IBN SINA, AL-GAZALI AND

IBN TAYMIYYAH ON THE

ORIGINATION OF THE
WORLD
Abstract: Philosophical doctrines and scientific world view of
an epoch from which a scholar gets too much impressed,
attain the status of the standard of rationality for him. He
begins to comprehend that to believe these ideas as compared
to the ones believed by past generations, is more rational and
logical. On the contrary, iman bil-ghaib (faith in the unseen)
is the foundation of religion. This is the prime quality of the
muttaqin (the God-fearing ones) who qualify for attaining
guidance from the Qurān.1 These are the people who after
acknowledging the truthfulness and trustworthiness of Shahid
(the messenger and those whom he certified), do not ask how
and why on what the shahid says next. Volition has been
ascribed in the Qurān to God as His Dignity and Majesty. The
God-fearing ones believe that Allah has created the universe
at Will and has created it ex-nihilo. They find no contradiction
in believing this view. They firmly believe that if any
metaphysical notion, principle of logic, or scientific world
view is contrary to the teachings of the revealed truth, fault
lies not with the assertions of faith but with the metaphysical
notion, logic, or science. Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina are very
close to each other in their views. 2 Ibn Sina (Avicenna)
developed these ideas much more than al-Farabi did. In
history of Muslim philosophy they both are referred to as
Muslim philosophers. The Muslim philosophers got so much
impressed by Plato and Aristotle that they accepted their
philosophical views as the standard of rational truth. As
Muslim they believed religion as the revealed truth.
Philosophical system and the scientific world view by which
one gets impressed, as said above, assumes the status of a
rational version of truth for him. If one already believes in a
revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed


Published in International Journal of Humanities and Religion (IJHR), 2(1),
February, 2013, 19-30
 335

and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance. In the

history of religious philosophy, this desire for reconciliation
has emerged in the form of reconstruction of religious thought
in terms of prevalent philosophical and scientific theories.
This is undertaken with the purpose to make the rational face
of religion more manifest. But in the end it is the religion that
suffers. In their attempt at the reconciliation of religion and
philosophy, Muslim philosophers had to deny all the major
beliefs of Islam. Imam Ghazali, with great philosophical
acumen, locates the presuppositions which made them deviate
from standard Qurānic beliefs and reconstructs them so as to
prove Islamic beliefs fully rational. Imam Ibn Taymiyyah, a
great Muslim thinker also enters in the discussion, but is
entangled in un-Qurānic notions like „absolute and fixed
privation‟ and principles like „Inconceivability of Inaction of
Divine Attributes.‟ etc. Controversy between these thinkers is
not merely an intellectual heritage of Muslim history, but also
has intimate relevance with our own times. This provides us
with a criterion to examine our own approach towards the
relationship between religion and the philosophical and
scientific world views of our times. Naturalism of Sir Seyyed
Ahmed Khan, Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam by
Dr. Muhammad Iqbal, and sociological interpretation of Islam
and especially presentation of Tauhid as World View by Dr.
Ali Shari‟ati in the recent past and similar attempts of various
contemporary scholars need to be seen and evaluated in this
perspective. Initially an article on the same theme was written
with the title “Takhlīq, Sadūr, aur Ham-azliyat” in Urdu
which was published in Iqbaliyat, Vol. 38, 39, no. 2, 1998.
Present one is a thoroughly revised and expanded version on
the same theme.
It has been a standard Islamic belief ever since its
beginning that Allah has created the world at His Will; that
He has created the universe ex-nihilo. Two things bear
great importance in this view. (i) That Volition/Will
(Iradah) is very much Allah's Attribute. (ii) That He is All
Powerful to create the universe ex-nihilo. In the later
periods some theologians proposed that the universe was
created out of a pre-existent matter. They presented those
verses of the Qurān in their support which say that before
the creation of the universe Allah's throne was on water.
But they admitted that this matter (i.e. water), too, was
Allah's creation. Thus they denied the existence of any
primordial matter or something coeternal with God.
Contrary to the above, Muslim philosophers Al-Farabi
(circa 873-950)3 and Ibn Sina (known in the West as
Avicenna, 980–1037)4 proclaimed that Allah does not
possess the attribute of Will. Under the influence of
Aristotle they denied Allah to be having Will.5 They argued
that 'Thought‘ instead of ‗Volition' was Allah's essential
attribute. They define 'volition' as a capacity to attain
something which one lacks or a capacity to remove
deficiency which one suffers. According to them, having
volition is contrary to the dignity of an absolutely perfect
being for the following reason: "Volition implies change,
and change implies imperfection. Since God is conceived
to be an absolutely perfect being, the attribute of 'volition'
cannot be ascribed to him." They held 'Thought' to be the
essential Attribute of God and said that in God 'Thought'
and 'Will' are one and the same thing. As to what is the
object of Divine Thought, for thought is always about
something, the Muslim philosophers replied that the Being
of God Himself is the object of His Thought! Since nothing
except Him existed with Him therefore object of His
Thought cannot be anything other than Him. He is a self-
thinking Thought, a Self-Contemplating Being from all
eternity.6 Finding that, 'volition' cannot be denied for
Qurānic God, Ibn-e-Sina makes an indirect move and says
that since Allah lacks in nothing nor is there any deficiency
in Him, so in Him 'Volition' is the same as 'Knowledge'.
Again following Aristotle he said that the essential nature
of God is 'Thought' and thought expresses it in knowledge;
so there is no contradiction in identifying 'volition' with
'knowledge' in God. Since there is nothing outside God to
have knowledge of it, therefore, God's knowledge consists
of His eternal self-knowledge. The Muslim philosophers
could not have denied Volition for God, had they not
 337

