Ac71587 2014 Divisionaltactics PDF

ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 PART 1A
Divisional Tactics
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Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

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Foreword
The capability to operate at the divisional level is the distinguishing feature of an Army that
is able to war fight. For it is the divisional level that is the lowest level where operational art
is practised. This involves the sequencing of tactical battles to meet military strategic
objectives. It requires the execution of simultaneous tactical actions, while planning ahead
for subsequent moves. Its acme is the ability to seize the initiative and generate a tempo
that discombobulates the opponent such that success becomes inevitable. Thus the
breadth, capacity, experience, training and education – as well as accumulated wisdom –
of the commander and staff is significantly greater than that found at levels below.
This tactics pamphlet seeks to reset the Army’s understanding of the divisional level in line
with lessons learned from the last 15 years of combat operations. It is designed to prepare
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formations for an operating environment that is not only more complex than ever, but
which continues to evolve apace. This pamphlet is not the finished article. Our doctrine is
also evolving and we will need to incorporate the idea of a ‘people-centric approach.’ This
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reflects the nature of conflict in the information age. Rarely is it possible to determine
success simply in relation to an opponent – now it is necessary to take account of the
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perspective of a multiplicity of audiences, many of whom will have a stake in the outcome.
This will require new processes at the heart of our decision making which will take a while
to develop and incorporate in our tactical doctrine.
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Commander Land Forces

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June 2014
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Army Code 71587

(2014)
ARMY FIELD MANUAL

VOLUME 1 COMBINED ARMS OPERATIONS
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PART 1A
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DIVISIONAL TACTICS
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This publication supersedes

AC 71587 (2007)
JULY 2014
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HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
COPYRIGHT
The information contained within this publication is British Crown Copyright and the intellectual
property rights belong exclusively to the Ministry of Defence (MOD). Material and information
contained in this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system and transmitted for MOD
use only, except where authority for use by other organisations or individuals has been authorised by
the officer whose details appear below.
SECURITY
This OFFICIAL document is issued for the information of such persons who need to know its contents
in the course of their duties. Any person finding this document should hand it to a British Forces unit
or to a police station for its safe return to the Ministry of Defence, Def Sy, Main Building, Whitehall,
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LONDON SW1A 2HB with particulars of how it was found.
This information is released by the United Kingdom Government to international organisations and
national governments for defence purposes only. The information must be afforded the same degree
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of protection as that afforded to information of an equivalent classification originated by the recipient
organisation or nation, or as required by the recipient organisation or nation’s security regulations.
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The information may only be disclosed within the Defence Departments of the recipient organisation
or nation, except as otherwise authorised by the UK MOD. This information may be subject to
privately owned rights. ED
STATUS
This publication has been produced under the direction and authority of the Chief of the General Staff
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by Director Land Warfare in his capacity as sponsor of Army Doctrine. It is the individual’s
responsibility to ensure that he or she is using the latest version of this publication. If in doubt the
individual should contact the Directorate of Land Warfare (details below).
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DISTRIBUTION
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As directed by Director Land Warfare.
CONTACT DETAILS
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Suggestions for change or queries are welcomed and should be sent to SO1 Tac Doc Pubs,
Directorate of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Centre, Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ,
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Telephone +44(0)1985 848764.

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RECORD OF AMENDMENTS
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Amendment Number Date Amended Initials

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PREFACE
Introduction
1. AFM Divisional Tactics is the second stage in the revision of AFM Formation Tactics
(2007). The first stage was the publication of AFM Brigade Tactics in 2012. Together they
articulate how the British Army will conduct formation operations, the environment in which
those operations may occur, the best practice gleaned from our and allied operational
experience and the capabilities likely to be at our disposal. Both are compliant with the
British Army’s Army 2020 (A2020) force structure. Both seek to understand and exploit
the Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental and Multinational interdependencies that are
essential to operational success.
2. A key strand of A2020 is the intent to re-set the divisional level of command after a
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decade of operations focused predominantly, for the UK, at the brigade level. AFM
Divisional Tactics details the unique capabilities of the division; its role in directing and
enabling brigade activity, its ability to plan and execute simultaneous tactical
engagements, to act as gearing between tactical reality and operational or strategic
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decision makers, to conduct manoeuvre and a command wisdom and staff capacity that is
a step change from the brigade. Recent experience has shown that a brigade, heavily
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augmented and at some cost to its core role, can fulfil some of these functions, however
the British Army has not sought to institutionalise this approach. Rather, through A2020,
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the Army seeks to acknowledge that each level of command has particular utility, to re-
establish the role of the division and to re-focus the brigade as a potent, manoeuvrable
force element optimised for tactical activity.
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3. It is impossible to predict the exact character of future operations. AFM Divisional

Tactics illustrates the scalable nature of the division, a modularity that allows it to meet the
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demands of the mosaic of possible conflicts and the enduring principles that should guide
its approach. Critically, built on our experience of recent operations, the division must
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integrate the capabilities that allow it to manoeuvre across the physical, cognitive and
virtual domains: “a smart manoeuvre” that links all activities – joint fires and ISR, physical
manoeuvre, cyber and information operations – to deliver success.
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4. AFM Divisional Tactics is aimed at divisional and brigade commanders and their
respective staff, as well as students at military seats of learning. It provides principles,
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best practice and relevant historical vignettes. Where appropriate it is linked to supporting
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e-based videos and demonstrations.

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5. AFM Divisional Tactics draws from the analysis of The Future Character of Conflict,
The Future Land Operating Concept and the tenets of ADP Operations. It has taken
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account of NATO’s Allied Tactical Publication 3.2.1 Allied Land Tactics and the US Army’s
Field Manual 3-94 Division, Corps and Theater Army Operations. AFM Divisional Tactics
signposts other doctrine where appropriate, but has been designed to contain sufficient
stand-alone material to be used by the divisional staff officer in conjunction with divisional
Standard Operating Instructions and The Staff Officers Handbook.
6. Doctrine encapsulates our collective wisdom and, to be useful, must be dynamic and
responsive. As we deepen our understanding of divisional level operations, by study, by
reflection and by operational lessons, ours and those of others, AFM Divisional Tactics will
be revised as appropriate.
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Structure
7. AFM Divisional Tactics is in 4 parts.
a. Part 1 outlines the purpose and function of the 2* level of command and the
context in which it will operate.
b. Part 2 describes the characteristics of the division and planning considerations
by tactical function.
c. Part 3 describes the execution of divisional tactical actions. Where appropriate
these are supported by diagrams and vignettes.
d. Part 4 is a supporting essay which presents a historical perspective of the role
of the division in the British Army, including enduring characteristics and lessons.
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CONTENTS Page
Foreword i
Preface ii
Contents iv
Part 1 Operating Context
Overview 1-1
Operating Context 1-1
The Application of Force 1-2
The Divisional Level 1-4
Implications of theFuture Character of Conflict to the 1-5
Divisional Level
The Divisional Construct 1-9
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Defence Engagement 1-10
Subordinate Elements 1-10
Annex A Illustrative Divisional Task Organisations 1-A-1
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Part 2 Divisional Characteristics and Planning Considerations
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The Divisional Battle 2-1
Combined, Joint, Inter Agency, Inter Governmental and Multi
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National
Command 2-3
Manoeuvre 2-13
Protection 2-17
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Firepower 2-22
Information and Intelligence 2-27
Sustainment 2-29
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Annex A Domains and Dimensions 2-A-1

Annex B CJIIM Integration 2-B-1
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Part 3 Divisional Tactical Actions

Introduction 3-1
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Annex A Offensive Actions 3-A-1

Annex B Defensive Actions 3-B-1
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Types of Defensive Action 3-B-1

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Delaying Actions 3-B-2

Annex C Stabilising Actions 3-C-1
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Stabilisation Planning Considerations 3-C-3

Security and Control 3-C-4
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Initial Restoration of Essential Services 3-C-5

Interim Governance 3-C-6
Security Sector Reform (SSR) 3-C-7
Situational Awareness 3-C-8
Planning the Military Input to SSR 3-C-9
Restructuring and Developing Indigenous Security Forces 3-C-9
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 3-C-9
Transfer of Security Responsibility 3-C-10
Annex D Enabling Actions 3-D-1
Reconnaissance 3-D-1-1
Security 3-D-2-1
Advance to Contact 3-D-3-1
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Meeting Engagement 3-D-4-1

Link Up 3-D-5-1
Relief of Troops 3-D-6-1
Withdrawal 3-D-7-1
March 3-D-8-1
Obstacle Crossing 3-D-9-1
Annex E Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 3-E-1
Annex F Control of Demolitions 3-F-1
Annex G Captured Persons 3-G-1
Part 4 A Historical Perspective of the Divisional Level of 4-1
Command
Index Index-1
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PART 1
OPERATING CONTEXT
Overview
1. Army 2020 provides the structural change that will underpin our future organisation
and capabilities. Key to A2020 is the intent to re-set and resource the divisional level after
a decade of stabilisation operations focused predominantly, nationally, at the brigade level.
Command is a capability where each level offers particular utility. The re-set
acknowledges the unique characteristics of the divisional level of command as:
a. The lowest level where operational art is practised by the UK in the land
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environment. It is also the lowest level able to deliver genuine strategic effect.
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b. The lowest level with the capacity to plan and execute simultaneous tactical
engagements, allowing operational tempo to be maintained while realising the
potential of a sustained decision-action cycle.
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c. The capability and capacity to conduct manoeuvre across the virtual and
cognitive domains, as well as the more traditional physical domain. Part 2, Annex A
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provides a detailed description of domains and dimensions.
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d. A command level able to provide effective gearing between operational and
strategic decision makers and tactical reality, freeing 1* commanders to concentrate
on the tactical fight.
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e. A hierarchy of wisdom to deal with complexity based on professional experience

and staff capacity that is a step change from that of the brigade.
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2. This chapter explains the divisional level of operations and the context in which it will
operate.
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Operating Context
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3. The Future Character of Conflict (FCOC) , with which it is assumed readers are
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familiar, describes a complex environment, in which a deployed force may face a variety of
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security challenges. The operating environment is likely to be volatile and unpredictable

with threats ranging from terrorism, hostile states, fragile and failing states, and hybrid
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threats and adversaries. Population growth and urbanisation mean that land forces will
have to operate in densely populated areas in and amongst the people. Operating under
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the scrutiny of society both at home and abroad, land forces will face greater constraints
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particularly given the evolution of international law.

4. In this environment, threats to UK interests will be politically rooted and nuanced, fed
by, or exploiting, complex problems. Adversaries may range from political groups to state,
state-sponsored or state-supported armed forces, or elements representing an interest or
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‘Operational Art translates strategic direction into tactical execution. It is the orchestration of a campaign, in
concert with other agencies, to convert (at the operational level) strategic objectives into tactical activity and
employment of forces, in order to achieve a desired outcome’. DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD
Publications, 2010).
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DCDC, Strategic Trends Programme, Future Character of Conflict (Shrivenham: MOD).
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ideology. Their strength might be political, economic or military and their military
capabilities may be conventional, irregular or a hybrid of both. In grouping, aim and
methods, they are likely to morph and adapt as a crisis develops.
5. When confronted, adversaries are likely to avoid our strengths, target our
vulnerabilities and may exploit different values on human life and proportionality to
undermine our will. Their threats will be multi-dimensional, seeking success in the battle of
the narratives or the cyber domain, concurrent with physical activity. Delivering success
will require us to understand where solutions lie in complex problems, exploit all the levers
at our disposal and operate skilfully within constraints.
The Application of Force
6. Political Context and Provenance. The National Security Strategy (NSS) and the
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Strategic Defence and Security Review 2010 (SDSR) outline the UK’s intent to react to
threats against our national security, whilst preventing conflict from occurring through long
term efforts that include upstream capacity building, which itself has a military element to
it. Where military force is required, it will be integrated into political, governmental,
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multinational, joint and host nation efforts. 3
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7. UK Land Forces. UK land forces will be used in a joint context. Land forces may be
used across the mosaic of conflict, as shown in the Figure 1.1 which is taken from ADP
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Operations, from deliberate intervention to peace support. The character of a particular
crisis may reflect more than one aspect of the mosaic concurrently (eg stabilisation
activities alongside combat) or may transition rapidly and unexpectedly during a campaign
(eg stabilisation challenges emerging in the wake of an intervention).
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Figure 1.1 – The Mosaic of Conflict
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Her Majesty’s Government’s Counter Terrorism Strategy CONTEST) and the Building Security Overseas
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Strategy both illustrate the complex interactions and interdependencies in security challenges and solutions.
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‘…military activities of different categories take place, concurrently in time and space, with elements of
many of them occurring in most scenarios. The activities’ proportions vary in terms on longevity, scale and
intensity. The model is illustrative, to give an impression, rather than to act as an exact categorisation of
conflict’. DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2010).
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8. Configuration. The land forces’ configuration must be appropriate to the operational

need and retain the ability to adapt. It may range from the corps level (NATO or coalition),
through the divisional level, down to brigade.
a. The Corps. In the British Army, the corps level is the highest level of
deployable headquarters. HQ Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) provides this
capability. HQ ARRC, as a High Readiness Force Land (HFS(L)), is to train at
readiness to deploy on NATO, EU, coalition or national orders, to a designated area
to undertake combined and joint operations, as a Corps HQ, Land Component
Command HQ, a theatre level NATO Force Structure Joint Task Force (NFS JTF
HQ), or to reinforce current operations with selected capabilities in order to support
crisis management options or the sustainment of current operations. Its tasks include:
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(1) Corps. In role as a corps HQ, HQ ARRC will exercise command over a
number of divisions, functional brigades and task forces, at the higher tactical
level of operations.
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(2) Land Component Command. As a Land Component Command (LCC)
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HQ, HQ ARRC will act as the senior land HQ in theatre. The LCC HQ will be
subordinate to a NATO Command Structure, Joint Task Force HQ (NCS JTF
HQ), which may or may not be deployed into theatre. The LCC HQ will operate
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alongside Maritime, Air, Special Operations and Joint Logistic Support Group
components in accordance with the joint commander’s plan.
(3) NATO Force Structure Joint Task Force HQ (NFS JTF HQ). As a NFS
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JTF HQ, the ARRC will provide command and control for a theatre of
operations. Under this model, the ARRC will sit below the component level, but
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will have an allocation of maritime and air elements. Integrated maritime and air
sockets within the HQ will enable the ARRC to deliver joint effects into the land
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domain. This capability is only suitable for a Land Heavy Small Joint Operation
(SJO(L)). The ARRC cannot provide a true joint HQ capability, ie the ability to
command components, without the time required to restructure and train.
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b. The Division. The division commands brigades within a corps, Joint Task
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Force (JTF) or theatre framework. It is ‘the smallest formation that is a complete

orchestra of war’, in that it contains a balance of arms and range of capabilities not
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routinely found at subordinate levels. If the division is working to a higher HQ its role
is to interpret the direction it receives, provide orders to its subordinates and
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coordinate the provision of essential combat support and combat service support to
enable the brigades to manoeuvre and complete their missions. In so doing the
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division must provide the operational gearing between the brigades and the corps.
On those occasions where the division provides the highest level of command in the
theatre of operations it will have to look ‘up and out’ as well as providing the
command oversight to its brigades. The balance between the divisional focus on ’up
and out’ and ’down and in’ will depend upon the structure above it. Notwithstanding
this, the deployment of a UK division will always be nationally highly significant and
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NATO defines the division as: ‘a major administrative and tactical unit / formation which combines in itself
the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat, larger than a regiment / brigade and smaller
than a corps’. NATO AAP06 2012.
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Field Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory, (London: Cassell and Company, 1956).
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the commander will be required to work back to the national chain of command to
some degree.
c. The Brigade. The brigade is the level where task organisation between combat
units takes place to create all arms battlegroups tasked to conduct tactical activities.
Its primary focus is on the delivery of tactical effect. Its focus is downwards, towards
subordinate battlegroups and the partners and agencies within its area of operations.
The Divisional Level
9. Divisional Span of Command. The division may command up to four manoeuvre
brigades, of which up to three could be either wholly or partially drawn from coalition
partners. These formations, supported by combat support and combat service support
assets, provide the basis of the divisional combat capability.
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10. Scalable and Versatile. The divisional level of command offers broad utility. The
division’s task organisation and HQ are both scalable and versatile and can be configured
as required. The following illustrate the division’s potential breadth of employment:
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a. As a UK led multinational division, conducting an intervention operation within a
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NATO command and control context and subordinate to a NATO corps HQ . 7
b. As a UK division, conducting an intervention operation within a NATO or

