Anthropocentrism More Than Just A Misunderstood PR PDF
Anthropocentrism More Than Just A Misunderstood PR PDF
Anthropocentrism More Than Just A Misunderstood PR PDF
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10806-018-9711-1
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John J Piccolo5
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system’’ for humans, anthropocentrism can and should be a powerful motivation for
environmental protection. Fourth, human self-love is not only natural but helpful as
a starting point for loving others, including nonhumans. Herein we analyze such
arguments, agreeing with parts of them while advancing four counter-arguments.
First, redefining the term anthropocentrism seems to be an attempt to ignore
behavior in which humans focus on themselves at the risk of the planet. Second, if
addressing human inequalities is a precondition for environmental protection, bio-
diversity protection will remain out of the scope of ethical consideration for an
indefinite period of time. Third, anthropocentric motivations can only make a
positive contribution to the environment in situations where humans are conscious
of a direct benefit to themselves. Fourth, ‘self-love’ alone is an inadequate basis for
environmental concern and action. We also explore the question of agency, shared
responsibility, and a fair attribution of blame for our environmental predicaments.
Introduction
Introducing Anthropocentrism
Since the early days of environmental ethics there has been discussion and debate
about whether values in nature are anthropocentric (human-centered) or ecocentric
(nonhuman-centered) (e.g. Goodpaster 1978; Rolston 1983; Taylor 1983). With the
popularization of the concept of ecosystem services (MEA 2005), this debate has
broadened to the conservation community at large (Kareiva and Marvier 2012),
resulting in calls for inclusive conservation that accepts both forms of valuation (Tallis
et al. 2014). Many have argued that anthropocentrism is inevitable and even benign for
the aim of environmental protection (Norton 1984; Weston 1985; Grey 1993),
whereas others argue that anthropocentrism is inadequate for biodiversity conserva-
tion (Rolston 2012; Cafaro and Primack 2014; Shoreman-Ouimet and Kopnina 2016).
In this article we take a deeper look at the anthropocentrism versus ecocentrism
debate, with a particular focus on arguments put forward by Tim Hayward (1997) in
Anthropocentrism: A Misunderstood Problem. A review of this debate is timely
because there is a rising interest in the ethical underpinnings of animal rights and
welfare (e.g. Singer 1977; Regan 1986; Bisgould 2008; Borràs 2016) and biological
conservation (e.g. Tallis et al. 2014; Doak et al. 2015; Mathews 2016; Cafaro et al.
2017; Kopnina et al. 2018; Piccolo et al. 2018).
Hayward (1997) argued that the term anthropocentrism is often misused as a
criticism of humanity as a whole, and that this is counterproductive for
environmental protection, and even misanthropic. The arguments put forward by
Hayward are reflected in the wider literature relating the issues of human agency to
environmental damage and protection that will be discussed in this article. The
sections below outline Hayward’s arguments and are followed by rejoinders. We
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First, Hayward argues that it is important to define what is ‘good’ and ‘not so good’
about anthropocentrism in relation to other species, stating that ‘‘it is less tenable to
think of humans as made in the image of God, as the purpose of creation, than as
one of the products of natural evolution’’ (Hayward 1997, p. 50). He outlines
ontological (seeing humans as being the centre of the world) and ethical criticisms
of the term anthropocentrism, defining it as attitudes, values or practices which
promote human interests at the expense of the interests or well-being of other
species or the environment. Significantly, ‘at the expense of nonhumans’ makes
anthropocentrism, at least in this definition, akin to speciesism and human
chauvinism. The conception of human chauvinism outlined in the Introduction is
often present in humanist anthropocentric thought, as represented by the dominant
Western paradigm (Catton and Dunlap 1978). Hayward argues that criticism of
anthropocentrism can be counterproductive in failing to distinguish between
legitimate and illegitimate human interests. Legitimate concerns include the need to
care for other members of one’s own species; and illegitimate concerns include
speciesism and human chauvinism. Indeed he argues: ‘it would also appear to be
unavoidable that we should be interested in ourselves and our own kind’ (Hayward
1997: 51). Hayward reflects: ‘‘it is not the concern with human welfare per se that is
the problem here, but the arbitrary privileging of that welfare over the welfare of
members of other species’’ (Ibid p. 59).