accepted definition of 'will' from Aristotle. Thus they

denied that the universe was contingent, created by God ex-
nihilo on Will. They argued that the universe has emanated
from the absolute perfection of God the way light emanates
from the sun.7
They said that self-thinking of God means His Self-
Knowledge, and His Self-Knowledge consists of knowing
that He is the Necessary Being and the Prime Cause of all
possible existents. Thus His Self-Knowledge comes to
encompass knowledge of everything universal and
particular. Since there was nothing deficient in God, with
His Self-Knowledge all possible beings became to emanate
from Him from eternity. Therefore universe as eternally
emanating from Him is eternal.8 God has not created it by
His Will. It has not come into being out of not-being. It is
eternal. Neither the Being of God is temporally prior to the
universe nor is the universe temporally posterior to God.
Both are co-eternal as cause and effect. God as Cause is
only logically prior and the universe as effect is only
logically posterior; temporally they are simultaneous.9
Why did the Muslim philosophers adopt theory of
emanation instead of theory of creation, which has been an
established religious doctrine in Muslims? Moreover why
did the Muslim philosophers adopt a cosmology consisting
of nine heavens instead of a Qurānic cosmology which very
clearly consists of seven heavens?
Philosophical system and scientific world view by
which one gets impressed assumes the status of a rational
version of truth for him. If one already believes in a
revealed religion the problem of reconciliation of revealed
and rational versions of truth takes utmost importance.
Aristotle conceived perfection as immutability. Aristotelian
concept of perfection as immutability was not in line with
the Qurān. Al-Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina, deeply impressed by
Aristotle's philosophy as they were, accepted the notions of
'volition' and 'perfection' from him. The Qurān very clearly
states 'Volition/Will' (Irada) as a Divine attribute and a sign
of His Majesty. Qurānic God is not immutable: Every day
He is at work. (al-Qurān, 55:29) It also states Allah's
Knowledge and Volition as two different attributes.10
Finding that, 'volition' cannot be denied for Qurānic God,
Muslim Philosophers make an indirect move and argue that
since Allah lacks in nothing nor is there any deficiency in
Him, so in Him 'Volition' is the same as 'Knowledge'.
Again following Aristotle they say that essential nature of
God is 'Thought' and thought is expressed in knowledge so
there is no contradiction in identifying 'volition' with
'knowledge' in God. Since there is nothing outside God to
have knowledge of it, therefore, God's Knowledge consists
of His eternal Self-Knowledge. Muslim Philosophers could
not have denied Volition for God had they not accepted
definition of 'will' from Aristotle.
Aristotle holds that reason is the ultimate source of
knowledge; therefore, what is rationally intelligible is
real.11 Aristotle's metaphysics consists of two ultimate
principles: Pure Form and Pure Matter. To pure form he
considers what the religious people call god. He argued that
everything in the universe is composed of form and matter.
He also holds that the pure form and pure matter are
absolutely real but they do not exist for existence
presupposes space and time. Working out the attributes of
his god, Aristotle as we have seen, considered the attribute
of 'volition' against god's perfection and argued in favor of
god‘s being a ‗self-thinking thought'.12
The Muslim philosophers, as we see, accept this
Aristotelian concept of god as absolutely rational and felt
obliged to reconcile Islamic concept of God with it.
According to Aristotelian metaphysics, pure form (god)
and pure matter both are eternal and parallel to each other.
Everything in the universe comes into being when matter
 339

takes up a form––this is becoming. Since pure form and

pure matter are eternal, the process of becoming must also
be eternal. Therefore the universe is eternal. Because of
considering Aristotle‘s system of thought a rational version
of truth, the Muslim philosophers, too, held the universe to
be eternal. Plotinus was also a successor mystic-
philosopher in the Platonic tradition. Plotinus believed that
the universe has come into being from god by a process of
emanation as the rays emanate from the sun.13 Al-Farabi
and Ibn Sina, finding in it a good precedent, introducing
certain amendments gave a theory of graded emanation as a
possible explanation of the coming into being of the
universe from God. They gave a model of emanation
according to which the universe comes into being from
God at tenth step.
Apparently this view shows great improvement upon
the earlier theory of emanation, yet was no better than the
Plotinus‘ view with respect to being nearer to the teachings
of the Qurān! It is as away from the Qurānic doctrine of
Creation as the other un-Islamic views are.
Ptolemy's model of the world which consisted of nine
heavens with the earth in the center14 presented the
scientific worldview of Al-Farabi and Ibn-e-Sina's times
(Circa 980-1037 A.D.). Qurānic model of the universe
consists of seven heavens and is irreconcilable with
Ptolemaic model. Remaining true to the Qurān, Ibn-e-Sina
could not accept Ptolemaic model. But they did not prove
their competence in locating flaws in Aristotelian
metaphysics, logic, concept of 'will' and 'perfection' etc.
They also could not locate flaws in Ptolemaic model of the
universe. This marred al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's whole
metaphysics with inconsistency and self-contradiction and
they had to surrender their beliefs in the creation of the
universe in favor of eternal emanation, in Allah's
Knowledge of particulars in favor of His eternal knowledge
of everything, in human freedom in favor of determinism,15
in bodily resurrection in favor of spiritual resurrection, in
miracles in favor of absolute causation and so on.
Under the influence of Greeks, preferring theory of
emanation over theory of creation by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina
entangled them into various intellectual problems. Theory
of emanation conceives God as a ‗Necessary Being‘ as
compared to all other things which are 'possible beings'.
God himself is 'Uncaused' but the 'first cause' of everything.
Since they hold 'thought' to be the essential attribute of
God, and that thought unfolds itself according to the laws
of logic in which the conclusion follows from its premises
with logical necessity, so when God thinks upon Himself as
Self-thinking Thought, the 'first intellect' is the first thing
that emanates from Him as a consequence. The Muslim
philosophers conceived Oneness of God as His absolute
simplicity according to which, they argued, the Knowledge
of God must also be One and without any ting of
multiplicity.16 They further argued that from something
which is absolutely one, only one can emanate. Therefore,
from God's knowledge which is one and absolutely simple,
only one thing could directly emanate. Conceiving
Knowledge of God as the cause, the first intellect as its
effect, they derived two characteristics of their theory of
causation: i) that a cause is a unitary event; ii) and that only
one effect follows from one cause.
The question is as to how the things of the universe
start emanating by mere Self-Knowledge of God in the
eternity? The Muslim philosophers' replied that in an
absolutely perfect being 'knowledge' is identical with
'creation' and there cannot be any temporal distance in
them. From this argument another principle of their theory
of causation comes to the fore: That 'the cause' and its
'effect' are simultaneous. Cause is only logically prior to its
effect and the effect is only logically posterior to its cause;
temporally they are simultaneous.17 Moreover, if it is
admitted that the relationship between cause and effect is of
 341

logical necessity, then they should both belong to one and

the same kind.
Since the Muslim philosophers held 'thought' to be the
essential characteristic of God, they argued that whatever
emanates from Him must be 'intellect' as to its essence.
Their concept of cause as a 'unitary event' implies another
principle of their theory of causation: That an effect will be
issued forth necessarily from a single cause. According to
this principle, only 'the first intellect' alone could directly
follow from God. The first intellect will have two kinds of
knowledge: Knowledge of its being a 'possible being' as
depending upon God for its coming into being; and
knowledge of its being a 'necessary being' as emanating
from God as a logical necessity. From one knowledge of
God only one thing followed, from two dimensional
knowledge of the First Intellect two things–––the second
intellect and the first heaven–– followed by logical
necessity.18
The 'second intellect' will have more than two kinds of
knowledge about itself, so more than two things i.e., the
third intellect, the second heaven, and some planets etc.
will emanate from it according to the principle of 'one
emanates from one'. The number of things emanating from
successive Intellects in this theory of graded emanation
goes on increasing at each step, with increase in references
of their self-knowledge, till at last this terrestrial world of
generation and corruption with all the genera, the species,
the relations, their members and instances comes into being
emanating from the 'tenth Intellect. The principle of
causation based on logical necessity, under which the
process of emanation starts from God, keeps on at each
successive step and ultimately prevails in the whole
universe through the Tenth Intellect.
The view of the world which arising from this theory is
necessarily of a world governed by logical necessity and
universal determinism. The actions of human beings can be
no exception to it. This nullifies freedom of will for man.
There can be no moral freedom, no freedom of choice etc.
Islam holds man free and accountable for his actions. If,
whatever happens to man is bound to happen with logical
necessity, prayer and entreating lose all their meaning. Al-
Farabi and Ibn Sina's concept of god creates an
unfathomable gulf between man and God. Neither God nor
man remains free. It leaves no scope for believing in
miracles. It makes believing in bodily resurrection
impossible. Denial of God's knowledge of particulars
becomes unavoidable.
Imam Ghazali severely criticized Muslim philosophers
for their ideas. He firmly believed their views to be
contrary to Qurānic teachings. He rightly felt that refutation
of the philosophers through traditional theological methods
will not produce desired results. He felt it necessary that the
philosophical ideas which provide foundation to their views
are refuted and that they are refuted on the basis of same
logic which they employ in formulating their arguments.
According to the philosophy of religion derivable from his
writings, Imam Ghazali believed that no religious truth
should be rejected unless believing it gives rise to a logical
contradiction; and that no philosophical truth should be
accepted unless rejecting it entails a logical contradiction.19
It is evident from his teachings that Imam Ghazali firmly
believed that the truth and the untruth can never be
reconciled. He believed that any attempt at such thing
would necessarily give rise to contradictions. He wrote
Incoherence of the Philosophers (Tahafatul Falasifa)20 in
which he critically examined twenty selected problems
from Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina's writings and proved that
(i) Either the very principles i.e., premises on the basis
of which they reached their conclusions were
wrong; or
 343