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coalition context and subordinate to a NATO or US corps HQ . 8
c. As a UK led Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) division

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operating in a UK-FR unilateral intervention operation. The division may fulfil a Land
Component Command Function.
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d. As the core of a UK 2* Joint Task Force HQ, for a land centred UK unilateral
intervention operation . 9
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e. As a 2*command node for a complex intervention operation, acting as

operational gearing between a 1* command and PJHQ.
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11. Roles and Responsibilities of the Divisional Level. Irrespective of its

configuration, the divisional level of command discharges the following roles and
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responsibilities:
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a. To provide the command space and top cover, whilst managing tactical risk, to
allow brigades and task forces tactical freedom of action.
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b. To integrate and usually command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and

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multinational capabilities. The divisional HQ is Air-Land by design. 10
c. To plan and execute several tactical engagements simultaneously in a

sustained decision / action cycle, in an area that illustratively could be as large as 50
x 50 km. 11
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Defence Strategic Direction 2013 (DSD) mandates this divisional capability by 2017.
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DSD mandates this divisional capability by 2020.
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The role of a JTF HQ is not dealt with further in this publication.
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In that the divisional HQ will consider and integrate air capabilities into the land environment from the
inception of planning.
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d. To routinely command the enablers that allow manoeuvre to be executed by

more than one formation, sequentially or concurrently, in a conceptual framework of
deep, close and rear (with these terms relating to effect, time and geography), in
order to shape, sustain, protect and enable decisive operations.
e. As the lowest level at which it is managed independently, enable the delivery of
the overall divisional Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I)
capability. Likely to consist of both UK and other nation’s operational and tactical
Communications and Information’s Systems (CIS), this network will support the
manoeuvre of brigade and task force CIS.
f. To serve as the core of a multinational 2* HQ with both UK and coalition force
elements under command, a Land Component or JTF HQ in certain circumstances.
g. To prepare and deploy force elements from the home base to the theatre of
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operations.
Implications of the to the Divisional Level
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Future Character of Conflict
12. War Amongst the People. Analysis of the current and future operating
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environments suggests that war will increasingly take place amongst the people and in the
complex environments in which they live. Information, opinion and perception will be
crucial factors in the effort to shape the course of an operation and achieve campaign
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objectives. Key decisions leading to favourable outcomes will be made in people’s minds.
Therefore, with the manoeuvrist approach and mission command at the centre of our
warfighting doctrine, military forces must now take account of the wide variety of additional
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audiences that exist in the operating environment, which is most likely to be global and
seek to achieve success by influencing those audiences. Essentially, a people-centric
approach. This is particularly important for land forces as they operate in close proximity
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to the population.
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In essence our objective is to form the people’s intentions, and thereby the opponents
leaders’ intentions by deterring them from the options of conflict because their
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subordinates judge that there is a high probability of being exposed and destroyed. The
information required to answer questions in these circumstances is to do with intentions,
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timing and consequences rather than items.

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Gen Sir Rupert Smith

The Utility of Force 2005
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a. An essential pre-requisite for people-centric operations is an understanding that

encompasses the full depth and breadth of a situation. The division must seek to
gain a sophisticated level of understanding in order to know how best to deliver
appropriate effects to achieve operational objectives.
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The Army’s 2013 Future Force Design exercise suggested that even this figure might be conservative and
that depending on the nature of the operation the divisional area of operations could be significantly larger.
Population centric metrics have also been developed to gauge the size of a force required to conduct an
operation. These should be considered alongside geographical templates.
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b. Having gained an understanding of the operating environment, the divisional

commander must determine which audiences are relevant to the achievement of his
objectives. Audiences could include military and political opponents, social and
political groups, as well as their leaders, allies and partners, NGOs, opinion formers
at home and abroad, as well as the media. The commander and his staff must then
decide which effects are most appropriately applied to each audience. An enemy
may have to be deterred, defeated or reconciled, while a social or political group may
have to be protected or marginalised. In every case the effect, method and objective
is likely to be different. It could be a conversation, a financial incentive, the leverage
of support from elsewhere, cyber activity, a precision strike, an offensive operation or
a demonstration of capability.
c. Whatever the audience, effect and objective, this approach will require the
orchestration and integration of all the available instruments of soft and hard power.
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It is the divisional level and above which has the resources that will blend all of the
required effects to enable a people-centric approach, even if the actual forces
deployed on the ground are at the brigade level or below. The division will conduct
manoeuvre to place strength against vulnerability, deliver fires to achieve destruction
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and carry out counter command activity when required. It will conduct information
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activity to deceive, as well as to develop understanding and provide outreach to
support stabilisation. Just as fires support movement in order to create manoeuvre,
divisional actions will be complementary and will set the conditions for effects to be
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achieved elsewhere. All activity will be conducted to influence specific target
audiences.
d. At the divisional level, the relative importance of these actions may change in
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response to circumstances, political imperatives and the actions of adversaries.

Violence may no longer be the primary activity upon which all military planning should
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focus and information operations – such as key leader engagement and the ‘battle of
the narratives’ – may be more decisive than ground based tactical activity. The
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division must be agile in concurrently conducting these activities, understanding the

interconnections between them, appreciating where decisive advantage can be
achieved and integrating the military effort with other key actors to achieve the
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mission.
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The character of conflict is changing. Future conflicts will, most likely, not be just ’kinetic’,
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but will require us to have or to generate the capabilities and the capacity to affect the
behaviour of both adversaries and other parties by means of a wide range of political,
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economic and social means. This in turn will demand deep cultural understanding, plus
the ability to instrument and assess the operational environment so that appropriate
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lessons can be learned.

Major General Nick Carter
’Learning from Current Operations’, The British Army Journal 2011
13. Influence. Achieving influence lies at the heart of successful people-centric

operations. All activities and actions in the divisional area are conducted with the purpose
of influencing target audiences in order to change perceptions and behaviours in support
of our own objectives. Influence is orchestrated through Joint Action and is conducted in
concert with other national levers of power.
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14. Joint Action. The military contribution to people-centric operations is exercised

through Joint Action, by which the division blends manoeuvre (physical), fires (real and
EMS), information activities and outreach to achieve influence through effects in the
physical, virtual and cognitive domains. Joint Action is the deliberate use and
orchestration of military capabilities and activities that will affect an actor’s will,
understanding and capability The cohesion between them is shown at Figure 1.2 and is
implemented through the orchestration of:
a. Information activities to manipulate perceptions and affect understanding.
b. Fires to achieve or threaten physical effects.
c. Outreach, including stabilisation, support to governance, capacity building, as
well as regional and local engagement.
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d. Manoeuvre, to gain advantage in time and space.
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Figure 1.2 – The Joint Action Model
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15. CJIIM Integration. The term Combined, Joint, Inter-Governmental, Inter-Agency and
Multinational (CJIIM) summarises the wide ranging and disparate group of actors who,
collectively, contribute to successful operations. For the UK, the divisional level is the
optimal level of command with the capacity to fully integrate, and be integrated into, CJIIM
capabilities. This has an important implication for the role of the commander and the
operation of the divisional HQ. The latter requires a modular approach with the
appropriate plugs and sockets to facilitate integration.
16. The Character of the Divisional Fight. The span of divisional activity will reflect the
character of the operation and ’the level of the fight’. The level of the fight is the level at
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which decisive tactical activity is organised, sequenced and delivered. In a complex

stabilisation operation, the level of the fight may be predominantly at unit level, with the
division shaping, directing and resourcing the overall land design and seeking advantage
in the political or information arenas. In a war fighting intervention operation, where the
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division is conducting offensive actions within a corps, the level of the fight may be at
brigade or even divisional level, with the division directing and enabling brigade actions or
conducting divisional level operations such as a divisional deep battle. Modern operations
require the division to be able to exploit the fight at the relevant level, as well as optimising
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and integrating military activity across the mosaic of conflict.
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Above the level of the fight, commanders orchestrate. In Iraq, Bosnia and NI, (General Sir
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Rupert) Smith commanded the same troop levels but had different levels of the fight. Iraq
began at brigade level and then went down to company level after a few days. Bosnia was
primarily at the battlegroup level. NI was at the four man patrol level.
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Major General Jonathan Shaw

’The Utility of Force Five Years On’, British Army Review 156
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17. The Compression of the Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels. Whilst the
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doctrinal distinctions between the tactical, operational and strategic levels of warfare 13
remain, there is significant compression and blurring of these levels. Tactical events may
have strategic consequences and the strategic level is often able to influence the tactical
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level with an agility and tempo enabled by modern communications and media. Campaign
planning tools, designed to manage complexity at the operational level, are now routinely
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required at the tactical level. Increased weapon ranges and more capable communication
systems have expanded the scale of the battlefield so that within the land dimension, what
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was once corps and above battle space, is now within reach of some of the capabilities of
a modern division, for example Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) and Joint Fires.
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The division has a key role in bridging the levels of warfare, shaping the conditions for
brigade tactical action and acting as a ‘gear’ between tactical reality and operational or
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strategic level decision making.
12
A term coined by General Sir Rupert Smith in the Utility of Force.
13
DCDC, JDP 01 ‘Campaigning’, 2nd Edition (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2008).
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The Divisional Construct
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O
C
ED
Figure 1.3 – The A2020 Structure
LL
18. A2020 (Fig 1.3) structures the Army around a Reaction Force (RF), an Adaptable
Force (AF), a pool of specialist formations within Force Troops Command (FTC) and the
Joint Helicopter Command (JHC). A modular, graduated readiness approach ensures that
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a bespoke divisional force can be packaged to meet operational need and can adapt to
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change, including sustaining an extended operation. The 3 (UK) Division provides much
rd
of the manoeuvre capability for the RF and is optimised for heavy, combined arms
operations in a joint context and in potentially high threat, high intensity environments.
The majority of the AF manoeuvre capability sits within the 1st (UK) Division, providing light
N
and light protected mobility capabilities, as well as the lead for the Army’s support to
Defence Engagement. The 1 (UK) Division is also tasked with holding light force
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st
elements at higher readiness to deploy as part of the vanguard armoured infantry brigade,
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or to deploy in their own right, as well as generating much of the C2 and combat capability
required for an enduring operation. This model enables the 3rd (UK) Division tost form the
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core of a heavy intervention operation and the next two roulements, with the 1 (UK)
Division providing the core of the upstream (also known as Phase 0) activities and latterly
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roulements four and five.

19. Boundaries between the RF and the AF are not hard edged. It is likely that a force
package, which is designed to meet an evolving operational requirement, will comprise
elements from both divisions. Light forces and expertise from the 1 (UK) Division and the
st
wider AF will be force multipliers in terms of increasing the tempo and precision of our
operational response. FTC and Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) force elements will
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augment and support both forces as required. Annex A shows 4 possible deployment
configurations. 14
20. The 1st (UK) and 3rd (UK) Divisional HQs are based on an identical design, but are
held at different levels of readiness. The HQ design is modular and requires the divisional
HQ to be augmented by additional staff, predominantly drawn from FTC, to provide
functional expertise and a full operational capability. This modular design ensures an
efficient use of specialists and enables the HQ to be configured appropriate to the mission.
Defence Engagement
21. As noted instpara 18, the Army contribution to Defence Engagement15 is coordinated
and led by HQ 1 (UK) Division, which provides oversight to the brigades with
international, regional responsibilities. Defence Engagement seeks to deliver long term
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consistency and predictability in the relationships that are important to the UK, thus
creating the conditions for long term security. Whilst this activity is primarily designed to
prevent conflict, the regional expertise built up, over time, will deliver situational awareness
and contribute towards understanding should instability develop, thus informing future
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actions. The linkage between long term engagement and regional understanding is
fundamental and is likely to be coordinated at a national level . The successful
16
C
understanding of a particular region will require the establishment of appropriate levels of
regional, cultural, stenvironmental and language expertise within the constituent force
ED
elements of the 1 (UK) Division.
Subordinate Elements
LL
22. Potential divisional force elements are:

a. Combat Brigades. The combat brigades within the 3rd (UK) Division will be
O
based on armoured infantry brigades. They contain armoured, armoured cavalry,

armoured infantry and protected mobility units, task organised by the brigade to form
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all arms battlegroups. Dependent upon the nature of the operating environment and
the task in hand, the brigades may be supplemented as required by specific force
elements drawn from the 1 (UK) Division, such as light infantry and light cavalry.
st
N
Should the situation require it, the Division may also be supported by air manoeuvre
or commando force elements at unit or formation level.
O
b. Offensive Support Group (OSG). The OSG (1st Artillery Brigade) contains
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Close Support (CS) artillery regiments supporting both 1st

and 3rd
(UK) Divisions.
The three CS regiments supporting the 3rd (UK) Division are equipped with AS 90,
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GMLRS and Exactor for area and precision fires, while the two CS regiments
supporting the 1 (UK) Division are equipped with Light Gun. The integration of Joint
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st
Fires is achieved through the provision of artillery ‘Tac Groups’ and subject matter
experts at the sub-unit, battlegroup and brigade levels. The HQ of the 1 Artillery
st
Brigade will not deploy as a stand-alone entity, but is configured to provide scalable
14
Recent operational experience underlines the modular nature of the divisionalrdconstruct. Op TELIC 1 saw
1st (UK) Armoured Division take under command 16th
Air Assault Brigade and 3 Commando Brigade in the
lead up to hostilities, in addition to its own 7th Armoured Brigade. Work up training, adaptability and a clear
understanding of capabilities under command proved key to successful execution.
15
DCDC, Joint Concept Note 1/14, Defence Joint Operating Concept (Shrivenham: MOD 2014).
16
Adaptable Force Concept of Employment.
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support to the divisional HQ. This includes the OF6 commander, who can augment
the divisional HQ as deputy commander (DCOM) Joint Fires and Information. Air
Defence (AD) is not part of the 1st Artillery Brigade Order of Battle (ORBAT). AD
regiments are under operational command (OPCOM) HQ Joint Ground Based AD (Jt
GBAD), within the RAF chain of command, with a staff officer embedded in the
divisional HQ and the HQ of 1 Artillery Brigade, who together with further staff
st
drawn from AD units, are able to plug into the divisional HQ when deployed.
c. Engineers. Close Support (CS) and Force Support (FS) engineer regiments,
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and infrastructure support assets, task
organised to either division, will be drawn from the 8 Engineer Brigade, which will not
deploy as a manoeuvre support brigade. The command and control (C2) of engineer
and EOD assets under command of the division is normally provided by the
commander of the Close Support Engineer Group, who is embedded within the
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divisional HQ. As directed by the division, mobility and counter-mobility effects are
integrated with the combat brigades, in order to enable own force manoeuvre and
constrain enemy manoeuvre.
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d. Sustainment Brigade. 101 Logistic Brigade will provide dedicated logistic
support to the 3 (UK) Division. In certain circumstances, it may be required to
rd
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coordinate multinational and joint logistic support. From the outset, 101 Logistic
Brigade will work closely with the Divisional HQ to set the logistic design for
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operations. Once deployed, it may co-locate with Divisional MAIN HQ or it may be
deployed elsewhere in order to conduct operations on the logistic line of
communication. In these circumstances, the Brigade will ensure that sufficient
logistic support is made available to the staff in the Divisional HQ. The Brigade
LL
contains a mixture of Close Support Logistics Regiments (CSLR) and Theatre

