PARTIES: Netherlands, U.S.A.

ARBITRATOR: Max Huber (Switzerland).

AWARD: The Hague, April, 1928.

SUMMARY: The dispute involves the US and Netherlands’ claim to the Islamd of Palmas. US bases its claim on discovery and as a
successor of Spain by virtue of the Treaty of Paris. Neatherlands claims it had exercised sovereignty over the island from 17 th
century onwards, arising from the island’s colonialization by the East India Company, as well as conventions entered into with
native princes of the Island of Sangi. It was held that the Island of Palmas is part of the Netherlands. The Netherlands’ tide of
sovereignty was acquired by continuous and peaceful display of State authority during a long period of time . The Treaty of
Paris did not create any title of Sovereignty in favor of the US because it was not vested in
S]===============================]=]===========================================================
================]
pain and there is no proof of any conflict between Spain and Netherlands, which may have threatened the Netherlands’ sovereignty
over the island.

DOCTRINE: Discovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot suffice to prove sovereignty over the Island of Palmas because of
a principle that developed mid-18th century, that occupation, to constitute a claim to territorial sovereignty, must be effective (offer
certain guarantees to other States and their nationals). Discovery does not create a definitive title of sovereignty, but only an
“inchoate” title, which exists without external manifestation. This inchoate title of discovery must be completed within a reasonable
period by the effective occupation of the region claimed to be discovered and there must be a continuous and peaceful display of
sovereignty.

ISLAND OF PALMAS (US V NETHERLANDS)

4 April 1928 | Territorial Sovereignty

FACTS: statement that the Island of Palmas was considered

US AND Netherlands signed a Special Agreement by Netherlands as forming part of the territory of
pertaining to the arbitration of differences regarding their possessions in East Indies. The Island of
sovereignty over the Island of Palmas (Msiangas), Palmas is considered to be in the “archipelago
ratified on April 1, 1925. . Palmas is a single known as the Philippine Island,” which was stated
isolated island about halfway between Cape San in the Treaty of Paris between US and Spain.
Augustin (Mindanao, Philippines) and the most
northernly island of Nanusa group (Netherlands
East Indies)
UNCONTESTED FACTS

