La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

10/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 278
498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
*
G.R. No. 95252. September 5, 1997.
LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, SOLID HOMES, INC., ATENEO DE MANILA
UNIVERSITY, ROMULO VILLA, LORENZO TIMBOL, EMDEN
ENCARNACION, VICENTE CASIÑO, JR., DOMINGO REYES,
PEDRO C. MERCADO, MARIO AQUINO, RAFAEL GOSECO,
PORFIRIO CABALU, JR., and ANTONIO ADRIANO, in their
behalf and in behalf of the residents of LOYOLA GRAND
VILLAS, INC., PHASES I AND II, respondents.
Remedial Law; Writ of Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary

injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The
opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary
injunction are interlocutory in nature and
___________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
499
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 499
made even before the trial on the merits is terminated.—We do not agree
with petitioner. The reliance of petitioner on the cited cases is out of place as
they involve the issuance of a preliminary injunction pending resolution of a
case on the merits. In the instant case, however, the subject of inquiry is not
merely the issuance of a preliminary injunction but the final injunctive writ
which was issued after trial on the merits. A writ of preliminary injunction
is generally based solely on initial and incomplete evidence. The opinion
and findings of fact of a court when issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
are interlocutory in nature and made even before the trial on the merits is
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000166b04bfb7a05de8533003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/18
terminated. Consequently there may be vital facts subsequently presented

during the trial which were not obtaining when the writ of preliminary
injunction was issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the issuance of a
preliminary injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive writ is
erroneous. And it does not necessarily mean that when a writ of preliminary
injunction issues a final injunction follows.
Civil Law; Easement; A legal or compulsory easement is that which is

constituted by law for public use or for private interest. A voluntary
easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or agreement of the
parties.—A legal or compulsory easement is that which is constituted by
law for public use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649
and 650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal or
compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the existence of four
(4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded by other immovables and
is without adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) after payment of the
proper indemnity; (c) the isolation was not due to the proprietor’s own acts;
and, (d) the right-of-way claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate, and insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will or
agreement of the parties.
Same; Same; When the court says that an easement exists, it is not
creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as there
is no such thing as a judicial easement. The court merely declares the
existence of an easement created by the parties.—Resultantly, when the
court says that an easement exists, it is not creating one. For, even an
injunction cannot be used to create one as there is no such thing as a judicial
easement. As in the instant case, the court merely declares the existence of
an easement created by
500
the parties. Respondent court could not have said it any better—It must be
emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement along
Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by the
manifest will of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of contracts
(Articles 1306 and 619, New Civil Code; Tolen-tino, supra, page 308; Civil
Code of the Philippines, by Paras, Volume II, 1984 edition, page 549).
Same; Same; The denial of the motions for intervention arising from
the strict application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the
alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit
an act of injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all
purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud,
falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be proven to be
true.—Petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA residents at a
time when the case was already on appeal, and submits that intervention is
no longer permissible after trial has been concluded. It is quite clear and
patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this stage of
the proceedings where trial has already been concluded, a judgment thereon
had been promulgated in favor of private respondent and on appeal by the
losing party x x x the same was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the
instant petition for certiorari to review said judgment is already submitted
for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and manifestly late,
beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the Rules of
Court (now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure). But Rule 12 of
the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule
of procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers
of the Court fully and completely available for justice. The purpose of
procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to facilitate the
application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. It was created
not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of
justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always striving
to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end. The denial of the motions for
intervention arising from the strict application of the Rule due to alleged
lack of notice to, or the alleged failure of, movants to act seasonably will
lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their
successors-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and
thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should
intervenors’ claims be proven to be true. After
501
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 501
all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay the
proceedings. On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the resolution of
the case as the incidents brought forth by the intervention, which could have
been raised in another case, were resolved together with the issues herein
resulting in a more thorough disposal of this case.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of

Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Bonifacio A. Alentajan for petitioner.