Support Logistics Regiments (TLR). Equipment Support (ES) is delivered through a
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mix of Armoured Close Support (Armd CS) battalions and a Force Support (FS)
battalion. The CSLR provides intimate and dedicated logistic support to an affiliated
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manoeuvre brigade, whilst the TLR provides supply and transport from the theatre
RV into the close support environment. The armoured CS battalions will be
configured to support combined arms manoeuvre operations, with one battalion
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being attributed to each armoured infantry brigade. A single FS battalion will provide
support in the Divisional rear area. Armoured medical regiments provide Role 1
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medical support to each of the combat brigades and to affiliated Force Troops. An
armoured medical regiment is the framework for the Tactical Role 1 Group, providing
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an agile structure that forms the basis for task organisation to support theatre entry,
manoeuvre andststabilisation operations. 102 Logistic Brigade will provide logistic
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support to the 1 (UK) Division. With two Force Logistic Regiments, (FLR) 102
Logistic Brigade will support 1st (UK) Division on roulements 4 and 5 of an enduring
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operation.
e. Command Support. Under A2020, brigade signal squadrons and divisional
signals regiments were replaced by 5 x MultithRole Signal Regiments (MRSR),
grouped under 7 Signal Group, within the 11 Signal Brigade. Up to 3 x MRSR will
support the deployed divisional HQ and its subordinate formations. If the scale of the
deployment requires it, Commander 7 Signals Group will support the divisional HQ as
DCOM Command Support.
f. Air Manoeuvre. The scale of Air Manoeuvre (AM) assets and their C2 will vary
in accordance with the phase, nature, environmental parameters and the size of force
that is being supported. AM force elements (airborne, air assault and battlefield
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helicopter) might be grouped within an AM formation – the 16th Air Assault Brigade or
Air Assault Task Force. Alternatively, they might be commanded by a bespoke
aviation HQ. Up to 2 x regiments of attack helicopters, up to 1 x regiment of
dedicated find helicopters and varying numbers of support helicopters could be
deployed within a Joint Aviation Group or Joint Helicopter Force. More detailed
information on deployable aviation C2 and task organisation can be found in the Joint
Helicopter Command Aviation Operations Manual.
g. Medical. The 2nd Medical Brigade will provide the deployed division with
hospital care. For major combat operations, the division may expect to have a field
hospital supporting each combat brigade and a force support hospital supporting the
Forward Support Group (FSG) or Joint Supply Area (JSA).
h. Intelligence and Surveillance. The deployed division’s intelligence and
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surveillance assets will be provided by the 1st Intelligence, Surveillance and
Reconnaissance Brigade, which will include Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS),
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) and Electronic Warfare (EW) assets, as
well as a Military Intelligence (MI) capability to analyse and exploit information. The
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division may also access joint ISTAR assets which are either deployed or through
reach-back.
C
i. Security Assistance Group. Soft effects capabilities and regional expertise
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will be made available to the deployed division by the Security Assistance Group
(SAG). These will include civil affairs, PsyOps, cultural specialists, gender advisors
and media operations specialists.
LL
j. stMilitary Police. All Military Police support at the divisional level is pooled within
the 1 Military Police Brigade who will then deliver support to the manoeuvre
brigades and divisions. MP functional staff will augment the deployed divisional HQ,
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providing specialist advice including, but not limited to, captured persons advice and
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planning, investigations in support of the Service Justice System, movement

regulation, the provision of criminal intelligence capability, and host nation mentoring
and liaison.
N
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Annex:
A. Illustrative Divisional Task Organisations (TASKORG).
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N
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ANNEX A TO
PART 1
ILLUSTRATIVE TASKORG
0
UK DIVISION
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O
Cbt X2 Man Sp OSG Engrs Sust Comd JAG/JHF ISR Med SAG
Bdes (UK) Bde Sp
7M 7s ( 5 5D 7a m 5 5x 5v 0
4
C
X2 X2 X3 X2(-)
AH MSSG
AS 90 CS (1)
5_ R 5_ Z
s 5 5 V 5 ¼
Q 5 5 p 3 ¿
ED
Collect Analyse
X2 Psyops
6 u 5 5¿
CLSR Wildcat
5_ A 5_ ;
s 5 5 E 5 I
Q 5 w 3 0
LL
X2 FP&
HVM FS TLR Lt Life SH DCSU
5 5r m 5
Land
5_ M 5 Q 5 E 5 J <
Sp
O
FS Air X2 EW
5_ M 4 W TR 5 ó 5 W
Armd CS
FS 5 5¿
I Lt
HUMINT
5E
N
5_ % 5 F 5 E 5 ,
(FARP FP)
O
(-) X2 GEO
Infra
4R
Armd
5 I 4 { 5 I
C
RAS/HQ Sy Geo CBRN

N
Lt ( FP)
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(1) Fd Hosps may be commanded by the deployed JTFHQ, JFLogC or NSE. It is possible that
more than one Fd Hosp may be deployed.
1-A-1
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0
UK-LED MULTINATIONAL DIVISION
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Cbt X1 Cbt X3 OSG DEG Sust Comd JAG/JHF ISR Med
O
Bde (UK) Bdes (MN) Sp
7M 7A 5( 5D 5Q 5m 5x 5v
C
X2
UK X2 CS CLSR
R 6 A 5 ; 5 C 5 Q 5w
ED
Collect Analyse
HVM
UK (-) TLR
5_ A 6 A 1 0 5 E 5 ¼ 4
5p 4u ¿
LL
TACP x8 EOD
5_ M 6 A 6 ( 5 E 5 J 5<
O
Infra
MN Armd CS
5_ M 6 M MN 5 # TR 4 { GEO 4 W FS
In addition to combat formations and units as shown
MN contributions may range from individual
augmentees on the divisional headquarters staff to
5_ % 6 Q 4 ` 4 0 5 , combat support and combat service support force

N
UK
MSSG elements.
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5 p 5 m 5 E 5 I
C
Wks
Gp MN X3
4 m 5 F 6 D 7 a
N
U
MN X3 MN
4 R BRF 5 W
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0
UK PROVIDING THE CORE OF A UK 2* JTF FOR A LAND-CENTRED UK UNILATERAL INTERVENTION
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7M 7Q
Land Logistic Air Maritime
Component Component Component Component
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To be To be
JF Log Gp determined determined
5_R 5( 4¿ 5Q , 5
ED
during force during force
package package
AS90 HUMINT CLSR design design
5_ A 5 ; ¿ 5 v
Q 5
LL
HVM PsyOps TLR
5_ M 5 D 4 0 5 J
O
SF
Component
Civ
CS Affairs
5_ M 4 E GEO 5 x AH
TR Armd CS
4
FSW
To be
determined
during force
package
N
5_ % 5 m MRSR
5 w design
O
Note 1 SH
5_ s 4 m 5 u
C
N
4 m 5 ¼
U
EW
Note 1: shown as part of Land Component, but will provide ICS to JTF HQ
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UK DIVISION PROVIDING THE OPERATIONAL GEARING BETWEEN A UK 1* COMMAND
AND AN IN THEATRE NATO OR COALITION 3* HQ IN AN ENDURING STABILISATION OPERATION
90
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0
NATO/Coalition
HQ
O
C
7_I 7Q
Combat Sustainment Comd
Sp
ED
TF HQ JtFSp 5m MRSR
5K 5# 4x 5Q 5v 5 ¼
LL
AH
5 G 5 E 4 p 5 Q
O
TR Wildcat
5 G 5 ó 4 w 5 J
N
SH
5 I 4 { 4 u 4 W
O
5 I 4 ¿
C
N
4 m 4 m
U
EW
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Contents Page
PART 2
DIVISIONAL CHARACTERISTICS AND PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS
1. Part 2 highlights the characteristics of the division and planning considerations by
tactical function.
The Divisional Battle
2. The division fights the deep battle, resources the close battle and protects the rear
areas. In order to achieve this, the division must synchronise and de-conflict activity
across the domains and dimensions (the domains and dimensions are described more
fully in Annex A to Part 2).
Fight the Deep Battle. The deep battle is where the divisional commander
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a.
shapes the battlespace to enable success in the close battle. Deep activity may be
cognitive and/or physical and is prosecuted across the dimensions. In certain
circumstances, the deep battle may be the decisive act. The deep battle must be
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appropriately resourced and synchronised with the close battle.
Resource the Close Battle. The conduct of the close battle is the business of
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b.
the subordinate brigades within the division. The division directs, shapes, enables
and sustains brigade activity. ED
c. Protect the Rear Areas. Operations in the rear area sustain the division.
Physically this includes the protection of lines of communication forward to the
brigades and rearward to the UK and its coalition partners. Elements of the rear
LL
protection task may be delegated to the logistic brigade. Rear operations are more
than physical. They include messaging and consequence management to sustain
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the will and cohesion of his force and maintain campaign legitimacy in the eyes of the
host nation, UK public and media.
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Combined, Joint, Inter-Agency, Inter-Governmental and Multinational

3. The CJIIM Environment. Land forces will operate in a CJIIM environment with the
N
requirement to work alongside joint forces, organisations and agencies from the UK, other
coalition partners and the host nation. CJIIM actors may be guided by different principles
O
and may seek differing objectives. The divisional HQ can provide a point of coordination,
alignment and integration, particularly when the environment is non-permissive. It may be
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more appropriate for some CJIIM elements, or they may prefer, to be integrated at the
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theatre command level.

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4. CJIIM. CJIIM elements are detailed at Annex B. They include:

a. Combined. A combined operation is one where force elements of 2 or more
allies participate, probably within a coalition. Examples include a UK division
operating within a US Corps context, or a specifically formed Anglo-French division.
b. Joint. Joint refers to activities, operations and organisations where the force
elements of at least 2 services participate. The division must integrate joint
capabilities into the land battle.
(1) Air. The divisional HQ is ‘Air-Land’ by design, in that it has sufficient air
planners and a generalist understanding of air capabilities to ensure that air is
considered and integrated from the outset of planning. Additional air staff may
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join the HQ dependent on Air Command and control and the role of the division.
For example, when the division is subordinate to a corps, the Air Component
may invest additional air planning capability into the land 3* rather than 2* level.
(2) Maritime and Amphibious. The HQ may be augmented by an
Amphibious Planning Cell. The size and composition of this will depend upon
the complexity of the amphibious element of the operation, the deployment or
otherwise of the Maritime Component Command (MCC) HQ, the involvement of
other nationalities and the integration of air projected from the maritime.
(3) Special Forces. Depending on the operation, UK Special Forces (SF)
may act at the strategic, operational or tactical levels. SF may provide a liaison
officer to the divisional HQ.
Inter-Agency. Inter-Agency refers to cooperation between other actors,
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c.
including government departments and intelligence agencies (from both the UK and
coalition partners), Non Governmental Organisations (NGO), International
Organisations (IO), humanitarian groups, private military and security companies, as
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well as contractors. The range of agencies present in the battle space will change as
an operation develops. Key government agencies will plug in at the appropriate
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command level whilst liaison with NGOs may be less formal and may even be
conducted through a third party. The division will have to tailor its approach to suit
ED
the organisation with whom it is liaising. All agencies should be considered in
planning as early as appropriate to ensure coherence of priorities and objectives.
Inter-Governmental. Inter-Governmental organisations are created by
LL
d.
international agreements. They include, amongst others, the United Nations (UN),
the Office for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the European Union (EU)
and the African Union (AU). Deployed elements of these organisations could include
O
forces organised for combat operations, those designed primarily for peacekeeping,
training advisory teams, observer missions, or politically and legally empowered
TR
representatives (UN Special Representative or High Representative). Although it is

unlikely that these organisations would plug into a divisional HQ, close coordination
will be required.
N
Multinational. Multinational describes activities, operations and organisations

O
e.
in which forces or agencies of more than one nation participate. Multinational

operations bring many advantages, such as burden sharing, through to campaign
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legitimacy, but have significant implications for understanding and interoperability,

which must be comprehended and mitigated
N
5. The Challenge of Integration. The nature of the operation and the level of
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command exercised by the division will dictate which CJIIM organisations it must integrate
with. Detailed implications are at Annex A to Part 2. Headline considerations include:
a. Understand. The division must understand the roles, aims, objectives,
narratives, capabilities and limitations (caveats by choice or law) of each element and
anticipate how these might develop as the operation proceeds. The division must
appreciate how each CJIIM element can contribute, through its unique perspective, to
collective understanding. Understanding must be mutual and bonded by trust.
b. Communication. Appropriate channels of communication must be established
to ensure understanding. These may range from bilateral relationships, facilitated by
the divisional commander with a key interlocutor, through to the comprehensive
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integration of CIS and even narratives. If CJIIM partners are relying on divisional
CIS, their expectations will need to be managed in terms of services and available
bandwidth. An early articulation of their requirements will be necessary.
c. Coordination. Relevant mechanisms must be established to coordinate, or as
a minimum, take account of CJIIM actors’ battle rhythms, planning, decision points
and execution.
d. Command Authority. Each CJIIM element is likely to have bespoke authority,
accountability and command procedures. The differences between multinational
elements, between civilian and military, or between deployed forces and the host
government, may be acute, with serious implications for decision making and
operational tempo. Understanding these differences, including where decisions can
be informed and shaped, is key to collective effort.
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e. Interoperability. Interoperability requirements will depend on the level of
integration deemed appropriate between the CJIIM actors. In some cases an
awareness of a particular activity, including how it contributes to the mission and can
O
be exploited, combined with suitable deconfliction may suffice. In other
circumstances, such as a multinational division, interoperability will lie at the heart of
C
mission success. Challenges may range from differing doctrine and law, through
language, to critical variations in techniques, tactics, procedures and sustainment.
ED
Interoperability risks must be understood in detail by the division and actively
managed.
Command
LL
6. Role of the Commander.

O
a. Understanding. The commander’s information requirements, drawn from his

unique political and military perspective, will provide the prioritised framework within
TR
which the division’s understanding is achieved and communicated externally and

internally.
Relationships. At the level where integration takes place with indigenous
N
b.
political figures and structures, the divisional commander will, through personal
O
discussions, establish and maintain relationships with the host nation. This will be
fundamental to the reinforcement of campaign legitimacy and will set the conditions
C
for the development of the campaign narrative and wider engagement. One key
issue will be to establish the extent to which the division ‘owns’ the battlespace of the
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sovereign host nation in which it is operating.

