of the holographic will. We, therefore, cannot
be certain that the holographic will was in the handwriting by the deceased.

Qualification / Disqualifications of Witnesses (Articles 820 – 821)

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals

Facts: Private respondent Lutgarda Santiago filed a petition with the CFI of Rizal, for the probate of a
will alleged to have been executed by the deceased Isabel Gabriel and designating therein petitioner as the
principal beneficiary and executrix.

There is no dispute in the records that the late Isabel Andres Gabriel died as a widow and without issue in
the municipality of Navotas, province of Rizal her place of residence, on June 7, 1961 at the age of
eighty-five (85), having been born in 1876. It is likewise not controverted that herein private respondent
Lutgarda Santiago and petitioner Rizalina Gabriel Gonzales are nieces of the deceased, and that private
respondent, with her husband and children, lived with the deceased at the latters residence prior an- d up
to the time of her death.

The will submitted for probate, Exhibit "F", which is typewritten and in Tagalog, appears to have been
executed in Manila on the 15th day of April, 1961, or barely two (2) months prior to the death of Isabel
Gabriel. It consists of five (5) pages, including the pages whereon the attestation clause and the
acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear
at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.

The will itself provides that the testatrix desired to be buried in the Catholic Cemetery of Navotas, Rizal
in accordance with the rites of the Roman Catholic Church, all expenses to be paid from her estate; that
all her obligations, if any, be paid; that legacies in specified amounts be given to her sister, Praxides
Gabriel Vda. de Santiago, her brother Santiago Gabriel, and her nephews and nieces, Benjamin, Salud,
Rizalina (herein petitioner), Victoria, Ester, Andres, all surnamed Gabriel, and Evangeline, Rudyardo
Rosa, Andrea, Marcial, Numancia, Verena an surnamed Santiago. To herein private respondent Lutgarda
Santiago, who was described in the will by the testatrix as "aking mahal na pamangkin na aking pinalaki,
inalagaan at minahal na katulad ng isang tunay na anak" and named as universal heir and executor, were
bequeathed all properties and estate, real or personal already acquired, or to be acquired, in her testatrix
name, after satisfying the expenses, debts and legacies as aforementioned.

Petitioner Gonzales opposed the probate. The Court ruled that Exhibit 'F' is not the purported will
allegedly dictated by the deceased, executed and signed by her, and attested by her three attesting
witnesses on April 15, 1961. In motion for reconsideration, the Court ruled that the supposed last will and
testament of Isabel Gabriel was not executed in accordance with law because the same was signed on
several occasions, that the testatrix did not sign the will in the presence of all the instrumental witnesses
did not sign the will in the presence of each other.

Issue: Whether the term "credible" is not synonymous with "competent" for a witness may be competent
under Article 820 and 821 of the Civil Code and still not be credible as required by Article 805 of the
same Code.

Held: (1) Article 820 of the Civil Code provides the qualifications of a witness to the execution of wills
while Article 821 sets forth the disqualification from being a witness to a will. Under the law, there is no
mandatory requirement that the witness testify initially or at any time during the trial as to his good
standing in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and
uprightness in order that his testimony may be believed and accepted by the trial court. It is enough that
the qualifications enumerated in Article 820 of the Civil Code are complied with, such that the soundness
of his mind can be shown by or deduced from his answers to the questions propounded to him, that his
age (18 years or more) is shown from his appearance, testimony , or competently proved otherwise, as
well as the fact that he is not blind, deaf or dumb and that he is able to read and write to the satisfaction of
the Court, and that he has none of the disqualifications under Article 821 of the Civil Code. The Court
reject petitioner's contention that it must first be established in the record the good standing of the witness
in the community, his reputation for trustworthiness and reliableness, his honesty and uprightness,
because such attributes are presumed of the witness unless the contrary is proved otherwise by the
opposing party.

(2) In probate proceedings, the instrumental witnesses are not character witnesses for they merely attest
the execution of a will or testament and affirm the formalities attendant to said execution.

In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses, namely, Matilde
Orobia, Celso Gimpaya and Maria Gimpaya, are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the
evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to
accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said
witnesses, much less has it been shown that anyone of them is below 18 years of age, of unsound mind,
deaf or dumb, or cannot read or write.

