PART III: SPECIFIC CONFLICT RULES

1. NATIONALITY THEORY
a) Nationality Theory

ELLIS V. RP, G.R. No. L-16922, 30 April 1963

Case Title : IN RE: ADOPTION OF CHILD BAPTIZED UNDER THE NAME OF ROSE, MARVIN G.
ELLIS and GLORIA C. ELLIS, petitioners-appellees, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.
Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Adoption
Syllabi:
1. Adoption; Non-resident aliens cannot adopt in the Philippines.-
—Petitioners, who are husband and wife, had been in the Philippines for three (3) years at the time of
the hearing of the petition for adoption, the husband being assigned as staff ser geant in the U.S, Air
Force Base in Angeles, Pampanga. Not being permanent residents, they cannot adopt in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 335 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which provides that non-
residents cannot adopt.
2. Same; Same; Nature of adoption proceedings.—
Adoption proceedings being in rem, no court may entertain them unless it has jurisdiction, not only over
the subject matter of the case and over the parties, but, also, over the res, which is the personal status
not only of the person to be adopted, but also of the adopting parents. The Civil Code of the Philippines
(Art. 15) adheres to the theory that jurisdiction over the states of a natural person is determined by his
nationality. Pursuant thereto, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over the status of an alien
petitioner in adoption proceedings. The political law of the Philippines is patterned after the Anglo-
American legal system, which adopts the view that personal status, in general, is determined by and/or
subject to the jurisdiction of the domicillary law (Restatement of the Law of Conflict of Laws, p. 86; The
Conflict of Laws by Beale, Vol. I, p. 305, Vol. II, pp. 713-714). Hence, under either the nationality theory
or the domicillary theory, the Philippine courts cannot assume and exercise jurisdiction over the status
of petitioners, who are not domiciled in the Philippines, and, hence non-resident aliens.

Docket Number: No. L-16922

Counsel: Leonardo F. Lansangan
Ponente: CONCEPCION, J.
Dispositive Portion: WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and another one
shall be entered denying the petition in this case.

b) Determination of Nationality
VIVO V. CLORIBEL, G.R. No. L-25441, 26 October 1968

Case Title : HON. MARTINIANO P. VIVO, as (Acting) Commissioner of Immigration, petitioner, vs. HON.
GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VI, CHUA PIC LUAN,
UY KOC SIONG and UY TIAN SIONG, respondents.Case Nature : APPEAL from certain orders of the
Court of First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Administrative law|Naturalization Law|Special civil action|Aliens|Change of status|Good
moral character|Civil Code|Naturalization law|Injunction
Syllabi:
1. Administrative law; Authority to extend the stay of aliens in the Philippines; Authority to change
status from temporary visitors to special non-immigrants; In whom vested.-
The socalled Cabinet Resolution of February 29, 1956 did not specifically authorize the Secretaries of
Foreign Affairs and of Justice to extend the stay of temporary visitors. It could not legally do so because
under the express provisions of the Immigration Law, it is the Commissioner of Immigration who is
vested with the power and authority to grant such extensions (Lim Chiok, et al. v. Vivo, L-20513, Dec.
26, 1963). The Supreme Court so declared in Ang Liong v. Commissioner of Immigration (51 O.G.
2893) that "The Secretary of Foreign Affairs is not authorized to admit into the Philippines aliens for
temporary stay, or to extend the period authorized by the Commissioner of Immigration for their stay in
the Philippines."Neither can the two secretaries authorize the change of status from temporary visitors
to special non-immigrants.
2. Administrative law; Aliens; Change of status; Requirement.-
Temporary visitors can not have their status changed to special non-immigrants without first departing
from the country. Any other ruling would encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretenses; every
alien, so permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission, however
flimsy such claim should be, and thereby compel our government to spend time, money and effort to
examining and verifying whether or not every such alien really has a right to take up permanent
residence here. In the meanwhile, the alien would be able to prolong his stay and evade his return to the
port whence he came, contrary to what he promised to do when he entered (Chiong Tiao Bing v.
Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1021).
3. Naturalization Law; Marriage of alien woman to naturalized Filipino citizen; Effect.-
An alien woman does not automatically become a Filipino citizen on account of her marriage to a
naturalized Filipino citizen, since she must first prove that she possesses all the qualifications and none
of the disqualifications for naturalization.
4. Naturalization Law; Good moral character; Where alien woman, married to a naturalized Filipino
citizen, failed to conduct herself in a proper and irreproachable manner and to meet the qualification of
continuous residence.-
By having misrepresented before Philippine consular and administrative authorities that she came to the
country for only a temporary visit when, in fact, her intention was to stay permanently; and for having
intentionally delayed court processes the better to prolong her stay, respondent Chua Pic Luan
demonstrated her incapacity to satisfy the qualifications exacted by the third paragraph of Section 2 of
the Revised Naturalization Law, that she must be of good moral character and must have conducted
herself in a proper and irreproachable manner during the entire period of her residence in the
Philippines in her relation with the constituted government.And, having lawfully resided in the Philippines
only from her arrival on 16 October 1960 to 16 June 1962, she (Chua Pic Luan) also failed to meet the
required qualification of continuous residence in the Philippines for ten (10) years, her stay beyond 16
June 1962 being illegal.
5. Naturalization Law; Foreign-born minor children; When Filipino citizen is extended to them; Meaning
of "dwelling;" Case at bar.-
As to foreign-born minor children, they are extended citizenship "if dwelling in the Philippines at the time
of the naturalization of their parent." "Dwelling" means lawful residence. In the case at bar, the lawful
period of stay of respondent alien visitors (including that of the alien-born children) had already expired
and they had already been required to leave at the time their father was supposed to take his oath of
citizenship. Hence, said children were no longer lawfully residing here (Kua Suy, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, L-13790, Oct. 31, 1963; Vivo v. Cloribel, L-23239, Nov. 23, 1966, 18
SCRA 713).
6. Naturalization Law; Civil Code; Naturalization law; Civil Code provisions on right of husband to fix
residence of his family and right of wife and children to live with him; When they may not be invoked;
Case at bar.-
It is contended for the respondents in the case at bar that two-year old respondent Uy Tian Siong
cannot, under Article 363 of the Civil Code, be separated from his mother; that husband Uy Pick Tuy
has the right to fix the residence of the family (Article 110), to the company of his wife (Article 109) and
those of his minor children (Article 316), and said wife and children are obliged to obey and live with him
(Articles 109, 311, 357); and that to make said wife and children depart from the Philippines is
destructive of family solidarity (Articles 218-221). These arguments are beside the point. Said laws
govern the relations between husband and wife inter se or between private persons, not the relations
between visiting aliens and the sovereign host-country. Respondents seem to have forgotten that they
came here for a visit, and, as visitors, they have no right to impose upon their host a period of stay of
their own choosing. Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in a position to invoke the provisions of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are
governed by their personal law, i.e., the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a
foreign country (Cf. Civil Code, Article 15).
7. Special civil action; Injunction; Where writ of preliminary injunction was improvidently issued; Case
at bar.-
In the case at bar, the date insisted upon by the Commissioner as the terminal date of stay of the
respondents (16 June 1962) had already passed, when respondent judge issued his writ of preliminary
injunction (24 July 1962). This fact should have cautioned him to issue notice to the Immigration
Commissioner and hold a hearing before issuing the writ. But respondent judge never did hold a
hearing, either on the preliminary injunction or on the merits, so that it is mild to say that his ex-parte
preliminary injunction was improvidently issued.
8. Special civil action; Where case had become moot and academic; Where judge had disregarded
the law and violated its policy; Case at bar.-
In the case at bar, the date insisted on by the respondents as their terminal date of stay (11 April 1963)
had, likewise, long expired when the Commissioner filed his motion to dismiss (14 September 1965) in
the court below. Plainly, the case had by then become moot and academic, and the court was left with
no further controversy to adjudicate. Hence, the respondent, Judge Cloribel, whimsically and arbitrarily
denied the motion, in open disregard of the public interest and of the national policy expressed in the
Immigration Act.Thus, the respondent judge, by refusing to dismiss the case, allowed these alien
visitors, to remain in the country for as long as the case remained pending in his docket; in effect, he
abusively arrogated unto himself the power to grant extensions of stay to temporary visitors, a faculty
that, under the law, belongs to the Commissioner. Thus, respondent judge, instead of applying and
interpreting the law, has effectively disregarded the same and violated its policy.

Docket Number: No. L-25411

Counsel: Jose S. Zafra, Tomas B. Torrefranca, Assistant Solicitor General Isidro C. Borromeo, Solicitor
General P. Pardo

Ponente: REYES

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the order granting preliminary injunction on 21 July 1962,
the writ of preliminary injunction on 24 July 1962, and the order of 26
October 1965, all issued in Civil Case No. 50993 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, are all hereby set aside, and the respondent judge is
hereby permanently restrained from taking cognizance and assuming
jurisdiction over said Civil Case No. 50993, except to dismiss it as moot
and academic. The preliminary injunction heretofore issued by this Court
is hereby made permanent. Costs against private respondents.

• BOARD OF IMMIGRATION V. CALLANO, G.R. No. L-24530, 31 October 1968

Case Title : BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
petitioners, vs. BEATO Go CALLANO, MANUEL Go CALLANO, GONZALO Go CALLANO and JULIO Go
CALLANO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Citizenship|Who are Filipino citizens|How lost
Syllabi:
1. Citizenship; Who are Filipino citizens; Citizenship of child as that of parent.-
The children born in the Philippines of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father who.
however, was not married to their mother, are citizens of the Philippines, having acquired
their Philippine citizenship by birth and their blood relationship with their mother.
2. Citizenship; How lost; Recognition by alien father not a ground for losing Philippine
citizenship.-
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country; (4) rendering service to, or accepting a
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country; (5) cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; (6) declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war; (7) in the case of a woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by
virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. Recognition
of illegitimate children by their alien father is not among the grounds for losing Philippine
citizenship under the law.
3. Citizenship; How lost; Renunciation must be express and distinct.-
Renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as a ground for loss of citizenship
should be express and must be made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication; a renunciation, manifested by direct and appropriate language as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
4. Citizenship; Due process of law in administrative proceedings.-
The proceedings conducted by the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong and the
Special Board of Inquiry No. 2, both of which resulted in a definite f inding that the Go
Callano brothers are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino, and are
therefore Filipino citizens entitled to travel direct to the Philippines and to remain within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic, are in accordance with the norms and regulations f
ollowed in the conduct of like proceedings and cannot be nullif ied by the Department of
Foreign Affairs nor the Board of Immigration Commissioners summarily and without giving
the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.

Docket Number: No. L-24530

Counsel: Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo, Demetrio B. Salem

Ponente: DIZON

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs. It
is so ordered.

c) Citizenship

• MOY YA LIM YAO V. COMMISSIONER, G.R. No. L-21289, 4 October 1971

Citizenship; Alien woman who marries a Filipino citizen ipso facto becomes a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under section 4 of Commonwealth Act 473.
—Section 15 of the Naturalization Law has been taken directly, copied and adopted from its American
counterpart. To be more accurate, said provision is nothing less than a reenactment of the American
provision. It is in the best interest of all concerned that Section 15 of the Naturalization Law be given
effect in the same way as it was understood and construed when the phrase “who may be lawfully
naturalized,” found in the American statute from which it was borrowed and copied verbatim, was applied
by the American courts and administrative authorities. Thus, under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she
is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien
woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her
husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of
the disqualifications under said Section 4.

Same; Applicability of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act.—The portion in question of Section 9 (g)
of the Immigration Act does not apply to aliens who after coming into the Philippines as temporary
visitors, legitimately become Filipino citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality
naturally bestows upon them the right to stay in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose,
and if they elect to reside here, the immigration authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their
bonds.

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Barcelona, J. Moy Ya Lim Yao vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292, No. L-21289 October 4, 1971

• DJUMANTAN V. DOMINGO, G.R. No. 99358, 30 January 1995

Case Title : DJUMANTAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDREA D. DOMINGO, COMMISSIONER OF THE
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION, HON. REGINO R. SANTIAGO and HON. JORGE V. SARMIENTO,
COMMISSIONERS BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION AND DEPORTATION, respondents.Case Nature :
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction.
Syllabi Class : Citizenship|Aliens|Immigration Law|Marriage|International Law|Conflict of Laws|
Prescription|Arrests and Seizures
Syllabi:
1. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; The civil status
of an alien applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence
the exercise of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities.-
There was a blatant abuse of our immigration laws in effecting petitioner’s entry into “the
country and the change of her immigration status from temporary visitor to permanent
resident. All such privileges were obtained through misrepresentation. Never was the
marriage of petitioner to Banez disclosed to the immigration authorities in her applications
for temporary visitor’s visa and for permanent residency. The civil status of an alien
applicant for admission as a temporary visitor is a matter that could influence the exercise
of discretion on the part of the immigration authorities. The immigration authorities would
be less inclined to allow the entry of a woman who claims to have entered into a marriage
with a Filipino citizen, who is married to another woman (Cf. Shiu Shun Man v. Galang, 3
SCRA 871 [1961]).
2. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; The right of the
President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed inimical to the public
interest is generally as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and prevent their
entry into the country.-
Generally, the right of the President to expel or deport aliens whose presence is deemed
inimical to the public interest is as absolute and unqualified as the right to prohibit and
prevent their entry into the country (Annotations, 8 ALR 1286). This right is based on the
fact that since the aliens are not part of the nation, their admission into the territory is a
matter of pure permission and simple tolerance which creates no obligation on the part of
the government to permit them to stay (3 Am. Jur. 2d. 72).
3. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; There is no law
guaranteeing aliens married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be
given permanent residency, in the Philippines.-
The interest, which an alien has in being admitted into or allowed to continue to reside in
the country, is protected only so far as Congress may choose to protect it (United States
ex rel. Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F. 2d. 489). There is no law guaranteeing aliens
married to Filipino citizens the right to be admitted, much less to be given permanent
residency, in the Philippines.
4. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; Conflict of
Laws; Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon
the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien.-
The fact of marriage by an alien to a citizen does not withdraw her from the operation of
the immigration laws governing the admission and exclusion of aliens (United States ex
rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 US 537 94 L. Ed. 317, 70 S. Ct. 309 [1950]; Low Wah
Suey v. Backus, 225 US 460 56 L. Ed. 1165, 32 S. Ct. 734 [1912]; Annotations, 71 ALR
1213). Marriage of an alien woman to a Filipino husband does not ipso facto make her a
Filipino citizen and does not excuse her from her failure to depart from the country upon
the expiration of her extended stay here as an alien (Joaquin v. Galang, 33 SCRA 362
[1970]).
5. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Marriage; International Law; The entry of
aliens into the country and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if
they are legally married to Filipino citizens.-
Under Section 9 of the Immigration Act of 1940, it is not mandatory for the CID to admit
any alien who applies for a visitor’s visa. Once admitted into the country, the alien has no
right to an indefinite stay. Under Section 13 of the law, an alien allowed to stay temporarily
may apply for a change of status and “may be admitted” as a permanent resident. Among
those considered qualified to apply for permanent residency is the wife or husband of a
Philippine citizen (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 13[a]). The entry of aliens into the country
and their admission as immigrants is not a matter of right, even if they are legally married
to Filipino citizens.
6. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Prescription; The right to deport an alien who
enters the Philippines by means of false and misleading statements (Sec. 37[a],
Immigration Act of 1940) prescribes after five (5) years from the time the cause for
deportation arises.-
Under clause 1 of Section 37(a), an “alien who enters the Philippines after the effective
date of this Act by means of false and misleading statements or without inspection and
admission by the immigration authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other
than at a designated port of entry” is subject to deportation. The deportation of an alien
under said clause of Section 37(a) has a prescriptive period and “shall not be effected x x
x unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause
for deportation arises” (Immigration Act of 1940, Sec. 37[b]). Congress may impose a
limitation of time for the deportation of alien from the country (Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287
 US 341 77 L. Ed. 350, 53 S. Ct. 152 [1932]; Guiney v. Bonham [CA 9] 261 F. 582, 8 ALR
1282).
7. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Prescription; The prescriptive period for
deportation is counted from the time the fact of illegal entry is brought to the attention of
the immigration authorities.-
The right of public respondents to deport petitioner has prescribed. Petitioner was
admitted and allowed entry into the Philippines on January 13, 1979 on the basis of false
and misleading statements in her application and in the other supporting documents
submitted to the immigration authorities. Leonardo C. Banez first complained with the CID
on November 19, 1980 about the manner petitioner was admitted into the country and
asked for her deportation (Rollo, pp. 77–78). After the EDSA Revolution, he sent a follow-
up letter to the CID requesting action on his 1980 letter-complaint (Rollo, p. 78). Tolling
the prescriptive period from November 19,1980, when Leonardo C. Banez informed the
CID of the illegal entry of petitioner into the country, more than five years had elapsed
before the issuance of the order of her deportation on September 27, 1990.
8. Citizenship; Aliens; Immigration Law; Prescription; Arrests and Seizures; The
“arrest” contemplated by Sec. 37(b) of the Immigration Act of 1940 refers to the arrest for
the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to proceedings
to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country.-
In their Comment, public respondents urged that what is barred under Section 37(b) is the
deportation of an alien and claimed that what they ordered was not the deportation of
petitioner but merely the revocation of Section 13(a) which refers to the visa previously
granted her (Rollo, p. 102), The “arrest” contemplated by Section 37(b) refers to the arrest
for the purpose of carrying out an order for deportation and not the arrest prior to
proceedings to determine the right of the alien to stay in the country. When public
respondents revoked the permanent residence visa issued to petitioner, they, in effect,
ordered her arrest and deportation as an overstaying alien. :

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 99358

Counsel: Teofilo F. Manalo

Ponente: QUIASON

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the temporary restraining
order issued on June 4, 1991 is MADE PERMANENT.The Decision of the
Board of Commissioners dated September 27, 1990 revoking the
issuance of the permanent resident visa to petitioner and the Resolution
dated January 29, 1991 are REVERSED.

d) How Acquired: Citizenship at Birth

• AZNAR V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
Case Title : JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Election Law|Constitutional Law||Citizenship
Syllabi:
1. Election Law; Petition for disqualification filed out of time.+
2. Election Law; Petition for disqualification cannot be treated as a petition for quo
warranto as it is unquestionably premature.+
3. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.-
Petitioner’s contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
4. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63.-
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption
that private respondent is a Filipino remains.-
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent
is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent
had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.
6. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo vs. Comelec and
Ramon L. Labo vs. Comelec are not applicable to the case at bar.-
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not
applicable to the case at bar. Same; Same; Same; Private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.—In the instant case, private
respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p.
81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
7. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.-
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because
Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in
1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded
as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non
sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express”, it
 stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either “express” or “implied”.
8. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has
no retroactive effect.-
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it
actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such
dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 83820

Counsel: Rufino B. Requina, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz

Ponente: PARAS

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

• TECSON V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004

Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given
by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared in the
administration of justice and in the holding of an office.— Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine
the constituency of the “State”, which he described as being composed of such persons who would be
adequate in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would
both govern and be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand, and with
concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general interest of society.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries, from simply
being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political citizenship, social citizenship, and
an ongoing and final stage of development might well be the internationalization of citizenship. —The
concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual freedom,
such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to
include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political power.
The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the
right of the citizen to economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained
expression in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization
of citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but
“subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”— In church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a
low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified
during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all
of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those
explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending legislation by
the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects, and although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.—The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in
the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political laws then in force,
would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered
into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil
rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be
determined by its Congress—x x x Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the
United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”
under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines
entitled to the protection of the United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the
first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902,
the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States in the Philippines.—The term
“citizens of the Philippine Islands” appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly
referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress of
the United States on the Philippines—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to
reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided in said
Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the
Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the treaty
of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December 10th 1898” Under the organic
act, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject
on the 11th day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an
inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April
1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines, weight was
given to the view that the common law principle of jus soli, otherwise known as the principle of
territoriality, governed.—Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11
April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight
was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law principle of
jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within that period.
Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and Phrases; With the
adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the first time
crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the
Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11
April 1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines on said date,
and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.—With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of
1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used
by William H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it
in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the
Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of
Congress in 1912—x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to
be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2)
residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood
relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on
whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to
any such link with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women automatically
losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign husbands, resulting in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their
legitimate children and requiring such children to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect
such concerns.—Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and
acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated
the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate
children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to
men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on citizenship to
reflect such concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973
Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated by
the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death Certificates;
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe, Jr., constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section 44,
Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.” The trustworthiness of
public documents and the value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of
official duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of
that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred.
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code of Spain, which
was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.—Under the Civil
Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30
August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or
compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary
acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public document. Complementary to
the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case
of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant
or only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in
the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein any
information by which such father could be identified.” In order that the birth certificate could then be
utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be
signed or sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an
authoritative document of recognition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950 Civil Code
categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory;
Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass
exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment could only be brought during
the lifetime of the presumed parent.—The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required
to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic
writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child
who was recognized or judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the
child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to liberalize the
acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child; There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate
civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State;
Civil law has been defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of
assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members
of society for the protection of private interests.—It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize
the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the
greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the private and
personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status
of the individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While,
indeed, provisions on “citizenship” could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly—Civil Law is that branch of law which has
for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations of assistance, authority and
obedience among members of a family, and those which exist among members of a society for the
protection of private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of
the Civil Code.— Stating that—“Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—that
explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the Civil Code, such as
on successional rights and family relations. In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be
considered the child of his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but
such legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
 Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should remain only in the sphere of civil
law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law—the proof of filiation or paternity for
purposes of determining a child’s citizenship should be deemed independent from and not inextricably
tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.—Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which,
while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in the
rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchical set-up of old Spain, the distribution and
inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these
bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. These distinctions between legitimacy and
illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the
Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains
and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes.
The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have
preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could
well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section 39, Rule 130, of
the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or
marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’
includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where
these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately
connected with pedigree.” For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is
already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be
a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the
controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree
is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could
be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match
would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong
weight of DNA testing—“Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA or a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the
use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress.”
 Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate
child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of the child; Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are
“those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”—Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child
as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate child. It was to help
the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him. The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant
consideration—is that the 1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year
of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers
are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or
distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are
Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.—In ascertaining, in G.R.
No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on
whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in
the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the
Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could
have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the
“en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution,
during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

Same; Election Law; Cancellation of Certificates of Candidacy; While the totality of the evidence
may not establish conclusively that Fernando Poe, Jr. is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the
evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in
relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.— Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his
case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position
and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

CO V. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, G.R. Nos. 92191-92, 30 July 1991

Political Law; Citizenship; Natural-born Citizen; The exercise of the right of suffrage and the participation
in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.—In the case of In Re:
Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the right of suffrage and the
participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. In the exact
pronouncement of the Court, we held: Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age,
constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship”. (p. 52; emphasis supplied) The private
respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the
Philippines. For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.

Same; Same; Same; Any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of private respondent Jose Ong, Jr.
would not only have been superfluous but would also have resulted in absurdity considering that it was
the law itself that had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.—The respondent was born in an
outlying rural town of Samar where there are no alien enclaves and no racial distinctions. The respondent
has lived the life of a Filipino since birth. His father applied for naturalization when the child was still a
small boy. He is a Roman Catholic. He has worked for a sensitive government agency. His profession
requires citizenship for taking the examinations and getting a license. He has participated in political
exercises as a Filipino and has always considered himself a Filipino citizen. There is nothing in the
records to show that he does not embrace Philippine customs and values, nothing to indicate any tinge of
alien-ness, no acts to show that this country is not his natural homeland. The mass of voters of Northern
Samar are fully aware of Mr. Ong’s parentage. They should know him better than any member of this
Court will ever know him. They voted by overwhelming numbers to have him represent them in Congress.
Because of his acts since childhood, they have considered him as a Filipino. The filing of a sworn
statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect citizenship. For those
already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice which cannot be less
binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where citizenship is a
qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of similar
nature are themselves formal manifestations of choice for these persons. An election of Philippine
citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful because he is a
national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong’s being a Filipino when he turned
twenty-one (21). We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent
would not only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino
citizen elect Philippine citizenship? The respondent HRET has an interesting view as to how Mr. Ong
elected citizenship. It observed that “when protestee was only nine years of age, his father, Jose Ong
Chuan became a naturalized Filipino. Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Act squarely applies its
benefit to him for he was then a minor residing in this country. Concededly, it was the law itself that had
already elected Philippine citizenship for protestee by declaring him as such.” (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; An attack on a person’s citizenship may only be done through a direct action for its nullity,
not through a collateral approach.—The petitioners question the citizenship of the father through a
collateral approach. This can not be done. In our jurisdiction, an attack on a person’s citizenship may only
be done through a direct action for its nullity. (See Queto v. Catolico, 31 SCRA 52 [1970]) To ask the
Court to declare the grant of Philippine citizenship to Jose Ong Chuan as null and void would run against
the principle of due process. Jose Ong Chuan has already been laid to rest. How can he be given a fair
opportunity to defend himself. A dead man cannot speak. To quote the words of the HRET: “Ong Chuan’s
lips have long been muted to perpetuity by his demise and obviously he could not rise beyond where his
mortal remains now lie to defend himself were this matter to be made a central issue in this case.”

Same; Same; The term “residence” has been understood as synonymous with domicile not only under
the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.—The petitioners lose sight of the
meaning of “residence” under the Constitution. The term “residence” has been understood as
synonymous with domicile not only under the previous Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution.
xxx The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word “residence” which
regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile. The term “domicile” denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. (Ong Huan Tin v.
Republic, 19 SCRA 966 [1967]) The absence of a person from said permanent residence, no matter how
long, notwithstanding, it continues to be the domicile of that person. In other words, domicile is
characterized by animus revertendi. (Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 [1966])

Same; Same; It is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and
domicile.—Even assuming that the private respondent does not own any property in Samar, the Supreme
Court in the case of De los Reyes v. Solidum (61 Phil. 893 [1935]) held that it is not required that a person
should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in
the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. (Emphasis supplied)

Same; Same; Absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence.—It has also
been settled that absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a
voter other than in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence. (Faypon v.
Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 [1954]) As previously stated, the private respondent stayed in Manila for the purpose
of finishing his studies and later to practice his profession. There was no intention to abandon the
residence in Laoang, Samar. On the contrary, the periodical journeys made to his home province reveal
that he always had the animus revertendi.

BENGZON V. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, 7 May 2001

Case Title : ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Remedial Law|Citizenship|Certiorari|Repatriation is simply the
recovery of original citizenship|Respondent did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by
birth and (2) by naturalization; A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.-
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born
citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a
particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof.
2. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalized citizens are those who have become
Filipino citizens through naturalization generally under Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 473.-
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens
through naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as
the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No.
2927), and by Republic Act No. 530. To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he
possesses all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided by law to
become a Filipino citizen.
3. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Modes by Which Philippine Citizenship may be
Reacquired by a Former Citizen.-
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (CA No. 63), enumerates the three
modes by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by
naturalization, (2) by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.
4. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality.-
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that a
naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not
have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily
is a natural-born Filipino; As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through
naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-
born Filipino.-
Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born citizens. It is
apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that
there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who
are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently
reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the
mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz
was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his
citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary
qualifications to be elected as member of the House of Representatives.
7. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Repatriation is simply the recovery of original
citizenship; It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one’s former or original
citizenship.-
Repatriation is simply the recovery of original citizenship. Under Section 1, of RA 2630, a
person “who ha[s] lost his citizenship” may “reacquire” it by “taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.” Former Senate President Jovito R. Salonga, a noted
authority on the subject, explains this method more precisely in his treatise, Private
International Law. He defines repatriation as “the recovery of the original nationality upon
fulfillment of certain conditions.” Webster buttresses this definition by describing the
ordinary or common usage of repatriate, as “to restore or return to one’s country of origin,
allegiance, or citizenship; x x x.” In relation to our subject matter, repatriation, then, means
restoration of citizenship. It is not a grant of a new citizenship, but a recovery of one’s
former or original citizenship.
8. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Respondent did not reacquire his natural-born
citizenship;Provision on “natural-born citizen of the Philippines” is precise, clear and
definite; Neither HRET nor the Court can construe it other than what its plain meaning
conveys.-
Clearly, he did not reacquire his natural-born citizenship. The cardinal rule in the
interpretation and construction of a constitution is to give effect to the intention of the
framers and of the people who adopted it. Words appearing in a Constitution are used
according to their plain, natural, and usual significance and import and must be
understood in the sense most obvious to the common understanding of the people at the
time of its adoption. The provision on “natural-born citizens of the Philippines” is precise,
clear and definite. Indeed, neither HRET nor this Court can construe it other than what its
plain meaning conveys. It is not phrased in general language which may call for
construction of what the words imply.
Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 142840

Counsel: Brillantes, Nachura, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin & Martinez Law Offices, Romulo B.
Macalintal

Ponente: KAPUNAN

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.WHEREFORE, I vote
to GRANT the petition.

POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 5 April 2016

Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.—The issue
before the COMELEC is whether or not the CoC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled
“on the exclusive ground” that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity
of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of
the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided or
undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide
the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.

Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a

declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty
of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.”—Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as
presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”

Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate cannot be disqualified

without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification “provided by law or the
Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy (CoC) be cancelled or denied due course on
grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding
that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found.—Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule
23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of
jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must
beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The
prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent
court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or her qualifications,
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found. The only exception that can be
conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions.
Such are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation can be
determined.
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner is
not a Filipino citizen.—At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither
unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on
Paternity and Filiation. That said, there is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents
and is therefore a natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to
show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this
case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.

Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a ninety-nine percent (99%) chance that a child born in the province would be a
Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are
Filipinos.—Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that she was
abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also has typical Filipino features:
height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes and an oval face. There is a disputable
presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits
of life. All of the foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that
there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would
indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. That
probability and the evidence on which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.

Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—As a matter of law,
foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to
foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of
silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent
of the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this Court held
that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental principle of constitutional
construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it should be given
effect. The primary task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization
of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the
framers.

Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate
against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict
this across the board marginalization.—The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers
“worked to create a just and humane society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and that it would be
unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave
implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court must search the
records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions “for an express intention to deny foundlings the status
of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to
show that the constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization.” We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the laws. All exhort the
State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in the present charter:
Article II, Section 11 which provides that the “State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to
human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x” and Article XV, Section 3 which
requires the State to defend the “right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and
special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on
account of their unfortunate status.

Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.—
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the
first place to be adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that
“[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens
of the Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption court
will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.

Same; Same; Adoption; Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the
Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino
children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.—Recent legislation is
more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption
of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of
1995”), R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly refer to “Filipino children” and
include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted. It has been argued that the process
to determine that the child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these
laws and the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make
the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 “Natural-born
citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the
act must be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done
not by the child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous
to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election of such citizenship by one
born of an alien father and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. In
this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced
by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which
approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to
Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her “foundling parents,” hence effectively affirming petitioner’s
status as a foundling.

Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are likewise citizens
under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become part of the sphere
of domestic law either by transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from
treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized
nations. International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two
elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological
element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it. “General principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a
process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal systems generally,”
such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,” and the “general
principle against discrimination” which is embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation.” These are
the same core principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights.

Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR) is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
—The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality
from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No.
473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18)
years old. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally
accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the
“nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child whose parents are both unknown shall have
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the
contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underlining supplied) The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the Reduction
of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the
nationality of that State.

Same; Same; Foreign Judgments; Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which
are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which are “basic to legal systems generally,”
support the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign
judgments, were correctly considered as “generally accepted principles of international law” under the
incorporation clause.—Our approach in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), and Mijares v.
Ranada, 455 SCRA 397 (2005), effectively takes into account the fact that “generally accepted principles
of international law” are based not only on international custom, but also on “general principles of law
recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ
Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the
right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly
considered as “generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume foundlings as having
been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is found.—Petitioner’s evidence shows that at
least sixty countries in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing
foundlings as its citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty,
only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26) are not
signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments pointed out
that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
circumstances, including the practice of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in
which the foundling is found.

Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issues
passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.—Current legislation
reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In
particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino
children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has
been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as
Philippine citizens. Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus sanguinis regime in
our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the presumption
that their parents are nationals of the Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that
presumption is at more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.

Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390
(2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under Republic Act [RA] No.
9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship.”—R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has
been described as such in several cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 678 SCRA 267
(2012), where we described it as an “abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship x x x.” Also included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390 (2007), which cited
Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006), where we said that “[t]he repatriation of the former
Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit is
categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover
his natural-born citizenship.”

Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship may be
reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
disagree with the Congress’ determination.—The COMELEC construed the phrase “from birth” in the
definition of natural citizens as implying “that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain
uninterrupted and continuous from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree that
natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the COMELEC to
disagree with the Congress’ determination. More importantly, COMELEC’s position that natural-born
status must be continuous was already rejected in Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001), where the phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth:
“A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a naturalborn citizen thereof.”
Neither is “repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship. In Bengson III v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court pointed out that there are only two types of citizens under
the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for
repatriated citizens: It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo
the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino.
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate category for persons who, after losing
Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they
would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and
the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not
required by law to go through naturalization proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
perforce a naturalborn Filipino. As such, he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as
member of the House of Representatives.

Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) cannot reverse a
judicial precedent.—The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court.
And while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively
applied. In Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015),
where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be prospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until
reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future
may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to
its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected.”

Civil Law; Adoption; One (1) of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the biological
parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter.”—It was
repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when she put in
the spaces for “born to” in her application for repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive
parents, and this misled the BI to presume that she was a naturalborn Filipino. It has been contended that
the data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown. This position
disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is “to sever
all legal ties between the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the
spouse of the adopter.” Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate
“attesting to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)” and which certificate “shall not bear
any notation that it is an amended issue.” That law also requires that “[a]ll records, books, and papers
relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare and
Development], or any other agency or institution participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept
strictly confidential.” The law therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth
parents as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of strict
confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case
for cancellation of CoC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process
undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.

Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires presidential candidates to
have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections.—The Constitution
requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years’ residence in the Philippines before the day of the
elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a
resident of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information
of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016,” she put in “10 years 11
months” which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May
2005 when she returned for good from the U.S. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost
her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual
removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to
remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and
her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner
returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.—It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on
residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence
could be counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together leads to no other
conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the
children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the
abandonment of their address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing T.I.N., enrolling her
children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a residence here, returning to the
Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual
application to reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines
over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.

Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there is no overriding intent
to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one (1) year.—The COMELEC also took it
against petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No.
6768 as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one year. Included in
the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and “comes or returns to the Philippines.”
The law institutes a balikbayan program “providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to
enable the balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country” in line with the government’s “reintegration program.” Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
transients. Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate
into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must
leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to reestablish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements
of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did — she reestablished life here by enrolling her
children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and then applying for repatriation
shortly thereafter.

Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy (CoC) which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency
qualification requirement.—It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a
binding and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it
was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as to period of
residence made in a CoC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA
300 (1995), the candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period of residence where the required
period was a minimum of one year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The COMELEC ought to have looked at
the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that she was in the Philippines from 24
May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC
both correctly stated the pertinent period of residency.

Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s misrepresentation in his

Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications for
elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible.—The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even
hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court’s pronouncement that: Concededly, a candidate’s disqualification to
run for public office does not necessarily constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground
for denying due course to, and for the cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as already discussed, the
candidate’s misrepresentation in his CoC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and qualifications
for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
one’s qualifications to run for public office.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on
Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016

e) How Acquired: Citizenship by Naturalization

YU KIAN CHIE V. REPUBLIC, G.R. No. L-20169, 26 February 1965

Case Title : IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF YU KIAN CHIE TO BE ADMITTED A CITIZEN OF
THE PHILIPPINES.YU KIAN CHIE, petitioner-appellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositor-
appellant.Case Nature : APPEAL from original and supplemental decisions of the Court of First Instance
of Manila,
Syllabi Class : Citizenship|Naturalization|Lucrative income
Syllabi:
1. Citizenship; Naturalization; Lucrative income; Conditional allowance and bonuses
not considered.-
In considering whether an applicant for naturalization has a lucrative income, allowances
and bonuses which may or may not be given to him as where they spring from purely
voluntary actuations of his employer conditioned to the circumstance that the employer
was making profits, should not be added to his basic salary.
2. Citizenship; Naturalization; Lucrative income; Salary of P400 monthly not lucrative
for a married applicant.-
Even granting arguendo, that petitioner receives a fixed monthly salary of P400 after he
applied for naturalization, still this amount cannot be considered lucrative in the face of a
change in his status from single to married, thereafter.

Docket Number: No. L-20169

Counsel: R. L. Rabayon, Solicitor General

Ponente: PAREDES

Dispositive Portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from, should be, as it
is hereby reversed and another entered denying Yu Kian Chie’s petition
for Philippine citizenship. Costs against petitioner-appellee.

• REPUBLIC V. GO PEI HUNG, G.R. No. 212785, 4 April 2018

f) How Lost
BOARD OF IMMIGRATION V. CALLANO, G.R. No. L-24530, 31 Oct 1968
Case Title : BOARD OF IMMIGRATION COMMISSIONERS and COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION,
petitioners, vs. BEATO Go CALLANO, MANUEL Go CALLANO, GONZALO Go CALLANO and JULIO Go
CALLANO and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.Case Nature : APPEAL from a decision of the
Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Citizenship|Who are Filipino citizens|How lost
Syllabi:
1. Citizenship; Who are Filipino citizens; Citizenship of child as that of parent.-
The children born in the Philippines of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father who.
however, was not married to their mother, are citizens of the Philippines, having acquired
their Philippine citizenship by birth and their blood relationship with their mother.
2. Citizenship; How lost; Recognition by alien father not a ground for losing Philippine
citizenship.-
A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by (1) naturalization in a foreign country; (2)
express renunciation of citizenship; (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country; (4) rendering service to, or accepting a
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country; (5) cancellation of the certificate of
naturalization; (6) declaration by competent authority that he is a deserter of the Philippine
armed forces in time of war; (7) in the case of a woman, by marriage to a foreigner if, by
virtue of laws in force in her husband's country, she acquires his nationality. Recognition
of illegitimate children by their alien father is not among the grounds for losing Philippine
citizenship under the law.
3. Citizenship; How lost; Renunciation must be express and distinct.-
Renunciation of Philippine citizenship to be recognized as a ground for loss of citizenship
should be express and must be made known distinctly and explicitly and not left to
inference or implication; a renunciation, manifested by direct and appropriate language as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
4. Citizenship; Due process of law in administrative proceedings.-
 The proceedings conducted by the Philippine Consul General in Hongkong and the
Special Board of Inquiry No. 2, both of which resulted in a definite f inding that the Go
Callano brothers are the illegitimate children of Emilia Callano, a Filipino, and are
therefore Filipino citizens entitled to travel direct to the Philippines and to remain within the
territorial jurisdiction of the Republic, are in accordance with the norms and regulations f
ollowed in the conduct of like proceedings and cannot be nullif ied by the Department of
Foreign Affairs nor the Board of Immigration Commissioners summarily and without giving
the parties concerned an opportunity to be heard.

Docket Number: No. L-24530

Counsel: Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor
Bernardo P. Pardo, Demetrio B. Salem

Ponente: DIZON

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed, with costs. It
is so ordered.

FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989

Case Title : JUAN GALLANOSA FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE
LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS
PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEE ESTUYE, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the order of
the Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Citizenship|Naturalization|Repatriation|Administrative Law|Election
Law|Public Officers|Election Contest|Quo Warranto
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Repatriation; Petitioner’s loss of his
naturalized American citizenship did not and could not have the effect of automatic
restoration of his Philippine citizenship.-
While Frivaldo does not invoke either of the first two methods, he nevertheless claims he
has reacquired Philippine citizenship by virtue of a valid repatriation. He claims that by
actively participating in the elections in this country, he automatically forfeited American
citizenship under the laws of the United States. Such laws do not concern us here. The
alleged forfeiture is between him and the United States as his adopted country. It should
be obvious that even if he did lose his naturalized American citizenship, such forfeiture did
not and could not have the effect of automatically restoring his citizenship in the
Philippines that he had earlier renounced. At best, what might have happened as a result
of the loss of his naturalized citizenship was that he became a stateless individual.
2. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Repatriation; Mere filing of
certificate of candidacy wherein Petitioner claimed that he is a natural born Filipino citizen,
not a sufficient act of repatriation.-
Frivaldo’s contention that he could not have repatriated himself under LOI 270 because
the Special Committee provided for therein had not yet been constituted seems to suggest
that the lack of that body rendered his repatriation unnecessary. That is far-fetched if not
specious. Such a conclusion would open the floodgates, as it were. It would allow all
Filipinos who have renounced this country to claim back their abandoned citizenship
without formally rejecting their adopted state and reaffirming their allegiance to the
Philippines. It does not appear that Frivaldo has taken these categorical acts. He contends
that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively
recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions
—surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the
Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the
petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial
proceedings.
3. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Naturalization; Repatriation; Repatriation requires
an express and unequivocal act.-
It is true as the petitioner points out that the status of the natural-born citizen is favored by
the Constitution and our laws, which is all the more reason why it should be treasured like
a pearl of great price. But once it is surrendered and renounced, the gift is gone and
cannot be lightly restored. This country of ours, for all its difficulties and limitations, is like a
jealous and possessive mother. Once rejected, it is not quick to welcome back with eager
arms its prodigal if repentant children. The returning renegade must show, by an express
and unequivocal act, the renewal of his loyalty and love.
4. Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Election Law; Public Officers;
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements which must be possessed not
only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office, but also during the
entire tenure.-
The argument that the petition filed with the Commission on Elections should be
dismissed for tardiness is not well-taken. The herein private respondents are seeking to
prevent Frivaldo from continuing to discharge his office of governor because he is
disqualified from doing so as a foreigner. Qualifications for public office are continuing
requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer’s entire tenure. Once any of the required
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. If, say, a female legislator
were to marry a foreigner during her term and by her act or omission acquires his
nationality, would she have a right to remain in office simply because the challenge to her
title may no longer be made within ten days from her proclamation? It has been
established, and not even denied, that the evidence of Frivaldo’s naturalization was
discovered only eight months after his proclamation and his title was challenged shortly
thereafter.
5. Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Election Law; Public Officers; Vice of
ineligibility cannot be cured by the will of the people as expressed through the ballot-
This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this
country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected
 by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting
public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the
people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if
they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. Obviously, this
rule requires strict application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a person seeks
to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country
only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
6. Constitutional Law; Election Law; Election Contest; Quo Warranto; The period
fixed for the filing of a protest whether quo warranto or election contest is mandatory and
jurisdictional.-
I concur in the pragmatic approach taken by the Court. I agree that when the higher
interests of the State are involved, the public good should supersede any procedural
infirmities which may affect a petition filed with the Commission on Elections. I fail to see
how the Court could allow a person who by his own admissions is indubitably an alien to
continue holding the office of Governor of any province. It is an established rule of long
standing that the period fixed by law for the filing of a protest—whether quo warranto or
election contest—is mandatory and jurisdictional.
7. Constitutional Law; Election Law; Election Contest; Quo Warranto; The ten-day
period for filing quo warranto petition against a public officer must be strictly applied.-
As a rule, the quo warranto petition seeking to annul the petitioner’s election and
proclamation should have been filed within ten days after the proclamation of election
results. The purpose of the law in not allowing the filing of protests beyond the period fixed
by law is to have a certain and definite time within which petitions against the results of an
election should be filed and to provide summary proceedings for the settlement of such
disputes. The Rules of Court allow the Republic of the Philippines to file quo warranto
proceedings against any public officer who performs an act which works a forfeiture of his
office. However, where the Solicitor General or the President feel that there are no good
reasons to commence quo warranto proceedings, the Court should allow a person like
respondent Estuye or his league to bring the action. I must emphasize, however, that my
concurrence is limited to a clear case of an alien holding an elective public office. And
perhaps in a clear case of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. Where the
disqualification is based on age, residence, or any of the many grounds for ineligibility, I
believe that the ten-day period should be applied strictly.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 87193

Counsel: J.L. Misa & Associates, Lladoc, Huab & Associates

Ponente: CRUZ
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and petitioner JUAN G.
FRIVALDO is hereby declared not a citizen of the Philippines and
therefore DISQUALIFIED from serving as Governor of the Province of
Sorsogon. Accordingly, he is ordered to vacate his office and surrender
the same to the duly elected Vice-Governor of the said province once this
decision becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order
dated March 9, 1989, is LIFTED.

FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996

Case Title : JUAN G. FRIVALDO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and RAUL R. LEE,
respondents., RAUL R. LEE, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JUAN G. FRIVALDO,
respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Preliminary
Injunction.
Syllabi Class : Political Law|Election Law|Constitutional Law|Citizenship|Statutory Construction|
Commission on Elections|Election Law|Local Government Code
Syllabi:
1. Political Law; Citizenship; Having been declared as a non-citizen, it is incumbent
upon Frivaldo to show that he has reacquired citizenship.-
Inasmuch as Frivaldo had been declared by this Court as a non-citizen, it is therefore
incumbent upon him to show that he has reacquired citizenship; in fine, that he possesses
the qualifications prescribed under the said statute (R.A. 7160).
2. Political Law; Citizenship; Citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress,
by naturalization or by repatriation.-
Under Philippine law, citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by
naturalization or by repatriation. Frivaldo told this Court in G.R. No. 104654 and during the
oral argument in this case that he tried to resume his citizenship by direct act of Congress,
but that the bill allowing him to do so “failed to materialize, notwithstanding the
endorsement of several members of the House of Representatives” due, according to him,
to the “maneuvers of his political rivals.” In the same case, his attempt at naturalization
was rejected by this Court because of jurisdictional, substantial and procedural defects.
3. Political Law; Citizenship; Statutory Construction; Memorandum dated March 27,
1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be construed as a law sanctioning or
authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725.-
This memorandum dated March 27, 1987 cannot by any stretch of legal hermeneutics be
construed as a law sanctioning or authorizing a repeal of P.D. No. 725. Laws are repealed
only by subsequent ones and a repeal may be express or implied. It is obvious that no
express repeal was made because then President Aquino in her memorandum—based on
the copy furnished us by Lee—did not categorically and/or impliedly state that P.D. 725
was being repealed or was being rendered without any legal effect.
4. Political Law; Citizenship; Statutory Construction; It is a basic rule of statutory
construction that repeals by implication are not favored.-
On the other hand, it is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are
not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed “unless it is convincingly and
unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently
inconsistent that they cannot co-exist.”
5. Political Law; Citizenship; The law does not specify any particular date or time when
the candidate must possess citizenship unlike that for residence and age.-
From the above, it will be noted that the law does not specify any particular date or time
when the candidate must possess citizenship, unlike that for residence (which must
consist of at least one year’s residency immediately preceding the day of election) and
age (at least twenty three years of age on election day).
6. Political Law; Citizenship; Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of
Qualifications of Elective Officials not of candidates.-
So too, even from a literal (as distinguished from liberal) construction, it should be noted
that Section 39 of the Local Government Code speaks of “Qualifications” of “ELECTIVE
OFFICIALS,” not of candidates. Why then should such qualification be required at the time
of election or at the time of the filing of the certificates of candidacies, as Lee insists?
Literally, such qualifications—unless otherwise expressly conditioned, as in the case of
age and residence—should thus be possessed when the “elective [or elected] official”
begins to govern, i.e., at the time he is proclaimed and at the start of his term—in this
case, on June 30, 1995. Paraphrasing this Court’s ruling in Vasquez vs. Giap and Li Seng
Giap Sons, if the purpose of the citizenship requirement is to ensure that our people and
country do not end up being governed by aliens, i.e., persons owing allegiance to another
nation, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but instead achieved by construing the
citizenship qualification as applying to the time of proclamation of the elected official and
at the start of his term.
7. Political Law; Citizenship; The Local Government Code requires an elective official to
be a registered voter, it does not require him to vote actually.-
If the law intended the citizenship qualification to be possessed prior to election consistent
with the requirement of being a registered voter, then it would not have made citizenship a
SEPARATE qualification. The law abhors a redundancy. It therefore stands to reason that
the law intended CITIZENSHIP to be a qualification distinct from being a VOTER, even if
being a voter presumes being a citizen first. It also stands to reason that the voter
requirement was included as another qualification (aside from “citizenship”), not to
reiterate the need for nationality but to require that the official be registered as a voter IN
THE AREA OR TERRITORY he seeks to govern, i.e., the law states: “a registered voter in
the barangay, municipality, city, or province x x x where he intends to be elected.” It
should be emphasized that the Local Government Code requires an elective official to be
a registered voter. It does not require him to vote actually. Hence, registration—not the
actual voting—is the core of this “qualification.” In other words, the law’s purpose in this
second requirement is to ensure that the prospective official is actually registered in the
area he seeks to govern—and not anywhere else.
8. Political Law; Citizenship; The repatriation of Frivaldo retroacted to the date of the
filing of his application on August 17, 1994.-
But to remove all doubts on this important issue, we also hold that the repatriation of
Frivaldo RETROACTED to the date of the filing of his application on August 17, 1994.
9. Political Law; Citizenship; Frivaldo deserves a liberal interpretation of Philippine laws
and whatever defects there were in his nationality should now be deemed mooted by his
repatriation.-
Being a former Filipino who has served the people repeatedly, Frivaldo deserves a liberal
interpretation of Philippine laws and whatever defects there were in his nationality should
now be deemed mooted by his repatriation.
10. Political Law; Citizenship; In case of doubt on the interpretation or application of
laws, it is to be presumed that the law making body intended right and justice to prevail.-
Another argument for retroactivity to the date of filing is that it would prevent prejudice to
applicants. If P.D. 725 were not to be given retroactive effect, and the Special Committee
decides not to act, i.e., to delay the processing of applications for any substantial length of
time, then the former Filipinos who may be stateless, as Frivaldo—having already
renounced his American citizenship—was, may be prejudiced for causes outside their
control. This should not be. In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
to be presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
11. Political Law; Citizenship; Decision declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship
cannot govern a person’s future status with finality.-
Indeed, decisions declaring the acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot govern a
person’s future status with finality. This is because a person may subsequently reacquire,
or for that matter lose, his citizenship under any of the modes recognized by law for the
purpose.
12. Election Law; Commission on Elections; The power to annul a proclamation must
be done within ten (10) days following the proclamation.-
The Court however cautioned that such power to annul a proclamation must “be done
within ten (10) days following the proclamation.” Inasmuch as Frivaldo’s petition was filed
only six (6) days after Lee’s proclamation, there is no question that the Comelec correctly
acquired jurisdiction over the same.
13. Election Law; Commission on Elections; It is obvious that Section 78 is merely
directory as Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide
petitions for disqualifications even after the elections.-
This claim is now moot and academic inasmuch as these resolutions are deemed
superseded by the subsequent ones issued by the Commission (First Division) on
December 19, 1995, affirmed en banc on February 23, 1996, which both upheld his
election. At any rate, it is obvious that Section 78 is merely directory as Section 6 of R.A.
No. 6646 authorizes the Commission to try and decide petitions for disqualifications even
after the elections.
14. Election Law; Commission on Elections; A decision promulgated by the Comelec
even after the elections is valid but Loong held that a petition filed beyond the 25-day
period is out of time.-
In dismissing the petition in G.R. No. 120295, we hold that the Comelec did not commit
grave abuse of discretion because “Section 6 of R.A. 6646 authorizes the Comelec to try
and decide disqualifications even after the elections.” In spite of his disagreement with us
on this point, i.e., that Section 78 “is merely directory,” we note that just like us, Mr. Justice
Davide nonetheless votes to “DISMISS G.R. No. 120295.” One other point. Loong, as
quoted in the dissent, teaches that a petition to deny due course under Section 78 must
 be filed within the 25-day period prescribed therein. The present case however deals with
the period during which the Comelec may decide such petition. And we hold that it may be
decided even after the fifteen day period mentioned in Section 78. Here, we rule that a
decision promulgated by the Comelec even after the elections is valid but Loong held that
a petition filed beyond the 25-day period is out of time. There is no inconsistency nor
conflict.
15. Political Law; Election Law; Local Government Code; Section 39 actually
prescribes the qualification of elective local officials and not those of an elected local
official.-
In the first place, Section 39 actually prescribes the qualifications of elective local officials
and not those of an elected local official. These adjectives are not synonymous, as the
ponencia seems to suggest. The first refers to the nature of the office, which requires the
process of voting by the electorate involved; while the second refers to a victorious
candidate for an elective office. The section unquestionably refers to elective—not elected
—local officials. It falls under Title Two entitled ELECTIVE OFFICIALS; under Chapter 1
entitled Qualifications and Election; and paragraph (a) thereof begins with the phrase “An
elective local official,” while paragraphs (b) to (f) thereof speak of candidates.
16. Political Law; Election Law; Local Government Code; Section 39 refers to no other
than the qualifications of candidates for elective local offices and their election.-
It is thus obvious that Section 39 refers to no other than the qualifications of candidates for
elective local offices and their election. Hence, in no way may the section be construed to
mean that possession of qualifications should be reckoned from the commencement of
the term of office of the elected candidate.
17. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by
repatriation under P.D. No. 725.-
Clearly then, the steps to reacquire Philippine citizenship by repatriation under the decree
are: (1) filing the application; (2) action by the committee; and (3) taking of the oath of
allegiance if the application is approved. It is only UPON TAKING THE OATH OF
ALLEGIANCE that the applicant is deemed ipso jure to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. If the decree had intended the oath taking to retroact to the date of the filing of
the application, then it should not have explicitly provided otherwise.
18. Political Law; Election Law; In election cases, we should strive to align the will of the
legislature as expressed in its law with the will of the sovereign people as expressed in
their ballots.-
Clearly then, Frivaldo is the overwhelming choice of the people of Sorsogon. In election
cases, we should strive to align the will of the legislature as expressed in its law with the
will of the sovereign people as expressed in their ballots. For law to reign, it must respect
the will of the people. For in the eloquent prose of Mr. Justice Laurel, “x x x an
enfranchised citizen is a particle of popular sovereignty and is the ultimate source of
established authority.” The choice of the governed on who shall be their governor merits
the highest consideration by all agencies of government. In cases where the sovereignty
of the people is at stake, we must not only be legally right but also politically correct. We
cannot fail by making the people succeed.

Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 120295, G.R. No. 123755

Counsel: Sixto S. Brillantes, Jr., Juanito G. Arcilla and Teodoro M. Jumamil, Felix Carao, Jr., Ferdinand
Laguna, Gavino Barlin and Bernardo P. Fernandez

Ponente: PANGANIBAN

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing:
LABO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, 1 August 1989
Case Title : RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN
BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZA-BAL, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the
Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Civil Procedure|Constitutional Law|Election Law|Special Civil Actions|Quo Warranto|
Docket Fees|Election Law|Appeals|Judgments|Res Judicata|Constitutional Law|Citizenship|
Commonwealth Act No. 63
Syllabi:
1. Civil Procedure; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Docket Fees; Election Law;
The petition for quo warranto was filed on time, the filing fee having been filed within the
ten-day period prescribed by law; whatever delay in the payment thereof was not
imputable to the private respondent.-
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during
the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing
fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. x x x In any event,
what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been
is not imputable to the private respon-dent’s fault or neglect. It is true that in the
Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for
the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
however, this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon
the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the
said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of noncompliance therewith, the case shall
be dismissed.
2. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it.-
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that
more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly
address it now in this same action. x x x While it is in the fault of the petitioner for
appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more
correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court
which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length
of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states: “x x x it is a cherished rule of procedure for
this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this
case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court.” (p. 43) x x x A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand x x x the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.’ (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the
dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality.” x x x Remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings,
such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or
when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had
already received all the evidence of the parties.
3. Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Constitutional Law; Citizenship; The
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.-
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the
doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not
appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private
respondent’s comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.
4. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; Modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost.-
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; The annulment of
petitioner’s Australian citizenship as a result of the finding that his marriage to an
Australian national was bigamous, did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.-
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture
of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines.
6. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation; It does
not appear that petitioner has reacquired his Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods.-
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the
record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any
of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any
statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he
has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: x x x (2) natural-born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by
applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. (Italics supplied.) That is why the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
7. Election Law; The qualifications for an elective office are continuing requirements,
once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.-
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the
belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election
cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were
not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the
election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
not now qualified to serve as such.
8. Election Law; The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot
occupy the office that was vacated as a result of the disqualification of the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes.-
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this
issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
 disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray.
In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote.
One was on official leave. Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that
it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, was supported by ten members of the Court,
without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, another took no part, and two others
were on leave. There the Court held: “x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-
eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
9. Civil Procedure; Appeals; No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship has been
rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.-
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to inquire
into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to
sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further
proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet,
be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my
concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of
the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 86564

Counsel: Estelito P. Mendoza, Rillera and Quintana

Ponente: CRUZ

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated
January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
AZNAR V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
Case Title : JOSE B. AZNAR (as Provincial Chairman of PDP Laban in Cebu), petitioner, vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEÑA, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for certiorari to review the resolution of the Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Election Law|Constitutional Law||Citizenship
Syllabi:
1. Election Law; Petition for disqualification filed out of time.-
The records show that private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy on November
19, 1987 and that the petitioner filed its petition for disqualification of said private
respondent on January 22, 1988. Since the petition for disqualification was filed beyond
the twenty five-day period required in Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear
that said petition was filed out of time.
2. Election Law; Petition for disqualification cannot be treated as a petition for quo
warranto as it is unquestionably premature.-
The petition for the disqualification of private respondent cannot also be treated as a
petition for quo warranto under Section 253 of the same Code as it is unquestionably
premature, considering that private respondent was proclaimed Provincial Governor of
Cebu only on March 3, 1988.
3. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Contention that private respondent is not a Filipino
citizen not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.-
Petitioner’s contention that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen and, therefore,
disqualified from running for and being elected to the office of Provincial Governor of
Cebu, is not supported by substantial and convincing evidence.
4. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Petitioner failed to present direct proof that private
respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A.
No. 63.-
In the proceedings before the COMELEC, the petitioner failed to present direct proof that
private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under
C.A. No. 63. Among others, these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by
express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to
support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that
private respondent Osmeña did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three
mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.
 5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption
that private respondent is a Filipino remains.-
By virtue of his being the son of a Filipino father, the presumption that private respondent
is a Filipino remains. It was incumbent upon the petitioner to prove that private respondent
had lost his Philippine citizenship. As earlier stated, however, the petitioner failed to
positively establish this fact.
6. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo vs. Comelec and
Ramon L. Labo vs. Comelec are not applicable to the case at bar.-
The cases of Juan Gallanosa Frivaldo v. COMELEC et al, (G.R. No. 87193, June 21,
1989) and Ramon L. Labo v. COMELEC et al (G.R. No. 86564, August 1, 1989) are not
applicable to the case at bar. Same; Same; Same; Private respondent remains a Filipino
and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.—In the instant case, private
respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States (p.
81, Rollo). He is a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has
continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to the
present, both as a voter and as a candidate (pp. 107-108, Rollo). Thus, private respondent
remains a Filipino and the loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed.
7. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was
both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an
American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino.-
In the learned dissent of Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla, he stresses the fact that because
Osmeña obtained Certificates of Alien Registration as an American citizen, the first in
1958 when he was 24 years old and the second in 1979, he, Osmeña should be regarded
as having expressly renounced Philippine citizenship. To Our mind, this is a case of non
sequitur (It does not follow). Considering the fact that admittedly Osmeña was both a
Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American
does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmeña, the Certification that
he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both
nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine
citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be “express”, it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is no
renunciation, either “express” or “implied”.
8. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual
allegiance of citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” has
no retroactive effect.-
Parenthetically, the statement in the 1987 Constitution that “dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law” (Art. IV, Sec. 5) has no
retroactive effect. And while it is true that even before the 1987 Constitution, Our country
had already frowned upon the concept of dual citizenship or allegiance, the fact is it
actually existed. Be it noted further that under the aforecited proviso, the effect of such
dual citizenship or allegiance shall be dealt with by a future law. Said law has not yet been
enacted.

Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 83820

Counsel: Rufino B. Requina, Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz

Ponente: PARAS

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED and the
Resolution of the COMELEC is hereby AFFIRMED.

g) How Reacquired
1. • FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 87193, 23 June 1989
2. • FRIVALDO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 120295, 28 June 1996
3. • LABO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 86564, 1 August 1989
Case Title : RAMON L. LABO, JR., petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) EN
BANC AND LUIS L. LARDIZA-BAL, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION to review the decision of the
Commission on Elections.
Syllabi Class : Civil Procedure|Constitutional Law|Election Law|Special Civil Actions|Quo Warranto|
Docket Fees|Election Law|Appeals|Judgments|Res Judicata|Constitutional Law|Citizenship|
Commonwealth Act No. 63
Syllabi:
1. Civil Procedure; Special Civil Actions; Quo Warranto; Docket Fees; Election Law;
The petition for quo warranto was filed on time, the filing fee having been filed within the
ten-day period prescribed by law; whatever delay in the payment thereof was not
imputable to the private respondent.-
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties and holds that the petition for quo
warranto was filed on time. We agree with the respondents that the fee was paid during
the ten-day period as extended by the pendency of the petition when it was treated by the
COMELEC as a pre-proclamation proceeding which did not require the payment of a filing
fee. At that, we reach this conclusion only on the assumption that the requirement for the
payment of the fees in quo warranto proceedings was already effective. x x x In any event,
what is important is that the filing fee was paid, and whatever delay there may have been
is not imputable to the private respon-dent’s fault or neglect. It is true that in the
Manchester Case, we required the timely payment of the filing fee as a precondition for
the timeliness of the filing of the case itself. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v. Asuncion,
however, this Court, taking into account the special circumstances of that case, declared:
This Court reiterates the rule that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon
the payment of the prescribed filing fee. However, the court may allow the payment of the
said fee within a reasonable time. In the event of noncompliance therewith, the case shall
be dismissed.
2. Civil Procedure; Appeals; Remand of the case to the lower court for further reception
of evidence is not necessary where the court is in a position to resolve the dispute based
on the records before it.-
This matter should normally end here as the sole issue originally raised by the petitioner is
the timeliness of the quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is
the subject of that proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that
more important question clearly and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly
address it now in this same action. x x x While it is in the fault of the petitioner for
appealing to the wrong court and thereby allowing the period for appeal to lapse, the more
correct procedure was for the respondent court to forward the case to the proper court
which was the Court of Appeals for appropriate action. Considering, however, the length
of time that this case has been pending, we apply the rule in the case of Del Castillo v.
Jaymalin, (112 SCRA 629) and follow the principle enunciated in Alger Electric, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, (135 SCRA 37) which states: “x x x it is a cherished rule of procedure for
this Court to always strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no
root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. No useful purpose will be served if this
case is remanded to the trial court only to have its decision raised again to the
Intermediate Appellate Court and from there to this Court.” (p. 43) x x x A marked
characteristic of our judicial set-up is that where the dictates of justice so demand x x x the
Supreme Court should act, and act with finality.’ (Li Siu Liat v. Republic, 21 SCRA 1039,
1046, citing Samal v. CA, 99 Phil. 230 and U.S. v. Gimenez, 34 Phil. 74). In this case, the
dictates of justice do demand that this Court act, and act with finality.” x x x Remand of the
case to the lower court for further reception of evidence is not necessary where the court
is in a position to resolve the dispute based on the records before it. On many occasions,
the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious administration of justice, has resolved
actions on the merits instead of remanding them to the trial court for further proceedings,
such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand of the case or
when public interest demands an early disposition of the case or where the trial court had
already received all the evidence of the parties.
3. Civil Procedure; Judgments; Res Judicata; Constitutional Law; Citizenship; The
doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship.-
There is also the claim that the decision can no longer be reversed because of the
doctrine of res judicata, but this too must be dismissed. This doctrine does not apply to
questions of citizenship, as the Court has ruled in several cases. Moreover, it does not
appear that it was properly and seasonably pleaded, in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer, having been invoked only when the petitioner filed his reply to the private
respondent’s comment. Besides, one of the requisites of res judicata, to wit, identity of
parties, is not present in this case.
4. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; Modes by which
Philippine citizenship may be lost.-
The petitioner now claims that his naturalization in Australia made him at worst only a dual
national and did not divest him of his Philippine citizenship. Such a specious argument
cannot stand against the clear provisions of CA No. 63, which enumerates the modes by
which Philippine citizenship may be lost. Among these are: (1) naturalization in a foreign
country; (2) express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) subscribing to an oath of
allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country, all of which are
applicable to the petitioner. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that under Article
IV, Section 5, of the present Constitution, “Dual allegiance of citizens is inimical to the
national interest and shall be dealt with by law.”
5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; The annulment of
petitioner’s Australian citizenship as a result of the finding that his marriage to an
Australian national was bigamous, did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship.-
Even if it be assumed that, as the petitioner asserts, his naturalization in Australia was
annulled after it was found that his marriage to the Australian citizen was bigamous, that
circumstance alone did not automatically restore his Philippine citizenship. His divestiture
of Australian citizenship does not concern us here. That is a matter between him and his
adopted country. What we must consider is the fact that he voluntarily and freely rejected
Philippine citizenship and willingly and knowingly embraced the citizenship of a foreign
country. The possibility that he may have been subsequently rejected by Australia, as he
claims, does not mean that he has been automatically reinstated as a citizen of the
Philippines.
6. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; Philippine citizenship
may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization or by repatriation; It does
not appear that petitioner has reacquired his Philippine citizenship by any of these
methods.-
Under CA No. 63 as amended by PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by
direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. It does not appear in the
record, nor does the petitioner claim, that he has reacquired Philippine citizenship by any
of these methods. He does not point to any judicial decree of naturalization as to any
statute directly conferring Philippine citizenship upon him. Neither has he shown that he
has complied with PD No. 725, providing that: x x x (2) natural-born Filipinos who have
lost their Philippine citizenship may reacquire Philippine citizenship through repatriation by
applying with the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter of Instruction No.
270, and, if their applications are approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be deemed to have reacquired
Philippine citizenship. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall thereupon
cancel their certificate of registration. (Italics supplied.) That is why the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation rejected his application for the cancellation of his alien
certificate of registration. And that is also the reason we must deny his present claim for
recognition as a citizen of the Philippines.
7. Election Law; The qualifications for an elective office are continuing requirements,
once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited.-
The probability that many of those who voted for the petitioner may have done so in the
belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of the election
cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him. These qualifications are
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during incumbency, title to the office
itself is deemed forfeited. In the case at bar, the citizenship and voting requirements were
not subsequently lost but were not possessed at all in the first place on the day of the
election. The petitioner was disqualified from running as mayor and, although elected, is
not now qualified to serve as such.
8. Election Law; The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot
occupy the office that was vacated as a result of the disqualification of the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes.-
 Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City. The latest ruling of the Court on this
issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregarded as stray.
In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight
members of the Court then, with three dissenting and another two reserving their vote.
One was on official leave. Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that
it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, which represents
the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs. Paredes, was supported by ten members of the Court,
without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, another took no part, and two others
were on leave. There the Court held: “x x x it would be extremely repugnant to the basic
concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through
their ballots that they do not choose him. Sound policy dictates that public elective offices
are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one
can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives
a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p.
676.) The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later
declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not
necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be
declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-
eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there.
However, in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.
9. Civil Procedure; Appeals; No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship has been
rendered and no decision can, as yet, be elevated to the Supreme Court for review.-
What was raised to the Court was only the issue of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to inquire
into the citizenship of the petitioner. Ordinarily, we would have limited ourselves to
sustaining the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and remanding the case for further
proceedings and the rendition of a decision. Under Section 7, Article IX-A of the
Constitution, a decision, order, or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.
No decision on the petitioner’s citizenship has been rendered and no decision can, as yet,
be elevated to us for review. I, therefore, reiterate my statement in Frivaldo that my
concurrence is limited only to cases involving citizenship and disloyalty but not to any of
the many other grounds for disqualification cited in my concurring opinion.

Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 86564

Counsel: Estelito P. Mendoza, Rillera and Quintana

Ponente: CRUZ

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, petitioner Ramon J. Labo, Jr. is hereby declared NOT a
citizen of the Philippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED from continuing to
serve as Mayor of Baguio City. He is ordered to VACATE his office and
surrender the same to the Vice-Mayor of Baguio City once this decision
becomes final and executory. The temporary restraining order dated
January 31, 1989, is LIFTED.
4. • JACOT V. DAL, G.R. No. 179848, 27 November 2008
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition is DISMISSED,
without prejudice to the outcome of the criminal cases still pending against private respondent Rolando L.
Magno for the same acts.

SO ORDERED.

Ynares-Santiago (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura and Reyes, JJ., concur.

Petition dismissed, without prejudice to the outcome of criminal cases pending against private respondent
Rolando L. Magno.

Note.—Due process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all situations require a trial-type
proceeding; in administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the
person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the minimum requirements of due
process. (Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, 541 SCRA 444 [2007])

——o0o——

G.R. No. 179848. November 27, 2008.*

NESTOR A. JACOT, petitioner, vs. ROGEN T. DAL and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Citizenship and Naturalization; Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that
natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must
take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their
Philippine citizenship.—Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the

_______________

* EN BANC.

296

296

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jacot vs. Dal

Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship: SEC. 3.
Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic.

Same; Same; Election Law; The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who
either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath
simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy.—The law categorically requires
persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who
reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public
officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of
candidacy.

Same; Same; Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been
naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1)
to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 and (2) for those seeking elective
public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship.—Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have
been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those
seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Clearly Section
5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish
an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath
of
297

VOL. 572, NOVEMBER 27, 2008

297

Jacot vs. Dal

allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). This is made clear in the discussion of the Bicameral
Conference Committee on Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill No. 4720 and Senate Bill No. 2130 held
on 18 August 2003 (precursors of Republic Act No. 9225), where the Hon. Chairman Franklin Drilon and
Hon. Representative Arthur Defensor explained to Hon. Representative Exequiel Javier that the oath of
allegiance is different from the renunciation of foreign citizenship.

Same; Election Law; To qualify as a candidate in Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one
citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.—There is little doubt, therefore, that the intent of the legislators
was not only for Filipinos reacquiring or retaining their Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225
to take their oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, but also to explicitly renounce their
foreign citizenship if they wish to run for elective posts in the Philippines. To qualify as a candidate in
Philippine elections, Filipinos must only have one citizenship, namely, Philippine citizenship.

Appeals; As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below.—As a rule, no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has been raised in the proceedings
below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower court,
administrative agency or quasi-judicial body need not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot
be raised for the first time at that late stage. Basic considerations of fairness and due process impel this
rule. Courts have neither the time nor the resources to accommodate parties who chose to go to trial
haphazardly.

Same; Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; The piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord
with orderly justice.—Section 1 of Rule 43 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure provides that “In the
absence of any applicable provisions of these Rules, the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court in the
Philippines shall be applicable by analogy or in suppletory character and effect.” Section 34 of Rule 132 of
the Revised Rules of Court categorically enjoins the admission of evidence not formally presented: SEC.
34. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must
298

298

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jacot vs. Dal

be specified. Since the said Affidavit was not formally offered before the COMELEC, respondent had no
opportunity to examine and controvert it. To admit this document would be contrary to due process.
Additionally, the piecemeal presentation of evidence is not in accord with orderly justice.

Attorneys; Pleadings and Practice; The only exceptions to the general rule—that a client is bound by the
mistakes of his counsel—which this court finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright
deprivation of one’s property through a technicality.—It is a well-settled rule that a client is bound by his
counsel’s conduct, negligence, and mistakes in handling the case, and the client cannot be heard to
complain that the result might have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. The only
exceptions to the general rule—that a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel—which this Court
finds acceptable are when the reckless or gross negligence of counsel deprives the client of due process
of law, or when the application of the rule results in the outright deprivation of one’s property through a
technicality. These exceptions are not attendant in this case.

Same; Same; Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or
irrelevancy of certain evidence, the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure to introduce evidence, to
summon witnesses and to argue the case—unless they prejudice the client and prevent him from properly
presenting his case—do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such that clients may no longer
be bound by the acts of their counsel.—The Court cannot sustain petitioner’s averment that his counsel
was grossly negligent in deciding against the presentation of the Affidavit of 7 February 2007 during the
proceedings before the COMELEC. Mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness; the
sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain evidence; the proper defense or the burden of proof, failure
to introduce evidence, to summon witnesses and to argue the case—unless they prejudice the client and
prevent him from properly presenting his case—do not constitute gross incompetence or negligence, such
that clients may no longer be bound by the acts of their counsel.

Same; Same; The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally deprived
De Guzman of any chance
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to present documentary evidence in his defense.—Petitioner cites De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 256

SCRA 171 (1996), where therein petitioner De Guzman was unable to present a piece of evidence
because his lawyer proceeded to file a demurrer to evidence, despite the Sandiganbayan’s denial of his
prior leave to do so. The wrongful insistence of the lawyer in filing a demurrer to evidence had totally
deprived De Guzman of any chance to present documentary evidence in his defense. This was certainly
not the case in the Petition at bar.

Same; Same; A case lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that
clients are bound by the acts and mistakes of their counsel.—Petitioner was in no way deprived of due
process. His counsel actively defended his suit by attending the hearings, filing the pleadings, and
presenting evidence on petitioner’s behalf. Moreover, petitioner’s cause was not defeated by a mere
technicality, but because of a mistaken reliance on a doctrine which is not applicable to his case. A case
lost due to an untenable legal position does not justify a deviation from the rule that clients are bound by
the acts and mistakes of their counsel.

Constitutional Law; Election Law; The rules on citizenship qualifications of a candidate must be strictly
applied.—Petitioner also makes much of the fact that he received the highest number of votes for the
position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman during the 2007 local elections. The fact that a candidate, who must
comply with the election requirements applicable to dual citizens and failed to do so, received the highest
number of votes for an elective position does not dispense with, or amount to a waiver of, such
requirement. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility,
especially if they mistakenly believed that the candidate was qualified. The rules on citizenship
qualifications of a candidate must be strictly applied. If a person seeks to serve the Republic of the
Philippines, he must owe his loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to
any other state. The application of the constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification is not a
matter of popularity.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Jacot vs. Dal, 572 SCRA 295, G.R. No. 179848 November 27, 2008

5. • CONDON V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 198742, 10 August 2012

Case Title : TEODORA SOBEJANA-CONDON, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, LUIS M.
BAUTISTA, ROBELITO V. PICAR and WILMA P. PAGADUAN, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL
CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Election Law|Citizenship|Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No.
9225)|Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship
Syllabi:
1. Election Law; Motion for Reconsideration; The power to decide motions for
reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the COMELEC en banc by Section 3,
Article IX-C of the Constitution.-
—The power to decide motions for reconsideration in election cases is arrogated unto the
COMELEC en banc by Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution, viz.: Sec. 3. The
Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission
en banc. A complementary provision is present in Section 5(c), Rule 3 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure, to wit: Any motion to reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling
of a Division shall be resolved by the Commission en banc except motions on interlocutory
orders of the division which shall be resolved by the division which issued the order.
2. Remedial Law; Election Law; Execution Pending Appeal; Judgments in election
cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those decided by trial courts and
those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its original or appellate
jurisdiction.-
—There is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to order discretionary execution
of judgment in view of the fact that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is
expressly sanctioned by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Under
Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, execution pending appeal may be issued by an
appellate court after the trial court has lost jurisdiction. In Batul v. Bayron, 424 SCRA 26
(2004), we stressed the import of the provision vis-à-vis election cases when we held that
judgments in election cases which may be executed pending appeal includes those
decided by trial courts and those rendered by the COMELEC whether in the exercise of its
original or appellate jurisdiction.
3. Same; Quo Warranto; Remedy of a person who fails to file the petition to disqualify a
certain candidate within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code is to file a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from
proclamation of the results of the election.-
—If a person qualified to file a petition to disqualify a certain candidate fails to file the
petition within the twenty-five (25)-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code for whatever reasons, the elections laws do not leave him completely
helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a
petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the
election, as provided under Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code.
4. Constitutional Law; Civil Law; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-
Acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225); R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-
acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic.-
—R.A. No. 9225 allows the retention and re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship for natural-
born citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to
the Republic, thus: x x x The oath is an abbreviated repatriation process that restores
one’s Filipino citizenship and all civil and political rights and obligations concomitant
therewith, subject to certain conditions imposed in Section 5.
 5. Same; Same; Same; Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; For renunciation
of foreign citizenship to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly
executed before an officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in
clear and unequivocal terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.-
—The language of Section 5(2) is free from any ambiguity. In Lopez v. COMELEC, 559
SCRA 696 (2008), we declared its categorical and single meaning: a Filipino American or
any dual citizen cannot run for any elective public position in the Philippines unless he or
she personally swears to a renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing the
certificate of candidacy. We also expounded on the form of the renunciation and held that
to be valid, the renunciation must be contained in an affidavit duly executed before an
officer of the law who is authorized to administer an oath stating in clear and unequivocal
terms that affiant is renouncing all foreign citizenship.
6. Remedial Law; Evidence; To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a
copy thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of
Court.-
—Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and
comply with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court. x x x The
Court has admitted certain exceptions to the above rules and held that the existence of a
foreign law may also be established through: (1) a testimony under oath of an expert
witness such as an attorney-at-law in the country where the foreign law operates wherein
he quotes verbatim a section of the law and states that the same was in force at the time
material to the facts at hand; and (2) likewise, in several naturalization cases, it was held
by the Court that evidence of the law of a foreign country on reciprocity regarding the
acquisition of citizenship, although not meeting the prescribed rule of practice, may be
allowed and used as basis for favorable action, if, in the light of all the circumstances, the
Court is “satisfied of the authenticity of the written proof offered.” Thus, in a number of
decisions, mere authentication of the Chinese Naturalization Law by the Chinese
Consulate General of Manila was held to be a competent proof of that law.
7. Election Law; Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003
(R.A. No. 9225);Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; R.A. No. 9225 categorically
demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their citizenship and seek elective office, to
execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before an
authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of
candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.-
—In fine, R.A. No. 9225 categorically demands natural-born Filipinos who re-acquire their
citizenship and seek elective office, to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any
and all foreign citizenships before an authorized public officer prior to or simultaneous to
the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections.
The rule applies to all those who have re-acquired their Filipino citizenship, like petitioner,
without regard as to whether they are still dual citizens or not. It is a pre-requisite imposed
for the exercise of the right to run for public offic.

Division: EN BANC
Docket Number: G.R. No. 198742

Counsel: Dexter A. Francisco and Salvador B. Belaro, Jr.

Ponente: REYES, J.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED. The Resolution dated September 6, 2011 of the
Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-44-2010 is
AFFIRMED in toto.
6. • MAQUILING V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 195649, 16 April 2013
G.R. No. 195649. April 16, 2013.*
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, respondents.

Citizenship; Renunciation of Philippine Citizenship; Commonwealth Act No. 63; While the act of using a
foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation
and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation
required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a
local elective position.―While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the acts enumerated in
Commonwealth Act No. 63 constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is nevertheless
an act which repudiates the very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also a
citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local elective position. When Arnado used his US
passport on 14 April 2009, or just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship, he recanted
his Oath of Renunciation that he “absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and fidelity to the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA” and that he “divest(s) [him]self of full employment of all civil and political
rights and privileges of the United States of America.” We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such
act of using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by
repatriation. However, by representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado voluntarily and effectively
reverted to his earlier status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not retroactive; it took place the instant
Arnado represented himself as an American citizen by using his US passport. This act of using a foreign
passport after renouncing one’s foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.

Same; Same; Election Law; The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing one. It
must be possessed not just

_______________

* EN BANC.
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at the time of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath
of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.―The citizenship requirement for elective public
office is a continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the foreign
citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to
attack. We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First Division that “Arnado’s act of
consistently using his US passport effectively negated his “Affidavit of Renunciation.” This does not mean,
that he failed to comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, for he in fact did. It was after
complying with the requirements that he performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him from
running for an elective public office pursuant to Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

Same; Same; Same; While those who acquire dual citizenship by choice are afforded the right of
suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public office are required to renounce their foreign
citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public office demands full and undivided allegiance
to the Republic and to no other.―Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of identity that
comes with attendant civil and political rights accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and country. While those who acquire dual
citizenship by choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek election or appointment to public
office are required to renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the public trust. Holding public
office demands full and undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other. We therefore hold that
Arnado, by using his US passport after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted the same Oath
of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is
disqualified not only from holding the public office but even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010
elections.

Election Law; When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number
of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the
qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates.―The ballot cannot override the

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Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections

constitutional and statutory requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. When the
law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not possessed by
persons desiring to serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met before one even
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest
number of votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot cannot cure the defect in the
qualifications of the candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent asunder the very law that
sets forth the qualifications and disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off our election
laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to occupy
elective positions in our republic.

Same; When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is
awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the
qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.―We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
COMELEC, 683 SCRA 105 (2012) and Jalosjos v. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are not
considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate
are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected, and even more so. The votes cast in favor of
an ineligible candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes
cast in favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. As in
any contest, elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of
those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to be ineligible,
their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does not possess any of the
disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as candidates.

Same; Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.―The electorate’s
awareness of the candidate’s disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification to attach to the
candidate. The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineli-

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gible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s disqualification is not necessary before a qualified
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer
in the vote count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidates. That the disqualified
candidate has already been proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent
disqualification based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of candidacy
voids not only the COC but also the proclamation.

Same; Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship.
Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code;
The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the elections, reaches back to the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a candidate at all in the May 2010
elections.―The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his citizenship. As earlier discussed,
Arnado was both a Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his certificate of candidacy. He was a
dual citizen disqualified to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
Section 40 starts with the statement “The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position.” The prohibition serves as a bar against the individuals who fall under any of the
enumeration from participating as candidates in the election. With Arnado being barred from even
becoming a candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the beginning. It could not
have produced any other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it impossible to effect his
disqualification prior to the elections because he filed his answer to the petition when the elections were
conducted already and he was already proclaimed the winner. To hold that such proclamation is valid is
to negate the prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado possessed even prior to the filing
of the certificate of candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado’s disqualification, although made long after the
elections, reaches back to the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared to be not a
candidate at all in the May 2010 elections. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified candidate

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Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections

who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the Local
Government Code will not apply.

Carpio, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Citizenship; View that Philippine courts have no power to declare whether a person
possesses citizenship other than that of the Philippines.―Philippine courts have no power to declare
whether a person possesses citizenship other than that of the Philippines. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307
SCRA 630 (1999), Constitutional Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas was quoted as saying, “[D]ual
citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other
countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of
another country is something completely beyond our control.” In the present case, we have no authority to
declare that Arnado is an American citizen. Only the courts of the USA, using American law, have the
conclusive authority to make an assertion regarding Arnado’s American citizenship.

Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; Republic Act No. 9225; View that Arnado’s use of his
American passport after his execution of an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American Citizenship is a
retraction of his renunciation; It is as if he never renounced his American citizenship at all. Arnado,
therefore, failed to comply with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of Allegiance and executing
a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225.―Arnado’s use of his American
passport after his execution of an Affidavit of Renunciation of his American Citizenship is a retraction of
his renunciation. When Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy on 30 November 2009, there was no
longer an effective renunciation of his American citizenship. It is as if he never renounced his American
citizenship at all. Arnado, therefore, failed to comply with the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship as found in Republic Act No. 9225. We
previously discussed the distinction between dual citizenship and dual allegiance, as well as the different
acts required of dual citizens, who may either have involuntary dual citizenship or voluntary dual
allegiance, who desire to be elected to Philippine public office in Cordora v. COMELEC, 580 SCRA 12
(2009).
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Same; Same; Same; Stray Votes; View that Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of
American Citizenship and before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act of retraction of his
renunciation before the filing of the Certificate of Candidacy renders Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy
void ab initio. Therefore, Arnado was never a candidate at any time, and all the votes for him are stray
votes.―Arnado used his USA passport after his Renunciation of American Citizenship and before he filed
his Certificate of Candidacy. This positive act of retraction of his renunciation before the filing of the
Certificate of Candidacy renders Arnado’s Certificate of Candidacy void ab initio. Therefore, Arnado was
never a candidate at any time, and all the votes for him are stray votes. We reiterate our ruling in Jalosjos
v. COMELEC, 683 SCRA 1 (2012), on this matter: Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer
cannot be proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to
situations where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but
subsequently had to be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that
took effect, after the filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio,
then legally the person who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections
at any time. All votes for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-
candidate can never be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is
cancelled on the day, or before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for
that candidate are stray votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after
the elections, all votes for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy
is void from the very beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab
initio can operate to defeat one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Brion, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Citizenship; Republic Act No. 9225; View that RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re-acquisition and
retention of Philippine citizenship by: 1) natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of

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Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections

a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law,
became citizens of a foreign country.―RA 9225 was enacted to allow the re-acquisition and retention of
Philippine citizenship by: 1) natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, became citizens of a foreign country. The law provides
that they are deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of
allegiance. x x x Arnado falls under the first category as a natural-born Filipino citizen who was deemed to
have lost his Philippine citizenship upon his naturalization as an American citizen.

Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; View that Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling back to
the Philippines on November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not, by itself, be an express
renunciation of the Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.―Arnado’s
Philippine passport was issued on June 18, 2009, but he was not immediately notified of the issuance so
that and he only received his passport three months after or sometime in September 2009. Clearly, when
Arnado travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that
he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the winding up of his business and other
affairs in America. A travel document issued by the proper Philippine government agency (e.g., a
Philippine consulate office in the US) would not suffice because travel documents could not be used; they
are issued only in critical instances, as determined by the consular officer, and allow the bearer only a
direct, one-way trip to the Philippines. Although Arnado received his Philippine passport by the time he
returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009, he could not use this without risk of complications with
the US immigration authorities for using a travel document different from what he used in his entry into the
US on July 29, 2009. Plain practicality then demanded that the travel document that he used to enter the
US on July 29, 2009 be the same travel document he should use in leaving the country on November 24,
2009. Given these circumstances, Arnado’s use of his US passport in travelling back to the Philippines on
November 24, 2009 was an isolated act that could not, by itself, be an express renunciation of

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the Philippine citizenship he adopted as his sole citizenship under RA 9225.

Same; Same; Same; View that the ponencia fails to consider that under RA 9225, natural-born citizens
who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of RA 9225, are deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship.―I disagree with the ponencia’s view that by using his US passport
and representing himself as an American citizen, Arnado effectively reverted to the status of a dual
citizen. Interestingly, the ponencia failed to cite any law or controlling jurisprudence to support its
conclusion, and thus merely makes a bare assertion. The ponencia fails to consider that under RA 9225,
natural-born citizens who were deemed to have lost their Philippine citizenship because of their
naturalization as citizens of a foreign country and who subsequently complied with the requirements of
RA 9225, are deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship. RA 9225 cured and negated the
presumption made under CA 63. Hence, as in Japzon, Arnado assumed “pure” Philippine citizenship
again after taking the Oath of Allegiance and executing an Oath of Renunciation of his American
citizenship under RA 9225.

Same; Same; Same; View that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose Philippine
citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left to inference
or implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as distinguished from
that which is inferred from conduct.―I loathe to rule that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounts to an
express renunciation of his Filipino citizenship, when its use was an isolated act that he sufficiently
explained and fully justified. I emphasize that the law requires express renunciation in order to lose
Philippine citizenship. The term means a renunciation that is made distinctly and explicitly and is not left
to inference or implication; it is a renunciation manifested by direct and appropriate language, as
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct.
Same; Same; Same; View that in the absence of clear and affirmative acts of re-acquiring US citizenship
either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-establishment of permanent resi-

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Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections

dency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport cannot but be considered an isolated act
that did not undo his renunciation of his US citizenship.―In the present case, other than the use of his US
passport in two trips to and from the United States, the record does not bear out any indication, supported
by evidence, of Arnado’s intention to re-acquire US citizenship. To my mind, in the absence of clear and
affirmative acts of re-acquiring US citizenship either by naturalization or by express acts (such as the re-
establishment of permanent residency in the United States), Arnado’s use of his US passport cannot but
be considered an isolated act that did not undo his renunciation of his US citizenship. What he might in
fact have done was to violate American law on the use of passports, but this is a matter irrelevant to the
present case. Thus, Arnado remains to be a “pure” Filipino citizen and the loss of his Philippine
citizenship cannot be presumed or inferred from his isolated act of using his US passport for travel
purposes.

Same; Same; Same; View that Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his US passport despite his
renunciation of his US citizenship; when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25, 2009 and July 29, 2009,
he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the
business and other affairs that he was leaving; He consistently used his Philippine passport for travel after
November 24, 2009, the true character of his use of his US passport stands out and cannot but be an
isolated and convenient act that did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.―I disagree however, with the
conclusion that Arnado effectively negated his Oath of Renunciation when he used his US passport for
travel to the United States. To reiterate if only for emphasis, Arnado sufficiently justified the use of his US
passport despite his renunciation of his US citizenship; when he travelled on April 14, 2009, June 25,
2009 and July 29, 2009, he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United
States to attend to the business and other affairs that he was leaving. If at all, he could be faulted for
using his US passport by the time he returned to the Philippines on November 24, 2009 because at that
time, he had presumably received his Philippine passport. However, given the circumstances explained
above and that he consistently used his Philippine passport for travel after November 24, 2009, the true
character of his use of his US passport stands out and cannot but be an isolated and convenient act that
did not negate his Oath of Renunciation.
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ABAD, J., Separate and Concurring Opinion:

Citizenship; Republic Act No. 9225; View that Section 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 provides the means by
which a former Philippine citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship to later reacquire his old citizenship
by complying with certain requirements.―Sec. 5(2) of Republic Act 9225 provides the means by which a
former Philippine citizen who has acquired foreign citizenship to later reacquire his old citizenship by
complying with certain requirements. Respondent Rommel Arnado complied with these requirements for
regaining Philippine citizenship but, because he wanted to run for public office, he also renounced his
United States (U.S.) Citizenship when he filed his certificate of candidacy, conformably with the provisions
of Republic Act 9225 that reads: (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the
qualification for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. But his compliance with the
above was challenged before the Commission on Elections (Comelec) because Arnado afterwards twice
used his U.S. passport in going to and coming from the U.S., the country whose citizenship he had
renounced.