U
c. Coalition Management. The divisional commander will create and manage the
coalition within his command. This requires an understanding of the political,
strategic and national issues associated with each troop contributing nation and
those of the lead nation, should it not be the UK. The commander must also
understand the respective national interpretations of international law and domestic
law that will often combine with policy to result for example in differing national Rules
of Engagement (ROE). There may be times when a coalition is forced upon the
commander for reasons that relate to the greater strategic good, thus creating
interoperability frictions at the tactical level that will require a great deal of patience
and pragmatism to overcome.
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d. The Commander as an Operator. In major combat operations, the principal

role of the commander is that of commanding the battle, assigning missions, tasks
and resources, understanding enemy intentions and taking key decisions to achieve
objectives. In operations other than war, whilst the divisional commander continues
to undertake this function, his role develops into that of an operator. Often, through
interaction with host nation actors and key inter-agency partners, the commander will
take on the additional functions of contributing significantly to the understanding
generated in the HQ and furthering key campaign goals through direct influence.
The commander must understand where and when he can add value and achieve
influence. His personal involvement is likely to carry significant weight.
e. National Contingent Commander. The divisional commander may also be
the National Contingent Commander (NCC). Recent operational experience has
shown that the 2* level of command is the lowest appropriate level for NCC
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responsibilities to rest. A brigade commander will be focussed ‘down and in’ and the
additional responsibility of NCC will distract him and his HQ from the conduct of the
close battle. The NCC role is more appropriate for the corps or divisional
commander, who is likely to be above the ‘level of the fight’ and whose focus will be
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‘up and out’. In this capacity, the divisional commander must fully understand the UK
C
domestic political agenda and how it may affect operations. As the focus for coalition
interaction, the divisional commander will be in an effective position to maintain
national relationships at the operational level. As the NCC within a multinational
ED
corps, the divisional commander is responsible for ensuring that the corps
commander is fully aware of the range of UK capabilities within the division, its key
strengths and limitations and any national caveats that may be in force.
LL
f. Inter-Agency Integration. The divisional commander will be at the heart of the

effort to integrate and command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and
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multinational capabilities. The commander will need to devote time and effort to the
establishment of key inter-agency relationships, the integration of working practices
TR
and procedures and the fusion of objectives and goals. Essentially this is leadership
by persuasion. In particular the commander will focus on improving unity of effort
and agility. Personal involvement will be crucial.
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g. Focussing the HQ at the Right Level. The divisional commander must

O
ensure that the HQ remains focussed at the right level. The HQ may be deployed in
a variety of roles, but whatever its primary role, the staff must be clear about the
C
fundamental distinctions between the divisional and brigade levels of command and
the roles and responsibilities of each. There is a risk that tactical activity at brigade
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level and below can set the agenda for the HQ and the force as a whole. The
commander cannot allow the HQ to lose sight of the divisional level and where it
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adds value.
The Challenge of Achieving Coherence

‘There was no strategic direction, there was no strategic military goal to achieve, there was
no military campaign, there were no theatre-level military objectives: all acts were tactical.
Nobody appeared to have noticed the danger in which UNPROFOR stood…[As a result]
force was used to attack and achieve tactical objectives, but it did not attain a strategic aim
or a definitive political outcome.’
General Sir Rupert Smith
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h. Managing Risk. The divisional commander must understand and inform the
risk context in which the operation is conducted. This includes:
(1) Informing the political and higher command appetite for risk.
Understanding and managing the risk appetite is critical to ensure that
operations meet the political imperative and that the division retains appropriate
freedom of tactical decision. Regular dialogue, trust, transparency,
understanding and anticipation will all be important.
(2) With the context understood, the commander must set the risk appetite
across the division. In a national force this is relatively straight-forward. It is far
more complex with a multinational division, where troop contributing nations
may have different perspectives and appetites for risk.
With the risk appetite set, the commander must delegate appropriate
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(3)
authority to manage risk, including when it should be elevated and to where. A

poor risk culture will constrain initiative, degrade the force, or hamper it with
process. An effective risk culture will protect the force, its legitimacy, exploit
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opportunity and play to the strengths of mission command. The divisional
commander has a pivotal role in striking the appropriate balance.1
C
i. Media and Information Operations. The divisional commander should be the
focal point for media engagement, freeing up brigade commanders to concentrate on
ED
the close battle. Whilst all elements of the force should be prepared to deal with the
media, it is the divisional commander with his ‘up and out’ perspective that is best
placed to deliver the narrative and guard against adverse coverage. Whilst there will
LL
always be a desire on the part of the media to visit the tactical environment, the
divisional media cell is likely to be the plug-in point for domestic and international
media. Media is just one of the many means that the commander has to fight the
O
deep battle in the virtual domain. In the divisional HQ, media operations is a part of
Information Activity (IA), sits within Joint Effects and will form a key part of divisional
TR
Joint Action.
7. Role of the HQ.
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Configuration of the HQ. Due to the level of integration that the divisional HQ
O
a.
must achieve, it will not manoeuvre in the same way that its subordinate HQs will
manoeuvre. The redeployment of MAIN is a deliberate operation. It achieves the
C
required level of tactical agility through the deployment of its Forward and Tactical
HQs as required. To meet the dynamic command and control demands of an
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operation, the divisional HQ has the following possible configurations:

U
(1) Division Main HQ (MAIN). MAIN is the principal controlling HQ where all
staff functions are coordinated and where command and control of all
subordinate formations is exercised. The primary functions of MAIN are
planning, the refinement of plans and control. Execution is devolved where
possible to subordinate formations, but key areas such as Joint Effects, Time
Sensitive Targeting, Battlespace Management and sustainment planning, are
retained by the divisional HQ. The location of MAIN will depend upon the
1
ADP Operations (pp. 6-5 – 6-9) covers risk in detail in the context of Command on operations. Further
guidance on risk management and its consideration in the planning process can also be found in the Staff
Officers’ Hand Book (Land) (SOHB(L)).
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operational situation, the location of subordinate brigades, superior and flanking

HQs and the interactions with key host nation and inter-agency actors. During
initial deployment, MAIN may remain in the UK, providing a reachback
capability to deployed HQ elements, as well as access to capabilities across
defence. If the situation warrants its deployment into theatre, MAIN will be
unable to manoeuvre. Although scalable in terms of its configuration prior to
deployment, once built it cannot be significantly re-configured without disruption,
including service outages. It will take 14 days to take down, move and establish
again and is likely to occupy a building of opportunity.
(2) Division Forward HQ (FWD). FWD has reduced command and control
functionality in comparison with MAIN, but has greater mobility and a reduced
footprint that more flexibly supports the commander. FWD may operate for
limited periods under canvas, under armour or from a building of opportunity
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and will facilitate the entry of MAIN into theatre if the situation warrants its
deployment. FWD may be deployed in several roles:
Advance HQ. The Advance HQ provides an agile 2* land command
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(a)
node capable of early entry, with reachback to MAIN HQ in the UK. For
contingency operations, an advance HQ may be required to develop
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understanding, control the in-load of divisional force elements and
establish key relationships. As a deployment develops, it will transition
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into the FWD HQ as required.
(b) Step-Up HQ that Enables MAIN to Move. Similar to a battlegroup
STEP-UP, this would accept control of the operation to allow MAIN to
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move. MAIN is unlikely to move frequently in contemporary operations but

may do so to conform to adjustments in the area of operations.
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(c) C2 Node for a Discrete Operation. FWD may be required as a C2

node to control a particularly complex, discrete, often enabling, tactical
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action. Examples include a divisional obstacle crossing or a deliberate

clearance operation within a wider stabilisation mission.
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(d) C2 Node in Close Proximity to Deployed Brigades. In a

manoeuvre battle there may be need for a static MAIN and a
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manoeuvrable FWD that can keep up with the battle2.

C
(3) Division Tactical HQ (TAC). TAC is a small manoeuvrable HQ

(commander and key advisers) with sufficient mobility, protection and
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communications, to direct the battle for limited periods away from MAIN or FWD
HQs. The structure will be dependent on the tactical situation and could be
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deployed in soft-skinned or armoured vehicles, or by command flight3.

b. Modular Approach. The divisional HQ will be supported from a common pool
of Force Troops, including all key enablers. In a modular ‘plug and socket’ approach,
the HQ will be augmented by specialist plugs dependent on operational need, which
provide key competencies as well as a 24/7 capability. A critical mass of Force
2
Examples of Div FWD being used as a C2 node in close proximity to deployed brigades are 1 (UK) Armd
Div FWD on Op GRANBY or the 3 (US) Inf Div FWD on the Thunder Run to Baghdad on Op IRAQI
FREEDOM.
3
The provision of a Command Flight is not an attribution for a JAG/JHF. Generation of a command flight
would lead to a direct loss of capability, typically provision of Find (ISTAR) BH.
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Troops may necessitate the deployment of senior functional commanders whose role
will be to command specialist force elements and to provide advice to the divisional
commander.
c. Challenge of Integration . The ‘plug and socket’ approach places a premium
on interoperability to ensure that a coherent and integrated divisional HQ can be
delivered within readiness. For the ‘plug and socket’ approach to work, divisional
Standing Operating Instructions (SOIs) and processes must be thoroughly
understood and routinely practiced in training. When integrating additional staff into
the HQ, a careful balance must be struck between plugs and sockets . 4
d. HQ Processes . At its heart, the divisional HQ exists to conduct 2 processes:

the generation of understanding and the Plan, Refine, Execute and Evaluate (PREE)
cycle. These 2 processes combine to produce outcomes through Joint Action.
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(1) Understanding . The divisional commander has a key role to play in
focusing the understand requirements of the division. Understanding must be
common across the HQ. It should be based on information that is accessible to
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all. Understanding is wider than just the provision of Intelligence. It is the
combination of fact, assessment, insight and foresight, in order to support
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decision making and enable the delivery of effects. It provides the requisite
foresight to meet divisional level planning timelines from the outset. The ISTAR
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staff is responsible for providing Red and White understanding across the
physical, virtual 5and cognitive domains. These 3 elements combine with the
Green and Blue picture, through the PREE process, to create a coherent view
of the past, current and future situations. This should generate 2 outputs:
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understanding in the divisional commander’s mind that will enable his decision
making, as well as the development of collective understanding across the
division.
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. Within the divisional HQ,

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(2) Plan, Refine, Execute and Evaluate (PREE)
the three integrating cells (Current Operations (COps), Future Operations

(FOps) and Future Plans (FPlans) operate as ‘pistons in an engine’, setting the
tempo and directing events, with functional expertise provided, as required, by a
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series of specialist or functional cells.

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(a) Collectively, the three pistons provide a total planning capability that
can be employed as required. Plans may be initiated in FPlans and then
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migrate through FOps to COps. In other circumstances, it may be

appropriate for FPlans to consider longer lead plans and policy, with
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shorter term plans commencing in FOps. In each case, the commander

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and COS will direct planning activity and the handover of plans, as
required.
(b) Each cell maintains a unique battle rhythm to meet mission specific
planning deadlines, but all are nested within the divisional HQ battle
rhythm.
4
Where this approach has been adopted a staff ratio of 1 plug to 3 sockets is the maximum that can be
integrated without diluting the essential coherence of the core HQ.
5
Red = Enemy, White = Civilian, Green = Host Nation Forces, Blue = Own and Allied Forces.
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(c) The FOps cell is where the refinement of plans takes place. The
FOps cell will issue near term fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) and will also
conduct contingency planning.
(d) In addition to the Plan, Refine, Execute process taking place in the
integrating cells, the Evaluate stage is completed by the ‘Intelligence and
Understand’ and ‘Joint Effects’ functional cells.
(e) Figure 2.1 below shows the diagrammatic relationship between the
integrating and functional cells within the HQ.
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O
C
ED
LL
O
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Fig 2.1 - Functional and Integrating Cells

8. Relationship with Superior HQ. In many cases the division will be deployed within
a corps or Joint Task Force (JTF) construct. If this is the case, the divisional HQ staff must
N
ensure that their staff processes and battle rhythm complement and are subordinate to
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those of the higher HQ. Staff officers must identify and use the correct functional points of
entry into the superior HQ. Where the superior HQ is multinational there may be a
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temptation to use national lines of communication. However, this is likely to be damaging

to this key relationship and the staff should make every effort to use the correct point of
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entry.
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9. Hierarchy of Wisdom. The intellectual and decision making capacity of the division
set it aside from lower levels of command, such as brigade and battlegroup. It provides
the division with the capability to command multiple formations, employ and synchronise
key manoeuvre and manoeuvre support assets, as well as engage with complex issues at
the operational level. The key characteristics which permit the division to exercise this
hierarchy of wisdom are:
a. Size and Capacity of the Staff. The divisional staff is larger than the staff of its
subordinate formations and units. Containing key staff officers and branches which
are not replicated at lower levels it is able to control and synchronise divisional level
capabilities. Individual branches are larger, containing a greater range of
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specialisations. Key staff are appointed at the SO1 and AD levels in order to exploit
their experience.
b. Sustained Decision/Action Cycle. The construct of the divisional HQ around
the three integrating cells (FPlans, FOps and COps) enables it to look out further and
maintain a sustained decision action cycle. This gives the HQ the capability to deal
with multiple problems over time and space, beyond the capacity of its subordinates.
c. Optimised for CJIIM Integration. The divisional HQ is optimised for CJIIM
integration. It is the plug in point for IA&O capabilities from the SAG, key national
and international agencies, including Partners Across Government. It can achieve
the wider leverage required for operational success through its access to these
actors.
CIS. The operational level CIS (OpCIS) fielded at the divisional level delivers
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d.
the ability to engage with a wide range of other headquarters and actors. Coupled
with good information management, exploitation and staff expertise, OpCIS provides
the processing power to deal with complex issues.
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10. Divisional Key Staff. Full descriptions of the roles and responsibilities of the
C
divisional staff are contained in divisional SOIs. However, the following key staff
appointments are crucial to the functioning of the divisional HQ:
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a. Deputy Commander. The scale and complexity of divisional level operations
means that command cannot be exercised without the support of a deputy
commander, who exercises command when the divisional commander is absent from
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the HQ. He may also be used to control a particular phase or geographical area of
the operation which requires forward command.
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b. Chief of Staff (COS). The COS commands MAIN HQ and is responsible to the
divisional commander for the operation, organisation and administration of the HQ.
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As the senior staff officer, he ensures that the commander’s intent is turned into
workable plans, which are communicated to and understood by subordinate
formations, as well as the superior and flanking formations.
N
c. Policy Advisor (POLAD). The POLAD is the divisional commander’s principal

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advisor on all non-military issues pertinent to the mission. The POLAD works closely
with the IA&O branch and will advise the commander on UK national policy issues.
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ACOS Sustain. ACOS Sustain is the senior G1/4 staff officer and is the
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d.
divisional commander’s principal advisor for sustainment planning and personnel

issues. He provides direction and guidance to the CSS planners in the integrating
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cells and coordinates the activity of the Sustain Cell, which provides specialist logistic
advice across the HQ.
e. Deputy Commander Information and Communication Services (DCOM
ICS). DCOM ICS is responsible for ICS support across the division. He oversees
functional support to the divisional HQ, maintains close liaison with the theatre CIS
HQ and commands all CIS force elements in the divisional area.
f. Deputy Commander Joint Fires and Information (DCOM JFI). DCOM JFI
commands the Joint Fires and Influence Group. He is responsible for the delivery
and integration of all Joint Effects and ISTAR on behalf of the divisional commander.
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He leads on the prioritisation of targets and is the principal advisor to the commander
on the integration of air, aviation and air defence.
g. Deputy Commander Engineering (DCOM Engineering). DCOM Engineering
is the commander of the close support engineer group. He commands the divisional
engineer force elements and provides the single point of engineer advice for the
divisional commander. He sets engineer priorities in accordance with the
commander’s intent and makes key engineer activity decisions.
h. Deputy Commander Intelligence and Surveillance (DCOM I&S). DCOM I&S
commands the deployed elements of the I&S brigade in the divisional area and acts
as the divisional commander’s advisor on I&S capability and employment.
11. Battlespace Management. Battlespace management allows activity to be
deconflicted so that effects can then be integrated. It is a key function, which optimises
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the effects that the division is able to deliver. At the divisional level, battlespace
management sets the conditions for the conduct of battlespace management by
subordinate formations. The division is the lowest level where airspace management
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genuinely takes place, particularly in situations where the division has more than one
manoeuvre brigade under command and the lowest level where the geographical
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framework can be successfully applied. It is the level where Joint Effects are fully
integrated. ED
a. Close, Deep and Rear. The geographic, or physical, framework distinguishes
military activity by close, deep and rear. This framework may be physical, virtual or
cognitive. The divisional close battle is likely to be the business of the combat
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brigades, with the division primarily operating in and controlling the deep and the rear
battles. The divisional deep battle may range from kinetic targeting beyond the
combat brigade boundaries, to Information Activities and Outreach (IA&O) and other
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activity that is focused on the virtual or cognitive ‘deep’.