Instead of anthropocentrism, Hayward speaks of human chauvinism and
speciesism as truly objectionable: ‘‘when humans give preference to interests of
members of their own species over the interests of members of other species for
morally arbitrary reasons’’ (Ibid p. 52). For instance, Hayward reflects: ‘‘if it is
wrong in the human case to inflict avoidable physical suffering because humans are
sentient beings, then it would be morally arbitrary to allow the inflicting of suffering
on other sentient beings. That is why cruel and degrading treatment of animals can
be condemned as speciesist’’ (Ibid pp. 52–53). Indeed, he argues, there is, by
definition, no legitimate form of speciesism to safeguard or defend (Ibid p. 59). For
the human chauvinist, Hayward reflects:
Interests of humans must always take precedence over the interests of
nonhumans. Human chauvinism does not take human values as a benchmark
of comparison, since it admits no comparison between humans and
nonhumans. Human chauvinism ultimately values humans because they are
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humans. While the human chauvinist may officially claim there are criteria
which provide reasons for preferring humans—such as that they have
language, rationality, sociality etc.—no amount of evidence that other beings
fulfill these criteria would satisfy them that they should be afforded a similar
moral concern. The bottom line for the human chauvinist is that being human
is a necessary and sufficient condition of moral concern (Ibid pp. 56–57).
Thus, Hayward argues, it is not anthropocentrism but speciesism and human
chauvinism that are ‘bad’.
Second, Hayward argues that it is unhelpful to address humanity as a whole as
anthropocentric. Indeed, many indigenous societies were not anthropocentric, but
industrial Western society has become so (Sponsel 2014). Hayward also posits that
it is: ‘‘unhelpful to criticize humanity in general for practices carried out by a
limited number of people when many others may in fact oppose them’’ (Ibid p. 58).
Hayward has noted that not all humans who benefit from the exploitative activities
of some. When the exclusive benefits of exploitation are unacknowledged, the
‘‘anti-anthropocentrists are left vulnerable to ideological rejoinders to the effect that
challenging those activities is merely misanthropic’’ (Ibid p. 59). Indeed, some
scholars have accused environmentalists for putting the blame for biodiversity loss
on all humanity, rather than over-exploitive elites (Brockington 2002; Chapin 2004;
Holmes 2013; Fletcher and Büscher 2016). Given the many documented social ills
of inequality, it is often assumed that inequality is an important factor to consider
when predicting biodiversity loss (Holland et al. 2009; Andrich et al. 2010; Haupt
and Lawrence 2012; Elliott 2013).
Third, Hayward argues that the best reason for preserving ecosystems is the
realization that these ecosystems constitute the ‘life-support system’ for humans
(Ibid p. 60). Self-interest in environmental protection is often assumed to lead to the
same practical outcomes as other ethical positions. This is consistent with
pragmatist environmental ethics literature, and particularly Norton’s (1984)
‘convergence theory’ which contends that human and environmental needs coincide
because maintaining the environment for human material benefit is the strongest
motivation for nature protection. Anthropocentric motivation is favored as the best
argument for maintaining the ecological systems on which we depend, ultimately
converging on the same practical outcomes as ecocentric positions (Norton 1984).
Illustrative of this position is the statement of the World Charter for Nature of the
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA 1982), that calls for non-wasteful use of
natural resources and observes that humanity benefits from healthy ecological
processes and biological diversity. This is in line with the anthropocentric ambition
to guarantee environmental protection in order to benefit humanity as a whole.
