CRIMINAL LAW

I. CRIMINAL LAW; Fundamental Principles

 CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
b. Limitations on the Power
3. Must not partake of the nature of a Bill of Attainder.
Case: - People vs. Ferrer, 48 SCRA 382
People vs Ferrer
G.R. Nos. L-32613-14, December 27, 1972
CASTRO, J.:p
FACTS:
On March 5, 1970 a criminal complaint for violation of section 4 of the Anti-Subversion Act was filed
against the respondent Feliciano Co, as he became an officer of the Communist Party of the Philippines,
an outlawed and illegal organization aimed to overthrow the government.

Co moved to quash on the ground that the Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

Meanwhile, on May 25, 29170, another criminal complaint was filed with before Nilo Tayag and five others
with subversion, as they were tagged as officers of the KABATAANG MAKABAYAN, a subversive
organization instigating and inciting the people to organize and unite for the purpose of overthrowing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines.
Tayag also moved to quash the complaint on the grounds that (1) it is a bill of attainder; (2) it is vague; (3)
it embraces more than one subject not expressed in the title thereof; and (4) it denied him the equal
protection of the laws.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 1700 otherwise known as Anti-Subversion Act is a bill of attainder.

RULING: No, the Supreme Court said it is only when a statute applies either to named individuals or to
easily ascertainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punishment on them without a
judicial trial does it become a bill of attainder.
In this case, when the act is viewed in its actual operation, it will be seen that it does not specify the
Communist Party of the Philippines or the member thereof for the purpose of punishment. What it does is
simple to declare the party to be an organized conspiracy for the overthrow of the Government for
the purposes of the prohibition.
The term "Communist Part of the Philippines" issues solely for definitional purposes. In fact, the act
applies not only to the Communist Party of the Philippines but also to "any organization having the same
purpose and their successors." Its focus is not on individuals but on conduct.
 4. Must not impose cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines.
Tañada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985) 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes
valid and enforceable.

HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the
law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens.
Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia
legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if
the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance
and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially
and specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.

Pesigan vs Angeles,129 SCRA 174 (1994)

Pesigan vs. Angeles, 129 SCRA 174 (1984)

FACTS:
Anselmo and Marcelo Pesigan transported in the evening of April 2, 1982 twenty-six carabaos and a calf
from Camarines Sur with Batangas as their destination. They were provided with three certificates:
1) a health certificate from the provincial veterinarian,
2) permit to transfer/transport from the
provincial commander; and
3) three certificates of inspections.

In spite of the papers, the carabaos were confiscated by the provincial veterinarian and the town’s police
station commander while passing through Camarines Norte. The confiscation was based on EO No. 626-
A which prohibits the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one province to another

ISSUE:
Whether or not EO No. 626-A, providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the government of
carabaos transported from one province to another, dated October 25, 1980 is enforceable before
publication in the Official Gazette on June 14, 1982

RULING:
No. The said order is not enforceable against the Pesigans on April 2. 1982 because it is a penal
regulation published more than two months later in the OG. It became effective only fifteen days
thereafter as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code and Sec-11 of the Revised Administrative Code.

The word “laws” in article 2 includes circulars and regulations which prescribe penalties.
Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make the said
penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.

Commonwealth Act No. 638 requires that all Presidential executive orders having general
applicability should be published in the Official Gazette. It provides that “every order or document
which shall prescribe a penalty shall be deemed to have general applicability and legal effect. This
applies to a violation of EO No. 626-A because its confiscation and forfeiture provision or sanction makes
it a penal statute. It results that they have cause of action for the recovery of the carabaos. The summary
confiscation was not in order. The recipients of the carabaos should return them to the Pesigans.
However, they cannot transport the carabaos to Batangas because they are now bound by the said
executive order. Neither can they recover damages. Doctor Miranda and Zenerosa acted in good faith in
ordering the forfeiture and dispersal of the carabaos.

Judgment: Order of dismissal and confiscation and dispersal of the carabaos,

reversed and set aside. Respondents to restore carabaos, with the requisite
documents, to petitioners for their own disposal in Basud or Sipocot, Camarines Sur. No costs.

Important point: Publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of the regulations and make
the said penalties binding on the persons affected hereby. Justice and fairness
dictate that the public must be informed of that provision by means of the publication on the Gazette.

 Scope of Application and Characteristics of the Philippine Criminal Law

3. PROSPECTIVITY/ IRRETROSPECTIVITY of Criminal Law

o Exception where a penal law may be given retroactive application
Exception to the exception
 Case: - Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons, 37 SCRA 420 (1971)

GUMABON vs DIRECTOR OF PRISONS

G.R. No. L-30026 January 30, 1971

FERNANDO, J.:

FACTS:
After pleading guilty for complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and kidnapping,
Mario Gumabon and five others were sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Each of the petitioners has been
since then imprisoned by virtue of the above convictions and has served more than 13 years.

Subsequently, the Supreme Court negated the complex crime stating that rebellion cannot be complexed
with other crimes. Thus, the accused in the Hernandez case was only sentenced to 10 years of
imprisonment. Petitioners now seek for the retroactive application of the Hernandez doctrine which was
promulgated after their conviction.
ISSUE:
WON the Hernandez doctrine be given a retroactive application to the petitioners.

RULING:

Yes, as stated in Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code, "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so
far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal."

The Civil Code also provides that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the Constitution forms part of
our legal system.

Moreover, one effect of repeal of penal law states that if the repeal makes the penalty lighter in the
new law, the new law shall be applied, except when the offender is a habitual delinquent.

 CONSTRUCTION OF PENAL LAWS

o Spanish Text of the RPC prevails over its English translation

Cases:
1. People v. Manaba (58 Phil 665. 668)

[ GR No. 38725, Oct 31, 1933 ]

PEOPLE v. PEDRO MANABA +

DECISION

58 Phil. 665

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of Judge Eulalio Garcia in the Court of First Instance of Oriental Negros
in criminal case No. 1827 dated November 15, 1932, finding the defendant guilty of rape and sentencing
him to suffer seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, and the accessory penalties of the
law, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the amount of P500, to maintain the offspring,
if any, at P5 a month until said offspring should become of age, and to pay the costs.
The defendant appealed to this court, and his attorney de oficio now makes the following assignments of
error:
"1. El Juzgado a quo erro al no estimar en favor del acusado apelante la defensa de double jeopardy o
legal jeopardy que ha interpuesto.
"2. El Juzgado a quo erro al no declarar insuficientes las pruebas de identificacion del acusado apelante.
"3. El Juzgado a quo tambien erro al pasar por alto las incoherencias de los testigos de la acusacion y al
no declarar que no se ha establecido fuera de toda duda la responsabilidad del apelante.
"4. El Juzgado a quo erro al condenar al acusado apelante por el delito de violacion y al no acceder a su
mocion de nueva vista."
It appears that on May 10, 1932, the chief of police of Dumaguete subscribed and swore to a criminal
complaint wherein he charged Pedro Manaba with the crime of rape, committed on the person of
Celestina Adapon. This complaint was filed with the justice of the peace of Dumaguete on June 1, 1932,
and in due course the case reached the Court of First Instance. The accused was tried and convicted, but
on motion of the attorney for the defendant the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the
ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant or the subject matter of the
action, because the complaint had not been filed by the offended party, but by the chief of police (criminal
case No. 1801).
On August 17, 1932, the offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the defendant with
the crime of rape. This complaint was filed in the Court of First Instance (criminal case No. 1827), but was
referred to the justice of the peace of Dumaguete for preliminary investigation. The defendant waived his
right to the preliminary investigation, but asked for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that he
had previously been placed in jeopardy for the same offense. This motion was denied by the justice of the
peace, and the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance, where the provincial fiscal in an
information charged the defendant with having committed the crime of rape as follows:
"Que en o hacia la noche del dia 9 de mayo de 1932, en el Municipio de Dumaguete, Provincia de
Negros Oriental, Islas Filipinas, y dentro de la jurisdiccion de este Juzgado. el referido acusado Pedro
Manaba, aprovechandose de la oscuridad de la noche y mediante fuerza, violencia e intimidacion,
voluntaria, ilegal y criminalmente yacio y tuvo acceso carnal con una niña llamada Celestina Adapon,
contra la voluntad de esta. El acusado Pedro Manaba ya ha sido convicto por Juzgado competente y en
sentencia firme por este mismo delito de violacion.
"Hecho cometido con infraccion de la ley."
The defendant renewed his motion for dismissal in the case on the ground of double jeopardy, but his
motion was denied; and upon the termination of the trial the defendant was found guilty and sentenced as
hereinabove stated.
Whether the defendant was placed in jeopardy for the second time or not when he was tried in the
present case depends on whether or not he was tried on a valid complaint in the first case. The offense in
question was committed on May 9, 1932, or subsequent to the date when the Revised Penal Code
became effective.
The third paragraph of article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, which relates to the prosecution of the
crimes of adultery, concubinage, seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness reads as follows:
"The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except
upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if
the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be."
The Spanish text of this paragraph is as follows:
"Tampoco puede procederse por causa de estupro, rapto, violacion o abusos deshonestos, sino en virtud
de denuncia de la parte agraviada, o de sus padres, o abuelos o tutor, ni despues de haberse otorgado al
ofensor, perdon expreso por dichas partes, segun los casos."
It will be observed that the Spanish equivalent of the word "filed" is not found in the Spanish text, which is
controlling, as it was the Spanish text of the Revised Penal Code that was approved by the Legislature.
The first complaint filed against the defendant was signed and sworn to by the chief of police of
Dumaguete. As it was not the complaint of the offended party, it was not a valid complaint in accordance
with the law. The judgment of the court was therefore void for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
and the defendant was never in jeopardy.
It might be observed in this connection that the judgment was set aside and the case dismissed on the
motion of defendant's attorney, who subsequently set up the plea of double jeopardy in the present case.
The other assignments of error relate to the sufficiency of the evidence, which in our opinion fully sustains
the findings of the trial judge.
The recommendation of the Solicitor-General is erroneous in several respects, chiefly due to the fact that
it is based on the decision of July 30, 1932 that was set aside, and not on the decision now under
consideration. The accused should not be ordered to acknowledge the offspring, if should there be any,
because the record shows that the accused is a married man.
It appears that the lower court should have taken into consideration the aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity. The defendant is therefore sentenced to suffer seventeen years, four months, and one day
of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the offended party, Celestina Adapon, in the sum of P500, and to
support the offspring, if any. As thus modified, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with the costs of
both instances against the appellant.

2.Pascual vs Board of Medical Examiners, 28 SCRA 344 (1969)

Facts:
Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta Gatbonton filed an administrative case against Arsenio Pascual Jr.
for alleged immorality. At the initial hearing thereof, Gatbonton’s counsel announced that he would
present Pascual as his first witness. Pascual objected, relying on the constitutional right to be exempt
from being a witness against himself. The Board of Examiners took note of such a plea but scheduled
Pascual to testify in the next hearing unless in the meantime he could secure a restraining order from a
competent authority. Pascual filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila an action for prohibition with
prayer for preliminary injunction against the Board of Medical Examiners. The lower court ordered that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue against the Board commanding it to refrain from hearing or further
proceeding with such an administrative case and to await the judicial disposition of the matter.
Subsequently, a decision was rendered by the lower court finding the claim of Pascual to be well-founded
and prohibiting the Board "from compelling the petitioner to act and testify as a witness for the
complainant in said investigation without his consent and against himself." Hence, the Board appealed.
Issue
Whether or not a medical practitioner charged with malpractice in administrative case can avail of
the constitutional guarantee not to be a witness against himself.
Held:

Yes. The case for malpractice and cancellation of the license to practice medicine while administrative
in character possesses a criminal or penal aspect. An unfavorable decision would result in the
revocation of the license of the respondent to practice medicine. Consequently, he can refuse to take
the witness stand.

The right against self-incrimination extends not only to right to refuse to answer questions put to the
accused while on witness stand, but also to forgo testimony, to remain silent and refuse to take the
witness stand when called by as a witness by the prosecution. The reason is that the right against self
incrimination, along with the other rights granted to the accused, stands for a belief that while a crime
should not go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objective should not be
accomplished according to means and methods offensive to the high sense of respect accorded to the
human personality. 

I. CODAL PROVISIONS OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE

Article 2 – Application of Its Provisions

o English Rule v. French Rule

 Cases:

1. People vs. Wong Cheng, (46 Phil 729)

 Wong Cheng, 46 Phil. 729
G.R. No.L-18924 October 19, 1922
ROMUALDEZ, J.

FACTS:
Appellee is accused of having illegally smoked opium, aboard the merchant vessel Changsa of English
nationality while said vessel was anchored in Manila Bay two and a half miles from the shores of the city.
Lower court dismissed the case

ISSUE: W/N the courts of the Philippines have jurisdiction over crime committed aboard merchant
vessels anchored in our jurisdiction waters

HELD: The order appealed from is revoked and the cause ordered remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance with law, without special findings as to costs.

YES.
2 fundamental rules on this particular matter in connection with International Law
1. French rule- according to which crimes committed aboard a foreign merchant vessels should
not be prosecuted in the courts of the country within whose territorial jurisdiction they were
committed
UNLESS: their commission affects the peace and security of the territory
2. English rule
-Based on the territorial principle and followed in the United States
-According to which crimes perpetrated under such circumstances are in general triable in the courts of
the country within territory they were committed.
   As to whether the United States has ever consented by treaty or otherwise to renouncing such jurisdiction
or a part thereof, we find nothing to this effect so far as England is concerned, to which nation the ship
where the crime in question was committed belongs.
·      Mere possession of opium aboard a foreign vessel in transit was held by this court not triable by or
courts, because it being the primary object of our Opium Law to protect the inhabitants of the Philippines
against the disastrous effects entailed by the use of this drug, its mere possession in such a ship, without
being used in our territory, does not being about in the said territory those effects that our statute
contemplates avoiding. Hence such a mere possession is not considered a disturbance of the public
order.
·       To smoke opium within our territorial limits, even though aboard a foreign merchant ship, is certainly
a breach of the public order here established, because it causes such drug to produce its pernicious
effects within our territory. It seriously contravenes the purpose that our Legislature has in mind in
enacting the aforesaid repressive statute.

1. U.S. vs. Look Chaw, (18 Phil 573)

Look Chaw, 18 Phil. 573
G.R. No.L-5887. December 16, 1910.
ARELLANO, C. J.

Lesson:  Crimes NOT involving a breach of public order committed on board a public vessel is NOT
triable by our courts.

Laws Applicable: Art. 2 RPC, Opium Law

FACTS:
Upon arrival of steamship Erroll  of English nationality, that it came from Hongkong, and that it was bound
for Mexico, via  the call ports of Manila and Cebu, 2 sacks of opium where found during the inspection and
search of the cargo. 
o   Smaller sack of opium on the cabin near the saloon
o   larger sack in the hold
o   Later on, there was also 4 cans of opium found on the part of the ship where the firemen habitually sleep
§  the firemen and crew of foreign vessels, pursuant to the instructions he had from the Manila custom-house,
were permitted to retain certain amounts of opium, always provided it should not be taken shore so it was
returned
Ø  2 charges were filed against Look Chaw at the Court of First Instance of Cebu:
o   unlawful possession of opium
o   unlawful sale of opium
Ø  Look Chaw admitted that he had bought these sacks of opium, in Hongkong with the intention of selling
them as contraband in Mexico or Vera Cruz, and that, as his hold had already been searched several
times for opium, he ordered two other Chinamen to keep the sack.
Ø  The court ruled that it did not lack jurisdiction, inasmuch as the crime had been committed within its district,
on the wharf of Cebu. The court sentenced him to5 years imprisonment, to pay a fine of P10,000, with
additional subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvencyxxx  It further ordered the confiscation, in favor of
the Insular Government.