(3) In the strict sense, the competency of a person to be an instrumental witness to a will is determined by
the statute, that is Art. 820 and 821, Civil Code, whereas his credibility depends On the appreciation of
his testimony and arises from the belief and conclusion of the Court that said witness is telling the truth.
Thus, in the case of Vda. de Aroyo v. El Beaterio del Santissimo Rosario de Molo, No. L-22005, May 3,
1968, the Supreme Court held and ruled that: "Competency as a witness is one thing, and it is another to
be a credible witness, so credible that the Court must accept what he says. Trial courts may allow a person
to testify as a witness upon a given matter because he is competent, but may thereafter decide whether to
believe or not to believe his testimony." In fine, We state the rule that the instrumental witnesses in Order
to be competent must be shown to have the qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of
the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and
entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses
have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy
and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other
words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the
court allows the probate of the will they have attested. We, therefore, reject petitioner's position that it
was fatal for respondent not to have introduced prior and independent proof of the fact that the witnesses
were "credible witnesses that is, that they have a good standing in the community and reputed to be
trustworthy and reliable.

Codicils and Incorporation by Reference (Articles 825 – 827)

Unson v. Abella

Facts: On July 19, 1918, Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, single, 60 years old, who was residing in the
municipality of Pagsanjan, Province of Laguna, executed her last will and testament with an attached
inventory of her properties, Exhibits A and A-1, in the presence of three witnesses, who signed with her
all the pages of said documents. The testatrix died on the 6th of January, 1921, and, as the record shows,
the executor appointed in the will, Pedro Unson, filed in the CFI of Laguna on the 19th of January of the
same year an application for the probate of the will and the issuance of the proper letters of administration
in his favor.

An opposition was presently by Antonio Abella, Ignacia Abella, Avicencia Abella, and Santiago Vito,
alleging that the supposed will of the deceased Zalamea was not executed in conformity with the
provinces of the law, inasmuch as it was not paged correlatively in letters, nor was there any attestation
clause in it, nor was it signed by the testatrix and the witnesses in the presence of each other.

Trial having been held, the judge a quo overruled the opposition of the contestants, and ordered the
probate of the will, Exhibit A, and the inventory, Exhibit A-1, holding that both documents contained the
true and last will of the deceased Josefa Zalamea.

Issue: The last error assigned by the appellants is made to consist in the probate of the inventory, Exhibit
A-1, despite the fact that this exhibit has no attestation clause in it, and its paging is made in Arabic
numerals and not in letters.

Held: In the third paragraph of the will, reference is made to the inventory, Exhibit A-1, and at the bottom
of said will, the testatrix Josefa Zalamea says:

In witness whereof, I sign this will composed of ten folios including the page containing the signatures and the
attestation of the witnesses; I have likewise signed the inventory attached to this will composed of ten folios in the
presence of Messrs. Gonzalo Abaya, Eugenio Zalamea, Pedro de Jesus, in this municipality of Pagsanjan, Laguna,
Philippine Islands, this 19th of July, 1918.

And the attestation clause is as follows:

The foregoing will composed of ten folios including this one whereunto we have affixed our signatures, as well as the
inventory of the properties of Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, was read to Doña Josefa Zalamea y Abella, and the latter
affixed her name to the last, and each and every page of this will and inventory composed of ten folios in our presence;
and she declared this to be her last will and testament and at her request we have affixed hereunto our respective
signatures in her presence and in the presence of each other as witnesses to the will and the inventory this 19th of July,
1918, at Pagsanjan, Laguna, P.I.

(Sgd.) GONZALO ABAYA,

PEDRO DE JESUS.

In view of the fact that the inventory is referred to in the will as an integral part of it, we find that the
foregoing attestation clause is in compliance with section 1 of Act No. 2645, which requires this
solemnity for the validity of a will, and makes unnecessary any other attestation clause at the end of the
inventory.