Benedicto G. Arcinas collaborating counsel for petitioner.
Angara, Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz for Romulo
Villa, et al.
Bengzon, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson, Bengson & Jimenez for
Ateneo de Manila University.
Tomas R. Leonidas for Solidhomes, Inc.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
MANGYAN ROAD is a 15-meter wide thoroughfare in Quezon

City abutting Katipunan Avenue on the west, traversing the edges of
La Vista Subdivision on the north and of the Ateneo de Manila
University and Maryknoll (now Miriam) College on the south.
Mangyan Road serves as the boundary between LA VISTA on one
side and ATENEO and MARYKNOLL on the other. It bends
towards the east and ends at the gate of Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision. The road has been the subject of an endless dispute, the
disagreements always stemming from this unresolved issue: Is there
an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road?
In resolving this controversy, the Court would wish to write finis
to this seemingly interminable debate which has dragged on for
more than twenty years.
The area comprising the 15-meter wide roadway was originally
part of a vast tract of land owned by the Tuasons in Quezon City and
Marikina. On 1 July 1949 the Tuasons sold
502

to Philippine Building Corporation a portion of their landholdings

amounting to 1,330,556 square meters by virtue of a Deed of Sale
with Mortgage. Paragraph three (3) of the deed provides that “x x x
the boundary line between the property herein sold and the
adjoining property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15)
meters wide, one-half of which shall be taken from the property
herein sold to the VENDEE and the other half from the portion
adjoining belonging to the VENDORS.”
On 7 December 1951 the Philippine Building Corporation, which
was then acting for and in behalf of Ateneo de Manila University
(ATENEO) in buying the properties from the Tuasons, sold,
assigned and formally transferred in a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Mortgage, with the consent of the Tuasons, the
subject parcel of land to ATENEO which assumed the mortgage.
The deed of assignment states—
The ASSIGNEE hereby agrees and assumes to pay the mortgage obligation
on the above-described land in favor of the MORTGAGOR and to perform
any and all terms and conditions as set forth in the Deed of Sale with
Mortgage dated July 1, 1949, hereinabove referred to, which said document
is incorporated herein and made an integral part of this contract by reference
xxxx
On their part, the Tuasons developed a part of the estate adjoining

the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation into a residential
village known as La Vista Subdivision. Thus the boundary between
LA VISTA and the portion sold to Philippine Building Corporation
was the 15-meter wide roadway known as the Mangyan Road.
On 6 June 1952 ATENEO sold to MARYKNOLL the western
portion of the land adjacent to Mangyan Road. MARYKNOLL then
constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter wide roadway
making one-half of Mangyan Road part of its school campus. The
Tuasons objected and later filed a complaint before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal for the demolition of the wall. Subsequently,
in an amicable settlement, MARYKNOLL agreed to remove the
wall and restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters.
503
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 503

Meanwhile, the Tuasons developed its 7.5-meter share of the 15-

meter wide boundary. ATENEO deferred improvement on its share
and erected instead an adobe wall on the entire length of the
boundary of its property parallel to the 15-meter wide roadway.
On 30 January 1976 ATENEO informed LA VISTA of the
former’s intention to develop some 16 hectares of its property along
Mangyan Road into a subdivision. In response, LA VISTA President
Manuel J. Gonzales clarified certain aspects with regard to the use of
Mangyan Road. Thus—
x x x The Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters wide, one-half of which is

taken from your property and the other half from the La Vista Subdivision.
So that the easement of a right-of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created
in our favor and likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7
1/2 portion of the road in your favor (paragraph 3 of the Deed of Sale
between the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation and Ateneo
de Manila dated 1 July 1949 x x x x
On 28 April 1976 LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales, in a

letter to ATENEO President Fr. Jose A. Cruz, S.J., offered to buy
under specified conditions the property ATENEO was intending to
develop. One of the conditions stipulated by the LA VISTA
President was that “[i]t is the essence of the offer that the mutual
right of way between the Ateneo de Manila University and La Vista

Homeowners’ Association will be extinguished.” The offer of LA
VISTA to buy was not accepted by ATENEO. Instead, on 10 May
1976 ATENEO offered to sell the property to the public subject to
the condition that the right to use the 15-meter roadway will be
transferred to the vendee who will negotiate with the legally
involved parties regarding the use of such right as well as the
development costs for improving the access road.
LA VISTA became one of the bidders. However it lost to Solid
Homes, Inc., in the bidding. Thus on 29 October 1976 ATENEO
executed a Deed of Sale in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., over parcels
of land covering a total area of 124,424 square meters subject,
among others, to the condition that—
504