- The Treaty of Paris (Dec 10, 1898) and the

Pursuant to the agreement, the US and Netherlands Special Agreement are the international
agreed to let the Permanent Court of Arbitration at instruments laid before the arbitrator. The
Hague determine whether the Island of Palmas scope of international treaties which relate to
forms part of America or Netherlands. Each party the Philippines and conventions entered into
submitted memoranda containing its contentions with native Princes will be considered in
and supporting documents. connection with the arguments of the parties
- Before 1906, there had been no dispute
between US/Spain and Netherlands
ORIGIN OF THE DISPUTE regarding the Island
- The two parties claim the Island as a
On January 21, 1906, American General Leonard territory attached for a very long period to
Wood, Governor of the Province of Moro visited territories relatively close at hand which are
the Island of Palma and found that Netherlands had incontestably under the sovereignty of one
established authority there. This visit led to the
 of them native princes of the Island of Sangi
- The parties agree that the Island can belong establishing the suzerainty of the
only to one of them. Rights of third powers Netherlands over territories of the princes,
only come into account in so far as the rights including the Island of Palmas
of the parties to the dispute may be derived
from them
ON SOVEREIGNTY IN RELATION TO
TERRITORY aka TERRITORIAL
US BASES ITS CLAIM ON DISCOVERY AND SOVEREIGNTY
AS A SUCCESSOR OF SPAIN BY VIRTUE OF
- Sovereignty in relation to a portion of the
THE TREATY OF PARIS
surface of the globe is a legal condition
- In addition to Actual display of sovereignty, necessary for the inclusion of such portion
US relies on reliable cartographers and in the territory of any particular State.
authors, as well as the Treaty of Munster - Sovereignty in the relations between States
of 1646, to which Spain and Netherlands are signifies independence. Independence in
contracting parties. Nothing has occurred by regard to a portion of the globe is the right to
nature of International Law to cause the exercise therein, to the exclusion of any
acquired title to disappear. The title was other state, the functions of a state.
intact during the Treaty of Paris. Treaty Territorial sovereignty belongs always to
of Paris transferred through cession, all one, or in exceptional circumstances to
rights of sovereignty possessed by Spain several states, to the exclusion of all others.
- The Island forms a geographical part of the - Territorial sovereignty is a situation
Philippines, and in virtue of the principle of recognized and delimited in space, either by
contiguity, it belongs to the power having natural frontiers as recognized by
sovereignty over the Philippines international law or by outward signs of
- The facts alleged by Netherlands are not delimitation that are undisputed, or else by
proved and even if proved, would not create legal engagements, entered into between
sovereignty interested neighbors, such as frontier
conventions, or by acts of recognition of
States within fixed boundaries
NETHERLANDS ARGUES EXERCISE OF - If dispute arises, it is customary to examine
SOVEREIGNTY BEGINNING 1677 FROM which of the states claiming sovereignty
TREATIES possesses a title (cession, conquest,
- The fact of discovery or any other form of occupation, etc) superior to the other State.
acquisition by Spain is not proved. - But if the contestation is based on the fact
- Even if Spain, at any moment had a title, that the other arty has actually displayed
such title has been lost Sovereignty, it is not enough to establish
- Contests the principle of contiguity title. It must also be shown that territorial
sovereignty has continued to exist and did
- MAIN ARGUMENT: In the first period of
exist at the moment which is considered
colonialization by the East India Company,
critical for the decision of the dispute
the Netherlands has possessed and exercised
- Titles of acquisition are based on: act of
rights of sovereignty from 1677 (or even
1648) to the present day. This sovereignty effective apprehension occupation
presuppose that the ceding and cessionary
arose out of conventions entered into with
 powers have the faculty of effectively 3. WON the conditions of acquisition of
disposing of the ceded territory sovereignty of Netherlands was fulfilled
- One of the most important (YES) and if so, WON the US as successors
considerations: Continuous and peaceful of Spain, are in a position to bring forward
display of territorial sovereignty (peaceful an equivalent or stronger title (NO)
in relation to other states) is as good as a
RULING: THE ISLAND OF LAS PALMAS IS PART OF
title NETHERLANDS TERRITORY.
- Territorial Sovereignty involves the
exclusive right to display the activities of a
State. There is a corollary duty/obligation is RATIO
to protect within the territory the rights of
1. ISLAND OF PALMAS DISCOVERED BY
other states (integrity and inviolability in
SPAIN
peace and in war, as well as rights each state
- Documents submitted consist of a
may claim for its nationals)
communication made by Spain to US as to
researches in the archives concerning
The current view is to be applied: that discovery expeditions and discoveries in the Moluccas,
alone, without any subsequent act, cannot suffice Talaos Islands, Palaos Islands, and
to prove sovereignty over the Island of Palmas Marianes. The communication had no
because of a principle that developed mid-18th details as to the date of expedition,
century, that occupation, to constitute a claim to navigators, or circumstances in which the
territorial sovereignty, must be effective (offer observations were made. Neither is it
certain guarantees to other States and their supported by extracts from the original
nationals). reports on which it is based. There were also
no reproductions of the maps mentioned
- US also gave quotations from a report of the
According to the 19th century view, discovery voyages of Spanish explorer Garcia de
Loaisa, who saw the Island of Palmas in
does not create a definitive title of sovereignty,
but only an “inchoate” title, which exists without October 1526
external manifestation. This inchoate title of - An island marked as “I (Ilha) de (or das)
discovery must be completed within a reasonable Palmeiras” orby similar names (Polanas,
period by the effective occupation of the region Palmas), appears on maps as early as 1595/6
claimed to be discovered. There must be a shows that it was discovered in the 16th
continuous and peaceful display of sovereignty. century. The Portuguese name (Ilha das
Palmeras) does not indicate whether the
discovery was made on behalf of Portugal or
Spain, but it was deemed unnecessary to
ISSUES:
find out which of the two nations acquired
1. WON the Island of Palmas formed part of original title because at the time, crowns of
the Spanish or Netherlands territory when Spain and Portugal were united.
the Treaty of Paris came into force. YES - It can be inferred that no landing was made/