As to the paging of the will in Arabic numerals, instead of in letters, we adhere to the doctrine announced
in the case of Aldaba vs. Roque recently decided by this court. In that case the validity of the will was
assailed on the ground that its folios were paged with the letters A, B, C, etc., instead of with the letters
"one," two," "three," etc. It was held that this way of numbering the pages of a will is in compliance with
the spirit of the law, inasmuch as either one of these methods indicates the correlation of the pages and
serves to prevent the abstraction of any of them. In the course of the decision, we said: "It might be said
that the object of the law in requiring that the paging be made in letters is to make falsification more
difficult, but it should be noted that since all the pages of the testament are signed at the margin by the
testatrix and the witnesses, the difficulty of forging the signatures in either case remains the same. In
other words the more or less degree of facility to imitate the writing of the letters A, B, C, etc., does not
make for the easiness to forge the signatures. And as in the present case there exists the guaranty of the
authenticity of the testament, consisting in the signatures on the left margins of the testament and the
paging thereof as declared in the attestation clause, the holding of this court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40
Phil., 476), might as well be repeated.

In that case the testament was written on one page, and the attestation clause on another. Neither one of
these pages was numbered in any way, and it was held: "In a will consisting of two sheets the first of
which contains all the testamentary dispositions and is signed at the bottom by the testator and three
witnesses, and the second contains only the attestation clause and is signed also at the bottom by the three
witnesses it is not necessary that both sheets be further signed on their margins by the testator and the
witnesses, or be paged."

This means that, according to the particular case, the emission of paging does not necessarily render the
testament invalid.

Revocations of Wills and Testamentary Dispositions (Articles 828 – 834)

Testate Estate of Maloto v. Court of Appeals

Facts: On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners
Aldina Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino
Maloto. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs
commenced on November 4, 1963 an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate.
However, while the case was still in progress, or to be exact on February 1, 1964, the parties — Aldina,
Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino — executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's estate.
The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos
then presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on
March 21, 1964. That should have signalled the end of the controversy, but, unfortunately, it had not.

Three years later, or sometime in March 1967, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's
counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA
PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be the last will and
testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was
going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document
was submitted to the office of the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on April 1, 1967.
Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are
bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they received by
virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises
and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic
Church of Molo, and Purificacion Miraflor.

Thus, on May 24, 1967, Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the
will, filed in Special Proceeding No. 1736 a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings
therein and for the allowance of the will. When the trial court denied their motion, the petitioner came to
us by way of a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the orders of the trial court, in which the SC
denied.

The appellate court while finding as inconclusive the matter on whether or not the document or papers
allegedly burned by the househelp of Adriana, Guadalupe Maloto Vda. de Coral, upon instructions of the
testatrix, was indeed the will, contradicted itself and found that the will had been revoked. The respondent
court stated that the presence of animus revocandi in the destruction of the will had, nevertheless, been
sufficiently proven. The appellate court based its finding on the facts that the document was not in the two
safes in Adriana's residence, by the testatrix going to the residence of Atty. Hervas to retrieve a copy of
the will left in the latter's possession, and, her seeking the services of Atty. Palma in order to have a new
will drawn up.

Issue: Whether or not the will was revoked by Adriana.

Held: It is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se
constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of
the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be
performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course,
it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself.

In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of
mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements
for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by
the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or
by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show
compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid,
Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For
another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then,
the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they
were the only ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which
the papers proffered as a will were burned.

Nowhere in the records before us does it appear that the two witnesses, Guadalupe Vda. de Corral and
Eladio Itchon, both illiterates, were unequivocably positive that the document burned was indeed
Adriana's will. Guadalupe, we think, believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because,
according to her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned
document was the will because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.

Doctrine of Dependent Relative Revocation (In relation with Articles 832 and 837)

De Molo v. Molo

Facts: Mariano Molo y Legaspi died on January 24, 1941, in the municipality of Pasay, province of
Rizal, without leaving any forced heir either in the descending or ascending line. He was survived,
however, by his wife, the herein petitioner Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, and by his nieces and nephew, the
oppositors-appellants, Luz Gliceria and Cornelio, all surnamed Molo, who were the legitimate children of
Candido Molo y Legaspi, deceased brother of the testator. Mariano Molo y Legaspi left two wills, one
executed on August 17, 1918, (Exhibit A) and another executed on June 20, 1939. (Exhibit I). The later
will executed in 1918.