TR
b. Fusing and Integrating Joint Effects. The fusion of Fires and IA&O into Joint
Effects is a crucial part of the PREE cycle. The COS guides and controls the staff,
ensuring that their efforts are integrated. This will be achieved through a Targets
N
Development Board process, run within the divisional HQ, at which all kinetic and
non-kinetic functions will be represented. The output of the Targets Development
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Board will be a developed and prioritised list of targets and effects, presented to the
divisional commander at the Targets Approval Board, for approval and subsequent
C
execution. The intent is to achieve a unified output, in accordance with the

commander’s direction, at each stage of the PREE process. Depending on the
N
nature of the deployment, the division is likely to be operating in concert with

U
elements from the other components. Careful integration will be required to

incorporate these assets into the divisional joint action plan.
c. Multi-Dimensional and Multi-Domain Deconfliction. The division will seek to
achieve effects across the domains and dimensions. This requires careful
deconfliction. Some activity at the tactical level may have effects at the operational
or strategic levels and vice-versa. The division must be aware of the implications of
actions in different dimensions and domains.
12. Command Support.
a. Multi Role Signals Regiments. Command support is delivered by Multi Role
Signals Regiments (MRSR) which support the divisional and brigade HQ and other
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Points of Presence (PoP) , such as the logistic brigade HQ if deployed

6
independently. Operational level CIS will be deployed in the divisional HQ,

irrespective of the phase of an operation. This may be extended downwards to
brigade level if required. Limited interoperability currently exists between operational
and tactical CIS.
b. Information Services. Support to the division is based on a mission
configurable system, able to deliver information services across all classifications, in
a range of domains that include MISSION, NATO and UK. The division will employ
these systems to pass information rearwards to the UK for national business, up to
the deployed corps or theatre HQ and down to the deployed brigade HQ. This
mission configurable system, made up from UK and other nation’s assets, will
provide data and telephony services across the divisional operational area. All
informed voice will be provided to all brigade HQs, irrespective of their nationality. It
PY
should be noted that whilst the UK relies on TacCIS from the divisional HQ down to
brigades some other nationalities might rely on OpCIS down to this level. The division
will need to consider this when developing its communications plan.
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c. Decision Support Cell. The COS oversees the Decision Support Cell, which
consists of specialist capabilities including the iHUB, OPLAW and the Provost
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Marshal (PM).
(1)
ED
Commanders Initiative Group. It is possible to establish a small cell to
assist the commander in decision making , using expertise from outside the HQ
7
to consider planned courses of action from a wider, non-military perspective.

The cell will inform the commander’s intent, analyse how planned actions will
LL
affect other lines of operation and will consider the wider predicted secondary
effects of future divisional actions.
O
(2) Red Team. The role of the Red Team is to challenge accepted wisdom
and the assumptions of the commander and his staff, in order to improve the
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quality and validity of divisional plans. The team should be tailored for the
operation and consist of critical and creative thinkers with a diverse mix of skills
and experience.
N
Liaison Officers. The successful integration of Liaison Officers (LO) will

O
(3)
reduce friction between the divisional HQ and those of subordinate, superior

and flanking formations. LOs must be able to communicate effectively and
C
must be able to confidently represent the intent and scheme of manoeuvre of

their parent formation. They should be embedded as early as possible in order
N
to enable full integration and should arrive with their own CIS/ICS and
U
operators, if applicable. The COS will ensure that the LO framework functions
effectively and must identify any training, cultural or language requirements.
(4) Detention Authority. Depending on the operational command and
control structure, detention authority may be held at divisional level. Detail
6
Each MRSR can deliver 2 x points of presence.
7
In Afghanistan in 2009, RC (S) established a ‘Prism’ cell to focus on areas which were receiving insufficient
attention in the headquarters. The cell challenged conventional thinking, anticipating problems and scoping
solutions. This term has subsequently been used to describe similar cells in other headquarters.
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regarding detention authority and the handling of Captured Persons (CPERS)

can be found in Part 3, Annex G.
13. Mission Threads. The division will structure its CIS on the Mission Threads model.
The threads represent the functions that are required to exercise command and control.
They comprise the people and processes, supported by the appropriate ICS, required to
deliver a particular military activity or effect. Mission Threads may be adjusted according
to the nature of the mission. Each thread has a responsible officer at each level of
command, who is responsible for defining the requirement and processes to be used to
produce operational results. Each Mission Thread is supported by a number of
applications and information services which provide the user access to data on a range of
information infrastructures with HQs inter-connected by a mix of fixed and mobile
networks. The design, delivery and operation of these services, applications and networks
are the responsibility of the specialist CIS commander supporting the Vanguard
PY
commander. The attribution of information services, infrastructure and networks to the
generic Mission Threads is shown in Fig 2.2.
ss )k
O
en t.v tc t t)a .p
hc er o eff tn (A tn ef sn
ny a M DE e ed ar
w ec fo sn El gn e -I (
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eg T,
dn ec fe m iot te na eg tsn DE go
a. ap od ar la lP an st an -I
Mission Threads: t D ee ep L- e ce a C, L,
se lei icd no la a m ffE M .d
m
g ltt ss rF O M ss kr no ro
what the force
M
EDe e n no eg es la it
a i & m M dn tia o ce o
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tsc B M er iti a de s the w

te to C
&. &r vu ra re l A ec
eff itS i sp p w L N rP ru
A eo M O on &t
/E2 de na
O
of K IS ec os
C gT C ro e
ra M nI ,F F R
LL
hS J
Specific and General Supporting Applications
O
Video Chat Web Messaging

Above UK Mission Restricted
TR
Secret Secret Secret Unclass

What decision Voice Collaboration Moving
makers get and all Imagery
the supporting Information Infrastructure
capabilities needed
N
to deliver the
effects……. Fixed Communications Mobile Communications
Networks
O
Others Environment
C
Supporting Activities Power Protection

N
Fig 2.2 - Mission Threads and User Applications Underpinned by Core ICS,
U
Information Infrastructure and Communications Networks

a. Deployment Sequence. Whilst no two operations will follow the same path,
the provision of ICS is likely to mature as the operation progresses. Illustratively:
(1)Phase 1. It is assumed that the brigades will be conducting fast moving
manoeuvre operations to establish presence and security. The emphasis will
be on self sufficient, joint, national and coalition ICS, delivering information
services to the divisional and brigade levels. Operations at brigade level and
below will rely on tactical CIS.
(2)Phase 2. This will be the most resource heavy phase for military delivered
ICS, with the force likely to be dispersed. Manoeuvre will be conducted using
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tactical CIS, with services to battlegroup level delivered by self sufficient, joint,
national and coalition means.
(3) Phase 3. This phase will be similar to Phase 2 but the employment of
contractor support will begin to release military ICS from the static elements of
the force. Noting that the employment of contractors (both international and
host nation) introduces risk, the divisional HQ must consider how best to
manage them.
(4) Phase 4. As the force enters the transition or stabilisation period, greater
use of contractor support will be enabled. Risk may increase. Military ICS will
only be used in areas where their employment is required to ensure
responsiveness and flexibility.
Core Services. The core services required by the division are shown in figure
PY
b.
2.2. They will include voice, Video Telephone Conference (VTC), moving imagery to
support the ISTAR product, messaging, chat, office automation (word processing and
productivity tools) and web services.
O
14. Military Police Support. The divisional provost marshal and his staff will provide
C
functional advice to the divisional commander on all Military Police (MP), civilian police and
detention matters, while the wider support to the division will come from 1 MP Brigade.
Military police elements will be deployed to provide close support to the manoeuvre
ED
brigades. A critical close support task will be determining the suitability of routes, in
conjunction with engineer reconnaissance, prior to their activation. The division will retain
a specialist investigation element to provide support, as required, throughout the area of
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operations, as well as Military Provost Service (MPS) elements to advise and support
commanders operating temporary holding facilities for CPERS.
O
15. Real Life Support. Upon deployment, the divisional HQ will be augmented by a light
infantry battalion. This unit (the Divisional Support Unit (DSU)) will assist the HQ with all
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aspects of real life support, including force protection at MAIN, FWD and TAC HQs as well
as the movement of key staff and HQ moves.
N
Manoeuvre
O
16. Manoeuvre seeks to achieve a position of advantage relative to the enemy.

Traditionally, manoeuvre has been described as the product of movement and firepower.
C
In the contemporary operating environment, manoeuvre is multi-dimensional. It is

conducted in the Cognitive, Physical and Virtual domains as described in Annex A. The
N
division seeks to manoeuvre in order to dominate the opponent in all domains, from the
electromagnetic through to land. Each dimension is exploited to achieve the necessary
U
influence outcomes, drawing on the division’s direct and indirect power and attacking the
opponent’s will and cohesion. Divisional manoeuvre and its supporting activity must be
carefully integrated. The result is a high tempo of activity that achieves battle-winning
shock and surprise. Through this tempo, the division seizes and retains the initiative. For
example, a divisional offensive operation may include offensive action by one or more of
its brigades, the application of Joint Fires in depth, electronic attack to dislocate enemy
C2, as well as IA&O to deceive and demoralise an opponent, whilst reassuring partner
forces and other key target audiences. The aim is always to seize and retain the initiative.
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‘The acme of operational art is holding the initiative and maintaining tempo in relation to
the opponent.’
Lieutenant General Nick Carter
17. Forms of Manoeuvre. The main forms of physical manoeuvre are envelopment,
double envelopment, encirclement, turning movement and penetration. They have
application for the division across each of the 3 domains and across several of the 7
dimensions. When planning manoeuvre, the divisional HQ must consider how to employ
both physical and non physical forms of manoeuvre. To illustrate the point, Electronic
Warfare (EW) or cyber operations can be used to penetrate the enemy’s communication
systems in the virtual domain. Key Leader Engagement (KLE), media operations and
development of host nation security forces can combine to encircle an insurgent in the
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cognitive domain, by closing down his options to manoeuvre. The authoritative source for
the forms of manoeuvre is ADP Operations. 8
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‘(The forms of manoeuvre are not) synonymous with, or confined to, combat operations.
They provide a language to describe how to get into a position of advantage in any activity,
C
physically and even psychologically, to coerce or to persuade and opponent, so their
application should be interpreted imaginatively and not necessarily literally.’
ED
ADP Operations
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18. The Challenge of Sustaining Manoeuvre. The challenge for the division is to
sequence activity to maintain tempo, prevent culmination and retain the initiative. The
division routinely commands the enablers that allow manoeuvre to be executed by more
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than one formation. It sequences and enables the tactical engagements of brigades and
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task forces within the deep, close and rear geographical framework, through the allocation
of scarce resources, fires and enablers, as well as through the application of the principles
of concentration of force and economy of effort.
N
19. Divisional Manoeuvre Capabilities. The Division delivers effects through the
application of Joint Action (manoeuvre, fires, information activities and outreach) and the
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employment of key capabilities that are specific to the divisional level of command:
C
a. Key Leader Engagement. As described at para 6, the personal involvement of

the divisional commander is key in exerting influence. The 2* level of command,
N
therefore, needs to engage at levels that are sufficiently high for this influence to be
U
effective.
b. Subordinate Formations. With 2 or more subordinate formations, the division
is able to generate and sustain manoeuvre over time, across a broad front or wide
area. Whilst brigades may culminate when combat power has been exhausted, or
replenishment is required, the division is able to replace force elements from within
its own resources in order to maintain tempo. The size of the divisional area of
operations allows it to manoeuvre force elements out of contact with the enemy, thus
distinguishing it from lower levels of command.
8
DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2010), pp 8-19 – 8-24.
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c. Concentration of Fires. With the number of organic fires assets at its disposal
and those that it may call on from other formations, the division is able to concentrate
fire in able to generate manoeuvre. It can switch fires from one formation to another,
as required, in order to overmatch an opponent.
d. Manoeuvre Support. Key manoeuvre support assets are held at the divisional
level and may be employed to facilitate the manoeuvre of one or more formations. In
addition, the division has the staff capacity and expertise to coordinate the movement
of one formation through another.
e. Information Activities and Outreach. The division integrates key IA&O
capabilities from the SAG. When employed in conjunction with other divisional
assets, such as fires and ground manoeuvre formations, the division is able to
generate effects in the cognitive and virtual domains as well as the physical. The net
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result is integrated manoeuvre.
f. CJIIM Integration. As described earlier, the division is the optimum level for
CJIIM integration. Access to CJIIM capabilities and the wider network of other
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agencies allows the division to leverage a range of activities that both enable
manoeuvre and exploit its effects.
C
20. Air Manoeuvre. In addition to those capabilities described above the division may
be allocated an Air Manoeuvre (AM) force element. AM is defined as the conduct of
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‘operations, conducted principally within the land tactical battlespace, aimed at achieving
decisive advantage through the exploitation of the third dimension, within a joint framework
as part of an effects based approach’ . An AM force is capable of conducting the core
9
LL
functions (find, fix, strike, exploit) across the operational framework. It offers particular
utility at the divisional level in the conduct of decisive and shaping operations distant from
the main force. AM gives the divisional commander the ability to conduct tactical activity at
O
reach, free from the constraints of the terrain and over a wider area than that afforded to
purely ground forces. It cannot be conducted without effective Air Land Integration (ALI).
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AM is usually coordinated at the corps level, with the division being the lowest level that is
genuinely capable of coordinating AM operations.
N
a. AM Operations. AM operations include recce, raids, feints and

demonstrations, counter and spoiling attacks, as well as deliberate and hasty attacks.
O
An AM force can also provide the division with a highly flexible reserve. The
complexity of AM operations increases with distance. When planning deep
C
operations the division must balance the distance over which effects are to be
achieved and the time in which they are to be achieved. If an air assault brigade, or
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air assault task force, is under command of the division, it offers the commander the
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ability to seize or secure key terrain, infrastructure or people for short periods. This
‘vertical envelopment’ option can be extremely effective in turning, unbalancing or
deterring an adversary. It should be noted that air assault forces are inherently 10light
with limited endurance. Detail is provided in AFM Vol 1 Part 12 Air Manoeuvre.
b. AM Capabilities. Inherent speed and manoeuvrability can allow an AM force to
achieve timely engagement in order to prevent escalation or resumption of adversary
action. AM ISTAR capability and tactical mobility can provide protection of key points
and/or framework security in areas that cannot be reached by land forces.
9
DLW, AFM Vol 1, Part 12 Air Manoeuvre (Warminster: Army Publications, 2007).
10
DLW, AFM Vol 1, Part 12 Air Manoeuvre (Warminster: Army Publications, 2007).
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Furthermore, the ability of AM forces to intervene rapidly can be used to dissuade a

potential adversary from an undesirable course of action, by threatening his expected
gains and reducing his likelihood of success. The high mobility of AM can potentially
overmatch an adversary, thereby achieving a decisive operational advantage and
increased freedom of action. The combination of attack helicopters (AH) and artillery
provides AM forces with potent and focussed combat power capable of defeating an
adversary by reducing his military effectiveness (by striking key signature or C2
equipment), rather than by trying to destroy his entire capability. By applying this
force intelligently, flexibly and rapidly, AM can attack the opponent’s key
vulnerabilities.
c. Air Manoeuvre Planning Training and Advisory Team. The divisional
aviation staff provides the HQ with in house oversight and advice on AM planning.
An Air Manoeuvre Planning Training and Advisory Team (AMPTAT) can be attached
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to the HQ, providing additional staff expertise and planning advice that will allow
effective command of AM operations. The AMPTAT supports the full range of AM
operations, not just attack helicopter operations and its principal role is to reinforce
the HQ commanding the AM force package. This ensures the HQ possesses the
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appropriate level of staff expertise, planning effort and command and control to plan
C
and execute AM operations. The AMPTAT will be integrated into all stages of
planning and will work closely with the Future Plans, Future Ops and Current Ops
branches. ED
d. AM Planning Considerations. The divisional HQ should consider the
following when planning the integration of AM:
LL
(1) The allocation of appropriate missions and tasks and the integration of AM
into the overall land scheme of manoeuvre. Aviation should be employed as a
manoeuvre combat arm.
O
The allocation of sufficient ISTAR and other enablers to facilitate AM

TR
(2)
committal decisions. Launch authority should be held at the divisional HQ.