Same; Same; Renunciation of Citizenship; View that Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality
Act (INA) provides that “(a) A person who is a national of the United States whether by birth or
naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the following acts with the
intention of relinquishing United States nationality―x x x (5) making a formal renunciation of nationality
before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in such form as may be
prescribed by the Secretary of State.” He does not effectively renounce his citizenship who does not
comply with what his country requires of him.―Section 349 (a)(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA) sets the procedure that those who have moved their residence to other countries must observe
when renouncing their U.S. citizenship. It provides that “(a) A person who is a national of the United
States whether by birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by voluntarily performing any of the
following acts with the intention of relinquishing United States nationality―x x x (5) making a formal
renunciation of nationality before a diplomatic or consular officer of the United States in a foreign state, in
such form as may be prescribed by the Secretary of State.” He does not effectively renounce his
citizenship who does not comply with what his country requires of him.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 696
SCRA 420, G.R. No. 195649 April 16, 2013

7. • ARNADO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.—In
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to
be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not
interfere with the resolutions of the COMELEC unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper.
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the “capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” “Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave.” Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.

Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when two (2) or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one (1) or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.—There is forum shopping when two or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two

_______________

* EN BANC.

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preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.
Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed “any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy (CoCs) but not later than the date of proclamation.”—
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be
filed “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.” Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. Thus, the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Cayago vs. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it was held that once
a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the
unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin.—Arnado’s claim that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan’s motion to
consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said
motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto. Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant,
Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the COMELEC on said motion. And even
assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc and
subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado
effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it was
held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have
abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. “[I]t is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction.”

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Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Consolidation; Under Section 9, Rule 3 of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not
mandatory.—In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, consolidation is
only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads: Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.—When an action
or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action
or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket
number.

Same; Local Government Code; Dual Citizenship; Elective Local Positions; Under Section 4(d) of the
Local Government Code (LGC), a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any
elective local positions.—Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with “dual
citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA
630 (1999), it was clarified that the phrase “dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.

Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division,
as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,
696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used
his United States (US) passport after executing said affidavit.—In the case at bench, the COMELEC
Second Division, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the
second requisite of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 because, as

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held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The COMELEC also noted that while
Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the
same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. The COMELEC En Banc did not err, nor did it
commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado’s
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and
undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines — still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the
2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The COMELEC En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in
Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.

Same; Same; The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born
Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225.—The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born
Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It
was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the
oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado
could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in
Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that
matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise
stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the
deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that
in this case, we should

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similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective office.

Same; Same; Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation
resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to
the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the
defect in his qualification.—The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public
office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same.
Arnado’s use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his
disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he
filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling,
therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.
Under the doctrine, “[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the
same.” It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower tribunal need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.—With due
respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already
been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this
petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado’s argument in this case — that he is qualified to run for mayor as
he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections — is
premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not
claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen
insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja, 74 Phil. 560 (1944), it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over
issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They
cannot

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render judgment based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that
“points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.”
Election Law; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; For those who avail themselves of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of
making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing
of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC).—At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by
Section 3 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office,
Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of
Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado’s 2008
implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009,
following the ruling in Maquiling.

Same; Same; In Maquiling, the Supreme Court (SC) emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.—In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013
elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same “cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications.” In Velasco v. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 590 (2008),
this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.
One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override
the required qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow
the same policy when it

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Arnado vs. Commission on Elections

comes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of the same law. After all, “[t]he qualifications
set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local public offices. The other
half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances that disqualify local
candidates.”
SERENO, CJ., Concurring Opinion:

Elections Law; View that while citizenship is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at
the time of election or assumption of office, but also during the entire tenure of the official, it is not a
continuing disqualification to run for and hold public office.—In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (1971), we emphasized the variable nature of a person’s citizenship, which
cannot be determined with finality or become the basis of rules that can be applied to any and all
proceedings thereafter. We said: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. In election contests, this pronouncement gains
significance, as elective local officials are constitutionally allowed to run and serve for three consecutive
terms. While citizenship is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of
election or assumption of office, but also during the entire tenure of the official, it is not a continuing
disqualification to run for and hold public office. As such, each case involving the question of an elective
official’s citizenship must be treated anew in accordance with the surrounding relevant facts and
applicable laws.

Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696
SCRA 420 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to
run for public office upon taking the Oath of Allegiance and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign
citizenship. Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States (US)
passport to travel in and out of the country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship.—In
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420

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(2013), we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to run for public office upon taking the
Oath of Allegiance and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship. Arnado subjected his
citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States (US) passport to travel in and out of the
country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship. The Court ruled that his use of his US passport
nullified the effect of his previous renunciation of US citizenship. While he did not lose his Philippine
citizenship in the process, he reverted to his status as a dual citizen and remained as such at the time
that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the
2010 elections. Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Same; Same; View that considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Arnado’s oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the
requirement of the law.—Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Arnado’s oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the
requirement of the law. The Decision found that from the time Arnado used his US passport to travel in
and out of the country up to the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013,
there had been no change in his circumstances. He still had not made a sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship. Thus, the ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had dual citizenship when he filed for
his candidacy on 1 October 2012. It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado
had filed for candidacy. Since he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport might have
adverse consequences on his candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should
have been prudent enough to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his citizenship.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; View that except for some clearly
unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide on the merits, especially in election controversies
in which the law is sometimes placed at odds with the will of the people.—A person’s citizenship may be
“threshed out again and again” in every proceeding as long as it becomes relevant and

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Arnado vs. Commission on Elections

necessary. Except for some clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide on the merits,
especially in election controversies in which the law is sometimes placed at odds with the will of the
people. At the same time, the Court puts a premium on economy, and where previous declarations of
one’s citizenship become pertinent, those cases may be used as a takeoff point if only to emphasize the
differences and similarities, as well as the measures that were taken in the interim.

BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Repatriation; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship through
naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.—RA No. 9225 was
enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship through naturalization in
a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship. It is a unique mode of reacquiring
Philippine citizenship and is a far departure from the citizenship reacquisition procedure under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 63, the law in place before RA No. 9225 was enacted. Under CA No. 63,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by: (1) naturalization; (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army,
Navy, or Air Corps, or of a woman who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien after the
termination of her marital status; and (3) direct act of the National Assembly.

Same; Same; View that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e., by
repatriation), on the other hand, provides for an easier procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies,
however, only to the specific group of persons enumerated therein.—Notably, reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship under the first mode (i.e., by naturalization) involves the more stringent procedure laid down in
CA No. 473. The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e., by repatriation), on
the other hand, provides for an easier procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies, however, only to the
specific group of persons enumerated

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therein. Under the procedure currently in place under RA No. 9225, the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines in a manner
similar to the second mode under CA No. 63. But, RA No. 9225 provides for a deeper effect by declaring
it a State policy that under its terms “all Philippine citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have
lost their Philippine citizenship” under the conditions provided therein.

Same; Same; View that while seemingly allowing dual citizenship for natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens in a foreign country, carry
the implicit effect of renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance because of the renewed allegiance
that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic.—While seemingly allowing dual citizenship for
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens in a foreign country, carry the implicit effect of renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance
because of the renewed allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic. In effect,
the problem of dual allegiance created by dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country. Since the latest oath that the person takes is one of allegiance to the Republic, whatever
treatment the foreign country may have on his or her status is a matter outside the concern and
competence of the Philippine government.

Same; View that the oath of allegiance taken under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy
full civil and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.—Jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of RA No. 9225 in AASJS v.
Hon. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108 (2007), when the Court pointedly declared: By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. [emphasis supplied] The
oath of allegiance taken under RA No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy full civil

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and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government. He or she may now vote.

Same; Election Law; Repatriation; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that to be voted upon to an
elective office, a natural-born Filipino citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or
she swears allegiance to the Republic under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 must still make his or her
previous implicit renunciation “express.”—To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born
Filipino citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she swears allegiance to the
Republic under RA No. 9225 must still make his or her previous implicit renunciation “express.” In the
words of the law, he must “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.”
[Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225] Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws, and at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply for the purpose of
running for elective public office, apparently to ensure that foreign citizenship and mixed loyalties are kept
out of the elective public service.—The requirement of an express renunciation, however, does not
negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance
made upon taking the oath of allegiance. Thus, persons availing of RA No. 9225 do not renounce their
foreign citizenship for the first time by executing the Affidavit of renunciation that Section 5(2) of the law
requires; they have implicitly made this renunciation when they swore allegiance to the supreme authority
of the Republic. What the oath of renunciation simply does is to make express what natural-born Filipino
citizens have already implicitly renounced. The requirement of express re-

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nunciation highlights the implication that it is not the exclusive means by which natural-born Filipino
citizens may renounce their foreign citizenship. In reality, the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply
for the purpose of running for elective public office, apparently to ensure that foreign citizenship and
mixed loyalties are kept out of the elective public service. To paraphrase Japzon v. COMELEC, 576
SCRA 331 (2009), the oath of renunciation makes these natural-born potential candidates for public office
“pure” Philippine citizens from the perspective of the election laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the extent of the legal consequences of the Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), ruling affect solely Arnado’s qualification to run for
public office and only for the purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not be
extended to situations outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.—I submit that the ponencia’s ruling,
insofar as it adopts the Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), ruling, is an
overreach that runs counter to the policy behind RA No. 9225. I submit that the extent of the legal
consequences of the Maquiling ruling affect solely Arnado’s qualification to run for public office and only
for the purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not be extended to situations
outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the express renunciation, in contrast, is an after-the-fact
requirement that arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to run for public office.—The
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship proceeds from the oath of allegiance that natural-born Filipino
citizens take to reacquire Philippine citizenship. This is patent from the terms of the oath of allegiance
and is a consequence of the resulting reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The express renunciation, in
contrast, is an after-the-fact requirement that arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to
run for public office. The requirement of an express renunciation of foreign citizenship arises only after
they have reacquired Philippine citizenship for the exclusive purpose of qualifying them for elective public
office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and reacquisition are much
broader concepts that cannot definitively be affected by a Court ruling in an election disqualifica-

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tion case, even if the disqualification case touches on the citizenship qualification of the candidate.—
Citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and reacquisition are much broader concepts that cannot definitively
be affected by a Court ruling in an election disqualification case, even if the disqualification case touches
on the citizenship qualification of the candidate. Thus, I submit that Maquiling invalidated Arnado’s
renunciation oath solely for the purpose of his qualification for the May 2010 elections.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that granting that Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport
amounted to a withdrawal of the express renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this
withdrawal does not erase the fact that he did make an express renunciation of his US citizenship.—
Granting that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of the express renunciation he
made of his allegiance to the US, this withdrawal does not erase the fact that he did make an express
renunciation of his US citizenship. To my mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be
reaffirmed, in the same way a statement already made and subsequently denied, can be reconfirmed.
Thus, Arnado’s 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation can validly reaffirm the 2009 express renunciation that the
Court held to have been recanted in Maquiling. Note that in the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation,
Arnado categorically stated that he renounces his US citizenship, as well as any and all foreign
citizenship; swears allegiance to the Republic; and confirms the renunciation (of his US citizenship) he
had previously made in the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as the law stands, natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country need only to take an
oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic to reacquire Philippine citizenship as they are
“deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.”—Indeed “there is no law prohibiting him from
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period” as the ponencia puts it. But, note that there
is equally no law that requires him to constantly and consistently assert his renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship. Neither is there any law that expressly or impliedly imposes on natural-born Filipino
citizens the obligation to constantly assert their alle-

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giance to the Republic and perform positive acts to assert this allegiance. In fact, as the law stands,
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country need only to take an oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the
Republic to reacquire Philippine citizenship as they are “deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.” Once they reacquire their Philippine citizenship after complying with these legal steps, they
no longer need to perform any positive act to assert Philippine citizenship or to elect citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Arnado’s persistent assertion of his allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of his United States (US) citizenship more than sufficiently prove his determined resolve to
profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none other.—RA No. 9225 is a relatively new statutory
enactment whose provisions have not been exhaustively interpreted and ruled upon by this Court,
through an appropriate case. In this respect, I submit that in situations of doubt where the strict
application of the equivocal letter of the law would clearly and undoubtedly disregard the legislative intent,
the Court must and should tread lightly as it rules on the relatively uncharted area of application where RA
No. 9225 overlaps with our elections laws. The unique factual situation of this case presents such
situation of doubt which the Court must resolve in the light of the clear legislative intent, rather than from
the strict application of the equivocal letter of the law. I find that Arnado’s persistent assertion of his
allegiance to the Republic and renunciation of his US citizenship more than sufficiently prove his
determined resolve to profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none other.

Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; View that as a concept, grave abuse of discretion
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.—As a concept, grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in

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contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.

Election Law; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that in the words of another leading case —
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996) — the law and the courts, including the Supreme Court
(SC), must give serious consideration to the popular will.—In the words of another leading case —
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), the law and the courts, including this Court, must give
serious consideration to the popular will. “In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.” Under the evidentiary and unique factual
situation of this case, the alleged eligibility of Arnado is not antagonistic, patently or otherwise, to
constitutional and legal principles such that giving effect to the sovereign will would create prejudice to our
democratic institutions.

LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Local Government Code; Election Law; View that under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code
(LGC), a candidate for Mayor must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the
municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of election, and be able to read and write Filipino or any local language or dialect.—Petitioner has
performed all the acts required by Republic Act No. 9225 in order to reacquire his Filipino citizenship.
Under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code, a candidate for Mayor must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected
for at least
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one (1) year immediately preceding the day of election, and be able to read and write Filipino or any local
language or dialect. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code expressly disqualifies those who
possess dual citizenship from running in any local elective position. These provisions, however, do not
disqualify candidates who might have lost their citizenship but were able to reacquire it before running for
public office. Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that “Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Those who lose their Filipino citizenship through naturalization
in another country may reacquire it through the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9225. This also
applies to naturalized citizens who wish to reacquire their Filipino citizenship in order to run for public
office.

Citizenship; View that the effect of reacquisition is the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as citizens in a foreign country.—The effect of reacquisition is
the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as
citizens in a foreign country. All that is required to retain their citizenship is to take the oath of allegiance
under the law.

Same; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (RA No. 9225); Repatriation; Election Law;
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that the law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of all
foreign citizenships before the candidate files a certificate of candidacy (CoC).—The law requires a
personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenships before the candidate files a certificate of
candidacy. In Jacot v. Dal and Commission on Elections, 572 SCRA 295 (2008), this court disqualified
Nestor A. Jacot from running for Vice Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, after he failed to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 restores full civil
and political rights to those who wish to reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted
for.—Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 restores full civil and political rights to those who wish to
reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted for. A candidate may have the right to
vote and be voted for as long as he or she has already done all positive acts necessary for the
reacquisition of his or
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her Philippine citizenship before filing his or her certificate of candidacy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that a candidate for local elective office may be eligible to run for
as long as he or she is proven to have animus revertendi in a certain domicile for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections.—Residency also need not be continuous for as long as the total
number of required years have been complied with before the election. Section 39(a) of the Local
Government Code requires residency for “at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election for local elective office.” A candidate for local elective office may be eligible to run for as long as
he or she is proven to have animus revertendi in a certain domicile for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the
immediate nullity of one’s affidavit of renunciation.—Petitioner’s use of his American passport was an
isolated act required by the circumstances. At that time, he had not yet been issued his Philippine
passport. In the dissent in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), led by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion, it was pointed out that when Arnado traveled back to the United States, “he had
no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the winding up of
his business and other affairs in America.” The use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the
immediate nullity of one’s affidavit of renunciation. Its circumstances must also be taken into account.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that his isolated use of his American passport when he did not
yet have his Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his Affidavit of Renunciation.—When
petitioner received his Philippine passport sometime in September 2009, he could not immediately use it
to exit the United States since he entered the country using an American passport. If he exited using a
Philippine passport, one presumably without an American visa, immigration authorities of both the
Philippines and the United States would have questioned his travel documents. He would have had no
choice but to use his American passport to exit the United States. However, petitioner did use his
Philippine pass-
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port in his subsequent travels. Hence, his isolated use of his American passport when he did not yet have
his Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Passports; Words and Phrases; View that according to Republic Act
(RA) No. 8239, a passport is “a document issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and
requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give
him/her all lawful aid and protection.”—According to Republic Act No. 8239, a passport is “a document
issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens
to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and protection.” By definition, a
Philippine passport is a document issued by the government to its citizens. Clearly, a Philippine passport
cannot be issued to an American citizen. If this court concludes, as the ponencia has done, that petitioner
remained an American citizen, the facts should show that he continued to use his American passport
before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 Elections. As of June 18, 2009, petitioner was
issued a Philippine passport. He has continually used his Philippine passport from December 11, 2009.
He also executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30, 2009. By the
time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on October 1, 2012, he was already the bearer of a Philippine
passport.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 requires a personal and sworn
renunciation from persons who seek to reacquire their Philippine citizenship in order to run for local office.
—Petitioner was forced by his circumstances to use his American passport at a time when he had not yet
been issued a Philippine passport. Upon the issuance of his Philippine passport, however, petitioner
consistently used this passport for his travels. His consistent use of his Philippine passport was a positive
act that showed his continued allegiance to the country. Petitioner’s continued intent to renounce his
American citizenship is clear when he executed his Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado’s “Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009” on May 9, 2013. Republic Act No. 9225 requires a personal and sworn
renunciation from persons who seek to reacquire their Philippine citizenship in order to run for local office.
Petitioner’s Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009, his
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continued use of his Philippine passport, his alleged Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance
dated November 30, 2009, and his Affidavit dated May 9, 2013 are more than enough evidence to show
his personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

Election Law; View that election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people.—Election
laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people. Petitioner garnered an overwhelming
8,902 votes, 84% of the total votes cast in the 2013 mayoralty elections. If he is disqualified, Florante
Capitan, his opponent who garnered 1,707 votes, a mere 16% of the total votes cast, will become the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. This court will have substituted its discretion over the
sovereign will of the people.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.

Arnado vs. Commission on Elections, 767 SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015

8. • DAVID V. AGBAY, G.R. No. 199113, 18 March 2015

Case Title : RENATO M. DAVID, petitioner, vs. EDITHA A. AGBAY and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the order of the Regional Trial Court of
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Falsification of Documents ;
Syllabi:
1. Criminal Law; Falsification of Documents; Falsification of documents under
paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) refers
to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.-
 —Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the
RPC refers to falsification by a private individual, or a public officer or employee who did
not take advantage of his official position, of public, private, or commercial documents.
The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 of the RPC are:
(1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take
advantage of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC; and (3) that the falsification was committed in a
public, official or commercial document.
2. Citizenship; Dual Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003; Republic Act (RA) No. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and
Reacquisition Act of 2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(PGMA)on August 29, 2003.-
—R.A. 9225, otherwise known as the “Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003,” was signed into law by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on August 29, 2003.
Sections 2 and 3 of said law read: SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy.—It is hereby declared
the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this
Act. SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.—Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic: “I ___________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support
and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal
orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.” Natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall
retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
3. Same; Same; Same; In the case of those who became foreign citizens after Republic
Act (RA) No. 9225 took effect, they shall retain Philippine citizenship despite having
acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the oath of allegiance under the new law.-
—In fine, for those who were naturalized in a foreign country, they shall be deemed to
have reacquired their Philippine citizenship which was lost pursuant to CA 63, under which
naturalization in a foreign country is one of the ways by which Philippine citizenship may
be lost. As its title declares, R.A. 9225 amends CA 63 by doing away with the provision in
the old law which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-born Filipinos who
become naturalized citizens of other countries and allowing dual citizenship, and also
provides for the procedure for reacquiring and retaining Philippine citizenship. In the case
of those who became foreign citizens after R.A. 9225 took effect, they shall retain
Philippine citizenship despite having acquired foreign citizenship provided they took the
oath of allegiance under the new law.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 199113

Counsel: Bienvenido C. Castillo for respondent.

Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Order dated October 8, 2011
of the Regional Trial Court of Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Civil Case
No. SCA-07-11 (Criminal Case No. 2012) is hereby AFFIRMED and
UPHELD. With costs against the petitioner.

h) Multiple Citizenship; Dual Allegiance

1. • AZNAR V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 83820, 25 May 1990
2. • MERCADO V. MANZANO, G.R. No. 135083, 26 May 1999
Case Title : ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO and
theCOMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme
Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Constitutional Law|Election Law|Parties|Citizenship
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an
interest in ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene; The
rule in Labo v. COMELEC, reiterated in several cases, only applies to cases in which the
election of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed
second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner.-
Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in
litigation nor an interest to protect because he is “a defeated candidate for the vice-
mayoralty post of Makati City [who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City
even if the private respondent be ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.”
The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in
the proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the
results of the election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which
petitioner came out only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had
been no proclamation at that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in
ousting private respondent from the race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in
Labo v. COMELEC,reiterated in several cases,only applies to cases in which the election
of the respondent is contested, and the question is whether one who placed second to the
disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the present case, at the time
petitioner filed a “Motion for Leave to File Intervention” on May 20, 1998, there had been
no proclamation of the winner, and petitioner’s purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified “from running for [an] elective local position” under §40(d) of R.A.
No. 7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a
registered voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since
the latter was a rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
2. Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; That petitioner had a right to intervene at that
stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear from §6
of Republic Act No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987.-
Nor is petitioner’s interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have
garnered the highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That
petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification
against private respondent is clear from §6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the
Electoral Reforms Lawof 1987.
3. Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for
disqualification even after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.-
Intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after election if there
has yet been no final judgment rendered.
4. Remedial Law; Election Law; Parties; Failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve
petitioner’s motion for intervention was tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying
petitioner in filing the instant petition for certiorari.-
The failure of the COMELEC enbanc to resolve petitioner’s motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC enbanc instead decided the merits of the case, the present
petition properly deals not only with the denial of petitioner’s motion for intervention but
also with the substantive issues respecting private respondent’s alleged disqualification on
the ground of dual citizenship.
5. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance.-
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.For instance, such a situation may
arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle
of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person,
ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of
both states.
6. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Instances where it is possible for certain classes of
citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship.-
Considering the citizenshipclause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship: (1) Those born
of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers’ country such children are citizens of that country; (3) Those who marry aliens if by
the laws of the latter’s country the former are considered citizens, unless by their act or
omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship. Dual allegiance, on
the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual
allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition.
 7. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; The phrase “dual citizenship” in Republic Act No.
7160, §40(d) and in Republic Act No. 7854, §20 must be understood as referring to “dual
allegiance.”-
In including §5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional Commission
was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase
“dual citizenship” in R.A. No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, §20 must be understood
as referring to “dual allegiance.” Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not
fall under this disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with
dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they
elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of
different states.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 135083

Counsel: Balane, Tamase, Alampay Law Office, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako, Raul A. Daza

Ponente: MENDOZA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

3. • ARNADO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015

4. • AASJS V. DATUMANONG, G.R. No. 160869, 11 May 2007
G.R. No. 160869. May 11, 2007.*

AASJS (ADVOCATES AND ADHERENTS OF SOCIAL JUSTICE FOR SCHOOL TEACHERS AND
ALLIED WORKERS) MEMBER—HECTOR GUMANGAN CALILUNG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE
SIMEON DATUMANONG, in his official capacity as the Secretary of Justice, respondent .
Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Dual Allegiance; What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who has lost Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country; On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance; By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizen-ship.—From the
excerpts of the legislative record, it is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep. Act No. 9225
is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship
from natural-born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries. What Rep. Act No. 9225
does is allow dual citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country. On its face, it does not recognize dual
allegiance. By swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his
foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the
concerned foreign country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act
No. 9225.

Same; Same; Same; Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of
what really constitutes dual allegiance; Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department
including this Court to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.—To begin with, Section 5, Article IV of
the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has
to enact the law on dual allegiance. In Sec-

_______________

* EN BANC.

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Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member vs.
Datumanong

tions 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225, the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but with
the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even after their
naturalization. Congress was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific parameters of what
really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,
including this Court, to rule on issues pertaining to dual allegiance.

Same; Same; Same; The case of Mercado did not set the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance
but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and dual citizenship.—Neither can we subscribe to
the proposition of petitioner that a law is not needed since the case of Mercado had already set the
guidelines for determining dual allegiance. Petitioner misreads Mercado. That case did not set the
parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance but merely made a distinction between dual allegiance and
dual citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Court cannot arrogate the duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual
allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute
dual allegiance for study and legislation by Congress.—In Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394
(2001), we said that the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority. Hence, in determining whether the acts
of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, we must proceed with judicial restraint and act with
caution and forbearance. The doctrine of separation of powers demands no less. We cannot arrogate the
duty of setting the parameters of what constitutes dual allegiance when the Constitution itself has clearly
delegated the duty of determining what acts constitute dual allegiance for study and legislation by
Congress.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Prohibition. Advocates and Adherents of Social Justice
for School Teachers and Allied Workers (AASJS) Member vs. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108, G.R. No.
160869 May 11, 2007

5. • OH HEK HOW V. REPUBLIC, 29 SCRA 94 (1969)

No. L-27429. August 27, 1969.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR ADMISSION AS CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES. OH HEK
HOW, petitionerappellee, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, oppositorappellant.
Political law; Naturalization; Oath of allegiance; Where oath was taken after court had lost jurisdiction over
case; Case at bar.—Where the oath of allegiance was, taken after the trial court had already lost its
jurisdiction over the case because of the timely appeal by the Government, the certificate of natural-
ization issued pursuant thereto is null and void,.

Same; Same; Qualifications; When net income of P540 a month is not lucrative.—A net income of
P6,485.50 per annum or about P540 a month is not lucrative income where applicant has a wife and three
children, one of them of school age, at the time of the filing of his application for naturalization.

Same; Same; Requirement, of securing valid renunciation of former citizenship; Effect of failure to secure
valid renunciation.—Section 12 of Commonwealth Act No. 473 requires the petitioner to renounce
"abosolutely and forever all allgiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate" and particularly to the
state "of which" he is "a subject or citizen." As a consequence, an applicant cannot be naturalized as a
citizen of the Philippines without first validly renouncing his former citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Purpose of requirement.—The obvious purpose of this requirement is to divest the
applicant of his former nationality, before acquiring Philippine citizenship, because, otherwise, he would
have two nationalities and owe allegiance to two distinct sovereignties, which our laws do not permit,
except that, pursuant to Republic Act No. 2689, "the acquisition of citizenship by a natural born Filipino
citizen from one of the Iberian and any friendly democratic Ibero-American countries shall not produce
loss or forfeiture of his Philippine citizenship, if the law of that country grants the same privilege to its
citizens and such had been agreed upon by treaty between the Philippines and the foreign country from
which citizenship is acquired."

Same; Same; Same; Chinese national must secure permission of Minister of the Interior for renunciation
of nationality.—The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that status is necessarily
governed—pursuant to Articles 16 and 16 of our Civil Code—by the laws of China, not by those

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Oh Hek How vs. Republic

of the Philippines. As a consequence, a Chinese national cannot be naturalized as a citizen of the

Philippines, unless he has complied with the laws of Nationalist China requiring previous permission of its
Minister of the Interior for the renunciation of nationality.

International law; Conflict of laws; Citizenship; Naturalization; Renunciation of allegiance; Personal law
governs renunciation of allegiance.—The question of how a Chinese citizen may strip himself of that
status is governed—pursuant to Articles 15 and 1.6 of our Civil Code—by the national law of the
applicant, by the laws of China not by those of the Philippines.

APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte. De Guzman, J.

Oh Hek How vs. Republic, 29 SCRA 94, No. L-27429 August 27, 1969

i) Statelessness
• KOOKOORITCHKIN V. SOLICITOR GENERAL, G.R. No. L-1812, 27 August 1948
Case Title : EREMES KOOKOORITCHKIN, petitioner, vs. THE SOLICITOR GENERAL, oppositorCase
Nature : APPEAL from a resolution of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur. Surtida, J.
Syllabi Class : POLITICAL LAW |lD.|CITIZENSHIP|DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME
CITIZEN|EVIDENCE|JUDICIAL NOTICE |PHILIPPINE LANGUAGE|KNOWLEDGE OF ANY|
SUFFICIENCY|PHILIPPINE LANGUAGES|ABILITY TO WRITE ANY|PROOF|STATELESS|STATUS OF
BEING
Syllabi:
1. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME
CITIZEN; ATTACHMENT OF CERTIFICATE OF ARRIVAL NOT ESSENTIAL TO
VALIDITY OF DECLARATION.-
Attachment of the certificate of arrival is not essential to the validity of a declaration of
intention to become a Filipino citizen, because section 5 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
merely uses the words “has been issued.”
2. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME
CITIZEN; EVIDENCE;JUDICIAL NOTICE; ARRIVAL AND LANDING OF RUSSIAN
REFUGEES IN MARCH, 1923.-
The Court may take judicial notice of the arrival of Russian refugees in March, 1923,
aboard a fleet under the command of Admiral S, who were allowed to land and remain in
the Philippines or proceed to other countries, except about 800 who were allowed to go to
the United States and given free transportation on the naval transport “Merritt.”
3. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME
CITIZEN; PERMANENT RESIDENCE, PROOF OF.-
The undisputed fact that petitioner has been continuously residing in the Philippines for
about 25 years, without having been molested by the authorities, who are presumed to
have been regularly performing their duties and would have arrested petitioner if his
residence is illegal, as rightly contended by appellee, can be taken as evidence that he is
enjoying permanent residence legally.
4. POLITICAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; DECLARATION OF INTENTION TO BECOME
CITIZEN; CERTIFICATE OF ARRIVAL, PROOF OF.-
That a certificate of arrival has been issued is a fact that should be accepted upon the
petitioner’s undisputed statement in his declaration of July, 1940, that the certificate had
actually been attached to the declaration, because it cannot be supposed that the
receiving official would have accepted the declaration without the certificate mentioned
therein as attached thereto. Petitioner’s declaration is valid under section 5 of the
Naturalization Law, failure to reconstitute the certificate of arrival notwithstanding. What an
unreconstituted document intended to prove may be shown by other competent evidence.
5. lD.; CITIZENSHIP; PHILIPPINE LANGUAGE, KNOWLEDGE OF ANY;
SUFFICIENCY; CASE AT BAR.-
The lower court made the finding of fact that applicant speaks and writes English and
Bicol and there seems to be no question about the competency of the judge who made
the pronouncement, because he has shown by the appealed resolution and by his
questions propounded to appellee, that he has command of both English and Bicol.The
law has not set a specific standard of the required ability to speak and write any of the
principal Philippine languages. There is reason to believe that the lower court’s
pronouncement is well taken considering the fact that, after he was liberated in 1942 from
the Japanese in the Naga prison, petitioner joined the guerrilla in the Bicol region, took
part in encounters and skirmishes against the Japanese, and remained with the guerrilla
until the Americans liberated the Bicol provinces. If appellee with his smattering of Bicol
was able to get along with his Bicol comrades in the hazardous life of the resistance
 movement, it is believed that his knowledge of the language satisfies the requirement of
the law.
6. lD.; CITIZENSHIP; PHILIPPINE LANGUAGES, ABILITY TO WRITE ANY; PROOF;
CASE AT BAR.-
Appellant contends that there is no piece of positive evidence to support petitioner’s
allegation that he can write too in the Bicol language. There is, however, on record
circumstantial evidence from which it can be concluded that petitioner ought to know also
how to write Bicol. Bicol, as all the important Philippine languages, uses the same
alphabet used in English, and it is much easier to write Bicol than English, because it is
phonetic. Vowels and consonants have in them single and not interchangeable phonetic
values, while English words deviate very often from the basic sounds of the alphabet. The
ability to write cannot be denied to a person like petitioner, who has undergone the
exacting technical training to be able to render services as flier in the Russian Naval
Squadron in the Baltic Sea and in the British Air Forces during the first World War. The
difference between the Cyrillic alphabet, as now used by Russians, and our Roman
alphabet, cannot weigh much to deny petitioner the ability to use the latter. A person who
has shown the command of English which can be seen in his testimony on record can
easily make use of an alphabet of twenty or more letters universally used in this country
where he has been residing continuously for 25 years.
7. lD.; CITIZENSHIP; STATELESS, STATUS OF BEING; PROOF.-
The lower court did not err in pronouncing appellee stateless. Appellee’s testimony,
besides being uncontradicted, is supported by the well-known fact that the ruthlessness of
modern dictatorships has scattered throughout the world a large number of stateless
refugees or displaced persons, without country and without flag. The tyrannical intolerance
of said dictatorships toward all opposition induced them to resort to beastly oppression,
con-centration camps and blood purges, and it is only natural that the not-so-fortunate
ones who were able to escape to foreign countries should feel the loss of all bonds of
attachment tothe hells which were formerly their fatherland’s. Petitioner belongs to that
group of stateless refugees. Knowing, as all cultured persons all over the world ought to
know, the history, nature and character of the Soviet dictatorship, presently the greatest
menace to humanity and civilization, it would be technically fastidious to require further
evidence of petitioner’s claim that he is stateless than his testimony that he owes no
allegiance to the Russian Communist government and, because he has been at war with
it, he fled from Russia to permanently reside in the Philippines.

Docket Number: No. L-1812

Counsel: First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon, Solicitor Florencio Villamor, L.D.
Lockwood “i Manuel O. Chan

Ponente: PERFECTO

Dispositive Portion:
The appealed resolution is affirmed.
 2. DOMICILE/DOMICILIARY THEORY
a) General Rules; Kinds; Loss and Retention
1. • ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 119976, 18 September 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY
MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose of meeting the
qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.—A perusal of the
Resolution of the COMELEC’S Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled
concepts of “Domicile” and “Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile,
the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a
conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate’s qualifications for election to the
House of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

_______________

33 People v. Jalon, 215 SCRA 680 [1992]; Magat v. People, 201 SCRA 21 [1991]; People v. Marti, 193
SCRA 57 [1991].

* EN BANC.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.—Article
50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which, whenever absent for
business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that
they disclose intent.” Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing
or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence, in its ordinary
conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of
a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile
in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up
his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person’s
intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established
it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various
places. However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly
and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.—For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar
criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with
domicile.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks of “residence ” in
election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the
residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the
Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”

302

302

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only
when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would
otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy regarding the
period of residency does not negate the fact of residence in a congressional district if such fact is
established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by
private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual residence in a space
which required her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7
and Item 8—the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled with the
circumstances surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down
an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be
allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places.—We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual
does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence,
it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from
legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-
permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that “she
could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in
which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law
purposes.

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Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his parents.—A minor
follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of
origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight
years old, when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s averments.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile of origin is not easily
lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; 2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing
a new one; and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin
should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. In the case at
bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required
to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed
occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium
voluntarium).

Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the
term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two
concepts are well delineated.—In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her
domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of
“domicile” and “residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by
operation of law upon marriage cannot be

304

304

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one
area where the two concepts are well delineated.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing which would suggest
that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of
residence upon marriage.—A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile
or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the
female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s choice of residence
upon marriage.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of the Civil Code refers to
“domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife
are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as
in the case of petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife
should necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is illogical to conclude that
Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.” Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where
the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their
(various) residences.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence—
she did not lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then
Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to
follow her husband’s actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr.
Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte.
There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s residence. But assuming that
Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of “matrimonial
domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law
concept of “matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experi-

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ences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference
between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been
supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women’s rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.

Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and
quite another thing in political law.—Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean
one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is
that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife-the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable conclusion
derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former
President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.

Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory.—It is
a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on
the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it.”

Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of necessity.—The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on
grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in
Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often
determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating
to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has
become a member of the House of Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal’s supposed assumption of jurisdic-

306

306

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

tion over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that
HRET’S jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections return and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the
HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

ROMERO, J., Separate Opinion :

Husband and Wife; A widow can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at all she
was before—and, exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin.—I submit that a
widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the
departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin,
but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her
domicile of origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to
meet the one-year requirement to run as Representatives of the First District of Leyte.

PUNO, J., Concurring Opinion :

Husband and Wife; It is not the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by
the husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage.—It is not,
therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that
will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made
by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any
and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot
change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the
wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.

Same; Family Code; In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and
wife as started and perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule
that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband.—In light of the

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Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the
common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of
her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has
been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its appeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are
not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner
is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Same; Constitutional Law; Equal Protection Clause; It can hardly be doubted that the common law
imposition on a married woman of her dead husband’s domicile even beyond his grave is patently
discriminatory to women—it cannot survive a constitutional challenge.—Aside from reckoning with the
Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of law. It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her
dead husband’s domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based
discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive
a constitutional challenge.

Same; Domicile; The better stance is to rule that petitioner reac-quired her Tacloban domicile upon the
death of her husband in 1989.—Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better
stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989.
This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner’s Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband’s death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule
that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of
petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the Civil Code, a right now
recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution.

Constitutional Law; Election Law; Statutory Construction; Political Harassment; Equal Protection; There is
but one Constitution for all Filipinos—petitioner cannot be adjudged by a “different” Constitution, and the
worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation bile and bitterness.—All these
attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will
allow

308

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating
light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a
“different” Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile
and bitterness.

FRANCISCO, J., Concurring Opinion :

Husband and Wife; Domicile; Petitioner reverted to her original domicile upon her husband’s death
without even signifying her intention to that effect.—Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner’s domicile of origin
which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with
then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the
reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to
one another. The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral
duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains her marital
domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter’s termination, for the
reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of
her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely
obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose. It is my view
therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband’s death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or
for some other place/s.

PADILLA, J., Dissenting Opinion :

Election Law; The one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term “residence”
is to be synonymous with “domicile”—the candidate’s intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law.—To my mind, the one year
residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term “residence” is to be synonymous with
“domicile.” In other words, the candidate’s intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations
satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional
purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent in
Congress and the one-

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309

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year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not versatility.

Same; Statutes; R.A. 6646; The Court should re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the
Jun Labo case.—It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a “winning candidate is disqualified,” but that the law considers him as the
candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified
candidate not being counted or considered. As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter,
then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in
the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that “the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the
vice of ineligibility” most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

REGALADO, J., Dissenting Opinion :

Husband and Wife; Domicile; In the absence of affirmative evidence to the contrary, the presumption is
that a wife’s domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.—
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband’s death the wife has the right
to elect her own domicile, she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she
makes an actual change. In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a
wife’s domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.

DAVIDE, JR., J., Dissenting Opinion :

Husband and Wife; Domicile; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Since the widow is presumed to retain her
deceased husband’s domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the
burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile.—The majority
opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals , 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then
Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her
domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at

310

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Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

least concludes that “[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium ), her legal domicile at the time of her
marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte.” That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the
Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband’s domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her
right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion :

Election Law; Electoral Tribunals; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELEC’s jurisdiction, in
the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned
begins.—The COMELEC’s jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction
of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a “member” of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The
question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of
the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I
believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined,
does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked
with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law
before a proclamation is properly done.

Same; Same; Separation of Powers; The Court should refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional
fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain.—The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain
from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters
which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging
question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court’s peremptory pronouncement on the ability
of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest “relating to the election,
returns and qualification” of its members.

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Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion :

Election Law; Commission on Elections; Jurisdiction; The COMELEC has no power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected—the
qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for
quo warranto or an election protest, in the appropriate forum.—In my view the issue in this case is
whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications
of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or
an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in
the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by
their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.

Same; Same; Same; The Omnibus Election Code, by its silence about a pre-proclamation remedy based
on a candidate’s qualifications, underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications
of candidates unless they have been elected.—By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for
determining an elected official’s qualifications after the results of elections are proclaimed, while being
conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election
Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of
candidates unless they have been elected.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates
cannot be supplied by a mere rule—such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is
a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power cannot do.—
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification.—Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds
for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. The lack of provision for declaring
the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to
the creation of a cause of action which

312

312

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on Elections

is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6
of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even
the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into
qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2[3]).

Same; Same; Same; Proceedings for “disqualification” and for a declaration of “ineligibility,” distinguished;
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for
disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law.—The assimilation in Rule 25 of the
COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for
“disqualification” different from those for a declaration of “ineligibility.” “Disqualification” proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in § 40
of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. “Ineligibility,” on the other hand, refers
to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and
the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, 248 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

2. • CAASI V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 88831, 8 November 1990

Case Title : MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C. MIGUEL,
respondents., ANECITO CASCANTE, petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MERITO
C. MIGUEL, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Election Law|Omnibus Election Code|His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for elective
office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of the United States
Syllabi:
1. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Miguel’s immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.-
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he did
not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he entered the
United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application
for an immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa. Based on that application of his, he was
issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or authority to reside there
permanently.
2. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office.-
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of
another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law” is not applicable to Merito
Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United States before he was
elected to public office, not “during his tenure” as mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan.
3. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy
for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Waiver should be
manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing his candidacy
for elective office in this country.-
 To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of his green
card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done prior to filing his
candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior waiver, he was “disqualified
to run for any elective office.”
4. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy
for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
Municipal Mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.-
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election as
municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that he was
disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
5. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy
for elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Absent clear evidence that
he made an irrevocable waiver of that status, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office hence his election thereto was null and void.-
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The waiver
of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it. Absent clear
evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he surrendered his
green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor of Bolinao in the
local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was disqualified to run for
said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 88831, G.R. No. 84508

Counsel: Ireneo B. Orlino, Montemayor & Montemayor Law Office

Ponente: GRIÑO-AQUINO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of
Appeals in SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and
 3. • JAO V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 128314, 29 May 2002
Case Title : RODOLFO V. JAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PERICO V. JAO,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Special Proceedings|Estate Proceedings|Residence|Death Certificates|Venue|Words and
Phrases
Syllabi:
1. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; The estate of an inhabitant of
the Philippines shall be settled or letters of administration granted in the proper court
located in the province where the decedent resides at the time of his death.-
The main issue before us is: where should the settlement proceedings be had—in
Pampanga, where the decedents had their permanent residence, or in Quezon City,
where they actually stayed before their demise? Rule 73, Section 1 of the Rules of Court
states: Where estate of deceased persons be settled.—If the decedent is an inhabitant of
the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be
proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First
Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of any province in which he had
estate. The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a
court, so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of
his estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record.
(underscoring ours) Clearly, the estate of an inhabitant of the Philippines shall be settled
or letters of administration granted in the proper court located in the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death.
2. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; Factors Considered in
Determination of Residence.-
Petitioner Rodolfo invokes our ruling in the case of Eusebio v. Eusebio, et al., where we
held that the situs of settlement proceedings shall be the place where the decedent had
his permanent residence or domicile at the time of death. In determining residence at the
time of death, the following factors must be considered, namely, the decedent had: (a)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (b) physical presence at the place chosen; and
(c) intention to stay therein permanently. While it appears that the decedents in this case
chose to be physically present in Quezon City for medical convenience, petitioner avers
that they never adopted Quezon City as their permanent residence.
3. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; Death Certificates; Recitals
in death certificates as to the residence of the decedent at the time of death are admissible
in evidence and presumed to be correct.-
The recitals in the death certificates, which are admissible in evidence, were thus properly
considered and presumed to be correct by the court a quo. We agree with the appellate
court’s observation that since the death certificates were accomplished even before
petitioner and respondent quarreled over their inheritance, they may be relied upon to
reflect the true situation at the time of their parents’ death.
4. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; The Rules of Court refers to
residence at the time of death, not the permanent residence or domicile.-
The death certificates thus prevailed as proofs of the decedents’ residence at the time of
death, over the numerous documentary evidence presented by petitioner. To be sure, the
documents presented by petitioner pertained not to residence at the time of death, as
required by the Rules of Court, but to permanent residence or domicile. In Garcia-Fule v.
Court of Appeals, we held: x x x x x x x x x the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini
“actual residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This term “resides,”
like the terms “residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of
the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of
venue statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute
uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence” and
“domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words, “resides” should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence,
that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence
in that place and also an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
5. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; It does not necessarily follow
that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the place where he permanently
resides, and neither can it be presumed that a person’s properties can be found mostly in
the place where he establishes his domicile.-
It does not necessarily follow that the records of a person’s properties are kept in the
place where he permanently resides. Neither can it be presumed that a person’s
properties can be found mostly in the place where he establishes his domicile. It may be
that he has his domicile in a place different from that where he keeps his records, or
where he maintains extensive personal and business interests. No generalizations can
thus be formulated on the matter, as the question of where to keep records or retain
properties is entirely dependent upon an individual’s choice and peculiarities.
6. Special Proceedings; Estate Proceedings; Residence; Venue; Words and
Phrases; Venue for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings have one and
the same meaning—as thus defined, “residence,” in the context of venue provisions,
means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or place of abode, provided he
resides therein with continuity and consistency.-
At any rate, petitioner is obviously splitting straws when he differentiates between venue in
ordinary civil actions and venue in special proceedings. In Raymond v. Court of Appeals
and Bejer v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that venue for ordinary civil actions and that for
special proceedings have one and the same meaning. As thus defined, “residence,” in the
context of venue provisions, means nothing more than a person’s actual residence or
place of abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. All told, the
lower court and the Court of Appeals correctly held that venue for the settlement of the
decedents’ intestate estate was properly laid in the Quezon City court.
Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 128314

Counsel: Agabin, Verzola, Hermoso, Layaoen & De Castro, Jose P. Villanueva, Jorge Roito N. Hirang

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED, and the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35908 is AFFIRMED.