On February 7, 1941, Juana Juan Vda. de Molo, filed in the CFI of Rizal a petition seeking the probate of
the will executed by the deceased on June 20, 1939. There being no opposition, the will was probated.
However, upon petition filed by the herein oppositors, the order of the court admitting the will to probate
was set aside and the case was reopened. After hearing, at which both parties presented their evidence, the
court rendered decision denying the probate of said will on the ground that the petitioner failed to prove
that the same was executed in accordance with law.

In view of the disallowance of the will executed on June 20, 1939, the widow on February 24, 1944, filed
another petition for the probate of the will executed by the deceased on August 17, 1918, in the same
court. Again, the same oppositors filed an opposition to the petition based on three grounds: (1) that
petitioner is now estopped from seeking the probate of the will of 1918; (2) that said will has not been
executed in the manner required by law and (3) that the will has been subsequently revoked. The court
issued an order admitting the will to probate already stated in the early part of this decision.

Issue: The next contention of appellants refers to the revocatory clause contained in 1939 will of the
deceased which was denied probate. They contend that, notwithstanding the disallowance of said will, the
revocatory clause is valid and still has the effect of nullifying the prior of 1918.
Held: There is no evidence which may directly indicate that the testator deliberately destroyed the
original of the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the revocatory clause contained in the will he
executed in 1939. The only evidence we have is that when the first will was executed in 1918, Juan
Salcedo, who prepared it, gave the original and copies to the testator himself and apparently they
remained in his possession until he executed his second will in 1939. And when the 1939 will was denied
probate on November 29, 1943, and petitioner was asked by her attorney to look for another will, she
found the duplicate copy (Exhibit A) among the papers or files of the testator. She did not find the
original.

If it can be inferred that the testator deliberately destroyed the 1918 will because of his knowledge of the
revocatory clause of the 1939 will, and it is true that he gave a duplicate copy thereof to his wife, the
herein petitioner, the most logical step for the testator to take is to recall said duplicate copy in order that
it may likewise be destroyed. But this was not done as shown by the fact that said duplicate copy
remained in the possession of petitioner. It is possible that because of the long lapse of twenty-one (21)
years since the first will was executed, the original of the will had been misplaced or lost, and forgetting
that there was a copy, the testator deemed it wise to execute another will containing exactly the same
testamentary dispositions. Whatever may be the conclusion we may draw from this chain of
circumstances, the stubborn fact is that there is no direct evidence of voluntary or deliberate destruction of
the first will by the testator. This matter cannot be inference or conjectur.

Granting for the sake of argument that the earlier will was voluntarily destroyed by the testator after the
execution of the second will, which revoked the first, could there be any doubt, under this theory, that
said earlier will was destroyed by the testator in the honest belief that it was no longer necessary because
he had expressly revoked it in his will of 1939? In other words, can we not say that the destruction of the
earlier will was but the necessary consequence of the testator's belief that the revocatory clause contained
in the subsequent will was valid and the latter would be given effect? If such is the case, then it is our
opinion that the earlier will can still be admitted to probate under the principle of "dependent relative
revocation".

This doctrine is known as that of dependent relative revocation, and is usually applied where the
testator cancels or destroys a will or executes an instrument intended to revoke a will with a
present intention to make a new testamentary disposition as a substitute for the old, and the new
disposition is not made or, if made, fails of effect for same reason. The doctrine is n limited to the
existence of some other document, however, and has been applied where a will was destroyed as
a consequence of a mistake of law. (68 C.J.P. 799).

The rule is established that where the act of destruction is connected with the making of another
will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend
upon the efficacy of a new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be
conditional and dependent upon the efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the
new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative, the revocation fails and the original
will remains in full force. (Gardner, pp. 232, 233.)

This is the doctrine of dependent relative revocation. The failure of a new testamentary
disposition upon whose validity the revocation depends, is equivalent to the non-fulfillment of a
suspensive conditions, and hence prevents the revocation of the original will. But a mere intent to
 make at some time a will in the place of that destroyed will not render the destruction conditional.
It must appear that the revocation is dependent upon the valid execution of a new will. (1
Alexander, p. 751; Gardner, p. 253.)

