Idolor V CA Digest

TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.
GUMERSINDO DE
GUZMAN and ILUMINADA DE GUZMAN and HON. PRUDENCIO A. CASTILLO, JR.,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 220,
Quezon City, respondents.
Facts
Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a
Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to
redeem the mortgage. Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage,
respondents went to the Barangay which resulted in a “Kasunduang Pag-aayos” and
quoted therein that the petitioner shall pay within 90 days and her failure to settle
would warrant her to execute a deed of sale with the right to repurchase without
interest within one year. Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus private
respondent Gumersindo filed a motion for execution before the Office of the Barangay
captain who subsequently issued a certification to file action. Respondent Gumersindo
De Guzman filed an extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage pursuant to the
parties agreement set forth in the real estate mortgage.
The mortgaged property was sold in a public auction to respondent Gumersindo and
the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City.
After more than one year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a complaint for
annulment of Sheriff's Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction alleging irregularity and lack
of notice in the extra-judicial foreclosure proceedings subject of the real estate
mortgage. In the meantime, a temporary restraining order was issued by the trial court.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents,
the Deputy Sheriffs and the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City from causing the issuance
of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject property in favor of
the De Guzman spouses. Spouses de Guzman filed with the respondent Court of Appeals
a petition for certiorari seeking annulment of the trial court's order which granted the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The respondent court granted the petition and
annulled the assailed writ of preliminary injunction. Hence this petition for review on
certiorari filed by petitioner Teresita V. Idolor.
Issue
Whether or not the respondent Court erred in finding that the trial court committed
grave abuse of discretion in enjoining the private and public respondents from causing
the issuance of a final deed of sale and consolidation of ownership of the subject parcel
of land in favor of private respondents.
Ruling
No. The SC affirmed the CA’s decision.
Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and
interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites
be present: 1) there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2)
the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Hence
the existence of a right violated, is a prerequisite to the granting of an injunction.
Injunction is not designed to protect contingent or future rights. Failure to establish
either the existence of a clear and positive right which should be judicially protected
through the writ of injunction or that the defendant has committed or has attempted to
commit any act which has endangered or tends to endanger the existence of said right,
is a sufficient ground for denying the injunction. The controlling reason for the existence
of the judicial power to issue the writ is that the court may thereby prevent a threatened
or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before their claims can be
thoroughly investigated and advisedly adjudicated. It is to be resorted to only when
there is a pressing necessity to avoid injurious consequences which cannot be remedied
under any standard of compensation.
In the instant case, we agree with the respondent Court that petitioner has no more
proprietary right to speak of over the foreclosed property to entitle her to the issuance
of a writ of injunction. It appears that the mortgaged property was sold in a public
auction to private respondent Gumersindo on May 23, 1997 and the sheriff's certificate
of sale was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on June 23, 1997.
Petitioner had one year from the registration of the sheriff's sale to redeem the property
but she failed to exercise her right on or before June 23, 1998, thus spouses de Guzman
are now entitled to a conveyance and possession of the foreclosed property. When
petitioner filed her complaint for annulment of sheriff's sale against private respondents
with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on June 25, 1998, she
failed to show sufficient interest or title in the property sought to be protected as her
right of redemption had already expired on June 23, 1998, i.e. two (2) days before the
filing of the complaint.
Furthermore, petitioner next contends that the execution of the "Kasunduang Pag-
aayos" dated September 21, 1996 between her and spouses de Guzman before the
Office of the Lupon Tagapamayapa showed the express and unequivocal intention of the
parties to novate or modify the real estate mortgage.
A review of the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" which is quoted earlier does not support
petitioner's contention that it novated the real estate mortgage since the will to novate
did not appear by express agreement of the parties nor the old and the new contracts
were incompatible in all points. In fact, petitioner expressly recognized in the Kasunduan
the existence and the validity of the old obligation where she acknowledged her long
overdue account since September 20, 1994 which was secured by a real estate mortgage
and asked for a ninety (90) days grace period to settle her obligation on or before
December 21, 1996 and that upon failure to do so, she will execute a deed of sale with a
right to repurchase without interest within one year in favor of private respondents.
Where the parties to the new obligation expressly recognize the continuing existence
and validity of the old one, where, in other words, the parties expressly negated the
lapsing of the old obligation, there can be no novation.
Notably, the provision in the "Kasunduang Pag-aayos" regarding the execution of a
deed of sale with right to repurchase within one year would have the same effect as the
extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage wherein petitioner was given one
year from the registration of the sheriff's sale in the Registry of property to redeem the
property, i.e., failure to exercise the right of redemption would entitle the purchaser to
possession of the property. It is not proper to consider an obligation novated by
unimportant modifications which do not alter its essence.

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TERESITA V. IDOLOR, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SPS.

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