ISSUE: W/N the Philippine court has jurisdiction.

HELD:  YES. Modified by reducing the imprisonment and the fine imposed to six months and P1,000
·         GR: mere possession of a thing of prohibited use in these Islands, aboard a foreign vessel in transit, in
any of their ports, does NOT constitute a crime triable by the courts of this country, on account of such
vessel being considered as an extension of its own nationality
·         EX: when the article, whose use is prohibited within the Philippine Islands, in the present case a can of
opium, is landed from the vessel upon Philippine soil, thus committing an open violation of the laws of the
land with respect to which, as it is a violation of the penal law in force at the place of the commission of
the crime, only the court established in that said place itself had competent jurisdiction, in the absence of
an agreement under an international treaty

1. U.S. vs. Ah Sing, (36 Phil 978)

U.S. vs Ah Sing

G.R. No. L-13005 October 10, 1917

MALCOLM, J.:

FACTS:

Defendant, Ah Sing, is a fireman on the steamship Shun Chang, a foreign vessel which arrived at the port
of Cebu from a direct voyage from Saigon. Ah Sing was charged for possession of eight cans of opium
which were found by authorities during a port search. Though he confessed that he is the owner, he did
not confess, however, as to his purpose in buying the opium. He did not say that it was his intention to
import the prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands. No other evidence direct or indirect, to show that the
intention of the accused was to import illegally this opium into the Philippine Islands, was introduced.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the defendant is guilty of illegal importation of opium into the Philippine Islands.

RULING:

Yes, it is to be noted that section 4 of Act No. 2381 begins, "Any person who shall unlawfully import or
bring any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands." "Import" and "bring" are synonymous terms. The
Federal Courts of the United States have held that the mere act of going into a port, without breaking
bulk, is prima facie evidence of importation. (The Mary [U. S.], 16 Fed. Cas., 932, 933.) And again, the
importation is not the making entry of goods at the custom house, but merely the bringing them into port;
and the importation is complete before entry of the Custom House. 

Applying the Opium Law, the Supreme Court expressly held that any person unlawfully imports or brings
any prohibited drug into the Philippine Islands, when the prohibited drug is found under this person's
control on a vessel which has come direct from a foreign country and is within the jurisdictional limits of
the Philippine Islands. In such case, a person is guilty of illegal importation of the drug unless contrary
circumstances exist or the defense proves otherwise. Applied to the facts herein, it would be absurd to
think that the accused was merely carrying opium back and forth between Saigon and Cebu for the mere
pleasure of so doing. It would likewise be impossible to conceive that the accused needed so large an
amount of opium for his personal use. No better explanation being possible, the logical deduction is that
the defendant intended this opium to be brought into the Philippine Islands. We accordingly find that there
was illegal importation of opium from a foreign country into the Philippine Islands. To anticipate any
possible misunderstanding, let it be said that these statements do not relate to foreign vessels in transit, a
situation not present.

Hence, Ah Sing was proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal importation.

CRIMINAL LAW 1

1. INTENTIONAL FELONIES (DOLO)

Cases:

1.Barrioquinto v. Fernandez[G.R. No. L-1278; January 21, 1949]TOPIC

: Executive Branch
 PONENTE
: Feria, J.
AUTHOR
: PJNOTES:
CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE
: Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communitieswho may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal
prosecution and sometimes afterconviction. Admission of guilt is not necessary in amnesty.
Emergency Recit:
Jimenez and Barrioquinto applied for amnesty but the Amnesty Commission refused to process
such since theyrefuse to admit to the crime charged. They claim that a certain Tolentino was the one who
committed the crime being charged tothem. Thus, they filed a special action for mandamus in the SC to
compel the commission to act and decide whether or not thepetitioners are entitled to the benefits of
amnesty. The SC ruled that admission of guilt is not necessary in amnesty, and that pardonand amnesty
are different.

FACTS:

 
Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged for murder for the killings they made during the war.2.
 
The case was proceeded against Jimenez because Barrioquinto was nowhere to be found. Jimenez was
then sentenced to life imprisonment.3.
 
Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, the defendant Jimenez became aware of
Proclamation No. 8, which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act
penalized under the RPC in furtherance of the resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the
war efforts of the enemy. He decided to submit is case to the Guerrilla Amnesty Comission.
 
Barrioquinto learned about the proclamation and he surfaced in order to invoke amnesty as well.
However, Commissioner Fernandez of the 14th Amnesty Commission refused to process the amnesty
request of the two accused because the two refused to admit to the crime as charged. They claim that a
certain Tolentino was the one who committed the crime being charged to them.
ISSUE(S)
WON admission of guilt is necessary in amnesty
 
HELD:
NO, such admission is not a condition precedent for amnesty. The respondents are ordered to
immediately proceed to hear and decide the application for amnesty of petitioners Barrioquinto and
Jimenez.
Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or
the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary
or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the
complainants and the accused, on whether he has committed the offense in furtherance of the resistance
to the enemy, or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled
to the benefits of amnesty and to be
“regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,” or not, in accordance
with the terms of
The Amnesty Proclamation.
Pardon is granted by the President and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and
proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by
Proclamation of the President with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which
the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while amnesty is
granted to classes of persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction. Pardon
looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does “nor
work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights
be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,” and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence” (art 36, RPC). While amnesty
looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlook sand
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely although he had committed no offense.
In order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, it is not necessary that he should,
as a condition precedentor sine qua non, admit having committed the criminal act or offense with which
he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the evidence, either of the
complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes within the terms of said Amnesty
Proclamation. Hence, it is not correct to say that “invocation of the benefits of amnesty is in the nature of
a plea of confession and avoidance.
” Although the accused does not confess the imputation against him, he may be declared by the courts or
the Amnesty Commissions entitled to the benefits of the amnesty. For, whether or not he admits or
confesses having committed the offense with which he is charged, the Commissions should, if necessary
or requested by the interested party, conduct summary hearing of the witnesses both for the complainants
and the accused, on whether he has committed the offensein furtherance of the resistance to the enemy,
or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and decide whether he is entitled to the benefits
of amnesty and to be “regarded as a patriot or hero who have rendered invaluable services to the nation,”
or not, in accordance with the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation. Since the Amnesty Proclamation is a
public act, the courts aswell as the Amnesty Commissions created thereby should take notice of the terms
of said Proclamation and apply the benefitsgranted therein to cases coming within their province or
jurisdiction, whether pleaded or claimed by the person charged with suchoffenses or not, if the evidence
presented shows that the accused is entitled to said benefits.
 
2.People vs. Hassan, 157 SCRA 261 (1988)

PEOPLE vs. HASSAN

157 SCRA 261 (1988)

Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the RTC of Zamboanga City finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to reclusion Perpetua.

Facts:

July 23, 1981, at around 7pm JOSE SAMSON was a backrider on the motorcycle of RAMON PICHEL
JR. when they went to buy mangoes at the Fruit Paradise near the Barter Trade Zone in Zamboanga City.
SAMSON saw a person stab PICHEL only once while he was parked 2-3 meters away. After stabbing,
the suspect fled to PNB. SAMSON rushed the victim to the General Hospital where the latter died. In the
hospital, the witness was interrogated as to the suspect’s description, who according to him was had
semi-long hair, wearing white polo short-sleeved shirt, maong pants, standing 5’5’’ and with a dark
complexion. According to SAMSON, he only knows the suspect by face and not by name. At
Funeraria La Merced, police brought the accused – alone, for identification where the witness positively
identified him as the killer.

Held:

Decision reversed; accused is acquitted. Evidence of the prosecution does not satisfy quantum of proof—
beyond reasonable doubt. Value judgment must not be separated

3.People vs. Temblor, 161 SCRA 623 (1988)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs.
VICENTE TEMBLOR
 
alias “
RONALD
," defendant-appellant161 SCRA 623, May 28, 1988
CASE NATURE
: APPEAL from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and ButuanCity.
SC RULING
: The judgment appealed from is
 AFFIRMED
 in all respects.
LEGAL DOCTRINE/TOPIC
:MOTIVE. Proof of motive is not essential when the culprit was positivelyidentified. 
FACTS
:On or about
7:30
 in the evening of December 30, 1980,
Julius Cagampang
 with his wife, VictorinaCagampang, and their two children were conversing in the store adjacent to their
house at Barangay Talo-ao,Buenavista, Agusan del Norte, Philippines,
 
 Vicente Temblor alias “Ronald
”
arrived and fired at JuliusCagampang, who instantly fell, wounded and bleeding. Plaintiff shouted at
Victorina (wife)
to let out Julius’
firearm and fired two shots at Julius. Victorina hurried to get the maleta with the firearm inside and
gave itto the plaintiff, who took
her husband’s .38 caliber
 revolver, and fled. Julius Cagampang, inflicted with mortalwounds, instantly died. The plaintiff was with
Anecito Ellevera who is at large.The accused and his companion were members of NPA and were hiding
in the mountains of Malapong. Accused surrendered to Mayor Dick Carmona of Nasipit during the mass
surrender of dissidents in August,1981. He was arrested by the Buenavista Police at the Buenavista
public market on November 26, 1981 anddetained at the Buenavista Municipal Jail, where Victorina (wife)
was summoned by the Station CommanderMilan, where she saw and identified the accused as the man
who killed her husband.
 Vicente Temblor
 
alias “
Ronald
” was charged with the
crime of murder
 and upon arraignment on June8,1982, he entered a plea of not guilty.
The accused’s defense was an alibi. He alleged that from 4:00 o’clock in
the afternoon of December 30, 1980, he and his father had been in the house of Silverio Perol in
BarangayCamagong, Nasipit, Agusan del Norte, where they spent the night drinking over a slaughtered
dog as
“pulutan,” until 8:00 o’clock in the morning of the following day, December 31, 1980
. He also capitalized thefact that Victorina (wife) did not know him but he was positively identified by her
and was corroborated byanother prosecution witness Claudio Sabanal (tricycle driver) who was a long-
time acquaintance of theaccu
sed and who knew him as “Ronald”
.
 Vicente Temblor
 
alias “
Ronald
 was convicted and sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua
,
 with the accessory penalties thereof under Articles 41 and 42 of the Revised Penal Code, and
toindemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P12,000
 without subsidiary imprisonment in case ofinsolvency. He appealed
:
1.
 
in finding that he was positively identified by the prosecution witness as the killer of the deceasedJulius
Cagampang; and2.
 
in rejecting his defense of alibi.
ISSUES
: Whether or not Vicente Temblor is guilty of murder.
RULING
:
 Yes
.
 Vicente “Ronald” Temblor is guilty of murder.
 
The settled rule is that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility of witnesses while testifying is
generally
binding on the appellate court because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor

4.People vs Delos Santos GR No. 135919, May 9, 2003

G.R. No. 135919            May 9, 2003

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
DANNY DELOS SANTOS Y FERNANDEZ, appellant.

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

For automatic review is the Decision1 dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos guilty of the crime
of murder and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death.

In the Information2 dated February 23, 1998, appellant was charged with murder, thus:

"That on or about the 6th day of November 1997, in the Municipality of San Jose, Del Monte,
Province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, armed with a kitchen knife, with intent to kill one Rod Flores y Juanitas,
with evident premeditation, treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with the said kitchen knife
said Rod Flores y Juanitas, hitting him on the different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon
him mortal wounds which directly caused his death."

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded "not guilty." 3 Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued. The prosecution
presented Marcelino de Leon, Marvin Tablate, Dr. Benito Caballero and Romeo Flores as its witnesses.
Appellant and Sonny Bautista took the witness stand for the defense.

Marcelino De Leon testified that at around 8:00 p.m. of November 6, 1997, he saw Rod Flores drinking
"gin" with Narciso Salvador, Marvin Tablate and Jayvee Rainier at the latter's house in Sarmiento Homes,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.4 As he was about to fetch water from a nearby faucet, he approached them
and borrowed Flores' cart.5 While waiting for the cart, he stood across Flores who was then seated and
conversing with the group.6 Suddenly, appellant emerged from the back of Flores and stabbed him with a
knife,7 making an upward and downward thrust.8 Flores ran after he was stabbed twice.9 Appellant
pursued him and stabbed him many times.10 As a result, Flores' intestines bulged out of his
stomach.11 Appellant ceased stabbing Flores only after he saw him dead. Thereafter, he turned his ire
against Jayvee Rainier and chased him. Fearful for his life, witness De Leon hid himself and later on
reported the incident to the police.12

Marvin Tablate corroborated De Leon's testimony. On cross-examination, Tablate testified that he tried to
help Flores by separating him from the appellant who ran away. 13 He also testified that the latter joined his
group at about 11:00 a.m. and kept on "coming back and forth."

Dr. Caballero declared on the witness stand that Flores suffered twenty-one (21) stab wounds in the
frontal, posterior and lateral side of his body, eleven (11) of which were fatal. Dr. Caballero said it was
possible that appellant was behind Flores considering the stab wounds inflicted at his back. 14 According to
the doctor, Flores died because of "massive external/internal hemorrhages due to multiple stab wounds in
the thorax and abdomen penetrating both lungs, heart, stomach, liver, spleen and intestines." 15
Romeo Flores testified that his son Rod Flores was then working at Vitarich, Marilao, Bulacan, earning
P600.00 every 15th day of the month;16 that he spent P100,000.00 for his son's burial and wake; that he
has receipts in the amount of P19,110.00 spent for the funeral services and the cost of the cemetery
lot17 and a list of other expenses in the amount of P35,960.00; 18 and that his family has been grieving for
the loss of a loved one.

Appellant had a different version of the events. He denied the accusation and declared that on November
6, 1997 at 8:00 p.m., he was in his auntie's house in Muson, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, 19 forty (40)
meters away from the scene of the crime. He was then fetching water. 20 Earlier, at about 5:30 p.m., he
and Flores met but they did not greet each other. There was no altercation between them. Hence, he
could not understand why De Leon and Tablate testified against him.

Sonny Bautista testified that on that particular date and time, he and appellant were in their auntie's
house in San Jose del Monte, Bulacan.21 They watched television up to 8:30 p.m. and then went home. At
about 10:00 p.m., appellant was arrested. Bautista did not inform the policemen that they were watching
television in their auntie's house at the time the crime took place. Neither did he accompany appellant to
the police station.22

On October 2, 1998, the trial court rendered a Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"All premises considered, this Court resolves and so holds that the prosecution has been able to
establish the criminal culpability of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Accordingly, Danny
delos Santos is hereby found guilty of the crime of Murder with the qualifying circumstance of
treachery.

"In the imposition of the penalty, the Court hereby takes into account the brutality in the manner
by which the life of the victim was taken, and if only to serve as deterrent to others who might be
similarly obsessed, it is believed that the higher of the two penalties provided should be meted to
the accused herein. Absent any circumstance that would mitigate the severity of his criminal act
and pursuant to Articles 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 6, Republic Act
no. 7659, the accused Danny delos Santos y Fernandez is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of Death by lethal injection.