The coordination of battle-space management measures, including those
N
(3)
to prevent ‘blue-on-blue’. Aviation should be allocated its own area of

operations.
O
The management and prioritisation of CSS and security requirements for

C
(4)
the AM formation.
N
21. Joint Helicopter Force. A Joint Helicopter Force (JHF), commanded at OF4 level,
provides the division with battlefield helicopters (BH) from more than one of the three
U
services and includes sizeable C2, CS and CSS elements. The core attribute of a JHF is
its flexibility and the ability to tailor the force to the specific operation, rather than providing
a generic solution. A JHF will typically command BH spanning the three key capabilities of
lift, find and attack. If deemed necessary, the divisional aviation capabilities may form part
of an OF5 led Joint Aviation Group (JAG). The following 5 roles can be allocated to the
aviation assets attributed to the division:
a. Offensive Action.
b. Control and direction of firepower.
c. Command support.
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d.ISTAR.
e.Tactical mobility.
22. Attack Aviation. Attack Helicopters (AH) are the principal platforms for helicopter
weapons, whether as a discrete combat manoeuvre element or in combination with other
manoeuvre elements, such as air assault infantry or armour. Missions can include Attack
(Deliberate, Hasty, Raid, Close Combat Attack), Armed Recce (Screening,
Guarding/Blocking, Exploitation, Pursuit, Advance to Contact, Relief in Place) and Escort
(Picketing, Protection). In addition, AH can act as a deterrent to the adversary and provide
reassurance to our own forces and indigenous partners. This utility across the cognitive
domain is an aspect that the divisional commander may use to complement the
manoeuvre plan.
Protection
PY
23. Protection is a whole force activity that maintains operational effectiveness by
identifying and countering threats posed by an adversary, as well as natural or human
O
hazards. The Protect function seeks to synchronise, organise and integrate the
capabilities and resources of the division, to preserve combat power so that force can be
C
decisively applied. Protection includes the division’s own people and resources, but also
the protection of populations, infrastructure, the environment and the reputation of the
force.
ED
24. The principal protection outputs are balanced, resourced and layered protection 11
measures, based on the perceived threat and the risk appetite set by the commander .
LL
These will include active defensive measures to protect the division, its information, bases,
camps, critical infrastructure and lines of communications, from an enemy or adversary
attack, as well as passive defensive measures, such as concealment and deception, to
O
make friendly forces, systems and facilities difficult to locate, strike and destroy.
Protection must be intrinsic to all planning activities and considered throughout the
TR
conduct of operations. The successful employment of protection measures ensures that

the divisional commander has physical, political and reputational freedom of action. At the
divisional level, it is necessary to consider both force protection and reputational
N
protection.
O
25. Force Protection. The force protection measures that must be considered by the
division are extensive. They include physical security, Operational Security (OPSEC), Air
C
Defence (AD), Chemical Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defence, Electronic
Counter Measures (ECM), Counter-Improvised Explosive Devices (C-IED), Combat
N
Identification (Combat ID), Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP), Cyber Security and Force
Health Protection. This list is not exhaustive. Of particular relevance to the divisional
U
commander and staff are:

a. OPSEC. OPSEC denies others knowledge of the detailed dispositions,
capabilities, intentions and vulnerabilities of the division. It is the process that gives a
military operation the necessary level of security to retain and enable freedom of
initiative and action. The implementation of OPSEC is the responsibility of all
commanders and staff, with the coordination of OPSEC being a G3 function,
supported by G2. OPSEC should be a vital part of planning divisional operations.
With modern ISTAR capabilities, cyber and EW operations, the pervasiveness of
11
For further detail regarding risk appetite, see Part 2, para 6.h.
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modern media and the fact that contemporary conflicts take place ‘amongst the
people’, the modern battlefield is ever more transparent. It is increasingly difficult to
maintain operational security as well as achieving surprise.
b. Air Defence. Air attack is singularly effective at destroying the cohesion and
the freedom of action of military forces. Consequently a successful counter-air
campaign12 is critical in allowing friendly forces freedom of action, whilst minimising
their vulnerability to detection and attack from the air. Air Defence (AD)
considerations are vital to commanders at all levels in a non-permissive environment,
where an enemy with significant air and aviation capabilities may enjoy periods of air
parity, or superiority, with consequent implications for own force protection and
manoeuvre. The division is the lowest level at which AD assets can be integrated
into the Joint Force Air Component Commander’s overall AD plan, as the majority of
AD assets will be controlled outside the divisional area of operations. However, if the
PY
division has been formed as the core of a Joint Task Force, the commander can
expect his staff to be augmented by a bespoke Air element drawn from the UK Joint
Force Air Component HQ, through which he will have greater influence over the
counter air campaign. The FPlans cell contains a permanent SO2 AD who is
O
augmented, when deployed, by the Divisional Air Defence Cell (DADC) drawn from
C
the Close Air Defence (CAD) regiment. The DADC advises the commander on all
surface-to-air planning considerations, execution, air raid warning and management
of assets. This is in accordance with the Joint Prioritised Defended Asset List
ED
(JPDAL) and in response to the air and missile threat at the time. The DADC staff is
split across COps, FOps and FPlans. They are routinely coordinated by SO1 AD and
under command of DCOM Joint Fires and Information, when one is allocated.
LL
c. Defensive Counter Air. The objective of Defensive Counter Air (DCA)

operations is to protect friendly forces and vital interests from enemy air and missile
O
attacks, including the increasingly prevalent threat from Unmanned Aerial Systems
(UAS). DCA consists of all active and passive AD operations to detect, identify,
TR
intercept, destroy or negate enemy air and missile forces attempting to attack or
penetrate friendly battlespace, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such
attacks. AD will be under the overall control of the Joint Force Air Defence
N
Commander (usually located within the Air Component HQ) who will integrate and
coordinate the AD assets of each force into a coherent joint AD plan. DCA
O
operations will normally include combat aircraft, medium range surface-to-air missile
systems and the Land Component’s organic Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD)
C
systems and can be sub-divided into:

N
(1) Active AD. Active AD is characterised by layered defence in depth

affording multiple engagement opportunities. Surface-to-air assets will
U
generally be scarce, with the division’s organic Ground Based Air Defence
(GBAD) assets held in the Offensive Support Group. The commander must set
clear priorities for their employment, with precedence given to protecting critical
land infrastructure, main supply routes, artillery and aviation (assets that allow
the divisional commander to concentrate force and exert influence most rapidly,
but which are difficult to conceal once brought into action).
(2) Passive AD. Passive AD includes all measures taken to minimise the
effectiveness of hostile air and missile attacks through individual and collective
12
Consisting of 2 elements: Offensive Counter Air (OCA) and Defensive Counter Air (DCA) operations. DCA
is synonymous with AD.
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Contents Page
protection. Measures may include early warning, camouflage, concealment,

deception, hardening and asset dispersion. It is worthwhile disguising the
nature of positions that cannot be completely concealed, as this may frustrate
enemy targeting and force them to employ more ISTAR assets. The need for
concealment may require reduced activity within a position. Consequently a
judgement should be made on the level of acceptable risk so that movement is
not totally constrained.
(3) Non Conventional. Depending on the operational situation the air threat
will extend beyond conventional aircraft. GBAD will also be required to provide
Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar (C-RAM), as well as Counter Indirect Fire
(C-IDF) capabilities. The proliferation of UAS presents an increasing threat to
the division. Such systems have already been widely employed by states and,
more recently, non-state actors in asymmetric conflicts. UAS present a
13
PY
particular challenge to AD due to their small size and difficulty in locating,
identifying and engaging.
CBRN Defence. CBRN defence relates to the plans and activities that are
O
d.
intended to mitigate, or neutralise, the adverse effects on operations and personnel

resulting from the use, or threatened use, of CBRN weapons and devices. It also
C
covers the secondary hazards arising from counter force targeting or the release, or
risk of release, of Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) into the environment. The CBRN
ED
threat is not purely a consideration for major combat operations against a peer
opponent, but could be a very effective asymmetric technique if employed by
adversaries in a stabilisation campaign. The division is the lowest level at which the
commander is likely to be able to use manoeuvre to mitigate the CBRN threat.
LL
(1) CBRN hazards may emanate from multiple sources, in a variety of forms
and as a consequence of adversary actions and through accidental or incidental
O
causes. In all cases, CBRN attacks and releases have the potential to disrupt
TR
the conduct of operations, sometimes over wide areas, through their immediate
and delayed effects, impacting upon both the physical (personnel, materiel and
terrain) and psychological capacity of the division.
N
(2) The divisional CBRN threat assessment needs to be constantly reviewed

and updated within the Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE)
O
process. This should scope the form, likelihood and intent of any potential
enemy’s use of CBRN weapons and devices, as well as the nature and location
C
of any sources of TIM. Where the threat derives from the possible use of CBRN
N
devices by non-state actors, physical security measures will need to be

scrupulously enforced across the division. In the case of TIM sources, the
U
principal response will be one of avoidance, noting that many of these materials
will offer challenges (including explosive, incendiary or corrosive effects) that lie
outside the performance boundaries of standard military CBRN defensive
equipments.
(3) After a CBRN attack and following the implementation of previously
rehearsed immediate recovery measures, there will be a need to determine the
precise nature of the event and hence the subsequent behaviour of the hazard.
This advice will allow the divisional commander to reconsider and, where
13
Hezbollah deployed a range of UAS in the 2006 Lebanon war.
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Contents Page
necessary, revise plans within a risk management philosophy that will balance
the protection of divisional forces against the continuing pursuit of the mission.
(4) Consideration must be given to the impact of CBRN releases on civilian
populations. UK forces involved in a conflict will have a moral obligation to
protect and assist civilians that have come into harm’s way. There is also an
element of reputational protection in this, in order to retain international support
and campaign legitimacy.
(5) The responsibilities and organisation of divisional CBRN staff and further
detail on CBRN planning can be found in AFM Vol 1 Part 5, Operations in
CBRN Conditions .
e. Combat Identification. Combat ID is the process of combining situational
awareness, target identification and specific Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
PY
(TTP) to increase the operational effectiveness of weapon systems and reduce the
incidence of casualties caused by ‘friendly fire’. Combat ID needs to be robust
enough to cope with fast moving operations in a less than certain battlespace. The
O
division must be proactive in maintaining situational awareness, ensuring that a
common operating picture is held by all. This will be particularly challenging when
C
operating in a coalition, where Combat ID must be coordinated between nationalities.
TTPs and human factors will largely be the preserve of combat brigades, although
ED
the division will standardise TTPs across its brigades. The division must consider all
aspects of ‘friendly fire’, including electromagnetic spectrum ‘blue-on blue’ and the
requirement for close coordination between coalition members when deploying ECM
and CIS systems.
LL
f. Cyber Security. Cyberspace is a global common within the information

environment, consisting of interdependent networks of IT infrastructures which
O
include the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded

processors and controllers. International and domestic law (the laws of the nations
TR
involved in the activities) applies to the conduct of operations in cyberspace.

Activities within cyberspace can have effects locally, regionally or globally. Both
offensive and defensive exploitation of cyberspace is required in support of physical
N
and cognitive activities and effects, as well as protection of that use. The implications
for the division in the land environment are profound. The most common cyber
O
threats that NATO and UK military systems are likely to experience include malicious
code attacks, unauthorized access or intrusions, unauthorized utilisation of services,
C
denial or disruption of service, misuse by legitimate users, espionage, hoaxes and

N
combinations of these that are described as blended attacks.14 Cyber operations are
coordinated at the joint and interagency level. However, the division will need to
U
understand the threat, the nature of ongoing cyber operations and how it can
contribute to the joint plan. This will require close cooperation with a range of joint
and inter-agency organisations. Cyber activity has 4 key roles:
(1) Control of Cyberspace.
(2) Intelligence and Situational Awareness.
14
Prior to and during the 2008 South Ossetia conflict Georgia was subjected to blended cyber attacks.
These took the form of coordinated barrages of millions of requests that overloaded and shut down the
servers of the Georgian government and transport, media and communications companies. There was also
evidence that Georgian e-mail traffic was being covertly redirected through telecommunications firms based
in another country.
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Contents Page
(3) Information Activity.

(4) Offensive Activity.
The UK approach to cyber operations is described in greater detail in JDN 3/13 –
,
Cyber Operations The Defence Contribution
15
.
g. Counter IED. Given the proliferation of IED technology, an IED threat may
materialise at any stage of an operation. In accordance with the key principles of C-
IED operations16, the division may have a key role to play in each of the three C-IED
pillars.
(1) Attack the Network. C-IED activities designed to attack the IED network
will be orchestrated by the division within the context of the ongoing operation.
They will be integrated into operational design, with priorities being allocated in
PY
the operational planning process. As a focus for CJIIM integration, the division
provides an appropriate mechanism for the coordination of this multinational,
inter-agency effort.
O
(2) Defeat the Device. At the tactical level C-IED activities will be planned in
C
detail. The division will generate an understanding of the IED threat based on
its access to a range of CJIIM capabilities and the exploitation of information.
Emphasis will be placed upon manoeuvre support and force protection to
ED
enable the division and its subordinate formations to conduct actions designed
to achieve operational objectives.
LL
(3) Prepare the Force. The division will instil an understanding of the IED
threat within its force elements and articulate its approach to C-IED operations.
All force elements must be appropriately manned, organised, equipped,
O
sustained and trained in C-IED operations. Successful C-IED operations rely

upon an effective joint and inter-agency approach.
TR
‘Integral to a successful C-IED approach is the wider understanding and

N
support from all levels of national, international and supra-national government

especially of those that direct, plan and support operations. The C-IED
O
approach is not limited to the execution of Allied joint operations in the land
environment although this doctrine concentrates upon this execution. C-IED
C
crosses military functional areas and therefore relies upon an integrated

comprehensive approach that is joint, inter-agency and multinational.’
N
JDP 3-65
U
26. Reputational Protection. While the divisional commander will have concern for
physical protection, the reputational protection of the force must also be considered. At
stake is the legitimacy of the campaign, as well as the potential fragility and vulnerability of
a multinational coalition.
15
DCDC, JDN 3/13 Cyber Operations, The Defence Contribution (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2013).
16
The C-IED principles; unity of effort, effective understanding and intelligence, offensive spirit, agility, and
use of priorities. JDP 3-65 (AJP 3.15(A)) 2011.
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a. Campaign Authority.17 The deployment of UK or multinational forces may not

have been universally popular and will be scrutinised by domestic, as well as
international media and their respective audiences. The force may have deployed
under a UN Security Council resolution but equally it may not, attracting critical
scrutiny. The commander will not be able to influence the perceived legitimacy of the
original authorisation or mandate for action but must understand how firm his position
is. He must clearly articulate to subordinate brigades and units the manner in which
he expects them to conduct themselves, both individually and collectively, in order to
improve or maintain perceptions of legitimacy. A large part of his battle will be to try
and increase the degree to which factions and local populations accept the authority
of his force by managing or meeting their aspirations, thus improving perceptions of
campaign authority. At the outset of a campaign and at regular intervals throughout,
the commander and staff must conduct an assessment of risks to their campaign
authority. This should look at opportunities, as well as threats and should
PY
encompass areas such as campaign narrative, collateral damage and consequence
management. This requirement for obvious legitimacy is important in a single-nation
campaign. In a coalition it is far more important and far more complex.
O
b. Independent Investigative Capability. Military police investigations will
C
ensure that the deployed division meets its statutory obligations under domestic and
international law, with matters of concern being appropriately investigated in a timely
and diligent manner. ED
c. Vulnerability of a Multinational Force. Levels of domestic support for
elements of the multinational force may vary from nation to nation and there will be
operational differences in areas such as rules of engagement. Variations can cause
LL
frictions that will be amplified as troop contributing nations attempt to retain strong
chains of national command. Different nations will have different appetites for risk.
O
The divisional commander must identify those issues and events that present a risk
to the force and understand how their impact should be mitigated. He must be
TR
proactively engaged with each coalition member to ensure that robust links between
national chains of command are maintained.
Firepower
N
27. Firepower is a key part of orchestrating influence and is thus a crucial element of the
O
manoeuvrist approach. Fires should usually18be applied from more than one element,
through integrated and coordinated actions. Firepower breaks the enemy’s will and
C
cohesion and can be employed in conjunction with manoeuvre, or on its own to destroy,
N
neutralise, suppress and demoralise. At the divisional level, it encompasses land, sea and
air delivered munitions, EW and psychological methods, usually applied as a Joint Effects
U
combination. The Joint Action Model, described in Part 1, combines manoeuvre, fires and
IA&O to achieve influence.
17
Campaign Authority is ‘the authority established by international forces, agencies and organisations within
a given situation in support of (or in place of) an accepted (or ineffective, even absent) indigenous
government or organisation. It is an amalgam of 4 inter-dependent factors: the perceived legitimacy of the
authorisation or mandate for action, the perceived legitimacy of the manner in which those exercising that
mandate conduct themselves both individually and collectively, the degree to which factions, local
populations and others accept the authority of those executing the mandate and the degree to which the
aspirations of factions, local populations and others are managed or met by those executing the mandate.’
DCDC, JDP 01 (Ed 2) Campaigning (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2008).
18
DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2010), 5-10.
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28. Firepower and Manoeuvre. Joint Fires Integration (JFI) synchronises joint fires with
manoeuvre, through the development of a fire plan owned by the commander. Firepower
is thus synchronised in time, space and the electromagnetic spectrum. As the
contemporary operating environment places a significant emphasis on the application of
precise fires, it will be necessary to consider the task organisation and resources required
to achieve precision. In complex, populated terrain, joint fires may be constrained in their
ability to support manoeuvre. Firepower is best able to support manoeuvre when it is
concentrated and not over committed.
29. Geographical Framework. Joint Fires can be used in the Close Support (CS) role
as well as to fight the deep battle. The priorities for the use of firepower must be clear at
each stage of an operation or tactical action. Assets will be allocated by the Deputy
Commander Joint Fires and Information on a divisional resources allocation proforma
(AB545B).
PY
30. Firepower Assets. The range of firepower capabilities that will either be
commanded at the divisional level or available to the division include:
O
a. Artillery. CS artillery is capable of delivering area fires and precision strike.
These capabilities will be organic to the division and may be reinforced by similar
C
capabilities from adjacent divisions for specific tasks. The CS artillery sits within the
divisional Joint Fires Group. ED
b. Attack Aviation. AH force elements sit within the JHF. In order to exploit AH,
its capability should be considered from the outset when planning ground manoeuvre
operations.
LL
c. Close Air Support and Armed UAS. Close Air Support (CAS) and Armed
UAS sit within the Air Component, but may be requested through the divisional Air
O
Support Operations Centre (ASOC), if one is allocated. Planning considerations for