4. • COQUILLA V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 151914, 31 July 2002

Case Title : TEODULO M. COQUILLA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MR. NEIL M. ALVAREZ, respondents.
Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Election Law|Motions|Pro Forma
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Motions; Pro Forma; Mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues
raised by the parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro-forma.-
The motion for reconsideration was not pro forma and its filing did suspend the period for filing the petition
for certiorari in this case. The mere reiteration in a motion for reconsideration of the issues raised by the
parties and passed upon by the court does not make a motion pro forma; otherwise, the movant’s remedy
would not be a reconsideration of the decision but a new trial or some other remedy.
2. Election Law; Residence is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence.-
The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or
“habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time,
eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every
person at birth. It is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is
abandoned by acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice).
3. Election Law; Naturalization in a foreign country results in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.-
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that immigration to the United States by virtue of a
“greencard,” which entitles one to reside permanently in that country, constitutes abandonment of
domicile in the Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign country result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines.
4. Election Law; Registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidate’s lack of residency.-
Petitioner nonetheless says that his registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar in January
2001 is conclusive of his residency as a candidate because §117 of the Omnibus Election Code requires
that a voter must have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the city or municipality
wherein he proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. As held in Nuval
v. Guray, however, registration as a voter does not bar the filing of a subsequent case questioning a
candidate’s lack of residency.
5. Election Law; Proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in
nature.-
Petitioner was not denied due process because the COMELEC failed to act on his motion to be allowed to
present evidence. Under §5(d), in relation to §7, of R.A. No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987),
proceedings for denial or cancellation of a certificate of candidacy are summary in nature. The holding of
a formal hearing is thus not de rigeur. In any event, petitioner cannot claim denial of the right to be heard
since he filed a Verified Answer, a Memorandum and a Manifestation, all dated March 19, 2001, before
the COMELEC in which he submitted documents relied by him in this petition, which, contrary to
petitioner’s claim, are complete and intact in the records.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 151914

Counsel: Franklin Delano M. Sacmar, Jonathan M. Agnes, Christopher L. Moscare

Ponente: MENDOZA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the resolution of the Second Division of the Commission
on Elections, dated July 19, 2001, and the order, dated January 30, 2002 of the Commission on Elections
en banc are AFFIRMED.
5. • MACALINTAL V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, 10 July 2003
Election Law; Constitutional Law; Parties in Interest; Taxpayers have the right to restrain officials from
wasting public funds through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute.—R.A. No. 9189, entitled, “An
Act Providing for A System of Overseas Absentee Voting by Qualified Citizens of the Philippines Abroad,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes,” appropriates funds under Section 29 thereof
which provides that a supplemental budget on the General Appropriations Act of the year of its enactment
into law shall provide for the necessary amount to carry out its provisions. Taxpayers, such as herein
petitioner, have the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an
unconstitutional statute. The Court has held that they may assail the validity of a law appropriating public
funds because expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of executing an
unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds.

Same; Same; Statutes; Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.—The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other
laws must conform and in accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution shall be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.

Same; Same; Same; Presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly.—

Generally, however, all laws are presumed to be constitutional. In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court said: .
. . An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations.
The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well.
The question of the validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of the
government itself. Thus, presumption of constitutionality of a law must be overcome convincingly: . . . To
declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must be clear and
unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public good, no infringement of
constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done.”

Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; A constitutional provision should function to the full extent of
its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that great
document.—It is a basic rule in constitutional construction that the Constitution should be construed as a
whole. In Chiongbian vs. De Leon, the Court held that a constitutional provision should function to the full
extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with all other provisions of that
great document. Constitutional provisions are mandatory in character unless, either by express statement
or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest. The intent of the Constitution may be drawn
primarily from the language of the document itself. Should it be ambiguous, the Court may consider the
intent of its framers through their debates in the constitutional convention.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Absentee Voting; Members to the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin.—It is clear from these discussions of the members of the Constitutional Commission intended to
enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not abandoned their domicile of
origin. The Commission even intended to extend to young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose
parents’ domicile of origin is in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising
act; The affidavit is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and
resume residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had
not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin.—Contrary to the claim of petitioner, the execution of the
affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned
his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d)
violates the Constitution that proscribes “provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a
condition to qualified to vote in a political exercise.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to
“resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from approval
of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for citizenship in
another country.—It must be emphasized that Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise
to “resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they have not applied for
citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return
“shall be cause for the removal” of their names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Section 5(d) itself provides for a deterrence which is that the Filipino
who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.—Congress itself was conscious of said
probability and in fact, it has addressed the expected problem. Section 5(d) itself provides for a
deterrence which is that the Filipino who fails to return as promised stands to lose his right of suffrage.
Under Section 9, should a registered overseas absentee voter fail to vote for two consecutive national
elections, his name may be ordered removed from the National Registry of Overseas Absentee Voters.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Court does not find Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally
defective.—In fine, considering the underlying intent of the Constitution, the Court does not find Section
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 as constitutionally defective.

Same; The canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and
vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.—Congress could not have
allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner,
to encroach “on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the
power to proclaim the winners for the said positions.” The provisions of the Constitution as the
fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-
president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress.

Same; By vesting itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority.—By vesting
itself with the powers to approve, review, amend, and revise the IRR for The Overseas Absentee Voting
Act of 2003, Congress went beyond the scope of its constitutional authority. Congress trampled upon the
constitutional mandate of independence of the COMELEC. Under such a situation, the Court is left with
no option but to withdraw from its usual reticence in declaring a provision of law unconstitutional.

BELLOSILLO, J., Separate Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does not
result in the acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.—In this
jurisdiction, it is well settled that “domicile” and “residence” as used in election laws are synonymous
terms which import not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place
coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. Domicile is a question of intention and circumstances.
There are three (3) rules that must be observed in the consideration of circumstances: first, that a man
must have a residence or domicile somewhere; second, domicile is not easily lost, once established it is
retained until a new one is acquired; and third, a man can have but one residence or domicile at a time.
The principal elements of domicile, i.e., physical presence in the locality involved and intention to adopt it
as a domicile, must concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will result if either
of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a domicile without actual residence in the locality does
not result in the acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without intention.

PUNO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Residence connotes the actual relationship of an individual to a specific place; To
be a resident, physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country is required; Elements
to determine the domicile of a person.—In its ordinary conception, residence connotes the actual
relationship of an individual to a specific place. To be a resident, physical presence of a person in a given
area, community or country is required. Even before the adoption of the 1935 Constitution, jurisprudence
has equated the first residence requirement (one year residence in the Philippines) with domicile or legal
residence. Domicile in turn has been defined as an individual’s permanent home or “the place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” The domicile of a person is determined by the
concurrence of the following elements: (1) the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place; and
(2) animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently. The mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.

Same; Same; To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and
establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with purpose.—In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,
we ruled that domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and establishing a new one; and acts which correspond with purpose. This
change of domicile is effected by a Filipino who becomes an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” of a
foreign country.

Same; Same; The affidavit merely proves the intent to return but not the other requisites for reacquiring
the domicile of origin.—With due respect, I submit that the affidavit merely proves the intent to return but
not the other requisites for reacquiring the domicile of origin. Intent, which is not coupled with actual
physical transfer, is not sufficient either to abandon the former domicile or to establish a new domicile.
Thus, the view that domicile could be established as soon as the old is abandoned even though the
person has not yet arrived at the new domicile, has not been accepted.

Same; Same; The burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who asserts it.—To
stress, the burden of establishing a change in domicile is upon the party who asserts it. A person’s
declarations as to what he considers his home, residence, or domicile are generally admissible “as
evidence of his attitude of mind.” However, whatever the context, “their accuracy is suspect because of
their self-serving nature, particularly when they are made to achieve some legal objective.”

Same; Same; The burden rests on an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” to prove that he has
abandoned his domicile in the foreign country and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines; A self-
serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when what is at stake is a very important privilege as the right
of suffrage; Until such promise is fulfilled, he continues to be a domiciliary of another country; Until then,
he does not possess the necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified voter.—In
the case at bar, the burden rests on an “immigrant” or a “permanent resident” to prove that he has
abandoned his domicile in the foreign country and reestablished his domicile in the Philippines. A self-
serving affidavit will not suffice, especially when what is at stake is a very important privilege as the right
of suffrage. I respectfully submit that what makes the intent expressed in the affidavit effective and
operative is the fulfillment of the promise to return to the Philippines. Physical presence is not a mere test
of intent but the “principal confirming evidence of the intention of the person.” Until such promise is
fulfilled, he continues to be a domiciliary of another country. Until then, he does not possess the
necessary requisites and therefore, cannot be considered a qualified voter.

Same; Same; Section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning
candidates should be construed as limited to the positions of Senators and party-list representatives.—On
its face, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 appears to be repugnant to section 4, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution. It gives the impression that Congress abdicated to COMELEC its constitutional duty to
canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for President and Vice-President. I agree with the majority
that the impugned provision should be given a reasonable interpretation that would save it from a
constitutional infirmity. To be sure, Congress could have not allowed the COMELEC to exercise a power
exclusively bestowed upon it by the Constitution. Thus, section 18.5 of Rep. Act No. 9189 empowering
the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates should be construed as limited to the positions of
Senators and party-list representatives.

Same; Same; Sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review, revise,
amend and approve the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC are unconstitutional.—
Under the 1987 Constitution, the power to promulgate rules and regulations has been directly granted by
the Constitution and no longer by Congress. Undoubtedly, the power was granted to COMELEC to
strengthen its independence, hence, its exercise is beyond invasion by Congress. Under any lens,
sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 constitute undue restrictions on the constitutional power of the
COMELEC to promulgate rules and regulations for such rules are made subject to the prior review and
approval of Congress. The impugned provisions can result in the denial of this constitutionally conferred
power because Congress can veto the rules and regulations the COMELEC has promulgated. Thus, I
respectfully submit that sections 19 and 25 of Rep. Act No. 9189 granting Congress the power to review,
revise, amend and approve the implementing rules and regulations of the COMELEC, otherwise known
as subordinate legislations in other countries, are unconstitutional.

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The power given to COMELEC by Section 18.5 of R.A. 9189 should be
understood to be limited only to the proclamation of winning candidates for the positions of senators and
party-list representatives; The election returns for the positions of president and vice-president should
then be certified by the Board of Canvassers to Congress and not to COMELEC as provided for in
Section 18.4 of the Act.—Section 4 of the Act allows all qualified Filipinos abroad to vote for President,
Vice-President, Senators and party-list representatives. In relation to this, Section 18.5 empowers the
Commission on Election to order the proclamation of winning candidates. Since it is Congress which has
been granted by the Constitution the authority and duty to canvass the votes and proclaim the winning
candidates for president and vice-president, I echo the sentiment of my colleagues that the power given
to COMELEC by Section 18.5 of R.A. 9189 should be understood to be limited only to the proclamation of
winning candidates for the positions of senators and party-list representatives. The election returns for the
positions of president and vice-president should then be certified by the Board of Canvassers to Congress
and not to COMELEC as provided for in Section 18.4 of the Act.

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Physical presence in the country is no longer indispensable to arm Filipinos
abroad with sufficient information to enable them to vote intelligently.—In sum, I respectfully submit that
physical presence in the country is no longer indispensable to arm Filipinos abroad with sufficient
information to enable them to vote intelligently. The advent of the Information Age and the globalization of
knowledge have empowered them to know enough about the Philippines to enable them to choose our
national officials prudently and, in the process, to have a significant voice in the governance of the country
they love and cherish.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; R.A. 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not possess
the constitutional requirement of residence.—I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion
because R.A. 9189 grants the right of suffrage to a category of voters who do not possess the
constitutional requirement of residence. These are men and women who are still Filipino citizens but who
have voluntarily and unambiguously chosen actual, physical, and permanent residence in a foreign
country. In other words, the questioned law allows non-residents to vote.

Same; Same; It is plain to see that Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 in its current form is unconstitutional.—
Juxtaposing these definitions found in our jurisprudence with the evident intent of the framers of our
Constitution, it is plain to see that Section 5 (d) of R.A. 9189, in its current form is unconstitutional. It
seeks to grant the benefits of absentee voting to those for whom it was never intended: Filipinos who are
permanent residents, necessarily including immigrants, of countries other than their own.

Same; Same; A mere promise to return home within three years from voting is no proof of intent to return
to a permanent residence.—“Absentee” has to be qualified. It refers only to those people residing abroad
whose intent to return home and forsake the foreign country is clear. It cannot refer to immigrants. A mere
promise to return home within three years from voting is no proof of intent to return to a permanent
residence. The sanction for its enforcement is so feeble that the promise will be an empty one. As earlier
stated, an immigrant gives up many things, including the right or opportunity of voting in the Philippines,
when he moves with his

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family abroad. A sanction of future disenfranchisement would not bother him in the least bit.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; R.A. No. 9189, which expands the meaning as to include those otherwise not
covered (such as Filipino immigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries), through the mere
imposition of certain requirements, “risks a declaration of unconstitutionality.”—The intention of the
Framers to limit the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad” to Filipinos temporarily residing abroad is clear and
unmistakable. Therefore, a law, such as R.A. No. 9189, which expands the meaning as to include those
otherwise not covered (such as Filipino immigrants or permanent residents of foreign countries), through
the mere imposition of certain requirements, “risks a declaration of unconstitutionality.”

Same; Same; Mere declaration that he intends to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines does not have the effect of conferring upon the immigrant the necessary qualification of
“residency” here.—Mere declaration that he intends to resume actual physical permanent residence in the
Philippines does not have the effect of conferring upon the immigrant the necessary qualification of
“residency” here. To reiterate, residence for voting is not wholly a question of intention, it is a question of
fact and intention. A voter’s statements, declarations, or testimony with respect to his intention is not
controlling, but must be taken in connection with his acts and conduct. Hence, the right to vote in a certain
place or precinct requires the occurrence of two things, the act of residing coupled with the intention to do
so.

Same; Same; Where the Constitution fixes the qualifications of voters, these qualifications cannot be
increased, diminished, or changed by legislative enactment, unless the power to do so is expressly
granted or necessarily implied.—In fine, let it be stressed that where the Constitution fixes the
qualifications of voters, these qualifications cannot be increased, diminished, or changed by legislative
enactment, unless the power to do so is expressly granted, or necessarily implied. The inclusion of the
residency requirement in the Constitution is not without reason. It constitutes an invaluable protection
against fraud and further affords some surety that the elector has in fact become a member of the
community and that, as such, he has a common interest in all matters pertaining to its government, and is
therefore more likely to exercise his right intelligently. The specification in the Constitution is an implied
prohibition against interference. It is not competent for Congress to diminish or alter such qualification.

622

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Macalintal vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 is unconstitutional for it diminishes the “residency requirement” of
the Constitution by including within the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad” immigrants and permanent
residents of foreign countries.—Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is unconstitutional for it diminishes the
“residency requirement” of the Constitution by including within the phrase “qualified Filipinos abroad”
immigrants and permanent residents of foreign countries. It defies the clear intent of the Constitution to
limit the application of the absentee voting law to Filipinos who are “temporarily abroad.” Thus, as statutes
which purport to modify constitutionally fixed qualifications are void, so must Section 5(d) of R.A. No.
9189 suffer the same fate.

CARPIO, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; Section 5(d) of RA No. 9189, which prescribes the reacquisition of residence by a
Filipino through the execution of an affidavit stating he is resuming residence in the Philippines, is
similarly well within the power of Congress to enact and is thus constitutional.—Thus, RA No. 8171 allows
a former natural-born Filipino who became a foreigner to reacquire Philippine citizenship by filing a
simplified administrative petition and taking an oath of allegiance to the Philippines. Section 5(d) of RA
No. 9189, which prescribes the reacquisition of residence by a Filipino through the execution of an
affidavit stating he is resuming residence in the Philippines, is similarly well within the power of Congress
to enact and is thus constitutional.

CARPIO-MORALES, J., Separate Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The affidavit executed in accordance with Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 by a Filipino
immigrant or permanent resident of another country expressing his intent to resume physical permanent
residence in the Philippines is an eloquent proof of his intention not to abandon his domicile of origin in
the Philippines.—It is my view that the affidavit executed in accordance with Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 by
a Filipino immigrant or permanent resident of another country expressing his intent to resume physical
permanent residence in the Philippines is an eloquent proof of his intention not to abandon his domicile of
origin in the Philippines. It is a statement under oath of what a Filipino seeks to do for the future of his
membership in a political community. Why should this affidavit be discredited on the mere speculation
that the immigrant might not fulfill his undertaking to return to the Philippines for good? If Filipinos who are
temporarily residing in foreign countries are accorded full faith and credit as to their domiciliary ties no
matter how indefinite their absence from the Philippines, what more in the case of Filipino immigrants who
have formally declared their intent to settle in their homeland?

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CALLEJO, SR., J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; While intention is an important factor to be considered in determining whether or
not a residence has been acquired, intention alone is insufficient to establish a residence for voting
purposes.—The majority view, I humbly submit, is non-sequitur for it is well-entrenched that while
intention is an important factor to be considered in determining whether or not a residence has been
acquired, intention alone is insufficient to establish a residence for voting purposes. Hence, a mere
intention to remove, not consummated, can neither forfeit the party’s old domicile nor enable him to
acquire a new one. And the fact that a person intends to remove at a future time does not of itself defeat
his residence before he actually does remove.

Same; Same; The undertaking required of an immigrant/permanent resident under the aforesaid section x
x x is ipso facto an admission that he/she is not an actual resident of the Philippines and does not
possess the residency requirement on the date of the election but merely promises to possess the same
within three (3) years from registration.—I am in complete accord with the petitioner’s position that
Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 virtually enfranchises a voter who, on the date of the election, does not
possess the residency requirement as ordained under Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution.
Indeed, the undertaking required of an immigrant/permanent resident under the aforesaid section, “that
he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years
from the approval of his/her registration,” is ipso facto an admission that he/she is not an actual resident
of the Philippines and does not, therefore, possess the residency requirement on the date of the election
but merely promises to possess the same within three (3) years from registration. Consequently, Section
5(d), which in effect attempts to permit non-residents to exercise the right of suffrage, in direct
contravention of the constitutional prescription in Section 1, Article V, must be stricken from Rep. Act No.
9189 as an invalid and unconstitutional provision.

AZCUNA, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; Domicile; The abandonment of present domicile of choice, by the execution of the affidavit,
operates to revive the domicile of origin to replace it, because of the principle that no person can be
without a domicile at any time.—Petitioner contends that Filipinos who establish permanent residence
abroad have thereby abandoned their Philippine domicile of origin and replaced it with a domicile of
choice in a foreign country. This may indeed be true, but with the execution of the affidavit provided for
under Section 5 (d) aforementioned, the affiant expressly states an abandonment of said domicile of
choice. The legal effect of this expression is to revive the domicile of origin. For unlike a domicile of
choice, which requires both intention and physical presence to be established or maintained, the domicile
of origin can be revived by an intention properly expressed. Thus, the abandonment of the present
domicile of choice, by the execution of the affidavit, operates to revive the domicile of origin to replace it,
because of the principle that no person can be without a domicile at any time.

Same; Same; Through the execution of the affidavit, the affiant does the operative act that makes said
affiant once more a Philippine domiciliary.—Through the execution of the affidavit, the affiant does the
operative act that makes said affiant once more a Philippine domiciliary. The requirement of resuming
actual physical presence within three (3) years is only a test of such intention, but is not needed to effect
the change or reversion of domicile. If the affiant does not resume the residence physically within said
period, then the intent expressed in the affidavit is defective and the law will deem it inoperative, thereby
allowing removal of affiant’s name from the National Registry of Absentee Voters.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition. Macalintal vs. Commission on
Elections, 405 SCRA 614, G.R. No. 157013 July 10, 2003

6. • NICOLAS-LEWIS V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 162759, 4 August 2006

Case Title : LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B. MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A. ESCLAMADO,
ARMANDO B. HEREDIA, REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D.
NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL
ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Mandamus.
Syllabi Class : Suffrage|Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225)|Absentee
Voting Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9189)
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Same; The Court notes that the expanded thrust of R.A. 9189
extends also to what might be tagged as the next generation of “duals”; If the next
generation of “duals” may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and
political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither rhyme nor reason why the
petitioners and other present day “duals,” provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of
suffrage as an overseas absentee voter.-
—While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the
expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next generation of
“duals.” This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship
in R.A. 9225 which reads: SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship.—The unmarried child, whether
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-
acquire Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines. It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below
eighteen (18) years of age had never set foot inthe Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of “duals” may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil and
political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor reason why
the petitioners and other present day “duals,” provided they meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189, be denied the right of
suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly intended such
absurd situation.
2. Suffrage; Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003 (R.A. No. 9225);
Overseas Absentee Voting act of 2003 (R.A. 9189); Considering the unison intent of the
Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the scope of that law with the passage of
R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that “duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage
thru the absentee voting scheme and as overseas absentee voters.-
—Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of
the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is that
“duals” may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and as
 overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the following wise:
“Absentee Voting” refers to the process by which qualified citizens of the Philippines
abroad exercise their right to vote; “Overseas Absentee Voter” refers to a citizen of the
Philippines who is qualified to register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified
by law, who is abroad on the day of elections.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 162759

Counsel: Sedfrey M. Candelaria

Ponente: GARCIA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court
rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and
Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the
system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas
Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

7. • SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS, G.R. No. 133743, 6 February 2007

Venue; In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals (74 SCRA 189 [1976]), we laid down the doctrinal
rule for determining residence—as contradistinguished from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of
fixing the venue of settlement of his estate.—Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province “in which he resides at the time of his death.” In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 74
SCRA 189 (1976), we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence—as contradistinguished
from domicile—of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.

Same; For purpose of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the residence of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his

_______________

* THIRD DIVISION.
legal residence or domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency.—It is incorrect for
petitioners to argue that “residence,” for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with “domicile.” The rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the
instant case because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between
“residence” for purposes of election laws and “residence” for purposes of fixing the venue of actions. In
election cases, “residence” and “domicile” are treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of returning. However, for purposes of fixing venue
under the Rules of Court, the “residence” of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or
actual residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or domicile provided
he resides therein with continuity and consistency. Hence, it is possible that a person may have his
residence in one place and domicile in another.

Family Code; Marriages; The Court stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.”—This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653
(1989), where the Court recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held
that the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino wife. The Court
stated that “the severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating the former spouses from each
other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other.”

Same; Same; Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be
productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the
other remains bound to it.—When the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance
intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community, relief in some way
should be obtainable. Marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the marital bond
while the other remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.

296

Same; Same; Pleadings and Practice; In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution must be
presented.—Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal
personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo’s surviving spouse. However, the records show that
there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437
(2001), the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official
publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record
is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

Marriages; Co-ownership; Property; Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to
have been obtained through their joint efforts.—Respondent would qualify as an interested person who
has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was
not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and Felicisimo’s capacity to remarry, but
fails to prove that her marriage with him was validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may
be considered as a co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, or their
marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.
In a coownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and
industry. Any property acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have been obtained through

their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless the
contrary is proven.

PETITIONS for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

San Luis vs. San Luis, 514 SCRA 294, G.R. No. 133743, G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007

8. • ARNADO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 210164, 18 August 2015

Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule
65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution.—In
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to
be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not
interfere with the resolutions of the COMELEC unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of
discretion. Thus, in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, a Rule 64 petition will not prosper.
Jurisprudence, on the other hand, defines grave abuse of discretion as the “capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” “Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it
must be grave.” Grave abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.

Same; Civil Procedure; Forum Shopping; There is forum shopping when two (2) or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one (1) or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.—There is forum shopping when two or more actions or
proceedings, founded on the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition. It exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. Thus, there is forum
shopping when in both actions there exist: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would
represent the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief
being founded on the same facts; and (3) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party
is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed “any day after
the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy (CoCs) but not later than the date of proclamation.”—
Under Section 3, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be
filed “any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation.” Here, Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. Thus, the
petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; In Cayago vs. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it was held that once
a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have abandoned the
unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin.—Arnado’s claim that the COMELEC
gravely abused its discretion in deciding SPA No. 13-309 (DC) without first resolving Capitan’s motion to
consolidate likewise lacks substantiation. In the first place, Arnado has not attached a copy of said
motion to his petition. This alone is sufficient ground for the dismissal of his Rule 64 Petition, filed in
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, for not being accompanied by pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent thereto. Also, it was Capitan who filed the motion for consolidation. Not being the movant,
Arnado is not in a position to question the alleged inaction of the COMELEC on said motion. And even
assuming that he has, by filing a Verified Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC En Banc and
subsequently appealing to this Court despite the still unresolved motion for consolidation, Arnado
effectively abandoned said motion for consolidation. In Cayago v. Hon. Lina, 449 SCRA 29 (2005), it was
held that once a party elevates the case before the appellate tribunal, the appellant is deemed to have
abandoned the unresolved motion which remains pending with the tribunal of origin. “[I]t is not right for a
party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an
affirmative relief, to afterwards make a volte face and deny that same jurisdiction.”

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SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Arnado vs. Commission on Elections

Election Law; Commission on Elections Rules of Procedure; Consolidation; Under Section 9, Rule 3 of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure, consolidation is only permissive. It is not
mandatory.—In any case, under Section 9, Rule 3 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, consolidation is
only permissive. It is not mandatory. Section 9 reads: Sec. 9. Consolidation of Cases.—When an action
or proceeding involves a question of law and fact which is similar to or common with that of another action
or proceeding, the same may be consolidated with the action or proceeding bearing the lower docket
number.

Same; Local Government Code; Dual Citizenship; Elective Local Positions; Under Section 4(d) of the
Local Government Code (LGC), a person with “dual citizenship” is disqualified from running for any
elective local positions.—Under Section 4(d) of the Local Government Code, a person with “dual
citizenship” is disqualified from running for any elective local position. In Mercado v. Manzano, 307 SCRA
630 (1999), it was clarified that the phrase “dual citizenship” in said Section 4(d) must be understood as
referring to “dual allegiance.” Subsequently, Congress enacted RA 9225 allowing natural-born citizens of
the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization abroad to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and to enjoy full civil and political rights upon compliance with the
requirements of the law. They may now run for public office in the Philippines provided that they: (1) meet
the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and (2)
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
authorized to administer an oath prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC.

Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Second Division,
as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the second requisite of
Section 5(2) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 because, as held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,
696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used
his United States (US) passport after executing said affidavit.—In the case at bench, the COMELEC
Second Division, as affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc, ruled that Arnado failed to comply with the
second requisite of Section 5(2) of RA 9225 because, as

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Arnado vs. Commission on Elections

held in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of
Renunciation was deemed withdrawn when he used his US passport after executing said affidavit.
Consequently, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 for purposes of the May 13, 2013
elections, Arnado had yet to comply with said second requirement. The COMELEC also noted that while
Arnado submitted an affidavit dated May 9, 2013, affirming his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation, the
same would not suffice for having been belatedly executed. The COMELEC En Banc did not err, nor did it
commit grave abuse of discretion, in upholding the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
disqualifying Arnado from running for public office. It is worth noting that the reason for Arnado’s
disqualification to run for public office during the 2010 elections — being a candidate without total and
undivided allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines — still subsisted when he filed his CoC for the
2013 elections on October 1, 2012. The COMELEC En Banc merely adhered to the ruling of this Court in
Maquiling lest it would be committing grave abuse of discretion had it departed therefrom.

Same; Same; The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born
Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225.—The ruling in Maquiling is indeed novel in the sense that it was the first case dealing with
the effect of the use of a foreign passport on the qualification to run for public office of a natural-born
Filipino citizen who was naturalized abroad and subsequently availed of the privileges under RA 9225. It
was settled in that case that the use of a foreign passport amounts to repudiation or recantation of the
oath of renunciation. Yet, despite the issue being novel and of first impression, plus the fact that Arnado
could not have divined the possible adverse consequences of using his US passport, the Court in
Maquiling did not act with leniency or benevolence towards Arnado. Voting 10-5, the Court ruled that
matters dealing with qualifications for public elective office must be strictly complied with. Otherwise
stated, the Court in Maquiling did not consider the novelty of the issue as to excuse Arnado from strictly
complying with the eligibility requirements to run for public office or to simply allow him to correct the
deficiency in his qualification by submitting another oath of renunciation. Thus, it is with more reason that
in this case, we should
similarly require strict compliance with the qualifications to run for local elective office.

Same; Same; Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation
resulting in his disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to
the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the
defect in his qualification.—The circumstances surrounding the qualification of Arnado to run for public
office during the May 10, 2010 and May 13, 2013 elections, to reiterate for emphasis, are the same.
Arnado’s use of his US passport in 2009 invalidated his oath of renunciation resulting in his
disqualification to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the 2010 elections. Since then and up to the time he
filed his CoC for the 2013 elections, Arnado had not cured the defect in his qualification. Maquiling,
therefore, is binding on and applicable to this case following the salutary doctrine of stare decisis et non
quieta movere, which means to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which are established.
Under the doctrine, “[w]hen the court has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state
of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where facts are substantially the
same.” It enjoins adherence to judicial precedents and bars relitigation of the same issue.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Settled is the rule that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the lower tribunal need not be, and ordinarily will not be,
considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time at such late stage.—With due
respect to my esteemed colleague, it appears that J. Leonen is not only reviving an issue that had already
been settled with finality in the Maquiling case, but he is also going beyond the issues raised in this
petition. To reiterate for clarity, Arnado’s argument in this case — that he is qualified to run for mayor as
he has satisfied the requirements of Sec. 5(2) of RA 9225 relative to the May 13, 2013 elections — is
premised only on the alleged newly discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit. Nothing more. He does not
claim in this case that his use of US passport in his travel abroad in 2009 is an isolated act, as J. Leonen
insists. In Vazquez v. De Borja, 74 Phil. 560 (1944), it was held that courts do not have jurisdiction over
issues neither raised in the pleading nor tried with the express or implied consent of the parties. They
cannot

render judgment based on issues that have never been raised before them. Equally settled is the rule that
“points of law, theories, issues, and arguments not brought to the attention of the lower [tribunal] need not
be, and ordinarily will not be, considered by a reviewing court, as these cannot be raised for the first time
at such late stage. Basic considerations of due process underlie this rule.”

Election Law; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; For those who avail themselves of Republic Act (RA)
No. 9225 and intend to run for public office, Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of
making a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing
of their Certificate of Candidacy (CoC).—At any rate, the execution of an Oath of Allegiance is required by
Section 3 of RA 9225. For those who avail themselves of RA 9225 and intend to run for public office,
Section 5(2) thereof provides the additional requirement of making a personal and sworn renunciation of
any and all foreign citizenships prior to or at the time of filing of their CoC. Definitely, the provisions of
Section 5(2) are not useless or meaningless surplusage. When the law expressly requires an explicit
renunciation, an implicit one would be insufficient. Furthermore, even assuming that Arnado’s 2008
implied renunciation is sufficient, the same has also been negated by his use of his US passport in 2009,
following the ruling in Maquiling.

Same; Same; In Maquiling, the Supreme Court (SC) emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate.—In Maquiling, this Court emphasized that popular vote does not cure the
ineligibility of a candidate. Thus, while in this case Arnado won by landslide majority during the 2013
elections, garnering 84% of the total votes cast, the same “cannot override the constitutional and statutory
requirements for qualifications and disqualifications.” In Velasco v. COMELEC, 575 SCRA 590 (2008),
this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic formula to bypass election
eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining to elections will become toothless.
One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of 1991, which specifies the basic positive
qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the Court ruled that popular vote cannot override
the required qualifications under Section 39, a fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow
the same policy when itcomes to disqualifications enumerated under Section 40 of the same law. After
all, “[t]he qualifications set out in [Section 39] are roughly half of the requirements for election to local
public offices. The other half is contained in the succeeding section which lays down the circumstances
that disqualify local candidates.”

SERENO, CJ., Concurring Opinion:

Elections Law; View that while citizenship is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at
the time of election or assumption of office, but also during the entire tenure of the official, it is not a
continuing disqualification to run for and hold public office.—In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Commissioner of
Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 (1971), we emphasized the variable nature of a person’s citizenship, which
cannot be determined with finality or become the basis of rules that can be applied to any and all
proceedings thereafter. We said: Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a
judicial or administrative case, whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed
out again and again as the occasion may demand. In election contests, this pronouncement gains
significance, as elective local officials are constitutionally allowed to run and serve for three consecutive
terms. While citizenship is a continuing requirement that must be possessed not only at the time of
election or assumption of office, but also during the entire tenure of the official, it is not a continuing
disqualification to run for and hold public office. As such, each case involving the question of an elective
official’s citizenship must be treated anew in accordance with the surrounding relevant facts and
applicable laws.

Same; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696
SCRA 420 (2013), the Supreme Court (SC) reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who
have lost their citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to
run for public office upon taking the Oath of Allegiance and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign
citizenship. Arnado subjected his citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States (US)
passport to travel in and out of the country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship.—In
Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420

(2013), we reiterated that natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their citizenship by reason
of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country may qualify to run for public office upon taking the
Oath of Allegiance and making a sworn renunciation of their foreign citizenship. Arnado subjected his
citizenship to attack when he continued to use his United States (US) passport to travel in and out of the
country despite previously renouncing his US citizenship. The Court ruled that his use of his US passport
nullified the effect of his previous renunciation of US citizenship. While he did not lose his Philippine
citizenship in the process, he reverted to his status as a dual citizen and remained as such at the time
that he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the
2010 elections. Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those with dual citizenship are
disqualified from running for any elective local position.

Same; Same; View that considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Arnado’s oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the
requirement of the law.—Considering that the Court had pinpointed the defect in Arnado’s oath of
renunciation, the simple act of taking the oath anew would have been enough compliance with the
requirement of the law. The Decision found that from the time Arnado used his US passport to travel in
and out of the country up to the filing of his Certificate of Candidacy for the succeeding elections in 2013,
there had been no change in his circumstances. He still had not made a sworn renunciation of his US
citizenship. Thus, the ruling in Maquiling still applies: that Arnado had dual citizenship when he filed for
his candidacy on 1 October 2012. It did not matter that Maquiling was promulgated months after Arnado
had filed for candidacy. Since he was not totally unaware that the use of his US passport might have
adverse consequences on his candidacy for the 2013 elections, the Decision concludes that he should
have been prudent enough to remedy whatever defect there might have been in his citizenship.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Judgment on the Merits; View that except for some clearly
unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide on the merits, especially in election controversies
in which the law is sometimes placed at odds with the will of the people.—A person’s citizenship may be
“threshed out again and again” in every proceeding as long as it becomes relevant and necessary. Except
for some clearly unmeritorious cases, it is always a good idea to decide on the merits, especially in
election controversies in which the law is sometimes placed at odds with the will of the people. At the
same time, the Court puts a premium on economy, and where previous declarations of one’s citizenship
become pertinent, those cases may be used as a takeoff point if only to emphasize the differences and
similarities, as well as the measures that were taken in the interim.

BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Repatriation; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225
was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship through
naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship.—RA No. 9225 was
enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship through naturalization in
a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine citizenship. It is a unique mode of reacquiring
Philippine citizenship and is a far departure from the citizenship reacquisition procedure under
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 63, the law in place before RA No. 9225 was enacted. Under CA No. 63,
Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by: (1) naturalization; (2) repatriation of deserters of the Army,
Navy, or Air Corps, or of a woman who has lost her citizenship by reason of marriage to an alien after the
termination of her marital status; and (3) direct act of the National Assembly.

Same; Same; View that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e., by
repatriation), on the other hand, provides for an easier procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath
of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies,
however, only to the specific group of persons enumerated therein.—Notably, reacquisition of Philippine
Citizenship under the first mode (i.e., by naturalization) involves the more stringent procedure laid down in
CA No. 473. The reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under the second mode (i.e., by repatriation), on
the other hand, provides for an easier procedure as it requires only the taking of the oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry; it applies, however, only to the
specific group of persons enumerated therein. Under the procedure currently in place under RA No. 9225,
the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic
of the Philippines in a manner similar to the second mode under CA No. 63. But, RA No. 9225 provides
for a deeper effect by declaring it a State policy that under its terms “all Philippine citizens of another
country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship” under the conditions provided
therein.

Same; Same; View that while seemingly allowing dual citizenship for natural-born Filipino citizens who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens in a foreign country, carry
the implicit effect of renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance because of the renewed allegiance
that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic.—While seemingly allowing dual citizenship for
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens in a foreign country, carry the implicit effect of renouncing their foreign citizenship and allegiance
because of the renewed allegiance that is accorded to the supreme authority of the Republic. In effect,
the problem of dual allegiance created by dual citizenship is transferred from the Philippines to the foreign
country. Since the latest oath that the person takes is one of allegiance to the Republic, whatever
treatment the foreign country may have on his or her status is a matter outside the concern and
competence of the Philippine government.

Same; View that the oath of allegiance taken under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy
full civil and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government.—Jurisprudence confirms this interpretation of RA No. 9225 in AASJS v.
Hon. Datumanong, 523 SCRA 108 (2007), when the Court pointedly declared: By swearing to the
supreme authority of the Republic, the person implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from
Section 3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual allegiance and shifted the burden of
confronting the issue of whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign country. What
happens to the other citizenship was not made a concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. [emphasis supplied] The
oath of allegiance taken under RA No. 9225 entitles a person to enjoy full civil

and political rights that include the right to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or
administration of the government. He or she may now vote.

Same; Election Law; Repatriation; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that to be voted upon to an
elective office, a natural-born Filipino citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or
she swears allegiance to the Republic under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 must still make his or her
previous implicit renunciation “express.”—To be voted upon to an elective office, however, a natural-born
Filipino citizen who has implicitly renounced foreign allegiance when he or she swears allegiance to the
Republic under RA No. 9225 must still make his or her previous implicit renunciation “express.” In the
words of the law, he must “make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship.”
[Section 5(2) of RA No. 9225] Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.—Those who retain or
reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all
attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions:
x x x (2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet the qualification for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws, and at the time of the filing of the certificate
of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply for the purpose of
running for elective public office, apparently to ensure that foreign citizenship and mixed loyalties are kept
out of the elective public service.—The requirement of an express renunciation, however, does not
negate the effect of, or make any less real, the prior implicit renunciation of citizenship and allegiance
made upon taking the oath of allegiance. Thus, persons availing of RA No. 9225 do not renounce their
foreign citizenship for the first time by executing the Affidavit of renunciation that Section 5(2) of the law
requires; they have implicitly made this renunciation when they swore allegiance to the supreme authority
of the Republic. What the oath of renunciation simply does is to make express what natural-born Filipino
citizens have already implicitly renounced. The requirement of express re-

nunciation highlights the implication that it is not the exclusive means by which natural-born Filipino
citizens may renounce their foreign citizenship. In reality, the oath of renunciation is a requirement simply
for the purpose of running for elective public office, apparently to ensure that foreign citizenship and
mixed loyalties are kept out of the elective public service. To paraphrase Japzon v. COMELEC, 576
SCRA 331 (2009), the oath of renunciation makes these natural-born potential candidates for public office
“pure” Philippine citizens from the perspective of the election laws.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the extent of the legal consequences of the Maquiling v.
Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), ruling affect solely Arnado’s qualification to run for
public office and only for the purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not be
extended to situations outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.—I submit that the ponencia’s ruling,
insofar as it adopts the Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), ruling, is an
overreach that runs counter to the policy behind RA No. 9225. I submit that the extent of the legal
consequences of the Maquiling ruling affect solely Arnado’s qualification to run for public office and only
for the purpose of the May 2010 elections. These consequences should not be extended to situations
outside of and not contemplated by Maquiling.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the express renunciation, in contrast, is an after-the-fact
requirement that arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to run for public office.—The
implied renunciation of foreign citizenship proceeds from the oath of allegiance that natural-born Filipino
citizens take to reacquire Philippine citizenship. This is patent from the terms of the oath of allegiance
and is a consequence of the resulting reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. The express renunciation, in
contrast, is an after-the-fact requirement that arises only if these natural-born Filipino citizens choose to
run for public office. The requirement of an express renunciation of foreign citizenship arises only after
they have reacquired Philippine citizenship for the exclusive purpose of qualifying them for elective public
office.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and reacquisition are much
broader concepts that cannot definitively be affected by a Court ruling in an election disqualifica-

tion case, even if the disqualification case touches on the citizenship qualification of the candidate.—
Citizenship and its loss, acquisition, and reacquisition are much broader concepts that cannot definitively
be affected by a Court ruling in an election disqualification case, even if the disqualification case touches
on the citizenship qualification of the candidate. Thus, I submit that Maquiling invalidated Arnado’s
renunciation oath solely for the purpose of his qualification for the May 2010 elections.
Same; Same; Same; Same; View that granting that Arnado’s use of his United States (US) passport
amounted to a withdrawal of the express renunciation he made of his allegiance to the US, this
withdrawal does not erase the fact that he did make an express renunciation of his US citizenship.—
Granting that Arnado’s use of his US passport amounted to a withdrawal of the express renunciation he
made of his allegiance to the US, this withdrawal does not erase the fact that he did make an express
renunciation of his US citizenship. To my mind, this express renunciation, even if recanted, may still be
reaffirmed, in the same way a statement already made and subsequently denied, can be reconfirmed.
Thus, Arnado’s 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation can validly reaffirm the 2009 express renunciation that the
Court held to have been recanted in Maquiling. Note that in the May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation,
Arnado categorically stated that he renounces his US citizenship, as well as any and all foreign
citizenship; swears allegiance to the Republic; and confirms the renunciation (of his US citizenship) he
had previously made in the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as the law stands, natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country need only to take an
oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the Republic to reacquire Philippine citizenship as they are
“deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship.”—Indeed “there is no law prohibiting him from
executing an Affidavit of Renunciation every election period” as the ponencia puts it. But, note that there
is equally no law that requires him to constantly and consistently assert his renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship. Neither is there any law that expressly or impliedly imposes on natural-born Filipino
citizens the obligation to constantly assert their alle-

giance to the Republic and perform positive acts to assert this allegiance. In fact, as the law stands,
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
citizens of a foreign country need only to take an oath of allegiance to the supreme authority of the
Republic to reacquire Philippine citizenship as they are “deemed not to have lost their Philippine
citizenship.” Once they reacquire their Philippine citizenship after complying with these legal steps, they
no longer need to perform any positive act to assert Philippine citizenship or to elect citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Arnado’s persistent assertion of his allegiance to the Republic and
renunciation of his United States (US) citizenship more than sufficiently prove his determined resolve to
profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none other.—RA No. 9225 is a relatively new statutory
enactment whose provisions have not been exhaustively interpreted and ruled upon by this Court,
through an appropriate case. In this respect, I submit that in situations of doubt where the strict
application of the equivocal letter of the law would clearly and undoubtedly disregard the legislative intent,
the Court must and should tread lightly as it rules on the relatively uncharted area of application where RA
No. 9225 overlaps with our elections laws. The unique factual situation of this case presents such
situation of doubt which the Court must resolve in the light of the clear legislative intent, rather than from
the strict application of the equivocal letter of the law. I find that Arnado’s persistent assertion of his
allegiance to the Republic and renunciation of his US citizenship more than sufficiently prove his
determined resolve to profess allegiance only to the Republic and to none other.
Grave Abuse of Discretion; Words and Phrases; View that as a concept, grave abuse of discretion
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.—As a concept, grave
abuse of discretion generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction; the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in

contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave.

Election Law; Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that in the words of another leading case —
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996) — the law and the courts, including the Supreme Court
(SC), must give serious consideration to the popular will.—In the words of another leading case —
Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 257 SCRA 727 (1996), the law and the courts, including this Court, must give
serious consideration to the popular will. “In any action involving the possibility of a reversal of the popular
electoral choice, this Court must exert utmost effort to resolve the issues in a manner that would give
effect to the will of the majority, for it is merely sound public policy to cause elective offices to be filled by
those who are the choice of the majority. To successfully challenge a winning candidate’s qualifications,
the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and
legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people
would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our
Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote.” Under the evidentiary and unique factual
situation of this case, the alleged eligibility of Arnado is not antagonistic, patently or otherwise, to
constitutional and legal principles such that giving effect to the sovereign will would create prejudice to our
democratic institutions.