7. The VENDOR hereby passes unto the VENDEE, its assigns and
successors-in-interest the privileges of such right of way which the
VENDOR acquired, and still has, by virtue of the Deeds mentioned in the
immediately preceeding paragraph hereof; provided, that the VENDOR
shall nonetheless continue to enjoy said right of way privileges with the
VENDEE, which right of way in favor of the VENDOR shall be annotated
on the pertinent road lot titles. However it is hereby agreed that the
implementation of such right of way shall be for the VENDEE’s sole
responsibility and liability, and likewise any development of such right of
way shall be for the full account of the VENDEE. In the future, if needed,
the VENDOR is therefore free to make use of the aforesaid right of way,
and/or Mangyan Road access, but in such a case the VENDOR shall
contribute a pro-rata share in the maintenance of the area.
Subsequently, Solid Homes, Inc., developed a subdivision now

known as Loyola Grand Villas and together they now claim to have
an easement of right-of-way along Mangyan Road through which
they could have access to Katipunan Avenue.
LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales however informed
Solid Homes, Inc., that LA VISTA could not recognize the right-of-
way over Mangyan Road because, first, Philippine Building
Corporation and its assignee ATENEO never complied with their
obligation of providing the Tuasons with a right-of-way on their 7.5-
meter portion of the road and, second, since the property was
purchased for commercial purposes, Solid Homes, Inc., was no
longer entitled to the right-of-way as Mangyan Road was established
exclusively for ATENEO in whose favor the right-of-way was
originally constituted. LA VISTA, after instructing its security
guards to prohibit agents and assignees of Solid Homes, Inc., from
traversing Mangyan Road, then constructed one-meter high

cylindrical concrete posts chained together at the middle of and
along the entire length of Mangyan Road thus preventing the
residents of LOYOLA from passing through.
Solid Homes, Inc., complained to LA VISTA but the concrete
posts were not removed. To gain access to LOYOLA through
Mangyan Road an opening through the adobe wall of ATENEO was
made and some six (6) cylindrical concrete
505
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 505

posts of LA VISTA were destroyed. LA VISTA then stationed

security guards in the area to prevent entry to LOYOLA through
Mangyan Road.
On 17 December 1976, to avert violence, Solid Homes, Inc.,
instituted the instant case, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-22450,
before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal and prayed that LA
VISTA be enjoined from preventing and obstructing the use and
passage of LOYOLA residents through Mangyan Road. LA VISTA
in turn filed a third-party complaint against ATENEO. On 14
September 1983 the trial court issued a preliminary injunction in
favor of Solid Homes, Inc. (affirming an earlier order of 22
November 1977), directing LA VISTA to desist from blocking and
preventing the use of Mangyan Road. The injunction order of 14
September 1983 was however nullified and set aside on 31 May
1
1985 by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. SP No.
02534. Thus in a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R.
No. 71150, Solid Homes, Inc., assailed the nullification and setting
aside of the preliminary injunction issued by the trial court.
Meanwhile, on 20 November 1987 the Regional 2
Trial Court of
Quezon City rendered a decision on the merits in Civil Case No. Q-
22450 affirming and recognizing the easement of right-of-way along
Mangyan Road in favor of Solid Homes, Inc., and ordering LA
VISTA to pay damages thus—
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that an easement

of a right-of-way exists in favor of the plaintiff over Mangyan Road, and,
consequently, the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff is granted, enjoining
thereby the defendant, its successors-in-interest, its/their agents and all
persons acting for and on its/their behalf, from closing, obstructing,
preventing or otherwise refusing to the plaintiff, its successors-in-interest,
its/their agents and all persons acting for and on its/their behalf, and to the
public in general,
__________________
1 Decision penned by Justice Simeon M. Gopengco, concurred in by Justices Lino M. Patajo
and Jose Racela, Jr.
2 Decision penned by Judge Rodolfo A. Ortiz, RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City.
506