(ii) In case the premises were correct, they had violated

the principles of logic which they themselves
proclaimed; so the conclusions were incorrect.
(iii) If the conclusions stated by them were correct,
these do not follow from their premises.
Imam Ghazali held that on sixteen out of these twenty
problems the Muslim philosophers can be exonerated of
deviation from established Islamic beliefs but they cannot
be given this leave on the remaining four problems which
are as follows:
(1) The problem of the eternity of the world
(2) The problem of the denial of God's Knowledge of
particulars
(3) The problem of the denial of miracles
(4) The problem of the denial of bodily resurrection
Imam Ghazali rightly pointed out that Muslim
philosophers' reason for preferring doctrine of emanation
over the doctrine of creation lay on the fact that they could
not reject Aristotle's definition of 'volition'. Imam Ghazali
rejected this definition with sound argument and
reconstructed its definition which showed that 'volition' is
not a demerit for a perfect being, rather it is a great merit, a
dignity of a perfect being that He should have the attribute
of 'Will‘ (Iradah).
Imam Ghazali believes that the 'universe' and 'the time'
both have been created in the past ex-nihilo at a moment
which is at a limited temporal distance from the present
moment.21 Ghazali does not support his stand point with
proofs; rather he considers the rejection of Muslim
philosophers' stand point sufficient in this regard. Muslim
philosophers have presented four arguments to prove the
eternity of the world. Their first argument is based on
Aristotle's concepts of 'cause' and of 'will'. Aristotle's
theory of causation holds that: (i) Every effect has a cause;
(ii) Cause and effect are two separate events. (iii) Cause
and effect are simultaneous. (iv) Aristotle applies his theory
of causation equally on physical and psychological
changes. (v) He applies this theory equally to God and His
attributes as he applies to human beings and other entities.22
Ibn Sina argues that suppose the universe is not eternal as a
whole, rather it is contingent (i.e., has come into being at a
specific moment at a limited distance in the past), there
must be some cause for its coming into being.
This cause cannot be a physical one, for as per our
supposition the matter does not exist prior to the coming
into being of the universe.
‗Volition‘ of Allah can be the cause of bringing into
being of the universe as the religious people believe, but in
that case there must be some cause for the activation of
Divine Will. This cause cannot be outside God. This will
make one Divine action need another Divine action for its
explanation, and there will be no limit to it. Ultimate
regress of Divine causes will make the existence of the
universe unintelligible. And if there is no eternal material
which could be referred to as a possible cause of the
universe, and if Will of Allah also cannot be held as its
cause, and if there exists nothing else which can be referred
to for coming into being of the universe, then we are left
with only two possibilities––Either the universe does not
exist; or the universe exists from ever. The first thing is
contrary to the fact. Therefore, the Muslim philosophers
argue, the universe is eternal; God has not created it from
nothingness; it has always been with God as the rays are
with the sun. They further argue that God is immaterial and
things of the universe are material, therefore God cannot be
the cause of the universe. Hence, matter is coeternal with
God and exists parallel to Him. Though God and matter
both are coeternal, God is logically prior to the universe as
the cause is logically prior to its effect.23
 345

According to the discussion made above God's Will

alone can be the cause of the creation of the universe from
nothingness. Muslim philosophers, arguing that the
explanation of the activation of Divine Will is
unintelligible, reject the view of creation but Ghazali
criticizes them on the same point. He says that may be God
eternally has ‗willed‘ to create the universe at a specific
moment! Ghazali says that no logical contradiction occurs
in believing in this way. Ghazali asserts that philosophers
may respond by saying:
That ‗volition‘ is a complete explanation of an event.
If someone wills a thing, it must happen immediately if
there is no hurdle in its way.
That no hurdle can be conceived if Allah wills a thing.
Responding to the philosophers, Ghazali takes support
from an Asharite argument and says: May be God has
eternally made the bringing into being of the universe
conditional to something. Philosopher may say in response:
That Will of God is eternal and as per our supposition the
creation of the universe is a contingent event, how an
eternal Will can be held to be a cause of a contingent event.
Ghazali replys this objection by saying: What logical
contradiction occurs in accepting delayed effect for a
cause!24 Ghazali asserts that no such contradiction occurs in
it; and if the philosopher think that it does, on what
principle their argument is based! If the philosophers think
that they intuitively feel so, then why do others do no share
such intuition!25
Another objection of the philosophers' against Asharite
delayed effect theory is that: According to it the Divine
Will chose a moment for the creation of the universe.
Choice is always based upon some principle of
particularization. Choosing one out of two logically
identical moments without a principle of particularization is
impossible. A principle of particularization in this respect is
inconceivable for God because He is absolutely perfect. So
it is not acceptable that God made up His mind to create the
universe in eternity, but postponed its coming into being to
a later moment. Ghazali‘s reply is: That Will (Iradah) is a
capacity which is free in its activity. It itself is its principle
of particularization. Asking why and how about it is
unnecessary. Ghazali explains the unconditional nature of
'will‘ or ‗volition' by an example. He says that two logically
identical dates are presented before a person who is
extremely hungry. The condition is that he can take just
one. Nothing except severe hunger is the principle of
particularization in this case. Now taking one out of two
things is possible––either he will take one out of the two
dates, or he will take none and remain hungry. Ghazali says
that it is absolutely unnecessary for the Divine Will to have
a principle of particularization for coming into action.
Commenting on discussion between Ghazali and Ibn Rushd
on this example, Van Den Berg objects on Ibn Rushd that
the problem for that person is not that which one of the
dates to take, the problem is that whether to take a date or
not to take one and remain hungry. And that there is clear
cut reason for taking any one of the dates. Commenting on
this Van Den Berg says that the person's 'volition' will
necessarily choose one out of the two dates. But Ibn Rushd
gives no answer as to what will be the principle of
particularization for choosing that date or on what grounds
he will choose that date. 26
Dilating upon the nature of Divine Will, referring to
some characteristics of the actual universe Imam Ghazali
says that these characteristics could have been otherwise.
For example: It can be conceived that God had so created
the universe that the planets that move from east to west,
moved in the opposite direction. God, by His Will, chose
one out of the two possibilities as He liked. No question as
to the principle of particularization could be raised in this
concern about Divine Will. Responding to it Ibn Rushd
 347