LEONEN, J., Concurring and Dissenting Opinion:

Local Government Code; Election Law; View that under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code
(LGC), a candidate for Mayor must be a citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the
municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of election, and be able to read and write Filipino or any local language or dialect.—Petitioner has
performed all the acts required by Republic Act No. 9225 in order to reacquire his Filipino citizenship.
Under Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code, a candidate for Mayor must be a citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, a resident in the municipality or city where he or she intends to be elected
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of election, and be able to read and write Filipino
or any local language or dialect. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code expressly disqualifies those
who possess dual citizenship from running in any local elective position. These provisions, however, do
not disqualify candidates who might have lost their citizenship but were able to reacquire it before running
for public office. Article IV, Section 3 of the Constitution provides that “Philippine citizenship may be lost or
reacquired in the manner provided by law.” Those who lose their Filipino citizenship through naturalization
in another country may reacquire it through the procedure outlined in Republic Act No. 9225. This also
applies to naturalized citizens who wish to reacquire their Filipino citizenship in order to run for public
office.

Citizenship; View that the effect of reacquisition is the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-born
Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as citizens in a foreign country.—The effect of reacquisition is
the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who have been naturalized as
citizens in a foreign country. All that is required to retain their citizenship is to take the oath of allegiance
under the law.

Same; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003 (RA No. 9225); Repatriation; Election Law;
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship; View that the law requires a personal and sworn renunciation of all
foreign citizenships before the candidate files a certificate of candidacy (CoC).—The law requires a
personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenships before the candidate files a certificate of
candidacy. In Jacot v. Dal and Commission on Elections, 572 SCRA 295 (2008), this court disqualified
Nestor A. Jacot from running for Vice Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, after he failed to make a personal
and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 5 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 restores full civil
and political rights to those who wish to reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted
for.—Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9225 restores full civil and political rights to those who wish to
reacquire their citizenship, including the right to vote and be voted for. A candidate may have the right to
vote and be voted for as long as he or she has already done all positive acts necessary for the
reacquisition of his or

her Philippine citizenship before filing his or her certificate of candidacy.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that a candidate for local elective office may be eligible to run for
as long as he or she is proven to have animus revertendi in a certain domicile for at least one (1) year
immediately preceding the elections.—Residency also need not be continuous for as long as the total
number of required years have been complied with before the election. Section 39(a) of the Local
Government Code requires residency for “at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the
election for local elective office.” A candidate for local elective office may be eligible to run for as long as
he or she is proven to have animus revertendi in a certain domicile for at least one (1) year immediately
preceding the elections.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that the use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the
immediate nullity of one’s affidavit of renunciation.—Petitioner’s use of his American passport was an
isolated act required by the circumstances. At that time, he had not yet been issued his Philippine
passport. In the dissent in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420 (2013), led by Associate
Justice Arturo D. Brion, it was pointed out that when Arnado traveled back to the United States, “he had
no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the United States to attend to the winding up of
his business and other affairs in America.” The use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the
immediate nullity of one’s affidavit of renunciation. Its circumstances must also be taken into account.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that his isolated use of his American passport when he did not
yet have his Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his Affidavit of Renunciation.—When
petitioner received his Philippine passport sometime in September 2009, he could not immediately use it
to exit the United States since he entered the country using an American passport. If he exited using a
Philippine passport, one presumably without an American visa, immigration authorities of both the
Philippines and the United States would have questioned his travel documents. He would have had no
choice but to use his American passport to exit the United States. However, petitioner did use his
Philippine pass

port in his subsequent travels. Hence, his isolated use of his American passport when he did not yet have
his Philippine passport is not sufficient cause to negate his Affidavit of Renunciation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Passports; Words and Phrases; View that according to Republic Act
(RA) No. 8239, a passport is “a document issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and
requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give
him/her all lawful aid and protection.”—According to Republic Act No. 8239, a passport is “a document
issued by the Philippine government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens
to pass safely and freely, and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and protection.” By definition, a
Philippine passport is a document issued by the government to its citizens. Clearly, a Philippine passport
cannot be issued to an American citizen. If this court concludes, as the ponencia has done, that petitioner
remained an American citizen, the facts should show that he continued to use his American passport
before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the 2013 Elections. As of June 18, 2009, petitioner was
issued a Philippine passport. He has continually used his Philippine passport from December 11, 2009.
He also executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30, 2009. By the
time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy on October 1, 2012, he was already the bearer of a Philippine
passport.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 requires a personal and sworn
renunciation from persons who seek to reacquire their Philippine citizenship in order to run for local office.
—Petitioner was forced by his circumstances to use his American passport at a time when he had not yet
been issued a Philippine passport. Upon the issuance of his Philippine passport, however, petitioner
consistently used this passport for his travels. His consistent use of his Philippine passport was a positive
act that showed his continued allegiance to the country. Petitioner’s continued intent to renounce his
American citizenship is clear when he executed his Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado’s “Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009” on May 9, 2013. Republic Act No. 9225 requires a personal and sworn
renunciation from persons who seek to reacquire their Philippine citizenship in order to run for local office.
Petitioner’s Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009, his

continued use of his Philippine passport, his alleged Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance
dated November 30, 2009, and his Affidavit dated May 9, 2013 are more than enough evidence to show
his personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship.
Election Law; View that election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people.—Election
laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people. Petitioner garnered an overwhelming
8,902 votes, 84% of the total votes cast in the 2013 mayoralty elections. If he is disqualified, Florante
Capitan, his opponent who garnered 1,707 votes, a mere 16% of the total votes cast, will become the duly
elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte. This court will have substituted its discretion over the
sovereign will of the people.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Arnado vs. Commission on Elections, 767
SCRA 168, G.R. No. 210164 August 18, 2015

9. • JALOSJOS V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 193237, 9 October 2012

Election Law; Perpetual Special Disqualification; The perpetual special disqualification against Jalosjos
arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material fact involving eligibility

_______________

* EN BANC.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.―The perpetual
special disqualification against Jalosjos arising from his criminal conviction by final judgment is a material
fact involving eligibility which is a proper ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy was void from the start since he was not eligible to run for any
public office at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy. Jalosjos was never a candidate at any time,
and all votes for Jalosjos were stray votes. As a result of Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy being void ab
initio, Cardino, as the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the highest number of votes for the
position of Mayor.

Same; Same; If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by final judgment in a criminal
case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false material representation that is a
ground for a petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.―Section 74 requires the candidate
to state under oath in his certificate of candidacy “that he is eligible for said office.” A candidate is eligible
if he has a right to run for the public office. If a candidate is not actually eligible because he is barred by
final judgment in a criminal case from running for public office, and he still states under oath in his
certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run for public office, then the candidate clearly makes a false
material representation that is a ground for a petition under Section 78.

Same; Same; A sentence of prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section
40 of the Local Government Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.―A sentence of
prisión mayor by final judgment is a ground for disqualification under Section 40 of the Local Government
Code and under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code. It is also a material fact involving the eligibility
of a candidate under Sections 74 and 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. Thus, a person can file a petition
under Section 40 of the Local Government Code or under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
3

VOL. 683, OCTOBER 9, 2012

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the
accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under
Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
“deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office.”―The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of law, the accessory
penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of
the Revised Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of “deprivation of the
right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of
the temporary absolute disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty. On the other hand,
under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code perpetual special disqualification means that “the offender
shall not be permitted to hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special disqualification constitute
ineligibilities to hold elective public office. A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for
elective public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his certificate of
candidacy that he is eligible to so run.

Same; Same; The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes effect immediately once
the judgment of conviction becomes final; Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of
his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for
any elective public office perpetually.―The accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification takes
effect immediately once the judgment of conviction becomes final. The effectivity of this accessory penalty
does not depend on the duration of the principal penalty, or on whether the convict serves his jail
sentence or not. The last sentence of Article 32 states that “the offender shall not be permitted to hold any
public office during the period of his [perpetual special] disqualification.” Once the judgment of conviction
becomes final, it is immediately executory. Any public office that the convict may be holding at the time of
his conviction becomes vacant upon finality of the judgment, and the convict becomes ineligible to run for
any

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

elective public office perpetually. In the case of Jalosjos, he became ineligible perpetually to hold, or to
run for, any elective public office from the time his judgment of conviction became final.

Same; Same; Certificates of Candidacy; A void certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that
existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and
much less to valid votes.―The COMELEC properly cancelled Jalosjos’ certificate of candidacy. A void
certificate of candidacy on the ground of ineligibility that existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy can never give rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes. Jalosjos’ certificate of
candidacy was cancelled because he was ineligible from the start to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate
of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because the cancellation on such
ground means he was never a valid candidate from the very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being
void ab initio. Jalosjos’ ineligibility existed on the day he filed his certificate of candidacy, and the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy retroacted to the day he filed it. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed.
There was only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections―Cardino―who received the
highest number of votes.

Same; Same; Same; Decisions of the Supreme Court holding that the second-placer cannot be
proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations
where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to
be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the
filing of the certificate of candidacy.―Decisions of this Court holding that the second-placer cannot be
proclaimed winner if the first-placer is disqualified or declared ineligible should be limited to situations
where the certificate of candidacy of the first-placer was valid at the time of filing but subsequently had to
be cancelled because of a violation of law that took place, or a legal impediment that took effect, after the
filing of the certificate of candidacy. If the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then legally the person
who filed such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. All votes
for such non-candidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such non-candidate can never
5

VOL. 683, OCTOBER 9, 2012

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

be a first-placer in the elections. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or
before the day, of the election, prevailing jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray
votes. If a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes
for such candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very
beginning. This is the more equitable and logical approach on the effect of the cancellation of a certificate
of candidacy that is void ab initio. Otherwise, a certificate of candidacy void ab initio can operate to defeat
one or more valid certificates of candidacy for the same position.

Same; Same; Same; Commission on Elections (COMELEC); The COMELEC is under a legal duty to
cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification to run for public office by virtue of a final judgment of conviction.―Even without a petition
under either Section 12 or Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, or under Section 40 of the Local
Government Code, the COMELEC is under a legal duty to cancel the certificate of candidacy of anyone
suffering from the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification to run for public office by virtue
of a final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of conviction is notice to the COMELEC of the
disqualification of the convict from running for public office. The law itself bars the convict from running for
public office, and the disqualification is part of the final judgment of conviction. The final judgment of the
court is addressed not only to the Executive branch, but also to other government agencies tasked to
implement the final judgment under the law.

BRION, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; Certificates of Candidacy; View that a basic rule and one that cannot be repeated often
enough is that the Certificate of Candidacy is the document that creates the status of a candidate.―As I
discussed in Talaga and Aratea, a basic rule and one that cannot be repeated often enough is that the
CoC is the document that creates the status of a candidate. In Sinaca v. Mula, 315 scra 266 (1999), the
Court described the nature of a CoC as follows―A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal
manifestation to the whole world of the candidate’s political creed or lack of political

creed. It is a statement of a person seeking to run for a public office certifying that he announces his
candidacy for the office mentioned and that he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to
which he belongs, if he belongs to any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well
stated.
Same; Same; View that under Section 79 of the Omnibus Election Code, a political aspirant legally
becomes a “candidate” only upon the due filing of his sworn Certificate of Candidacy.―Under Section 79
of the OEC, a political aspirant legally becomes a “candidate” only upon the due filing of his sworn CoC.
In fact, Section 73 of the OEC makes the filing of the CoC a condition sine qua non for a person to “be
eligible for any elective public office” ―i.e., to be validly voted for in the elections. Section 76 of the OEC
makes it a “ministerial duty” for a COMELEC official “to receive and acknowledge receipt of the certificate
of candidacy” filed.

Same; Same; View that to disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or
privilege; or (2) to make him or her ineligible for further competition because of violation of the rules.―To
disqualify, in its simplest sense, is (1) to deprive a person of a power, right or privilege; or (2) to make him
or her ineligible for further competition because of violation of the rules. It is in these senses that the term
is understood in our election laws. Thus, anyone who may qualify or may have qualified under the general
rules of eligibility applicable to all citizens (Section 74 of the OEC) may be deprived of the right to be a
candidate or may lose the right to be a candidate (if he has filed his CoC) because of a trait or
characteristic that applies to him or an act that can be imputed to him as an individual, separately from the
general qualifications that must exist for a citizen to run for a local public office.

Same; Same; View that a unique feature of “disqualification” is that under Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC), it refers only to a “candidate,” not to one who is not yet a candidate.―A unique
feature of “disqualification” is that under Section 68 of the OEC, it refers only to a “candidate,” not to one
who is not yet a candidate. Thus, the grounds for disqualification do not apply to a would-be candidate
who is still at the point of filing his CoC. This is the reason why no representation is required in the CoC
that the would-be candidate does not possess any ground for disqualification. The time to hold a person
accountable for the grounds for disqualification is after attaining the status of a candidate, with the filing of
the CoC.

Same; Same; Second Placer Doctrine; View that with the disqualification of the winning candidate and the
application of the doctrine of rejection of the second placer, the rules on succession under the law
accordingly apply, as provided under Section 44 of Local Government Code (LGC) 1991.―With the
disqualification of the winning candidate and the application of the doctrine of rejection of the second
placer, the rules on succession under the law accordingly apply, as provided under Section 44 of LGC
1991. As an exceptional situation, however, the candidate with the second highest number of votes
(second placer) may be validly proclaimed as the winner in the elections should the winning candidate be
disqualified by final judgment before the elections, as clearly provided in Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646. The
same effect obtains when the electorate is fully aware, in fact and in law and within the realm of notoriety,
of the disqualification, yet they still voted for the disqualified candidate. In this situation, the electorate that
cast the plurality of votes in favor of the notoriously disqualified candidate is simply deemed to have
waived their right to vote.

BERSAMIN, J., Concurring Opinion:

Election Law; View that there are two remedies available to challenge the qualifications of a
candidate.―In Salcedo II v. Commission on Elections, 312 SCRA 447 (1999), the Court pointed out that
there are two remedies available to challenge the qualifications of a candidate, namely: (1) Before the
election, pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit: Section 78. Petition to deny due
course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy.―A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel
a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
misrepresentation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be
filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy
and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. and―
(2) After the election, pursuant to Section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz.: Section 253. Petition
for quo warranto.―Any voter contesting the election of any Member of the Batasang Pambansa, regional,
provincial, or city officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines shall
file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the Commission within ten days after the proclamation of the
results of the election.

Same; Certificate of Candidacy; View that the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the Certificate
of Candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a finding not only that a person
lacked the qualifications but also that he made a material representation that was false.―The denial of
due course to or the cancellation of the CoC under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code involves a
finding not only that a person lacked the qualifications but also that he made a material representation
that was false. In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 622 SCRA 744 (2010), the Court added that there
must also be a deliberate attempt to mislead, thus: The false representation under Section 78 must
likewise be a “deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible.” Given the purpose of the requirement, it must be made with the intention to deceive
the electorate as to the would-be candidate’s qualifications for public office. Thus, the misrepresentation
that Section 78 addresses cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake, and cannot exist in a
situation where the intent to deceive is patently absent, or where no deception on the electorate results.
The deliberate character of the misrepresentation necessarily follows from a consideration of the
consequences of any material falsity: a candidate who falsifies a material fact cannot run; if he runs and is
elected, he cannot serve; in both cases, he can be prosecuted for violation of the election laws.

Same; Same; Moral Turpitude; View that as the Supreme Court has already settled, “embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes
of which fraud is an element are looked on as involving moral turpitude.”―Pursuant to Section 40(a) of
the LGC, his having been sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one year or more of imprisonment rendered Jalosjos ineligible to run for Mayor of
Dapitan City. There is no quibbling about the felony of robbery being an offense involving moral turpitude.
As the Court has already settled, “embezzlement, forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which
denote moral turpitude and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude.”

Same; Same; Temporary Absolute Disqualification; Perpetual Special Disqualification; View that the
effects of the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification included the deprivation during the
term of the sentence of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to
such office. The effects of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification from the right of
suffrage was to deprive the convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election for any public
office or to be elected to such office; he was further prohibited from holding any public office
perpetually.―In accordance with the express provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty of prision
mayor imposed on Jalosjos for the robbery conviction carried the accessory penalties of temporary
absolute disqualification and of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The effects of
the accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification included the deprivation during the term of
the sentence of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective office or to be elected to such
office. The effects of the accessory penalty of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
was to deprive the convict perpetually of the right to vote in any popular election for any public office or to
be elected to such office; he was further prohibited from holding any public office perpetually. These
accessory penalties would remain even though the convict would be pardoned as to the principal penalty,
unless the pardon expressly remitted the accessory penalties.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Probation; View that the grant of probation cannot by itself remove a
person’s disqualification to be a candidate or to hold any office due to its not being included among the
grounds for the removal of the disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code.―Jalosjos
had no legal and factual bases to insist that he became eligible to run as Mayor of Dapitan City because
he had been declared under the RTC order dated February 5, 2004 to have duly complied with the order
of his probation. His insistence has no merit whatsoever. Probation, by its legal definition, is only “a
disposition under which a defendant, after conviction and sentence, is released subject to conditions
imposed by the court and to the supervision of a probation officer.” The grant of probation cannot by itself
remove a person’s disqualification to be a candidate or to hold any office due to its not being included
among the grounds for the removal of the disqualification under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election
Code.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; View that upon his final discharge as a probationer, the convict is
restored only to “all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his conviction;” There is no question that
civil rights are distinct and different from political rights, like the right of suffrage or the right to run for a
public office.―For sure, probation or its grant has not been intended to relieve the convict of all the
consequences of the sentence imposed on his crime involving moral turpitude. Upon his final discharge
as a probationer, the convict is restored only to “all civil rights lost or suspended as a result of his
conviction.” This consequence is according to the second paragraph of Section 16 of the Probation Law
of 1976, which states: “The final discharge of the probationer shall operate to restore to him all civil rights
lost or suspended as a result of his conviction and to fully discharge his liability for any fine imposed as to
the offense for which probation was granted.” There is no question that civil rights are distinct and
different from political rights, like the right of suffrage or the right to run for a public office.

Same; Same; View that a person without a valid Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered a
candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any Certificate of Candidacy cannot at
all be a candidate.―In Bautista v. Commission on Elections, 298 SCRA 480 (1998), the Court stated that
a cancelled CoC does not give rise to a valid candidacy. A person without a valid CoC cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not filed any CoC cannot at all be
a candidate. Hence, the cancellation of Jalosjos’ CoC rendered him a non-candidate in the May 10, 2010
elections. But, even without the cancellation of his CoC, Jalosjos undeniably possessed a disqualification
to run as Mayor of Dapitan City. The fact of his ineligibility was by itself adequate to invalidate his CoC
without the necessity of its express cancellation or denial of due course by the COMELEC. Under no
circumstance could he have filed a valid CoC. The accessory penalties that inhered to his penalty of
prision mayor perpetually disqualified him from the right of suffrage as well as the right to be voted for in
any election for public office. The disqualification was by operation of a mandatory penal law. For him to
be allowed to ignore the perpetual disqualification would be to sanction his lawlessness, and would permit
him to make a mockery of the electoral process that has been so vital to our democracy. He was not
entitled to be voted for, leaving all the votes cast for him stray and legally non-existent.
Same; Same; View that the objective of prescribing disqualifications in the election laws as well as in the
penal laws is obviously to prevent the convicted criminals and the undeserving from running and being
voted for.―Although the doctrine of the sovereign will has prevailed several times in the past to prevent
the nullification of an election victory of a disqualified candidate, or of one whose CoC was cancelled, the
Court should not now be thwarted from enforcing the law in its letter and spirit by any desire to respect the
will of the people expressed in an election. The objective of prescribing disqualifications in the election
laws as well as in the penal laws is obviously to prevent the convicted criminals and the undeserving from
running and being voted for. Unless the Court leads the way to see to the implementation of the
unquestionable national policy behind the prescription of disqualifications, there would inevitably come the
time when many communities of the country would be electing convicts and misfits. When that time
should come, the public trust would be trivialized and the public office degraded. This is now the
appropriate occasion, therefore, to apply the law in all its majesty in order to enforce its clear letter and
underlying spirit. Thereby, we will prevent the electoral exercise from being subjected to mockery and
from being rendered a travesty.

REYES, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Election Law; “Ineligibility” and “Disqualification,” Distinguished.―A candidate may be prevented from
participating in the electoral race either because he is ineligible or he suffers from any of the grounds for
disqualification. Ineligibility refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in Sections 3 and 6 of Article
VI, and Sections 2 and 3 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution for senatorial, congressional, presidential
and vice-presidential candidates, or under Section 39 of the LGC for local elective candidates. On the
other hand, disqualification pertains to the commission of acts which the law perceives as unbecoming of
a local servant, or to a circum-

12

12

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

stance, status or condition rendering said candidate unfit for public service. To question the eligibility of a
candidate before the elections, the remedy is to file a petition to deny due course or cancel the COC
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). If, on the other hand, any ground for
disqualification exists, resort can be made to the filing of a petition for disqualification against the
candidate thought to be unqualified for public service under Section 68 of the same Code.

Same; Moral Turpitude; View that it is beyond dispute that Jalosjos cannot run for public office because of
a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.―It is beyond dispute that Jalosjos cannot run for
public office because of a prior conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude. While he was granted
probation, his failure to comply with the terms and conditions of this privilege resulted to the revocation of
the same on March 19, 1987. It bears reiterating that probation is not a right of an accused but a mere
privilege, an act of grace and clemency or immunity conferred by the state, which may be granted to a
seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors of the penalty imposed by law for
the offense for which he was convicted. As a mere discretionary grant, he must pay full obedience to the
terms and conditions appertaining thereto or run the risk of the State revoking this privilege.

Same; Certificate of Candidacy; View that the votes in favor of the candidate whose Certificate of
Candidacy was cancelled are considered stray even if he happens to be the one who gathered the
majority of the votes. In such case, the candidate receiving the second highest number of votes may be
proclaimed the winner as he is technically considered the one who received the highest number of
votes.―Truly, a judgment on a petition to cancel a COC impinges on the very eligibility of an individual to
qualify as a candidate and that its ultimate effect is to render the person a non-candidate as if he never
filed a COC at all. The votes in favor of the candidate whose COC was cancelled are considered stray
even if he happens to be the one who gathered the majority of the votes. In such case, the candidate
receiving the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed the winner as he is technically
considered the one who received the highest number of votes. Further, the judgment on a petition to
cancel a COC does not distinguish whether the same attained finality before or after the elections since
the consequences retroact to the date of filing of the COC. Regardless of the point in time when the
cancellation of the COC was adjudged, the effect is nevertheless the same: the person is stripped of his
status as an official candidate.

Same; Same; View that when Jalosjos was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was
created in the office of the mayor for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the position. As provided by
law, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor of the locality who should succeed to the vacated office.―The
language of the law is clear, explicit and unequivocal, thus admits no room for interpretation but merely
application. Accordingly, when Jalosjos was adjudged to be disqualified, a permanent vacancy was
created in the office of the mayor for failure of the elected mayor to qualify for the position. As provided by
law, it is the duly-elected vice-mayor of the locality who should succeed to the vacated office. Following
the foregoing ratiocination, Cardino’s contention that he should be proclaimed mayor of Dapitan City,
Zamboanga del Norte lacks legal basis. That he was the one who received the second highest number of
votes does not entitle him to any right or preference to succeeding the vacated post. Unmistakably, he did
not have the mandate of the voting populace and this must not be defeated by substituting him, a losing
candidate, in place of the disqualified candidate who received the majority votes.

Same; Same; Second Placer Doctrine; View that a second placer cannot bank on a mere supposition that
he could have won the elections had the winning candidate, who was eventually adjudged disqualified,
been excluded in the roster of official candidates; For in such event, they could have cast their votes in
favor of another candidate, not necessarily the one who received the second highest number of votes.―A
second placer cannot bank on a mere supposition that he could have won the elections had the winning
candidate, who was eventually adjudged disqualified, been excluded in the roster of official candidates. It
is erroneous to assume that the sovereign will could have opted for the candidate who received the
second highest number of votes had they known of the disqualification of the winning candidate early on.
For in such event, they could have cast their votes in favor of another candidate, not necessarily the one
who received the second highest number of votes.
14

14

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

Same; Same; Same; View that the doctrine of rejection of the second placer was not conceived to suit the
selfish interests of losing candidates or arm them with a weapon to retaliate against the prevailing
candidates; The doctrine ensures that only the candidate who has the people’s faith and confidence will
be allowed to run the machinery of the government.―The doctrine of rejection of the second placer was
not conceived to suit the selfish interests of losing candidates or arm them with a weapon to retaliate
against the prevailing candidates. The primordial consideration in adhering to this doctrine is not simply to
protect the interest of the other qualified candidates joining the electoral race but more than that, to
safeguard the will of the people in whom the sovereignty resides. The doctrine ensures that only the
candidate who has the people’s faith and confidence will be allowed to run the machinery of the
government. It is a guarantee that the popular choice will not be compromised, even in the occasion that
the prevailing candidate is eventually disqualified, by replacing him with the next-in-rank official who was
also elected to office by the authority of the electorate.

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Jalosjos, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections,
683 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 193237 October 9, 2012

10. • POE-LLAMANZARES V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, 5 April 2016

See above
11. • CABALLERO V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 209835, 22 September 2015
Case Title : ROGELIO BATIN CABALLERO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
JONATHAN ENRIQUE V. NANUD, JR., respondents.Case Nature : SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the
Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law ; Civil Procedure ; Appeals ;
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; View that it is not for a court to, out of its
own initiative, address the lacunae and fill the deficiencies in the arguments of a party or
the reasoning of the tribunal whose ruling it is reviewing.-
—It is not for a court to, out of its own initiative, address the lacunae and fill the
deficiencies in the arguments of a party or the reasoning of the tribunal whose ruling it is
reviewing. The task of alleging and proving the existence and the accuracy of supposed
statements of any foreign law that could have helped his cause was respondent’s alone.
Failing in this, he should not find solace before the court adjudicating his claims so it can
do his work for him, buttress his arguments where their weakness were apparent, and
ultimately, obtain his desired conclusion.
2. Election Law; COMELEC Rules of Procedure; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) may exercise its power to suspend its own rules as provided under Section 4,
Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure.-
—While private respondent failed to comply with the above mentioned requirements, the
settled rule, however, is that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal
construction. Moreover, the COMELEC may exercise its power to suspend its own rules
as provided under Section 4, Rule 1 of their Rules of Procedure. Sec. 4. Suspension of
the Rules.—In the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition of all
matters pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be
suspended by the Commission. Under this authority, the Commission is similarly enabled
to cope with all situations without concerning itself about procedural niceties that do not
square with the need to do justice, in any case without further loss of time, provided that
the right of the parties to a full day in court is not substantially impaired.
3. Citizenship; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Republic Act
(RA) No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can reacquire
or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law.-
—RA No. 9225, which is known as the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of
2003, declares that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country, can reacquire
or retain his Philippine citizenship under the conditions of the law. The law does not
provide for residency requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino. RA No. 9225
treats citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical and consistent with the
general intent of the law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may establish
residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a citizen.
However, when a natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship seeks for an elective public
office, residency in the Philippines becomes material.
4. Election Law; Local Government Code; The Local Government Code (LGC) requires
that the candidate must be a resident of the place where he seeks to be elected at least
one (1) year immediately preceding the election day.-
—Clearly, the Local Government Code requires that the candidate must be a resident of
the place where he seeks to be elected at least one year immediately preceding the
election day. Respondent filed the petition for cancellation of petitioner’s COC on the
ground that the latter made material misrepresentation when he declared therein that he is
a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately preceding the day of
elections. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as
referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is,
“the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain
(animus manendi).” A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It is usually
the place where the child’s parents reside and continues until the same is abandoned by
acquisition of new domicile (domicile of choice). It consists not only in the intention to
reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.
5. Domicile; In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385 SCRA 607 (2002), the Supreme Court (SC)
ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an abandonment of domicile in
the Philippines.-
—Petitioner was a natural-born Filipino who was born and raised in Uyugan, Batanes.
Thus, it could be said that he had his domicile of origin in Uyugan, Batanes. However, he
later worked in Canada and became a Canadian citizen. In Coquilla v. COMELEC, 385
SCRA 607 (2002), we ruled that naturalization in a foreign country may result in an
abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. This holds true in petitioner’s case as
permanent resident status in Canada is required for the acquisition of Canadian
citizenship. Hence, petitioner had effectively abandoned his domicile in the Philippines
and transferred his domicile of choice in Canada. His frequent visits to Uyugan, Batanes
during his vacation from work in Canada cannot be considered as waiver of such
abandonment.
6. Residence; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; Petitioner’s
retention of his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as
such.-
—Petitioner’s retention of his Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225 did not
automatically make him regain his residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must still prove that
after becoming a Philippine citizen on September 13, 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
Batanes as his new domicile of choice which is reckoned from the time he made it as
such. The COMELEC found that petitioner failed to present competent evidence to prove
that he was able to reestablish his residence in Uyugan within a period of one year
immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It found that it was only after
reacquiring his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. 9225 on September 13, 2012 that
petitioner can rightfully claim that he reestablished his domicile in Uyugan, Batanes, if
such was accompanied by physical presence thereat, coupled with an actual intent to
reestablish his domicile there. However, the period from September 13, 2012 to May 12,
2013 was even less than the one year residency required by law.
7. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments;
Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the
instant case, are final unless grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual
determinations.-
—Doctrinally entrenched is the rule that in a petition for certiorari, findings of fact of
administrative bodies, such as respondent COMELEC in the instant case, are final unless
grave abuse of discretion has marred such factual determinations. Clearly, where there is
no proof of grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, fraud or error of law in the questioned
Resolutions, we may not review the factual findings of COMELEC, nor substitute its own
findings on the sufficiency of evidence. Records indeed showed that petitioner failed to
prove that he had been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year immediately
preceding the day of elections as required under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code.
8. Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; The
Supreme Court (SC) has held that in order to justify the cancellation of Certificate of
Candidacy (CoC) under Section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned
therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect
the substantive rights of a candidate-
— the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the CoC.—We have held that in
order to justify the cancellation of CoC under Section 78, it is essential that the false
representation mentioned therein pertains to a material matter for the sanction imposed by
this provision would affect the substantive rights of a candidate — the right to run for the
elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy. We concluded that material
representation contemplated by Section 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such
as the requisite residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to
run for a local elective office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Furthermore,
aside from the requirement of materiality, the misrepresentation must consist of a
deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. We, therefore, find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the
COMELEC in canceling petitioner’s CoC for material misrepresentation.
9. Residence; Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003; View that
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 does not touch on a person’s residence; does not
mention it; and does not even require residence in the Philippines prior to or at the
time he or she takes the oath to reacquire Philippine citizenship; Residency in the
Philippines becomes material only when the natural-born Filipino availing of RA No. 9225,
decides to run for public office.-
—RA No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipinos (who lost their Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country) to expeditiously reacquire their Filipino
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines. Upon taking
the oath, they reacquire their Philippine citizenship and the accompanying civil and
political rights that attach to citizenship. RA No. 9225 does not touch on a person’s
residence; does not mention it; and does not even require residence in the Philippines
prior to or at the time he or she takes the oath to reacquire Philippine citizenship. In fact,
RA No. 9225 allows former natural-born citizens to reacquire their Philippine citizenship
while still residing in the country that granted them naturalized citizenship status.
Residency in the Philippines becomes material only when the natural-born Filipino availing
of RA No. 9225, decides to run for public office. As provided under Section 5 of this law,
those who seek elective public office shall, in addition to taking the oath of allegiance,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship and meet the
qualifications for holding such public office that the Constitution and existing laws require.
10. Same; Same; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 does not even require Filipinos
with reacquired citizenship to establish or maintain any Philippine residence, although they
can, as Filipinos, come and go as they please into the country without any precondition
other than those applicable to all Filipino citizens.-
—RA No. 9225 does not even require Filipinos with reacquired citizenship to establish or
maintain any Philippine residence, although they can, as Filipinos, come and go as they
please into the country without any precondition other than those applicable to all Filipino
citizens. By implication, RA No. 9225 (a dual citizenship law) allows residency anywhere,
within or outside the Philippines, before or after reacquisition of Philippine citizenship
under its terms. Reacquisition of citizenship, however, does not — by itself — imply nor
establish the fact of Philippine residency. In these senses, RA No. 9225 and the LGC are
complementary to, yet are independent of, one another.
11. Same; Same; View that another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating
Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 and residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights
that come with the reacquired citizenship comes only when the requirements have been
completed and Filipino citizenship has been reacquired.-
—Another legal reality that must be kept in mind in appreciating RA No. 9225 and
residency is that entitlement to the civil and political rights that come with the reacquired
citizenship comes only when the requirements have been completed and Filipino
citizenship has been reacquired. Only then can reacquiring Filipinos secure the right to
reside in the country as Filipinos and the right to vote and be voted for elective office
under the requirements of the Constitution and applicable existing laws. For would-be
candidates to local elective office, these applicable requirements include the taking of an
oath of renunciation of all other citizenships and allegiance, and allegation and proof of
residency for at least a year counted from the date of the election.
12. Election Law; Residence; View that under our election laws, the term “residence” is
synonymous with domicile and refers to the individual’s permanent home or the place to
which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return.-
—Under our election laws, the term “residence” is synonymous with domicile and refers to
the individual’s permanent home or the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. Domicile is classified into three, namely: (1) domicile of
origin, which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is acquired
upon abandonment of the domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law, which
the law attributes to a person independently of his residence or intention. Caballero’s
indisputable domicile of origin is Uyugan, Batanes. He subsequently went abroad for work,
established his residence in Canada beginning 1989, and acquired Canadian citizenship
in 2007. On September 12, 2012, and while still residing in Canada, he applied with the
Philippine Consul General of Toronto, Canada for the reacquisition of his Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225.
13. Domicile; View that there are requirements to effect a change of domicile or to acquire
a domicile by choice.-
—Jurisprudence provides the following requirements to effect a change of domicile or to
acquire a domicile by choice: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) a
bona fide intention to remain there; and (3) a bona fide intention to abandon the old
domicile. These are the animus manendi and the animus non revertendi that
jurisprudence requires to be satisfied. Under these requirements, no specific unbending
rule exists in the appreciation of compliance because of the element of intent — an
abstract and subjective proposition that can only be determined from the surrounding
circumstances. Separately from intent is the question of the actions taken pursuant to the
intent, and the consideration of the applicable laws, rules and regulations.
14. Residence; View that given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who
had been living in Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen in
2007) would not have been granted Canadian citizenship had he not applied for it and had
he not shown proof of permanent residence in that country.-
—Given the Canadian citizenship requirements, Caballero (who had been living in
Canada since 1989 prior to his naturalization as Canadian citizen in 2007) would not have
been granted Canadian citizenship had he not applied for it and had he not shown proof of
permanent residence in that country. This is the indicator of intent that I referred to in
considering the question of Caballero’s Philippine residency and his factual claim that he
never abandoned his Philippine residence. Parenthetically, the requirement that a foreign
national be a resident of the State for a given period prior to the grant of the State’s
citizenship is not unique to the Canadian jurisdiction. The requirement proceeds from the
State’s need to ensure that the foreign applicant is integrated to the society he is
embracing, and that he has actual attachment to his new community before citizenship is
granted. The requirement can be said to be a preparatory move as well since the grant of
citizenship carries with it the right to enjoy civil and political rights that are not ordinarily
granted to noncitizens.
15. Same; View that our existing laws require continued residency in the Philippines for a
given period before any foreign national who wishes to become a Philippine citizen is
conferred this status.-
—Even the Philippines, through our laws on naturalization, recognizes these requirements
prior to the grant of Philippine citizenship. Our existing laws require continued residency in
the Philippines for a given period before any foreign national who wishes to become a
Philippine citizen is conferred this status.
16. Same; View that to comply with Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC) by
transferring his domicile anew to Uyugan, Caballero has to prove the fact of transfer and
his reestablished domicile by residing in Uyugan for at least one (1) year immediately
before the May 13, 2013 elections.-
—In this limited sense, I believe that the Court may look into the Canadian citizenship
laws to get an insight into Caballero’s intent. To reiterate, Caballero would not have been
granted Canadian citizenship had he not applied for it and had he not been a Canadian
permanent resident for the required period. Under the foundational rule that a man can
only have one domicile, Caballero’s moves constitute positive, voluntary, overt and
intentional abandonment of his domicile of origin. His moves signified, too, the
establishment of a new domicile of choice in Canada. Thus, to comply with Section 39 of
the LGC by transferring his domicile anew to Uyugan, Caballero has to prove the fact of
transfer and his reestablished domicile by residing in Uyugan for at least one year
immediately before the May 13, 2013 elections. In accordance with the jurisprudential
rules on change of domicile, he must establish substantial physical presence in Uyugan
during the required period.
17. Same; View that under Section 13(f) of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 613 (the
Philippine Immigration of 1940), as amended, “a natural-born citizen of the Philippines,
who has been naturalized in a foreign country and is returning to the Philippines for
permanent residence x x x shall be considered a nonquota immigrant for purposes of
entering the Philippines.” The returning former Filipino can apply for a permanent resident
visa (otherwise known as Returning Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall
entitle the person to stay indefinitely in the Philippines.-
—Existing immigration laws allow former natural-born Filipinos, who lost their Philippine
citizenship by naturalization in a foreign country, to acquire permanent residency in the
Philippines even prior to, or without reacquiring, Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225.
Under Section 13(f) of Commonwealth Act No. 613 (the Philippine Immigration of 1940),
as amended, “a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, who has been naturalized in a
foreign country and is returning to the Philippines for permanent residence x x x shall be
considered a nonquota immigrant for purposes of entering the Philippines.” The returning
former Filipino can apply for a permanent resident visa (otherwise known as Returning
Former Filipino Visa) which, when granted, shall entitle the person to stay indefinitely in
the Philippines. Other than through such permanent resident visa, Caballero could have
stayed in the Philippines only for a temporary period. Any such temporary stay, of course,
cannot be considered for purposes of Section 39 of the LGC as it does not fall within the
concept of “residence.”
18. Election Law; Certificate of Candidacy; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy;
View that a petition to cancel Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) is governed by Section
74 in relation with Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC). As these
provisions operate, the would-be candidate must state only true facts in the CoC, as
provided by Section 74; any false representation of a material fact may lead to the
cancellation or denial of his or her CoC, under Section 78.-
—A petition to cancel CoC is governed by Section 74 in relation with Section 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). As these provisions operate, the would-be candidate must
state only true facts in the CoC, as provided by Section 74; any false representation of a
material fact may lead to the cancellation or denial of his or her CoC, under Section 78.
19. Same; Same; Residence; View that the assertion that the would-be candidate is a
resident of the locality where he intends to be elected carries with it the negative assertion
that he has neither been an immigrant nor a permanent resident in a foreign country for at
least one (1) year immediately preceding the election.-
—Notably, the positive representation in the CoC that the would-be candidate is required
to make under Section 74 of the OEC, in relation with the residency requirement of
Section 39 of the LGC, complements the disqualifying ground of being an immigrant or
permanent resident in a foreign country under Section 40 of the LGC. In plainer terms, the
assertion that the would-be candidate is a resident of the locality where he intends to be
elected carries with it the negative assertion that he has neither been an immigrant nor a
permanent resident in a foreign country for at least one year immediately preceding the
election.
20. Grave Abuse of Discretion; View that the abuse of discretion, to be grave, must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.”-
—Jurisprudence has consistently defined grave abuse of discretion as a “capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment x x x equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.” The abuse of
discretion, to be grave, must be so patent and gross as to amount to an “evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility.” Based on this definition, the grave abuse of discretion
that justifies the grant of certiorari involves an error or defect of jurisdiction resulting from,
among others, an indifferent disregard for the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission
to weigh pertinent considerations, or lack of rational deliberation in decision-making.
21. Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Certiorari; View that certiorari is not an
appeal that opens up the whole case for review; it is limited to a consideration of the
specific aspect of the case necessary to determine if grave abuse of discretion had
intervened.-
—The remedy of certiorari applies only to rulings that are not, or are no longer,
appealable. Thus, certiorari is not an appeal that opens up the whole case for review; it is
limited to a consideration of the specific aspect of the case necessary to determine if
grave abuse of discretion had intervened. In short, to assail a Comelec ruling, the
assailing party must show that the final and inappealable ruling is completely void, not
simply erroneous, because the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in considering the
case or in issuing its ruling. It is within this context that I fully concur with the ponencia’s
dismissal of the petition. Caballero’s assertion in his CoC that he has been a resident of
Uyugan for at least one year immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections — a clear
material misrepresentation on his qualification for the mayoralty post — undoubtedly
justified the Comelec in cancelling his CoC pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. In acting
as it did, the Comelec simply performed its mandate and enforced the law based on the
established facts and evidence. Clearly, no grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to
its actions.
22. Residence; Citizenship; View that Republic Act (RA) No. 9225 is concerned only
with citizenship; it does not touch on and does not require residency in the Philippines to
reacquire Philippine citizenship.-
—I reiterate that RA No. 9225 is concerned only with citizenship; it does not touch on and
does not require residency in the Philippines to reacquire Philippine citizenship. Residency
in the Philippines becomes material only when the natural-born Filipino who reacquires or
retains Philippine citizenship under the provisions of RA No. 9225 decides to run for public
office. Even then, RA No. 9225 leaves the resolution of any residency issue to the terms of
the Constitution and specifically applicable existing laws.
23. Domicile; View that domicile is distinct from citizenship. They are separate matters.
Domicile is not a mere incident or consequence of citizenship and is not dictated by it.-
—Domicile is distinct from citizenship. They are separate matters. Domicile is not a mere
incident or consequence of citizenship and is not dictated by it. The case of petitioner
Rogelio Batin Caballero who, as it is not disputed, has Uyugan, Batanes as his domicile of
origin must be resolved with this fundamental premise in mind.
24. Same; Residence; Election Law; View that it is settled that for purposes of election
law, “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.”-
—It is settled that for purposes of election law, “residence” is synonymous with “domicile.”
“Domicile” denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent for business,
pleasure, or like reasons, one intends to return. Jurisprudence has established three
fundamental principles governing domicile: “first, that [one] must have a residence or
domicile somewhere; second, that where once established it remains until a new one is
acquired; and third, [one] can have but one domicile at a time.” In this jurisdiction, it is
settled that, for election purposes, the term “residence” contemplates “domicile.”
25. Election Law; Local Government Code; View that Qualifications that a Candidate
Must Possess in Order to be Eligible for Local Elective Public Office.-
—Section 39(a) of the Local Government Code provides that in order to be eligible for
local elective public office, a candidate must possess the following qualifications: (a) a
citizen of the Philippines; (b) a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, city,
 province, or in the case of a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sangguniang
Panlungsod, or Sangguniang Bayan, the district where he or she intends to be elected; (c)
a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election;
and (d) able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or dialect.
26. Domicile; View that if one does not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of
choice, his or her (old) domicile of origin remains.-
—There is no shortcut to determining one’s domicile. Reference to formalities may be
helpful — they may serve as guideposts — but these are not conclusive. It remains that
domicile is a matter of intention. For domicile to be lost and replaced, there must be an
intention to abandon the domicile of origin before a domicile of choice can be had.
Consequently, if one does not manifestly establish his or her (new) domicile of choice, his
or her (old) domicile of origin remains. To hearken to Japzon v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA
331 (2009), one who changes his or her citizenship merely acquires an option to establish
his or her new domicile of choice. Accordingly, naturalization — a process relating to
citizenship — has no automatic effect on domicile.
27. Residence; View that in Limbona v. COMELEC, 555 SCRA 391 (2008), the Supreme
Court (SC) stated, in no uncertain terms, that “for purposes of election law, the question of
residence is mainly one of intention.”-
—The primacy of intention is settled. In Limbona v. COMELEC, 555 SCRA 391 (2008),
this court stated, in no uncertain terms, that “for purposes of election law, the question of
residence is mainly one of intention.” This primacy is equally evident in the requisites for
acquisition of domicile by choice (and concurrent loss of one’s old domicile): “In order to
acquire a domicile by choice, these must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old
domicile.”

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 209835

Counsel: Kristoffer James E. Purisima for private respondent.

