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Gamas VS Judge Oco

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RULE 116, SECTION 1 (Case No.

2)
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1231. March 17, 2004.] (formerly OCA IPI No. 97-287-MTJ)
Complainants: ANTONIO GAMAS and FLORENCIO SOBRIO
Respondents: JUDGE ORLANDO A. OCO, in his capacity as presiding judge of Municipal
Trial Court, Polomolok, South Cotabato and PNP SPO4 WILLIE ADULACION in his
capacity as public prosecutor of MTC-Polomolok, South Cotabato

Facts:
Complainants allege that they are the accused in a case for theft which was pending
in the sala of respondent judge. According to them, respondent Adulacion enticed them
to plead guilty to the charge, apply for probation, and thus avoid imprisonment.

Respondent Adulacion, who had allegedly prepared a draft decision embodying his
suggestion, conferred with respondent judge, and handed the draft decision to respondent
judge.
a. After reading the document, respondent judge signed it, told complainants "O,
plead guilty man kamo" ("O, you're pleading guilty"), and handed the document
to a clerk.
b. Respondent judge told the clerk to read the contents of the decision to
complainants and to instruct them on what to do. The clerk read the contents of
the document to complainants and asked them to sign it. Complainants signed
the document upon respondent Adulacion's assurance that once the police
apprehend the rest of the accused, the police will revive the case and respondent
Adulacion will present complainants as "star witnesses." Complainants later
found out that what they signed was an Order ("3 October 1996 Order") finding
them guilty of theft and sentencing them each to imprisonment for six (6) months
and one (1) day.

Finding the proceedings highly irregular, complainants sought the assistance of a lawyer.
Upon motion of complainants' counsel, respondent judge vacated the 3 October 1996 Order,
ostensibly on the ground that complainants had entered improvident guilty pleas. Respondent
judge scheduled complainants' re-arraignment on 2 February 1997. In the present complaint,
complainants contend that respondent judge is administratively liable for rendering judgment
against them without the benefit of an arraignment and in violation of their right to be
represented by counsel. Respondent judge maintains that there was no irregularity in the
issuance of the 3 October 1996 Order. Respondent judge adds that he decided to set aside his
ruling merely out of compassion for complainants.
Issue:
Whether or not complainants were properly arraigned.

Ruling:
No, the complainants were not properly arraigned.

1. Respondent Judge Failed to Properly Apprise Complainants of their Right to


Counsel.

The Constitution mandates that "[I]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall . . .
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel." Indeed, the accused has a right to
representation by counsel from the custodial investigation all the way up to the appellate
proceedings. At the arraignment stage, Section 6 of Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: “SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. — Before
arraignment, the court shall inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires
to have one. Unless the accused is allowed to defend himself in person or has employed
counsel of his choice, the court must assign a counsel de officio to defend him. “

Compliance with these four duties is mandatory. The only instance when the court can
arraign an accused without the benefit of counsel is if the accused waives such right and the
court, finding the accused capable, allows him to represent himself in person. However, to be a
valid waiver, the accused must make the waiver voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. In
determining whether the accused can make a valid waiver, the court must take into account all
the relevant circumstances, including the educational attainment of the accused.

In the present case, respondent judge contends that complainants waived their right to
counsel and insisted on their immediate arraignment. However, the court find that respondent
judge did not properly apprise complainants of their right to counsel prior to their arraignment.
Consequently, there was no basis for complainants' alleged waiver of such right.

In his Answer, respondent judge does not deny that when he "arraigned" complainants,
no lawyer assisted the complainants. However, respondent judge asserted that the attendance
of a "lawyer was their (complainants') problem." Respondent judge stated that before arraigning
complainants, he gave a "discourse [of] their rights as accused." Respondent judge also stated
that since the police caught complainants in flagrante delicto, complainants told him "a lawyer
would not have much use." Respondent judge further stated that complainants "expressed that
they have no money to pay for a lawyer." Respondent judge informed complainants "he can
give them a PAO lawyer" if they so desired. However, respondent judge did not appoint a PAO
lawyer despite being informed by complainants that they could not afford a lawyer.

These do not amount to compliance with Section 6 of Rule 116. Respondent judge has
the duty to insure that there is no violation of the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.
Respondent judge is grossly mistaken in saying that securing a "lawyer was their
(complainants') problem." Once the accused informs the judge that he cannot afford a lawyer
and the court has not allowed the accused to represent himself, or the accused is incapable of
representing himself, the judge has the duty to appoint a counsel de oficio to give meaning and
substance to the constitutional right of the accused to counsel.

2. Respondent Judge's Arraignment of Complainants Highly Irregular

Section 1(a), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states: “Arraignment
and plea; how made. — The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint
or information was filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment shall be made in open court by the
judge or clerk by furnishing the accused with a copy of the complaint or information, reading the
same in the language or dialect known to him, and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not
guilty. The prosecution may call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint
or information.”

[S]ection 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the arraignment should be made in open court
by the judge himself or by the clerk of court [1] furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or
information with the list of witnesses stated therein, then [2] reading the same in the language or
dialect that is known to him, and [3] asking him what his plea is to the charge.

The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said Section 1 should
be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the accused by way of implementation of
the all-important constitutional mandate regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the
precise nature of the accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be
able to hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.

In this case, respondent judge similarly failed to comply with the requirements of Section
1(a) of Rule 116. Complainants deny respondent judge's claim that he arraigned complainants
by "read[ing] to them [the information] in the dialect they understand and inform[ing] them [of]
the nature of the evidence arrayed [against them]. However, there is no disputing that
respondent judge failed to furnish complainants a copy of the information with the list of the
witnesses.

Respondent judge may have genuinely desired to spare complainants the travails of being
detained in jail, thus the rush in arraigning them, accepting their guilty pleas, imposing a light
sentence, and granting them probation. While well-intentioned, such conduct unjustifiably short-
circuited the mandatory arraignment procedure in Section 1(a) of Rule 116.

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