We hold therefore, that even in the supposition that the destruction of the original will by the testator
could be presumed from the failure of the petitioner to produce it in court, such destruction cannot have
the effect of defeating the prior will of 1918 because of the fact that it is founded on the mistaken belief
that the will of 1939 has been validly executed and would be given due effect. The theory on which this
principle is predicated is that the testator did not intend to die intestate. And this intention is clearly
manifest when he executed two wills on two different occasion and instituted his wife as his universal
heir. There can therefore be no mistake as to his intention of dying testate.

Allowance v. Disallowance of Wills (Articles 838 – 839)

Mercado v. Santos

Facts: On May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a petition
for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the
testimony of Benigno F. Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June 27,1931,
admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later, on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein
moved ex parte to reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court to probate the will and
to close the proceedings. Because filed ex parte, the motion was denied.

It appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., sixteen months after the probate of the will of Ines Basa,
intervenor Rosario Basa de Leon filed with the justice of the peace court of San Fernando, Pampanga, a
complaint against the petitioner herein, for falsification or forgery of the will probated as above indicated.
The petitioner was arrested. He put up a bond in the sum of P4,000 and engaged the services of an
attorney to undertake his defense. Preliminary investigation of the case was continued twice upon petition
of the complainant. The complaint was finally dismissed, at the instance of the complainant herself, in an
order dated December 8, 1932. Three months later, or on March 2, 1933, the same intervenor charged the
petitioner for the second time with the same offense, presenting the complaint this time in the justice of
the peace court of Mexico, Pampanga. The petitioner was again arrested, again put up a bond in the sum
of P4,000, and engaged the services of counsel to defend him. This second complaint, after investigation,
was also dismissed, again at the instance of the complainant herself who alleged that the petitioner was in
poor health. That was on April 27, 1933. Some nine months later, on February 2, 1934, to be exact, the
same intervenor accused the same petitioner for the third time of the same offense. The information was
filed by the provincial fiscal of Pampanga in the justice of the peace court of Mexico. The petitioner was
again arrested, again put up a bond of P4,000, and engaged the services of defense counsel. The case was
dismissed on April 24, 1934, after due investigation, on the ground that the will alleged to have been
falsified had already been probated and there was no evidence that the petitioner had forged the signature
of the testatrix appearing thereon, but that, on the contrary, the evidence satisfactorily established the
authenticity of the signature aforesaid. Dissatisfied with the result, the provincial fiscal, on May 9, 1934,
moved in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga for reinvestigation of the case. The motion was granted
on May 23, 1934, and, for the fourth time, the petitioner was arrested, filed a bond and engaged the
services of counsel to handle his defense. The reinvestigation dragged on for almost a year until February
18, 1934, when the Court of First Instance ordered that the case be tried on the merits.

Issue: Whether the probate of the will of his deceased wife is a bar to his criminal prosecution for the
alleged forgery of the said will.

Held: The probate of a will in this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice by
Publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is constructive notice to the whole world, and
when probate is granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even against the State.

A subtle distinction could perhaps be drawn between setting aside a decree of probate, and declaring a
probated will to be a forgery. It is clear, however, that a duly probated will cannot be declared to be a
forgery without disturbing in a way the decree allowing said will to probate. It is at least anomalous that a
will should be regarded as genuine for one purpose and spurious for another.

The American and English cases show a conflict of authorities on the question as to whether or not the
probate of a will bars criminal prosecution of the alleged forger of the probate will. We have examined
some important cases and have come to the conclusion that no fixed standard maybe adopted or drawn
therefrom, in view of the conflict no less than of diversity of statutory provisions obtaining in different
jurisdictions. It behooves us, therefore, as the court of last resort, to choose that rule most consistent with
our statutory law, having in view the needed stability of property rights and the public interest in general.
To be sure, we have seriously reflected upon the dangers of evasion from punishment of culprits
deserving of the severity of the law in cases where, as here, forgery is discovered after the probate of the
will and the prosecution is had before the prescription of the offense. By and large, however, the balance
seems inclined in favor of the view that we have taken. Not only does the law surround the execution of
the will with the necessary formalities and require probate to be made after an elaborate judicial
proceeding, but section 113, not to speak of section 513, of our Code of Civil Procedure provides for an
adequate remedy to any party who might have been adversely affected by the probate of a forged will,
much in the same way as other parties against whom a judgment is rendered under the same or similar
circumstances. (Pecson vs. Coronel, 43 Phil., 358.)