the unobstructed ingress and egress on Mangyan Road, which is the

boundary road between the La Vista Subdivision on one hand, and the
Ateneo de Manila University, Quezon City, and the Loyola Grand Villas
Subdivision, Marikina, Metro Manila, on the other; and, in addition the
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff reasonable attorney’s fees in the
amount of P30,000.00. The defendant-third-party plaintiff is also ordered to
pay the third-party defendant reasonable attorney’s fees for another amount
of P15,000.00. The counter-claim of the defendant against the plaintiff is
dismissed for lack of merit. With costs against the defendant.
Quite expectedly, LA VISTA appealed to the Court of Appeals,

docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19929. On 20 April 1988 this Court,
taking into consideration the 20 November 1987 Decision of the trial
court, dismissed the petition docketed as G.R. No. 71150 wherein
Solid Homes, Inc., sought reversal of the 31 May 1985 Decision in
AC-G.R. SP No. 02534 which nullified and set aside the 14
September 1983 injunction order of the trial court. There we said—
Considering that preliminary injunction is a provisional remedy which may

be granted at any time after the commencement of the action and before
judgment when it is established that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded and only when his complaint shows facts entitling such reliefs
(Section 3[a], Rule 58) and it appearing that the trial court had already
granted the issuance of a final injunction in favor of petitioner in its decision
rendered after trial on the merits (Sections 7 & 10, Rule 58, Rules of Court),
the Court resolved to Dismiss the instant petition having been rendered
moot and academic. An injunction issued by the trial court after it has
already made a clear pronouncement as to the plaintiff’s right thereto, that
is, after the same issue has been decided on the merits, the trial court having
appreciated the evidence presented, is proper, notwithstanding the fact that
the decision rendered is not yet final (II Moran, pp. 81-82, 1980 ed.). Being
an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction cannot stand
separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered on the merit of
the main case for injunction. The merit of the main case having been already
determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary determination of its
3
non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
_______________
3 Resolution of 20 April 1988, G.R. No. 71150, p. 2.

507
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 507

On the other hand, in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, several incidents

were presented for resolution: two (2) motions filed by Solid Homes,
Inc., to cite certain officers of LA VISTA for contempt for alleged
violation of the injunction ordaining free access to and egress from
Mangyan Road, to which LA VISTA responded with its own motion
to cite Solid Homes, Inc., for contempt; a motion for leave to
intervene and to re-open Mangyan Road filed by residents of
LOYOLA; and, a petition praying for the issuance of a restraining
order to enjoin the closing of Mangyan Road. On 21 September
4
1989 the incidents were resolved by the Court of Appeals thus—
1. Defendant-appellant La Vista Association, Inc., its Board of

Directors and other officials and all persons acting under their
orders and in their behalf are ordered to allow all residents of Phase
I and II of Loyola Grand Villas unobstructed right-of-way or
passage through the Mangyan Road which is the boundary between
the La Vista Subdivision and the Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision;
2. The motion to intervene as plaintiffs filed by the residents of
Loyola Grand Villas Subdivision is GRANTED; and
3. The motions for contempt filed by both plaintiff-appellee and
defendant-appellant are DENIED.
5
This resolution is immediately executory.
On 15 December 1989 both motions for reconsideration of Solid

Homes, Inc., and LA VISTA were denied. In separate petitions, both
elevated the 21 September 1989 and 15 December 1989 Resolutions
of the Court of Appeals to this Court. The petition of Solid Homes,
Inc., docketed as G.R. No. 91433, prayed for an order directing the
appellate court to take cognizance of and hear the motions for
contempt, while that of LA VISTA in G.R. No. 91502 sought the
issuance of a preliminary injunction to order Solid Homes, Inc.,
ATENEO
__________________
4 Resolution penned by Justice Santiago M. Kapunan (now a member of this