CAS and Armed UAS will be considered under Air-Land Integration below.
TR
d. Naval Gunfire Support. Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) provides firepower to

littoral manoeuvre and actions in the land environment that are within the range of
N
naval gunfire capabilities.

O
e. Electronic Warfare. Although primarily an information collection asset,

Electronic Warfare (EW) provides an offensive capability and should be considered
C
as a divisional OS capability.
N
f. Psychological Methods. A Psychological Support Element (PSE) will sit

within the IA&O functional cell (within Joint Effects) and will be responsible for target
U
audience analysis and the planning of targeted psychological activities.

31. Command and Control. The application of fires is commanded at the highest level
and controlled at the lowest. Multiple batteries of artillery may be commanded at the
divisional level but for a given mission they may all be controlled by a single Fire Support
Team (FST) commander. For C2 to be successful, effective communications networks
must exist that can cue the various capabilities. Artillery batteries should not be held in
reserve although a stock of ammunition may be designated as a reserve. It is important
that the commander is sufficiently well resourced with organic firepower assets so that he
can allocate firepower to support the activity which he has designated as his main effort.
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32. Multi National Considerations. Fire support elements from allied nations may be
operating as part of the division. This will have implications for system interoperability and
logistics. Allies may also have specific national caveats that limit freedom of action and C2
arrangements.
33. Fire Support Coordination Measures. Fire Support Coordination Measures
(FSCM) are essential for the integration of Joint Fires. At the lower levels, terminal control
will be carried out by FSTs, while at the divisional level, FSCM will be applied by the Joint
Effects Cell after coordination with other functional branches. The allocation of Artillery
Manoeuvre Areas (AMA) will need to be considered. A key Battlespace Management
(BM) factor will be the enemy counter battery threat, which, if significant, will mean the
divisional artillery needing to move frequently for its own protection. More detail regarding
BM may be found in AFM Volume 1, Part 11, Battlespace Management, 2007.
34. Targeting. Targeting is the process of selecting and prioritising targets and matching
PY
the appropriate responses to them, taking into account operational requirements and
capabilities.19 The divisional commander has a key role to play in the targeting process
and should chair targeting boards. Targeting is the part of Joint Action where the Joint
O
Effects staff matches Fires and IA&O to targets. The aim of targeting must be to achieve
influence in support of campaign objectives. The targeting process is continuous and
C
relies on an understanding of the operational environment and the development of
targeting priorities. As targeting is a coordinated process, priorities also need to be set for
ED
ISTAR systems that are capable of target acquisition, as well as information gathering. 20
The HQ will use the tactical targeting cycle of Decide, Detect, Deliver and Asses (D3A)
and the complementary Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse (F3EA) cycle to ensure that
targeting is synchronised with other activities.
LL
35. Use of Force Principles. The Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) applies to the
offensive use of force in armed conflict. Targeting activity that involves the use of force will
O
be guided by the following key LOAC principles:

TR
a. Proportionality. Military objectives must not be attacked if the expected

civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects would be excessive in relation to the
expected military advantage to be gained from the attack. This determination is a
N
careful process, requiring a commander to balance a variety of factors given any

particular circumstance.
O
Distinction. Offensive action must only be directed against military targets,

C
b.
which by their nature, location, purpose or use, make an effective contribution to

military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the
N
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage.

U
c. Humanity. The infliction of suffering, injury or destruction which is not

necessary for the accomplishment of legitimate military purposes is forbidden.
d. Necessity. A target should not be attacked simply by virtue of being military in
nature. The test of definite military advantage must also be satisfied. In addition, no
more force than necessary should be used to achieve the desired effect.
19
DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2010), p 5-13.
20
DLW, Staff Officers Handbook (Land) (Warminster: Army Publications, 2013) p 3.8.
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36. Targeting Factors. Factors that the commander and Joint Effects staff must
consider when targeting include:
a. Higher Formation Targeting. If the division is working within a corps
construct, Joint Effects staff in the division must have access to the targeting
priorities and target list of the corps.
b. The Campaign Narrative. If the matching of effect to target does not support,
or is detrimental to, the campaign narrative, the effect is wrong.
c. Measurement of Effect. In order to judge the success of Joint Action, effects
must be measurable. The commander must specify what metrics he wishes his Joint
Effects staff to use. For the use of force, Measurement of Effect (MoE) is likely to
take the form of Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) and, therefore, ISTAR assets will
likely be required to gain the required information to enable effective BDA.
PY
d. Collateral Damage Estimate. Collateral Damage Estimates (CDE) provide a
template to assess the likely impact of weapons effects on civilians and infrastructure
O
and enables the commander to understand the likelihood of negative second order
effects resulting from the use of force. CDE also has utility when considering the use
C
of IA&O, where potential second order effects and unintended consequences must
be considered. ED
e. Consequence Management. When planning Joint Action through the targeting
process, consequence management must be considered, in order to ensure that the
division has plans to deal with the unintended consequences of any action.
LL
Ineffective consequence management can result in a failure to exploit success, as

well as negative operational effects.
O
37. Air Land Integration. Air Land Integration (ALI) is the focussed application of the Air
and Land Component capabilities within a joint force. At the divisional level it seeks to
TR
fuse the effects of all force elements operating within the divisional battle space in order to
achieve a common objective.
38. Integrated Staff Process. The divisional commander and staff must consider the
N
integration of air and aviation assets in order to fully exploit the unique capability and
O
significant effect that air power can have in the land environment. The presence of air or
aviation can act as a deterrent or provide reassurance, allowing the commander to exert
C
influence without the need to resort to violence. The divisional HQ will have air and
aviation staff officers integrated into the COps, FOps and FPlans cells. It is the role of
N
Deputy Commander Joint Fires and Information to ensure that these assets are properly
integrated into the divisional plan. Depending on the context and allocated mission, the
U
HQ may be augmented by additional expertise.

39. Air Battle Rhythm. The Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) employs
a joint air tasking cycle to direct the employment of air capabilities. This is articulated on a
daily basis through the Air Tasking Order (ATO). Requests for support from the division
for both the close and deep battles will be articulated in this Order once they have been
prioritised, approved and coordinated with requests from other components. Requests for
air support will be collated and endorsed by Deputy Commander Joint Fires, in line with
the divisional commander’s intent.
40. Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC). The ASOC is the senior air management
function and is collocated with the senior fielded land formation (usually corps or division).
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The ASOC allocates support tasks to its associated and subordinate TACP and facilitates
CAS, AI, Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD), air mobility and ISR missions within
its assigned area of control. The ASOC is the primary control agency responsible for the
execution of CAS in direct support of ground forces and processes immediate requests
submitted directly by ground manoeuvre forces. When the Combined Air Operations
Centre (CAOC) has granted the ASOC authority for missions designated to it on the ATO,
the ASOC can directly task on call missions, or divert scheduled missions when its own
allocation of aircraft is insufficient to meet demand. In a multi corps environment, there will
normally be one ASOC with each corps with each ASOC reporting individually to the
CAOC21.
41. Air and Aviation Capabilities. These can be considered as fixed wing (air) and
rotary wing (aviation) platforms, but can also be considered under the tactical functions,
with both air and aviation assets providing command, manoeuvre, protection, firepower,
PY
information and intelligence and sustainment. The roles of aviation are discussed above.
a. Air. Air support is a vital component in the conduct of land offensive
operations. It provides control of the air to enable freedom of action and can disrupt
O
and destroy enemy forces, both in the close battle and at long range. These effects
are achieved by counter-land operations. By attacking or threatening the enemy,
C
counter-land operations can provide fire support to offensive operations, as well as
preventing reinforcement and the strengthening of his defence. The 3 components of
ED
counter-land operations are : 22
(1) Close Air Support. Close Air Support (CAS) is air action short of the Fire
Support Coordination Line (FSCL) against hostile targets, in such close
LL
proximity to friendly forces that it requires detailed integration of each air

mission with ground manoeuvre, including positive identification of friendly
forces and positive control of aircraft. The firepower and mobility of aircraft can
O
make an immediate, direct and decisive contribution to the land battle,

TR
especially against targets that are either inaccessible or invulnerable to

available surface weapons. In offensive actions, CAS can be especially
effective as a means to enhance manoeuvre.
N
(2) Air Interdiction. Air Interdiction (AI) missions are conducted beyond the
FSCL and range of most land-based weapon systems and thus do not require
O
detailed integration with the fire and movement of friendly forces. However,
they must be integrated with the divisional scheme of manoeuvre. The capacity
C
of AI for disruption, diversion and delay makes it a powerful tool for the
N
divisional commander to shape the deep battle.

U
(3) Strike, Coordination and Reconnaissance. Strike, coordination and

reconnaissance as a hybrid control of the air, intelligence and situational
awareness mission.
Resource allocation will depend on the role of the division in the higher commander’s
plan. For example, if a division is on the corps Main Effort, CAS sorties are likely to
be allocated to it during planning. Requests for AI against nominated targets will also
receive priority. CAS and AI should primarily be planned against forces whose
21
AP3002
22
DCDC, JDP 0-30, UK Air and Space Doctrine (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2013) para 321.
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destruction or delay will unhinge the enemy commander’s plan or reduce his
operational tempo.
b. Composite Air Operation. A Composite Air Operation (COMAO) can also be
used to concentrate air power in both time and space, thus maximising weapons
effect by employing a large number of aircraft in efficient force packages.
Information and Intelligence
42. Understanding. Understanding is required in order to gain and orchestrate
influence. The primary source for building understanding is intelligence, which in turn is
derived from accessing and processing information. The divisional commander has a
critical role in determining the type and level of understanding required. This must be
regularly reviewed and updated. A collection management plan is vital to optimise the
efficient and effective use of ISTAR assets and achieve synergy with those at the
23
PY
brigade, theatre and national levels.
43. Intelligence Cycle. The development of intelligence is derived through the
O
Intelligence Cycle, which works continuously across multiple lines of operation and
timelines. There are four key stages to the cycle:
C
a. Direction. The commander must set the direction for the intelligence gathering
effort such that the ISTAR staff is given unambiguous priorities.
ED
b. Collection. The initial focus should be on information and intelligence that is
known, followed by the tasking of organic divisional assets to fill any identified
LL
information gaps. Requests for support may be made up the chain of command, or
to other CJIIM agencies, as required.
O
c. Processing. Processing involves the analysis conducted by the divisional

intelligence staff and the conversion of information into objective intelligence.
TR
d. Dissemination. Intelligence products from the cycle are used by the

commander to enable his decision making. The output will also be fed into the PREE
process to enable the staff to create the plans that will meet the commander’s intent.
N
44. Understanding the Physical Environment. The embedded divisional HQ

O
geographic cell will be instrumental in developing an understanding of the operating

environment and in conducting Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE). Working with other
C
actors, specifically within the intelligence community, they will compile a comprehensive
N
database of Geospatial Information (GEOINF) that can be analysed and exploited to

create Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) products. The geographic cell will also make
U
some of this data available to other users.

45. stCommand Board Input. Command Board input is provided by a commander from
the 1 Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Brigade, who acts as the divisional
commander’s advisor on ISR capability and employment.
46. Information Management and Information Exploitation. Effective information
management (IM) and exploitation (IX) is critical to successful divisional operations. This
will be predicated on best practice, appropriate IM staff and a high level of IM awareness
23
Detailed ISTAR doctrine can be found in: DLW, AFM Vol 1 Part 3 ISTAR (Warminster: Army Publications,
2011).
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across the HQ. The COS, as the Senior Information Officer, is the lead for IM and IX. IM
is a COps led activity (supported by G6) and focuses on determining information needs,
managing information flows, as well as administering and securing information. IX is the
use of information to gain advantage and improve situational awareness, thus enabling
effective planning, decision-making and the coordination of those activities required to
realise influence effects. IX is a key part of developing understanding to which the entire
divisional HQ will contribute. Divisional HQ IM and IX processes integrate and exploit
knowledge to produce a unified effort in support of the commander’s intent. This ensures
that potential “stovepipes” are removed. Access to information is made available to all
with appropriate scalable, flexible and mobile ICS. IM and IX within a multinational
coalition will face additional frictions, particularly where systems and procedures are
incompatible. Early engagement by the COps staff, to develop mitigation measures, will
help to overcome these frictions.
PY
47. Requests for Information (RFI). The efficient management of RFIs will be critical.
The divisional RFI manager must quality control RFIs in order to ensure that they contain
sufficient detail to enable effective tasking of the appropriate collection assets.
O
48. Central Processing and Fusion Team. The optimal method to provide ISTAR
support to the divisional HQ is by using a dedicated staff from which assigned Subject
C
Matter Experts (SME) will support the integrating cells. The SMEs receive direction in the
form of Information Requirements (IR), brief these requirements to the ISTAR staff and
ED
then disseminate the required intelligence back to the originator.
49. Support to the Integrating Cells. ISTAR SMEs are permanently assigned to COps,
FOps and FPlans.
LL
50. Information Gathering Assets.

O
a. Within the Division. Assets that will be available to the division will largely be
held within 1 ISR Brigade. These include a Military Intelligence (MI) battalion, Human
TR
Intelligence (HUMINT), EW and Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), UAS, Weapon Locating

Radar (WLR) and CBRN. In addition, the geographic cell in the divisional HQ will be
available. In stability operations, base ISTAR is also likely to be deployed. Aviation
N
reconnaissance may be available through the JHF HQ. Each combat brigade will
have an armoured or light cavalry regiment, which may be given tasks by the division
O
to support information gathering.