"Further, the accused is condemned to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the amount of
P50,000.00 for the victim's death. Moreover, accused delos Santos is ordered to pay the said
heirs of the deceased Rod Flores the following sums of money:

1. P264,000.00 for loss of earning capacity;

2. P55,070.00 for actual and compensatory damages;

3. P50,000.00 for moral damages;

4. P50,000.00 for exemplary damages.

"With costs against the accused.

"SO ORDERED."

In his Appellant's brief, appellant ascribes to the trial court the following errors:

"I
 THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING FULL FAITH AND CREDENCE TO THE
TESTIMONY OF THE ALLEGED EYEWITNESSES, AND IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.

"II

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO INDEMNIFY THE

HEIRS OF VICTIM THE AMOUNT OF P50,000.00 FOR VICTIM'S DEATH; P264,000.00 FOR
LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY; P55,070.00 FOR ACTUAL AND COMPENSATORY
DAMAGES; P50,000.00 FOR MORAL DAMAGES; AND P50,000.00 FOR EXEMPLARY
DAMAGES."23

Appellant contends that there are some inconsistencies between the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate,
the prosecution witnesses. Also, there is no evidence that he has a motive to kill Flores. In fact, there was
no previous heated argument or altercation between them. That the prosecution witnesses executed their
sworn statements only after two months from the commission of the crime raises doubt as to their
credibility. Finally, the evidence for the prosecution failed to meet the exacting test of moral certainty,
hence, the trial court should not have ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Flores.

The Solicitor General, in the Appellee's brief, counters that: (a) the inconsistencies pointed out by
appellant are minor and do not vitiate the fact that he was the one who killed Flores; (b) appellant's
defenses of alibi and denial are worthless since he was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses;
(c) he failed to proffer any explanation why the prosecution witnesses implicated him; (d) the crime was
aggravated by cruelty because he "butchered" Flores until his intestines bulged out of his stomach; and
(e) the heirs of Flores are entitled to indemnification as it has been shown beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant killed him.

The first assigned error involves a determination of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Settled is
the rule that when it comes to credibility of witnesses, appellate courts generally do not overturn the
findings of trial courts. The latter are in a best position to ascertain and measure the sincerity and
spontaneity of witnesses through their actual observation of the witnesses' manner of testifying,
demeanor and behavior in court.24

We see no reason to deviate from this rule.

Appellant maintains that there are inconsistencies in the testimonies of De Leon and Tablate. While De
Leon testified that appellant did not join Flores' group, however, Tablate declared that he was drinking
"gin" with them at about 11:00 a.m. De Leon testified that no one assisted Flores when he was being
attacked by appellant. However, Tablate stated that he attempted to separate Flores from appellant after
the former had sustained two stab wounds.

The first alleged inconsistency is understandable. Unlike Tablate who was with the group in a drinking
spree, De Leon approached Flores only when he borrowed the cart from the latter at about 8:00 p.m. He
stayed with Flores' group only for about thirty minutes, 25 or up to 8:30 p.m. Thus, he could not have
observed that appellant joined the group earlier, or at about 11: 00 a.m.

The second alleged inconsistency is a minor one that does not enfeeble the prosecution's theory that
appellant killed Flores. Evident from De Leon's testimony is the fact that he was so shocked in witnessing
the gruesome killing of his companion. With such a state of mind, it would be too much to demand from
him a full recollection of the details surrounding the event. Many times we have ruled that inconsistencies
in the testimony of witnesses when referring only to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declaration, their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 26 They only serve to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of witnesses for they erase the suspicion of a rehearsed
testimony.27 What we find important in the case at bar is that the two prosecution witnesses were one in
saying that it was appellant who stabbed Flores with a knife. We quote the clear and straightforward
account of the incident by De Leon and Tablate. During cross-examination, De Leon testified as follows:

Appellant argues that since the prosecution witnesses testified that there was no altercation between him
and Flores, it follows that no motive to kill can be attributed to him. This is an inconsequential
argument. Proof of motive is not indispensable for a conviction, particularly where the accused is
positively identified by an eyewitness and his participation is adequately established.30 In People
vs. Galano,31 we ruled that in the crime of murder, motive is not an element of the offense, it becomes
material only when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive and there is some doubt on whether the
accused had committed it. In the case before us, no such doubt exits as De Leon and Tablate positively
identified appellant.

In a last-ditch attempt to cast doubt on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant questions
why their statements were taken only on January 29, 1998 when the incident happened on November 6,
1997. The two-month delay is hardly an indicium of a concocted story. It is but natural for witnesses to
avoid being involved in a criminal proceeding particularly when the crime committed is of such gravity as
to show the cruelty of the perpetrator. Born of human experience, the fear of retaliation can have a
paralyzing effect to the witnesses.32 Thus, in People vs. Dacibar,33 we held that the initial reluctance of
witnesses to volunteer information about a criminal case is of common knowledge and has been judicially
declared as insufficient to affect credibility, especially when a valid reason exists for such hesitance.

Anent the second error, appellant contends that the trial court erred in indemnifying the heirs of Flores
since his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Suffice it to state at this point that the evidence
for the prosecution produces moral certainty that appellant is guilty of the crime charged, hence, should
be answerable for all its consequences.

As earlier mentioned, appellant's defenses are mere alibi and denial. He testified that at the time the
crime took place, he was in his auntie's house in Muson; San Jose del Monte, Bulacan. When probed by
the trial court, he categorically stated that the house is only 40 meters away from the scene of the crime
and may be traveled in about three or five minutes. 34 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be
convincing enough to preclude any doubt on the physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at
the locus criminis at the time of the incident.35 Certainly, the required impossibility does not exist here.

Weighing the evidence of the prosecution vis-à-vis that of the defense, the scale of justice must tilt in
favor of the former. Time and again, we ruled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent
and without any showing of ill-motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter, prevails
over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing proof, are negative and self-
serving evidence undeserving of weight in law.36 With marked relevance is the fact that appellant did not
present any evidence to show that the prosecution witnesses, in testifying against him, have improper
motive.

The prosecution was able to establish that appellant's attack on Flores was from behind without any
slightest provocation on his part37 and that it was sudden and unexpected. This is a clear case of
treachery. Where the victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from behind with no weapon
to resist it, the stabbing could only be described as treacherous. 38 There being treachery, appellant's
conviction for murder is in order.

However, in the imposition of penalty, we cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of cruelty
considered by the trial court. Pursuant to the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, every
Information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances. 39 This rule may be
given retroactive effect in the light of the well-established rule that statutes regulating the procedure of the
courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.40 The aggravating circumstance of cruelty, not having been alleged in the Information, may not
be appreciated to enhance the liability of appellant.
 Under Article 24841 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the consummated crime of murder
is reclusion perpetua to death. In this case, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties shall be imposed,
there being neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attending the crime. 42

In keeping with the current jurisprudence, the heirs of Flores are entitled to the amount of P50,000.00 by
way of civil indemnity ex delicto.43 As regards the actual damages, it appears that out of the P55,070.00
awarded by the trial court, only P19,170.0044 was actually supported by receipts. The other amounts were
based solely on a list prepared by Romeo Flores. To be entitled to actual damages, it is necessary to
prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof
and on the best evidence obtainable to the injured party. 45 In the case at bar, the prosecution failed to
present receipts for the other expenses incurred. Thus, in light of the recent case of People vs.
Abrazaldo,46 we grant the award of P25,000.00 as temperate damages inasmuch as the proven actual
damages is less than P25,000.00. The moral damages awarded in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed,
there being proofs that because of Flores' death, his heirs suffered wounded feelings, mental anguish,
anxiety and similar injury.47 However, we reduce to P25,000.00 only the trial court's award of P50,000.00
as exemplary damages.48

The amount of indemnity for loss of earning capacity is based on the income at the time of death and the
probable life expectancy of the victim. In the case at bar, the trial court found that Flores' annual gross
income is P14,400.00 computed at the rate of P1,200.00 a month for twelve (12) months. From this
amount is deducted the necessary and incidental expenses, estimated at 50%, leaving a balance of
P7,200.00. His net income would then be multiplied by his life expectancy, using the following formula:
2/3 x 80 - 25 (age of the victim at time of death). Considering that he was 25 years old when he died, his
life expectancy would be 37. Multiplying the net balance of his annual income by his life expectancy, the
loss of his earning is P266,400.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated October 2, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Malolos,
Bulacan, in Criminal Case No. 3551798, finding appellant Danny delos Santos y Fernandez guilty of the
crime of murder is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that he is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay the heirs of the late Rod Flores y Juanitas the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P25,0000.00 as temperate damages, P50,000.00 as moral damages,
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P266,400.00 for loss of earning capacity

 Mistake of Fact (Ignorantia Facti Excusat)

Cases:

- U.S. vs. Ah Chong (15 Phil 499)

1. People V. Oanis 1943

 People v. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257

G.R. No.L-47722  July 27, 1943
MORAN, J.
Lesson applicable: mitigating circumstances
FACTS:
  Captain Godofredo Monsod, Constabulary Provincial Inspector at Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, received from
Major Guido a telegram of the following tenor: "Information received escaped convict Anselmo Balagtas
with bailarina  and Irene in Cabanatuan get him dead or alive." Captain Monsod accordingly called for his
first sergeant and asked that he be given four men.
  The same instruction was given to the chief of police Oanis who was likewise called by the Provincial
Inspector.
  Defendants Oanis and Galanta then went to the room of Irene, and an seeing a man sleeping with his back
towards the door where they were, simultaneously or successively fired at him with their .32 and .45
caliber revolvers. Awakened by the gunshots, Irene saw her paramour already wounded, and looking at
the door where the shots came, she saw the defendants still firing at him. Shocked by the entire scene.
Irene fainted; it turned out later that the person shot and killed was not the notorious criminal Anselmo
Balagtas but a peaceful and innocent citizen named Serapio Tecson, Irene's paramour.
  According to Appellant Galanta, when he and chief of police Oanis arrived at the house, the latter asked
Brigida where Irene's room was. Brigida indicated the place, and upon further inquiry as to the
whereabouts of Anselmo Balagtas, she said that he too was sleeping in the same room.
ISSUE: W/N they may, upon such fact, be held responsible for the death thus caused to Tecson
HELD: Appellants are hereby declared guilty of murder with the mitigating circumstance
YES.
  ignorantia facti excusat, but this applies only when the mistake is committed without fault or carelessness
  appellants found no circumstances whatsoever which would press them to immediate action. The person
in the room being then asleep, appellants had ample time and opportunity to ascertain his identity without
hazard to themselves, and could even effect a bloodless arrest if any reasonable effort to that end had
been made, as the victim was unarmed.
  "No unnecessary or unreasonable force shall be used in making an arrest, and the person arrested shall
not be subject to any greater restraint than is necessary for his detention."
  a peace officer cannot claim exemption from criminal liability if he uses unnecessary force or violence in
making an arrest
  The crime committed by appellants is not merely criminal negligence, the killing being intentional and not
accidental. In criminal negligence, the injury caused to another should be unintentional, it being simply the
incident of another act performed without malice.
  2 requisites in order that the circumstance may be taken as a justifying one:
1) offender acted in the performance of a duty or in the lawful exercise of a right-present
2) injury or offense committed be the necessary consequence of the due performance of such duty
or the lawful exercise of such right or office.-not present
  According to article 69 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty lower by 1 or 2 degrees than that
prescribed by law shall, in such case, be imposed.

2 People v. Ah Chong 15 Phil. 488

CULPABLE FELONIES (CULPA)

Cases: --People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25366             March 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

          Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal
Case No. 5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence),
overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

          Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:

          The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the
MacArthur Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence — and
recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao,
damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered
slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with
serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the
extent of P1,395.00.

          A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on
December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of
First Instance the information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.

          When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the
charges on the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the
Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to
secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.

          Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.

          We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the information for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's
previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.

          Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this
Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.
          Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the same vehicular
accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight
physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs.
Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of
reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property through reckless imprudence based
on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information
for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was
declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and
another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted
in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard
as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing
category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.

          WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is
directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.

CULPABLE FELONIES (CULPA)

 Elements
 Culpa distinguished from Dolo
o RPC, Article 3 & 365

o Cases: --

People vs. Buan, 22 SCRA 1383 (1968)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-25366             March 29, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JOSE BUAN, accused-appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Felipe C. Magat and Amado D. Dyoco for accused-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., Actg. C.J.:

          Direct appeal by the accused from an order of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, in its Criminal
Case No. 5243 (for serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence),
overruling a motion to quash on the ground of double jeopardy.

          Stripped to essentials, the case arose in this wise:

          The accused was driving a passenger bus of the La Mallorca Company on July 23, 1962, along the
MacArthur Highway in the municipality of Guiguinto, Bulacan. Allegedly because of his negligence — and
recklessness, the vehicle driven by him struck and collided with the passenger jeep of Sergio Lumidao,
damaging said jeep and causing it to turn turtle, and injuring its passengers. Six of the latter suffered
slight physical injuries requiring medical attendance for 5 to 9 days: three other riders came out with
serious bodily injuries that needed medical attention for 30 to 45 days; while the jeep was damaged to the
extent of P1,395.00.

          A charge was filed against the accused-appellant, one for slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, in the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, for which he was tried and acquitted on
December 16, 1963. Prior to this acquittal, however, the Provincial Fiscal of Bulacan filed in the Court of
First Instance the information in the case now before us, for serious physical injuries, and damage to
property through reckless imprudence. Admittedly, both charges referred to the same highway collision.

          When the accused was arraigned in the Court of First Instance, his counsel moved to quash the
charges on the ground that he had already been acquitted of the same offense by the Justice of the
Peace Court. The prosecution opposed the motion and the Court denied the motion quash. Unable to
secure reconsideration, the accused appealed to this Court.

          Sole issue before us, therefore, is whether the second case placed the appellant twice in jeopardy
for the same offense, and is barred by the previous acquittal.

          We agree with the appellant that the Court below erred in not dismissing the information for
"serious physical injuries and damage to property through reckless imprudence," in view of the appellant's
previous acquittal by the Justice of the Peace Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, for the same imprudence.

          Reason and precedent both coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the essence of the quasi
offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised Penal Code lies in the execution of an
imprudent or negligent act that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes
thus the negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is only taken into
account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance of the offense. And, as the careless
act is single, whether the injurious result should affect one person or several persons, the offense
(criminal negligence) remains one and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and
prosecutions. This has been the constant ruling of the Spanish Supreme Court, and is also that of this
Court in its most recent decisions on the matter.

          Thus, in People vs. Silva, L-15974, January 30, 1962, where as the result of the same vehicular
accident one man died, two persons were seriously injured while another three suffered only slight
physical injuries, we ruled that the acquittal on a charge of slight physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, was a bar to another prosecution for homicide through reckless imprudence. In People vs.
Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954, the ruling was that the dismissal by the Municipal Court of a charge of
reckless driving barred a second information of damage to property through reckless imprudence based
on the same negligent act of the accused. In People vs, Belga, 100 Phil. 996, dismissal of an information
for physical injuries through needless imprudence as a result of a collision between two automobiles was
declared, to block two other prosecutions, one for damage to property through reckless imprudence and
another for multiple physical injuries arising from the same collision. The same doctrine was reasserted
in Yap vs. Lutero, et al., L-12669, April 30, 1959. In none of the cases cited did the Supreme Court regard
as material that the various offenses charged for the same occurrence were triable in Courts of differing
category, or that the complainants were not the individuals.