2. WON US’ inchoate title prevails over the island was uninhabited at the time of
Netherlands’ definite title found on the discovery because the island was given a
continuous and peaceful display of name borrowed from European language
sovereignty? NO and not a native one, as was customary
- Reports only note that an island (with the India Company, and thereby with ihe
same location as the Island of Palmas) was Netherlands, by contracts of
“seen.” No mention of landing or contact suzerainty, which conferred upon the
with the natives suzerain such powers as would
- No signs of taking possession or justify his considering the vassal
administration of Spain were shown to exist State as a part of his territory.
until reports of Captain Malone and M. o Acts characteristic of State authority
Alvarez in 1919 exercised either by the vassal State
or by the suzerain Power in regard
precisely to the Island of Palmas (or
Miangas) have been established as
2. THE TREATY OF PARIS DID NOT occurring at different epochs
CREATE ANY TITLE OF between 1700 and 1898, as well as in
SOVEREIGNTY IN FAVOR OF THE US the period between 1898 and 1906.
BECAUSE IT WAS NOT VESTED IN - It is not necessary that the display of
SPAIN. THERE IS PROOF OF sovereignty should go back to a very far
NETHERLANDS’ SOVEREIGNTY OVER distant period. It may suffice that such
THE ISLAND BECAUSE THERE IS AN display existed in 1898, and had already
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF existed as continuous and peaceful before
CONFLICT BETWEEN SPAIN AND that date long enough to enable any Power
NETHERLANDS FOR MORE THAN who might have considered herself as
TWO CENTURIES, possessing sovereignty over the island, or
- US failed to establish that sovereignty was having a claim to sovereignty, to have,
acquired and effectively displayed at any according to local conditions, a reasonable
time, meanwhile, Netherlands based their possibility for ascertaining the existence of a
claim on peaceful and continuous display of state of things contrary to her real or alleged
state authority over the island. Netherland’s rights.
title would prevail over US’ title of - It is quite natural that the establishment of
sovereignty not followed by actual display sovereignty may be the outcome of a slow
of state authority. No act of occupation evolution, of a progressive intensification of
(except recently), nor any exercise of State control. This is particularly the case, if
sovereignty at Island of Palmas by Spain sovereignty is acquired by the establishment
was alleged. of the suzerainty of a colonial Power over a
- Netherlands succeeded in establishing the native State, and in regard to outlying
following facts: possessions of such a vassal State.
o The Island of Palmas (or Miangas) is - Evidence relating to the period after the
identical with an island designatedby middle of the 19* century makes it clear that
this or a similar name, which has the Netherlands Indian Government
formed, at least since 1700, considered the island distinctly as a part of
successively a part of two of the its possessions and that, in the years
native States of the Island of Sangi immediately preceding 1898, an
(Talautse Isles). intensification of display of sovereignty took
o These native States were from 1677 place.
onwards connected with the East - There is also no evidence which would
establish any act of display of sovereignty
 over the Island by Spain or another power, rights at the present time.
such as might counter-balance or annihilate - The Netherlands tide of sovereignty, was
Netherlands’ sovereignty  No third acquired by continuous and peaceful display
powers of State authority during a long period of
time going probably back beyond the year
1700
3. THE US, AS SUCCESSORS OF SPAIN,
- Facts constitute a beginning of
DOES NOT HAVE AN EQUIVALENT/
establishment of sovereignty by continuous
STRONGER TITLE TO THAT OF
and peaceful display of State authority, or a
NETHERLANDS’ SUCCESSFUL
commencement of occupation of an island
ACQUISITION OF SOVEREIGNTY. The
not yet forming a part of the territory of a
Netherlands tide of sovereignty, was
State (ex: flags and coat of arms) and such a
acquired by continuous and peaceful display
state of things would create in favor of the
of State authority during a long period of
Netherlands an inchoate title for completing
time (1700-1906)
the conditions of sovereignty. Such inchoate
- The title of discovery, if it had not been
title, based on display of State authority,
already disposed of by the Treaties of
would, in the opinion of the Arbitrator,
Munster and Utrecht would, under the most
prevail over an inchoate title derived from
favorable and most extensive interpretation,
discovery, especially if this latter title has
exist only as an inchoate title, as a claim to
been left for a very long time without
establish sovereignty by effective
completion by occupation; and it would
occupation. An inchoate title however
equally prevail over any claim which, in
cannot prevail over a definite title founded
equity, might be deduced from the notion of
on continuous and peaceful display of
contiguity.
sovereignty. The title of contiguity,
understood as a basis of territorial
sovereignty, has no foundation in
international law.
- The title of recognition by treaty does not
apply, because even if the Sangi States, with
the dependency of Miangas, are to be
considered as "held and possessed" by Spain
in 1648, the rights of Spain to be derived
from the Treaty of Munster would have been
superseded by those which were acquired by
the Treaty of Utrecht. Now if there is
evidence of a state of possession in 1714
concerning the island of Palmas (or
Miangas), such evidence is exclusively in
favour of the Netherlands. But even if the
Treaty of Utrecht could not be taken into
consideration, the acquiescence of Spain in
the situation created after 1677 would
deprive her and her successors of the
possibility of still invoking conventional
MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R. 187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties
over their territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in
R.A. 3046 reserving the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some
basepoints and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our
sovereignty and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those
territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm
that regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out
basepoints along coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the
international community of the scope of our maritime space.
2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes
within the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of
such, international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them
in lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international
law, no modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues
claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it
should follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.