Ponente: PERALTA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Resolution
dated May 3, 2013 of the COMELEC First Division and the Resolution
dated November 6, 2013 of the COMELEC En Banc and are hereby
AFFIRMED.
 3. PERSONAL STATUS AND CAPACITY
• RECTO V. HARDEN, G.R. No. L-6897, 29 November 1956
Case Title : In the Matter of the Claim for Attorney’s Fees. CLARO M. RECTO, claimant and appellee, vs.
ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN and FRED M. HARDEN, defendants and appellants.Case Nature :
APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Encarnación, J.
Syllabi Class : ATTORNEY AND CLIENT|OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS|WIFE’S CONTRACT FOR
LEGAL SERVICES WITHOUT HUSBAND’S CONSENT|ATTORNEY AND CLIENT|WIFE’S CONTRACT
OF SERVICES|20% CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP
Syllabi:
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE’S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES WITHOUT
HUSBAND’S CONSENT; CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP DOES NOT BIND THE LATTER.-
Where the wife executed a contract of professional services whereby she binds herself
among other things that she agrees to pay her attorney twenty (20%) per cent of the value
of the share and participation which she may receive in the funds and properties of the
conjugal partnership of herself and her husband, such contract does not seek to bind the
conjugal partnership. The wife merely bound herself—and assumed the personal
obligation—to pay by way of contingent fees, 20% of her share in said partnership. The
contract neither gives, nor purports to give to her lawyer any right whatsoever, personal or
real, in and to her aforesaid share. The amount thereof is simply a basis for the
computation of said fees.
2. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CONTINGENT FEES NOT PROHIBITED IN THE
PHILIPPINES.-
Appellants contention “that article 1491 of the Civil Code of the Philippines in effect
prohibit contingent fees is untenable. Contingent fees are not prohibited in the Philippines
and are impliedly sanctioned by our Canons (No. 13) of Professional Ethics. (See also
Ulanday vs. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil., 540, 554).
3. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE’S CONTRACT FOR LEGAL SERVICES;
INTERPRETED AND CONSTRUED.-
Appellant’s contention that the contract in question has for its purpose to secure a decree”
of divorce allegedly in violation of Articles 1305, 1352 and 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines is not borne out either by the language ofthe contract between them or by the
intent of the parties thereto. Its purpose was not to secure a divorce or facilitate or
promote the procurement of a divorce. It merely sought to protect the interest of the wife in
the conjugal partnership, during the pendency of a divorce suit she intended to file in the
United States. What is more, inasmuch as the husband and wife are admittedly citizens of
the United States, their status and the dissolution thereof are governed—pursuant to Art. 9
of the Civil Code of Spain (which was in force in the Philippines at the time of the
execution of the contract in question) and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the Philippines—
by the laws of the United States, which sanction divorce. In short, the contract of services,
between the wife and her lawyer, is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order or public policy.
4. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; CONTRACT OF SERVICES WHEN NOT OPPRESSIVE
OR INEQUITABLE.-
 Considering the character of the services rendered by the attorney in the case at bar, the
nature and importance of the issues in said litigations, the amount of labor, time (1944 to
1952) and the trouble involved therein, the skill displayed in connection with said cases,
the value of the property affected by the controversy, the professional character and
standing of the lawyer, the risks assumed and the results obtained, Held: that the contract
of services In question is neither harsh nor oppressive or inequitable.
5. OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS; ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; WIFE’S CONTRACT
OF SERVICES; 20% CONTINGENT FEES ON HER SHARE IN CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP; INTENTION TO FILE SUIT FOR DIVORCE AS CONDITION;
RENDERED IMPOSSIBLE BY WIFE.-
The contract of services was made principally, in contemplation of a suit for divorce which
the wife intended to file before a competent court in California, “and of the liquidation of
the conjugal partnership between’ her and her husband. Had she filed said action for
divorce and secure a decree of divorce, said conjugal partnership would have been
dissolved and then liquidated and the share of the wife therein would have been fixed.
However this cannot take place, either now or in the forseeable future owing to the
agreements between the wife and her husband which were made for the evident purpose
of defeating the attorney’s claim for his fees. In other words the occurrences within the
time contemplated by the parties—bearing in mind the nature of and circumstances under
which they entered into, said contract of services—of the event upon which the amount of
said fees depended, was rendered impossible by the wife. Hence, whether such event be
regarded as a condition or as a period, she may not insist upon its occurrence prior to the
enforcement of the rights of the lawyer, for “the condition shall be deemed fulfilled when
the obligor voluntarily prevents its fulfillment,” (Art. 1186, Civil Code) and “the debtor shall
lose every right to make use of the period” when he “violates any undertaking in
consideration of which the creditor agreed to the period.” (Art. 1198, Civil Code).

Docket Number: No. L-6897

Counsel: J.W. Ferrier, Sr., M.R. Sotelo, Claro M. Recto

Ponente: CONCEPCION

Dispositive Portion:
Subject to this qualification, the decision appealed from is hereby
affirmed, therefore, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

b) Beginning and End of Personality

• GELUZ V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. L-16439, 20 July 1961
Criminal Law; Abortion; Consent of woman or husband does not excuse criminal act.—Abortion, without
medical necessity to warrant it, is a criminal act, and neither the consent of the woman nor that of the
husband would excuse it.
Damages; Unborn foetus without personality; Award for death of a person does not cover unborn foetus.
—The minimum award for the death of a person does not cover the case of an unborn foetus that is not
endowed with personality and incapable of having rights and obligations.

Same; Same; Parents of unborn foetus cannot sue for damages on its behalf.—Since an action for
pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the injured, no such right
of action could derivatively accrue to the parents or heirs of an unborn child.

Same; Same; Nature of damages recoverable by parents of unborn child.—The damages which the
parents of an unborn child can recover are limited to the moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal
development of the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parental expectations, as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances
should warrant them (Art. 2230, New Civil Code).

PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Geluz vs. Court of
Appeals, 2 SCRA 801, No. L-16439 July 20, 1961
• LIMJOCO V. FRAGANTE, G.R. No. L-770, 27 April 1948
Case Title : ANGEL T. LIMJOCO petitioner, vs. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGANTE,
deceased, respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review of a judgment of the Public Service
Commission. Ibañez, Deputy Commissioner.
Syllabi Class : PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION |CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE
Syllabi:
1. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ;
RlGHT OF ESTATE OF DECEDENT TO PROSECUTE APPLICATION; CASE AT BAR.-
If P. O. F. had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the right to
prosecute his application for a certificate of public convenience to its final conclusion. No
one would have denied him that right. As declared by the commission in its decision, he
had invested in the ice plant in question P35,000, and from what the commission said
regarding his other properties and business, he would certainly have been financially able
to maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone was
netting him about P1,440 monthly. He was a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till
his demise. The commission declared in its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that
his estate was financially able to maintain and operate the ice plant. The aforesaid right of
P. O. F. to prosecute said application to its final conclusion was one which by itsnature did
not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, f or
such a right was property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have
denied the application, although under the facts of the case, the commission granted the
application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and operate the ice
plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (p. 3) that a certificate of
public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset."
Such certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by
complying with the requisites of the law, belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and
survived to his estate and judicial administrator after his death.
2. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ;
ESTATE OF DECEDENT, A PERSON; CASE AT BAR.-
 Within the philosophy of the present legal system and within the framework of the
constitution, the estate of P. O. F. should be considered an artificial or juridical person for
the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate which, of course, include the
exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment of
those obligations of his which survived after his death. One of those rights was the one
involved in his pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant
case, consisting in the prosecution of said application to its final conclusion. An injustice
would ensue from the opposite course.
3. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ; CERTIFICATE OF PUBLIC CONVENIENCE ;
CITIZENSHIP OF DECEDENT EXTENDED TO His EsTATE; CASE AT BAR.-
If by legal fiction the personality of P. O. F. is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be
exercised for the benefit of his creditors and heirs, respectively, there is no sound and
cogent reason for denying the application of the same fiction to his citizenship, and for not
considering it as likewise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid unfinished
proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if
successful, would in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even
in that event petitioner could not allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he
could have done if F. had lived longer and obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of
such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same principle, and motivated by
the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of his personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by
reason of his death, to the lossof the investment amounting to P35,000, which. he already
made in the ice plant, not counting the other expenses occasioned by the instant
proceeding, from the Public Service Commission to this court.

Docket Number: No. L-770

Counsel: Angel Limjoco, jr., Delfin L. Gonzales, Bienvenido A. Tan

Ponente: HILADO

c) Absence
d) Name
e) Age of Majority
7. PROPERTY
a) Real; Personal; Intellectual Property
1. • LAUREL V. GARCIA, G.R. No. 92013, 25 July 1990
Case Title : SALVADOR H. LAUREL, petitioner, vs. RAMON GARCIA, as head of the Asset Privatization
Trust, RAUL MANGLAPUS, as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and CATALINO MACARAIG, as Executive
Secretary, respondents., DIONISIO S. OJEDA, petitioner, vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY MACARAIG,
JR., ASSETS PRIVATIZATION TRUST CHAIRMAN RAMON T. GARCIA, AMBASSADOR RAMON DEL
ROSARIO, et al., as members of the PRINCIPAL AND BIDDING COMMITTEES ON THE
UTILIZATION/DISPOSITION OF PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT PROPERTIES INCase Nature :
PETITIONS for prohibition and mandamus to review the decision of the Executive Secretary.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Administrative Law|Property|Property|Political Law|President can not convey
valuable real property of the government on his or her own sole will
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Property; Roppongi property is of public dominion.-
There can be no doubt that it is of public dominion unless it is convincingly shown that the
property has become patrimonial. This, the respondents have failed to do.
2. Civil Law; Property; As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the
commerce of man and can not be alienated.-
As property of public dominion, the Roppongi lot is outside the commerce of man. It
cannot be alienated. Its ownership is a special collective ownership for general use and
enjoyment, an application to the satisfaction of collective needs, and resides in the social
group. The purpose is not to serve the State as a juridical person, but the citizens; it is
intended for the common and public welfare and cannot be the object of appropriation.
3. Civil Law; Property; Roppongi property correctly classified under paragraph 2 of
Article 420 of the Civil Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some
public service.-
The Roppongi property is correctly classified under paragraph 2 of Article 420 of the Civil
Code as property belonging to the State and intended for some public service.
4. Civil Law; Property; A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available
for private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such.-
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy
service does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion
happens only if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene
Co. v. Bercilles, 66 SCRA 481 [1975]). A property continues to be part of the public
domain, not available for private appropriation or ownership “until there is a formal
declaration on the part of the government to withdraw it from being such.
5. Civil Law; Property; An abandonment of the intention to use the Roppongi property for
public service and to make it patrimonial property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must
be definite.-
The respondents enumerate various pronouncements by concerned public officials
insinuating a change of intention. We emphasize, however, that an abandonment of the
intention to use the Roppongi property for public service and to make it patrimonial
property under Article 422 of the Civil Code must be definite. Abandonment cannot be
inferred from the non-use alone specially if the non-use was attributable not to the
government’s own deliberate and indubitable will but to a lack of financial support to repair
and improve the property (See Heirs of Felino Santiago v. Lazaro, 166 SCRA 368 [1988].
Abandonment must be a certain and positive act based on correct legal premises.
6. Civil Law; Property; A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976
is not relinquishment of the Roppongi property’s original purpose.-
A mere transfer of the Philippine Embassy to Nampeidai in 1976 is not relinquishment of
the Roppongi property’s original purpose. Even the failure by the government to repair the
building in Roppongi is not abandonment since as earlier stated, there simply was a
shortage of government funds. The recent Administrative Orders authorizing a study of the
status and conditions of government properties in Japan were merely directives for
investigation but did not in any way signify a clear intention to dispose of the properties.
7. Civil Law; Property; Republic Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) does not authorize the
Executive Department to sell the Roppongi property.-
Section 63 (c) of Rep. Act No. 6657 (the CARP Law) which provides as one of the sources
of funds for its implementation, the proceeds of the disposition of the properties of the
Government in foreign countries, did not withdraw the Roppongi property from being
classified as one of public dominion when it mentions Philippine properties abroad.
Section 63 (c) refers to properties which are alienable and not to those reserved for public
use or service. Rep. Act No. 6657, therefore, does not authorize the Executive
Department to sell the Roppongi property. It merely enumerates possible sources of future
funding to augment (as and when needed) the Agrarian Reform Fund created under
Executive Order No. 299. Obviously any property outside of the commerce of man cannot
be tapped as a source of funds.
8. Administrative Law; Political Law; President can not convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole will; Conveyance must be
authorized and approved by a law enacted by Congress.-
It is not for the President to convey valuable real property of the government on his or her
own sole will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted
by the Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence.
9. Administrative Law; Political Law; President can not convey valuable real
property of the government on his or her own sole will; Resolution No. 55 of the
Senate dated June 8, 1989 asking for the deferment of the sale of the Roppongi property
does not withdraw the property from public domain much less authorize its sale.-
Resolution No. 55 of the Senate dated June 8, 1989, asking for the deferment of the sale
of the Roppongi property does not withdraw the property from public domain much less
authorize its sale. It is a mere resolution; it is not a formal declaration abandoning the
public character of the Roppongi property. In fact, the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations is conducting hearings on Senate Resolution No. 734 which raises serious
policy considerations and calls for a fact-finding investigation of the circumstances behind
the decision to sell the Philippine government properties in Japan.
10. Property; To turn public property to patrimonial, a legislative or executive declaration
is necessary, not were non-use thereof.-
In holding that there is “a need for a law or formal declaration to withdraw the Roppongi
property from public domain to make it alienable and a land for legislative authority to
allow the sale of the property,” the majority lays stress to the fact that: (1) An affirmative
act—executive or legislative—is necessary to reclassify property of the public dominion,
and (2) a legislative decree is required to make it alienable. It also clears the uncertainties
brought about by earlier interpretations that the nature of property—whether public or
patrimonial—is predicated on the manner it is actually used, or not used, and in the same
breath, repudiates the Government’s position that the continuous non-use of “Roppongi”,
 among other arguments, for “diplomatic purposes”, has turned it into State patrimonial
property.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 92013, G.R. No. 92047

Counsel: Arturo M. Tolentino

Ponente: GUTIERREZ, JR.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the peti- tions are
GRANTED. A writ of prohibition is issued enjoining the respondents from
proceeding with the sale of the Roppongi property in Tokyo, Japan. The
February 20, 1990 Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

2. • LLANTINO V. CO LIONG CHONG, 188 SCRA 592 (1990)

Case Title : GREGORIO LLANTINO and BELINDA LLANTINO assisted by husband Napoleon Barba,
plaintiffs-appellants, vs. CO LIONG CHONG alias JUAN MOLINA, defendant-appellee.Case Nature :
APPEAL from the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Virac, Catanduanes. Gonzales, J.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Citizenship|Lease
Syllabi:
1. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Lease; General rule that aliens are not completely
excluded from use of lands for residential purposes.-
Under the circumstances, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an
option giving an alien the right to buy real property on condition that he is granted
Philippine citizenship. Aliens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from use of
lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they
may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the
Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortune and
misfortune, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire (Philippine Banking
Corporation vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967); citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79
Phil. 461 (1947).
2. Constitutional Law; Citizenship; Lease; Exception to the rule.-
The only instance where a contract of lease may be considered invalid, is, if there are
circumstances attendant to its execution, which are used as a scheme to circumvent the
constitutional prohibition. If an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy,
a piece of land, by virtue of which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of
his property, this to last for 50 years, then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a
 virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner divests himself in stages not only of the
right to enjoy the land (jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus fruendi, and jus abutendi)—rights,
the sum of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred,
tomorrow the use, the next day the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of
which ownership is made up are consolidated in an alien (Philippine Banking Corporation
vs. Lui She, 21 SCRA 52 (1967).

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 29663

Counsel: Delfin de Vera, Antonio G. Sosito

Ponente: PARAS

Dispositive Portion:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants.

3. CHEESMAN V. IAC, 193 SCRA 93 (1991) - my case

4. ASIATIC PETROLEUM V. CO QUICO, 69 Phil. 433 (1940)
Case Title : THE ASIATIC PETROLEUM (P. I.), LTD., plaintiff and appellant, vs. Co Quico, defendant
and appellee.Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila. Dizon, J.
Syllabi Class : NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT|SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION
Syllabi:
1. NONRESIDENT DEFENDANT; SUMMONS BY PUBLICATION; SUBJECTION OF
ALL PROPERTY WITHIN THE STATE TO JURISDICTION OF ITS COURTS.-
The defendant-appellee in this case although he was outside of the Philippines at the time
this action was instituted against him, possessed property found and located here and that
such property was within the reach of our courts. It is well to emphasize in this connection
the general proposition that all property within a State is subject to the jurisdiction of its
courts, and they have the right to adjudicate title thereto, to enforce liens thereupon, and
to subject it to the payment of the debts of its owners, whether resident or not. The
sovereign power may lay hands on any and all persons or property within its borders, and
where, as in our case, the functions of government are departmentalized, what is within
the reach of executive and legislative action, must also be within the reach of the judiciary.
The modern tendency in this regard is to make no distinction between mobility and
immobility of property established by the time-honored principles of lex rei sitae and
mobilia personam sequuntur. We find it neither necessary nor fruitful to indulge in any
characterization as to whether the present proceedings should be described as those in
rem or quasi in rem. Such characterization is of no legal significance in this connection.
 The situs of the res is clear no less than the garnishment of the res at the commencement
of the action, and reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard presumptively had by
virtue of the publication of the summons in accordance with the provisions of section 398
of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Docket Number: No. 46529

Counsel: Ross, Lawrence, Selph & Carrascoso, Leon T. Zavalla

Ponente: LAUREL

Dispositive Portion:
The order of September 12, 1938, of the Court of First Instance of Manila
is accordingly reversed, with costs against the plaintiff-appellee, Co
Quico. So ordered.

5. CIR V. ANGLO-CALIFORNIA BANK, G.R. No. L-12476, 29 January 1960

Case Title : COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ANGLO CALIFORNIA NATIONAL
BANK (CROCKER-ANGLO NATIONAL BANK), as Trustee for CALAMBA SUGAR ESTATE, INC.,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review by certiorari of a decision of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Syllabi Class : CORPORATION LAW|TAXATION|SHARES OF STOCK|INCOME TAX
Syllabi:
1. CORPORATION LAW; SHARES OF STOCK; CONSIDERED INTANGIBLE
PERSONAL PROPERTIES.-
Although shares of stock of a corporation represent equities that may consist of real as
well as personal properties therein, they are considered under applicable law and
jurisprudence as intangible personal properties.
2. CORPORATION LAW; SHARES OF STOCK; REGISTRATION OF TRANSFER NOT
ESSENTIAL TO TEST TITLE ON VENDEE.-
The provision in section 35 of the Corporation Law (Act No. 1459) which requires the
transfer of shares of stock to be noted and entered upon the books of the corporation,
does not invalidate the transfer between the parties nor is it essential to vest title upon the
vendee. The capital gains sought to be taxed in the case at bar arose from the severance
of gain from the investment occasioned by the transfer of title abroad and not on account
of any registration that might be effected later.
3. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; CAPITAL GAINS FROM SALE OF SHARES OF STOCK;
PLACE OF SALE DEEMED SOURCE OF INCOME.-
Section 24 of the National Internal Revenue Code levies income taxes on foreign
corporations only on income derived from sources within the Philippines. With respect to
 capital gains on the sale of personal property, section 37 (e) of the same Tax Code deems
the place of sale as also the place or source of the capital gains.
4. TAXATION; INCOME TAX; INCOME DERIVED FROM SALE ABROAD NOT
TAXABLE HERE.-
Since in the case at bar the negotiation, perfection and consummation of the contract of
sale of the shares of the capital stock in question were all effected in California, U.S.A., it
follows that title to those shares passed from the vendor to the vendee at said place, from
which time the incidents of ownership were vested on the buyer. Consequently, the
income from that sale was derived from abroad, and is not subject to income tax.

Docket Number: No. L-12476

Counsel: Assistant Solicitor General José P. Alejandro, Special Attorney Librada del Rosario-Natividad,
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta

Ponente: REYES

Dispositive Portion:
Wherefore, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. No costs.

6. LA CHEMISE LACOSTE V. FERNANDEZ, G.R. No. L-63796, 21 May 1984

Unfair Competition; Trademarks and Tradenames; Corporation Law; Petitioner is not doing business in
the Philippines.—Applying the above provisions to the facts of this case, we find and conclude that the
petitioner is not doing business in the Philippines. Rustan is actually a middleman acting and transacting
business in its own

_________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

374

374

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

name and/or its own account and not in the name or for the account of the petitioner.

Same; Same; Same; A foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no license to sue
in the Philippines for trademark violations.—But even assuming the truth of the private respondent’s
allegation that the petitioner failed to allege material facts in its petition relative to capacity to sue, the
petitioner may still maintain the present suit against respondent Hemandas. As early as 1927, this Court
was, and it still is, of the view that a foreign corporation not doing business in the Philippines needs no
license to sue before Philippine courts for infringement of trademark and unfair competition.

Same; Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; Where a violation of our unfair trade lanes which provide a
penal sanction is alleged, lack of capacity to sue of injured foreign corporation becomes immaterial.—
More important is the nature of the case which led to this petition. What preceded this petition for
certiorari was a letter-complaint filed before the NBI charging Hemandas with a criminal offense, i.e.,
violation of Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. If prosecution follows after the completion of the
preliminary investigation being conducted by the Special Prosecutor the information shall be in the name
of the People of the Philippines and no longer the petitioner which is only an aggrieved party since a
criminal offense is essentially an act against the State. It is the latter which is principally the injured party
although there is a private right violated. Petitioner’s capacity to sue would become, therefore, of not
much significance in the main case. We cannot allow a possible violator of our criminal statutes to escape
prosecution upon a far-fetched contention that the aggrieved party or victim of a crime has no standing to
sue.

Same; Same; Same; Same; International Law; The Philippines being a party to the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, the right of a foreign corporation to file suit in our courts to protect its
trademark is to be enforced.—In upholding the right of the petitioner to maintain the present suit before
our courts for unfair competition or infringement of trademarks of a foreign corporation, we are moreover
recognizing our duties and the rights of foreign states under the Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property to which the Philippines and France are parties. We are simply interpreting and
enforcing a solemn international commit-

375

VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984

375

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

ment of the Philippines embodied in a multilateral treaty to which we are a party and which we entered
into because it is in our national interest to do so.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Foreign nationals are, by treaty, entitled to the same protection as
Filipino citizens against unfair competition.—By the same token, the petitioner should be given the same
treatment in the Philippines as we make available to our own citizens. We are obligated to assure to
nationals of “countries of the Union” an effective protection against unfair competition in the same way
that they are obligated to similarly protect Filipino citizens and firms.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Patents Office; Director of Patents should obey directive of Minister of Trade
against registration of internationally known brands in favor of persons other than their original owners or
users.—The memorandum is a clear manifestation of our avowed adherence to a policy of cooperation
and amity with all nations. It is not, as wrongly alleged by the private respondent, a personal policy of
Minister Luis Villafuerte which expires once he leaves the Ministry of Trade. For a treaty or convention is
not a mere moral obligation to be enforced or not at the whims of an incumbent head of a Ministry. It
creates a legally binding obligation on the parties founded on the generally accepted principle of
international law of pacta sunt servanda which has been adopted as part of the law of our land.
(Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 3). The memorandum reminds the Director of Patents of his legal duty to obey
both law and treaty. It must also be obeyed.

Same; Same; Criminal Procedure; A bare allegation that respondent’s trademark is different from that of
petitioner’s is a matter of defense. It is not sufficient ground for a motion to quash a search warrant.—A
review of the grounds invoked by Hemandas in his motion to quash the search warrants reveals the fact
that they are not appropriate for quashing a warrant. They are matters ot defense which should be
ventilated during the trial on the merits ot the case. For instance, on the basis of the facts before the
Judge, we fail to understand how he could treat a bare allegation that the respondent’s trademark is
different from the petitioner’s trademark as a sufficient basis to grant the motion to quash. We will treat
the issue of prejudicial question later. Granting that respondent Hemandas was only trying to show the
absence of probable cause, we, nonetheless, hold the arguments to be untenable.

376

376

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

Criminal Procedure; Words and Phrases; “Probable cause” defined.—This concept of probable cause
was amplified and modified by our ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause
“presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed
particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.”

Same; An allegation that applicant for search warrant withheld certain information from the court is not of
itself a sufficient basis to quash the search warrant issued.—True, the lower court should be given the
opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any, but the rectification must, as earlier stated be based on
sound and valid grounds. In this case, there was no compelling justification for the about face. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by the petitioner should have been
assessed more carefully because the object of the quashal was the return of items already seized and
easily examined by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and quite obviously would be needed as
evidence in the criminal prosecution. Moreover, an application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is
neither a trial nor a part of the trial Action on these applications must be expedited for time is of the
essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by the judge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant
and the witnesses. The allegation of Hemandas that the applicant withheld information from the
respondent court was clearly no basis to order the return of the seized items.

Same; Unfair Competition, Trademarks and Tradenames; A certificate of registration in the supplemental
register is not prima facie evidence of validity of a registration; Quashal of search warrant not justified.—A
certificate of registration in the Supplemental Register is not prima facie evidence of the validity of
registration, of the registrant’s exclusive right to use the same in connection with the goods, business, or
services specified in the certificate. Such a certificate of registration cannot be filed, with effect, with the
Bureau of Customs in order to exclude from the Philippines, foreign goods bearing infringement marks or
trade names (Rule 124, Revised Rules of Practice Before the Phil. Pat. Off. in Trademark Cases; Martin,
Philippine Commercial Laws, 1981, Vol. 2, pp. 513-515).

Same; Same; Same; Same.—Registration in the Supplemental Register, therefore, serves as notice that
the registrant is using or

377

VOL. 129, MAY 21, 1984

377

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

has appropriated the trademark. By the very fact that the trademark cannot as yet be entered in the
Principal Register, all who deal with it should be on guard that there are certain defects, some obstacles
which the user must still overcome before he can claim legal ownership of the mark or ask the courts to
vindicate his claims of an exclusive right to the use of the same. It would be deceptive for a party with
nothing more than a registration in the Supplemental Register to posture before courts of justice as if the
registration is in the Principal Register.

Same; Same; Same; Pendency of application for registration in the Patent Office not a prejudicial
question to the issuance of search warrant on a charge of unfair competition.—By the same token, the
argument that the application was premature in view of the pending case before the Patent Office is
likewise without legal basis. The proceedings pending before the Patent Office involving IPC No. 1658 do
not partake of the nature of a prejudicial question which must first be definitely resolved.

Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Patent Office; The Minister of Trade has the power to direct the
Patent Office not to register certain trademarks except to its original users and to cancel those registered
in violation of its directive.—The Intermediate Appellate Court, in the La Chemise Lacoste S.A. v.
Sadhwani decision which we cite with approval sustained the power of the Minister of Trade to issue the
implementing memorandum and, after going over the evidence in the records, affirmed the decision of the
Director of Patents declaring La Chemise Lacoste S.A. the owner of the disputed trademark and crocodile
or alligator device.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same.—Indeed, due process is a rule of reason. In the case at bar the order
of the Patent Office is based not only on the undisputed fact of ownership of the trademark by the
appellee but on a prior determination by the Minister of Trade, as the competent authority under the Paris
Convention, that the trademark and device sought to be registered by the appellant are well-known marks
which the Philippines, as party to the Convention, is bound to protect in favor of its owners. It would be to
exalt form over substance to say that under the circumstances, due process requires that a hearing
should be held before the application is acted upon.

Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is the owner of the trademarks at bar.—We have carefully gone over the
records of all the cases filed in

378

378

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez

this Court and find more than enough evidence to sustain a finding that the petitioner is the owner of the
trademarks “LACOSTE”, “CHEMISE LACOSTE”, the crocodile or alligator device, and the composite
mark of LACOSTE and the representation of the crocodile or alligator. Any pretensions of the private
respondent that he is the owner are absolutely without basis. Any further ventilation of the issue of
ownership before the Patent Office will be a superfluity and a dilatory tactic.
Same; Same; Same; Right of owner of a trademark cannot be preempted by fact that another first secure
its registration in the Supplemental Register.—The records show that the goodwill and reputation of the
petitioner’s products bearing the trademark LACOSTE date back even before 1964 when LACOSTE
clothing apparels were first marketed in the Philippines. To allow Hemandas to continue using the
trademark Lacoste for the simple reason that he was the first registrant in the Supplemental Register of a
trademark used in international commerce and not belonging to him is to render nugatory the very
essence of the law on trademarks and tradenames.

PETITION for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review the order of the Regional Trial Court, Capital
Judicial Region, Manila, Br. XLIX. Fernandez, J. La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. vs. Fernandez, 129 SCRA
373, Nos. L-63796-97, Nos. L-65659 May 21, 1984

7. PHILIPS EXPORT V. COURT OF APPEALS, 206 SCRA 457 (1992)

Corporation Law; Trademarks; A corporation’s right to use its corporate and trade name is a property
right, a right in rem which it may assert and protect against the world in the same manner as it may
protect its tangible property, real or personal against trespass or conversion.—As early as Western
Equipment and Supply Co. v. Reyes, 51 Phil. 115 (1927), the Court declared that a corporation’s right to
use its corporate and trade name is a property right, a right in rem, which it may assert and protect
against the world in the same manner as it may protect its tangible property, real or personal, against
trespass or conversion. It is regarded, to a certain extent, as a property right and one which cannot be
impaired or defeated by subsequent appropriation by another corporation in the same field.

Same; Same; Same; The general rule as to corporations is that each corporation must have a name by
which it is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts.—A name is peculiarly important as necessary to the
very existence of a corporation (American Steel Foundries vs. Robertson, 269 US 372, 70 L ed 317, 46 S
Ct 160; Lauman vs. Lebanon Valley R. Co., 30 Pa 42; First National Bank vs. Huntington Distilling Co. 40
W Va 530, 23 SE 792). Its name is one of its attributes, an element of its existence, and essential to its
identity (6 Fletcher [Perm Ed], pp. 3-4). The general rule as to corporations is that each corporation must
have a name by which it is to sue and be sued and do all legal acts. The name of a corporation in this
respect designates the corporation in the same manner as the name of an individual designates the
person (Cincinnati Cooperage Co. vs. Bate, 96 Ky 356, 26 SW 538; Newport Mechanics Mfg. Co. vs.
Starbird, 10 NH 123); and the right to use its corporate name is as much a part of the corporate franchise
as any other privilege granted.

Same; Same; Same; A corporation can no more use a corporate name in violation of the rights of others
than an individual can use

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.
458

458

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals

his name legally acquired so as to mislead the public and injure another.—A corporation acquires its
name by choice and need not select a name identical with or similar to one already appropriated by a
senior corporation while an individual’s name is thrust upon him (See Standard Oil Co. of New Mexico,
Inc. v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 56 F 2d 973, 977). A corporation can no more use a corporate name
in violation of the rights of others than an individual can use his name legally acquired so as to mislead
the public and injure another.

Same; Same; Same; The right to the exclusive use of a corporate name with freedom from infringement
by similarity is determined by priority of adoption.—The right to the exclusive use of a corporate name
with freedom from infringement by similarity is determined by priority of adoption (1 Thompson, p. 80
citing Munn v. Americana Co., 82 N., Eq. 63, 88 Atl. 30; San Francisco Oyster House v. Mihich, 75 Wash.
274; 134 Pac. 921). In this regard, there is no doubt with respect to Petitioners’ prior adoption of the name
“PHILIPS” as part of its corporate name. Petitioners Philips Electrical and Philips Industrial were
incorporated on 29 August 1956 and 25 May 1956, respectively, while Respondent Standard Philips was
issued a Certificate of Registration on 19 April 1982, twenty-six (26) years later (Rollo, p. 16). Petitioner
PEBV has also used the trademark “PHILIPS” on electrical lamps of all types and their accessories since
30 September 1922, as evidenced by Certificate of Registration No. 1651.

Same; Same; Same; In determining the existence of confusing similarity in corporate name, the test is
whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care and discrimination.—The second
requisite no less exists in this case. In determining the existence of confusing similarity in corporate
names, the test is whether the similarity is such as to mislead a person using ordinary care and
discrimination. In so doing, the Court must look to the record as well as the names themselves (Ohio Nat.
Life Ins. Co. v. Ohio Life Ins. Co., 210 NE 2d 298). While the corporate names of Petitioners and Private
Respondent are not identical, a reading of Petitioner’s corporate names, to wit: PHILIPS EXPORT B.V.,
PHILIPS ELECTRICAL LAMPS, INC. and PHILIPS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT, INC., inevitably leads
one to conclude that “PHILIPS” is, indeed, the dominant word in that all the companies affiliated or
associated with the principal corporation, PEBV, are known in the Philippines and abroad as the PHILIPS
Group of Companies.

459
VOL. 206, FEBRUARY 21, 1992

459

Philips Export B.V. vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Same; Same; It is settled that proof of actual confusion need not be shown; It suffices that
confusion is probably or likely to occur.—Respondents maintain, however, that Petitioners did not present
an iota of proof of actual confusion or deception of the public much less a single purchaser of their
product who has been deceived or confused or showed any likelihood of confusion. It is settled, however,
that proof of actual confusion need not be shown. It suffices that confusion is probably or likely to occur.

Same; Same; Same; A corporation has an exclusive right to the use of its name which may be protected
by injunction upon a principle similar to that upon which persons are protected in the use of trademarks
and tradenames.—What is lost sight of, however, is that PHILIPS is a trademark or trade name which
was registered as far back as 1922. Petitioners, therefore, have the exclusive right to its use which must
be free from any infringement by similarity. A corporation has an exclusive right to the use of its name,
which may be protected by injunction upon a principle similar to that upon which persons are protected in
the use of trademarks and tradenames (18 C.J.S 574). Such principle proceeds upon the theory that it is
a fraud on the corporation which has acquired a right to that name and perhaps carried on its business
thereunder, that another should attempt to use the same name, or the same name with a slight variation
in such a way as to induce persons to deal with it in the belief that they are dealing with the corporation
which has given a reputation to the name.

PETITION for review of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Philips Export B.V. vs. Court
of Appeals, 206 SCRA 457, G.R. No. 96161 February 21, 1992

8. EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING CORP. V. CA, 251 SCRA 600 (1995)

Trademarks and Tradenames; The reckoning point for the filing of a petition for cancellation of certificate
of registration of trademark is not from the alleged date of use but from the date the certificate of
registration was published in the Official Gazette and issued to the registrant.—Petitioner alleges that it
has been using its trademark “STYLISTIC MR. LEE” since 1 May 1975, yet, it was only on 18 September
1981 that private respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of registration for the
said trademark. We reject petitioner’s contention. Petitioner’s trademark is registered in the supplemental
register. The Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166) provides that “marks and tradenames for the supplemental
register shall not be published for or be subject to opposition, but shall be published on registration in the
Official Gazette.” The reckoning point, therefore, should not be 1 May 1975, the date of alleged use by
petitioner of its assailed trademark but 27 October 1980, the date the certificate of registration SR No.
5054 was published in the Official Gazette and issued to petitioner.

Same; Estoppel; Laches; Actions; To be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the
delay must be lengthy.—Corollarily, private respondent could hardly be accused of inexcusable delay in
filing its notice of opposition to petitioner’s application for registration in the principal register since said
application was published only on 20 February 1984. From the time of publication to the time of filing the
opposition on 27 July 1984 barely five (5) months had elapsed. To be barred from bringing suit on
grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be lengthy.

Same; In the history of trademark cases in the Philippines, particularly in ascertaining whether one
trademark is confusingly similar to or is a colorable imitation of another, no set rules can be deduced—
each case must be decided on its own merits.—Practical

_____________

* FIRST DIVISION.

601

VOL. 251, DECEMBER 29, 1995

601

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

application of the provision of Section 22 of R.A. No. 166 (Trademark Law) is easier said than done. In
the history of trademark cases in the Philippines, particularly in ascertaining whether one trademark is
confusingly similar to or is a colorable imitation of another, no set rules can be deduced. Each case must
be decided on its own merits.

Same; Infringements; The essential element of infringement is colorable imitation.—Proceeding to the

task at hand, the essential element of infringement is colorable imitation. This term has been defined as
“such a close or ingenious imitation as to be calculated to deceive ordinary purchasers, or such
resemblance of the infringing mark to the original as to deceive an ordinary purchaser giving such
attention as a purchaser usually gives, and to cause him to purchase the one supposing it to be the
other.”

Same; Same; In determining whether colorable imitation exists, jurisprudence has developed two kinds of
tests—the Dominancy Test and the Holistic Test.—In determining whether colorable imitation exists,
jurisprudence has developed two kinds of tests—the Dominancy Test applied in Asia Brewery, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals and other cases and the Holistic Test developed in Del Monte Corporation v. Court of
Appeals and its proponent cases.
Same; Same; Dominancy Test and Holistic Test, Compared.—As its title implies, the test of dominancy
focuses on the similarity of the prevalent features of the competing trademarks which might cause
confusion or deception and thus constitutes infringement. On the other side of the spectrum, the holistic
test mandates that the entirety of the marks in question must be considered in determining confusing
similarity.

Same; Same; Maong pants and jeans are not inexpensive, and as the casual buyer is predisposed to be
more cautious and discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase, confusion and deception
is less likely.—The products involved in the case at bar are, in the main, various kinds of jeans. These are
not your ordinary household items like catsup, soy sauce or soap which are of minimal cost. Maong pants
or jeans are not inexpensive. Accordingly, the casual buyer is predisposed to be more cautious and
discriminating in and would prefer to mull over his purchase. Confusion and deception, then, is less likely.

602

602

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Ordinary Purchaser,” Defined.—The definition laid down in Dy Buncio
v. Tan Tiao Bok is better suited to the present case. There, the “ordinary purchaser” was defined as one
“accustomed to buy, and therefore to some extent familiar with, the goods in question. The test of
fraudulent simulation is to be found in the likelihood of the deception of some persons in some measure
acquainted with an established design and desirous of purchasing the commodity with which that design
has been associated. The test is not found in the deception, or the possibility of deception, of the person
who knows nothing about the design which has been counterfeited, and who must be indifferent between
that and the other. The simulation, in order to be objectionable, must be such as appears likely to mislead
the ordinary intelligent buyer who has a need to supply and is familiar with the article that he seeks to
purchase.”

Same; Same; A personal name or surname may not be monopolized as a trademark or tradename as
against others of the same name or surname.—“LEE” is primarily a surname. Private respondent cannot,
therefore, acquire exclusive ownership over and singular use of said term . . . It has been held that a
personal name or surname may not be monopolized as a trademark or tradename as against others of
the same name or surname. For in the absence of contract, fraud, or estoppel, any man may use his
name or surname in all legitimate ways. Thus, “Wellington” is a surname, and its first user has no cause
of action against the junior user of “Wellington” as it is incapable of exclusive appropriation.
Same; Same; Actual use in commerce in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for the acquisition of
ownership over a trademark.—In addition to the foregoing, we are constrained to agree with petitioner’s
contention that private respondent failed to prove prior actual commercial use of its “LEE” trademark in
the Philippines before filing its application for registration with the BPTTT and hence, has not acquired
ownership over said mark. Actual use in commerce in the Philippines is an essential prerequisite for the
acquisition of ownership over a trademark pursuant to Sec. 2 and 2-A of the Philippine Trademark Law
(R.A. No. 166).

Same; Same; International Law; Conflict of Laws; Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property; Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirements of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as
the apparent clash is being de-

603

VOL. 251, DECEMBER 29, 1995

603

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

cided by a municipal tribunal.—The provisions of the 1965 Paris Convention for the Protection of
Industrial Property relied upon by private respondent and Sec. 21-A of the Trademark Law (R.A. No. 166)
were sufficiently expounded upon and qualified in the recent case of Philip Morris, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals: Following universal acquiescence and comity, our municipal law on trademarks regarding the
requirement of actual use in the Philippines must subordinate an international agreement inasmuch as the
apparent clash is being decided by a municipal tribunal (Mortisen vs. Peters, Great Britain, High Court of
Judiciary of Scotland, 1906, 8 Sessions, 93; Paras, International Law and World Organization, 1971 Ed.,
p. 20). Withal, the fact that international law has been made part of the law of the land does not by any
means imply the primacy of international law over national law in the municipal sphere. Under the doctrine
of incorporation as applied in most countries, rules of international law are given a standing equal, not
superior, to national legislative enactments.

Same; Evidence; A registration certificate serves merely as prima facie evidence—it is not conclusive but
can and may be rebutted by controverting evidence.—The credibility placed on a certificate of registration
of one’s trademark, or its weight as evidence of validity, ownership and exclusive use, is qualified. A
registration certificate serves merely as prima facie evidence. It is not conclusive but can and may be
rebutted by controverting evidence.

Same; Same; A supplemental register was created precisely for the registration of marks which are not
registrable on the principal register due to some defects.—Moreover, the aforequoted provision applies
only to registrations in the principal register. Registrations in the supplemental register do not enjoy a
similar privilege. A supplemental register was created precisely for the registration of marks which are not
registrable on the principal register due to some defects.

Same; Same; Administrative Law; The findings of fact of the Director of Patents are conclusive upon the
Supreme Court provided they are supported by substantial evidence.—The determination as to who is the
prior user of the trademark is a question of fact and it is this Court’s working principle not to disturb the
findings of the Director of Patents on this issue in the absence of any showing of grave abuse of
discretion. The findings of facts of the Director of Patents are conclusive upon the Supreme Court
provided they are supported by substantial evidence.

604

604

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Emerald Garment Manufacturing
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 251 SCRA 600, G.R. No. 100098 December 29, 1995

8. WILLS AND SUCCESSION

1. • SUNTAY V. SUNTAY, G.R. No. L-3087, 31 July 1954
Case Title : In re: Testate Estate of the deceased JOSÉ B. SUNTAY. SILVINO SUNTAY, petitioner and
appellant. In re: Intestate Estate of the deceased JOSÉ B. SUNTAY, FEDERICO C. SUNTAY,
administrator and appelleeCase Nature : APPEAL from a decree of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan. Pecson, J.
Syllabi Class : WlLLS|WILL|PROBATE OF|PROBATE OF WlLLS|APPEALS
Syllabi:
1. WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; ASSIGNMENT OF INTEREST IN THE ESTATE, NOT
A BAR TO PROBATE OF A LOST OR FOREIGN WlLL.-
In an intestate proceeding that had already been instituted in the Philippines, the widow
and child of the testator are not estopped from asking for the probate of a lost will or of a
foreign will just because of the transfer or assignment of their share, right, title and interest
in the estate of the deceased. The validity and legality of such assignments can not be
threshed out in the probate proceeding which is concerned only with the probate of the
will.
2. WlLLS; PROBATE OF WlLLS; PROOF OF LOST WILL; PROVISIONS OF WILL
MUST BE PROVED BY AT LEAST Two CREDIBLE WITNESSES; WHO ARE CREDIBLE
WITNESSES.-
Granting that a will was duly executed and that it was in existence at the time of, and not
revoked before, the death of the testator, still the provisions of the lost will must be clearly
and distinctly proved by at least two credible witnesses. "Credible witnesses" mean
competent witnesses and not those who testify to facts from or upon hearsay.
3. WlLLS; PROBATE OF WILL is A PROCEEDING IN REM; NOTICE TO ALL PARTIES
ESSENTIAL FOR ITS VALIDITY.-
In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on
the Chinese law of procedure in probate matters, it may be presumed that the
proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the
same as those provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the
validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested
parties must be made.
4. WlLLS; PROCEEDINGS LIKENED TO A DEPOSITION OR TO A PERPETUATION OF
TESTIMONY.-
The proceedings had in the municipal district court of Amoy, China, may be likened to a
deposition or to a perpetuation of testimony, and even if it were so, notice to all interested
parties was necessary for the validity of such proceedings.
5. WlLLS; WILLS PROVED IN A FOREIGN COUNTRY; PROBATE SHOULD BE IN
ACCORDANCE WlTH ACCEPTED BASIC AND FUNDAMENTAL CONCEPTS AND
PRINCIPLES.-
Where it appears that the proceedings in the court of a foreign country were held for the
purpose of taking the testimony of two attesting witnesses to the will and the order of the
probate court did not purport to allow the will, the proceedings cannot be deemed to be for
the probate of a will, as it was not done in accordance with the basic and fundamental
concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. Consequently, the
will referred to therein cannot be allowed, filed and recorded by a competent court of this
country.
6. WILL, PROBATE OF; LACK OF OBJECTION TO PROBATE OF LOST WILL DOES
EXECUTION.-
The lack of objection to the probate of a lost will does not relieve the proponent thereof or
the party interested in its probate from establishing its due execution and proving clearly
and distinctly the provisions thereof by at least two credible witnesses, as provided for in
section 6, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court.
7. WILL, PROBATE OF; APPEALS; JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT TO
REVIEW FINDINGS OF FACT AND LEGAL PRONOUNCEMENTS IN CASES
INVOLVING MORE THAN P50,000.-
In an appeal from a judgment of the probate court, the Supreme Court, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, has the power to review and correct erroneous findings of fact
and legal pronouncements of the probate court, where the amount involved is more than
P50,000.
Docket Number: Nos. L-3087 and L-3088

Counsel: Claro M. Recto, Sison & Aruego

Ponente: PADILLA

Dispositive Portion:
The decree appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs.For the ex oregoing reasons, the motion ex or reconsideration is
denied.