Court), concurred in by Justices Lorna S. Lombos-De la Fuente and Minerva G.
Reyes.
5 See Resolution of 4 March 1992 in G.R. Nos. 91433 and 91502, pp. 3-4.
508

and LOYOLA residents to desist from intruding into Mangyan

Road.
On 22 May 1990, pending resolution of G.R. Nos. 91433 and
6
91502, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 19929 affirmed in toto the Decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. Q-22450. On 6 September 1990 the motions for
reconsideration and/or re-raffle and to set the case for oral argument
were denied. In view of the affirmance of the Decision by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929 this Court dismissed the
petition in G.R. No. 91502 for being moot as its main concern was
merely the validity of a provisional or preliminary injunction earlier
issued. We also denied the petition in G.R. No. 91433 in the absence
of a discernible grave abuse of discretion in the ruling of the
appellate court that it could not entertain the motions to cite the
parties for contempt “ because a charge of contempt committed
against a superior court may be filed only before the court against
whom the contempt has been committed” (Sec. 4, Rule 71, Rules of
7
Court).
Consequently we are left with the instant case where petitioner
LA VISTA assails the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
affirming in toto the Decision of the trial court which rendered a
judgment on the merits and recognized an easement of right-of-way
along Mangyan Road, permanently enjoining LA VISTA from
closing to Solid Homes, Inc., and its successors-in-interest the
ingress and egress on Mangyan Road.
In its first assigned error, petitioner LA VISTA argues that
respondent appellate court erred in disregarding the decisions in (a)
8
La Vista Association, Inc. v. Hon. Ortiz, affirmed by
___________________
6 Decision penned by Justice Jose A.R. Melo (now a member of this Court),
concurred in by Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Filemon H. Mendoza.
7 See Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, 21
September 1989, p. 7.
8 CA-G.R. No. 02534, 31 May 1985.
509
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 509

9
this Court in Tecson v.
10
Court of Appeals; (b) La Vista Association,
Inc. v. Hon. Leviste, affirmed by this Court in Rivera v. Hon.
11 12
11 12
Intermediate Appellate Court; and, (c) La Vista v. Hon. Mendoza,
and in holding that an easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road
13
exists.
We do not agree with petitioner. The reliance of petitioner on the
cited cases is out of place as they involve the issuance of a
preliminary injunction pending resolution of a case on the merits. In
the instant case, however, the subject of inquiry is not merely the
issuance of a preliminary injunction but the final injunctive writ
which was issued after trial on the merits. A writ of preliminary
injunction is generally based solely on initial and incomplete
evidence. The opinion and findings of fact of a court when issuing a
writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made
even before the trial on the merits is terminated. Consequently there
may be vital facts subsequently presented during the trial which
were not obtaining when the writ of preliminary injunction was
issued. Hence, to equate the basis for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction with that for the issuance of a final injunctive writ is
erroneous. And it does not necessarily mean that when a writ of
preliminary injunction issues a final injunction follows. Accordingly,
respondent Court of Appeals in its assailed Decision rightly held that
—
We are unswayed by appellant’s theory that the cases cited by them in their
Brief (pages 17 and 32) and in their motion for early resolution (page 11,
Rollo) to buttress the first assigned error, are final judgments on the merits
of, and therefore res judicata to the instant query. It is quite strange that
appellant was extremely cautious in not mentioning this doctrine but the
vague disquisition nevertheless points to this same tenet, which upon closer
examination negates the very proposition. Generally, it is axiomatic that res
_________________
9 G.R. No. 89283, 23 August 1989.

10 CA-G.R. SP No. 03083, 6 January 1996.
11 G.R. No. 74249, 20 January 1989, 169 SCRA 307.
12 CA-G.R. SP No. 16410, 22 May 1989.
13 Memorandum of Petitioner, p. 18.
510

judicata will attach in favor of La Vista if and when the case under review
was disposed of on the merits and with finality (Manila Electric Co. vs.
Artiaga, 50 Phil. 144; 147; S. Diego vs. Carmona, 70 Phil. 281; 283; cited in
Comments on the Rules of Court, by Moran, Volume II, 1970 edition, page
365; Roman Catholic Archbishop vs. Director of Lands, 35 Phil. 339; 350-
351, cited in Remedial Law Compendium, by Regalado, Volume I, 1986
Fourth revised Edition, page 40). Appellants suffer from the mistaken
notion that the “merits” of the certiorari petitions impugning the preliminary
injunction in the cases cited by it are tantamount to the merits of the main
case, subject of the instant appeal. Quite the contrary, the so-called “final
judgments” adverted to dealt only with the propriety of the issuance or non-
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, unlike the present recourse
which is directed against a final injunctive writ under Section 10, Rule 58.
14
Thus the invocation of the disputed matter herein is misplaced.
15
We thus repeat what we said in Solid Homes, Inc. v. La Vista which
16
respondent Court of Appeals quoted in its assailed Decision —
Being an ancillary remedy, the proceedings for preliminary injunction