says that present structure of the universe is the best of all

possible structures. Rationally speaking, God made the best
choice by creating the universe in its present form. Ibn
Rushd further says that the question before God was that
whether He creates the universe or He does not create the
Universe; the question was not of choosing out of two
identical possible universes in which planets move in
opposite directions. F. H. Hourani says that Ibn Rushd
could not properly prove his point, and that his argument is
weak. He further says that if the Divine Will is considered
to be like human will, Ibn Rushed gets some point, i.e., that
God has seen form eternity that the creation of the universe
was better than not creating it, so God has created it from
eternity and the universe is eternal. But if we admit that the
Divine Will cannot be conceived on the analogy of human
will, then whole of Ibn Rushed's argument collapses. God
can Will to create the universe without any reason, in any
form, and at any moment. He can choose a possibility
without any reason or principle of particularization.
Therefore the problem of the eternity of the universe cannot
be solved by comparing Divine Will with human will
because all our knowledge about Divine Will is no more
than mere conjecture.27
The other arguments of the Muslim philosophers for the
eternity of the world related to proving the existence of a
primordial matter, and through it they wanted to prove the
eternity of the universe. Ghazali refuted these arguments
too. Ghazli also severely criticized their theory of
emanation. He attempted to show that the theory of
emanation was a mere myth created by Al-Farabi and Ibn
Sina. Ghazali argued that these philosophers violated the
principles put forward by them as the governing principles
in the process of emanation. For example: Ghazali says that
the philosophers hold that only one emanates from one. But
when they say that from one kind of First Intellect's
knowledge the first heaven emanates, their own principle
fails. Philosophers admit that everything is composed of
matter and form; the first heaven is a celestial body which
must be composed of matter and form. Ghazali asks: If one
emanates from the one as the philosophers proclaim, how
the above two things emanated from one knowledge of the
First Intellect! Arguing against other principles of
emanation Ghazali says that the philosophers claim a
relationship of logical necessity between cause and its
effect whereas this relationship is that of 'psychological
necessity' rather than that of 'logical necessity'.28
Ghazali also argued that neither cause is a unitary event
nor it is necessary that an effect always emerges from a
single cause. Ghazali also rejects the doctrine of the logical
priority of a cause over its effect and put forward the
doctrine of the temporal priority of cause over its effect
proclaiming that cause and effect are two separate events,
and that delayed effect was possible. Thus Ghazali not only
falsified Muslim philosophers' theory of the eternity of the
world and theory of emanation but also rejected their
arguments which had forced them for the denial of miracles
and bodily resurrection. One of the implications of the
philosophers' theory of emanation was that believing in
God's knowledge of particulars had become impossible for
them. The philosopher had argued that knowledge refers to
a relation between the knower and the known. Therefore
knowledge implies change in the knower, and change
implies imperfection. Ghazali could never tolerate the
denial of the knowledge of particulars for God, so he very
severely criticized them on this problem.
The reason of why the Muslim philosophers adopted
theory of emanation instead of theory of creation was that
they were too much impressed by Greek philosophers and
especially by Plato and Aristotle, and of Plotinus––a later
representative of Greek philosophy. Though the Greek
philosophers had not produced a cosmological model
similar to Muslim philosopher's theory of graded emanation
 349

and the Muslim philosophers had not followed Greeks in

this respect, yet the origin of theory of graded emanation
did not lie in Islamic teachings. Its origin lay in the
Ptolemaic model of the universe. Ptolemy's world view
presented the scientific cosmology of al-Farabi and Ibn
Sina's times.29 According to this cosmological model the
universe consisted of nine heavenly spheres; sun, moon,
mars, and other known planets of their times were placed in
these heavenly spheres. Ptolemy successfully located these
planets.30 The cosmological scheme and placement of
planets in Muslim philosopher's cosmological model follow
Ptolemaic model. At the beginning of seventeenth century
Keplar (1571–1630) and Galileo Galilei (1564 –1642)
harmed Aristotle and Ptolemy's cosmology. Newton (1642–
1727) presented a comprehensive model of the universe
based on complex mathematical calculations in the
seventeenth century. Newton's cosmology reigned almost
for two centuries as a scientific world view before its being
replaced by Einstein‘s Theory of Relativity at the end of the
nineteenth century. This view is still prevalent as most
modern scientific cosmology having no concept of heavens.
So the scientific theories on which al-Farabi and Ibn Sina
founded their theory of emanation and because of which
they had to deny creation of the universe, God's knowledge
of particulars, miracles, and bodily resurrection has long
been rejected and replaced by different and diverse
theories. 31
Al-Farabi denied knowledge of particulars for God. He
held that God's Knowledge is eternal and one. God knows
Himself from eternity and He knows everything through
His Self-knowledge.32 Though Ibn Sina does not differ
from al-Farabi, yet he presents his views in such a way that
it does not easily become clear that he denies God‘s
knowledge of particulars. However, the arguments he puts
forward to prove God's knowledge of particulars,
ultimately end up in its denial.
 We know that Ibn Sina divides reality into two parts:
celestial world (i.e., the heavenly world) and terrestrial
world. According to his cosmology, every entity or event
relating to heavenly or celestial world is the only member
of their respective species. For example, the First Intellect
is the only entity or member of its species. Similarly the
first heaven too is the only member of its species.
Following Ptolemaic cosmology, Ibn Sina placed sun,
moon, mars and other planets or known stars of their times
at different heavens. So these are also celestial entities and
a solar or lunar eclipse is a celestial event. Ibn Sina also
argued that like heavenly bodies and entities, heavenly
events are also a sole member of their respective species.
Regarding God's Knowledge, Ibn Sina held that it can
neither be sensational nor rational; rather God knows all
particulars in a universal way.33 Ibn Sina explained this by
saying that God's Knowledge actually consists of the
essence of things and events. Knowledge of essences
consists of the knowledge of species and genera and this is
a universal and general knowledge of the nature of all
things. Now if a genus consists of more than one species or
a species consists of more than one members, universal
knowledge of that genus or species will not be equivalent to
the particular knowledge of their individual members. But
if a genus consists of only one species or a species consists
of not more than one member, universal knowledge of that
genus or species will be equivalent to the direct knowledge
of that particular entity or event. Ibn Sina holds that in the
celestial sphere each entity or event, from First Intellect to
the Tenth Intellect, is the sole member of its species, and
the respective species is a sole member of its genus,
therefore God directly and completely knows each of these
particular entities or events by a universal way. In Ibn
Sina‘s theory of emanation, as we already know, Tenth
Intellect is the origin of all terrestrial entities, idividuals,
events and of their species and genera. Since it is the only
 351

member of its species, it is known to God directly and

completely by a universal knowledge. Therefore, by
knowing Tenth Intellect directly and completely in a
universal way God directly and completely knows all the
particular entities, individuals and events belonging to this
spatiotemporal world. So, Ibn Sina argues, God knows all
the particulars, not a shred of anything remains outside His
Knowledge, but God knows the particulars by a universal
way.34
According to Ibn Sina's cosmological model, the
celestial sphere consists of ten intellects, nine heavens,
some planets placed on them. These are the entities each of
which is the only member of its respective species, and
their species the only member of their respective genus.
The total number of these entities is not more than thirty.
These are the particulars which can be known by God
directly and completely. Though Ibn Sina argues that God
knows all the particular entities and events emanating from
the Tenth Intellect completely and directly by knowing
their source which is the sole member of its species, but
according to al-Ghazali he is not successful. There is none
among the particulars emanating from the Tenth Intellect
which is the only member of its species. Every genus
consists of many species and every species consists of
innumerable members. Therefore, God's direct knowledge
of the Tenth Intellect cannot be held equivalent to directly
knowing these particulars. Ghazali is right when he asserts
that the Muslim philosophers do not believe God's
Knowledge of particulars.
Accepting Aristotle‘s theory of causation and adopting
theory of emanation instead of theory of creation, the
Muslim philosophers had to deny the miracles as well as
bodily resurrection. If the nature of relationship between
cause and effect is admitted to be of logical necessity, then
the effect will be as natural and efficient an event as will be
the cause. (It will bring God to the category of efficient
entities.) Every event occurring in the universe will be held
merely a natural event. If a miracle is a supernatural event,
there will be no scope for their occurrence in such a
universe. Denial of Volition for God also implies that God
can never intervene in the universe with His free will.
When God is conceived to be the Uncaused First Cause and
it is held that an effect follows from its cause with logical
necessity, absolute determinism prevails in the universe.
Neither God nor man remains free. Prayers and
solicitations lose their meaning; the intimate relationship
between God and His servants which is the essence of
religion, has to be denied. Another implication of accepting
Aristotle‘s theory of causation was that the Muslim
philosophers had to deny bodily resurrection. The
relationship of logical necessity between cause and effect
implies that an effect will always be entailed by one
specific cause. If mankind is to resuscitate passing through
the same series of causation as in this world, as much time
will be needed in their bodily resurrection on the day of
resurrection as it took in their coming into being in this
world. Moreover, there is no sense in repeating the same
process and creating the same world again. Therefore
bodily resurrection is impossible, resurrection will be
spiritual in nature.
Ghazali rightly conceived that accepting Aristotle's
theory was the basic cause of holding above ideas by
Muslim philosophers. So he rightly felt that this theory
should be rejected. Ghazali argued that the relationship
between cause and effect was not of logical necessity but of
psychological necessity. Observing two events always
following each other we ascribe a relationship of logical
necessity between them.35 For example, it is possible that
water does not quench one's thirst, fire does not burn one's
hand. Hume, (1711-1776) a modern British philosopher
and historian who argued that human knowledge arises
only from sense experience also presented the same view
 353

centuries after Ghazali. Modern philosophy and science do

not admit the doctrine of logical necessity as nature of
relationship between cause and effect. They simply admit it
as a rule of the game.36 Ghazali also falsified Muslim
philosophers' principle of ‗one effect generating from a
single cause.‘ Ghazali argued that it is quite conceivable
that the same effect comes about from more than one
causes. Conceiving so does not give rise to any logical
contradiction. For example, death is an effect, which can
arise from many causes. Mill (1806-1873) a British
philosopher and economist of the modern period known
especially for his interpretations of empiricism and
utilitarianism,37 supported Ghazali's view by his doctrine of
the plurality of causes. Ghazali also refuted Muslim
philosopher's view of cause as a unitary event. Ghazali
argued that cause is a composite event. In the modern
period Bertrand Russell (1872-1970)38 supported Ghazali in
this aspect of his theory of causation. Ghazali argued that
God is a Willing Being and Volition absolutely befits to
His Majesty as a Perfect Being. He has created the universe
on His Will. That there is no logical necessity between
cause and effect. Therefore, occurrence of miracles is
absolutely possible. Regarding bodily resurrection Ghazali
argued that it is not necessary that resurrection will follow
the present system of causation known by us. May be there
is a system of causation which is not known to us and will
be activated on the day of resurrection or God brings into
being a new system of causation on that Day. Thus Ghazali
considers cause and effect to be subservient to Allah‘s Will,
and not the otherwise. Imam Ghazali argued that
resurrection was not a logical impossibility.
Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328) 39 an Islamic scholar,
theologian and logician born in Harran located in what is
now Turkey, close to the Syrian border, also enters into the
discussion on the problem of the eternity/creation of the
world and gives his views in the form of his ‗doctrine of the
continuity of effects.‘40 He considers that the inaction and
suspension (rakūd and t‟aṭṭal ‫ )رکىدوتعطل‬for the Divine
Attributes is logically impossible, Ibn Taymiyyah argues,
the Divine Attributes including His Attribute of Creation
has been expressing them in some form from ever. So the
effects of Divine Attributes have been existed from all
eternity. Though matter in itself is contingent, and this
universe in itself is not eternal, yet Divine Attribute of
Creation has been creating something from eternity and
forever shall this continue without interruption.41 Ibn
Taymiyyah holds that though everything is contingent (i.e.,
it was non-existent before its coming into being), yet there
existed something before it such that no absolute privation
existed prior to anything.42 So a theory of creation which
presupposes an absolute privation (or nothingness) before
the coming into being of the universe, Ibn Taymiyyah
argues, is a logical impossibility. Privation is only relative;
it simply means the nonexistence of a thing before its
coming into being. Though no inactivity or suspension in
the expression of Divine Attributes is acceptable, and
Attribute of Creation has continuously been creating its
effects from eternity, no particular entity or event is
coeternal with God. At most what we can say is that
because of uninterrupted eternal activity of the Attribute of
Creation, the continuity of effects as a whole becomes
eternal and there is no harm in accepting this.43
Aristotle argued that pure form and pure matter are two
ultimate principles which are parallel to each other from
eternity. To pure form he calls god. Pure matter, according
to him, is a logical substratum, a capacity of being molded
into things. It is present from all eternity and god has not
created it. According to Aristotle, god and primordial
matter are coeternal to each other. Another form of
coeternity is given by Plato before Aristotle. Plato
conceives reality consisting of two worlds: celestial world,
and terrestrial world. Celestial world of Plato consists of
 355

‗world of ideas‘, creator god (demiurge), and ‗the world

soul‘. The world of ideas consists of innumerable abstract,
rational, eternal, uncreated and absolutely perfect ideas
organized in hierarchical form. The idea of matter is also
included in this hierarchy of ideas. As to the relationship of
these ideas and god, there is difference of opinion between
interpreters of Platonic thought. Some consider these ideas
to be separate from god as uncreated and eternally present
with him; whereas according to others these ideas are
eternally present in god‘s mind but are uncreated. Thus
according to both interpretations the ideas are coeternal
with god. Though, according to Platonic metaphysics, this
universe is a dim copy of the world of ideas, but this copy
too exists from eternity as god is eternally creating copies
on the pattern of eternal ideas. Thus Platonic metaphysics,
too, conceives universe coeternal with god. The thing to be
noted is that both in Aristotle and in Plato, each individual
object is contingent but the process of becoming is eternal
and there is no absolute privation before anything. Neither
Plato‘s nor Aristotle‘s god is a ‗willing‘ agent. An eternal
becoming can never be an act of ‗volition‘. It must be some
kind of a logically necessary process like emanation.
Let us make a comparison of the ideas discussed above.
1) A theory of creation must admit the absolute
absence of determinations, including archetypes or
ideas even, before the coming into being of the
universe. Creation must take place from ‗Volition‘ and
on ‗Command‘.
2) The basic objection on this view was that Volition
is contrary to the absolute perfection of God and we
know that Imam Ghazali refuted this view with a strong
argument.
3) Plato and Aristotle do not admit of any absolute
privation. Matter is coeternally present with god and the
process of becoming starts from eternity. Aristotle's
philosophy makes god, the matter and the universe
eternally present with each other. One cannot have
power over what is parallel to him.
4) According to the theory of emanation propounded
by al-Farabi and Ibn Sina god is the Prime Cause.
Because there is no temporal distance between cause
and effect, therefore, emanation from god through first
intellect to the tenth intellect is eternal. Tenth intellect
includes genera, species, forms and matter, and
universal properties from which all things come into
being. In this way all these things will also become
eternal. Particulars, individuals and states since are
contingent therefore take privation before them but the
universe as a whole does not proceed from absolute
privation so it is also coeternal with god. Thus this view
too is similar to that of Plato and Aristotle.
5) Apparently Ibn Taymiyyahh's and Ibn Sina's views
look essentially different from each other because Ibn
Sina's philosophy presupposes the existence of a
primordial matter coeternal with god whereas there is
no such thing in Ibn Taymiyyah. So in Ibn
Taymiyyahh, though the process of creation is eternal,
however, everything is a unique creation and the
universe as a whole is not coeternal with God. But as
we shall see, this impression is not correct.
(i) If the process of creation is admitted to be
eternally continuing, it will become coeternal with
God. Those who are co-eternal are parallel, and
those who are parallel have no power over each
other. An eternal becoming, whether an emanation
or creation of unique objects (as in Ibn Taymiyyah)
can never be an act of ‗volition‘. It must be some
kind of a logically necessary process. Volition is a
capacity to freely choose between two logically
identical possibilities without any principle of
particularization. Choice of doing something or not
doing something both are included in it. A being
 357

who has freedom of will has control over his

activity. Doctrine of the continuity of effects
negates this control of God over the effects and
makes creation a logically necessary process like
theory of emanation.
(ii) It is necessary for a 'Willing Agent' that what he
wills comes into being on his Command (amr) but
not with logical necessity as in al-Farabi and Ibn
Sina‘s theory of emanation. Ibn Taymiyyah‘s theory
also defies this principle.
(iii)The above ideas apply same concept of serial
time to God, His Attributes, and to the contingent
objects.
In Western thought the concept of eternity is conceived
in following two ways: Everlastingness; and in the sense of
Timelessness. Everlastingness in its essence is a serial time
which we divide into past, present, and future. When it is
seen without beginning with reference to past, it is eternity
(azliyat ‫ ;)اسليت‬when it is seen unending with reference to
future, it is everlastingness (abdiyat ‫)ابديت‬. The doctrine of
the continuity of effects in its discussions conceives time as
serial in nature like theory of emanation and equally applies
to Divine Attributes, the process of creation, and their
effects in the same sense. The concept of absolute and fixed
privation and its logical impossibility before the coming
into being of the universe etc., all support the contention
that the time presupposed by Ibn Taymiyyah is serial in its
essence. Eternal continuity of effects implies eternity of
serial time as well as eternity of space. The concept of
'absolute and determined privation' and all discussions
associated with it become meaningless when seen in the
light of modern analytical philosophy.
God is transcendent and Absolutely Matchless.
Conceiving Him on the analogy of things is against His
Dignity. Having determinations or form is the essential
feature of things. Nothing except the Absolute Creator of
all determinations can be beyond determinations. The
Absolute Creator of all determinations must be Absolutely
Matchless and Unique.44 The time and space are real. The
same present is going to transform into future.45 On the
Day of Resurrection though all adornment on earth will be
eliminated, yet the time and space will still remain.46 No
word occurs in the Qurān for azliyat (eternity). The word
abdiyat (‫ ابديت‬endlessness, everlastingness) is also used
with reference to human beings, it is not used with
reference to God.47 The word 'ad-dahr' (‫ )الدﮬۯ‬occurs twice
in the Qurān yet does not refer to God. Identifying God
with 'time' is absolutely against the Qurān.48 The Qurān
uses the words 'Aḥd' and 'Wāḥid' for God.49 Keeping in
view the above descriptions of azliyat, abdiyat, and of ad-
dahr, it appears that 'Aḥdiyat' is a phase before the coming
into being of the Universe. There are absolutely no
determinations at 'Aḥdiyat'. Here the Divine Being is in His
'Ṣamdiyat' (‫ )صمديت‬i.e., beyond having any desire, want etc.
No aspiration as to be known, nor of seeing His Own
Beauty in the mirror of the universe; neither any Will to
create the universe nor of not to create it; no archetypes nor
anything like Platonic ideas etc. At this phase the Divine
Being willed that He creates the universe. Now the
determinations come into being in Divine Knowledge and
these determinations are expressed, not with logical
necessity, but with Allah‘s absolute Knowledge and on His
Command (amr). This is the stage of Oneness (Waḥdat).
Divine Attributes are real attributes but dividing God into
Essence and Attributes is to apply Aristotelian logic on
God which is wrong. Similarly to say that 'delayed action
and inaction of Divine Attributes is a logical impossibility'
presupposes that the concept of God made on the basis of
above faulty logic is in mind. The universe is a
manifestation of the Being of God, and not of His
Attributes. Attributes are real but not other than the essence
 359

of God as the Aristotelian logic conceives it. Moreover,

wherein the attributes (ṣift) are present the owner of the
attributes (mauṣoof) is present, is the principle. For
example, anything in whom the attributes of a specific
being are present, the being to the extent of the presence of
attributes is present. It appears from the principle presented
by Ibn Taymiyyahh concerning the eternally continuous
activity of Divine Attributes as if the Divine Attributes do
not manifest under Divine discretion, but on their own; this
is not a merit for a human being, not to talk of God. The
Qurān says that the universe is replete with Signs of God.
Phase of Seclusion (Aḥdiyat) comes before the phase of
Divine Manifestation (Waḥdat).50 Ibn Taymiyyahh wrongly
conceives Aḥdiyat as inaction, suspension and delay in the
manifestation of Divine Attributes. Night comes before the
day; 'Being' follows 'Not-being'. At Aḥdiyat the Divine
Being is not manifest. Neither Allah is identical with 'Time'
(ad-dahr) nor 'Time' is an essential feature of the Being of
God. To assert any such thing is contrary to the Qurān. At
Aḥdiyat there are no determinations. Time and space refer
to determinations and their coming into being by Allah's
Will (Iradah) and Command (Amr) is called the phase of
Waḥdat. Those who on the analogy of the world (being
four dimensional reality) conceive God as infinitely
dimensional Being, conceive God on the analogy of His
creation which is wrong. They who conceive God infinite
as compared to things, observe difference of degree not of
kind, they conceive God on the analogy of mankind; which
is again contrary to the teachings of the Qurān. To
differentiate 'Aḥdiyat' and 'Waḥdat' as phases and to state
Will, Command, and Creation in a preferential order is
right for it has been observed in the Qurān.51 Conceiving it
on human experience is not correct, for God is
Transcendent, Absolutely Matchless and Unique.
All discussion in this article is made in the perspective
of Islam. There is a mention in the Qurān of the creation of
a universe which consists of seven heavens. Throne („Arsh)
and water were present before it. Allah is the Lord of the
Throne and the Creator of water too. He created all living
things from water. If someone conjectures that the present
universe is not the only universe which has been created,
the onus of proof lies on his shoulder alone for such an
unfounded assertion. The universe is not eternal. The
universe is manifestation of the Being of God; it is replete
with His Majesty and Oneness. Everything in the universe
either belongs to the category of His 'creation' or of His
'command'. Every determination has a beginning, The One
is there before every beginning, every determination has an
end; The One is there after its end.52 God with His
Attributes transcends all determinations; none is a partner
to Him in any manner.53
1
Al-Qurān, (02:2-3)
2
“These two philosophers were Aristotelian. They were also Neoplatonists who
had formulated two closely related but quite distinct emanative schemes. There
are, moreover, differences between these two thinkers, not only in their
emanative schemes, but also in their theories of the soul, epistemologies, and
eschatologies. At the same time, however, there is overlap in their ideas, so that
many of al-Ghazali's criticisms apply to both.‖ Michael E. Marmura (tr.),
―Translater‘s Introduction‖ in The Incoherence of the Philosophers, (Eng. tr. of
Ghazali‘s Tahafut al-Falasfa), Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University Pmsi,
2000, p.xix
3
The first Islamic philosopher to uphold philosophical truth over revelation. He
was born in Fārāb, Transoxiana (now Uzbekistan), under the name Muhammad
ibn Muhammad ibn Tarkhan ibn Uzalagh al-Farabi. He became one of the
earliest Islamic thinkers to transmit to the Arab world the doctrines of Greek
philosophers Plato and Aristotle.
4
Celebrated Islamic physician, philosopher, and scientist whose best known
work is the Canon of Medicine, born in Bukhara, Persia.
5
G.F. Hourani, ―The dialogue between Al-Ghazali and the philosophers on the
origin of the world‖, part-I, the Muslim World, vol.48 Issue 4(1958), p.183.
6
Cf. Simon Van Den Berg (tr.), ―Introduction‖ in Averoes‟ Tahafut Al-Tahafut
(The Incoherence of the Incoherence), Vol. I, London Lozac & Co, 1954, p.
xix.
7
Al-Farabi and Ibn Sina had upheld the Aristotelian position that the world as a
whole was eternal in the past. The Muslim philosophers see God, as Aristotle
did, as the First Mover. They did not deny God as the Creator, but they regard
 361

Him, under the influence of the Plotinian theory of emanation, as the Creator of
the universe from whom the world emanates eternally. Hourani, Ibid, part I,
p.184.
Michael E. Marmura says: ―Their entire philosophical system rested on
affirming the existence of God, from whom all other existents emanated. But,
according to the Islamic philosophers, these existents emanated as the
necessary consequence of the divine essence. As al-Ghazali saw it, this meant
that God produces the world by necessity in the same way that an inanimate
object like the sun was said to produce its light by its very nature—by its
essence, necessarily. It meant for him the denial of the divine attributes of life,
will, power, and knowledge. Denuded of these attributes, he maintained, the
God of the philosophers was not the God of the Qur‘an. At issue was not the
question of God's existence, but the nature of the godhead.‖ Michael E.
Marmura (tr.), ―Translator‘s Introduction‖ p.xv.
Van Den Berg (tr.), Ibid, p. xvi. Al-Ghazali‘s answers to the Muslim
Philosophers are contained in his Tahāfut al-Falāsifa completed in 1095. The
debate in its final form is contained in Ibn Rushd‘s Tahafut al-Tahatfut which
was written sometime after 1180.
8
Hourani, Ibid, part-II, p,308.
9
Michael E, Marmura, ―Some Aspects of Avicena's Theory of God's
Knowledge of Particulars‖, Journal of the American Oriental Society,
83.3(1962), p.302-03
10
Cf. al-Qurān, 65:12, 16:40
11
Cf. Dr. Naeem Ahmed, Tarikh e Falsfa-e Yunaan, Lahore: Ilmi Kitab Khana,
2005, p. 145
12
Ibid, p. 158
13
Ibid, 204.
14
Claudius Ptolemy c. AD 90 – c. AD 168, was a Greek-Roman citizen of
Egypt. He was a renowned mathematician, astronomer, geographer, astrologer,
and poet.
15
Van Den Berg writes that ―In the Qurān there is no definite theory about free
will.‖ Van Den Berg, Ibid, p. xi. Simon Van Den Berg is absolutely mistaken
on this point. There is a definite theory of free will in the Qurān. For
verification please see the following articles of Dr. Abdul Hafeez Fāzli:
Free Will and Predestinarian Verses in the Qura‘n,
Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXII, No. 4 (October-December, 1999) Bait
al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 97-105.
The Antinomy of Free Will and the Appointed Term (Ajal Mussamma)
Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXIII No. 4, (October-December 2000) Bait
al-Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 63-68.
 Qudrat e Mutliq our Insaani Aazadi,(Urdu) in al-Hikmat, Vol. 20
(2000), The Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab Lahore
Pakistan.
Allah‘s Omnipotence and Freedom of Will for Man
Hamdard Islamicus Vol. XXV, No. 1, (January-March 2002) Bait al-
Hikma at Madinat al-Hikma, Karachi, Pakistan, p. 31-40.
Islamic View of Omniscience and Human Freedom
Al-Hikmat, vol. 26 (2006), pp.11-46, Department of Philosophy,
University of the Punjab, Lahore.
16
H.A.Wolfson, Avicena, Al-Ghazali and Averros on divine attributes,
Homenaje a Miltas vallicrosa vol-II, 1956, p.545-46
17
Van Den Berg, Ibid, p. xxi.
18
Marmura, Ibid article, p.304
19
Cf. M.Saeed Shaikh, Studies in Muslim Philosophy, Sh. Muhammad Ashraf
Kashmiri Bazar, Lahore. 1974, p.154; also Cf. Hourani, Ibid, part-II, p.311-13.
20
A magnum opus of Ghazali in which he refutes the Muslim philosophers‘
views as incoherent.
21
Hourani, ibid, part-I, the Muslim World, vol.48(1958), p.183
22
Cf. Dr. Naeem Ahmed, Ibid, p. 158-59
23
Cf. Marmura, Ibid article, p.303
24
As per Aristotle‘s definition ‗something is a logical contradiction if it is
impossible to be conceived.‘
25
Hourani, ibid, part-I, p.184-91
26
Ibid, p.184-85
27
Ibid, p.186
28
Ibid, part-II, p.312-13
29
―The earliest thoroughly-established system is that of Ptolemy… We obtain
an excellent view of the general nature of this system from Cicero. He writes:–
―The Universe is composed of nine heavens, or rather of nine moving globes.
The outermost sphere is that of the heavens which surrounds all the others, and
on which are fixed stars. Beneath this revolve seven other globes, carried round
by a motion in a direction contrary to that of the heavens. (John F. Blake,
Astronomical Myths Based on Flammarion‘s History of the Heavens, chap viii
Astronomical Systems, 1877, p. 179-80, Google Books )
30
Steven Hocking, A Brief History of Time, 14.
31
Ibid p. 23
32
Dr. Abdul Khaliq and Prof. Yousaf Shadai, Muslim Falsfa (Urdu), Aziz
Publishers, Urdu Bazar, Lahore, 1988, p.189
33
Micheal E.Marmura, Ibid, p.302
34
Ibid, p. 305
 363