Fourth, care for others starts with love for oneself: ‘self-love, properly
understood, can be considered a precondition of loving others’ (Ibid p. 52).
Following from this, Hayward argued that if, theoretically, humanity can be at peace
with itself, and would love itself more, it will have a positive effect on other species.
As Hayward states: ‘‘positive concern for human well-being need not automatically
preclude a concern for the well-being of non-humans, and may even serve to
promote it’’ (Ibid p. 52).
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We now turn to our counterarguments to the four key points raised by Hayward
(1997).
The Counterarguments
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Hayward reflected that: ‘‘a unified and peaceful body is more likely to be
considerate—or at least guided by a far-sighted and ecologically enlightened
conception of its self-interest—than one which is riven by internal strife’’ (Ibid
p. 60). Indeed, not all humans are equal in their impacts, as: ‘‘there is tremendous
diversity in relationships with and impacts on biodiversity’’ (Sponsel 2014). This is
certainly true, humanity is not harmonious and humans are unequal. But even if they
were equal—the evidence of the positive relationship between equality and
environmental protection is inconclusive at best. Eco-modernization and the
Kuznets curve hypothesis (assuming that societies and economies will become more
‘green’ as economic and technological progress advances) have been brought into
doubt. Data from the relatively rich and egalitarian countries shows that the level of
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material saturation is still unsustainably high (e.g. Czech 2008; O’Neill 2012;
Kopnina 2014a, b). The presupposition that economic development and overall
higher income levels can mitigate biodiversity loss through improved willingness
and affordability to implement measures such as protected areas, is not supported by
evidence (Gren et al. 2016). Simply, the Kuznets hypothesis does not work with
biodiversity (Mills and Waite 2009). This is because raising the quality of living in
practice means getting the poor to be as rich as the ‘top’, while the ‘top’ does not
seem to place biodiversity protection as a priority, continuing to reify the cult of
economic growth (O’Neill 2012). As Crist (2012: 141) has pointed out, while
‘‘raising the standard of living’’ may be nebulous shorthand for the worthy aim of
ending severe deprivation, it is in fact a ‘‘euphemism for the global dissemination of
consumer culture’’. Even if decreasing inequality of income is not aimed at making
everyone rich (just stopping the rich from getting richer at the expense of the poor),
unless ‘equalization’ happens in a ‘sustainable’ way, it is unlikely that the overall
consumptive level of the population and damage to nature will decrease. The claim
that inequality is the root cause of unsustainability is best understood as an item of
faith and an expressed wish.
Also, as Islam (2015) notes, there might be a correlation between inequality and
environmental protection, but it is doubtful that this is a causality. Mikkelson et al.
(2007) note that potential mechanisms behind equality-biodiversity relationship are
presently unexplored. Consequently, we ought not assume reducing inequality will
result in environmental benefits. Indeed, to return to Crist (2012: 141), to ‘‘feed a
growing population and enter increasing numbers of people into the consumer class
is a formula for completing the Earth’s overhaul into a planet of resources… for the
continued extraction, exploitation, and harnessing of the natural world’’. Many
prescriptions typically made by social justice advocates are fanciful because they do
not take into account the material aspirations of those currently consuming little,
and the logical consequences of enabling everybody to consume more (Crist and
Cafaro 2012). Simply, it does not matter to the planet whether a few rich individuals
are consuming a lot or a large number of poor individuals are consuming an equal
amount. Raising per capita consumption through poverty alleviation, without a
strategy to increased productive efficiency and humanely reducing the number of
consumers, is no solution.
Perhaps the reason why social equality is often conflated with environmental
benefits is our desire for altruistic win–win solutions, reflected in the rhetoric of
‘sustainable development’ (WCED 1987) and the triple bottom line approach of
‘People, Planet, and Profit’ (Elliott 2013). This approach is rooted in classical
economic assumptions shared by both the political Left and Right, that economic
growth is generally good, and through market self-regulation, growth will maximize
human well-being, and will spread evenly—thus, that the ‘‘rising tide will raise all
boats’’ (for discussion and criticism of this notion, see e.g. Daly 2014; Washington
2015).