cannot stand separately or proceed independently of the decision rendered
on the merits of the main case for injunction. The merits of the main case
having been already determined in favor of the applicant, the preliminary
determination of its non-existence ceases to have any force and effect.
Petitioner LA VISTA in its lengthy Memorandum also quotes our

17
ruling in Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc., no less than five (5)
18
times —
To allow the petitioner access to Sucat Road through Gatchalian Avenue

inspite of a road right-of-way provided by the petitioner’s subdivision for its
buyers simply because Gatchalian Avenue allows petitioner a much greater
ease in going to and coming
___________________
14 CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, 22 May 1990, pp. 9-10.

15 G.R. No. 71150, 20 April 1988.
16 Id., pp. 12-13.
17 G.R. No. 75905, 12 October 1987, 154 SCRA 703, 712.
18 Memorandum of Petitioner, pp. 21-22, 25, 29-30, 32-33, 45.
511
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 511

from the main thoroughfare is to completely ignore what jurisprudence has

consistently maintained through the years regarding an easement of a right-
of-way, that ‘mere convenience for the dominant estate is not enough to
serve as its basis. To justify the imposition of this servitude, there must be a
real, not a fictitious or artificial, necessity for it’ (See Tolentino, Civil Code
of the Philippines, Vol. II, 2nd ed., 1972, p. 371)
19
Again this is misplaced. Ramos, Sr. v. Gatchalian Realty, Inc.,
concerns a legal or compulsory easement of right-of-way—
Since there is no agreement between the contending parties in this case

granting a right-of-way by one in favor of the other, the establishment of a
voluntary easement between the petitioner and the respondent company
and/or the other private respondents is ruled out. What is left to examine is
whether or not petitioner is entitled to a legal or compulsory easement of a
right-of-way—
which should be distinguished from a voluntary easement. A legal or

compulsory easement is that which is constituted by law for public
use or for private interest. By express provisions of Arts. 649 and
650 of the New Civil Code, the owner of an estate may claim a legal
or compulsory right-of-way only after he has established the
existence of four (4) requisites, namely, (a) the estate is surrounded
by other immovables and is without adequate outlet to a public
highway; (b) after payment of the proper indemnity; (c) the isolation
was not due to the proprietor’s own acts; and, (d) the right-of-way
claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the servient estate, and
insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance from20 the
dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. A
voluntary easement on the other hand is constituted simply by will
or agreement of the parties.
_________________
19 See Note 17, p. 710.

20 Vda. de Baltazar v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106082, 27 June 1995, 245
SCRA 333, citing Locsin v. Climaco, No. L-27319|||, 31 January 1969, 26 SCRA 816
and Angela Estate v. CFI of Negros Occidental, L-27084, 31 July 1968, 24 SCRA
500, 510.
512

From the facts of the instant case it is very apparent that the parties
and their respective predecessors-in-interest intended to establish an
easement of right-of-way over Mangyan Road for their mutual
benefit, both as dominant and servient estates. This is quite evident
when: (a) the Tuasons and the Philippine Building Corporation in
1949 stipulated in par. 3 of their Deed of Sale with Mortgage that the
“boundary line between the property herein sold and the adjoining
property of the VENDORS shall be a road fifteen (15) meters wide,
one-half of which shall be taken from the property herein sold to the
VENDEE and the other half from the portion adjoining belonging to
the vendors”; (b) the Tuasons in 1951 expressly agreed and
consented to the assignment of the land to, and the assumption of all
the rights and obligations by ATENEO, including the obligation to
contribute seven and one-half meters of the property sold to form