Summary: 

This original action for the writs of certiorari and prohibition assails the constitutionality of Republic
Act No 9522 (RA 9522) adjusting the country’s archipelagic baselines and classifying the baseline
regime of nearby territories. In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA 9522, the
statute under scrutiny. The change was prompted by the need to make RA 3046 compliant with the
terms of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which the Philippines
ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others, UNCLOS prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic States like the Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of
application for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these requirements, RA 9522
shortened one baseline, optimised the location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the
Scarborough Shoal, as 'regimes of islands' whose islands generate their own applicable maritime
zones.
The petitioners, professors of law, law students and a legislator, assail the constitutionality of RA
9522 on two principal grounds, namely: (1) RA 9522 reduces Philippine maritime territory, and
logically, the reach of the Philippine State’s sovereign power, in violation of Article 1 of the 1987
Constitution, embodying the terms of the Treaty of Paris and ancillary treaties; and (2) RA 9522
opens the country’s waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage by all vessels and
aircrafts, undermining Philippine sovereignty and national security, contravening the country’s
nuclear-free policy, and damaging marine resources, in violation of relevant constitutional provisions.

In addition, the petitioners contend that RA 9522’s treatment of the KIG as a 'regime of islands' not
only results in the loss of a large maritime area but also prejudices the livelihood of subsistence
fishermen. To buttress their argument of territorial diminution, the petitioners facially attack RA 9522
for what it excluded and included - its failure to reference either the Treaty of Paris or Sabah and its
use of UNCLOS’s framework of regime of islands to determine the maritime zones of the KIG and
the Scarborough Shoal.

Commenting on the petition, the respondent officials raise threshold issues questioning: (1) the
petition’s compliance with the case or controversy requirement for judicial review grounded on
petitioners’ alleged lack of locus standi; and (2) the propriety of the writs of certiorari and prohibition
to assail the constitutionality of RA 9522. On the merits, respondents defend RA 9522 as the
country’s compliance with the terms of UNCLOS, preserving Philippine territory over the KIG or
Scarborough Shoal. Respondents add that RA 9522 does not undermine the country’s security,
environment and economic interests or relinquish the Philippines’ claim over Sabah.

Held: Petition denied.

The petitioners submit that RA 9522 'dismembers a large portion of the national territory' because it
discards the pre-UNCLOS demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related
treaties, successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. The petitioners theorise that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory
provision denying the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea
recognised at the time of the Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. The
petitioners argue that from the Treaty of Paris’ technical description, Philippine sovereignty over
territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing
the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris.

The petitioners' theory fails to persuade us. UNCLOS has nothing to do with the acquisition (or loss)
of territory. It is a multilateral treaty regulating, among others, sea-use rights over maritime zones (ie,
the territorial waters [12 nautical miles from the baselines], contiguous zone [24 nautical miles from
the baselines], exclusive economic zone [200 nautical miles from the baselines]), and continental
shelves that UNCLOS delimits. UNCLOS was the culmination of decades-long negotiations among
United Nations members to codify norms regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognising coastal and archipelagic States’ graduated authority over a limited
span of waters and submarine lands along their coasts.

On the other hand, baselines laws such as RA 9522 are enacted by UNCLOS States Parties to mark
out specific basepoints along their coasts from which baselines are drawn, either straight or
contoured, to serve as geographic starting points to measure the breadth of the maritime zones and
continental shelf. Article 48 of UNCLOS on archipelagic States like ours could not be any clearer:
'Measurement of the breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone
and the continental shelf. – The breadth of the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive
economic zone and the continental shelf shall be measured from archipelagic baselines drawn in
accordance with article 47.' (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms for UNCLOS States Parties to delimit
with precision the extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In turn, this gives notice to
the rest of the international community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine areas
within which States Parties exercise treaty-based rights, namely, the exercise of sovereignty over
territorial waters (art 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal, immigration, and sanitation laws in
the contiguous zone (art 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living resources in the
exclusive economic zone (art 56) and continental shelf (art 77).