          As for the Spanish jurisprudence, Cuello Calon, in his Derecho Penal (12th Ed.), Vol. I, p. 439, has
this to say:1äwphï1.ñët

          Aun cuando de un solo hecho imprudente se originen males diversos, como el hecho
culposo es uno solo, existe un solo delito de imprudencia. Esta es jurisprudencia constante del
Tribunal Supremo. De acuerdo con esta doctrinael automovilista imprudente que atropella y
 causa lesiones a dos personas y ademas daños, no respondera de dos delitos de lesiones y uno
de daños por imprudencia, sino de un solo delito culposo.

          The said author cites in support of the text the following decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
(footnotes 2 and 3).

          8 octubre 1887, 18 octubre 1927.

          Si con el hecho imprudente se causa la muerte de una persona y ademas se ocasionan

daños, existe un solo hecho punible, pues uno solo fue el acto, aun cuando deben apreciarse
dos enorden a la responsabilidad civil, 14 diciembre 1931 si a consecuencia de un solo acto
imprudente se produjeron tres delitos, dos de homicidio y uno de daños, como todos son
consecuencia de un solo acto culposo, no cabe penarlos por separado, 2 abril 1932.

          The Solicitor General stresses in his brief that the charge for slight physical injuries through
reckless imprudence could not be joined with the accusation for serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence, because Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code allows only the complexing of grave or less
grave felonies. This same argument was considered and rejected by this Court in the case of People vs.
Diaz, supra:

          ... The prosecution's contention might be true. But neither was the prosecution obliged to
first prosecute the accused for slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence before
pressing the more serious charge of homicide with serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence. Having first prosecuted the defendant for the lesser offense in the Justice of the
Peace Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which acquitted the defendant, the prosecuting attorney is
not now in a position to press in this case the more serious charge of homicide with serious
physical injuries through reckless imprudence which arose out of the same alleged reckless
imprudence of which the defendant has been previously cleared by the inferior court.

          In view of the foregoing, we must perforce rule that the exoneration of this appellant, Jose Buan, by
the Justice of the Peace (now Municipal) Court of Guiguinto, Bulacan, of the charge of slight physical
injuries through reckless imprudence, prevents his being prosecuted for serious physical injuries through
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of the province, where both charges are derived from
the consequences of one and the same vehicular accident, because the second accusation places the
appellant in second jeopardy for the same offense.

          WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed, and the Court of First Instance of Bulacan is
directed to quash and dismiss the charge in its Criminal Case No. 5243. No costs. So ordered.

Crimes Defined and Penalized by Special Laws

 MALA IN SE vs. MALA PROHIBITA
 Case:

-- Padilla vs. Dizon, 158 SCRA 127 (1988)

Padilla vs. Dizon (Crim1)

Alexander Padilla, complainant, vs. The Hon. Baltazar R. Dizon, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Pasay City, Branch 113, respondent.

February 23, 1988

Per Curiam
Facts:
 Respondent Baltazar R. Dizon acquitted, in his decision, the tourist and accused, Lo Chi Fai,
saying that Lo Chi Fai had no willful intention to violate the law. He also directed the release to Lo Chi Fai
of at least the amount of US$3,000.00 under Central Bank Circular No. 960.
 Lo Chi Fai was caught by Customs guard at the Manila International Airport while
attempting to smuggle foreign currency and foreign exchange instruments out of the country.
 An information was filed against Lo Chi Fai with the RTC for violation of Sec. 6, Central
Bank Circular No. 960 with a penal sanction provided by Sec. 1, PD NO. 1883.
 Sec. 6, Central Bank Circular No. 960 provides that no person shall take out or
transmit or attempt to take out or transmit foreign exchange in any form out of the Philippines without an
authorization by the Central Bank. Tourists and non-resident visitors may take out or send out from the
Philippine foreign exchange in amounts not exceeding such amounts of foreign exchange brought in by
them. Tourists and non-resident temporary visitors bringing with them more than US$3,000.00 or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies shall declare their foreign exchange in the form prescribed by the
Central Bank at points of entries upon arrival in the Philippines.
 Sec. 1, P.D. No. 1883 provides that any person who shall engage in the trading
or purchase and sale of foreign currency in violation of existing laws or rules and regulations of the
Central Bank shall be guilty of the crime of black-marketing of foreign exchange and shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal (minimum of 12 years and 1 day and maximum of 20 years) and a fine of no
less than P50,000.00.
 At the trial, Lo Chi Fai tried to establish that he was a businessman from Hongkong, that
he had come to the Philippines 9 to 10 times to invest in business in the country with his business
associates, and that he and his business associates declared all the money they brought in and all
declarations were handed to and kept by him.
 Because of the revolution taking place in Manila during that time, Lo Chi Fai was urged
by his business associates to come to Manila to bring the money out of the Philippines.
 Commissioner of Customs, Alexander Padilla, then filed a complaint against Baltazar R. Dizon for
acquitting Lo Chi Fai.
Issue:
WON respondent Baltazar R. Dizon is guilty of gross incompetence or gross ignorance of the law in
holding that the accused, Lo Chi Fai, for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the prosecution must
establish that the accused had the criminal intent to violate the law.
Held:
 Yes. Baltazar R. Dizon ignored the fact that the foreign currency and foreign currency instruments
found in the possession of Lo Chi Fai when he was apprehended at the airport and the amounts of such
foreign exchange did not correspond to the foreign currency declarations presented by Lo Chi Fai at the
trial, and that these currency declarations were declarations belonging to other people. 
 In invoking the provisions of the Central Bank Circular No. 960 to justify the release of
US$3,000.00 to Lo Chi Fai, Baltazar R. Dizon again displayed gross incompetence and gross ignorance
of law
Article 4- CRIMINAL LIABILITY

Article 4- CRIMINAL LIABILITY

B. PROXIMATE CAUSE VS. REMOTE CAUSE
1.People v. Villacorta, G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 20111.

FACTS: 
While Cruz was ordering bread at Mendeja’s store, Villacorta suddenly appeared and stabbed Cruz on
the left side of Cruz’s body using a sharpened bamboo stick. The bamboo stick broke and was left in
Cruz’s body. Immediately after the stabbing incident, Villacorta fled. 
RTC rendered a Decision finding Villacorta guilty of murder, qualified by treachery. The Court of Appeals
promulgated its Decision affirming in toto the RTC judgment of conviction against Villacorta.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was an efficient intervening cause from the time Javier was wounded until his death
which would exculpate Urbano from any liability for Javier's death 
HELD:
The proximate cause of Cruz’s death is the tetanus infection and not the stab wound.

In the event he is found to have indeed stabbed Cruz, he should only be held liable for   slight
physical injuries for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz.

If Cruz acquired severe tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a
lot sooner than 22 days later. Ultimately, we can only deduce that Cruz’s stab wound was merely
the remote cause, and its subsequent infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of
Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or
between the time Cruz was stabbed to the time of his death. 

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the
wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are dealing with a criminal conviction, the
proof that the accused caused the victim's death must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt.
The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus
was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death.
The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime. 

2.Rodolfo Belbis Jr. y Competente and Alberto Brucales v. People, G.R. No. 181052,

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 181052               November 14, 2012

RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo Belbis, Jr.
and Alberto Brucales that seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, at1irrning with modification the
Decision3 dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Tabaco City, AI bay, Branch 17,
finding petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime off Homicide.

The factual antecedents follow.

Jose Bahillo (Jose), the victim, was a Barangay Tanod of Sitio Bano, Barangay Naga, Tiwi, Albay. Around
9:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, Jose left his house and proceeded to the area assigned to him. Later on,
around 10:00 p.m., Veronica Dacir (Veronica), Jose's live-in partner, heard Jose shouting and calling her
name and went to where Jose was and saw blood at his back and shorts. It was there that Jose told
Veronica that he was held by Boboy (petitioner Alberto Brucales), while Paul (petitioner Rodolfo Belbis,
Jr.) stabbed him. Jose was taken to St. Claire Medical Clinic at Tiwi, Albay, about four kilometers from
Barangay Naga where he was initially attended by Dr. Bernardo Corral (Dr. Corral). Jose was later
referred to Ziga Memorial District Hospital at Tabaco, Albay and, thereafter, was referred to Albay
Provincial Hospital on December 10, 1997 at 2:00 a.m. He was confined therein for six (6) days. Dr.
Sancho Reduta (Dr. Reduta), his attending physician, issued a medical certificate, which stated the
following wounds found on Jose's body: (1) stab wound, 3 cm., lumbar area, right; (2) stab wound, 3 cm.,
lumbar area, left; (3) stab wound, 3 cm., left buttock, medial aspect; and (4) stab wound, 3 cm., left
buttock, lateral aspect. He was also found positive for alcoholic breath, his blood level was monitored and
was given I.V. (intravenous) fluids and antibiotics. He was finally discharged on December 15 1997. Dr.
Reduta issued Jose prescriptions and instructed the latter to go back to the hospital after the medicines
prescribed are consumed. Jose remained bedridden and should have returned to the hospital on
December 22, 1997, but failed to do so due to financial constraints. During that time, the wounds of Jose
were not yet fully healed.

Veronica brought Jose back to St. Claire Medical Clinic on January 1, 1998, because the latter was
complaining of urinary retention and pains in his left and right lumbar regions. Dr. Corral suspected that
Jose had septicemia; thus, he was given I.V. fluids, antibiotics and diuretics, and a catheter was used to
relieve Jose of urinary retention. Upon Jose's request, he was discharged on January 3, 1998. He was
brought back to the same hospital on January 7, 1998 and was diagnosed by Dr. Corral as having
advanced Pyelonephritis, his kidney was inflamed and with pus formation and scarring. Around 10:30
a.m. on January 8, 1998, SPO1 Lerma Bataller of the Philippine National Police-Tiwi went to the hospital
to secure Jose's ante-mortem statement. Later, in the afternoon of the same day, Jose was brought to the
clinic of Dr. Marilou Compuesto upon the advice of Dr. Corral where he underwent ultrasound scanning. It
was found that Jose's kidney had acute inflammation due to infection. He was returned to St. Claire
Medical Clinic and was advised to go to Manila. However, Jose died at 10:00 p.m. of the same day.

Dr. Corral issued a Death Certificate which shows the following:

a) Immediate cause – Uremia, secondary to renal shutdown

b) Antecedent cause – Septicemia, renal inflammatory disease.

Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, Medical Officer III of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) of Naga City, Region
V, conducted an autopsy on the victim's cadaver on January 14, 1998 and issued Autopsy Report No.
BRO No. 98-02, which indicated multiple organ failure as the cause of the victim's death. Thus, petitioners
were charged with the crime of homicide. The Information reads:

That on or about the 9th day of December 1997, at about 10:30 o'clock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay Naga, Municipality of Tiwi, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, conspiring, confederating and helping one
another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, and stab JOSE BAHILLO,
thereby inflicting upon the latter stab wounds which caused his death on January 8, 1998, to the damage
and prejudice of the latter's heirs.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On February 17, 1999, petitioners entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented documentary evidence as well as the testimonies of Dr. Marilou Compuesto,
Dr. Sancho Reduta, Dr. Bernardo Corral, Dr. Wilson Moll Lee, SPO1 Lerma Bataller and Calixto Dacullo.

Petitioners claimed that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Through the
testimonies of petitioners, Dr. Olga Bausa and Dr. Edwin Lino Romano, their version of the incident is as
follows:

Around 10:00 p.m. of December 9, 1997, petitioners were outside a store in Naga, Tiwi, Albay, engaged
in a conversation with other people when Jose went to them and told them to go home. While on their
way home, they heard Jose's whistle go off as the latter was following them. Petitioner Rodolfo asked
Jose what is the matter and the latter replied, "What about?" Suddenly, Jose thrust a nightstick on
petitioner Rodolfo, but the latter was able to evade it. Afterwards, Jose held the nightstick horizontally with
both hands and tried to hit petitioner Rodolfo's forehead. Petitioner Rodolfo held the nightstick which was
in reality, a bolo sheathed on a scabbard. Jose pulled the bolo inside and the wooden scabbard was
detached from it, thus, the blade thereof injured his left hand. Petitioner Rodolfo kept holding the wooden
scabbard and when Jose thrust the bolo to petitioner Rodolfo, the latter parried it with the wooden
scabbard he was holding. Petitioner Rodolfo managed to take the bolo away from Jose and, thereafter,
the latter embraced petitioner Rodolfo while trying to get the bolo back. Petitioner Rodolfo held the bolo
with his right hand and swung it away from Jose. Thereafter, Jose pushed petitioner Rodolfo causing the
bolo to slip from the latter's hand. Jose tried to pick the bolo up, but petitioner Rodolfo was able to hold it
first, thus, Jose stepped back. During that commotion, petitioner Alberto was only watching and told Jose
and petitioner Rodolfo to stop fighting.

Thereafter, petitioner Alberto accompanied petitioner Rodolfo to the latter's house because he suffered a
hand injury. Petitioner Rodolfo was then brought to Tabaco General Hospital before he was referred to
Albay Provincial Hospital. Dr. Reduta sutured the top layer of his wound and the following day, he went
back to Tabaco General Hospital where he was operated on his left hand injury by Dr. Romano.

Petitioner Rodolfo brought the bolo used in the incident with him in his house and reported the matter to
the police station of Tiwi and surrendered the same bolo to the police authorities.

The RTC convicted the petitioners of the crime charged against them, but appreciated the mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The dispositive portion of the decision follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the accused Rodolfo Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are found
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the death of Jose Bahillo. Considering the privileged mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense in their favor, and applying the Indeterminate

Sentence Law, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of Jose Bahillo the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
P50,000.00 as moral damages.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.4

After the denial of their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners elevated the case to the CA. However,
the latter denied their appeal and affirmed the RTC decision with modification that there was no mitigating
circumstance of incomplete self-defense. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 23 December 2004 of the Regional Trial Court of Tabaco City, Albay,
Branch 17 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed. Accused-appellants
Rodolfo C. Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales are sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.5

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition.

Raised are the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

STATEMENTS MADE BY THE VICTIM TO VERONICA DACIR, ONE MONTH PRIOR TO THE
VICTIM'S DEATH. CONSTITUTES A DYING DECLARATION WITHIN THE CONTEMPLATION
OF SECTION 37, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT?

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS-

APPELLANTS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO THE JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF SELF-
DEFENSE AND THE MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE?

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE STAB
WOUNDS WERE THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE VICTIM'S DEATH?

IV

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF VOLUNTARY SURRENDER IS NOT PRESENT IN THE CASE AT BAR? 6

The petition lacks merit.

In a criminal case, factual findings of the trial court are generally accorded great weight and respect on
appeal, especially when such findings are supported by substantial evidence on record. 7 This rule,
however, is not without exceptions, one of which is when there is a conflict between the factual findings of
the Court of Appeals and the trial court which necessitates a review of such factual findings. 8

Petitioners claim that there is discrepancy in the findings of the RTC and the CA. According to them, the
RTC never mentioned about a dying declaration which the CA discussed in its decision. They then argue
that the CA erred in ruling that the statements made by the victim in the presence of witnesses Veronica
Dacir right after being stabbed, and SPO1 Lerma Bataller before he died, are dying declarations within
the contemplation of the law as the victim still lived for one month after the said dying declaration was
made.