The aggrieved party may file an application for relief with the proper court within a reasonable time, but
in no case exceeding six months after said court has rendered the judgment of probate, on the ground of
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect. An appeal lies to review the action of a court of first
instance when that court refuses to grant relief. (Banco Español Filipino vs. Palanca, 37 Phil., 921;
Philippine Manufacturing Co. vs. Imperial, 47 Phil., 810; Samia vs. Medina, 56 Phil., 613.)

After a judgment allowing a will to be probated has become final and unappealable, and after the period
fixed by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure has expired, the law as an expression of the
legislative wisdom goes no further and the case ends there.

Ortega v. Valmonte

Facts: Placido toiled and lived for a long time in the United States until he finally reached retirement.
Two years after his arrival from the United States and at the age of 80 he wed Josefina who was then 28
years old, in a ceremony solemnized by Judge Perfecto Laguio, Jr. on February 5, 1982. But in a little
more than two years of wedded bliss, Placido died on October 8, 1984.
Placido executed a notarial last will and testament written in English and consisting of two (2) pages, and
dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983. The first page contains the entire
testamentary dispositions and a part of the attestation clause, and was signed at the end or bottom of that
page by the testator and on the left hand margin by the three instrumental witnesses. The second page
contains the continuation of the attestation clause and the acknowledgment, and was signed by the
witnesses at the end of the attestation clause and again on the left hand margin. Placido appointed his
wife, Josefina C. Valmonte as sole executrix of his last will and testament, and it is my will that said
executrix be exempt from filing a bond.

The allowance to probate of this will was opposed by Leticia on the ground that the signature of testator
was procured by fraud, or trick, and he did not intend that the instrument should be his will at the time of
affixing his signature thereto.

Notary Public Floro Sarmiento, the notary public who notarized the testators will, testified that it was in
the first week of June 1983 when the testator together with the three witnesses of the will went to his
house cum law office and requested him to prepare his last will and testament. After the testator
instructed him on the terms and dispositions he wanted on the will, the notary public told them to come
back on June 15, 1983 to give him time to prepare it. After he had prepared the will the notary public kept
it safely hidden and locked in his drawer. The testator and his witnesses returned on the appointed date
but the notary public was out of town so they were instructed by his wife to come back on August 9,
1983, and which they did. Before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared will, the notary public
explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke and
understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator and his
witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out of town, the
formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. He reasoned that he no longer changed the typewritten
date of June 15, 1983 because he did not like the document to appear dirty. The notary public also
testified that to his observation the testator was physically and mentally capable at the time he affixed his
signature on the will.

Issue: Whether or not the signature of Placido Valmonte in the subject will was procured by fraud or
trickery, and that Placido Valmonte never intended that the instrument should be his last will and
testament.

Held: Petitioner alleges that respondent, who is the testators wife and sole beneficiary, conspired with the
notary public and the three attesting witnesses in deceiving Placido to sign it. Deception is allegedly
reflected in the varying dates of the execution and the attestation of the will.

Petitioner contends that it was highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life [to] almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be [a]
Fil-American pensionado, thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the probate of the
will. Moreover, it supposedly defies human reason, logic and common experience for an old man with a
severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

The Court is not convinced. Fraud is a trick, secret device, false statement, or pretense, by which the
subject of it is cheated. It may be of such character that the testator is misled or deceived as to the nature
or contents of the document which he executes, or it may relate to some extrinsic fact, in consequence of
the deception regarding which the testator is led to make a certain will which, but for the fraud, he would
not have made.

The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of credible
evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of petitioner, no
evidence of fraud was ever presented.

It is a settled doctrine that the omission of some relatives does not affect the due execution of a will. That
the testator was tricked into signing it was not sufficiently established by the fact that he had instituted his
wife, who was more than fifty years his junior, as the sole beneficiary; and disregarded petitioner and her
family, who were the ones who had taken the cudgels of taking care of [the testator] in his twilight years.