Even under the petitioners’ theory that the Philippine territory embraces the islands and all the
waters within the rectangular area delimited in the Treaty of Paris, the baselines of the Philippines
would still have to be drawn in accordance with RA 9522 because this is the only way to draw the
baselines in conformity with UNCLOS. The baselines cannot be drawn from the boundaries or other
portions of the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of Paris, but from the 'outermost islands and
drying reefs of the archipelago'.

UNCLOS and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in the acquisition, enlargement or, as the
petitioners claim, diminution of territory. Under traditional international law typology, States acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion, cession and prescription, not by
executing multilateral treaties on the regulations of sea-use rights or enacting statutes to comply with
the treaty’s terms to delimit maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims to land
features are outside UNCLOS, and are instead governed by the rules on general international law.

The petitioners next submit that RA 9522’s use of UNCLOS' regime of islands framework to draw the
baselines, and to measure the breadth of the applicable maritime zones of the KIG, 'weakens our
territorial claim' over that area. The petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside Philippine
territory because the baselines that RA 9522 draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522
itself. Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines' continued claim of sovereignty and
jurisdiction over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal:

SEC. 2. The baselines in the following areas over which the Philippines likewise exercises
sovereignty and jurisdiction shall be determined as 'Regime of Islands' under the Republic of
the Philippines consistent with Article 121 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS):

a) The Kalayaan Island Group as constituted under Presidential Decree No. 1596 and

b) Bajo de Masinloc, also known as Scarborough Shoal. (Emphasis supplied)

Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine
archipelago, adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines would have committed a
breach of two provisions of UNCLOS. First, art 47.3 of UNCLOS requires that '[t]he drawing of such
baselines shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general configuration of the
archipelago'. Second, art 47.2 of UNCLOS requires that 'the length of the baselines shall not exceed
100 nautical miles', save for three per cent (3%) of the total number of baselines which can reach up
to 125 nautical miles. Although the Philippines has consistently claimed sovereignty over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal for several decades, these outlying areas are located at an appreciable
distance from the nearest shoreline of the Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline
looped around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably 'depart to an appreciable extent from
the general configuration of the archipelago'.

The petitioners hold the view that, based on the permissive text of UNCLOS, Congress was not
bound to pass RA 9522. We have looked at the relevant provision of UNCLOS and we find the
petitioners’ reading plausible. Nevertheless, the prerogative of choosing this option belongs to
Congress, not to this Court. Moreover, the luxury of choosing this option comes at a very steep
price. Absent an UNCLOS-compliant baselines law, an archipelagic State like the Philippines will
find itself devoid of internationally acceptable baselines from where the breadth of its maritime zones
and continental shelf is measured. This is a recipe for a two-fronted disaster: first, it sends an open
invitation to the seafaring powers to freely enter and exploit the resources in the waters and
submarine areas around our archipelago; and second, it weakens the country’s case in any
international dispute over Philippine maritime space. These are consequences Congress wisely
avoided.
MOST REV. PEDRO ARIGO, et. al., Petitioners,

vs.

SCOTT H. SWIFT, et. al., Respondents.

G.R. No. 206510 September 16, 2014

PONENTE: Villarama

TOPIC: Writ of kalikasan, UNCLOS, Immunity from suit

FACTS:

The USS Guardian is an Avenger-class mine countermeasures ship of the US Navy. In

December 2012, the US Embassy in the Philippines requested diplomatic clearance for the said
vessel “to enter and exit the territorial waters of the Philippines and to arrive at the port of Subic
Bay for the purpose of routine ship replenishment, maintenance, and crew liberty.” On January 6,
2013, the ship left Sasebo, Japan for Subic Bay, arriving on January 13, 2013 after a brief stop
for fuel in Okinawa, Japan.

On January 15, 2013, the USS Guardian departed Subic Bay for its next port of call in
Makassar, Indonesia. On January 17, 2013 at 2:20 a.m. while transiting the Sulu Sea, the ship ran
aground on the northwest side of South Shoal of the Tubbataha Reefs, about 80 miles east-
southeast of Palawan. No one was injured in the incident, and there have been no reports of
leaking fuel or oil.

Petitioners claim that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the
USS Guardian cause and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
the provinces of Palawan, Antique, Aklan, Guimaras, Iloilo, Negros Occidental, Negros Oriental,
Zamboanga del Norte, Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, which events violate their constitutional
rights to a balanced and healthful ecology.