A dying declaration is a statement made by the victim of homicide, referring to the material facts which
concern the cause and circumstances of the killing and which is uttered under a fixed belief that death is
impending and is certain to follow immediately, or in a very short time, without an opportunity of retraction
and in the absence of all hopes of recovery. In other words, it is a statement made by a person after a
mortal wound has been inflicted, under a belief that death is certain, stating the facts concerning the
cause and circumstances surrounding his/her death.9

As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as follows: (1) the declaration is
made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death; and (4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant’s death is
the subject of inquiry.10

The fact that the victim was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8, 1998 does not
prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness of an impending death.
The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed belief in inevitable and imminent
death must be entered by the declarant. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death in point of fact that renders the dying declaration admissible. It is not necessary that the
approaching death be presaged by the personal feelings of the deceased. The test is whether the
declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly impending. 11 As such, the
CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.

The CA should have admitted the statement made by the victim to Veronica Dacir right after he was
stabbed as part of the res gestae and not a dying declaration. Section 42 of Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court, reads as follows:

Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. - Statements made by a person while a startling occurrence is taking
place or immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given
in evidence as part of the res gestae. So also, statements accompanying an equivocal act material to the
issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be received as part of the res gestae.

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be made
under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had
time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and
without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in question or its immediate
attending circumstances. In sum, there are three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before
the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the
occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances. 12

It goes without saying that the element of spontaneity is critical. The following factors are then considered
in determining whether statements offered in evidence as part of the res gestae have been made
spontaneously, viz., (1) the time that lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the
making of the statement; (2) the place where the statement was made; (3) the condition of the declarant
when he made the statement; (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence
and the statement relative thereto; and (5) the nature and circumstances of the statement itself. 13

Clearly, the statement made by the victim identifying his assailants was made immediately after a startling
occurrence which is his being stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie. As shown in the testimony
of Veronica:

Be that as it may, the CA need have discussed in its decision the presence of a dying declaration or a
statement as part of the res gestae, because petitioner Rodolfo admitted stabbing the victim but insists
that he had done the deed to defend himself. It is settled that when an accused admits killing the victim
but invokes self-defense to escape criminal liability, the accused assumes the burden to establish his plea
by credible, clear and convincing evidence; otherwise, conviction would follow from his admission that he
killed the victim.15 Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent
and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. 16 Indeed, in invoking self-defense, the
burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own
evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. 17

The essential requisites of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim;
(2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. 18 Verily, to invoke self-defense
successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the
accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable
means to resist the attack.19

Petitioners argue that the unlawful aggression that was started by the victim continued even if petitioner
Rodolfo was already in possession of the bladed weapon used in the victim's stabbing. Petitioner Alberto
narrated the event as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, dated February 22, 2008, of Rodolfo
Belbis, Jr. and Alberto Brucales, is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated August 17, 2007, and its Resolution dated January 4, 2008, affirming with modification the Decision
dated December 23, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Tabaco City, Albay, Branch 17, finding petitioners
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

3.U.S. vs. Valdez (41 Phil 497)

US VS. CALIXTO VALDEZ (41 Phil 497)
G.R No. L-16486   22 March 1921

FACTS: Sometime in November 1919, a small boat was sent out to raise the anchor. The crew of this
boat consisted of the accused, Calixto Valdez and six others among who was the deceased, Venancio
Gargantel. During their work, the accused began to abuse the men with offensive words. Gargantel
complained, saying that it would be better if he would not insult them. The accused took this as a display
of insubordination, thus, he moved towards Gargantel, with a big knife in hand, threatening to stab him. At
the instant when the accused had attained to within a few feet of Gargantel, the latter, evidently believing
himself in great and immediate peril, threw himself into the water and disappeared beneath its surface to
be seen no more.
As alleged in the information, that said Gargantel had died by drowning, as a consequence of having
thrown himself into the water and upon seeing himself threatened and attacked by the accused. The
Judgment rendered against the accused. Having been convicted as the author of the homicide, the
accused alleged on appeal that he was only guilty of the offense of inflicting serious physical injuries, or at
most of frustrated homicide.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is liable for the death of Venancio Gargantel.
HELD:  
The Supreme Court disallowed the appeal of the accused, enunciated the following doctrine:
“ That even though the death of the injured person should not be considered as the exclusive and
necessary effect of the very grave wound which almost completely severed his axillary artery ,
occasioning a hemorrhage impossible to stanch under the circumstances in which that person was
placed, nevertheless as the persistence of the aggression of the accused compelled his adversary, in
order to escape the attack, to leap into the river, an act which the accused forcibly compelled the injured
person to do after having inflicted, among others, a mortal wound upon him and as the aggressor by said
attack manifested a determined resolution to cause the death of the deceased, by depriving him of all
possible help and putting him in the very serious situation narrated in the decision appealed from, the trial
court, in qualifying the act prosecuted as consummated homicide, did not commit any error of law, as the
death of the injured person was due to the act of the accused.”

The accused must, therefore, be considered the responsible author of the death of Venancio Gargantel,
and he was properly convicted of the offense of homicide. The trial judge appreciated as an attenuating
circumstance the fact that the offender had no intention to commit so great a wrong as that committed.
( Par.3, Art 9 Penal Code)

4.People vs. Almonte (56 Phil 54)

Gerardo Concepcion v. Court of Appeals and Ma. Theresa Almonte
G.R. No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Petitioner  Gerardo  Concepcion  and  private  respondent  Ma.  Theresa Almontewere married in 1989.
Almost a year later, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo. In 1991, however, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of bigamy. He alleged that 9 years before
he married private respondent, the latter had married one Mario Gopiao, which marriage was never
annulled. The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresa’s marriage to Mario was valid and subsisting when
she married Gerardo and annulled her marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo
to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo
was granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeals reversed the decision and held that Jose Gerardo was
not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario during his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that Jose Gerardo is a legitimate child of
Mario and not petitioner Gerardo.

RULING: Yes. Under Article 164 of the Family Code, a child who is conceived or born during the
marriage of his parents is legitimate. In the present case, since the marriage between Gerardo and Ma.
Theresa was void ab initio, the marriage between Mario and Ma. Theresa was still subsisting at the time
Jose Gerardo was conceived, and thus the law presumes that Jose Gerardo was a legitimate child of
private respondent and Mario. Also, Gerardo cannot impugn the legitimacy of the child because such right
is strictly personal to the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and
Ma. Theresa was void from the very beginning; he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.

The petition was denied.

5.People vs. Toleng et.al. (G.R. No. L-33535, January 17, 1975)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. L-33535 January 17, 1975

SERGIO M. ISADA, in his capacity as Acting General Manager of the National Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority (NWSA) and in his personal capacity, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JUAN L. BOCAR as Judge, Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XVI; ANGELINO S.
PASCUAL, FRANCISCO R. UNTALAN, ALEJANDRO S. REYES, ROLANDO M. MAZO, ICASIANO M.
SANTOS, SEVERINO MATEO, BENJAMIN M. TULALI, TEODORO M. SALINAS, and more than 700
others in a class suit; GENARO C. BAUTISTA, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of NWSA
Employees Housing Project; and RELITO M. PUMARADA, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Housing Project Implementation Committee created by employees-awardees for the
implementation of the NWSA Employees Housing Project, respondents.

Gov't. Corp. Counsel Leopoldo M. Abellera, Asst. Govt. Corp. Counsel Manuel M. Lazaro and Trial
Attorney Virgilio A. Abejo for petitioner.

Benito P. Fabie for private respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

Petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the orders of respondent court of March 5, 1971 and
May 11, 1971, granting the mandatory preliminary injunction applied for by private respondents, which
commands petitioner to execute certain deeds of sale of lots of the NWSA or the National Waterworks &
Sewerage Authority (now the Metropolitan Waterworks & Sewerage System), be set aside, with prayer for
preliminary injunction. Acting on the petition, on May 26, 1971, the Court issued the preliminary injunction
prayed for. Respondents filed their answer in due time, after which the parties filed their respective
memoranda in lieu of oral argument and the case was submitted for decision.

On June 18, 1968, pursuant to its collective bargaining agreement with two unions of its employees and
workers, the KKMK-NWSA (Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng Mga Manggagawa sa NWSA) and BELA (Balara
Employees and Laborers Association), and "in line with the Housing Program of the Administration",
NWSA, through its board of directors, segregated and set aside a portion of its land below the La Mesa
Dam in Quezon City, consisting of 58 hectares, as the initial site of the proposed NWSA Housing Project
for said workers and employees. (Resolution 415-'68, Annex A of the petition, p. 43, Record.) On
December 23, 1968, a raffle was held to determine who among its employees and workers would be
allowed to purchase housing units, considering that the estimated number of said units would not be
enough for all the members of the two unions. Only 1,411 awardees were selected.

With the prospective awardees thus known, the NWSA Board approved Resolution No. 113-'69, on March
11, 1969 worded as follows:

RESOLVED, That in pursuance to Resolution No. 415, series 1968, and as a gesture of
harmonious Labor-Management relationships in the NWSA, the sale to the NWSA Labor
Unions (KKMK & BELA) of raw land with a total area of 479,433 square meters consisting
of:

Area for proposed main and

side streets 130,735 sq. m.
Saleable Area 348,698 sq. m.

within the portion of the NWSA property below the La Mesa Dam, Quezon City, as
reserved and allotted for the NWSA Housing Project under said Res. No. 415, s. 1968, at
the minimal price of P4.00 per square meter or at a total value of P1,917,732.00, be and
is hereby approved, Provided That, in the repayment of the land by the Unions, a housing
lot in the said housing project, shall be priced at P5.50 per square meter in order to
absorb the cost of the land to be converted into streets.

xxx xxx xxx (Annex B P. 45, Record.)

Shortly thereafter, upon request of the unions made on March 24 and 26, 1969, the Board approved
Resolution No. 154-'69 on April 1, 1969 reading thus:

RESOLVED, That in order to facilitate the financing of the housing project for the NWSA
rank and file as contemplated under Resolution No. 415 series 1968 and Resolution No.
113, series 1969, the request of the Unions (KKMK-BELA) for the mass preparation of lot
titles and the transfer of the same to the individual employee-awardees so that such titles
can be deposited under the care and custody of the GSIS to serve as collaterals of
individual real estate loan applications, be and is hereby approved, provided that the
individual employee-awardees shall make a down payment in the amount of P100.00 for
the awarded lot, deductible from the payrolls, or payable in cash.

RESOLVED FURTHER, That in the preparation of the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of

Titles (TCT) to the individual employee-awardees, a notation of conviction of final transfer
should be entered at the back thereof under the column "Memorandum of Encumbrance,"
to the effect that absolute ownership of the lot will only be obtained upon full payment of
the individual loan applications to the GSIS, a provision shall be inserted therein whereby
the cost of the lot or the unpaid balance of the cost of the same, shall be deducted from
the proceeds of the loan in favor of the NWSA.

xxx xxx xxx (Annex C p. 47, Record.)

This resolution was subsequently amended on June 17, 1969 to read as follows:

RESOLVED, That the second paragraph of Resolution No. 154, series 1969, which
approved the request of the Union (KKMK-BELA) for the mass preparation of Transfer
 Certificate of Titles to individual employee-awardees in the NWSA Housing Project, be
and is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Resolved Further, That in the preparation of the aforesaid Transfer Certificate of Title to
individual employee-awardees, a notation should be entered at the back of said titles
under the column "Memorandum of Encumbrances" that the said lot is mortgaged to the
NWSA for the balance of the purchase price, and that in the preparation of the individual
loan applications to the GSIS, a provision shall be inserted, therein whereby the cost of
the lot or the unpaid balance of the cost of the same, shall be deducted from the
proceeds of the GSIS loan and paid to the NWSA, after which the NWSA shall execute
the corresponding Deed of Release and Cancellation of Mortgage."

RESOLVED FURTHER, That the Acting General Manager, NWSA, be and is hereby
authorized to sign for and in behalf of the Authority the individual deed of sale to
employee-awardees.

xxx xxx xxx (Resolution No.

283-'69, Annex D, p. 49, Record.)

In other words, by way of implementing the sale of the homesite to the unions for the benefit of its
individual members who had won in the raffle, it was necessary to execute deeds of sale in favor
respectively of each awardee. Accordingly, a subdivision plan was prepared, on the basis of which each
awardee was to be allotted his respective lot.1 This lot, to be identified by block number and lot number,
would be the basis of the deeds. Obviously, no titles could be immediately issued because payment to the
NWSA would have to come from the GSIS, and the GSIS is agreeable to this arrangement, so much so
that, as will be stated more in detail later, it has gone to the extent of already granting the KKK-NWSA,
one of the unions, an interim loan of P1.5 M. to pay the contractor who had already started the work.

Indeed, in the meanwhile, the awardees, through an attorney-in-fact, the respondent Genero C. Bautista,
who acted with the assistance of a Housing Project Implementation Committee, appointed and created,
respectively, by them, called for bids in the newspapers, through paid advertisements, among contractors,
and on April 24, 1969, the job was awarded to Builders Heavy Equipment and Service Corporation or
BHESCO. And in order not to lose time, the KKK-NWSA requested the Board to allow it to obtain an
interim loan with the GSIS, on the security of the lots sold by NWSA to its members, so BHESCO could
immediately start working on the project. Acting on this request, on August 29, 1969, the Board approved
the following resolution:

RESOLVED, That in line with the recommendation of Management, the request of the
KKMK-NWSA for authority to mortgage with the Government Service Insurance System
the mother title of the land allotted as housing project of the KKMK-NWSA, identified as
TCT No. 141924 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City, for an interim loan pending
completion of the individual lot titles of the NWSA employee-awardees who are qualified
to borrow real estate loans with the GSIS, be and is hereby granted and approved
subject to the following conditions:

1. That the GSIS shall make a written commitment to the NWSA that it will deduct from
the loan of every individual awardee, the amount corresponding to the balance of the
purchase price of the lot sold to the individual NWSA employee-awardee, and shall remit
the same to the NWSA. .

2. That at the back of the aforesaid TCT No. 141924, under the column "Memorandum of
Encumbrance", shall be entered a notation to the effect that the total area of 130,735
square meters earmarked for the proposed main and side streets valued at P522,940.00
is not included as being mortgaged.
 xxx xxx xxx (Resolution No.
410-'69, Annex B, p. 353, Record.)

Accordingly, BHESCO proceeded to develop the site. Incidentally, it may be mentioned at this point that
the P1.5 M. interim loan given by the GSIS to the KKK-NWSA by virtue of the above resolution has to be
assumed pro-rata by the individual awardees, and as it is drawing interest in the meanwhile, the
awardees will have to carry the burden of said interests until the work on the project is resumed. Please
note that the award to BHESCO took place, presumably with the knowledge of NWSA before the
resolution of June 17, 1969 was approved.

During the month of January, 1970, petitioner, as manager of NWSA and pursuant to the terms of above-
quoted resolution No. 283-'69, began executing deeds of sale with mortgage in favor of individual
awardees. He has signed already 29 of them.2 On February 24, 1970, due to intra-union disputes, the
President ordered the suspension of the Housing Project but later, on May 22, 1970, upon the joint
request of the two unions, the suspension was lifted. After this lifting, the NWSA approved the following
resolution (No. 150-'70) on August 18, 1970:

RESOLVED, That Condition No. 1 of Resolution No. 410-'69, be and is hereby amended
to read as follows:

"1. That the GSIS shall make a written commitment to the NWSA that it will deduct from
the loan of every individual awardee, the amount corresponding to the balance of the
purchase price of the lot sold to the individual NWSA employee-awardee, and that such
amount to be deducted in favor of NWSA shall be set off against the outstanding
accounts of the NWSA with the GSIS, like the unremitted insurance and retirement
premiums as well as salary loan deductions, instead of remitting the same directly to the
NWSA."

The common man, like, for example, a salaried employee, is entitled not only "to a little more food in his
stomach, a little more clothing on his back, and a little more shelter over his head" but also to a lot, even
small, where he can build his house and establish a permanent abode. "A man with a home and a means
of subsistence is a lover of peace and order and will profess affections for his country, whereas one
without a home and in penury is not only a social parasite but also a dangerous element in the social
order" (Moran, J., dissent in Kasilag vs. Rodriguez, 69 Phil. 217, 254, 264). The Government, as the
biggest employer, should be the first to help its employees in the solution of their housing problem.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. No costs.

Makalintal, C.J., Antonio and Fernandez, JJ., concur.

6. People vs. Ortega, Jr. (276 SCRA 166)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.BENJAMIN ORTEGA, JR. and Manuel Garcia, accused-appellants
G.R. No. 116736 July 24, 1997

FACTS:
On October 15, 1992 at 5:30 in the afternoon, Andre Mar Masangkay, Ariel Caranto, Romeo
Ortega, Roberto San Andres and Diosdado Quitlong were having a drinking spree in the
compound near the house of Benjamin Ortega, Jr. On October 15, 1992 11:00 pm, the accused
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. and Manuel Garcia who were already drank joined them. At about 12:30
a.m of October 16, 1992 the victim Andre Mar Masangkay answered the call of nature and went
to the back portion of the house. Benjamin Ortega, Jr. followed him and suddenly, they heard a
shout from Andre “Don’t, help me!” (Huwag, tulungan ninyo ako!)
Diosdado and Ariel ran and saw Benjamin on top of Andre who was lying down being
stabbed. Ariel got Benjamin Ortega, Sr., Benjamin’s father while Diosdado called Romeo to
pacify his brother. Romeo, Benjamin and Manuel lifted Andre from the canal and dropped him
in the well. They dropped stones to Andre’s body to weigh the body down. Romeo warned
Diosdado not to tell anybody what he saw. He agreed so he was allowed to go home. But, his
conscience bothered him so he told his mother, reported it to the police and accompanied them to
the crime scene.
Manuel Garcia alibi
o He was asked to go home by his wife to fetch his mother-in-law who performed a ritual
called “tawas” on his sick daughter and stayed home after
Benjamin Ortega, Jr. story
o After Masangkay left, he left to urinate and he saw Andre peeking through the room of his
sister Raquel. Then, Andre approached him to ask where his sister was. When he answered he
didn’t know, Andre punched him so he bled and fell to the ground. Andre drew a knife and
stabbed him, hitting him on the left arm, thereby immobilizing him. Andre then gripped his neck
with his left arm and threatened to kill him. Unable to move, Ortega shouted for help. Quitlong
came, seized the knife and stabbed Andre 10 times with it. Andre then ran towards the direction
of the well. Then, he tended his wound in the lips and armpit and slept

ISSUE:
Whether or not Benjamin and Manuel should be liable for murder.

HELD:
NO. PARTLY GRANTED. Benjamin is guilty only of homicide. Manuel deserves acquittal
• If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately reported the matter to
the police authorities. If Ortega’s version of the assault was true, he should have immediately
reported the matter to the police authorities. It is incredible that Diosdado would stab Andre 10
times successively, completely ignoring Benjamin who was grappling with Masangkay and that
Andre was choking him while being stabbed.
• Abuse of superior strength requires deliberate intent on the part of the accused to take
advantage of such superiority – none shown
o Andre was a 6-footer, whereas Ortega, Jr. was only 5’4”
• Article 4, par. 1, of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall be incurred by
“any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.”
o The essential requisites
1. The intended act is felonious – assisting Benjamin by carrying the body to the well
2. The resulting act is likewise a felony - concealing the body of the crime to prevent its
discovery
3. The unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the actor’s wrongful acts
(praeter intentionem) – still alive and was drowned to death
• a person may be convicted of homicide although he had no original intent to kill
• Garcia is a brother-in-law of Benjamin
o Exempt by Article 20 of RPC
ART. 20. Accessories who are exempt from criminal liability. -- The penalties prescribed for
accessories shall not be imposed upon those who are such with respect to their spouses,
ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural, and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by
affinity within the same degrees with the single exception of accessories falling within the
provisions of paragraph 1 of the next preceding article.
• The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code,
which is imposable in its medium period, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, as
in the case of Appellant Ortega. Because he is entitled to the benefits of the Indeterminate
7. Urbano vs. IAC (157 SCRA 10 [1988])

FILOMENO URBANO vs. CA (G.R. No. 72964 January 7, 1988)

SEPTEMBER 9, 2016  / RUSSELL JAY
Subject: Criminal Law- Proximate Cause
Ponente: Justice Hugo Guitierrez, Jr.
Doctrine: Proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinarily
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
 
FACTS: Marcelino Javier opened the irrigation of a canal by means of cutting grass which caused the
flooding of the storage area of the petitioner. Petitioner got angry and demanded Javier to pay for the
soaked palay. Javier refused and a quarrel between them ensued. Urbano unsheathed his bolo and
hacked Javier hitting him on the right hand and left leg. Javier went to the hospital for the treatment of the
wounds. Two weeks after, Javier returned to his farm and tended to his tobacco plants.
Then, on a fateful day of November 14, Javier was rushed to the hospital. Doctors findings showed that
he was suffering from tetanus infection. The next day, Javier died.

RTC and CA found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide. Petitioner raised the case
to the SC arguing that the cause of the death of Javier was due to his own negligence.

 
ISSUE: WON Urbano’s action was the proximate cause of the death of Javier.
 
RULING: NO. Pursuant to this provision “an accused is criminally responsible for acts committed by him
in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom. The rule is that the
death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him
by the accused
The petitioner reiterates his position that the proximate cause of the death of Marcelo Javier was due to
his own negligence, that Dr. Mario Meneses found no tetanus in the injury, and that Javier got infected
with tetanus when after two weeks he returned to his farm and tended his tobacco plants with his bare
hands exposing the wound to harmful elements like tetanus germs.

Consequently, Javier’s wound could have been infected with tetanus after the hacking incident.
Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier’s death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus
2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22 days before he died. The medical findings, however, lead us to a distinct
possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between
the time Javier was wounded to the time of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to
the crime.

And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets into operation the instances which result in
injury because of the prior defective condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause.

CA’s decision was SET ASIDE and petioner is ACQUITED of the crime of homicide.
8. People vs. Abarca (153 SCRA 735 [1987])

People v. Abarca, G.R. No. 74433, 14 September 1987.

30MAY
Second Division

[SARMIENTO, J.]
FACTS: Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The
illicit relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. The accused missed his itineraries that day so he decided to go home. Upon reaching
home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual intercourse. When the
wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his revolver. The accused who
was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away. The accused went to look
for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, got an M-16 rifle, and went back to
his house but he was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the “mahjong session” as it
was the “hangout” of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at Kingsley Koh
three times with his rifle hitting Koh, as well as Arnold and Lina Amparado who were occupying a room
adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong. Kingsley Koh died instantaneously. Arnold
Amparado was hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet Arnold’s  wife, Lina
Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments.
 
The accused is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of murder with double
frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal
Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating circumstances when the law
prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is sentenced to death.

On appeal by the accused, the Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated
murder.

 
ISSUE: Is the trial court correct in finding Abarca guilty of the COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER with
DOUBLE FRUSTRATED MURDER?
 
HELD: NO.
 
Article 247 reads in full:

ART. 247.  Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of  destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.

Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no
question that the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit
copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247
prescribes the following elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting the
accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred. It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra,
does not define an offense. Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
banished, but that is intended for his protection. It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death
under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by either
aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate
treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the
victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-
appellant, and being the more severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. This is where we disagree. The
accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one
committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the
act done amounts to a felony. But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant
was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under
exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting
the fact that he was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be
entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words (“an
waray labot kagawas,”) that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the
Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first
part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through simple imprudence or
negligence.

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-
appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the
graver penalty (than destierro).

9. Bataclan vs. Medina (102 Phil. 181)

Bataclan v. Medina 
[G.R. No. L-10126, October 22, 1957]
MONTEMAYOR, J.

Facts:
 At about 2:00am of September 13, 1952, the bus, operated by its owner defendant Mariano
Medina and driven by its regular chauffeur, Conrado Saylon, left the town of Amadeo, Cavite. While on
its way to Pasay City, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig-zag until it fell into a
canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle.
 Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus but the three passengers seated beside
the driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named Natalia
Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. No evidence to show that the freed passengers,
including the driver and the conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four
passengers trapped inside the vehicle.
 After half an hour, came about ten men, one of them carrying a lighted torch, approach the
overturned bus, and almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus,
including the four passengers trapped inside it. 
 That same day, the charred bodies of the four passengers inside the bus were removed and
duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name
and in behalf of her five minor children, brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150.
 After trial, the CFI Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600 as attorney's fee, plus
P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan to Pasay City for sale and which was
lost in the fire. Both plaintiffs and defendants appealed the case to CA which endorsed the case to
SC. 
Issue: W/N the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was the overturning of the bus or the fire that
burned the bus, including the 4 passengers left inside. 

Held:
 The Court held that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus because when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank
was not unnatural or unexpected.
 The coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, made not only
by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the conductor themselves, and that because
it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as
they did from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available. 
 In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural
sequence of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside
help. 
 Moreover, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the carrier,
through its driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and the conductor were on the
road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and must have known that in the
position in which the overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank
and soaked the area in and around the bus. 
 The leaked gasoline can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither the
driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.
 In addition, the case involves a breach of contract of transportation because the Medina
Transportation failed to carry Bataclan safely to his destination, Pasay City. There was likewise
negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There is evidence to
show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding and that the driver failed to changed the
tires into new ones as instructed by Mariano Medina. 
 The driver had not been diligent and had not taken the necessary precautions to insure the
safety of his passengers. Had he changed the tires, specially those in front, with new ones, as he had
been instructed to do, probably, despite his speeding, the blow out would not have occurred.
Ratio:
 Proximate cause is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred.
 Comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the
chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted,
under such circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default
that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
 10. People vs. Ulep (G.R. No. L-36858, June 20, 1988

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-36858 June 20, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MACARIO A. ULEP, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Castor Naval for accused-appellant.

GANCAYCO, J.:

A man must love his wife. He must not lift a finger to hurt her. Indeed he must be her protector. When
against this unwritten rule he beats her, he ceases to be a man. He becomes a beast. And the law
imposes the supreme penalty when in the process he kills her. It is parricide pure and simple.

This is what Macario A. Ulep, was convicted of by the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Second
Judicial District. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,  and to indemnify the heirs
of the deceased in the amount of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs in a decision of March 20, 1973.

The facts are undisputed. On May 21, 1970, at nine o'clock in the evening, in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte,
one Asuncion Pablo Ulep died as a result of physical injuries inflicted upon her on that very day by her
husband, accused Macario Ulep. The following day, the Chief of Police of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte
received a report of the said death of Asuncion Pablo who allegedly died of a heart attack. The Chief of
Police and the Rural Health Officer went to the house of the deceased and there they saw the body on a
bamboo bed surrounded by relatives, friends, and the husband of the deceased, Macario. The Chief of
Police suggested that an autopsy be conducted but the husband refused to allow the same. However, the
daughter of the deceased by a previous marriage asked for a day or two to decide on her preference.

At the behest of the daughter, the request for an autopsy was made shortly before the burial. Accordingly,
the police chief and Dr. Eliseo Bonoan, a physician, caught up with the funeral Procession at the Catholic
cemetery and thereupon conducted an autopsy on the deceased.

The autopsy reports read as follows:

POSTMORTEM EXAMINATION

Name: ASUNCION PABLO ULEP

Age: 42

Nationality: Filipino
Address: No. 24, San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte

Date: May 25, 1970

PATHOLOGICAL DIAGNOSIS

SKIN:

A rectangular area of about 1" x 3" bluish black in color was noted on the
upper half, anterior aspect of the arm, left.

SKELETAL SYSTEM:

Complete fracture of the 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th ribs, left. The 4th and 5th
ribs fractured along the midolavicular line, left. The 6th and 7th ribs
fractured along the anterior auxillary line, left. Presence of extravascated
blood and injuries of the surrounding tissues of the broken ribs areas,
left.

Complete fracture of the 3rd and 4th ribs at the juncture of the rib and
external cartillages with concomitant injury to its sounding tissues and
extravascated blood, right side.

THORACIC CAVITY:

Presence of about 200 cc. of a serous fluid found within the cavity.

Pleura lacerated at the points of fractures.

CARDIOVASCULAR SYSTEM:

Heart with small amount of clotted blood. Coronary vessels congested.

The big blood vessels contained small amount of clotted blood.

ABDOMINAL CAVITY:

Presence of about 500 cc. of serous fluid within the cavity.

DIGESTIVE SYSTEM:

Apparently normal

CENTRAL NERVOUS SYSTEM:

The meningeal vessels were congested.

CAUSE OF DEATH:

CARDIAC ARREST

PRIMARY SHOCK.
 (Exh. D, p. 16, rec.). 1

Two weeks after the burial, two (2) constabulary sergeants investigated Macario Ulep. A statement was
prepared and signed by the accused and was subsequently sworn to before Fiscal Cesar Abaya of Ilocos
Norte. In this statement, marked as Exhibit "A", he admitted that he caused the death of his wife by
elbowing her because his wife was then drunk and was uttering indecent words. The following day, PC
sergeant Damian Bautista of Camp Juan, Laoag City conducted another investigation of accused Macario
Ulep. His statement was reduced to writing and then subscribed to before Fiscal Abaya. He reiterated that
the cause of death of his wife, Asuncion Pablo, was his elbowing her on her breast. This statement was
marked Exhibit "B".

Ulep narrated that this elbowing and attack took place at their home at 5:30 in the afternoon. She
vomitted and then went to bed, The accused then left for the fields and returned at around 9:00 in the
evening and found his wife dead on her bed. He reported this death to their barrio captain.

Despite these statements, (Exhibits "A" and "B") admitting his guilt, Ulep retracted his statement in court
by narrating that more than a year before that, and while his wife went to have their palay milled, their
bullcart loaded with sacks of rice turned upside down and pinned his wife on her breast. With the pain in
her chest, she was treated by a country quack doctor or "arbularyo."

The accused took exception to his conviction when he raised the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF

ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO THE ELBOW BLOWS BY THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT ON HER BREAST, AS ADMIRED BY HIM IN HIS AFFIDAVITS, EXHIBIT
"A" AND EXHIBIT "A-1," ENGLISH TRANSLATION, WHEN SUCH ADMISSION IS BUT
A MERE BELIEF ON HIS PART.