Moreover, as correctly ruled by the appellate court, the conflict between the dates appearing on the will
does not invalidate the document, because the law does not even require that a [notarial] will x x x be
executed and acknowledged on the same occasion. More important, the will must be subscribed by the
testator, as well as by three or more credible witnesses who must also attest to it in the presence of the
testator and of one another. Furthermore, the testator and the witnesses must acknowledge the will before
a notary public. In any event, we agree with the CA that the variance in the dates of the will as to its
supposed execution and attestation was satisfactorily and persuasively explained by the notary public and
the instrumental witnesses.

Seangio v. Judge Reyes

Facts: On September 21, 1988, private respondents filed a petition for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the late Segundo Seangio, and praying for the appointment of private respondent Elisa D.
SeangioSantos as special administrator and guardian ad litem of petitioner Dy Yieng Seangio.

Petitioners Dy Yieng, Barbara and Virginia, all surnamed Seangio, opposed the petition. They contended
that: 1) Dy Yieng is still very healthy and in full command of her faculties; 2) the deceased Segundo
executed a general power of attorney in favor of Virginia giving her the power to manage and exercise
control and supervision over his business in the Philippines; 3) Virginia is the most competent and
qualified to serve as the administrator of the estate of Segundo because she is a certified public
accountant; and, 4) Segundo left a holographic will, dated September 20, 1995, disinheriting one of the
private respondents, Alfredo Seangio, for cause. In view of the purported holographic will, petitioners
averred that in the event the decedent is found to have left a will, the intestate proceedings are to be
automatically suspended and replaced by the proceedings for the probate of the will.

On July 1, 1999, private respondents moved for the dismissal of the probate proceedings primarily on the
ground that the document purporting to be the holographic will of Segundo does not contain any
disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus does not meet the definition of a will under Article 783
of the Civil Code. According to private respondents, the will only shows an alleged act of disinheritance
by the decedent of his eldest son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not
named nor instituted as heir, devisee or legatee, hence, there is preterition which would result to intestacy.
Such being the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to
rule only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of the
same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is clear that it
contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: 1) generally, the authority of
the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the will; 2) private
respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; 3) the rule on preterition does
not apply because Segundos will does not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the exclusion of one or
more compulsory heirs.

The RTC dismissed the probate petition. The trial court held that there is preterition, as the only heirs
mentioned thereat are Alfredo and Virginia. [T]he other heirs being omitted, Article 854 of the New Civil
Code thus applies. However, insofar as the widow Dy Yieng Seangio is concerned, Article 854 does not
apply, she not being a compulsory heir in the direct line.

Issue: Whether the document executed by Segundo can be considered as a holographic will.

Held: (1) Segundos document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance instrument,
conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated and signed by the
hand of Segundo himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa[9] can be clearly deduced from the terms of
the instrument, and while it does not make an affirmative disposition of the latters property, the
disinheritance of Alfredo, nonetheless, is an act of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance
results in the disposition of the property of the testator Segundo in favor of those who would succeed in
the absence of Alfredo.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator, expressed in the form and
within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the supreme law in succession. All rules of
construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to that intention. It is only when the intention of the
testator is contrary to law, morals, or public policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law, as illustrated in
the present case, should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account
the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In this
regard, the Court is convinced that the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-Aalis ng Mana,
was intended by Segundo to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law
in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given effect.

(2) The Court believes that the compulsory heirs in the direct line were not preterited in the will. It was, in
the Courts opinion, Segundos last expression to bequeath his estate to all his compulsory heirs, with the
sole exception of Alfredo. Also, Segundo did not institute an heir to the exclusion of his other compulsory
heirs. The mere mention of the name of one of the petitioners, Virginia, in the document did not operate
to institute her as the universal heir. Her name was included plainly as a witness to the altercation
between Segundo and his son, Alfredo.

Considering that the questioned document is Segundos holographic will, and that the law favors testacy
over intestacy, the probate of the will cannot be dispensed with. Article 838 of the Civil Code provides
that no will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with
the Rules of Court. Thus, unless the will is probated, the right of a person to dispose of his property may
be rendered nugatory.

In view of the foregoing, the trial court, therefore, should have allowed the holographic will to be
probated. It is settled that testate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of the decedent take
precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose.