Institutionalization and Structuration: Studying

the Links between Action and Institution

Stephen R. Barley, Pamela S. Tolbert

Abstract

Stephen R. Institutional theory and structuration theory both contend that institutions and
Barley actions are inextricably linked and that institutionalization is best understood
Department of as a dynamic, ongoing process. Institutionalists, however, have pursued an
Industrial
empirical agenda that has largely ignored how institutions are created, altered,
Engineering and and reproduced, in part, because their models of institutionalization as a pro-
Engineering cess are underdeveloped. Structuration theory, on the other hand, largely
Management, remains a process theory of such abstraction that it has generated few empirical
Stanford
University, studies. This paper discusses the similarities between the two theories,
U.S.A. develops an argument for why a fusion of the two would enable institutional
theory to significantly advance, develops a model of institutionalization as a
Pamela S. structuration process, and proposes methodological guidelines for investigating
Tolbert the process empirically.
School of
Industrial and
Labour Relations, Descriptors: structuration, institutionalization, organizational change, social
Cornell action, methodology, longitudinal analysis
University,
Ithaca, U.S.A.

Introduction - ~ . ~ ~ - ~ . , -
.

The concept of institution has long been a mainstay of sociological

theory (Hughes 1936, 1939; Parsons 1951; Selznick 1949, 1957), but
has only recently acquired prominence in organization studies (Meyer
and Rowan 1977; Zucker 1977, 1983; DiMaggio and Powell 1983;
Powell and DiMaggio 1991). The rising interest in institutions among
students of organizations reflects a growing disenchantment with theor-
ies that portray efficiency as the driving force behind decision making
or that treat variations in formal structure as rational adaptations to
technical and environmental conditions (e.g. Woodward 1958;
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967; Blau 1970). Unlike these more traditional
theories, institutional theory highlights cultural influences on decision
making and formal structures. It holds that organizations, and the indi-
viduals who populate them, are suspended in a web of values, norms,
rules, beliefs, and taken-for-granted assumptions, that are at least par-
93-
tially of their own making. These cultural elements define the way the
world is and should be. They provide blueprints for organizing by speci-
fying the forms and procedures an organization of a particular type
94

should adopt if it is to be seen as a member-in-good-standing of its

class (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Institutions, therefore, represent con-
straints on the options that individuals and collectives are likely to exer-
cise, albeit constraints that are open to modification over time.
These arguments bear a resemblance to certain tenets of structuration
theory as articulated by Anthony Giddens (1976, 1979) and those who
have brought Giddens’ insights to organization studies (Ranson et al.
1980; Pettigrew 1985, 1987; Willmott 1987). Like structuration theorists,
institutional theorists acknowledge that cultural constraints do not com-
pletely determine human action (DiMaggio 1988, 1991; Oliver 1991;
Strang 1994). Rather, institutions set bounds on rationality by restricting
the opportunities and alternatives we perceive and, thereby, increase the
probability of certain types of behaviour. However, just as perfect ration-
ality is rare, so too is completely bounded rationality. Through choice and
’
action, individuals and organizations can deliberately modify, and even
’
eliminate, institutions. The acquisition of suffrage by women in the
United States, the dismantling of apartheid in South Africa, and the col-
lapse of the Soviet Union represent a few ready examples.
Nevertheless, even though organizational theorists may now more will-
ingly acknowledge the interdependence of actions and institutions, they
have only begun to develop the theoretical and empirical implications
of such a stance. We contend that for institutional theory to fulfill its
promise for organizational studies, researchers must develop dynamic
models of institutions (see Whittington 1992) and devise methodologies
for investigating how actions and institutions are recursively related.
This paper seeks headway on both fronts. We begin by reviewing recent
analyses of organizations based on institutional theory, focusing on their
common neglect of the links between actions and institutions.’ Next,
we draw on Giddens’ (1976, 1979, 1984) work on structuration to
articulate a model of how institutions are formed, reproduced, and
modified through an interplay of action and structure. We then propose
guidelines and procedures, based on this model, for investigating how
institutions affect, and are affected by, action.

’~

Institutional Theory and the Study of Organizations

a~ Zucker (1977: 727-728) and Meyer and Rowan (1977: 346) initially
drew on the work of Berger and Luckmann (1967) to argue that institu-
tions are socially constructed templates for action, generated and main-
m tained through ongoing interactions. From this perspective, actors create
institutions through a history of negotiations that lead to ’shared typi-
.&dquo;

fications’ or generalized expectations and interpretations of behaviour.

.
The patterned relations and actions that emerge from this process gradu-
ally acquire the moral and ontological status of taken-for-granted facts
which, in turn, shape future interactions and negotiations. Although
j ~ Berger and Luckmann largely ignored the role that conflicting material
 95

interests may play in an institution’s development, such considerations

are notentirely incompatible with their formulation (Ranson et al.
.

1980). In fact, Berger and Luckmann allude to material and political

interests in their discussion of institutional change and elaboration
(1967: 81-84).
The role of actors’ self-awareness and self-interest is more explicit in
DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) definition of organizational fields.
Although DiMaggio and Powell did not draw explicitly on Berger and
Luckmann to frame their arguments, their views of emerging institu-
tions are generally consistent:
. : <
. ,;.< - ..I : -..
’Fields only exist to the extent that they are institutionally defined. The process
of institutional definition, or ‘structuration’, consists of four parts: an increase
in the extent of interaction among organizations in the field; the emergence of
sharply defined interorganizational structures of domination and patterns of
coalition; an increase in the information load with which organizations must
contend, and the development of a mutual awareness among participants in a
set of organizations that are involved in a common enterprise.’ (DiMaggio and
Powell 1983: 148) ,, , ,
.
, , ,

Note that passage links the actions of actors (organizations) to a larger

social structure (the field), posits that actors are knowledgeable (’mutual
awareness of a common enterprise’ ), and suggests that institutions
...

constrain the very actions that produce them ( ‘emergence of ... struc-
tures of domination’). Thus, in their early work, institutionalists expli-
citly postulated that institutions exhibit an inherent duality: they both
arise from and constrain social action. More often than not, however,
institutionalists have concentrated on an institution’s capacity to con-
strain (Zucker 1987: 444-447; Whittington 1992).
With the passage of time, Meyer and his colleagues have come to treat
institutions primarily as exogenous to organizational action (Meyer and
Scott 1983; Scott and Meyer 1987; Sutton et al. 1994; Scott and Meyer
1994). Their more recent work associates institutional pressures with
the demands of centralized authorities or regulatory agencies and, only
secondarily, with widespread beliefs, practices, and norms. Con-
sequently, their research programme has focused on the causes and
consequences of conformity and on the manner in which the environ-
-

ment ’interpenetrates the organization’ (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The

problem with this approach is that it depicts an institution as somehow
: distinct from those who comply and, more importantly, from the act of
compliance itself. The result reifies the notion of institution. Moreover,
>.

by emphasizing the rewards and sanctions associated with compliance,

the approach blurs the distinction between resource dependence and
i ,
institutional theory, thereby obscuring the latter’s distinctive contribu-
tion to organization studies (Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
In contrast, Zucker and her colleagues have continued to emphasize the
role of normative and taken-for-granted assumptions in their analyses
&dquo;_ . of organizations, but have paid relatively little attention to the process

I
96

by which such assumptions arise and are maintained (Zucker 1977,

1986, 1991; Tolbert and Zucker 1983, 1996; Tolbert 1985; Zucker et
al. 1995). This line of work has sought to elaborate, theoretically and
.

empirically, the claim that organizational structures reflect institutional

understandings, rather than rational calculations of efficiency. To
muster empirical support, researchers in this camp usually pit pre-
dictions derived from efficiency or power-oriented theories against
;:. predictions derived from institutional theory, and then take findings that
.. are consistent with the latter, but not the former, as support for an
institutional perspective. With few exceptions (e.g. Zucker 1977), how-
ever, these studies rarely measure institutionalization directly and only
briefly address how particular organizational structures emerge or why
their scope (diffusion) is inevitably limited. To answer such questions,
one needs to consider how actions affect institutions.
Thus, even though both streams of institutional research initially
claimed that organizational structures are socially constructed, neither
.

has directly investigated the processes by which structures emerge from,

or influence, action. For insight into these processes, we turn to Gid-
dens’ (1976, 1979, 1984) notion of structuration.
~

Towards a General Model of Action and Institution ~

.

f’ . ~.: j ..
n :j .’.. ~ . ...
,,:> ... ,
t í’
~

Defining Institution --

.> A viable of the relation between action and institution requires,

theory
.
at minimum, heuristic definition of an institution that will allow
a
researchers to examine the change and reproduction of institutions as
general, ongoing, and historically embedded processes. With this aim
in mind, we define institutions as shared rules and typifications that
identify categor-ies of social actor-s and their appr-opriate activities or
..

relationships (see also Burns and Flam 1987). This definition bears a
,
strong resemblance to Giddens’ (1984:2 377) notion of ’structure’ and
..
Sewell’s (1992) idea of a ’schema’. Neither Giddens nor Sewell, how-
ever, emphasize the degree to which institutions vary in their normative
.

power and their effect on behaviour. As Tolbert and Zucker (1996)

.

point out, practices and behavioural patterns are not equally institution-
,
.

alized. This variation depends, in part, on how long an institution has

.;
been in place and on how widely and deeply it is accepted by members
.

of a collective. Institutions that have a relatively short history or that

have not yet gained widespread acceptance are more vulnerable to chal-
lenge and less apt to influence action.
One can think of institutions as abstract algebras of relations among
members of social sets. From this perspective, institutions are to social
action as grammars are to speech. Speech allows for an infinite variety
of expressions, yet to be comprehensible, every expression must con-
= .
form to an underlying set of tacitly understood rules that specify rela-
 97

tions between classes of lexemes. Similarly, social actions may vary in

their particulars, but to be interpretable, their contours must conform
to taken-for-granted assumptions about the activities and interactions

appropriate for different classes of actors. The specifics of any grammar

or institution are arbitrary in the sense that both are essentially social

stipulations. Adherence to such stipulations, however, is far from

arbitrary, if by arbitrary one means entirely open to individual
choice.
Note that our definition of institution applies to various levels of ana-
lysis because it makes no assumption about the identity of relevant
social actors. They may be individuals, groups, organizations, or even
larger collectives. Researchers should, therefore, be able to use this
definition, regardless of whether they are investigating an institution
associated with a group, an organization, an industry, or even society
at large. Yet the definition is sufficiently precise to enable us to delin-
eate more explicitly the nature of the link between institutions and
everyday activities.
’

Institutions in Action ,
_~

Giddens’ ( 1976, 1979, 1984) work on structuration is an attempt to

articulate a process-oriented theory that treats structure (institutions) as
both a product of and a constraint on human action. Drawing simultan-
eously on the tenets of functionalism and phenomenology, Giddens tries
to bridge the gap between deterministic, objective, and static notions
of structure, on the one hand, and voluntaristic, subjective, and dynamic
views, on the other, by positing two realms of social order (analogous to
grammar and speech) and by focusing attention on points of intersection
between the two realms. Figure 1 displays Giddens’ conception of how
the two realms of social organization, action and institution, are
related.
The institutional realm represents an existing framework of rules and
typifications derived from a cumulative history of action and inter-
action. According to Giddens, institutional orders consist of general

Figure 1
Giddens’ Model
of Structuration
98

principles that undergird systems of signification, domination, and legit-

imation. In contrast, the realm of action refers to actual arrangements
of people, objects, and events in the minute-by-minute flow of social
life’s unfolding (Ranson et al. 1980). To the degree that institutions
., are encoded in actors’ stocks of practical knowledge (in the form of
-
interpretive schemes, resources, and norms adapted to a particular set-
ting which Giddens calls ‘modalities’ ), they influence how people com-
municate, enact power, and determine what behaviours to sanction and
’ reward.
, With regard to day-to-day interactions, it is useful to think of institu-
...
tions as being enacted through ’scripts’ (Barley 1986). Although some
’

.
.
analysts have treated scripts primarily as cognitive phenomena (Schank
and Ableson 1977), we believe it is empirically more fruitful to view
scripts as behavioural regularities instead of mental models or plans.
I i From this perspective, scripts are ohservable, recurrent activities and
..
patterns of interaction characteristic of a particular setting. Scripts
encode the social logic of what Goffman (1983) called an ’interaction
order’. Our contention is that the institutions relevant to a particular
setting will manifest themselves in behaviours characteristic of that set-
ting and, hence, will appear as local variants of more general
principles.
The notion of a script usefully substitutes for Giddens’ more abstract
. notion of modalities because scripts can be empirically identified,
.

regardless of the type of actor or level of analysis in which a researcher

is interested. Barley’s (1986) study of interaction patterns in two radi-
.

ology departments, during the year in which they acquired CT scanners,

.

offers numerous examples of scripts whose relevant actors are indi-

viduals. ’Direction seeking’, for instance, was a script that embodied
.

the institution of medical dominance. Although the content of specific

.., instances of direction seeking varied widely, each was characterized by
the same interactional plot: (1) a technologist inquired about an appro-
: ,

priate course of action; (2) a radiologist provided the technologist with

’It an answer; and (3) the technologist acted accordingly. Because the tech-
..
nologists enacted the script long after they had learned to run the scan-
ner and, hence, generally knew the answers to the questions they asked,
the script served primarily to validate the radiologists’ dominance as
professional experts.
Scripts are also useful analytic tools for studying organization-level
institutions when an organization’s sub-units are the relevant actors.
For example, contemporary ’market-based control’ systems (see Whal-
ley 1986; Hinings et al. 1991; du Gay and Salaman 1992; Whittington
et al. 1994) are instantiated in such scripts as the formulation of explicit
business plans by semi-autonomous business units, the incorporation of
entrepreneurial criteria into performance reviews, and the elaboration
of financial data systems (revenue and expenditure codes) for individual
departments.
Finally, scripts whose central actors are organizations encode institu-
 99

tions at the interorganizational level of analysis. The institution of

’
accreditation among colleges and universities, for example, pivots
around well-established patterns of interaction between an accrediting
.
agency and a school. Accreditation proceeds through such ritualized
..
(scripted) procedures as establishing an outside review committee, con-
ducting interviews with faculty and students, collecting data through
. <; internal audits of libraries and other educational resources, and so forth.
. , The enactment of such rituals is the essence of accreditation.
&dquo;

Because Giddens argues that institutions exist only insofar as they are
instantiated in everyday activity, critics have charged that he ’conflates’
- .
structure with action (Archer 1982, 1989; Layder 1987; Callinicos
1985). Conflation concerns the problem of reducing structure to action
(or vice versa) and the difficulty of documenting the existence of an
.
institution apart from activity. Unless institutions and actions are ana-
lytically as well as phenomenologically distinct, it is difficult to under-
stand how one can be said to affect the other. Although the critics of
,
structuration theory have aimed their critique at problems they believe
, to be inherent to the theory’s logic and, for this reason, have sometimes
argued for re-establishing the separation between structure and action
.

i’ that Giddens sought to transcend (Archer 1989: 103-104), we submit

. that the worth of the critique actually lies in the epistemological rather
; than the ontological issues that it raises.
Institutions are historical accretions of past practices and understandings
that set conditions on action. Unless an institution exists prior to action,
it is difficult to understand how it can affect behaviour and how one
can examine its implications for action or speak of action’s subsequent
.

affects on the institution. Thus, to reduce the empirical problem of

;
conflating action and institution, one needs a diachronic model of the
.
structuration process as well as longitudinal data. Moreover, unless
.

researchers use separate indicators of institutions (which span settings

and time) and actions (which are localized to a specific setting), they
: .
can neither argue convincingly that the two map the same principles
..
nor show how actions implicate structures broader than those of setting
itself. Finally, researchers require an empirically viable means of link-
ing the two realms that does not rely on ’artistic hermeneutics’ (Archer
<
1989). The value of defining scripts in behavioural terms and treating
.

them as pivots between an institution and action is that it allows one

to explicate the basis for one’s inferences about systems of action, while
simultaneously providing a point of reference for gauging the acceptab-
..
ility of deductions from transituational indicators of an institution and
>
_ its implications for the logic of an interaction order.

: . ;
&dquo; , ..- . l’
, ’; I . «« ’; ~, . I. I.: .. , . :&dquo; iI

,
.
Institutions and Actions: A Recursive Model

.
< .

Although researchers have analyzed single instances of interaction for

.
how they confirm or disconfirm an institutional order (see Manning
100

1982; Riley 1983; Willmott 1987), to fully understand the processes

by which institutions and actions are reciprocally related requires
diachronic analysis (Archer 1982). While Giddens (1984) explicitly
contends that structuration occurs through time, his models are only
implicitly temporal, since he usually treats duration as a background
assumption rather than a focus of attention. The task then, as we see
it, is to translate Giddens’ essentially static portrayal of structuration
into a more dynamic model that links action to the maintenance and
change of an institution and that provides a framework for empirical
.
research.
To investigate how patterns of interaction lead to the emergence of a
’

.
new institution is, to say the least, a formidable task. An enormous
amount of luck or prescience are required to recognize an emerging
.
institution and then gather data on relevant, ongoing actions and interac-
tions. Moreover, historical or archival material will rarely contain the
detailed data necessary for documenting the link between everyday acts
and the creation of an institution. Thus, it is likely that most investi-
gations seeking to link actions and institutions will focus on the pro-
cesses by which existing institutions are maintained and modified. To

carry out research on these processes requires a conceptual framework

.

that specifies the relations between interactional episodes and institu-

tional principles. One such model, which synthesizes and elaborates
notions drawn from Giddens and Berger and Luckmann, is depicted in
Figure 2.
The model reflects the contention that institutionalization (or structur-
ation -

henceforth, we use the terms synonymously) is a continuous

’

process whose operation can be observed only through time. The bold
’

horizontal arrows that define the figure’s upper and lower boundaries
,
signify the temporal extensions of Giddens’ two realms of social struc-
ture : institution and action. The vertical and diagonal arrows linking
the two realms denote the duality of social systems. Vertical arrows
represent institutional constraints on action, while diagonal arrows rep-
resent maintenance or modification of the institution through action.
Thus, social behaviours constitute institutions diachronically, while
institutions constrain action synchronically.
The first moment (arrow a) entails the encoding of institutional prin-
.

ciples in the scripts used in specific settings. As Berger and Luckmann

suggest, encoding frequently takes place during socialization and
involves an individual internalizing rules and interpretations of behavi-
.

our appropriate for particular settings .2 However, institutional principles

can also be encoded in scripts in other ways as well. For instance,
Noble ( 1984), Shaiken (1984) and other students of technology
(Scarbrough 1993) have shown how engineers can wittingly or unwit-
tingly reproduce systems of domination in technical designs. The con-
straints of the technology then force operators to engage in patterns of
;
activity that reinforce existing status systems. Similarly, formal organ-
.

izational rules and procedures often define scripts that embody institu-
101
102

tions that coversuch activities as hiring personnel, evaluating perform-

ance, or offering goods or services to customers (Ranson et al. 1980;
Covaleski and Dirsmith 1988).
The second moment (arrow h) of institutionalization occurs when actors
enact scripts that encode institutional principles. Enacting a script may
or may not entail conscious choice or an awareness of alternatives. If
actors recognize that they are following a script, they will often offer a
standard rationale for doing so (e.g. ’accounting needs this information’;
’creativity requires a high degree of autonomy’). In many cases, how-
ever, enactment does not involve awareness or intentionality: actors
simply behave according to their perception of the way things are. It
is presumably for this reason that Jepperson (1991: 145) argues that
institutions are not reproduced by action, since ’action’ usually connotes
conscious choice. The distinction is important, regardless of whether
one agrees that action deserves the connotation of intentionality. Under-

standing the degree to which people consciously choose to enact and

ignore scripts that encode institutions is a critical issue for research on
how action and institutions are linked, since modification of an institu-
tion is more likely to require conscious choice than does its
reproduction.
This issue brings us to the third moment of institutionalization (arrow
c), the degree to which behaviours revise or replicate the scripts that
informed the action. Under most circumstances, an intention to alter
scripts is more likely to lead to institutional change than are uncon-
scious, unintended deviations from a script (see Boisot and Child 1988).
Changes in technology, cross-cultural contacts, economic downturns,
and similar events increase the odds that actors will realize that they
can (or must) modify an institution (Burns 1961; Ranson et al. 1980).

People can certainly conceive of alternatives without ’exogenous’

changes in the situation. They may even act according to alternative
visions of what social life should be like. However, their ability to
foment change is likely to be constrained by the intransigence of others
who, in lieu of a disturbance in the status quo, are likely to resist
reopening previously negotiated arrangements (Pettigrew 1987). Thus,
we believe that contextual change is usually necessary before actors can
assemble the resources and rationales that are necessary for collectively
questioning scripted patterns of behaviour. In the absence of contextual
change, actors are more likely to replicate scripted behaviour, and it is
this propensity that makes institutions so persistent (Hughes 1936: 180).
While idiosyncratic deviations from scripts occur, perhaps even with
some frequency, such random deviations are apt to have only passing

impact on social arrangements.

Finally, the fourth moment (arrow c~ of institutionalization entails the
objectification and externalization of the patterned behaviours and inter-
actions produced during the period in question. This involves the
disassociation of patterns with particular actors and particular historical
circumstances: the patterns acquire a normative, ’factual’ quality and
 103

their relationship to the existing interests of different actors becomes

obscured.
Since it is impossible to observe instantaneous rates of social change,
the partitioning shown in the model (T1, T2, T3) implies that by com-
paring the scripts uncovered at T to those at T+l, one can assess whether
change in an interaction order has or has not occurred. Given such a
systematic comparison, the task is then to identify the forces in the
interactional setting and beyond that produced the observed outcomes
and to link the findings to other indicators of institutional change
beyond those found in the research site itself. This brings us to the
methodological issues implied by such a model.
&dquo;I’:&dquo; .. :.... ’ : <
.

Towards a Methodology for Studying Structuration

Our model of institutionalization as structuration suggests a general

research strategy. Regardless of the level of analysis, studies that aim
to investigate the dynamics of institutionalization will need to concen-
trate on four tasks that correspond to analytically distinct steps in the
research process. Specifically, the tasks include: (1) defining an institu-
tion at risk of change over the term of the study and selecting sites in
light of this definition; (2) charting flows of action at the sites and
extracting scripts characteristic of particular periods of time; (3) exam-
ining scripts for evidence of change in behavioural and interaction pat-
terns; and (4) linking findings from observational data to other sources
of data on changes in the institution of interest. Although the particulars
of these tasks will depend, in part, on whether the units of analysis are
individuals or collectives, we shall sketch a series of general procedures
.

and issues, focusing primarily on observations where individual actors

are the units of analysis. To illustrate our points, we shall also draw

extensively on Barley’s ( 1984, 1986, 1988, 1990) study of the effects

of new technologies on the institution of professional dominance in
radiology departments.
’

Defining Institutions and Selecting Sites

Assuming that most scholars will take an existing institution as the
starting point for studying links between actions and institutions, their
research is likely to focus initially on the second moment of institu-
tionalization, the enactment of scripts, since scripts already associated
. with the institution will need to be defined before change can be
assessed. It is also probable that researchers will want to target events
.
that maximize the probability of institutional change and, hence, the
opportunity for gaining insight into conditions that shape action and
the subsequent revision or reproduction of an institution. As we have
indicated, forces initially exogenous to the system under study that
create disturbances -

e.g. changes in technology, new regulations or

<
104

laws, major economic shifts, etc. are most likely to occasion institu-
-

tional change. Structuring a study around such events also has the desir-
able property of allowing the researcher to use a ’before and after’
design. This approach, however, carries important implications for
where and when one collects data.
For instance, it implies that researchers will need to identify, in advance,
events with system-disturbing potential and begin collecting baseline
.

data on the system before an event occurs. Baseline data are crucial
for assessing whether an event brings about changes in scripted action.
The ability to foresee occasions for potentially significant institutional
change is less difficult than it might seem. Organizations usually
anticipate and even announce mergers and acquisitions, the adoption of
new technologies, and changes in personnel before they occur. Sim-

ilarly, governments typically publicize new laws before they are enacted
and routinely stipulate when they will be enforced.
To evaluate the impact of such events on institutional outcomes,
. researchers will need to choose sites for observation that vary along
; dimensions that might be expected to mediate the impact of such events.
.
Because one can normally collect detailed observational data over an
.

extended period of time from only a small number of settings, when

selecting sites, it is particularly important that researchers should con-
sider factors that are likely to affect the degree to which patterns of
behaviour are institutionalized.
For example, researchers interested in examining the transition to
market-based control systems in professional firms might want to select
< sites where the professional staff’s length of tenure or primary sources
of revenue vary (e.g.. Hinings et al. 1991; Whittington et al. 1994),
.

since these characteristics should affect how market control will affect
interaction orders. Barley (1990) chose sites that permitted him to com-
pare ongoing interactions surrounding the use of new and old technolo-
gies because he was interested in how computerized medical imaging
devices, in general, and CT scanners, in particular, affected the institu-
tion of professional dominance in radiology departments. He also
required sites that would acquire a scanner sometime during the course
of the research since this was the only imaging technology that was
diffusing into community hospitals at the time. Finally, he chose one
hospital which had close ties to a medical school and one that did not,
..
to determine whether a teaching mandate would influence role relations
and the structuring process. Studies examining the impact of declines
in college enrollment on accreditation systems might similarly target
schools and/or academic departments of varying prestige levels or those
,
emphasizing different degree programmes. In short, to study structur-
.
ation, scholars need to select sites based on careful consideration of
factors apt to affect an institution’s boundaries or that may impede or
.
enhance institutional change (see Scheid-Cook 1992).

:... , , . _~~i.D ..,i :....: - -

,,~. _&dquo;i’ I I ..
-, .

>
 105

Charting Flows of Action and Scripts

Given the goals of formulating scripts and analyzing whether and how
the scripts change, researchers need to compile accurate observational
records on who interacts with whom in what ways at what times, as
well as data on actors’ interpretations of their behaviour at the time it
occurs. Information on actors’ interpretations is crucial for
assessing
whether they consciously consider alternative courses of action and the
costs and benefits associated with such choices. Such information can
help researchers avoid erroneously interpreting behaviour in structur-
ally-deterministic ways and better assess the role of agency. Retrospect-
ive accounts and archival data may also prove useful for this but, all
else being equal, contemporaneous accounts are probably less subject
to rationalized reconstruction.
When the key actors in an analysis are collectives rather than indi-
viduals, charting flows of action and interaction is apt to be more diffi-
cult for a number of reasons. First, the time frame of the structuring
process is likely to be longer when collectives are the relevant actors.
Moreover, defining the actions of collectives can be problematic, since
many individuals can act on behalf of a collective. Finally, even if one
can determine how to observe the actions of a collective, charting the
’ acts of multiple collectives is logistically more difficult than docu-
menting the behaviour of multiple individuals, because comparable col-
lectives are less
likely to be physically proximal. Researchers who wish
to study changes in institutions that govern the actions of collectives
may therefore need to resort to historical and archival data.
Although many organizations fail to record or retain much data on their
decision processes and activities, the dearth of information may be less
than is typically supposed. Studies of interorganizational networks sug-
gest that researchers can reconstruct relationships among organizations
over time by drawing on a variety of archival sources (Burt 1983; Mintz
and Schwartz 1985). Moreover, as the work of industrial historians
repeatedly demonstrates, organizations often leave behind numerous
traces of their actions and deliberations. In some domains, such as
research and development in the electrical equipment industry, archives
of considerable size exist (Birr 1957; Kline 1987). Not only do indi-
vidual entrepreneurs, managers and scientists keep personal diaries, but
a good number of corporations actually maintain libraries where docu-
ments relevant to the firm’s history are enshrined.
To date, institutional researchers have made little use of such data,
perhaps in part, because they are unaware of its existence and because
most sociologists are not schooled in the ways of historians. Neverthe-
less, we believe that the basic tasks of identifying scripts and assessing
their continuity can be carried out with historical data through a logic
similar to that described above, assuming that sufficient data exist.
Andrew Pettigrew’s (1985) incredibly detailed and nuanced historical
study of structural and strategic change in Imperial Chemical Industries
r
106

gives testimony to the possibility of successfully studying structuring

processes in which an organization and its divisions are the primary
,>
actors. ,.1.&dquo; ’ ,: ¡

Finally, in addition to observations, interviews, and archival material,

other documentary sources of data (e.g. sociometric questionnaires,
formal records of procedures, etc.) collected intermittently are useful
for gathering information on structuring processes. Such data can be
used to augment fieldnotes on who typically engages in what sorts of
interactions, and with whom. Likewise, after a sufficient period of
observation, it may be useful to devise survey instruments for clarifying
or supplementing observational data. However, we would emphasize
that since the particulars of patterned action are often specific to the
setting, questionnaires are unlikely to provide useful data on the interac-
tion order unless they are based on detailed knowledge of the settings
under study.
Researchers can begin the task of identifying scripts either after com-
pleting observations or at selected points during data collection. The
latter strategy has the benefit of allowing researchers to develop ideas
’

and hypotheses while there is time to acquire additional data. Four pro-
cesses are crucial to identifying and analyzing scripts: ( 1 ) grouping the
data by category or unit of observation, (2) identifying behavioural pat-
terns (scripts) within categories, (3) identifying commonalities across
scripts, and (4) comparing scripts over time.
Grouping Data
.
A system of categories for collecting and sorting data greatly facilitates
identifying scripts. Although the types of categories used depend on the
research project, experienced field researchers typically employ several
.
broad categorization schemes for collecting observational data (see
Lofland 1976). One such scheme targets types of events or aotivities
that have discrete temporal and spatial boundaries and that are ecolo-
.

gically and culturally meaningful in the setting under study. Barley’s

(1990) decision to structure his observations around types of radiolo-
gical procedures illustrates the use of such a framework. Because work
in radiology departments is oriented to performing a specific procedure
on a particular patient at a specific point in time, most activities and
. interactions meaningful to radiologists and technologists hinge on the
execution of procedures, whose unfolding is typically highly structured.
Moreover, because the unit is ecologically meaningful, Barley could
begin and end periods of observation without artificially disrupting the
flow of action..--i, ...

A second scheme is based on types of actors, defined in terms that are

relevant to the actors themselves. Such a scheme would focus attention
on activities characteristic of those who fill a particular role and on
.

interactions between people who occupy positions in a role set. For

example, researchers interested in studying scripts associated with the
; institution of market-based control might focus their observations on
 107

the patterned behaviours of corporate managers, department or sub-unit

heads, line workers and support staff (see Whittington et al. 1994), and
on the interactions that occur among the occupants of each role. This

strategy would enable researchers to specify scripts that structure rela-

tions between support staff and line workers, line workers and sub-unit
administrators, and so on.
Still a third scheme would be to organize observations around meaning-
ful tvpes of behaviour, such as expressions of conflict, coordination, or
information giving. Thus, a researcher interested in accreditation might
find it reasonable to organize her data by requests for information, clari-
fication seeking, compliance with requests, overt denials of requests,
etc..; ,.. ~, _ ... :

/~ ( .~ ’
I ’.,

Identifying Scripts within Categories -- ..

Having chosen a scheme for organizing observations, the analyst next

focuses on identifying scripts, and on the patterns of action and interac-
tion that occur within observational categories. The first task is to com-
pile all incidents representative of a particular category, and then sort
these incidents within categories according to the period of structuring
in which they occurred. Analysis should begin with data from the base-
line period. It is unlikely that all observations in a category will follow
the same script, because categories generally encompass many scripts.
Thus, one should not be disturbed by a multiplicity of patterns. The
primary objective at this point is simply to identify observed orderings
of behaviour that may represent a script and to understand the actors’
interpretations of the scripts’ logic as thoroughly as possible. Inform-
ants’ explanations of their activities are relevant to this latter purpose,
as are their reactions to violations of patterns. Violations of institu-

tionally-based patterns are more likely to evoke emotional or moralistic

reactions than are violations of patterns that are simply grounded in
rational calculations of efficient action.
Prior knowledge of the setting and of the institution under investigation
may permit researchers to anticipate some scripts. However, unexpected
scripts inevitably emerge during the course of the study. This is particu-
larly true when researchers are studying interaction orders with which
they have little personal experience or that are in the process of chan-
.

ging. Close observation and careful recording increase the odds of iden-
tifying scripts, even though one may not recognize at the time that the
events one is observing are either important or scripted. Meticulous
.

recording is essential, because one cannot identify a pattern unless one

has documented multiple instances of its occurrence.
Once the existence and relevance of a pattern become apparent, the
researcher’s job is to document the pattern’s frequency. If the researcher
analyzes his or her notes as the research progresses, it is possible to
structure observations around emergent scripts. For example, after
months of observation, in reviewing his field notes, Barley (1984)
noticed that radiologists seemed to express their requests differently,
108

depending on the technology in use. Radiologists appeared to use fewer

imperative sentences when interacting with those technologists who
staffed computerized imaging devices. Tape recordings of the verbal
exchanges that occurred as radiologists and technologists worked with
different technologies later verified the differential distribution of this
syntactical indicator of enacted dominance. Similarly, research focusing
on scripted relations among different organizations or different depart-
ments might serendipitously uncover contextually related differences in
the use of informal and formal communications (see Yates and Orli-
kowski 1992).
.. : ,_, ;11B’ ~

identifying Commonalities across Scripts

Once analysts have identified scripts within categories for a particular
time period, they can compare different scripts for commonalities or
global properties. The notion here is that different scripts may represent
alternate encodings of the same underlying institution. Actors are even
less likely to be aware of underlying commonalities than they are of
the scripts themselves. For instance, interactions between radiologists
and technologists during the early days of CT scanning in one of the
hospitals that Barley ( 1986) studied evinced a number of distinct scripts.
One was the ’direction seeking’ script discussed above. Another, ’direc-
tion giving’, characterized interactions in which (1) a radiologist told
a technologist what to do and (2) the technologist carried out the radi-

ologist’s orders without question. A third script involved incidents in

.

which a radiologist ’usurped the scanner’s controls’ from a technologist

by (1) approaching the scanner’s console and (2) interrupting the tech-
nologist’s work by pushing buttons or typing commands at the key-
board. Although different in content, all three scripts encoded the
radiologists’ professional dominance ois a nis technologists and the
.
technologists’ deference toward the radiologists.
Comparing Scripts over Time
.

After identifying and assessing commonalities among scripts associated

. with the baseline period, analysts will need to repeat the foregoing pro-
cedures for data collected after the occurrence of the event anticipated
to affect the structuring process. If baseline scripts continue to be
common in later periods and no new scripts arise, then one might con-
;
jecture that the interaction order has not changed and that the institution
remains intact, at least as it is instantiated within the settings. On the
other hand, if new scripts arise and the frequency of baseline scripts
declines, then one can infer that the interaction order has changed.
Whether the shift in the interaction order also signals a change in the
institution under investigation depends, in large part, on whether the
underlying logic of the scripts characteristic of different time periods
has also shifted. For example, suppose one found that, before a shift
to team-based systems, foremen routinely gave orders to workers, that
.
order giving declined after the change, but that teams now routinely
 109

sought directions from mid-level managers. One might not want to con-
clude that the institution of hierarchical authority had been seriously
altered by the shift to teams.
An additional point is worth noting. Up to now, we have discussed the
collection and analysis of data in terms of a simple comparison of social
action and interaction before and after some exogenous change. In actu-
ality, the data following an exogenous event may evince multiple
periods. As discussed earlier, researchers are unlikely to anticipate such
additional periods of structuring and, even after extensive observations,
the existence of later phases may not be immediately obvious to the
researcher. Consequently, researchers need to remain sensitive to the
possibility of multiple phases defined primarily by observed shifts in
, the patterned properties of ongoing action. For example, Barley (1986)
was able to estimate the approximate timing of the CT scanners’ arrival
in the radiology departments he studied. However, he was unable to
foresee later events, such as personnel changes, that proved to be
significant junctures in the history of scanner operations and that sub-
sequently affected the evolution of the interaction order between techni-
cians and radiologists (and, ultimately, the maintenance and change of
institutional parameters ). Unless researchers remain acutely sensitive to
the possibility of additional, unanticipated partitioning points, they may
misrepresent the dynamics and even the outcomes of the structuring
process.
, 4 .. - ~ . ~

Validating the Link between Scripts and Institutions .

Scripts allow researchers to systematically identify patterns of social

interaction that encode institutional principles; that is, to ’see’ an institu-
’

tion in day-to-day actions and to understand how actors’ interpretations

of those actions are related to the institution’s reproduction or modi-
fication. However, scripts are, by definition, apt to be tied to a specific
interaction order, and the relationship of such an order to others, that
are also associated with an institution, is problematic. Hence, although
one may wish to infer changes in an institution from a changing array
of scripts, the inference is not foolproof, especially when researchers
wish to speak to the fate of an institution beyond the settings they have
studied. Moreover, making such an inference risks conflating actions
with institutions.
Thus, to fully explore the extent and conditions of institutional change,
it behooves researchers to compile evidence of institutional change or
stability independent of the data from which scripts are derived. Ideally,
such evidence would show that the trajectory of a set of scripts parallels
the fate of the institution they presumably encode. According to our
model of structuration, if scripts change, independent data on the insti-
tution should, ultimately, also provide evidence of change. If scripts
remain unchanged, so should other indicators of the institution.
Analysts can use a variety of non-observational sources of data to assess
110

the fate of institutions across collectives. Documents such as training

manuals, memoirs, legal records, journals, and newspaper articles offer
&dquo;

rich sources of evidence amenable to systematic content analysis. Stat-

istical data compiled by governmental and private sources on personnel
distributions in organizations and occupations, legal violations and
sanctions, collective action, the formation of organizations and so on,
&dquo;

can also be useful. Such data may track changes in institutional para-
meters and help researchers assess the boundaries of such change. Inso-
far as they can be shown to vary with the same type of events that
triggered changes in the interaction order, they may also provide sup-
port for the process-based conclusions drawn from the observational
.
data.
Indices of the concern within the field of radiology for the proper role
.

of a radiological technician illustrate how researchers can complement

observational evidence on changing institutional parameters with
artifactual data. Over the years, journals on radiology have paid varying
amounts of attention to the ’ problem’ of technicians who interpret films.
Articles and letters to the editor on the topic were relatively frequent
before the American College of Radiology succeeded in gaining control
over the training and certification of x-ray technicians. Afterwards,
interest in the topic waned until the early 1970s when cybernetic tech-
.

nologies once again raised the specter of technicians usurping the core
of the radiologists’ role (Barley 1984). Fluctuating interest in the topic
can be interpreted as evidence for the relative stability and change of

’
the institution of professional dominance in radiology which pivots on
restrictions regarding who can interpret medical images (Larkin
1983 ).3
Interestingly enough, after the advent of ultrasound, the first computer-
ized and cybernetic imaging device, the number of published discus-
sions on the rightful role of the technologist in a radiology department
increased. Moreover, new journals targeted at sonographers published
more articles on the interpretation of images than do journals read by

x-ray technicians, whose activities and interactions are more consistent

’,
with the prohibition on technicians interpreting films (Barley
.

1984).
Several organizational indicators also support the thesis that computer-
ized imaging devices have altered the interaction order of radiology
departments and, consequently, the institution of professional domin-
ance in radiology. During the early 1980s, sonographers established
their own professional society and their own registry, both of which
represented moves toward an occupational identity separate from that
of radiological technologists in general. In sharp contrast to the tests
that x-ray technicians take to become certified, the examination for son-
ographers includes questions on the interpretation of images. Pay scales
for sonographers, CT technicians and special technologists are typically
.
higher than those for x-ray technologists. Hospitals are increasingly
’
treating CT, ultrasound, and special procedures as separate organiza-
 111

tional units, distinct from the x-ray department. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, as the number of computerized imaging devices has
grown, more and more radiology departments have begun to change
their name to ’departments of medical imaging’. By tying such
artifactual data to observational data gathered before and after the intro-
duction of new technologies into radiology departments, Barley ( 1984,
1986, 1990) was able to articulate the link between technological
change, patterned interactions among physicians and technicians, and
changes in the institution of professional dominance in radiology
departments.
·
~ ,
, ~

Caveats on Interpreting Indicators of Institutional Change

.
The foregoing examples suggest how indicators of institutional para-
meters can change in tandem with the restructuring of interaction
orders, as our model suggests they should. The mapping of changes in
patterns of everyday action onto changes in organizational forms, pri-
vately and publicly articulated ideologies, and large-scale patterns pro-
vides the sort of rich insights that are crucial to a full understanding of
the nature of macro-micro linkages and the reciprocal interplay between
actions and institutions.
It is conceivable, however, that changing scripts will index a shift that
occurs only in a given setting, perhaps because of the setting’s particular
characteristics (hence, the need for careful selection of sites), and that
elsewhere, the institution remains unaffected. Likewise, it is possible
that institutional change could affect other interaction orders, but not
in the ones under study.
If widespread change is to occur across an array of interaction orders,
a relatively large number of actors must alter their behaviour in similar

ways. This is most likely to occur when common conditions affect many
actors more or less simultaneously in much the same way (as occurs
with a shift in an infrastructural technology) and when the social net-
works among actors are relatively dense. The degree to which changes
in the interaction orders of particular settings can affect widespread
institutions and the paths by which such changes unfold are empirical
questions that still require considerable research.
It is also possible for an institution to seem to change without concomit-
ant changes in interaction orders. For example, in theory, a significant

proportion of a population of organizations can adopt formal policies

and positions without producing discemable shifts in the day-to-day
activities of their members (Meyer and Rowan 1977). Some would say
that affirmative action and sexual harassment policies in U.S. organiza-
tions evince this property. Likewise, the passage of regulatory statutes
may be of relatively little consequence in terms of an organization’s
observed activities.
We would submit that in such instances institutional change has not
occurred. We leave open the question of whether, and under what
112

conditions, changes in fornial structures can take place without actually

affecting interaction orders. To our knowledge, this question has not
been seriously addressed in either social theory or research. Our intu-
ition is that the decoupling of formal structures and actions is apt to
be rare and relatively short lived (see Tolbert and Zucker 1996).
In cases where institutional change does appear to have taken place, a
final issue for research involves documenting the mechanisms through
which the changes are encoded and, thus, preserved. The question is
equivalent to asking how the fourth moment of the institutionalization
process, extemalization and objectification, proceeds. The methodology
we have outlined does not directly address these dynamics. Instead,
we have assumed that these processes must be occurring if artifactual

indicators of an institution parallel changes in interaction orders.

Researchers may find clues to how extemalization and objectification
unfold by examining documents associated with the formalization of
changes and by studying socialization practices in work groups, schools
and so on. Although extemalization and objectification may be beyond
the purview of most studies, it remains a critical element for estab-
lishing closure in the study of action-institution links.

Summary .

.
Structuration theory and institutional theory provide complementary
insights. Both share the premise that action is largely organized by
.

institutions, widely held definitions of the behaviour and relationships

appropriate for a set of actors. Both acknowledge that institutions are
created, maintained and changed through action. Structuration theory,
however, explicitly focuses on the dynamics by which institutions are
reproduced and altered, an issue that has been largely neglected by
institutional theorists. Nevertheless, as it is currently formulated. struc-
turation theory provides little guidance on how to investigate the way
in which everyday action revises or reproduces an institution.
Our aim has been to develop the implications of structuration theory
for the interplay between actions and institutions and to address the
practical problem of how to study institutional maintenance and change
in organizations. We believe that the institutional perspective must
come to grips with institutionalization as a process if it is to fulfill its

promise in organization studies. To date, most empirical work inspired

by institutional theory has concentrated on the diffusion of particular
policies and practices (e.g. Fligstein 1990; Palmer, Jennings and Zhou
1993). Efforts to document the behaviours and decision-making pro-
cesses that underwrite diffusion are virtually non-existent, and yet are

particularly critical in understanding cases that do not involve some

sort of legal coercion.
Although structuration theory deals directly with such dynamics, its
abstract formulation has also made its empirical application a rare event,
 113

although there are notable exceptions (see, for example, Stimpert et al.
1995; Orlikowski 1992; Orlikowski and Yates 1995; Poole and
DeSanctis 1993; DeSanctis and Poole 1994). Thus, while both institu-
tional and structuration theory promise important insights into the pro-
cess of organizing, our ability to apply and test those insights has been
limited. By offering some preliminary guidelines for studying institu-
tionalization as structuration, we hope to spark further interest in and
debate on the issue. We view our contribution as but an opening remark
in a long-running conversation, and far from the final word.
In fact, by choosing to focus on the identification and analysis of scripts
in our approach, we have consciously emphasized the behavioural and
the structural rather than the cognitive and the cultural. Although we
believe such an approach has value because it enables systematic
empiricism, it does so at the cost of relegating interpretations to the
background. Consequently, our approach is far less sensitive to the role
that cognitions and interpretive frames play in the institutionalization
process than are the methodologies employed by Pettigrew ( 1987 ),
Willmott ( 1987) and other European students of structuration in organ-
izations. What is required is a systematic exploration of the relative
importance of behavioural and interpretive phenomena in the institu-
tionalization process and, on the basis of such exploration, the fash-
ioning of a set of methods that are sensitive to and systematic about
documenting both cultural and structural dynamics.

4otes 1. Scott ( 1988) has identified four separate variants of institutional theory. In addition
to the approach taken by Zucker and her colleagues and that developed by Meyer and
his colleagues, Scott distinguishes Selznick’s approach, which associates institutions
with valued organizations, and a functionalist or Parsonian approach which identifies
institutions with sectors of society that are characterized by distinct systems of values
and beliefs. While the latter two clearly represent important approaches to the study
of institutions, their influence in contemporary organization theory has been slight in
comparison to that of the more recent camps. We, therefore, focus explicitly on more
recent conceptualizations.
2. While socialization often connotes a specific period of time during which neophytes
enter a group and leam its ways, we contend that such a connotation is too limiting.
Socialization is a process that never ceases, because individuals are always being
assigned new roles and adapting to changes in existing roles. To understand the role
of socialization in the structuring process, we must not make the mistake of limiting
socialization to a particular phase of a person’s career in a social collective.
3. Although proscriptions against technologists interpreting films are central to the
system of professional dominance in radiology, this particular proscription is relatively
meaningless in other medical specialties. Yet, professional dominance is an institution
that encompasses all medical specialties (Friedson 1970). The difference underscores
a point we made at the outset: broad institutions may be represented by different scripts
in different settings.

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