II

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE CAUSE OF DEATH OF
SAID ASUNCION PABLO WAS DUE TO A LONG STANDING PROCESS OR
CONDITION IN HER BODY SYSTEM, AS TESTIFIED TO BY DR. PEDRO BLANCO
FOR THE DEFENSE.

III

THE LOWER COURT ERRED CONSEQUENTLY IN NOT ACQUITTING HIM OF THE

CRIME OF PARRICIDE.

Our primary concern is to determine the cause of death of Asuncion Pablo, the wife, of the accused. Was
her death a result of cardiac arrest and primary shock due to fractured ribs? The appellant alleges that the
gradual weakening of the heart due to a long standing illness of the body system caused the cardiac
arrest which claimed the life of Asuncion Pablo.

The post-mortem report on the deceased was prepared by Dr. Eliseo V. Bonoan who conducted an
autopsy at the behest of a daughter of tile deceased by a previous marriage. The husband who previously
denied permission to conduct an autopsy was present when the autopsy was performed shortly before
the body was buried at the cemetery of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. In the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan,
the cause of death was manifestly due to cardiac arrest and primary shock. We agree and see no fault in
this finding made in the necropsy report of Dr. Bonoan.
The defense took exception to Dr. Bonoan's testimony that the fractures in the chest could have been
caused by blows or physical pressure. Could such injuries not have been inflicted by elbow blows when
the victim was standing or by knee or feet blows when the victim was lying on her back or was sitting with
her back against the wall?

While the accused admitted that he delivered several elbow blows on the chest of his wife immediately
before her death and the prosecution attributed these blows as the proximate cause of the cardiac arrest
and primary shock which resulted in the wife's death, the defense assails this theory of the prosecution in
the following manner:

First, there were no contusions on the chest of the victim. This indicates that the elbow
blows were not of sufficient force to fracture the ribs. This is so because a fracture
necessarily results in the extravasation of blood in the fractured area and it is the
extravasated blood that causes the swelling or contusion. 2 Dr. Blanco attributes the
absence of swelling or contusion on the chest, where the fractures were found, to the fact
that the fracture conditions Were of long standing; that is, some repairs has happened
and that sufficient time have elapsed for the swelling to disappear (t.s.n., p. 180).

Second, even on the theory that fractures of the ribs as that found by Dr. Bonoan were
present, the same could have not caused cardiac arrest and primary shock. This is so
because only extravasated blood was present around the immediate area of the
fractures, This means that the fractures were not depressed or that the fractured ends did
not cave-in, so as to injure the heart and impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest.
The claim of Dr. Bonoan that the chest is pliant and is like an accordion which can be
compressed is puerile to say the least. Even so, the elbow blows of the accused could
not have caused a compression of the chest wall, no matter how pliant it could be. And
even on the theory that the fractures were caused by stamping the foot on a piece of
wood placed on the chest, while the victim was lying on her back, still the fractures could
not have injured the heart or impede its functions to cause cardiac arrest, because the
fractures, were not depressed fractures or cave-in fractures. The fractures merely caused
the extravasation of blood within the fractured areas. And neither would the fractures
cause primary shock because they were merely complete fractures; which means a mere
breakage that would not cause the stoppage of the heart, because it does not tend to
compress the heart. 3

And third, although the pleura or thoracic cavity was lacerated at the points of fracture,
the same could not have caused cardiac arrest or primary shock because the lacerations
were limited to the pleura. The points of fracture did not cave-in or were not depressed
and they did not injure or impede the heart to cause cardiac arrest. Neither did the
lacerations of the pleura cause primary shock because blood did not spill into the pleura,
which indicates that the hemorrhage was nil. This is so because the serous fluid in the
pleura -as not reddish.

On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution shows that the deceased died of cardiac
arrest because of the weakening of the heart due to a long standing process or condition
in her body system. Thus the theory of the defense is strengthened by the very evidence
of the prosecution. 4

Furthermore, both sides in this case took issue to the presence of 200 cc. of serous fluid in the pleura.
The appellant claims that it is not normal whereas the prosecution says that the pleura normally contains
100 to 200 cc. of serous fluid and that this is normal. Anyway both agree that there should be enough
serous fluid to lubricate the tissues.
The presence of 500 cc. of serous fluid in the abdominal cavity which, according to Dr. Blanco, the
physician, witness for the appellant, may be due to the chronic condition of the kidney like nephritis and
edema or the hardening of the liver or a long progressively weakening of the heart. 5 Dr. Bonoan did not
concur in this view when he said that the fluid was rather increased as a result of the diffusion of the
medicine used in the embalming. 6 We find cogent basis in the explanation given by Dr. Bonoan.

Another point raised in the necropsy report pertains to the presence of clotted blood in the heart and
blood vessels as well as the congestion of the meningeal vessels. The appellant bares that this is a sign
of the hardening of the heart. Dr. Bonoan of the prosecution disclosed that there were no signs of
circulatory weakening and that blood clots were not found adherent to the heart and such being the
condition there could be no abnormality and thus he further declares that such clots are normally found in
the heart of a dead person or in any part of the circulatory system. 7

There is an admission by Dr. Blanco, the appellant's witness, that he has not "attended a case of
fractured ribs" 8 and that he explains cardiac failure as a "failing of the heart" and his further concept is
that it is "the stopping of the heart." He says that such stoppage could be due to trauma, such as a
fracture of the ribs. 9

A resume of the evidence presented by the parties establishes the fact of death of Asuncion Pablo on
May 21, 1970. She was legally married to Macario Ulep, the appellant herein. The death, established in
two affidavits, Exhibits "A" and "B," was caused by said accused. In these affidavits, the appellant
admitted that he elbowed and attacked his wife. This attack caused the complete fracture of the 4th, 5th,
6th and 7th ribs on her left chest and the 3rd, and 4th ribs, right chest of Asuncion Pablo on the same
evening of May 21, 1970. The trial judge observed: "There was never any attempt on the part of the
accused to repudiate the sworn statements wherein he admitted that the cause of death of his wife was
his having elbowed her many times on her breast." 10

Having realized the gravity of his act, the appellant presented a witness to prove that sometime in
February or March, 1969 his wife was pinned down by a sack of rice and the side portion of a bullcart and
was attended to by a town quack doctor called an arbularyo. This witness said that two (2) ribs on each
side of the chest were fractured, without stating which particular ribs were so affected.

From all these observations, findings, and an incisive study of the necropsy report, the cause of death of
the wife-victim in this case is cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by the strong pressure applied on
the upper front chest bone. This happens when one steps, kneels or presses the body of a victim against
a wall. The man-size blows coming from the elbow of the aggressor upon a thin-framed woman can only
bring about fatal results.

We find relevance in Wharton and Stilles' findings in their book, Medical Jurisprudence under the title of
"SHOCK," to wit:

Sec. 225. Shock. — Death may also be due to the shock associated with the injury. The
possibility of a person dying from the shock attendant upon an injury which, by itself
appears to be unimportant is attested by experience. No satisfactory explanation of the
cause of the shock seems to have been found, though it is due in some way to the
upsetting of the nervous equilibrium of the body. Shock from an injury may be fatal even
when the blow leaves no trace behind it; as, for instance, when a person receives a
violent blow upon the pit of the stomach, or behind the ear, or to the larynx. ... In the case
of Reg. v. Slane, et al., 11 the deceased had received injuries to the abdomen by kick and
blows, but there were no marks of bruises present, or anything to show the cause of
death. Death however, had followed twenty minutes after the maltreatment and was
evidently due to the shock. The prisoners were convicted of murder. 12

We have previously stated that:

 Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or
tuberculosis, if the blow delivered by the accused —

(a) is the efficient cause of death; or

(b) accelerated his death; or

(c) is the proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability. 13

Apropos to all these is that time-respected doctrine: "He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the
evil caused." This is the rationale in Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "criminal
liability shall be incurred by a person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be
different from that which he intended."

Again, We elucidated that: even though a blow with the fist or a kick does not cause any external wound,
it may easily produce inflammation of the spleen and peritonitis and cause death, and even though the
victim may have been previously affected by some internal malady, yet if the blow with the fist or foot
accelerated death, he who caused such acceleration is responsible for the death as the result of an injury
willfully and unlawfully inflicted. 14

We are, therefore, convinced that there is no fundamental disagreement between the two medical
witnesses as to the cause of the victim's death and that cardiac arrest and primary shock took away the
life of the victim, Asuncion Pablo.

There is that clear and categorical showing that on the appellant fell the blame for these in human acts on
his wife. He should answer for her tragic death.

The indemnity to the heirs of his deceased wife should be increased to P30,000.00.

WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to indemnity, the judgment appealed from is hereby
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.

11.People vs. Bindoy (56 Phil 15)

[ GR No. 34665, Aug 28, 1931 ]

PEOPLE v. DONATO BINDOY +

DECISION

56 Phil. 15
VILLAMOR, J.:
The appellant was sentenced by the Court of First In- stance of Occidental Misamis to the penalty of 
twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law,  to indemnify  the heirs of the
deceased in the amount of P1,000, and to pay the costs.  The crime charged against the accused is
homicide,  according to the following information:

 "That on or about the 6th of May, 1930, in the barrio of Calunod,  municipality of Baliangao,
Province of Occidental Misamis, the accused Donato Bindoy willfully, unlawfully, and  feloniously
 attacked  and  with  his  bolo wounded Emigdio  Omamdam, inflicting upon the latter a serious
wound in the chest which caused his instant death,  in violation of  article 404 of the Penal Code."
 The accused appealed from the  judgment of the  trial court,  and his counsel in this instance
contends  that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and in convicting
him of  the  crime of homicide.

The record shows that in the  afternoon of May 6, 1930, a disturbance arose in a tuba wineshop
in the barrio market of Calunod, municipality of Baliangao,  Province of  Occidental  Misamis, 
started by  some of the tuba drinkers. There were Faustino Pacas (alias  Agaton), and his  wife
called  Tibay.  One Donato Bindoy, who was  also there, offered some tuba to Pacas' wife;  and
as she refused to drink having already done so, Bindoy threatened to injure her if she did  not
accept.  There ensued an interchange of words between Tibay and Bindoy, and Pacas stepped in
to defend his  wife, attempting to take away from Bindoy the bolo  he  carried.  This occasioned a
disturbance which "attracted the attention of Emigdio Omamdam, who,  with his family, lived near
the market.   Emigdio left his house to see what was happening* while Bindoy and Pacas were
struggling for the bolo.   In the course of this struggle, Bindoy  succeeded in  disengaging 
himself  from  Pacas, wrenching the bolo from the latter's hand towards the left behind the
accused, with such violence that the point of the bolo  reached Emigdio  Omamdam's chest, who
was  then behind Bindoy.

There is no evidence that Emigdio took part in the fight between Bindoy and Pacas.  Neither is
there any indication that the accused was aware of Emigdio Omamdam's presence in the place,
for, according to the testimony of the witnesses, the latter passed behind the combatants when
he left his house to satisfy his curiosity.  There was  no disagreement or ill feeling between
Bindoy and Omamdam, on the contrary, it appears they were nephew and uncle, respectively,
and were on good terms with each other.  Bindoy did not  try to wound  Pacas, and instead of
wounding him, he hit  Omamdam; he was only defending his  possession of the bolo, which
Pacas  was  trying to wrench away from him, and his conduct was perfectly lawful.

The wound which Omamdam received in the chest, judging by the description given by the
sanitary inspector who attended him as he lay dying, tallies with the size of the point of Bindoy's
bolo.

There is no doubt that the latter caused the wound which produced Emigdio Omamdam's death,
but the defendant alleges that it was caused accidentally and without malicious intent.

Pacas and the widow of the deceased, Carmen  Angot, testified having seen the accused stab
Omamdam with his bolo. Such  testimony is  not incompatible  with that of the accused, to the
effect  that he wounded Omamdam by accident.  The widow testified that she knew  of her
husband's wound being caused by Bindoy from his statement to her before his death.

The testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution tends to show that the accused  stabbed
Omamdam in the  chest with his bolo on that occasion. The defendant, indeed, in his  effort to
free himself of  Pacas, who was endeavoring to wrench his bolo from him, hit Omamdam in the
chest; but, as we have stated, there is no evidence to show that he did so deliberately and with
the intention of committing a crime.   If, in his struggle with Pacas, the defendant had attempted to
wound his opponent, and instead of doing so, had wounded Omamdam, he would have had to
answer for his  act, since whoever willfully commits a felony or a misdemeanor incurs criminal
liability, although the wrongful act  done  be different from that which he intended.   (Art. 1 of the 
Penal Code.)   But,  as we have said, this is not the case.

The witness for the  defense, Gaudencio Cenas, corroborates  the defendant to the effect that
Pacas and Bindoy were  actually struggling for the  possession  of the bolo, and that when the
latter let  go, the former had pulled so violently  that it flew towards his left side, at the very
moment when Emigdio Omamdam came up, who was therefore hit  in the chest, without Donato's
seeing him,  because Emigdio  had passed behind him.  The same witness adds that he went to
 see Omamdam at his home later, and asked him about his wound when he replied:  "I think I shall
die of this wound."  And then continued:   "Please look after my  wife when I die:  See that she
doesn't starve,'* adding further:  "This wound was an accident.  Donato did not aim at me, nor I at
him:  It was a mishap."  The testimony of this witness was not contradicted by any rebuttal
evidence  adduced by the fiscal.

We have searched the record  in vain for the motive of this kind, which,  had  it existed,  would 
have  greatly facilitated the solution  of this case.  And we deem  it well to repeat  what this court
said in United States vs.  Carlos (15 Phil., 47), to wit:

 "The attention of prosecuting officers, and  especially of provincial fiscals, directed  to the
importance of definitely ascertaining and proving, when possible, the motives which actuated  the
commission of a crime under investigation.

"In many criminal cases one of the most important aids in completing the proof of the commission
of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence  disclosing the motives  which tempted
the  mind of the guilty person to indulge the criminal act."
 In view of the evidence before us,  we are of opinion and so hold, that the appellant  is entitle  to
acquittal according to article 8, No. 8,
 Penal Code.  Wherefore,  the judgment appealed from is reversed, and the accused Donato
Bindoy is hereby acquitted with costs de oficio.   So ordered.