2. • AZNAR V. GARCIA, G.R. No. L-16749, 31 January 1963 - SEE ABOVE

3. • BELLIS V. BELLIS, G.R. No. L-23678, 6 June 1967
Case Title : TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased. PEOPLE'S BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, executor. MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs. EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of
First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Wills|Succession|Conflict of laws|Applicability of national law to succession|Legitimes|
Statutes
Syllabi:
1. Wills; Succession; Conflict of laws; Renvoi doctrine.-
The doctrine of renvoi is usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country
and is domiciled in another. It does not apply to a case where the decedent was a citizen
of Texas and was domiciled therein at the time of his death. So that, even assuming that
Texas has a conflicts rule providing that the domiciliary law should govern successional
rights, the same would not result in a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but it would
still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule, adopting the rule of lex
rei sitae, which calls for the application of the law of the place where the properties are
situated, renvoi would arise, where the properties involved are found in the Philippines.
2. Wills; Foreign laws.-
In the absence of proof as to the conflicts rule of Texas, it would be presumed to be the
same as our local conflicts rule.
3. Wills; Applicability of national law to succession; Capacity to succeed-
The decedent's national law governs the order of succession, the amount of successional
rights, the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and capacity to succeed.
4. Wills; Third paragraph of article 17 of New Civil Code does not modify article 16.-
The third paragraph of article 17 of the New Civil Code is not an exception to the second
paragraph of article 16. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the
provisions of this and the next preceding article," when it incorporated article 11 of the old
Civil Code as article 17, while reproducing without substantial change the second
 paragraph of article 10 of the old Civil Code, as article 16. The legislative intent must have
been to make the second paragraph of article 176 a specific provision in itself which must
be applied in testate and intestate succession. As a further indication of this legislative
intent, Congress added a new provision, under article 1039, which decrees that capacity
to succeed is governed by the decedent's national law,
5. Wills; Legitimes; Statutes; Special and general provisions.-
Whatever public policy and good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congres has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. It has
specifically chosen the decedent's national law to govern, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.
6. Wills; Testamentary provision that successional right to decedent's estate would be
governed by law other than his national law is void.-
A provision in a foreigner's will that his properties should be distributed in accordance with
Philippine law and not in accordance with his national law is void, being contrary to article
16 of the New Civil Code.
7. Wills; System of legitimes does not apply to estate of a citizen of Texas.-
Where the decedent was a citizen of Texas and under Texas laws there are no forced
heirs, the system of legitimes in Philippine law cannot be applied to the succession to the
decedent's testate because the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the decedent's will and
the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law.

Docket Number: No. L-23678

Counsel: Vicente R. Macasaet, Jose D. Villena, Paredes, Poblador, Cruz & Nazareno, Quijano, Arroyo,
J. R. Balonkita, Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta

Ponente: BENGZON

Dispositive Portion:
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with
costs against appellants. So ordered.

4. • TAYAG V. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, 26 SCRA 242 (1968)

Case Title : TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG,
ancillary administrator-appellee, vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED. INC., oppositor-appellant.Case Nature
: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Special proceedings|Settlement of estate of a decedent|Corporation law|Principal
administration and ancillary administration distinguished|When ancillary administration is proper|Ancillary
administrator|Refusal of domiciliary administrator to deliver shares of stock despite judicial order|
Corporation
Syllabi:
1. Special proceedings; Principal administration and ancillary administration
distinguished; When ancillary administration is proper; Reason.-
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration.
2. Settlement of estate of a decedent; Ancillary administrator; Scope of his power and
authority.-
No one could dispute the power of an ancillary administrator to gain control and
possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Such a
power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors
(Rule 84, Sec. 3, Rules of Court. Cf. Pavia v. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70; Liwanag v. Reyes, L-
19159, Sept. 29, 1964; Ignacio v. Elchico, L-18937, May 16, 1967; etc.). It is a general rule
universally recognized that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly extends
to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, the
corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property la another state or country" (Leon and Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 90
Phil. 459).
3. Settlement of estate of a decedent; Refusal of domiciliary administrator to deliver
shares of stock despite judicial order; Case at bar.-
Since, in the case at bar, there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary
administrator in New York, to deIiver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned
by the decedent to fee ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing
unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue
new certificates in lieu thereof Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. Any other view would
result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of a party or entity.
4. Corporation law; Corporation; Concept and nature.-
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law (Sec. 2, Act No. 1459). A
corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until
it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law. It is logically
inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of
its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its
state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary. whenever called upon .to do so.

Docket Number: No. L-23145

Counsel: Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., Ross. Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa

Ponente: FERNANDO
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the
Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With
costs against oppositor-appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

5. • CAYETANO V. LEONIDAS, G.R. No. L-54919, 30 May 1984

Succession; Due Process; Attorneys; There being a proper substitution of attorneys where the Motion to
Dismiss Opposition to reprobate of will was filed, trial judge acted properly in hearing evidence ex parte
on probate of will in question.—We find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge.
No proof was adduced to support petitioner’s contention that the motion to withdraw was secured through
fraudulent means and that Atty. Franco Loyola was not his counsel of record. The records show that after
the filing of the contested motion, the petitioner at a later date, filed a manifestation wherein he confirmed
that the Motion to Dismiss Opposition was his voluntary act and deed. Moreover, at the time the motion
was filed, the petitioner’s former counsel, Atty. Jose P. Lagrosa had long withdrawn from the case and
had been substituted by Atty. Franco Loyola who in turn filed the motion. The present petitioner cannot,
therefore, maintain that the old man’s attorney of record was Atty. Lagrosa at the time of filing the motion.
Since the withdrawal was in order, the respondent judge acted correctly in hearing the probate of the will
ex-parte, there being no other opposition to the same.

Same; Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon
even before the extrinsic validity of will is resolved, probate court should meet the issue.—The third issue
raised deals with the validity of the provisions of the will. As a general rule, the probate court’s authority is
limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testatrix’s testamentary
capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of
the will normally comes only after the court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
However, where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon,
even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue. (Maninang v. Court of Appeals, 114 SCRA
478).

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

523

VOL. 129, MAY 30, 1984

523

Cayetano vs. Leonidas

Same; The U.S. law on succession in the state of Pennsylvania applies to the intrinsic and extrinsic
validity of the last will and testament of a U.S. national and resident of Pennsylvania under whose laws a
person may give his entire estate to a complete stranger.—Although on its face, the will appeared to have
preterited the petitioner and thus, the respondent judge should have denied its reprobate outright, the
private respondents have sufficiently established that Adoracion was, at the time of her death, an
American citizen and a permanent resident of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.A. Therefore, under Article
16 par. (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code which respectively provide: x x x x the law which governs
Adoracion Campo’s will is the law of Pennsylvania, U.S.A., which is the national law of the decedent.
Although the parties admit that the Pennsylvania law does not provide for legitimes and that all the estate
may be given away by the testatrix to a complete stranger, the petitioner argues that such law should not
apply because it would be contrary to the sound and established public policy and would run counter to
the specific provisions of Philippine Law.

Same; Same.—It is a settled rule that as regards the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will, as
provided for by Article 16 (2) and 1039 of the Civil Code, the national law of the decedent must apply.
This was squarely applied in the case of Bellis v. Bellis (20 SCRA 358).

Motions; Due Process; There was no denial of due process as what the court repeatedly set for hearing
was the Petition for Relief, not the Motion to Vacate Order of Jan. 10, 1979.—As regards the alleged
absence of notice of hearing for the petition for relief, the records will bear the fact that what was
repeatedly scheduled for hearing on separate dates until June 19, 1980 was the petitioner’s petition for
relief and not his motion to vacate the order of January 10, 1979. There is no reason why the petitioner
should have been led to believe otherwise. The court even admonished the petitioner’s failing to adduce
evidence when his petition for relief was repeatedly set for hearing. There was no denial of due process.
The fact that he requested “for the future setting of the case for hearing x x x” did not mean that at the
next hearing, the motion to vacate would be heard and given preference in lieu of the petition for relief.
Furthermore, such request should be embodied in a motion and not in a mere notice of hearing.

524

524

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cayetano vs. Leonidas

Succession; Jurisdiction; Probate of Will of American citizen who left an estate in the Philippines was
properly filed in the City of Manila where estate is located.—Therefore, the settlement of the estate of
Adoracion Campos was correctly filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila where she had an estate
since it was alleged and proven that Adoracion at the time of her death was a citizen and permanent
resident of Pennsylvania, United States of America and not a “usual resident of Cavite” as alleged by the
petitioner. Moreover, petitioner is now estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the probate court in
the petition for relief. It is a settled rule that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure
affirmative relief, against his opponent and after failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that
same jurisdiction.

PETITION for review on certiorari the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Br. XXXVIII. Leonidas,
J. Cayetano vs. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 522, No. L-54919 May 30, 1984

6. • VDA. DE PEREZ V. TOLETE, 232 SCRA 722 (1994)

Succession; Probate of Wills; Conflict of Laws; Proof that wills executed abroad conform with the
formalities prescribed by laws in the foreign jurisdiction or by Philippine laws is imperative.—The
respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country
upon compliance with the following

________________

* FIRST DIVISION.

723

VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994

723

Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete

provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines: “Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect
in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or
according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code
prescribes.” Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by
Philippine laws is imperative.

Same; Same; Same; Evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been
probated outside the Philippines.—The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which
have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in
accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the
Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal
is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran
Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954];
Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]).

Same; Same; Same; Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.—The necessity of
presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is
impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them (Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank v. Escolin, 56 SCRA 266 [1974]).

Same; Same; Same; Evidence; In the probate of wills, the courts should relax the rules on evidence, as
the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a purported will is
probated or denied probate.—Petitioner must have perceived this omission as in fact she moved for more
time to submit the pertinent procedural and substantive New York laws but which request respondent
Judge just glossed over. While the probate of a will is a special proceeding wherein courts should relax
the rules on evidence, the goal is to receive the best evidence of which the matter is susceptible before a
purported will is probated or denied probate (Vda. de Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 81 SCRA 393 [1978]).

Same; Same; Same; The separate wills of the spouses may be probated jointly.—There is merit in
petitioner’s insistence that the separate wills of the Cunanan spouses should be probated jointly.
Respondent Judge’s view that the Rules on allowance of wills is couched in singular terms and therefore
should be interpreted to mean that there should be separate probate proceedings for the wills of the

724

724

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete

Cunanan spouses is too literal and simplistic an approach. Such view overlooks the provisions of Section
2, Rule 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, which advise that the rules shall be “liberally construed in order
to promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action and proceeding.” A literal application of the Rules should be avoided if they would only
result in the delay in the administration of justice (Acain v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 155 SCRA 100
[1987]; Roberts v. Leonidas, 129 SCRA 33 [1984]).

Same; Same; Same; Joint Wills; What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills, not the joint
probate of separate wills containing essentially the same provisions and pertaining to property which in all
probability are conjugal in nature.—What the law expressly prohibits is the making of joint wills either for
the testators’ reciprocal benefit or for the benefit of a third person (Civil Code of the Philippines, Article
818). In the case at bench, the Cunanan spouses executed separate wills. Since the two wills contain
essentially the same provisions and pertain to property which in all probability are conjugal in nature,
practical considerations dictate their joint probate. As this Court has held a number of times, it will always
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of
future litigation (Motoomull v. Dela Paz, 187 SCRA 743 [1990]).

Same; Same; Same; With regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an
“original will” or a will that is presented for probate for the first time and accordingly must comply with
Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice to the known heirs, legatees and
devisees, and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner.—The rule that the court having jurisdiction over
the reprobate of a will shall “cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for
allowance” (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will
probated abroad should be treated as if it were an “original will” or a will that is presented for probate for
the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and
notice by mail or personally to the “known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the
Philippines” and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

Same; Same; Certiorari; Parties; A judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal
party.—This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact—petitioner

725

VOL. 232, JUNE 2, 1994

725

Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete

has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not
consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the
proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a
judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General,
215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari. Vda. de Perez vs. Tolete, 232 SCRA 722,
G.R. No. 76714 June 2, 1994

7. • QUITA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. 124862, 22 Dec 1998

Case Title : FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Actions|Settlement of Estates|Succession|Husband and Wife|Conflict of Laws|Divorce|
Forum Shopping
Syllabi:
1. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; If there is a controversy before the court
as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to
which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided
as in ordinary cases.-
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If
there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
2. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; If there is a question as to whether a wife was still a Filipino citizen at the time of
her divorce from her husband—the decedent—the trial court should conduct a hearing to
establish her citizenship.-
We note that in her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried.
She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner replied that Arturo
was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they
obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial
court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to
ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and testimonial
evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the
evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely
applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
3. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law; Once proved that a wife was no
longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband, then she could very
well lose her right to inherit from the latter.-
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling
in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. She
prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the motion but failed
to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did not grant private
respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that
both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were married in the Philippines.” It
main- tained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California, U.S.A., was
not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained
solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to
determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to
 whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was decreed. The trial court
must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.
4. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Forum Shopping; There is no forum
shopping where one petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before other courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of
titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of the decedent.-
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared
in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, the
same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same
transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical
causes of action, subject matter and issue. The present petition deals with declaration of
heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the
issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the
estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the existence of forum shopping.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 124862

Counsel: Puruganan, Chato, Tan, Geronimo Law Offices, Balgos & Perez Law Offices

Ponente: BELLOSILLO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court
of Appeals ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding
petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is
AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the
Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and
Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of
Arturo’s brother Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court
however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial court
should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel
in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is DENIED.

8. • LLORENTE V. CA, G.R. No. 124371, 23 November 2000

Case Title : PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Conflict of Laws|Marriages|Divorce
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; Foreign laws must be
alleged and proved.-
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi
doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s domicile, in this
case, Philippine law.
2. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Marriages; Divorce; The Court ruled that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law; Only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces.-
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
provided they are valid according to their national law.

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 124371

Counsel: E.A. Dacanay, Pardalis, Navarro & Sales

Ponente: PARDO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET
ASIDE.

9. • ANCHETA V. GUERSEY-DALAYGON, G.R. No. 139868, 8 June 2006

Case Title : ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, petitioner, vs. CANDELARIA GUERSEY-DALAYGON,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Succession|Judgments|Constitutional Law|Settlement of Estate|Decree of Distribution|
Annulment|Grounds|Extrinsic Fraud|Public Lands|Ownership|Parity Rights Amendment of 1946
Syllabi:
1. Succession; Settlement of Estate; Decree of Distribution; Once it becomes final, its
binding effect is like any other judgment in rem.-
A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the
estate in the distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it
becomes final, its binding effect is like any other judgment in rem. However, in exceptional
cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be set aside for lack of jurisdiction or
fraud. Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 730 (1951), the Court ruled that a party
interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left
out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not
imputable to negligence.
2. Judgments; Annulment; Grounds; Extrinsic Fraud; The prescriptive period for
annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of
the fraud or fraudulent act/s.-
It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s.
Respondent’s knowledge of the terms of Audrey’s will is immaterial in this case since it is
not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioner’s failure to introduce in evidence the
pertinent law of the State of Maryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period
should be counted from the time of respondent’s discovery thereof.
3. Judgments; Annulment; Grounds; Extrinsic Fraud; Definition.-
There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9, par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it is
one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to
the judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair
submission of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act
of the prevailing party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case,
whereby the defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case
by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the
unsuccessful party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any knowledge of the suit,
being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or
without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that there
has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are reasons for which a
new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and open the case
for a new and fair hearing.
4. Constitutional Law; Public Lands; Ownership; Parity Rights Amendment of 1946;
As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits
non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to lands of the public
domain.-
 The Parity Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and
business enterprises the right in the acquisition of lands of the public domain, the
disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural resources of the
Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands.
The prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973
Constitution under Article XIV, Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by
hereditary succession and when the transfer was made to a former natural-born citizen, as
provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and 8 of the
1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private
lands or to lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the
acquisition was made by a former natural-born citizen.

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 139868

Counsel: Quasha, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco, Ocampo, Dizon & Domingo

Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999
and the Resolution dated August 27, 1999 of the Court of Appeals are
AFFIRMED.Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the
performance of his duties as an official of the court.

9. CORPORATION
1. • CARGILL V. INTRA STRATA, G.R. No. 1686266, 15 March 2010
Case Title : CARGILL, INC., petitioner, vs. INTRA STRATA ASSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Corporation Law|Foreign Corporations|Actions
Syllabi:
1. Corporation Law; Foreign Corporations; Actions; Where a foreign corporation does
business in the Philippines without the proper license, it cannot maintain any action or
proceeding before Philippine Courts.-
—The principal issue in this case is whether petitioner, an unlicensed foreign corporation,
has legal capacity to sue before Philippine courts. Under Article 123 of the Corporation
Code, a foreign corporation must first obtain a license and a certificate from the
appropriate government agency before it can transact business in the Philippines. Where
a foreign corporation does business in thePhilippines without the proper license, it cannot
maintain any action or proceeding before Philippine courts as provided under Section 133
of the Corporation Code.
2. Same; Same; Same; A foreign company that merely imports goods from a Philippines
exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines is not doing
business in the Philippines.-
—In the present case, petitioner is a foreign company merely importing molasses from a
Philipine exporter. A foreign company that merely imports goods from a Philippine
exporter, without opening an office or appointing an agent in the Philippines, is not doing
business in the Philippines.
3. Same; Same; Same; To constitute “doing business,” the activity undertaken in
the Philippines should involve profit-making; “Soliciting purchases” has been deleted
from the enumeration of acts or activities which constitute “doing business.”-
—In this case, the contract between petitioner and NMC involved the purchase of
molasses by petitioner from NMC. It was NMC, the domestic corporation, which derived
income from the transaction and not petitioner. To constitute “doing business,” the activity
undertaken in the Philippines should involve profit-making. Besides, under Section 3(d) of
RA 7042, “soliciting purchases” has been deleted from the enumeration of acts or
activities which constitute “doing business.”
4. Same; Same; Same; Activities with Philippine jurisdiction that do not constitute doing
business in the Philippines.-
—Most of these activities do not bring any direct receipts or profits to the foreign
corporation, consistent with the ruling of this Court in National Sugar Trading Corp. v. CA,
246 SCRA 465 (1995), that activities within Philippine jurisdiction that do not create
earnings or profits to the foreign corporation do not constitute doing business in the
Philippines. In that case, the Court held that it would be inequitable for the National Sugar
Trading Corporation, a state-owned corporation, to evade payment of a legitimate
indebtedness owing to the foreign corporation on the plea that the latter should have
obtained a license first before perfecting a contract with the Philippine gov-
5. Same; Same; Same; There is no showing that the transactions between petitioner and
Northern Mindanao Corporation (NMC) signify the intent of petitioner to establish a
continuous business or extend its operations in the Philippines.-
—In this case, petitioner and NMC amended their contract three times to give a chance to
NMC to deliver to petitioner the molasses, considering that NMC already received the
minimum price of the contract. There is no showing that the transactions between
petitioner and NMC signify the intent of petitioner to establish a continuous business or
extend its operations in the Philippines.
6. Same; Same; Same; The determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing
business in the Philippines must be based on the facts of each case; Court gives
emphasis to the importance of the element of continuity of commercial activities to
constitute doing business in the Philippines.-
—The determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines
must be based on the facts of each case. In the case of Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. CA,
143 SCRA 288 (1986), in which a foreign corporation filed an action for collection of sum
of money against petitioners therein for damages and loss sustained for the latter’s failure
to deliver coconut crude
Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 168266

Counsel: Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & Delos Angeles

Ponente: CARPIO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Decision
dated 26 May 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48447. We
REINSTATE the Decision dated 23 November 1994 of the trial court.

2. • STEELCASE V. DESIGN INTL. SELECTIONS, INC., G.R. No. 171995, 18 April

2012
Case Title : STEELCASE, INC., petitioner, vs. DESIGN INTERNATIONAL SELECTIONS, INC.,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Corporation Law|Foreign Corporations|Capacity to Sue
Syllabi:
1. Corporation Law; Foreign Corporations; The rule that an unlicensed foreign
corporations doing business in the Philippine do not have the capacity to sue before the
local courts is well-established.-
—The rule that an unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the Philippine do not
have the capacity to sue before the local courts is well-established. Section 133 of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines explicitly states: Sec. 133. Doing business without a
license.—No foreign corporation transacting business in the Philippines without a license,
or its successors or assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in any action, suit
or proceeding in any court or administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before Philippine courts or administrative
tribunals on any valid cause of action recognized under Philippine laws. The phrase “doing
business” is clearly defined in Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 7042 (Foreign Investments Act of
1991), to wit: d) The phrase “doing business” shall include soliciting orders, service
contracts, opening offices, whether called “liaison” offices or branches; appointing
representatives or distributors domiciled in the Philippines or who in any calendar year
stay in the country for a period or periods totalling one hundred eighty (180) days or more;
participating in the management, supervision or control of any domestic business, firm,
entity or corporation in the Philippines; and any other act or acts that imply a continuity of
commercial dealings or arrangements, and contemplate to that extent the performance of
acts or works, or the exercise of some of the functions normally incident to, and in
progressive prosecution of, commercial gain or of the purpose and object of the business
organization: Provided, however, That the phrase “doing business” shall not be deemed to
include mere investment as a shareholder by a foreign entity in domestic corporations duly
registered to do business, and/or the exercise of rights as such investor; nor having a
nominee director or officer to represent its interests in such corporation; nor appointing a
representative or distributor domiciled in the Philippines which transacts business in its
own name and for its own account.
2. Same; Same; The appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient
to constitute “doing business” unless it is under the full control of the foreign
corporation; It should be kept in mind that the determination of whether a foreign
corporation is doing business in the Philippines must be judged in light of the attendant
circumstances.-
—The appointment of a distributor in the Philippines is not sufficient to constitute “doing
business” unless it is under the full control of the foreign corporation. On the other hand, if
the distributor is an independent entity which buys and distributes products, other than
those of the foreign corporation, for its own name and its own account, the latter cannot be
considered to be doing business in the Philippines. It should be kept in mind that the
determination of whether a foreign corporation is doing business in the Philippines must
be judged in light of the attendant circumstances.
3. Same; Same; Capacity to Sue; A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines
without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a Filipino or a Philippine entity
that had derived some benefit from their contractual arrangement because the latter is
considered to be estopped from challenging the personality of a corporation after it had
acknowledged the said corporation by entering into a contract with it.-
—This Court has time and again upheld the principle that a foreign corporation doing
business in the Philippines without a license may still sue before the Philippine courts a
Filipino or a Philippine entity that had derived some benefit from their contractual
arrangement because the latter is considered to be estopped from challenging the
personality of a corporation after it had acknowledged the said corporation by entering into
a contract with it. In Antam Consolidated, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 143 SCRA 288 (1986),
this Court had the occasion to draw attention to the common ploy of invoking the
incapacity to sue of an unlicensed foreign corporation utilized by defaulting domestic
companies which seek to avoid the suit by the former. The Court cannot allow this to
continue by always ruling in favor of local companies, despite the injustice to the overseas
corporation which is left with no available remedy.
4. Same; Same; While it is essential to uphold the sound public policy behind the rule that
denies unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the Philippines access to our
courts, it must never be used to frustrate the ends of justice by becoming an all-
encompassing shield to protect unscrupulous domestic enterprises from foreign entities
seeking redress in our country.-
—During this period of financial difficulty, our nation greatly needs to attract more foreign
investments and encourage trade between the Philippines and other countries in order to
rebuild and strengthen our economy. While it is essential to uphold the sound public policy
behind the rule that denies unlicensed foreign corporations doing business in the
Philippines access to our courts, it must never be used to frustrate the ends of justice by
becoming an all-encompassing shield to protect unscrupulous domestic enterprises from
foreign entities seeking redress in our country. To do otherwise could seriously jeopardize
the desirability of the Philippines as an investment site and would possibly have the
 deleterious effect of hindering trade between Philippine companies and international
corporations.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 171995

Counsel: Quisumbing, Torres

Ponente: MENDOZA, J.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the March 31, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and
its March 23, 2006 Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The dismissal order of the Regional Trial Court dated November 15, 1999
is set aside. Steelcase’s Second Amended Complaint is ordered
ADMITTED. The case is REMANDED to the RTC for appropriate action.

3. • NORTHWEST AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, 241 SCRA 192 G.R. No. 112573.
February 9, 1995.*

NORTHWEST ORIENT AIRLINES, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and C.F. SHARP &
COMPANY, INC., respondents.
Courts; Judgments; Jurisdiction; A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the country
from which it comes, until the contrary is shown.—A foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding
in the country from which it comes, until the contrary is shown. It is also proper to presume the regularity
of the proceedings and the giving of due notice therein.

Same; Same; Same; A court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption that it was
acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.—Under Section
50, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, a judgment in an action in personam of a tribunal of a foreign country
having jurisdiction to pronounce the same is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and
their successors-in-interest by a subsequent title. The judgment may, however, be assailed by evidence
of want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Also,
under Section 3 of Rule 131, a court, whether of the Philippines or elsewhere, enjoys the presumption
that it was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction and has regularly performed its official duty.

Same; Same; Same; The party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of overcoming the
presumption of its validity.—Consequently, the party attacking a foreign judgment has the burden of
overcoming the presumption of its validity. Being the party challenging the judgment rendered by the
Japanese court, SHARP had the duty to demonstrate the invalidity of such judgment. In an attempt to
discharge that burden, it contends that the extraterritorial service of summons effected at its home office
in the Philippines was not only ineffectual but also void, and the Japanese Court did not, therefore,
acquire jurisdiction over it.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the
service of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the

______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

193

VOL. 241, FEBRUARY 9, 1995

193

Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

forum.—It is settled that matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of process
upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the forum. In this case, it is the
procedural law of Japan where the judgment was rendered that determines the validity of the
extraterritorial service of process on SHARP.

Same; Same; Same; It was then incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese
procedural law is and to show that under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid.—As to what this
law is is a question of fact, not of law. It may not be taken judicial notice of and must be pleaded and
proved like any other fact. Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provide that it may be
evidenced by an official publication or by a duly attested or authenticated copy thereof. It was then
incumbent upon SHARP to present evidence as to what that Japanese procedural law is and to show that
under it, the assailed extraterritorial service is invalid. It did not. Accordingly, the presumption of validity
and regularity of the service of summons and the decision thereafter rendered by the Japanese court
must stand.

Same; Same; Same; In the light of the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of
identity or similarity or the so-called processual presumption may be invoked.—Alternatively, in the light of
the absence of proof regarding Japanese law, the presumption of identity or similarity or the so-called
processual presumption may be invoked. Applying it, the Japanese law on the matter is presumed to be
similar with the Philippine law on service of summons on a private foreign corporation doing business in
the Philippines.

Same; Same; Same; The extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not
only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance
of official duty.—Inasmuch as SHARP was admittedly doing business in Japan through its four duly
registered branches at the time the collection suit against it was filed, then in the light of the processual
presumption, SHARP may be deemed a resident of Japan, and, as such, was amenable to the jurisdiction
of the courts therein and may be deemed to have assented to the said courts' lawful methods of serving
process. Accordingly, the extraterritorial service of summons on it by the Japanese Court was valid not
only under the processual presumption but also because of the presumption of regularity of performance
of official duty.

194

194

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 192, G.R. No. 112573 February 9, 1995

• STATE INVESTMENT V. CITIBANK, G.R. No. 79926-27, 17 October 1991

Case Title : STATE INVESTMENT HOUSE, INC. and STATE FINANCING CENTER, INC., petitioners,
vs. CITIBANK, N.A., BANK OF AMERICA, NT & SA, HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review from
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Corporation Law|Foreign Corporation|Attachment|Insolvency Law
Syllabi:
1. Corporation Law; Foreign Corporation; Attachment; A foreign corporation licitly
doing business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not be
considered a non-resident within the scope of the legal corporation authorizing attachment
against a defendant not residing in the Philippine Islands.-
This Court itself has already had occasion to hold that a foreign corporation licitly doing
business in the Philippines, which is a defendant in a civil suit, may not be considered a
non-resident within the scope of the legal provision authorizing attachment against a
defendant “not residing in the Philippine Islands;” in other words, a preliminary attachment
 may not be applied for and granted solely on the asserted fact that the defendant is a
foreign corporation authorized to do business in the Philippines—and is consequently and
necessarily, “a party who resides out of the Philippines.” Parenthetically, if it may not be
considered as a party not residing in the Philippines, or as a party who resides out of the
country, then, logically, it must be considered a party who does reside in the Philippines,
who is a resident of the country. Be this as it may, this Court pointed out that: “x x Our
laws and jurisprudence indicate a purpose to assimilate foreign corporations, duly licensed
to do business here, to the status of domestic corporations. (Cf. Section 73, Act No. 1459,
and Marshall Wells Co. vs. Henry W. Elser Co., 46 Phil. 70, 76; Yu; Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 411) We think it would be entirely out of line with this policy should
we make a discrimination against a foreign corporation, like the petitioner, and subject its
property to the harsh writ of seizure by attachment when it has complied not only with
every requirement of law made specially of foreign corporations, but in addition with every
requirement of law made of domestic corporations. xx.”
2. Corporation Law; Foreign Corporation; Insolvency Law; The law grants to a
juridical person as well as to natural persons the power to petition for the adjudication of
bankruptcy of any natural or judicial, provided it is a resident corporation.-
Neither can the Court accept the theory that the omission by the banks in their petition for
involuntary insolvency of an explicit and categorical statement that they are “residents of
the Philippine Islands,” is fatal to their cause. In truth, in light of the concept of resident
foreign corporations just expounded, when they alleged in that petition that they are
foreign banking corporations, licensed to do business in the Philippines, and actually
doing business in this country through branch offices or agencies, they were in effect
stating that they are resident foreign corporations in the Philippines. There is, of course,
as petitioners argue, no substantive law explicitly granting foreign banks the power to
petition for the adjudication of a Philippine corporation as a bankrupt. This is
inconsequential, for neither is there any legal provision expressly giving domestic banks
the same power, although their capacity to petition for insolvency can scarcely be disputed
and is not in truth disputed by petitioners. The law plainly grants to a juridical person,
whether it be a bank or not or it be a foreign or domestic corporation, as to natural persons
as well, such a power to petition for the adjudication of bankruptcy of any person, natural
or juridical, provided that it is a resident corporation and joins at least two other residents
in presenting the petition to the Bankruptcy Court.

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. Nos. 79926-27

Counsel: Roco, Bunag, Kapunan & Migallos, Agcaoili & Associates, Belo, Abiera & Associates

Ponente: NARVASA

Dispositive Portion:
 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the challenged Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against the petitioners.

• HYATT ELEVATORS V. GOLDSTAR ELEVATORS, G.R. No. 161026, 24 October

2005
Case Title : HYATT ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. GOLDSTAR
ELEVATORS, PHILS., INC., respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Civil Procedure|Corporation Law|Actions|Venue|Domicile
Syllabi:
1. Civil Procedure; Actions; Venue; Residence is the permanent home—the place to
which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return. Residence is vital
when dealing with venue.-
Residence is the permanent home—the place to which, whenever absent for business or
pleasure, one intends to return. Residence is vital when dealing with venue. A corporation,
however, has no residence in the same sense in which this term is applied to a natural
person. This is precisely the reason why the Court in Young Auto Supply Company v.
Court of Appeals ruled that “for practical purposes, a corporation is in a metaphysical
sense a resident of the place where its principal office is located as stated in the articles of
incorporation.” Even before this ruling, it has already been established that the residence
of a corporation is the place where its principal office is established. This Court has also
definitively ruled that for purposes of venue, the term “residence” is synonymous with
“domicile.”
2. Corporation Law; Domicile; The residence or domicile of a juridical person is fixed by
“the law creating or recognizing” it.-
It now becomes apparent that the residence or domicile of a juridical person is fixed by
“the law creating or recognizing” it. Under Section 14(3) of the Corporation Code, the
place where the principal office of the corporation is to be located is one of the required
contents of the articles of incorporation, which shall be filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC).
3. Civil Procedure; Actions; Venue; It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of
personal actions are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses subject
to regulation by the Rules of Court.-
Indeed, it is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions are fixed for the
convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses. Equally settled, however, is the principle
that choosing the venue of an action is not left to a plaintiff’s caprice; the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court. Allowing petitioner’s arguments may lead precisely to
what this Court was trying to avoid in Young Auto Supply Company v. CA: the creation of
confusion and untold inconveniences to party litigants.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 161026

Counsel: Alan A. Leynes, Castillo, Laman, Tan, Pantaleon

Ponente: PANGANIBAN

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Decision
and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

• TAYAG V. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, 26 SCRA 242 (1968)

Case Title : TESTATE ESTATE OF IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, deceased. RENATO D. TAYAG,
ancillary administrator-appellee, vs. BENGUET CONSOLIDATED. INC., oppositor-appellant.Case Nature
: APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
Syllabi Class : Special proceedings|Settlement of estate of a decedent|Corporation law|Principal
administration and ancillary administration distinguished|When ancillary administration is proper|Ancillary
administrator|Refusal of domiciliary administrator to deliver shares of stock despite judicial order|
Corporation
Syllabi:
1. Special proceedings; Principal administration and ancillary administration
distinguished; When ancillary administration is proper; Reason.-
It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person
dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country,
administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of
decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other
administration is termed the ancillary administration.
2. Settlement of estate of a decedent; Ancillary administrator; Scope of his power and
authority.-
No one could dispute the power of an ancillary administrator to gain control and
possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines. Such a
power is inherent in his duty to settle her estate and satisfy the claims of local creditors
(Rule 84, Sec. 3, Rules of Court. Cf. Pavia v. De la Rosa, 8 Phil. 70; Liwanag v. Reyes, L-
19159, Sept. 29, 1964; Ignacio v. Elchico, L-18937, May 16, 1967; etc.). It is a general rule
universally recognized that administration, whether principal or ancillary, certainly extends
to the assets of a decedent found within the state or country where it was granted, the
corollary being "that an administrator appointed in one state or country has no power over
property la another state or country" (Leon and Ghezzi v. Manufacturers Life Ins. Co., 90
Phil. 459).
3. Settlement of estate of a decedent; Refusal of domiciliary administrator to deliver
shares of stock despite judicial order; Case at bar.-
Since, in the case at bar, there is a refusal, persistently adhered to by the domiciliary
administrator in New York, to deIiver the shares of stocks of appellant corporation owned
by the decedent to fee ancillary administrator in the Philippines, there was nothing
 unreasonable or arbitrary in considering them as lost and requiring the appellant to issue
new certificates in lieu thereof Thereby, the task incumbent under the law on the ancillary
administrator could be discharged and his responsibility fulfilled. Any other view would
result in the compliance to a valid judicial order being made to depend on the uncontrolled
discretion of a party or entity.
4. Corporation law; Corporation; Concept and nature.-
A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law (Sec. 2, Act No. 1459). A
corporation as known to Philippine jurisprudence is a creature without any existence until
it has received the imprimatur of the state acting according to law. It is logically
inconceivable therefore that it will have rights and privileges of a higher priority than that of
its creator. More than that, it cannot legitimately refuse to yield obedience to acts of its
state organs, certainly not excluding the judiciary. whenever called upon .to do so.

Docket Number: No. L-23145

Counsel: Cirilo F. Asperillo, Jr., Ross. Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito & Misa

Ponente: FERNANDO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of the Honorable Arsenio Santos, the
Judge of the Court of First Instance, dated May 18, 1964, is affirmed. With
costs against oppositor-appellant Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

• NARRA NICKEL MINING V. REDMONT, G.R. No. 195580, 21 April 2014 - NB:
There’s MR
G.R. No. 195580. April 21, 2014.*

NARRA NICKEL MINING AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., TESORO MINING AND DEVELOPMENT, INC.,
and MCARTHUR MINING, INC., petitioners, vs. REDMONT CONSOLIDATED MINES CORP.,
respondent.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Moot and Academic; A case is said to be moot and/or academic when it
“ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.”—Basically, a case is said to be moot and/or academic when it
“ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon
would be of no practical use or value.” Thus, the courts “generally decline jurisdiction over the case or
dismiss it on the ground of mootness.” The “mootness” principle, however, does accept certain exceptions
and the mere raising of an issue of “mootness” will not deter the courts from trying a case when there is a
valid reason to do so. In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo (David), 489 SCRA 160
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.

383
(2006), the Court provided four instances where courts can decide an otherwise moot case, thus: 1.)
There is a grave violation of the Constitution; 2.) The exceptional character of the situation and paramount
public interest is involved; 3.) When constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar, and the public; and 4.) The case is capable of repetition yet
evading review.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; Grandfather Rule; Basically, there are two acknowledged
tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the grandfather rule.—Basically,
there are two acknowledged tests in determining the nationality of a corporation: the control test and the
grandfather rule. Paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC Rules
which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the controlling
interests in enterprises engaged in the exploitation of natural resources owned by Filipino citizens,
provides: Shares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned
by Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality, but if the percentage of Filipino
ownership in the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to
such percentage shall be counted as of Philippine nationality. Thus, if 100,000 shares are registered in
the name of a corporation or partnership at least 60% of the capital stock or capital, respectively, of which
belong to Filipino citizens, all of the shares shall be recorded as owned by Filipinos. But if less than 60%,
or say, 50% of the capital stock or capital of the corporation or partnership, respectively, belongs to
Filipino citizens, only 50,000 shares shall be counted as owned by Filipinos and the other 50,000 shall be
recorded as belonging to aliens. The first part of paragraph 7, DOJ Opinion No. 020, stating “shares
belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens
shall be considered as of Philippine nationality,” pertains to the control test or the liberal rule. On the other
hand, the second part of the DOJ Opinion which provides, “if the percentage of the Filipino ownership in
the corporation or partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such
percentage shall be counted as Philippine nationality,” pertains to the stricter, more stringent grandfather
rule.

384

Same; Same; Corporate Layering; “Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by the Foreign Investments
Act (FIA); but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal.
—“Corporate layering” is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the Constitution and
pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the grandfather rule
has already been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis. Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution
provides: Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources
shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under
the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may
enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five
years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law.

Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; Elementary in statutory construction is when there is conflict
between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail.—Elementary in statutory construction
is when there is conflict between the Constitution and a statute, the Constitution will prevail. In this
instance, specifically pertaining to the provisions under Art. XII of the Constitution on National Economy
and Patrimony, Sec. 3 of the FIA will have no place of application. As decreed by the honorable framers
of our Constitution, the grandfather rule prevails and must be applied.

Partnership; Words and Phrases; A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves
to contribute money, property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits
among themselves.—A partnership is defined as two or more persons who bind themselves to contribute
money, property, or industry to a common fund with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves. On the other hand, joint ventures have been deemed to be “akin” to partnerships since it is
difficult to distinguish

385
between joint ventures and partnerships. Thus: [T]he relations of the parties to a joint venture and the
nature of their association are so similar and closely akin to a partnership that it is ordinarily held that their
rights, duties, and liabilities are to be tested by rules which are closely analogous to and substantially the
same, if not exactly the same, as those which govern partnership. In fact, it has been said that the trend in
the law has been to blur the distinctions between a partnership and a joint venture, very little law being
found applicable to one that does not apply to the other.

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Pseudo-Partnerships; As a rule, corporations are prohibited from entering
into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter into joint venture agreements with other
corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to form “pseudo partnerships.”—Though
some claim that partnerships and joint ventures are totally different animals, there are very few rules that
differentiate one from the other; thus, joint ventures are deemed “akin” or similar to a partnership. In fact,
in joint venture agreements, rules and legal incidents governing partnerships are applied. Accordingly,
culled from the incidents and records of this case, it can be assumed that the relationships entered
between and among petitioners and MBMI are no simple “joint venture agreements.” As a rule,
corporations are prohibited from entering into partnership agreements; consequently, corporations enter
into joint venture agreements with other corporations or partnerships for certain transactions in order to
form “pseudo partnerships.” Obviously, as the intricate web of “ventures” entered into by and among
petitioners and MBMI was executed to circumvent the legal prohibition against corporations entering into
partnerships, then the relationship created should be deemed as “partnerships,” and the laws on
partnership should be applied. Thus, a joint venture agreement between and among corporations may be
seen as similar to partnerships since the elements of partnership are present. Considering that the
relationships found between petitioners and MBMI are considered to be partnerships, then the CA is
justified in applying Sec. 29, Rule 130 of the Rules by stating that “by entering into a joint venture, MBMI
have a joint interest” with Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.
386
Mines and Mining; Panel of Arbitrators; Jurisdiction; The Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has jurisdiction to
settle disputes over rights to mining areas.—We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has
jurisdiction over the instant case. The POA has jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas
which definitely involve the petitions filed by Redmont against petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro.
Redmont, by filing its petition against petitioners, is asserting the right of Filipinos over mining areas in the
Philippines against alleged foreign-owned mining corporations. Such claim constitutes a “dispute” found in
Sec. 77 of RA 7942: Within thirty (30) days, after the submission of the case by the parties for the
decision, the panel shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following: (a)
Disputes involving rights to mining areas (b) Disputes involving mineral agreements or permits.

Same; Same; Same; It is clear that the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) has exclusive and original jurisdiction
over any and all disputes involving rights to mining areas.—It is clear that POA has exclusive and original
jurisdiction over any and all disputes involving rights to mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA
application to which an adverse claim, protest or opposition is filed by another interested applicant. In the
case at bar, the dispute arose or originated from MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting their
rights to mining areas subject of their respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate
petitions for the denial of said applications, then a controversy has developed between the parties and it
is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve said disputes. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions
while what petitioners filed with the DENR Regional Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO are
MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction. Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA
applications under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. Euro-med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas,
495 SCRA 301 (2006), elucidates: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an administrative body, relief
must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter
may well be within their proper jurisdiction.
387

Mercantile Law; Corporations; Control Test; The “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining
whether or not a corporation is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, entitled to undertake the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of
the Philippines.—The “control test” is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation
is a Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake
the exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. When in the mind
of the Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40
Filipino-equity ownership in the corporation, then it may apply the “grandfather rule.”

Leonen, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Mines and Mining; Grandfather Rule; View that the so-called “Grandfather Rule” has no statutory basis. It
is the Control Test that governs in determining Filipino equity in corporations.—The so-called
“Grandfather Rule” has no statutory basis. It is the Control Test that governs in determining Filipino equity
in corporations. It is this test that is provided in statute and by our most recent jurisprudence.
Furthermore, the Panel of Arbitrators created by the Philippine Mining Act is not a court of law. It cannot
decide judicial questions with finality. This includes the determination of whether the capital of a
corporation is owned or controlled by Filipino citizens. The Panel of Arbitrators renders arbitral awards.
There is no dispute and, therefore, no competence for arbitration, if one of the parties does not have a
mining claim but simply wishes to ask for a declaration that a corporation is not qualified to hold a mining
agreement. Respondent here did not claim a better right to a mining agreement. By forum shopping
through multiple actions, it sought to disqualify petitioners. The decision of the majority rewards such
actions.

Same; View that mining is an environmentally sensitive activity that entails the exploration, development,
and utilization of inalienable natural resources.—Mining is an environmentally sensitive activity that entails
the exploration, development, and utilization of inalienable natural resources. It falls within the broad
ambit of Article XII, Section 2 as well as other sections of the 1987 Constitu-

388
tion which refers to ancestral domains and the environment. More specifically, Republic Act No. 7942 or
the Philippine Mining Act, its implementing rules and regulations, other administrative issuances as well
as jurisprudence govern the application for mining rights among others. Small-scale mining is governed
by Republic Act No. 7076, the People’s Small-scale Mining Act of 1991. Apart from these, other statutes
such as Republic Act No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and Republic Act No.
7160, the Local Government Code (LGC) contain provisions which delimit the conduct of mining activities.
Republic Act No. 7042, as amended by Republic Act No. 8179, the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) is
significant with respect to the participation of foreign investors in nationalized economic activities such as
mining. In the 2012 resolution ruling on the motion for reconsideration in Gamboa v. Teves, 682 SCRA
397 (2012), this court stated that “The FIA is the basic law governing foreign investments in the
Philippines, irrespective of the nature of business and area of investment.” Commonwealth Act No. 108,
as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Dummy Law, penalizes those who “allow [their] name or
citizenship to be used for the purpose of evading” “constitutional or legal provisions requir[ing] Philippine
or any other specific citizenship as a requisite for the exercise or enjoyment of a right, franchise or
privilege.” Batas Pambansa Blg. 68, the Corporation Code, is the general law that “provide[s] for the
formation, organization, [and] regulation of private corporations.” The conduct of activities relating to
securities, such as shares of stock, is regulated by Republic Act No. 8799, the Securities Regulation
Code (SRC).
389

Same; Philippine Mining Act (R.A. No. 7942); Panel of Arbitrators; View that nowhere in Section 77 of the
Republic Act No. 7942 is there a grant of jurisdiction to the Panel of Arbitrators (POA) over the
determination of the qualification of applicants.—Nowhere in Section 77 of the Republic Act No. 7942 is
there a grant of jurisdiction to the Panel of Arbitrators over the determination of the qualification of
applicants. The Philippine Mining Act clearly requires the existence of a “dispute” over a mining area, a
mining agreement, with a surface owner, or those pending with the Bureau or the Department upon the
law’s promulgation. The existence of a “dispute” presupposes that the party bringing the suit has a
colorable or putative claim more superior than that of the respondent in the arbitration proceedings. After
all, the Panel of Arbitrators is supposed to provide

389
binding arbitration which should result in a binding award either in favor of the petitioner or the
respondent. Thus, the Panel of Arbitrators is a qualified quasi-judicial agency. It does not perform all
judicial functions in lieu of courts of law.

Same; Same; Mineral Agreements; View that a mineral agreement shall grant to the contractor the
exclusive right to conduct mining operations and to extract all mineral resources found in the contract
area.—In Section 26 of the Mining Act, “[a] mineral agreement shall grant to the contractor the exclusive
right to conduct mining operations and to extract all mineral resources found in the contract area.” There
are three (3) forms of mineral agreements: 1. Mineral production sharing agreement (MPSA) “where the
Government grants to the contractor the exclusive right to conduct mining operations within a contract
area and shares in the gross output [with the] contractor x x x provid[ing] the financing, technology,
management and personnel necessary for the implementation of [the MPSA]”; 2. Co-production
agreement (CA) “wherein the Government shall provide inputs to the mining operations other than the
mineral resource”; and 3. Joint-venture agreement (JVA) “where a joint-venture company is organized by
the Government and the contractor with both parties having equity shares. Aside from earnings in equity,
the Government shall be entitled to a share in the gross output.”