part of the 15-meter wide roadway; (c) the Tuasons in 1958 filed a
complaint against MARYKNOLL and ATENEO for breach of
contract and the enforcement of the reciprocal easement on
Mangyan Road, and demanded that MARYKNOLL set back its wall
to restore Mangyan Road to its original width of 15 meters, after
MARYKNOLL constructed a wall in the middle of the 15-meter
wide roadway; (d) LA VISTA President Manuel J. Gonzales
admitted and clarified in 1976, in a letter to ATENEO President Fr.
Jose A. Cruz, S.J., that “Mangyan Road is a road fifteen meters
wide, one-half of which is taken from your property and the other
half from the La Vista Subdivision. So that the easement of a right-
of-way on your 7 1/2 m. portion was created in our favor and
likewise an easement of right-of-way was created on our 7 1/2 m.
portion of the road in your favor”; (e) LA VISTA, in its offer to buy
the hillside portion of the ATENEO property in 1976, acknowledged
the existence of the contractual right-of-way as it manifested that the
mutual right-of-way between the Ateneo de Manila University and
La Vista Homeowners’ Association would be extinguished if it
bought the adjacent ATENEO property and would thus become the
owner of both the dominant and servient estates; and, (f) LA VISTA
President Luis G. Quimson, in a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
received by this Court on 26
513
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 513

March 1997, acknowledged that “one-half of the whole length of

(Mangyan Road) belongs to La Vista Assn., Inc. The other half is
owned by Miriam (Maryknoll) and the Ateneo in equal portions”;
These certainly are indubitable proofs that the parties concerned
had indeed constituted a voluntary easement of right-of-way over
Mangyan Road and, like any other contract, the same could be
extinguished only by mutual agreement or by renunciation of the
owner of the dominant estate. Thus respondent Court of Appeals did
not commit a reversible error when it ruled that—
Concerning the pivotal question posed herein on the existence of an

easement, we are of the belief, and thus hereby hold that a right-of-way was
properly appreciated along the entire route of Mangyan Road. Incidentally,
the pretense that the court a quo erred in holding that Mangyan Road is the
boundary road between La Vista and Ateneo (page 31, Appellant’s Brief)
does not raise any critical eyebrow since the same is wholly irrelevant to the
existence of a servitude thereon from their express admission to the contrary
(paragraph 1, Answer).
One’s attention should rather be focused on the contractual stipulations

in the deed of sale between the Tuason Family and the Philippine Building
Corporation (paragraph 3, thereof) which were incorporated in the deed of
assignment with assumption of mortgage by the Philippine Building
Corporation in favor of Ateneo (first paragraph, page 4 of the deed) as well
as in the deed of sale dated October 24, 1976 when the property was
ultimately transferred by Ateneo to plaintiff-appellee. Like any other
contractual stipulation, the same cannot be extinguished except by voluntary
rescission of the contract establishing the servitude or renunciation by the
owner of the dominant lots (Chuanico vs. Ibañez, 7 CA Reports, 2nd Series,
1965 edition, pages 582; 589, cited in Civil Law Annotated, by Padilla,
Volume II, 1972 Edition, pages 602-603), more so when the easement was
implicitly recognized by the letters of the La Vista President to Ateneo dated
February 11 and April 28, 1976 (page 22, Decision; 19 Ruling Case Law
745).
The free ingress and egress along Mangyan Road created by the
voluntary agreement between Ateneo and Solid Homes, Inc., is thus legally
demandable (Articles 619 and 625, New Civil Code) with
514

the corresponding duty on the servient estate not to obstruct the same so
much so that—
When the owner of the servient tenement performs acts or constructs works
impairing the use of the servitude, the owner of the dominant tenement may ask for
the destruction of such works and the restoration of the things to their condition
before the impairment was committed, with indemnity for damages suffered (3
Sanchez Roman 609). An injunction may also be obtained in order to restrain the
owner of the servient tenement from obstructing or impairing in any manner the
lawful use of the servitude (Resolme v. Lazo, 27 Phil. 416; 417; 418).”
(Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, by Tolentino,
21
Volume 2, 1963 edition, page 320)
Resultantly, when the court says that an easement exists, it is not

creating one. For, even an injunction cannot be used to create one as
there is no such thing as a judicial easement. As in the instant case,
the court merely declares the existence of an easement created by the
parties. Respondent court could not have said it any better—
It must be emphasized, however, that We are not constituting an easement

along Mangyan Road, but merely declaring the existence of one created by
the manifest will of the parties herein in recognition of autonomy of
contracts (Articles 1306 and 619, New Civil Code; Tolentino, supra, page
308; Civil Code of the Philippines, by Paras, Volume II, 1984 edition, page
22
549).
The argument of petitioner LA VISTA that there are other routes to