COURSE OUTLINE and CASE LIST

Professor: Atty. Dimpna D. Bermejo-Dulay, MSChem PhD

C. CAUSES THAT PRODUCE A DIFFERENT RESULT

1. Error in personae -- Mistake in person
2. Aberratio ictus – Mistake in blow
3. Praeter intentionem – No intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed

 Additional Cases:

-1. People vs. Gona, (54 Phil 605) [ GR No. 32066, Mar 15, 1930 ]

PEOPLE v. GONA +

DECISION

54 Phil. 605
OSTRAND, J.:

The defendant was charged before the Court of First Instance of the Province of Davao with the crime of
homicide, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about October 26, 1928, in the municipal district of Pantukan, Province of Davao, Philippine
Islands, and within the jurisdiction of the court, the said accused voluntarily, illegally, and criminally and
with a bolo which he then carried, assaulted the Mansaca Mapudul, causing him a mortal wound on the
left side of the neck and that, as a consequence of said wound, the said Mapudul died."
Upon trial the court below found the defendant guilty as charged in the information and taking into
consideration the extenuating circumstance of non-habitual intoxication, sentenced him to suffer twelve
years and one day of reclusion temporal with the accessory penalties prescribed by law, to indemnify the
heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. From this sentence the defendant
appealed.
It appears from the evidence that on the evening of October 26, 1928, a number of Mamacas celebrated
a reunion in the house of the Mansaca Gabriel. There seems to have been a liberal supply of alcoholic
drinks and some of the men present became intoxicated, with the result that a quarrel took place between
the Mamaca, Dunca and the defendant Dunca and his son Aguipo eventually left the house and were
followed by Mapudul and one Awad. The defendant left the house about the same time with intention of
assaulting Dunca, but in the darkness of the evening and in the intoxicated condition of the defendant, he
mistook Mapudul for Dunca and inflicted on him a mortal wound with a bolo.
There can be no doubt that the defendant killed Mapudul and that he is guilty of the crime charged, but
his attorney argues that in view of the fact that said defendant had no intention to kill the deceased and
committed the crime by mistake, he should have been found guilty of homicide through negligence under
paragraph 1 of article 568 of the Penal Code and not of the graver crime of intentional homicide.
This contention is contrary to earlier decisions of this court. In the case of United States vs, Mendieta (84
Phil., 242), the court said:
"Even admitting that the defendant intended to injure Hilario Lauigan instead of Pedro Acierto, even that,
in view of the mortal wound which he inflicted upon the latter, in no way could be considered as a relief
from his criminal act. That he made a mistake in killing one man instead of another, when it is proved that
he acted maliciously and willfully, cannot relieve him from criminal responsibility. Neither do we believe
that the fact that he made a mistake in killing the wrong man should be considered as a mitigating
circumstance."
The appealed sentence is affirmed with the costs against the defendant. So ordered.

2.People vs. Mabug-at, (51 Phil 967)

PEOPLE VS MABUG-AT (Digest)

 PEOPLE VS  MABUG-AT
G.R. No. L-25459 
Facts:
The accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of
the latter having frequently visited the house of another girl. The accused invited Juana to take a walk on
the afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day,
the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in
some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come
downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get
Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the
direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two, followed them without saying a word.
The houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot
of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a
part of her neck, and coming out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper
medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this
case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends
that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having
been proven that it was the accused's intention to kill.

Issue: 
Whether or not the accused is guilty with frustrated murder
Held: Yes.The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not
accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana
Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially
having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than
that, in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not
in itselfsufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein
the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was
not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act
is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver
is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the
body, it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal
liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the
accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime
without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The
treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana
Buralo was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going
upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver.
The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill and performed all the
acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

3.People vs. Cagoco, (58 Phil 524)

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES, GR No. 38511, 1933-10-06

Facts:
on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalkWhile
they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee was
about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing back and forth behind Yu Lon
approached him from behind and suddenly and... without warning struck him with his fist on the back part
of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of
his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailant immediately ran away.
The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died... about midnight.
Issues:
it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.
Ruling:
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a felony different from that which he
proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a
felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of
the... crime committed by the offender.
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal
liability for the... natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from
criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate
that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious...
act, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from
the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance... under the circumstances of
this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence
of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in
a treacherous... manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend
to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder,
because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Principles:
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal
liability for the... natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences

IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Requisites
 MODIFIED CONCEPT OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Cases:
- 1.Intod et.al. vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992)

FACTS:
•    February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. 
Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan
to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany them. 
Otherwise, he would also be killed.
•    February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
•    RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the costs

•    Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:

xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for
the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
•    The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his formidability
to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
•    Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
•    Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1.    the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2.    there is intention to perform the physical act
3.    there is a performance of the intended physical act
4.    the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o    Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
•    Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o    Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty
•    United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment -
attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

2.People vs. Mabug-at, (51 Phil 967)

PEOPLE VS MABUG-AT
 PEOPLE VS  MABUG-AT
G.R. No. L-25459 
Facts: 
The accused and Juana Buralo was sweethearts. Juana had been jealous of the accused on account of
the latter having frequently visited the house of another girl. The accused invited Juana to take a walk on
the afternoon of August 9, 1925. Juana refused him, later sending him a note of excuse. On the third day,
the accused went to the threshold of Cirilo Banyan's house where Juana Buralo had gone to take part in
some devotion. There the accused, revolver in hand, requested Francisco Abellon to ask Juana to come
downstairs and as Abellon refused to do so, the accused said: "If you do not want to go upstairs, I will get
Juana and if anyone tries to defend her I will kill him."
The accused waited until Juana and her niece Perfecta Buralo came downstairs, when they went in the
direction of their house. The accused, who was seen by the two, followed them without saying a word.
The houses being adjacent. As the two girls were going upstairs, the accused, while standing at the foot
of the stairway, fired a shot from his revolver which wounded Perfecta Buralo, the bullet passing through a
part of her neck, and coming out through the left eye, which was completely destroyed. Due to proper
medical attention, Perfecta Buralo did not die and is one of the witnesses who testified at the trial of this
case.
The defense, without abandoning its allegation that the accused is not responsible for the crime, contends
that the crime proven is not frustrated murder but the discharge of a firearm, with injuries, it not having
been proven that it was the accused's intention to kill.
Issue:  Whether or not the accused is guilty with frustrated murder?
Held: Yes. The relations existing between the accused and Juana Buralo, his disappointment at her not
accepting his invitation to take a walk, the fact that the accused, revolver in hand, went to look for Juana
Buralo at the house where the devotion was being held, later following her to her house, and especially
having aimed at her person--the head--are facts which, in our opinion, permit of no other conclusion than
that, in firing the shot, it was the accused's intention to kill.
In the decision of this court in the case of United States vs. Montenegro (15 Phil., 1), it was held:
We do not doubt that there may be cases wherein the discharge of a firearm at another is not
in itselfsufficient to sustain a finding of the intention to kill, and there are many cases in the books wherein
the attendant circumstances conclusively establish that on discharging a firearm at another the actor was
not in fact animated by the intent to kill. But, in seeking to ascertain the intention with which a specific act
is committed, it is always proper and necessary to look not merely to the act itself but to all the attendant
circumstances so far as they are developed by the evidence; and where, as in the case at bar, a revolver
is twice discharged point-blank at the body of another, and the shots directed at the most vital parts of the
body, it needs but little additional evidence to establish the intent to kill beyond a reasonable doubt.
The fact that a person received the shot which was intended for another, does not alter his criminal
liability. (Art. 1, par. 3, Penal Code.)
the fact is that treachery was proven and must be taken into consideration in this case, because the
accused fired at Perfecta Buralo, employing means which tended to insure the execution of the crime
without running any risk himself from anyone who might attempt to defend the said offended party. The
treachery which, according to the evidence, would have attended the crime had the bullet hit Juana
Buralo was present in this case because the offended party Perfecta Buralo and Juana were going
upstairs with their backs towards the accused when he fired his revolver.

The crime now before us is frustrated murder, the accused having intended to kill and performed all the
acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of murder but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of his will. (Art. 3, Penal Code.)

3.People vs. Cagoco, (58 Phil 524)

PEOPLE v. FRANCISCO CAGOCO Y RAMONES, GR No. 38511, 1933-10-06

Facts:
on the night of July 24, 1932 Yu Lon and Yu Yee, father and son, stopped to talk on the sidewalk
While they were talking, a man passed back and forth behind Yu Lon once or twice, and when Yu Yee
was about to take leave of his father, the man that had been passing back and forth behind Yu Lon
approached him from behind and suddenly and... without warning struck him with his fist on the back part
of the head. Yu Lon tottered and fell backwards. His head struck the asphalt pavement; the lower part of
his body fell on the sidewalk. His assailant immediately ran away.
The wounded man was taken to the Philippine General Hospital, where he died... about midnight.
Issues:
it is contended that the appellant if guilty at all, should be punished in accordance with article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code, or for slight physical injuries instead of murder.
Ruling:
Paragraph No. 1 of article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability shall be incurred by
any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he
intended; but in order that a person may be criminally... liable for a felony different from that which he
proposed to commit, it is indispensable that the two following requisites be present, to wit: (a) That a
felony was committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved person be the direct consequence of
the... crime committed by the offender.
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal
liability for the... natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences; but that in such cases, the lack of intention, while it does not exempt from
criminal liability, is taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance
There can be no reasonable doubt as to the cause of the death of Yu Lon. There is nothing to indicate
that it was due to some extraneous case. It was clearly the direct consequence of defendants felonious...
act, and the fact that the defendant did not intend to cause so great an injury does not relieve him from
the consequence of his unlawful act, but is merely a mitigating circumstance... under the circumstances of
this case the defendant is liable for the killing of Yu Lon, because his death was the direct consequence
of defendant's felonious act of striking him on the head. If the defendant had not committed the assault in
a treacherous... manner, he would nevertheless have been guilty of homicide, although he did not intend
to kill the deceased; and since the defendant did commit the crime with treachery, he is guilty of murder,
because of the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
Principles:
where death results as the direct consequence of the use of... illegal violence, the mere fact that the
diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve the illegal
aggressor of criminal responsibility; that one is not relieved, under the law in these Islands, from criminal
liability for the... natural consequences of one's illegal acts, merely because one does not intend to
produce such consequences.
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Requisites
 MODIFIED CONCEPT OF IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
 Cases:

1.Intod et.al. vs. C.A. (G.R. No. 103119, October 21, 1992)

FACTS:
•    February 4, 1979: Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to
Salvador Mandaya's house and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. 
Thereafter, they had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan who told Mandaya that he wanted
Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should
accompany them.  Otherwise, he would also be killed.
•    February 4, 1979 10:00 pm: All of them armed arrived at Palangpangan's house and fired at
Palangpangan's bedroom but there was no one in the room.
•    RTC: convicted Intod of attempted murder based on the testimony of the witness

ISSUE: W/N Intod is guilty attempted murder since it is an impossible crime under Art. 4 (2)

HELD: YES. petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding
Petitioner guilty of Attempted Murder is hereby MODIFIED. sentences him to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, together with the accessory penalties provided by the law, and to pay the
costs
•    Art. 4(2). CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY. — Criminal Responsibility shall be incurred:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not
for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the employment of inadequate or
ineffectual means.
Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan's absence from her room on the night he and his companions
riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.
•    The Revised Penal Code, inspired by the Positivist School, recognizes in the offender his
formidability to punish criminal tendencies in Art. 4(2)
•    Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime
•    Legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where
1.    the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law
2.    there is intention to perform the physical act
3.    there is a performance of the intended physical act
4.    the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime
o    Ex: The impossibility of killing a person already dead
•    Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his
control prevent the consummation of the intended crime – this case
o    Ex: man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's
wallet and finds the pocket empty
•    United States: where the offense sought to be committed is factually impossible or accomplishment
- attempt to commit a crime; legally impossible of accomplishment - cannot be held liable for any crime

2.People vs. Domasian (March 1, 1993)

 
Lessons Applicable:

Laws Applicable: Art. 4

FACTS:
•    March 11, 1982 morning: While Enrico was walking with Tirso Ferreras, his classmate, along Roque
street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by Pablito Domasian who requested his
assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate. Enrico agreed to help and rode with
the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan, where he waited outside while the man went into a building to get
the certificate. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital,
the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to
stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. When they alighted at Gumaca, they took another
tricycle, this time bound for the municipal building from where they walked to the market. Here the man
talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father.
The two then boarded a tricycle headed for San Vicente.  As Enrico was crying and being firmly held,
Alexander Grate, the tricycle driver became suspicious and asked Domasian about his relationship with
the boy who told him they were brothers.  Their physical differences and the wide gap between their ages
made Grate doubt so he immediately reported the matter to two barangay tanods when his passengers
alighted from the tricycle.  Grate and the tanods went after the two and saw the man dragging the boy.
Noticing that they were being pursued, Domasian was able to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was
on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital
ambulance and already looking for him.
•    At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope
containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that
otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing
it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for
examination
•    March 11, 1982 1:45 pm: Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note demanding P1 million
otherwise Enrico will be killed.  . Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar so he referred it to
the NBI for examination and it turned out to be Dr. Samson Tan’s signature.
•    Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal
detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
o    Domasian’s alibi: at the time of the incident he was watching a mahjong game in a friend's house and
later went to an optical clinic with his wife for the refraction of his eyeglasses
o    Dr. Tan’s alibi: he was in Manila
•    Enrico, Tirso Ferreras and Grate all pointed Domasian. 
•    RTC: Domasian and Tan guilty as charged and sentenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and all accessory penalties
•    Appealed

ISSUE: W/N Domasian and Tan is guilty of kidnapping kidnapping with serious illegal detention

HELD: YES. appealed decision is AFFIRMED

•    Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention may consist not only in placing a person in an
enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
•    Tan claims that the lower court erred in not finding that the sending of the ransom note was an
impossible crime which he says is not punishable.
•    Tan conveniently forgets the first paragraphs of the same article, which clearly applies to him, thus:
Art. 4.    Criminal liability. — Criminal liability shall be incurred:
1.    By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended.
•    Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had
already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no
inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The
sending of the ransom note would have had the effect only of increasing the penalty to death under the
last paragraph of Article 267 although this too would not have been possible under the new Constitution.
•    On the issue of conspiracy, we note first that it exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it, whether they act through
physical volition of one or all, proceeding severally or collectively. These acts were complementary to
each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective, viz., to extort the ransom
of P1 million in exchange for Enrico's life.
•    The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him 6 days
before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at
that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he
really wanted to help.

3.Jacinto vs. People (July 13, 2009)

JACINTO vs PEOPLE

GEMMA JACINTO vs PEOPLE

G.R. NO. 162540 13July2009 592SCRA26
FACTS: In June 1997, Baby Aquino, handed petitioner -collector of Mega Foam, a post dated checked
worth P10,000 as payment for Baby’s purchases from Mega Foam International, Inc. The said check was
deposited to the account of Jacqueline Capitle’s husband-Generoso. Rowena Recablanca, another
employee of Mega Foam, received a phone call from an employee of Land Bank, who was looking for
Generoso to inform Capitle that the BDO check deposited had been dishonored. Thereafter, Joseph
Dyhenga talked to Baby to tell that the BDO Check bounced. However, Baby said that she had already
paid Mega Foam P10,000 cash in August 1997 as replacement for the dishonored check.
Dyhengco filed a compliant with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) and worked out an entrapment
operation with its agents. Thereafter, petitioner and Valencia were arrested. The NBI filed a criminal case
for qualified theft against the two (2) and Jacqueline Capitle.

RTC rendered a decision that Gemma, Anita and Jacqueline GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of QUALIFIED THEFT and each of the sentenced to suffer imprisonment of Five (5) years, Five (5)
months and Eleven (11) days to Six (6) years, Eight (8) months and Twenty (20) days.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime committed falls the definition of Impossible Crime.
HELD: Yes, Since the crime of theft is not a continuing offense, petitioner’s act of receiving the cash
replacement should not be considered as continuation of the Theft.
The requisites of an impossible crime are:

1. That the Act performed would be an offer against persons or property;

2. That the act was alone with evil intent; and
3. That the accomplishment was inherently impossible or the means employed was either
inadequate or ineffectual.
The time that petitioner took a possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had performed all the
acts to consummate that crime of theft had it not been impossible of accomplishment in this case.

Therefore, the Supreme Court held that petitioner Gemma T. Jacinto is found GUILTY of an impossible  
crime and suffer the penalty of Six (6) months of arresto mayor and pay courts.