Yet, practically speaking, the triple objective of maintaining economic growth,
social equality and ecological integrity simply cannot be balanced when society has
exceeded ecological limits (as we have). Also, it is unlikely that human intra-species
differences can ever be fully solved, especially because we live on a planet of
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limited resources (Washington 2015). It can also be argued that as inequality and
injustice have been around for millennia, trying to address them prior to turning to
ecological justice (Baxter 2005) would indefinitely leave aside concerns about
biodiversity loss. The continuous accent on internal strife and differences between
human populations, serves to disable the idea of collective blame for destruction of
nature.
Moral denunciations of detrimental effects of protected areas on local popula-
tions are supported by the: ‘‘shrill rhetoric of the fortress critique, along with the
intimidating high moral ground of human rights it professes’’ (Crist 2015: 93). The
position that biological conservation should benefit these communities or cease to
exist has been morally defendable (e.g. by some ‘new’ conservationists) because
equality with other species is simply left out of any consideration (Noss 1992;
Kopnina 2016; Cafaro et al. 2017). The so-called ‘new’ conservationists who
promote biodiversity protection for human sake only, and label conservation for the
sake of nature as misanthropic (e.g. Marvier 2014), are often aligned with the
neoliberal/capitalist side of the economic spectrum. These self-described ‘eco-
modernist’ critics typically place their faith in technological solutions and promote
intensive management of nature, either top-down or at the community level (for a
discussion and criticism of anthropocentrically-motivated conservation see e.g.
Miller et al. 2013; Doak et al. 2015 and Crist 2016). On the other hand, those deeply
rooted in Marxism and Leftist development studies (e.g. Brockington 2002; Chapin
2004; Holmes 2013; Büscher 2015; Fletcher and Büscher 2016) see conservation as
a barrier to eliminating poverty and class divisions. The former group of neoliberal
eco-modernists with anthropocentric social justice priorities, and the latter with
Leftist social justice priorities are both essentially anthropocentric. With both,
human well-being (as they envision it) always trumps the rest of the living world.
If interspecies justice is addressed as secondary to social justice, in all likelihood
it will never be achieved. To paraphrase George Orwell’s famous maxim, exclusive
focus on social injustice implies that human beings are infinitely more ‘equal’ then
all other living beings (Kopnina 2016). By supporting ecojustice, none of us are
arguing against social justice. Indeed, they can and should be entwined (Washington
2015).
Most environmentalists will not deny the destructive reach of industrial elites.
Crist (2015), for example, has clearly stated that economic growth is one of the most
significant causes of unsustainability and the disappearance of habitats and species.
It is a well-known maxim that if all of us lived as Western consumers right now, we
would need four new planet Earths to satisfy our consumption desires. However,
while the destructive reach of the affluent is globally profound, that of the poor is
more localized, involving deforestation for subsistence agriculture and overhunting
for bushmeat, leading to the ‘empty forest syndrome’ (Crist and Cafaro 2012).1
Splitting humans into the ‘innocent’ and the ‘guilty’ is counterproductive when it
comes to addressing interspecies discrimination. As Polly Higgins, an advocate of
ecocide law has suggested, there are no a priori innocent or guilty parties:
1
http://www.cites.org/eng/news/pr/2011/20110610_bushmeat.shtml.
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Those who are prima facie guilty of committing ecocide are not in themselves
evil—many companies have bought into the norm that it is collateral damage
to destroy the earth whilst serving humanity. There is rarely wilful intent
where companies are looking to help satisfy human needs, such as energy.
Rather it is a blindness that prevents many from facing the truth that human
needs can be well served without diminishing the earth’s capacity to support
life as we know it (Higgins 2010).