Same; View that the purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that corporations
or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be controlled by
Filipinos.—The rationale for nationalizing the exploration, development, and utilization of natural
resources was explained by this court in Register of Deeds of Rizal v. Ung Siu Si Temple, 97 Phil. 58
(1955), as follows: The purpose of the sixty per centum requirement is obviously to ensure that
corporations or associations allowed to acquire agricultural land or to exploit natural resources shall be
controlled by Filipinos; and the spirit of the Constitution demands that in the absence of capital stock, the
controlling membership should be composed of Filipino citizens.

Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the conclusion that the Grandfather Rule “applies only when the 60-40
Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt” is borne by that opinion’s consideration

390
of an earlier Department of Justice (DOJ) opinion (i.e., DOJ Opinion No. 18, Series of 1989).—The
conclusion that the Grandfather Rule “applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in
doubt” is borne by that opinion’s consideration of an earlier DOJ opinion (i.e., DOJ Opinion No. 18, Series
of 1989). DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005’s quotation of DOJ Opinion No. 18, Series of 1989, reads: x
x x. It is quite clear x x x that the “Grandfather Rule,” which was evolved and applied by the SEC in
several cases, will not apply in cases where the 60-40 Filipino-alien equity ownership in a particular
natural resource corporation is not in doubt.

Same; Foreign Investments Act; Philippine Nationals; View that the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) Lists
the Persons Included in the term “Philippine National.”—Under the Foreign Investments Act, a “Philippine
national” is any of the following: 1. a citizen of the Philippines; 2. a domestic partnership or association
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines; 3. a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines,
of which at least 60% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of
the Philippines; 4. a corporation organized abroad and registered as doing business in the Philippines
under the Corporation Code, of which 100% of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is wholly
owned by Filipinos; or 5. a trustee of funds for pension or other employee retirement or separation
benefits, where the trustee is a Philippine national and at least 60% of the fund will accrue to the benefit
of Philippine nationals.

Same; Same; Same; Control Test; View that the Foreign Investments Act’s (FIA’s) implementing rules
and regulations are clear and unequivocal in declaring that the Control Test shall be applied to determine
the nationality of a corporation in which another corporation owns stocks.—The Foreign Investments Act’s
implementing rules and regulations are clear and unequivocal in declaring that the Control Test shall be
applied to determine the nationality of a corporation in which another corporation owns stocks. From
around the time of the issuance of the SEC’s May 30, 1990 opinion addressed to Mr. Johnny M. Araneta
where the SEC stated that it “decided to do away with the strict application/computation of the so-called
‘Grandfather Rule’ x x x, and instead appl[y] the so-called ‘Control Test,’” the SEC “has consistently
applied the control test.”
391

Same; Same; Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the Foreign Investments Act (FIA) and its implementing
rules notwithstanding, the Department of Justice (DOJ), in DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005, still
posited that the Grandfather Rule is still applicable, “only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership
is in doubt.”—The Foreign Investments Act and its implementing rules notwithstanding, the Department of
Justice, in DOJ Opinion No. 20, series of 2005, still posited that the Grandfather Rule is still applicable,
albeit “only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity ownership is in doubt.” Anchoring itself on DOJ Opinion
No. 20, series of 2005, the SEC En Banc found the Grandfather Rule applicable in its March 25, 2010
decision in Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. v. McArthur Mining Corp. (subject of the petition in G.R.
No. 205513). It asserted that there was “doubt” in the compliance with the requisite 60-40 Filipino-foreign
equity ownership: Such doubt, we believe, exists in the instant case because the foreign investor, MBMI,
provided practically all the funds of the remaining appellee-corporations.

Same; View that the 1987 Constitution is silent on the precise means through which foreign equity in a
corporation shall be determined for the purpose of complying with nationalization requirements in each
industry.—The 1987 Constitution is silent on the precise means through which foreign equity in a
corporation shall be determined for the purpose of complying with nationalization requirements in each
industry. If at all, it militates against the supposed preference for the Grandfather Rule that, its mention in
the Constitutional Commission’s deliberations notwithstanding, the 1987 Constitution was, ultimately,
inarticulate on adopting a specific test or means. The 1987 Constitution is categorical in its omission. Its
meaning is clear. That is to say, by its silence, it chose to not manifest a preference. Had there been any
such preference, the Constitution could very well have said it.

Same; Foreign Investments Act; Philippine Nationals; Words and Phrases; View that Section 3(a) of the
Foreign Investments Act (FIA) defines a “Philippine national” as including “a corporation organized under
the laws of the Philippines of which at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and
entitled to vote is owned and held by citizens of the Philippines.”—Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments
Act defines a “Philippine national” as including “a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines
of which

392
at least sixty per cent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote is owned and held by
citizens of the Philippines.” This is a definition that is consistent with the first part of paragraph 7 of the
1967 SEC Rules, which, as proffered by DOJ Opinion No. 20, Series of 2005, articulates the Control Test:
“[s]hares belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60 per cent of the capital of which is owned by
Filipino citizens shall be considered as of Philippine nationality.”

Same; Same; Same; Control Test; View that it is a matter of transitivity that if Filipino stockholders control
a corporation which, in turn, controls another corporation, then the Filipino stockholders control the latter
corporation, albeit indirectly or through the former corporation.—The application of the Control Test is by
no means antithetical to the avowed policy of a “national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” The
Control Test promotes this policy. It is a matter of transitivity that if Filipino stockholders control a
corporation which, in turn, controls another corporation, then the Filipino stockholders control the latter
corporation, albeit indirectly or through the former corporation.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that as against each other, it is the Control Test, rather than the
Grandfather Rule, which better serves to ensure that Philippine Nationals control a corporation.—As
against each other, it is the Control Test, rather than the Grandfather Rule, which better serves to ensure
that Philippine Nationals control a corporation. As is illustrated by the SEC’s September 21, 1990 opinion
addressed to Carag, Caballes, Jamora, Rodriguez and Somera Law Offices, the application of the
Grandfather Rule does not guarantee control by Filipino stockholders. In certain instances, the application
of the Grandfather Rule actually undermines the rationale (i.e., control) for the nationalization of certain
economic activities.

Same; Same; Same; Same; View that Section 3(aq) of the Mining Act deems as a qualified person (for
purposes of a mineral agreement) a “corporation, at least sixty per centum (60%) of the capital of which is
owned by citizens of the Philippines.”—The Foreign Investments Act’s reckoning of a Philippine national
on the basis of control and the requisite application of the Control Test are reinforced by the Mining Act.
Section 3(aq) of the Mining Act deems as a qualified

393
person (for purposes of a mineral agreement) a “corporation, x x x at least sixty per centum (60%) of the
capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines.” Insofar as the controlling equity requirement is
concerned, this is practically a restatement of Section 3(a) of the Foreign Investments Act.

Same; Same; Same; Grandfather Rule; View that the Grandfather Rule may be used as a supplement to
the Control Test, that is, as a further check to ensure that control and beneficial ownership of a
corporation is in fact lodged in Filipinos.—In Gamboa, “[f]ull beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the
outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is required.” With this in mind, the
Grandfather Rule may be used as a supplement to the Control Test, that is, as a further check to ensure
that control and beneficial ownership of a corporation is in fact lodged in Filipinos.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Litis Pendentia; Words and Phrases; View that litis pendentia
“refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of
action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.”—Litis pendentia “refers to that
situation wherein another action is pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, such
that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious.” It requires the concurrence of three (3)
requisites: (1) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interests in both actions;
(2) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3)
the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would
amount to res judicata in the other. In turn, prior judgment or res judicata bars a subsequent case when
the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there
is — between the first and the second actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of
action.

Same; Same; Forum Shopping; Direct Contempt; View that willful forum shopping leads not only to an
action’s dismissal with prejudice but “shall [also] constitute direct contempt, [and is] a cause for
administrative sanctions.—It should also not escape this court’s

394
attention that the vexatious actions of Redmont would not have been possible were it not for the
permissiveness of Redmont’s counsels. To reiterate, willful forum shopping leads not only to an action’s
dismissal with prejudice but “shall [also] constitute direct contempt, [and is] a cause for administrative
sanctions.” Redmont’s counsels should be reminded that the parameters established by judicial (and
even administrative) proceedings, such as the rule against forum shopping, are not to be trifled with.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals. Narra Nickel
Mining and Development Corp. vs. Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp., 722 SCRA 382, G.R. No. 195580
April 21, 2014

• GAMBOA V. TEVES, G.R. No. 176579, 28 June 2011

Case Title : WILSON P. GAMBOA, petitioner, vs. FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO B. TEVES,
FINANCE UNDERSECRETARY JOHN P. SEVILLA, AND COMMISSIONER RICARDO ABCEDE OF
THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG) IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS
CHAIR AND MEMBERS, RESPECTIVELY, OF THE PRIVATIZATION COUNCIL, CHAIRMAN ANTHONI
SALIM OF FIRST PACIFIC CO., LTD. IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF METRO PACIFIC ASSET
HOLDINGS INC., CHAIRMAN MANUEL V. PANGILINAN OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE
TELEPHONE COMPANY (PLDT) IN HIS CAPACITY AS MANAGING DIRECTOR OF FIRST PACIFIC
CO., LTD., PRESIDENT NAPOLEON L. NAZARENO OF PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE
COMPANY, CHAIR FE BARIN OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION, and PRESIDENT
FRANCIS LIM OF THE PHILIPPINE STOCK EXCHANGE, respondents. PABLITO V. SANIDAD and
ARNO V. SANIDAD, petitioners-in-intervention.Case Nature : ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court.
Prohibition, Injunction, Declaratory Relief and Declaration of Nullity of Sale of Shares of Stock.
Syllabi Class : Corporation Law|Capital
Syllabi:
1. Special Civil Actions; Declaratory Relief; Mandamus; Court treats the petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications.-
—In short, it is well-settled that this Court may treat a petition for declaratory relief as one
for mandamus if the issue involved has far-reaching implications. As this Court held in
Salvacion: The Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for
declaratory relief. However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the
petition has far-reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may
be treated as one for mandamus. (Emphasis supplied)
2. Same; Same; The Court should not leave the matter of compliance with the
constitutional limit on foreign ownership in public utilities, a matter of
transcendental importance, to judicial legislation especially since any ruling the
Court makes on the matter could have deep economic repercussions; It is apt for
Congress to build up on this framework by defining the meaning of “capital.”-
—Under this confusing legislative signals, the Court should not leave the matter of
compliance with the constitutional limit on foreign ownership in public utilities, a matter of
transcendental importance, to judicial legislation especially since any ruling the Court
makes on the matter could have deep economic repercussions. This is not a concern over
which the Court has competence. The 1987 Constitution laid down the general framework
for restricting foreign ownership of public utilities. It is apt for Congress to build up on this
framework by defining the meaning of “capital,” establishing rules for the implementation
of the State policy, providing sanctions for its violation, and vesting in the appropriate
agency the responsibility for carrying out the purposes of such policy.
3. Corporation Law; Capital; The Constitution fails to provide for the meaning of the term
“capital” considering that the shares of stock of a corporation vary in kinds.-
—The Constitution fails to provide for the meaning of the term “capital,” considering that
the shares of stock of a corporation vary in kinds. The usual classification depends on how
profits are to be distributed and which stockholders have the right to vote the members of
the corporation’s board of directors.
4. Remedial Law; Actions; Jurisdiction; Gamboa actions for injunction, declaratory
relief, and declaration of nullity of sale are not among the cases that can be initiated
before the Supreme Court; Only exceptional and compelling circumstances such as
cases of national interest and of serious implications justify direct resort to the Supreme
Court for the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.-
—Strictly speaking, Gamboa actions for injunction, declaratory relief, and declaration of
nullity of sale are not among the cases that can be initiated before the Supreme Court.
Those actions belong to some other tribunal. And, although the Court has original
jurisdiction in prohibition cases, the Court shares this authority with the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts. But this concurrence of jurisdiction does not give the parties
absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice on which court the remedy will be sought.
They must observe the hierarchy of courts. As a rule, the Supreme Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the remedy desired cannot be obtained in other tribunals. Only
exceptional and compelling circumstances such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications justify direct resort to the Supreme Court for the extraordinary remedy
of writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus.
5. Same; Same; Outstanding Capital Stock; The Corporation Code defines
“outstanding capital stock” as the “total shares of stock issued”; It includes all types
of shares.-
—Similarly, the Corporation Code defines “outstanding capital stock” as the “total shares
of stock issued.” It does not distinguish between common and preferred shares. It includes
all types of shares.
6. Same; Same; Securities and Exchange Commission; Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) defined “capital” as to include both voting and non-voting in the
determination of the nationality of a corporation.-
—More importantly, the SEC defined “capital” as to include both voting and non-voting in
the determination of the nationality of a corporation, to wit: In view of the foregoing, it is
opined that the term “capital” denotes the sum total of the shares subscribed and paid by
the shareholders, or secured to be paid, irrespective of their nomenclature to be issued by
the corporation in the conduct of its operation. Hence, non-voting preferred shares are
considered in the computation of the 60-40% Filipino-alien equity requirement of certain
economic activities under the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied.)
7. Same; Same; Stockholders, whether holding voting or non-voting stocks, have all
the rights, powers and privileges of ownership over their stocks; Control is another
inherent right of ownership.-
—Stockholders, whether holding voting or non-voting stocks, have all the rights, powers
and privileges of ownership over their stocks. This necessarily includes the right to vote
because such is inherent in and incidental to the ownership of corporate stocks, and as
such is a property right. Additionally, control is another inherent right of ownership. The
circumstances enumerated in Sec. 6 of the Corporation Code clearly evince this. It gives
voting rights to the stocks deemed as non-voting as to fundamental and major corporate
changes. Thus, the issue should not only dwell on the daily management affairs of the
corporation but also on the equally important fundamental changes that may need to be
voted on. On this, the “non-voting” shares also exercise control, together with the voting
shares.
8. Corporation Law; Capital; The intent of the framers of the Constitution was not to limit
the application of the word “capital” to voting or common shares alone.-
—Contrary to pronouncement of the ponencia, the intent of the framers of the Constitution
was not to limit the application of the word “capital” to voting or common shares alone. In
fact, the Records of the Constitutional Commission reveal that even though the UP Law
Center proposed the phrase “voting stock or controlling interest,” the framers of the
Constitution did not adopt this but instead used the word “capital.”
9. Same; Hierarchy of Courts; The doctrine dictates that when jurisdiction is shared
concurrently with different courts, the proper suit should first be filed with the lower-ranking
court.-
—Although this Court, the CA, and the RTC have “concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.”
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts dictates that when jurisdiction is shared concurrently
with different courts, the proper suit should first be filed with the lower-ranking court.
Failure to do so is sufficient cause for the dismissal of a petition.
10. Same; Mandamus; A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative
remedies available to petitioner.-
—A petition for mandamus is premature if there are administrative remedies available to
petitioner. Under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, “courts cannot or will
not determine a controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound
administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the
administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. In other words,
if a case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and
knowledge of an administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before resort to the courts is had even if the matter may well be within their
proper jurisdiction.” Along with this, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
also requires that where an administrative remedy is provided by statute relief must be
sought by exhausting this remedy before the courts will act.
11. Same; Same; Same; The exercise of such discretion, whether to treat a petition for
declaratory relief as one for mandamus, presupposes that the petition is otherwise viable
or meritorious.-
—Despite this, the ponencia decided to treat the petition for declaratory relief as one for
mandamus, citing the rule that “where the petition has far-reaching implications and raises
questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.” However,
such rule is not absolute. In Macasiano v. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236
(1993), the Court explicitly stated that the exercise of such discretion, whether to treat a
petition for declaratory relief as one for mandamus, presupposes that the petition is
otherwise viable or meritorious. As I shall discuss subsequently in the substantive portion
of this opinion, the petition in this case is clearly not viable or meritorious.
12. Same; Jurisdiction; Declaratory Relief; Petitions for declaratory relief,
annulment of sale and injunction do not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of this
Court; The proper jurisdiction for declaratory relief is the Regional Trial Court
(RTC); Requisites for an Action for Declaratory Relief.-
—Based on the foregoing provisos, it is patently clear that petitions for declaratory relief,
annulment of sale and injunction do not fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of this
Court. First, the court with the proper jurisdiction for declaratory relief is the Regional Trial
Court (RTC). Sec. 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court stresses that an action for declaratory
relief is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, viz.: Any person interested
under a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, whose rights are affected by a
statute, executive order or regulation, ordinance, or any other governmental regulation
may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial
Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of
his rights or duties, thereunder. (Emphasis supplied.) An action for declaratory relief also
requires the following: (1) a justiciable controversy between persons whose interests are
adverse; (2) the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (3) the
issue is ripe for judicial determination. As previously discussed, petitioner lacks any real
interest in this action; thus, no justiciable controversy between adverse interests exists.
13. Same; Same; A taxpayer is deemed to have the standing to raise a constitutional
issue when it is established that public funds have been disbursed in alleged contravention
of the law or the Constitution.-
—Likewise, petitioner’s assertion that he has standing to bring the suit as a “taxpayer”
must fail. In Gonzales v. Narvasa, We discussed that “a taxpayer is deemed to have the
standing to raise a constitutional issue when it is established that public funds have been
disbursed in alleged contravention of the law or the Constitution.” In this case, no public
funds have been disbursed. In fact, the opposite has happened—there is an inflow of
funds into the government coffers.
14. Actions; Locus Standi; Petitioner has not shown any real interest substantial enough
to give him the requisite locus standi to question the sale of the government’s PTIC shares
to First Pacific.-
—The Rules of Court specifically requires that “[e]very action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.” A real party in interest is defined as the
“party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.” Petitioner has failed to allege any interest in the 111,415
PTIC shares nor in any of the previous purchase contracts he now seeks to annul. He is
neither a shareholder of PTIC nor of First Pacific. Also, he has not alleged that he was an
interested bidder in the government’s auction sale of the PTIC shares. Finally, he has not
shown how, as a nominal shareholder of PLDT, he stands to benefit from the annulment
of the sale of the 111,415 PTIC shares or of any of the sales of the PLDT common shares
held by foreigners. In fine, petitioner has not shown any real interest substantial enough to
give him the requisite locus standi to question the sale of the government’s PTIC shares to
First Pacific.
15. Same; Securities and Exchange Commission; The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is vested with the power and function to suspend or revoke, after
proper notice and hearing, the franchise or certificate of registration of corporations,
partnerships or associations, upon any of the grounds provided by law.-
—Under Section 5(m) of the Securities Regulation Code, the SEC is vested with the
“power and function” to “suspend or revoke, after proper notice and hearing, the franchise
or certificate of registration of corporations, partnerships or associations, upon any of the
grounds provided by law.” The SEC is mandated under Section 5(d) of the same Code
with the “power and function” to “investigate x x x the activities of persons to ensure
compliance” with the laws and regulations that SEC administers or enforces. The GIS that
all corporations are required to submit to SEC annually should put the SEC on guard
against violations of the nationality requirement prescribed in the Constitution and existing
laws. This Court can compel the SEC, in a petition for declaratory relief that is treated as a
petition for mandamus as in the present case, to hear and decide a possible violation of
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution in view of the ownership structure of PLDT’s
voting shares, as admitted by respondents and as stated in PLDT’s 2010 GIS that PLDT
submitted to SEC.
16. Same; Same; The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to
include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the
State’s constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens; The
Court should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to
Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest.-
—Indisputably, construing the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution to
include both voting and non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a clear abdication of the State’s
constitutional duty to limit control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an
interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional provision reserving certain areas
of investment to Filipino citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well as
the ownership of land, educational institutions and advertising businesses. The Court
should never open to foreign control what the Constitution has expressly reserved to
Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the Constitution and of the national interest. The
Court must perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent and letter of the
Constitution to ensure, in the words of the Constitution, “a self-reliant and independent
national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.”
17. Same; Same; The term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.-
—Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares. However, if the
preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of directors, then the term
“capital” shall include such preferred shares because the right to participate in the control
or management of the corporation is exercised through the right to vote in the election of
directors. In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only
to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
18. Same; Capital; Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to vote in any
corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting the right of
common shareholders to vote is invalid.-
—Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the control or
management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in the election of
directors because it is the board of directors that controls or manages the corporation. In
the absence of provisions in the articles of incorporation denying voting rights to preferred
shares, preferred shares have the same voting rights as common shares. However,
preferred shareholders are often excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to
vote in the election of directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred
shareholders are merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as
bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable shares
can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of the right to
vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of incorporation restricting
the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.
19. Corporation Law; Words and Phrases; “Capital”; The term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.-
—We agree with petitioner and petitioners-in-intervention. The term “capital” in Section 11,
Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of
directors, and thus in the present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock comprising both common and non-voting preferred shares.
20. Actions; Locus Standi; Petitioner being a stockholder of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone (PLDT) has the right to question the subject sale which he
claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution; Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public.-
—There is no dispute that petitioner is a stockholder of PLDT. As such, he has the right to
question the subject sale, which he claims to violate the nationality requirement prescribed
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution. If the sale indeed violates the Constitution,
 then there is a possibility that PLDT’s franchise could be revoked, a dire consequence
directly affecting petitioner’s interest as a stockholder. More importantly, there is no
question that the instant petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the public.
The fundamental and threshold legal issue in this case, involving the national economy
and the economic welfare of the Filipino people, far outweighs any perceived impediment
in the legal personality of the petitioner to bring this action. In Chavez v. PCGG, 299
SCRA 744 (1998), the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a suit on matters of
transcendental importance to the public.

Division: EN BANC

Docket Number: G.R. No. 176579

Counsel: Edgar D. Dumlao

Ponente: CARPIO, J.

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, we PARTLY GRANT the petition and rule that the term
“capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to
shares of stock entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common shares, and not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and non-voting preferred shares). Respondent
Chairperson of the Securities and Exchange Commission is DIRECTED
to apply this definition of the term “capital” in determining the extent of
allowable foreign ownership in respondent Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company, and if there is a violation of Section 11, Article XII of
the Constitution, to impose the appropriate sanctions under the law.

10.TORTS/ DAMAGES AND CRIMES

• US V. LOOK CHAW, 18 Phil. 573 (1910)
Case Title : THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff and appellee, vs. LOOK CHAW (alias LUK CHIU), defendant
and appellant.Case Nature : APPEAL from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Paredes, J.
Syllabi Class : SHIPS AND SHIPPING|OPIUM IN TRANSIT|LANDING OF CONTRABAND GOODS
Syllabi:
1. SHIPS AND SHIPPING; OPIUM IN TRANSIT; LANDING OF CONTRABAND GOODS;
JURISDICTION.-
Although the mere possession of an article of prohibited use in the Philippine Islands,
aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in any local port, does not, as a general rule, constitute
a crime triable by the courts of the Islands, such vessel being considered as an extension
of its own nationality, the same rule does not apply when the article, the use of which is
 prohibited in the Islands, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil; in such a case an
open violation of the laws of the land is committed, with respect to which, as it is a
violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of the crime, no court
other than that established in the said place has jurisdiction of the offense, in the absence
of an agreement under an international treaty.

Docket Number: No. 5887

Counsel: Thos. D. Aitken, Attorney-General Villamor

Ponente: ARELLANO

Dispositive Portion:
Therefore, reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months
and P1,000, respectively, we affirm in all other respects the judgment
appealed from, with the costs of this instance against the appellant. So
ordered.

• PEOPLE V. WONG CHENG, G.R. No. L-18924, 19 October 1922

Case Title : THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff and appellant, vs. WONG CHENG
(alias WONG CHUN), defendant and appellee.Case Nature : APPEAL from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Manila. De Joya, J.
Syllabi Class : JURISDICTION|FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS
Syllabi:
1. JURISDICTION; FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS; CRIMES COMMITTED
ABOARD.-
There are two fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International
Law; to wit, the French rule, according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign
merchant vessel should not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose
territorial jurisdiction they were committed, unless their commission affects the peace and
security of the territory; and the English rule, based on the territorial principle and followed
in the United States, according to which, crimes perpetrated under such circumstances
are in general triable in the courts of the country within whose territory they were
committed. Of these two rules, it is the last one that obtains in this jurisdiction, because at
present the theories and jurisprudence prevailing in the United States on the matter are
authority in the Philippines which is now a territory of the United States.
2. JURISDICTION; FOREIGN MERCHANT VESSELS; CRIME OF SMOKING OPIUM.-
The mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court in
United States vs. Look Chaw (18 Phil., 573), not triable by our courts, because it being the
primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines against the
disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship,
 without being used in our territory, does not bring about in the said territory those effects
that our statute contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered
a disturbance of the public order. But to smoke opium within our territorial limits, even
though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly a breach of the public order here
established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious effects within our
territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature had in mind in enacting
the aforesaid repressive statute, and is, therefore, triable in our courts.

Docket Number: No. 18924

Counsel: Attorney-General Villa-Real, Eduardo Gutierrez Repide

Ponente: ROMUALDEZ

Dispositive Portion:
The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law, without
special finding as to costs. So ordered.
• TIME, INC. V. REYES, 39 SCRA 303 (1971)
Case Title : TIME, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, ELISEO S. ZARI, as Deputy Clerk of Court, Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, ANTONIO J.
VILLEGAS and JUAN PONCE ENRILE, respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION to annul orders of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Certiorari and prohibition.
Syllabi Class : Remedial law|Revised Penal Code|International law|Criminal law|Libel|Multiple publication
rule|When jurisdiction conferred is exclusive
Syllabi:
1. Remedial law; Venue of civil action for damages in cases of written defamations when
offended party or plaintiff is a public. officer.-
Under the first proviso in section 1, Rep. Act 4363, the venue of a civil action for damages
in cases of written defamations is localized upon the basis of, first, whether the offended
party or plaintiff is a public officer or a private individual; and second, if he is a public
officer, whether his office is in Manila or not in Manila, at the time of the commission of the
offense. If the offended party is a public officer with office in the City of Manila, the proviso
limits him to two (2) choices of venue, namely, "in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila or in the city or province where the libelous article is printed and first published.
2. Remedial law; Allegation of printing and first publication in the complaint.-
The complaint lodged in the court of Rizal by respondents does not allege that the libelous
article was printed and first published in the province of Rizal, and, since the respondents-
plaintiffs are public officers with offices in Manila at the time of the commission of the
alleged offense, it is clear that the only place left for them wherein to file their action is the
Court of First lnstance of Manila.
3. Remedial law; Reasons for limitation of choices of venue.-
The limitation of the choices of venue, as introduced into the Penal Code through its
amendment by Republic Act 4363, was intended "to minimize or limit the filing of out-of-
town libel suits" to protect an alleged offender from "hardships, inconveniences and
harassments" and, furthermore, to protect "the interest of the public service" where one of
the offended parties is a public officer. The intent of the law is clear, a libeled public official
must sue in the court of the locality where he hold? office, in order that the prosecution of
the action should interfere as little as possible with the discharge of his official duties and
labors. The only alternative allowed him by law is to prosecute those responsible for the
libel in the place where the offending article was printed and first published. Here, the law
tolerates the interference with libeled officer's duties only for the sake of avoiding
unnecessary harassment of the accused Since the offending publication was not printed in
the Philip- pines, the alternative venue was not open to respondents Mayor Villegas of
Manila and Undersecretary of Finance Enrile, who were the offended parties.
4. Revised Penal Code; Application and effectivity of law.-
The implication of respondents' argument is that the law should not take effect as to non-
resident defendants or accused. There is nothing in the text of the law that would sustain
such unequal protection to some of those who may be charged with libel. The official
proclamation that a Philippine Press Council has been organized is made a pre-condition
to the effectivity of the entire Republic Act No. 4363, and no terms are employed therein to
indicate that the law can or will be effective only as to some, but not all, of those that may
be charged with libeling our public officers.
5. Remedial law; Venue and jurisdiction, not dependent upon convenience or
inconvenience.-
The assertion that a foreign corporation or a non-resident defendant is not inconvenienced
by an out-of-town suit is irrelevant and untenable, for venue and jurisdiction are not
dependent upon convenience or inconvenience to a party; and moreover, venue was fixed
under Republic Act No. 4353, pursuant to the basic policy of the law that is. a? previously
stated, to protect the interest of the public service when the offended party is a public
officer. by minimizing as much as possible any interference with the discharge of his
duties.
6. International law; No state or court can affect property or persons beyond the limits of
that state.-
It is a fundamental rule of international jurisdiction that no state can by its laws, and no
court (which is only a creature of the state) can by its judgments or decrees, directly bind
or affect property or persons beyond the limits of that state.
7. Remedial law; No criminal action against corporations.-
If the accused is a corporation, no criminal action can lie against it, whether such
corporation be resident or non-resident.
8. Criminal law; Libel; Multiple publication rule; Single publication rule.-
The common law as to causes of action for tort arising out of a single publication was to
the effect that each communication of written or printed matter was a distinct and separate
publication of a libel contained therein, giving rise to a separate cause of action. This rule
(multiple publication rule) is still followed in several American jurisdictions, and seems to
be favored by the American Law Institute. Other jurisdictions have adopted the "single
 publication rule," which or stated in New York under which any single integrated pub-
lication, such as one edition of a newspaper, book, or magazine, or one broadcast, is
treated as a unit, giving- rise to only one cause of action, regardless of the number of
times it is exposed to different people.
9. Remedial law; When jurisdiction conferred is exclusive; Venue provisions of Rep.
Act 4363 is mandatory for party bringing action.+
10. Remedial law; Foreign corporation may seek relief against wrongful assumption of
jurisdiction.-
Petitioner's failure to aver its legal capacity to institute the present petition is not fatal, for a
foreign corporation may, by writ or prohibition, seek relief against the wrongful assumption
of jurisdiction. And a foreign corporation seeking a writ of prohibition against further
maintenance of a suit, on the ground of want of jurisdiction, is not bound by the ruling of
the court in which the suit was brought, on a motion to quash service of summons, that it
has jurisdiction.
11. Remedial law; Certiorari or prohibition in case of denial or deferment of action on a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.-
The action of a court in refusing to rule, or deferring its ruling, on a motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction over the subjectmatter, or for improper venue. is in excess of
jurisdiction and correctible by writ of prohibition or certiorari sued out in the appellate
Court, even before trial on the merits is had.
12. Remedial law; Jurisdiction of court determined by allegations in the complaint.-
It is a settled rule that the jurisdiction of a court over the subject-matter is determined by
the allegations in the complaint; and when a motion to dismiss is filed for lack of
jurisdiction those allegations are deemed admitted for purposes of such motion, so that it
may be resolved without waiting for the trial. Thus it has been held that the consideration
thereof may not be postponed in the hope that the evidence may yield other qualifying or
concurring data which would bring the case under the court's jurisdiction.

Docket Number: No. L-28882

Counsel: Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo & Feliciano, Angel C. Cruz Law Office

Ponente: REYES

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the writs applied for are granted: the respondent Court of
First Instance of Rizal is declared Without jurisdiction to take cognizance
of its

• SAUDI ARABIA AIRLINES V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 122191, 8 October

1998
G.R. No. 122191. October 8, 1998.*

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, MILAGROS P. MORADA and HON.
RODOLFO A. ORTIZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 89, Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
Conflict of Laws; Actions; Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily establish the existence of a foreign
element, the problem could present a “conflicts” case.—Where the factual antecedents satisfactorily
establish the existence of a foreign element, we agree with petitioner that the problem herein could
present a “conflicts” case. A factual situation that cuts across territorial lines and is affected by the diverse
laws of two or more states is said to contain a “foreign element.” The presence of a foreign element is
inevitable since social and economic affairs of individuals and associations are rarely confined to the
geographic limits of their birth or conception.

Same; Same; The forms in which a foreign element may appear are many, such as the fact that one party
is a resident Philippine national, and that the other is a resident foreign corporation.—The forms in which
this foreign element may appear are many. The foreign element may simply consist in the fact that one of
the parties to a contract is an alien or has a foreign domicile, or that a contract between nationals of one
State involves properties situated in another State. In other cases, the foreign element may assume a
complex form. In the instant case, the foreign element consisted in the fact that private respondent
Morada is a resident Philippine national, and that petitioner SAUDIA is a resident foreign corporation.
Also, by virtue of the employment of Morada with the petitioner SAUDIA as a flight stewardess, events did
transpire during her many occasions of travel across national borders, particularly from Manila,
Philippines to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and vice versa, that caused a “conflicts” situation to arise.

Same; Same; Damages; While Article 19 of the Civil Code merely declares a principle of law, Article 21
gives flesh to its provisions; Violations of Articles 19 and 21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable
remedies in the municipal forum.—Although Article 19 merely declares a principle of law, Article 21 gives
flesh to its provisions. Thus, we agree with private respondent’s assertion that violations of Articles 19 and
21 are actionable, with judicially enforceable remedies in the municipal forum. Based on the allegations in
the Amended Complaint, read in the light of the Rules of Court on jurisdiction we find that the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City possesses jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit. Its authority to
try and hear the case is provided for under Section 1 of Republic Act No. 7691.

Same; Same; Forum Non Conveniens; Forum Shopping; Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient
forum, ‘vex,’ ‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or
disturbance, but unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum
should rarely be disturbed.—Pragmatic considerations, including the convenience of the parties, also
weigh heavily in favor of the RTC Quezon City assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is the private interest of
the litigant. Enforceability of a judgment if one is obtained is quite obvious. Relative advantages and
obstacles to a fair trial are equally important. Plaintiff may not, by choice of an inconvenient forum, ‘vex,’
‘harass,’ or ‘oppress’ the defendant, e.g. by inflicting upon him needless expense or disturbance. But
unless the balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should rarely be
disturbed.
Same; Same; Forcing a party to seek remedial action in a place where she no longer maintains
substantial connections would cause a fundamental unfairness to her.—Weighing the relative claims of
the parties, the court a quo found it best to hear the case in the Philippines. Had it refused to take
cognizance of the case, it would be forcing plaintiff (private respondent now) to seek remedial action
elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains substantial connections.
That would have caused a fundamental unfairness to her.

Same; Same; A party effectively submits to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the
complaint on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.—The records show that petitioner SAUDIA has filed
several motions praying for the dismissal of Morada’s Amended Complaint. SAUDIA also filed an Answer
In Ex Abundante Cautelam dated February 20, 1995. What is very patent and explicit from the motions
filed, is that SAUDIA prayed for other reliefs under the premises. Undeniably, petitioner SAUDIA has
effectively submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction by praying for the dismissal of the Amended Complaint
on grounds other than lack of jurisdiction.

Same; Choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.—As to the choice of applicable law, we
note that choice-of-law problems seek to answer two important questions: (1) What legal system should
control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to
what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation.

Same; Although ideally, all choice-of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and
predictability, they do not always do so, in which case the forum is then faced with the problem of
deciding which of these two important values should be stressed.—Several theories have been
propounded in order to identify the legal system that should ultimately control. Although ideally, all choice-
of-law theories should intrinsically advance both notions of justice and predictability, they do not always
do so. The forum is then faced with the problem of deciding which of these two important values should
be stressed.

Same; Characterization or Doctrine of Qualification; Words and Phrases; Characterization is the “process
of deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.”—Before a
choice can be made, it is necessary for us to determine under what category a certain set of facts or rules
fall. This process is known as “characterization,” or the “doctrine of qualification.” It is the “process of
deciding whether or not the facts relate to the kind of question specified in a conflicts rule.” The purpose
of “characterization” is to enable the forum to select the proper law.

Same; Same; An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or
“point of contact.”—Our starting point of analysis here is not a legal relation, but a factual situation, event,
or operative fact. An essential element of conflict rules is the indication of a “test” or “connecting factor” or
“point of contact.” Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting factor or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of
celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing.
Same; Same; “Test Factors” or “Points of Contact” or “Connecting Factors.”—Note that one or more
circumstances may be present to serve as the possible test for the determination of the applicable law.
These “test factors” or “points of contact” or “connecting factors” could be any of the following: “(1) the
nationality of a person, his domicile, his residence, his place of sojourn, or his origin; (2) the seat of a
legal or juridical person, such as a corporation; (3) the situs of a thing, that is, the place where a thing is,
or is deemed to be situated. In particular, the lex situs is decisive when real rights are involved; (4) the
place where an act has been done, the locus actus, such as the place where a contract has been made, a
marriage celebrated, a will signed or a tort committed. The lex loci actus is particularly important in
contracts and torts; (5) the place where an act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
performance of contractual duties, or the place where a power of attorney is to be exercised; (6) the
intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the lex loci
intentionis; (7) the place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done. The lex fori—
the law of the forum—is particularly important because, as we have seen earlier, matters of ‘procedure’
not going to the substance of the claim involved are governed by it; and because the lex fori applies
whenever the content of the otherwise applicable foreign law is excluded from application in a given case
for the reason that it falls under one of the exceptions to the applications of foreign law; and (8) the flag of
a ship, which in many cases is decisive of practically all legal relationships of the ship and of its master or
owner as such. It also covers contractual relationships particularly contracts of affreightment.” (Italics
ours.)

Same; Same; Same; Torts; Where the action is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of
contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred; The
Philippines is the situs of the tort where it is in the Philippines where the defendant allegedly deceived the
plaintiff, a citizen residing and working here, and the fact that certain acts or parts of the injury occurred in
another country is of no moment, for what is important is the place where the over-all harm or the totality
of the injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of the plaintiff had lodged.—
Considering that the complaint in the court a quo is one involving torts, the “connecting factor” or “point of
contact” could be the place or places where the tortious conduct or lex loci actus occurred. And applying
the torts principle in a conflicts case, we find that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the tort (the
place where the alleged tortious conduct took place). This is because it is in the Philippines where
petitioner allegedly deceived private respondent, a Filipina residing and working here. According to her,
she had honestly believed that petitioner would, in the exercise of its rights and in the performance of its
duties, “act with justice, give her her due and observe honesty and good faith.” Instead, petitioner failed to
protect her, she claimed. That certain acts or parts of the injury allegedly occurred in another country is of
no moment. For in our view what is important here is the place where the over-all harm or the totality of
the alleged injury to the person, reputation, social standing and human rights of complainant, had lodged,
according to the plaintiff below (herein private respondent). All told, it is not without basis to identify the
Philippines as the situs of the alleged tort.

Same; Same; Same; Same; “State of the Most Significant Relationship” Rule; The “State of the most
significant relationship” rule is the appropriate modern theory on tort liability to apply in the instant case.—
With the widespread criticism of the traditional rule of lex loci delicti commissi, modern theories and rules
on tort liability have been advanced to offer fresh judicial approaches to arrive at just results. In keeping
abreast with the modern theories on tort liability, we find here an occasion to apply the “State of the most
significant relationship” rule, which in our view should be appropriate to apply now, given the factual
context of this case. In applying said principle to determine the State which has the most significant
relationship, the following contacts are to be taken into account and evaluated according to their relative
importance with respect to the particular issue: (a) the place where the injury occurred; (b) the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred; (c) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of
incorporation and place of business of the parties; and (d) the place where the relationship, if any,
between the parties is centered.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Where the Philippines is the situs of the tort complained of and the
place “having the most interest in the problem,” the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount
application to and control in the resolution of the legal issues arising therein.—As already discussed,
there is basis for the claim that over-all injury occurred and lodged in the Philippines. There is likewise no
question that private respondent is a resident Filipina national, working with petitioner, a resident foreign
corporation engaged here in the business of international air carriage. Thus, the “relationship” between
the parties was centered here, although it should be stressed that this suit is not based on mere labor law
violations. From the record, the claim that the Philippines has the most significant contact with the matter
in this dispute, raised by private respondent as plaintiff below against defendant (herein petitioner), in our
view, has been properly established. Prescinding from this premise that the Philippines is the situs of the
tort complained of and the place “having the most interest in the problem,” we find, by way of
recapitulation, that the Philippine law on tort liability should have paramount application to and control in
the resolution of the legal issues arising out of this case. Further, we hold that the respondent Regional
Trial Court has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the complaint; the appropriate venue
is in Quezon City, which could properly apply Philippine law.

Same; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; A party whose cause of action is based on a Philippine law has
no obligation to plead and prove the law of another State.—We find untenable petitioner’s insistence that
“[s]ince private respondent instituted this suit, she has the burden of pleading and proving the applicable
Saudi law on the matter.” As aptly said by private respondent, she has “no obligation to plead and prove
the law of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia since her cause of action is based on Articles 19 and 21” of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. In her Amended Complaint and subsequent pleadings, she never alleged
that Saudi law should govern this case. And as correctly held by the respondent appellate court,
“considering that it was the petitioner who was invoking the applicability of the law of Saudi Arabia, then
the burden was on it [petitioner] to plead and to establish what the law of Saudi Arabia is.”

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Saudi Arabian Airlines vs. Court
of Appeals, 297 SCRA 469, G.R. No. 122191, G.R. No. 122494 October 8, 1998

• LIANG V. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 125865 (2000)

Case Title : JEFFREY LIANG (HUEFENG), petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig City, Br. 160.
Syllabi Class : International Law|Courts|Foreign Affairs|Diplomatic Immunity|Courts|Due Process|
Criminal Law|Slander|Criminal Procedure|Preliminary Investigation
Syllabi:
1. International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity; Courts; Due Process;
Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face a communication from the Department of
Foreign Affairs that a particular person is covered by any immunity; Due process is a right
of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution.-
 Courts cannot blindly adhere and take on its face the communication from the DFA that
petitioner is covered by any immunity. The DFA’s determination that a certain person is
covered by immunity is only preliminary which has no binding effect in courts. In receiving
ex-parte the DFA’s advice and in motu proprio dismissing the two criminal cases without
notice to the prosecution, the latter’s right to due process was violated. It should be noted
that due process is a right of the accused as much as it is of the prosecution. The needed
inquiry in what capacity petitioner was acting at the time of the alleged utterances requires
for its resolution evidentiary basis that has yet to be presented at the proper time. At any
rate, it has been ruled that the mere invocation of the immunity clause does not ipso facto
result in the dropping of the charges.
2. International Law; Foreign Affairs; Diplomatic Immunity; Criminal Law; Slander;
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement between
the Asian Development Bank and the Republic of the Philippines because our laws do not
allow the ccmmission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of official duty.-
Slandering a person could not possibly be covered by the immunity agreement because
our laws do not allow the commission of a crime, such as defamation, in the name of
official duty. The imputation of theft is ultra vires and cannot be part of official functions. It
is well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private
capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice or in bad
faith or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. It appears that even the
government’s chief legal counsel, the Solicitor General, does not support the stand taken
by petitioner and that of the DFA.
3. Courts; Criminal Procedure; Preliminary Investigation; Preliminary investigation is
not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC—being purely a statutory right, it
may be invoked only when specifically granted by law.-
On the contention that there was no preliminary investigation conducted, suffice it to say
that preliminary investigation is not a matter of right in cases cognizable by the MeTC
such as the one at bar. Being purely a statutory right, preliminary investigation may be
invoked only when specifically granted by law. The rule on criminal procedure is clear that
no preliminary investigation is required in cases falling within the 7 jurisdiction of the
MeTC. Besides, the absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court’s
jurisdiction nor does it impair the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective.

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 125865

Counsel: Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los Angeles, The Solicitor General

Ponente: YNARES-SANTIAGO

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
NB: There’s an MR a year after on the same case

• DEL SOCORRO V. VAN WILSEM, G.R. No. 193707, 10 December 2014

Case Title : NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, petitioner, vs. ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, respondent.Case Nature :
PETITION for review on certiorari of the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.
Syllabi Class : Criminal Law ; Violence Against Women and Their Children ; Continuing Offenses ;
Syllabi:
1. Same; Same; Continuing Offenses; The act of denying support to a child under
Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262 is a continuing offense, which started
in 1995 but is still ongoing at present.-
—The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense, which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed. Given, however, that the
issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood
of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-
Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Appeals; Hierarchy of Courts; Republic v. Sunvar
Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320 (2012), lays down the instances when a
ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court (SC)
without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.-
—At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation, 674 SCRA 320 (2012),
which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal
directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
3. Civil Law; Conflict of Law; Nationality Theory; Support; Since the respondent is a
citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, the Supreme Court (SC) agrees with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC)-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law,
as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.-
—We agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 195 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 15 of
the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support,
the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties. The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights
and duties. Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so.
 4. Conflict of Laws; Evidence; Burden of Proof; Foreign Laws; International Law; In
international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
has the burden of proving the foreign law.-
—In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or
case has the burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, respondent hastily
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support. While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never
proved the same. It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law
of the Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court
of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 (2000), has already enunciated that: True, foreign laws do not
prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.
5. Same; Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Foreign Laws; If the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.-
—In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor,
the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
the same as our local or domestic or internal law. Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the noncompliance therewith.
6. Criminal Law; Violence Against Women and Their Children; The deprivation or
denial of financial support to the child is considered an act of violence aga inst women and
children.+

Division: THIRD DIVISION.

Docket Number: G.R. No. 193707

Counsel: Joyo, Labrado and Yapha Law Offices for respondent.

Ponente: PERALTA

Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19,
2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of
the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is
REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on
the merits of the case.
• AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, 11 January 2018