LOYOLA from Mangyan Road is likewise meritless, to say the
least. The opening of an adequate outlet to a highway can extinguish
only legal or compulsory easements, not voluntary easements like in
the case at bar. The fact that an easement by grant may have also
qualified as an easement of necessity does not detract from its
permanency as a property right, which survives the termination of
23
the necessity.
_________________
21 CA-G.R. CV No. 19929, 22 May 1990, pp. 11-12.

22 Id., p. 13.
23 Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, No. L-22733, 25 September 1968, 25 SCRA 145.
515
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 515

That there is no contract between LA VISTA and Solid Homes, Inc.,

and thus the court could not have declared the existence of an
easement created by the manifest will of the parties, is devoid of
merit. The predecessors-in-interest of both LA VISTA and Solid
Homes, Inc., i.e., the Tuasons and the Philippine Building
Corporation, respectively, clearly established a contractual easement
of right-of-way over Mangyan Road. When the Philippine Building
Corporation transferred its rights and obligations to ATENEO the
Tuasons expressly consented and agreed thereto. Meanwhile, the
Tuasons themselves developed their property into what is now
known as LA VISTA. On the other hand, ATENEO sold the hillside
portions of its property to Solid Homes, Inc., including the right over
the easement of right-of-way. In sum, when the easement in this case
was established by contract, the parties unequivocally made
provisions for its observance by all who in the future might succeed
them in dominion.
The contractual easement of right-of-way having been confirmed,
we find no reason to delve on the issue concerning P.D. No. 957
which supposedly grants free access to any subdivision street to
government or public offices within the subdivision. In the instant
case, the rights under the law have already been superseded by the
voluntary easement of right-of-way.
Finally, petitioner questions the intervention of some LOYOLA
residents at a time when the case was already on appeal, and submits
that intervention is no longer permissible after trial has been
concluded. Suffice it to say that in Director of Lands v. Court of
24
Appeals, we said—
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the
movants at this stage of the proceedings where trial has already been
concluded, a judgment thereon had been promulgated in favor of private
respondent and on appeal by the losing party x x x the same was affirmed by
the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review said
judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are
obviously and manifestly
___________________
24 No. L-45168, 25 September 1979, 93 SCRA 238, 245-246.
516

late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the

Rules of Court (now Sec. 2, Rule 19, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein
promulgated, is simply a rule of procedure, the whole purpose and object of
which is to make the powers of the Court fully and completely available for
justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its proper aim is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties.
It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts
are always striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best
adopted to obtain that thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
The denial of the motions for intervention arising from the strict
application of the Rule due to alleged lack of notice to, or the alleged failure
of, movants to act seasonably will lead the Court to commit an act of
injustice to the movants, to their successors-in-interest and to all purchasers
for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood
and misrepresentation, should intervenors’ claims be proven to be true.
After all, the intervention does not appear to have been filed to delay
the proceedings. On the contrary, it seems to have expedited the
resolution of the case as the incidents brought forth by the
intervention, which could have been raised in another case, were
resolved together with the issues herein resulting in a more thorough
disposal of this case.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of respondent Court of Appeals
dated 22 May 1990 and its Resolution dated 6 September 1990,
which affirmed the Decision of the RTC-Br. 89, Quezon City, dated
20 November 1987, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment affirmed.
Notes.—View that the purpose of a temporary restraining order

or preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo ante litem
motam or the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status. (Lim vs.
Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 [1995])
517
VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 517

People vs. Talisic
To be permitted to intervene in a pending action, the party must have

a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either
of the parties or an interest against both, or he must be so situated as
to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of the
property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. (Acenas II
vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 773 [1995])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

La Vista Association, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

10/26/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 278

498 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LA VISTA ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF

Remedial Law; Writ of Preliminary Injunction; A writ of preliminary

VOL. 278, SEPTEMBER 5, 1997 499