Unless we address all humans, including Slovakian transgender fashion models,
Mexican drug dealers, Turkish history professors, Japanese Lolitas, American
amateur astronomers, and so on, we cannot speak of humanity to start with? We
disagree. Some groups (for example commercial loggers) can be more easily held
responsible than small-scale poor farmers who are forced to cut trees to feed their
families. Indeed, Elliott (2013) argued that the poor are caught in the vicious spiral
in which they are forced to overuse natural resources, which in turn further
impoverishes them. But are these poor farmers by definition ‘innocent’, while their
actions still result in hectares of forest being destroyed? Will they still be ‘innocent’
when they become more rich by striking gold or migrating to a high-consumption
country? While it might be easy to assign blame to a CEO of Shell for contributing
to greenhouse gas emissions, can we say that an average driver who fills his tank
with fuel is innocent, or a bit more innocent than the CEO? How can we measure
innocence? The relevance of this discussion is to reinforce the argument that
anthropocentrism is not just about elites, it is about an ideology that privileges any
and all humans above the rest of nature. This discussion is also significant in relation
to people who live outside the industrial market system, and who do not degrade
their habitats. On an individual level, we can speak of ‘innocents’. Yet every
collectivity such as nation states (even if relatively poor) should be held responsible.
We accept that in some states, some people have greater responsibilities.
Third, the convergence theory (Norton 1984) supports shallow ecology or protection
of nature for human sake (Naess 1973) and is often associated with strong
anthropocentrism or pragmatic environmental ethics. Pragmatic ethics is based on
the assumption that anthropocentric or ecocentric motivations achieve the same
ends, for example as in the case of fighting pollution threatening human health (e.g.
Norton 1984; Weston 1985; Grey 1993).
Ecocentric writers would disagree with Hayward that: ‘‘the best, if not only,
reason for preserving eco-systemic relations is precisely that they constitute the
‘life-support system’ for humans’’ (p. 60). While an anthropocentric motivation can
produce environmentally-positive outcomes in situations where both humans and
environment are negatively affected, anthropocentrism does not protect nonhumans
without utilitarian value (Katz 1999), nor safeguard animal welfare (Singer 1977).
In fact, the loss of some biodiversity does not affect humanity (at least not yet), as
evidenced by mass extinctions (Crist 2015). Also, utilitarian approaches presume
that we know the long-term effect of disappearance of keystone species necessary
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dire environmental conditions require (Carnegie 2004). Orr (2013, p. 287) discusses
governance for sustainability, and notes that democracies are prone to ‘spoiled child
psychology’, which involves contempt for many realities.
Besides, even if ideally humanity can be at peace with itself and harmonious
(which as Hayward himself notes, it is not), this does not mean that it will be
collectively biophilic—some people will be, some not (Taylor 2010; Kopnina
2015). While some cultures respect (holy) cows or worship trees (Sponsel 2014),
other communities can be cruel to animals and indifferent to this-worldly
environmental concerns (Taylor 2010, 2013; Taylor et al. 2016). Learning to ‘love’
or respect one’s own tribe does not mean loving animals (or sacred forests and
places). This ethnographic example is instructive:
Should Aboriginal communities in Australia have the ‘right’ to adapt their
traditional practices to shoot rather than spear wallabies, to the point that the
once plentiful population of wallabies in Cape York has dwindled to critical
levels? The complexities of the issue surfaced at a meeting between
Aboriginal elders and representatives of the Queensland National Parks
service, while legislation was being tabled to prevent hunting in Australia’s
national parks. One of the elders, Colin Lawrence, referred to the history of
settlement in the area. In the early 1900s, a European grazier had shot a
number of Aboriginal people until being speared by one of their leaders, now
regarded as a local hero. The grazier had shot Aboriginal people ‘like dogs’,
said Lawrence pointedly, ‘and now you want to tell us we can’t even shoot a
wallaby!’ (field notes 1991 in Strang 2017: 275).