35
According to Ash‘arites and al-Ghazali there is no causation in this world at
all. There is only one extra-mundane cause which is God. Van Den Berg, Ibid,
p. xxvi
―al-Ghazali was an Ash'arite in Kalam. Ash‘arism … subscribed to a
metaphysics of transient atoms and accidents, from which material bodies are
composed. It regarded all temporal existents as the direct creation of God,
decreed by His eternal attribute of will and enacted by His attribute of power.
What humans habitually regard as sequences of natural causes and effects are
in reality concomitant events whose constant association is arbitrarily decreed
by the divine will. Between created things, there is no necessary causal
connection— indeed, no causal interaction at all. God is the sole cause: all
events are His direct creation. There is no inherent necessity in the uniformity
of nature. Hence, when at certain times in history God interrupts this uniformity
by creating a miracle on behalf of a prophet or holy man, no contradiction
ensues. In his works of Kalam, al-Ghazali ardently defended this atomist-
occasionalist doctrine on logical and epistemological grounds.‖ Marmura,
―Translator‘s Introduction‖ p.xvi-vii.
36
Hospers, John, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Reprint 1978,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p. 317
37
Ibid p.
38
Bertrand Arthur William. Third Earl Russell, British philosopher,
mathematician, social critic, and writer who had profound influence on the
development of symbolic logic, logical positivism, and the set theory of
mathematics. His written works include Principia Mathematica (1910-1913),
written with Alfred North Whitehead, and A History of Western Philosophy
(1945). He won the 1950 Nobel Prize for literature.
39
Ibn Taymiyyah, in full Taqī al-Dīn Abū al-ʿAbbās Aḥmad ibn ʿAbd al-Salām
ibn ʿAbd Allāh ibn Muḥammad ibn Taymiyyah (born 1263, Ḥarran,
Mesopotamia—died Sept. 26, 1328, Cairo), one of Islam‘s most forceful
theologians who, as a member of the Pietist school founded by Ibn Ḥanbal,
sought the return of the Islamic religion to its sources: the Qurʾān and the
sunnah, revealed writing and the prophetic tradition. He is also the source of
the Wahhābīyah, a mid-18th-century traditionalist movement of Islam.
Encyclopædia Britannica Online, s. v. "Ibn Taymiyyah", accessed June 06,
2012, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/280847/Ibn-Taymiyyah.
40
Muhammad Hanif Nadvi, Aqliyāt-e Ibn Tamiya, Lahore: Institute of Islamic
Culture, Second reprint 2001, p. 196. Muhammad Hanif Nadvi developes Ibn-e
Tamiyah‘s doctrine of the continuity of effects with reference to pages 71, 72,
188, 189, 190, 201, 209 of Ibn Tamiyah‘s Ar-Rasala tut Tadmiryah published
by Husainiya of Egypt. Year of publishing is not given.
41
Ibid, ―Ibn Taimiya ka Tasawar-e Sifaat‖, (Urdu) in Pakistan Philosophical
Journal, Vol. January 1962, Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Club Road
Lahore, pp. 45-46
42
Ibid, p.48
43
Ibid, p.20
 ْ ‫ْس َك ِم ْثلِه ِِِ ش‬
44
Al-Quran,... ‫َيء‬ َ ‫ لَي‬Laysa Kamithlihi Shay'un...(Nothing is like Him)
(42:11)
45
The concept of reward in the Quran of human actions depends upon this
belief. Reference to few verses is as follows: Ibid, 17:63,98, 41:28.
46
Ibid, 18:47
47
Ibid 64:09; 65:11; 72:23; 98:08
48
Al-Quran, ‫ك ِم ْه ِع ْلم ٍ إِ ْن‬ ُ ‫َوقَبلُىا َمب ِﮬ َي إِالَّ َحيَبتُىَب ال ُّد ْويَب وَ ُم‬
َ ِ‫ىت َووَحْ يَب َو َمب يُ ْهلِ ُكىَب إِالَّ ال َّد ْﮬ ُز َو َمب لَهُ ْم بِ َذل‬
َ‫ ﮬُ ْم إِال َّ يَظُىُّىن‬Wa Qalu Ma Hiya 'Illa Hayatuna Ad-Dunya Namutu Wa Nahya Wa
Ma Yuhlikuna 'Illa Ad-Dahru Wa Ma Lahum Bidhalika Min `Ilmin 'In Hum
'Illa Yažunnuna. (45:24); ً ‫ ﮬَلْ أَتَى َعلَى ا ِإلو َسب ِن ِحيه ِمهَ ال َّدﮬْ ِز لَ ْم يَ ُك ْه َشيْئب ً َم ْذ ُكىرا‬Hal 'Atá
`Alá Al-'Insani Hinun Mina Ad-Dahri Lam Yakun Shay'aan Madhkuraan.
(76:01). For detailed criticism please see: Abdul Hafeez Fazli, ―Iqbal's view of
Omniscience and human freedom‖, The Muslim World, (95), 2005, p.136
49
Al-Quran, ‫' إِنَّ إِلَهَ ُك ْم لَ َىا ِحد‬Inna 'Ilahakum Lawahidun. (37:4), ‫قُ ِل ََّّللاُ خَ بلِ ُق ُك ِّل ش َْيء ٍ َوﮬ َُى ا ْل َىا ِح ُد‬
‫ ا ْلقَهَّب ُر‬Quli Allahu Khaliqu Kulli Shay'in Wa Huwa Al-Wahidu Al-Qahharu.
(13:16), ِ ‫َّللاُ إِلَه ِ ِ َا ِحد‬ َّ ‫'إِوَّ َمب‬Inna 'maIlahu ilahun Wahidu. (4:171), Wa
'Ilahukum 'Ilahun Wahidun La 'Ilaha 'Illa Huwa Ar-Rahmanu Ar-Rahimu.
(2:163)
50
Night comes before the day.
51
Ibid, 'Innama 'Amruhu 'Idha 'Arada Shay'aan 'An Yaqula LahuKun
Fayakunu. (36:82)

52
Ibid, Huwa Al-'Awwalu Wa Al-'Akhiru Wa Až-Žahiru Wa Al-Batinu Wa
Huwa Bikulli Shay'in `Alimun. (57:3)
53 َ
‫ص َم ُد ُ لَ ْم يَلِ ْد َولَ ْم يُىلد‬ َّ ,ْ ‫َّللاُ أَ َحد ; َولَ ْم يَ ُك ْه لَه ُُِ ُكفُىاً أَ َحد‬
َّ ‫َّللاُ ال‬ َّ ‫ قُلْ ﮬُ َى‬Qul Huwa Allahu
'Ahadun. Allahu As-Samadu. Lam Yalid Wa Lam Yulad. Walam Yakun Lahu
Kufuan 'Ahadun. (112:1-4)