ISSUES:

Whether or not petitioners have legal standing.

Whether or not US respondents may be held liable for damages caused by USS Guardian.

Whether or not the waiver of immunity from suit under VFA applies in this case.

HELD:

First issue: YES.

Petitioners have legal standing

Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”

Specifically, it is “a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case where he has sustained or
will sustain direct injury as a result” of the act being challenged, and “calls for more than just a
generalized grievance.” However, the rule on standing is a procedural matter which this Court
has relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers and legislators when the
public interest so requires, such as when the subject matter of the controversy is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.
 In the landmark case of Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., we recognized the “public right” of
citizens to “a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in our constitutional
history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law.” We declared that the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology need not be written in the Constitution for it is assumed, like
other civil and polittcal rights guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, to exist from the inception of
mankind and it is an issue of transcendental importance with intergenerational implications. Such
right carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.

On the novel element in the class suit filed by the petitioners minors in Oposa, this
Court ruled that not only do ordinary citizens have legal standing to sue for the enforcement of
environmental rights, they can do so in representation of their own and future generations.

Second issue: YES.

The US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who had control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. The alleged act
or omission resulting in the unfortunate grounding of the USS Guardian on the TRNP was
committed while they were performing official military duties. Considering that the satisfaction
of a judgment against said officials will require remedial actions and appropriation of funds by
the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US itself. The principle of State
immunity therefore bars the exercise of jurisdiction by this Court over the persons of respondents
Swift, Rice and Robling.

During the deliberations, Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio took the position
that the conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of
R.A. No. 10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit
of Article 31 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). He explained
that while historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as extensions of their flag
State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases where they fail to comply
with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage through the latter’s internal
waters and the territorial sea.
 In the case of warships, as pointed out by Justice Carpio, they continue to enjoy
sovereign immunity subject to the following exceptions:

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State

If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance therewith which is
made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other government
ship operated for non-commercial purposes

The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal State
resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated for non-
commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning passage
through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules of international
law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-commercial
purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31,
nothing in this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships
operated for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above provisions
may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter
of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the
“traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.
Moreover, Justice Carpio emphasizes that “the US refusal to join the UNCLOS was centered on
its disagreement with UNCLOS” regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which considers the
oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind,” pointing out that such “has nothing to
do with its the US’ acceptance of customary international rules on navigation.”

The Court also fully concurred with Justice Carpio’s view that non-membership in the UNCLOS
does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of the Philippines as a Coastal State over its
internal waters and territorial sea. We thus expect the US to bear “international responsibility”
under Art. 31 in connection with the USS Guardian grounding which adversely affected the
Tubbataha reefs. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that our long-time ally and trading partner,
which has been actively supporting the country’s efforts to preserve our vital marine resources,
would shirk from its obligation to compensate the damage caused by its warship while transiting
our internal waters. Much less can we comprehend a Government exercising leadership in
international affairs, unwilling to comply with the UNCLOS directive for all nations to cooperate
in the global task to protect and preserve the marine environment as provided in Article 197 of
UNCLOS

Article 197: Cooperation on a global or regional basis

States shall cooperate on a global basis and, as appropriate, on a regional basis, directly or
through competent international organizations, in formulating and elaborating international rules,
standards and recommended practices and procedures consistent with this Convention, for the
protection and preservation of the marine environment, taking into account characteristic
regional features.

In fine, the relevance of UNCLOS provisions to the present controversy is beyond dispute.
Although the said treaty upholds the immunity of warships from the jurisdiction of Coastal States
while navigating the latter’s territorial sea, the flag States shall be required to leave the territorial
sea immediately if they flout the laws and regulations of the Coastal State, and they will be liable
for damages caused by their warships or any other government vessel operated for non-
commercial purposes under Article 31.

Third issue: NO.

 The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction
and not to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In
fact, it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

The Court considered a view that a ruling on the application or non-application of

criminal jurisdiction provisions of the VFA to US personnel who may be found responsible for
the grounding of the USS Guardian, would be premature and beyond the province of a petition
for a writ of Kalikasan.

The Court also found unnecessary at this point to determine whether such waiver of
State immunity is indeed absolute. In the same vein, we cannot grant damages which have
resulted from the violation of environmental laws. The Rules allows the recovery of damages,
including the collection of administrative fines under R.A. No. 10067, in a separate civil suit or
that deemed instituted with the criminal action charging the same violation of an environmental
law.