Clearly Aborigines no longer want to use spears (and other traditional hunting tools)
as they have been ‘Westernised’ into Australian society. Yet ‘traditional hunting
practice’ seems to be praised, without any realization that hunting in reserves no
longer occurs in ecologically-sustainable ways. More generally, when humanity
‘loves itself’, this does not mean that it does so by also respecting nonhumans. This
is not to imply that killing animals (especially for food) is wrong. This does not
follow from ecocentrism, for which it is the ‘good of the environmental system’ that
is the axial value.
Even though some individuals might ‘love’ animals, there is an increasing
proportional difference between the number of people on this Earth and the number
of nonhumans outside of food and medical industries. ‘Self-love’ cannot address
how the food and medical industries have evolved to serve us at the expense of
billions of other species without the protection of law.
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‘‘negotiate with them or in any way treat them as political equals’’ (p. 185).
Wandesforde-Smith argues that for the purposes of giving a place (in our own
minds) to what we imagine might be nonhuman interests, it could be helpful to talk
metaphorically about animals as if they were actors who could shape their own
future. But, he continues: ‘‘it is, at best, reasoning by analogy, a fanciful notion, a
mere projection’’ (p. 185).
We do not agree that what makes anthropocentrism unavoidable is a limitation:
‘‘which cannot be overcome even in principle because it involves a non-contingent
limitation on moral thinking as such’’ (Hayward 1997: 56). There is nothing in
human moral-thinking that should prevent us from realising that nonhumans are not
mere objects, without personhood. While we agree that we can discuss the wants
and needs of nonhumans, we also believe it is hard to deny that many animals feel
fear, pain, and have other emotions akin to our own. For example, Fitzgerald (2015:
174) reflects while observing an elephant family: ‘‘When the matriarch approaches
the top of the bank, she looks down, leans onto her back knees, and slides down.
Imagine a three-ton animal sand-sledding. It is incredible to watch; the scene makes
it hard not to imagine hearing an anthropomorphic ‘Yee-haw’ coming out of their
mouths’’.
Hayward’s ideas about avoiding speciesism and human chauvinism are most
helpful: ‘‘My claim that speciesism is avoidable can be made vivid by referring to
the analogy with racism and sexism: thus while a white man cannot help seeing the
world with the eyes of a white man, this does not mean that he cannot help being
racist or sexist’’ (Ibid p. 55). The ‘Anthropocentric Fallacy’ explains that just
because humans can only perceive nature by ‘human’ senses, this does not mean
they cannot ‘attribute’ intrinsic value to it (Fox 1990; Eckersley 1992; Washington
2015). As Washington states, by way of comparison, white men are quite capable of
cultivating a non-sexist or non-racist consciousness. They do not ‘have’ to be sexist
or racist, and can clearly attribute value to women and dark-skinned people.
Following similar logic, humans are quite capable of cultivating an ecocentric
consciousness (Washington 2015). What is significant is not what the white men
think or do, but whether or not non-whites or women had value in and of themselves
before white men recognized it. The same is true for ecocentric value, which
requires the recognition that there is objective good to be found in the world without
any relation to human preference or even human existence (Rolston 2002). This
good was here long before us and will outlive us.
Hayward notes that there is in practice a significant difference between
speciesism and racism in that whereas discriminated individuals can articulate
their claims in a language understandable to those who discriminate, nonhumans:
‘‘quite literally, do not have the ears to hear’’ (Ibid p. 55). However, the progressive
overcoming of speciesism is a: ‘‘clearly defined project, and there is no reason in
principle why it should not be fully accomplished’’ (Ibid p. 55). Indeed, there is also
no reason to limit certain rights duties or entitlements or legal protection to some
individuals. It is assumed that the whole of humanity should enjoy the same
privileges, and if some individuals transgress, they should be punished. Why can
humanity as a whole not be held responsible for transgressing the rights of nature?
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Discussion
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Conclusion
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
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