C
b. Additional Sources. The division may be allocated non-organic ISTAR assets

and feeds appropriate to its mission. Assets available to higher formations, other
N
components and nations, may provide information and intelligence that cannot be
acquired through organic systems. An Operational Intelligence Support Group
U
(OISG) may be established within the divisional HQ to collate information from SF,
Partners Across Government (PAG), HUMINT and Electronic Warfare Signals
Intelligence (EWSI), and feed it directly into the planning process. In turn, the
division may allocate some of its assets to subordinate brigades to support their
missions. This may include coalition partners when working in a multinational
construct.
51. ISTAR Planning Considerations. ISTAR planning considerations are explained in
detail in AFM Vol 1 Part 3 ISTAR. The key considerations are:
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a. Command Driven. Direction of the ISTAR effort and determination of priorities

must stem from the commander’s information requirements and must support the
COps, FOps and FPlans staff.
b. Centralised Coordination. The ISTAR process and collection management
must be controlled centrally at each level of command within the division.
c. Responsive and Timely. Response times for producing the required
information will be dependent on the collection asset employed, which should be
matched to the timeliness of the information required.
d. Accuracy. Information must be filtered, analysed and interpreted to produce
accurate intelligence. Time may be a significant constraint. Under exceptional
circumstances, unprocessed information may be used to support decision making,
however the provenance of information must be made explicit to commanders.
PY
e. Sensor Mix. Capabilities should be allocated to each level of command to
provide flexibility and redundancy.
O
f. Continuous Coverage. The division must strive for continuous coverage in
C
time, space and across the electromagnetic spectrum.
g. Multi-Source Approach. A multi-source approach allows information from one
ED
source to confirm, augment or perhaps contradict information provided by another.
This provides resistance to deception and a higher level of confidence in the
intelligence product.
LL
h. Threat from Deception. An enemy will seek to conceal or deceive the division
and a degree of suspicion must be engendered throughout the ISTAR process to
O
avoid miscalculation.
TR
i. Interconnectivity and Information Management. Information and intelligence

must be readily accessible, both for users and for intelligence staff, but it should be
controlled to prevent ‘intelligence overload’. Information and intelligence should
always be pushed down to the lowest possible level, cognisant of national security
N
caveats when in a multinational environment.

O
j. Law. Legal advice should be sought to clarify whether to comply with the
Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) when undertaking covert surveillance
C
and HUMINT operations.

N
Sustainment
U
‘Only a commander who understands logistics can push the military machine to the limits
without risking total breakdown.’
Major General Julian Thompson, Royal Marines
52. Regardless of the nature of the deployment, or the configuration of the division,
sustainment will be central to the divisional operation. Not only will the HQ have to
consider sustaining the whole formation, it will have to allocate priorities to ensure that
brigade actions are supported appropriately. The challenge for the division is to sequence
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activity in order to maintain tempo and prevent culmination. The commander may choose
when to execute operations in order to accommodate the logistical realities of the moment.
He may opt to fight sequentially, as opposed to simultaneously. In order to allow the
commander to make these decisions, there are core divisional HQ sustainment staff
across each of the 3 integrating cells. In addition to this, the logistic brigade will provide a
number of plugs to augment the core staff. Sustainment staff within the division are
headed by the Assistant Chief of Staff Sustain (ACOS Sustain) who acts as the divisional
commander’s principal CSS staff officer.
53. Sustainment includes the provision of support to the division in the 5 main functional
areas of logistic, health service, equipment, administrative and infrastructure support.
Sustainment should be considered as a means to an end. It supports and enables
missions, although occasionally sustainment may be the mission itself, for example in
humanitarian relief operations.
PY
54. The Divisional Commander’s Role. The commander should establish the
conditions that allow subordinate commanders to focus their attention on the operation
rather than on support. It is the division’s business to identify areas of sustainment risk
O
and recognise their impact on operations. To do this the commander and staff must:
C
a. Consider the implications of any proposed actions on the levels of support
necessary to maintain combat effectiveness.
ED
b. Plan, balance and allocate the resources of time, equipment, troops to task and
materiel.
LL
c. Evaluate the risks of enemy action and security of the lines of communication,
which should include both physical and virtual domains (eg main supply routes and
CIS systems).
O
Adapt plans to reduce the effect of manpower or resource constraints.

TR
d.
55. The Logistic Brigade Commander. One of the key relationships the divisional
commander will have is with his logistic brigade commander. The logistic brigade may be
co-located with MAIN, or it may be deployed elsewhere in order to best control operations
N
in the rear area. It may have multinational or joint responsibilities. Wherever it is

O
deployed, the logistic brigade commander, supported by the divisional ACOS Sustain, will
provide logistic advice to the commander.
C
56. Functional Command. At the divisional level, functional commanders exercise

N
control and direct the activities of their units. This includes direction on technical and non-
technical issues, advice on the allocation of resources and control of allocated
U
infrastructure. The functional chain of command complements the divisional chain of

command and provides a source of subject matter expertise to the operational
commander. Functional command is exercised by Assistant Commanders Medical,
Logistic Support, Equipment Support and Equipment Capability, who are logistic brigade
staff, as well as Comd Staff and Personnel Services (SPS), who is a member of the
divisional staff.
57. Sustainment Risk. In effective sustainment, risks should be taken to concentrate
resources at critical points. The allocated main effort informs such concentrations. Two
aspects of sustainment risk should be considered:
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a. Sustainment planning should assess where risks may be taken in order to

achieve agility and enhance freedom of manoeuvre. Planning will produce a range of
options for the commander, noting relevant freedoms and constraints.
b. Reduction in the volume of stocks increases the vulnerability of supply to
unforeseen circumstances. Sustainment assets have an easily identifiable signature
and they operate along obvious lines of communication, often between obvious
nodes, therefore they need to be protected against detection and attack.
58. The Forward Support Group. The sustainment of the division is centred on the
Forward Support Group (FSG). It will be established to coordinate and control the
sustainment assets supporting the division. Command of the FSG will be facilitated
through the HQ of the logistic brigade wherever possible. The FSG will comprise close
support and theatre logistic regiments, as well as ES, medical and smaller groups of
PY
specialists, including military police. The size and location of the FSG will depend on the
tactical situation and the ground available. It will normally be in the divisional rear area, 50
km behind the Forward Line Own Troops (FLOT), where there is one and can occupy an
area as large as 30 km . It is ideally located in semi-urban areas, but rural locations are
O
2
acceptable. Careful reconnaissance is required to provide good access, vehicle circuits

and cover.
C
59. Logistics Regiments. The roles of the logistic regiments are:
ED
a. Close Support Logistic Regiment. The role of Close Support Logistic
Regiments (CSLR) is to provide intimate and dedicated logistic support to their
affiliated brigades. Having both a stock holding and distribution capability, the
LL
CSLRs are responsible for the delivery of combat supplies and materiel forward to A2
Echelons and, when required, the deployment of Immediate Replenishment Groups
(IRG) to support A1 Echelons. CSLRs are found within 101 Logistic Brigade.
O
Theatre Logistic Regiment. Theatre Logistic Regiments (TLR), also found

TR
b.
within 101 Logistic Brigade, provide formation level support to their affiliated combat
brigades. Less mobile than CSLRs, they will hold the bulk stock for their affiliated
brigades.
N
Force Logistic Regiment. Force Logistic Regiments (FLR) are part of 102
O
c.
Logistic Brigade within 1 (UK) Division, but could be used to support either division.
st
They hold and distribute stock forward to brigade rear areas and would be heavily
C
supported by both contractors and reservists. FLRs may also be required to take
theatre enabling capabilities under command, such as port and maritime or postal
N
and courier sub-units . 24

U
60. Equipment Support Units. Equipment Support (ES) follows the principles of
forward repair, echeloning, sustainability and command and control. ES to the division is
based upon:
a. Formation Support. Formation support is provided by Close Support REME
Battalions, some of which are armoured, 8 Field Company (Parachute) of 7 Air
Assault Battalion, REME and the ES squadron of the Commando Logistic Regiment.
Each unit is optimised to support manoeuvre and provides intimate support to their
respective brigades.
24
This enabling function may in some circumstances be commanded by the TLR.
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b. Force Support. The Force Support (FS) Battalion delivers ES to its affiliated
logistic brigade, as well as level 3 ES to the RF. The FS battalion HQ will deploy as
the theatre ES enabling HQ and may deploy ahead of the main body in order to
facilitate the entry into theatre of the deploying force.
c. Aviation Support. A specialist air assault ES battalion provides support to
aviation and UAS units.
61. Medical Support. The ideal position is to deliver expert medical care as soon as
possible after wounding, following the 1-2-4 hour principle. The aim of this principle is to
be able to provide damage control resuscitation within one hour of wounding, damage
control surgery no later than two hours, followed by primary surgery within four hours of
wounding25. Functional advice is provided to the divisional commander by Assistant
Commander Medical. Medical force elements may be described as follows:
PY
a. Medical Regiments. Medical regiments are placed under TACOM of
manoeuvre brigades. The bulk of a medical regiment’s capability is configured as
Tactical Role 1 Groups, where two or more medical capabilities are grouped together
O
under a functional medical commander to deliver medical effect in support of a force
element. A medical regiment will also provide Role 1 medical support to the force
C
support area and the ground lines of communication. 16 Medical Regiment provides
Role 1 support and Role 2 healthcare to 16 Air Assault Brigade.
ED
b. Field Hospital. Field hospitals may be commanded by the deployed JTFHQ,
JFLogC, or national support element. They are modular and scalable secondary
healthcare facilities that provide care to the deployed force. For major combat
LL
operations, the division may be allocated hospitals under command in order to

maximise hospital care availability within planning timelines. Their capability,
capacity and location will be determined by the estimate process. Deployed hospital
O
care may also be provided by other coalition partners, or may be provided by

maritime forces.
TR
62. Protection. The nature of the distribution of combat supplies and materiel
throughout the divisional area of operations is dependent on the prevalent threat. In a
N
permissive environment, semi-autonomous, self-protected movement by troop-sized

packets of sustainment assets might be feasible. In more hostile environments,
O
sustainment assets will need to be formally grouped to make the best use of the C2 and
force protection offered by a deliberately planned sustainment move.
C
63. Principles of Logistics. The 10 principles of logistics apply to all divisional

N
sustainment activities .
U
a. Authority. There is an essential inter-dependence between responsibility and

authority. The responsibility assigned to any NATO commander must be matched
with the delegation of authority by nations and NATO to allow the adequate
discharge of responsibilities. The NATO commander at the appropriate level must be
given sufficient authority over the logistic resources necessary to enable him to
receive, employ, sustain and redeploy forces assigned to him by nations in the most
effective manner. The same should apply for non-NATO commanders of
multinational forces participating in a NATO-led operation.
25
DG AMS, Army Medical Services Core Doctrine (Andover: MOD Publications, 2012) pp 3-5, 3-7.
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b. Cooperation. Cooperation amongst the nations and NATO is essential.

Cooperation across the full spectrum of logistics, including between the military and
civilian sector, within and between nations, will contribute to the best use of limited
resources. For non-Article 5 operations, cooperation must be extended to non-NATO
nations and other relevant organisations as required.
c. Coordination. Logistics support must be coordinated amongst NATO and
nations at all levels. It must also be carried out with non-NATO nations and other
relevant organisations as required. Generic and standing pre-arranged agreements
are the tools to facilitate logistics coordination and cooperation. The overall
responsibility for logistics coordination in NATO-led operations lies with NATO and
should be conducted as a matter of routine.
d. Efficiency. Logistics resources and capabilities must be used as effectively
PY
and economically as possible. Needs must be identified in a timely manner to
optimise the efficient provision and effective use of such resources.
Sufficiency. Logistics support must be available in the appropriate quantity
O
e.
and quality, at the appropriate notice, when and where it is required, throughout the
full spectrum of the Alliance’s possible missions. It must be ensured for any NATO-
C
led operation continuously and for the duration required to accomplish the mission.
Simplicity. Uncomplicated mission-orientated logistics organisations,
f.
ED
structures and procedures minimise confusion and help to ensure that the support
provided meets NATO commanders’ requirements. Additionally, clear orders, simple
plans and reporting mechanisms ensure accurate and efficient dissemination of
LL
information and minimise misunderstandings.

Flexibility. Logistics support must be proactive, adaptable and responsive to
O
g.
achieve the objective. Adequate planning which considers potential changes to

circumstances enhances flexibility.
TR
h. Assured Provision. Nations and NATO must ensure the provision of logistics
resources to support the forces and capabilities allocated to NATO during peace,
N
crisis and conflict.

O
i. Visibility. Visibility and transparency of logistic resources are essential for

effective logistic support. NATO commanders require a timely and accurate
C
exchange of information, among nations and NATO, to prioritise consignment

movement into and within the Joint Operational Area (JOA), to allow for redirection in
N
accordance with agreements between the commander and National Support

Elements (NSE) and to effectively employ logistic assets within the JOA.
U
j. Primacy of Operation Requirements. All logistics support efforts, from both

the military and civilian sector, should be focussed to satisfy the operational
requirements necessary to guarantee the success of the mission.
64. Combat Service Support Estimate. Straddling the planning and execution of
operations is the Combat Service Support (CSS) estimate. This follows the operational
estimate sequence and considers the logistic and administrative requirements of the
commander’s plan. It is undertaken concurrently and in collaboration with the
commander’s estimate. CSS planning must be synchronised with all other aspects of
planning activity in order to allow the commander to make adjustments to his plan as a
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result of logistic constraints. In addition, synchronised output from the CSS estimate will
allow subordinate formations to conduct timely battle procedure.
65. Sustainment Planning Considerations.
a. Time. Preparation time is vital for the successful conduct of divisional
sustainment operations. Immediate priorities for sustainment activity and the
priorities for the employment of scarce logistic resources will often differ from
operational priorities. Time is particularly relevant when planning the medical support
for an operation as it will determine the geographical deployment of medical assets.
b. Opportunity. Sustainment activity achieves its greatest effect when conducted
out of contact with the enemy. Opportunities for replenishment, evacuation of
casualties, or forward repair, must be seized, either by exploiting a pause in the
operation, or by fighting for time and space. The divisional CSS framework must be
PY
established so that it can respond to opportunity.
Enemy Interference. The division’s sustainment units should be close enough
O
c.
to support the brigades conducting the close battle, but far enough from the enemy to
avoid interference. They should not be positioned where effort has to be squandered
C
on their protection, to the detriment of other operations.
d. Security. Should the threat warrant it, consideration should be given to
ED
deploying rear area security forces to provide air defence, anti-armour and a mobile
defence force. A rear area surveillance plan must identify air, CBRN and ground
threats and be backed by clear and simple contingency plans.
LL
e. Balance. The grouping of sustainment units within the division must be kept
under constant review to ensure that the combat brigades are best served.
O
Sustainment units may be attached to combat forces for certain operations, with
other sustainment units remaining in depth.
TR
f. Restoration of Combat Power. Rehabilitation must be planned and

sequenced correctly. Its scale, scope and depth will reflect the condition of the
brigade or unit commencing rehabilitation, the level of fighting power to be recreated
N
and the time and resources available.

O
g. The ‘4Ds’. Small details overlooked in the sustainment planning stage can
C
often lead to disproportionate failure in execution. The planning process needs to

relate sustainment effect to the operational plan, identifying those CSS factors that
N
constrain operations. Sustainment planning is centred on a comprehensive analysis

of the factors specific to a theatre or operation. These factors are commonly referred
U
to as the ‘4Ds’ - destination, distance, demand and duration . 26
Sustainment planning must reflect the fact that activity is not constant throughout an
operation. Activity levels shift considerably depending upon the phase and nature of a
particular operation. Key to success is creating the conditions for sustainability through
anticipation and foresight. This requires forward planning, frequently 2 steps ahead of the
operation
66. Joint Force Sustainment. Divisional deployments will occur in the joint environment
and will therefore operate with a Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC). The JFLogC
26
DCDC, ADP Operations (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2010), paragraph 0907.
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is a task-organised, joint sustainment C2 organisation that provides a single focus for all
sustainment activity in support of the joint force and its components. The JFLogC is
responsible for the logistical deployment of a force and, once deployed, owns the joint
supply chain and coupling bridge into theatre. The JFLogC controls the Air Point of
Departure (APOD), the Sea Point of Departure (SPOD) and Rail Point of Departure
(RPOD), where applicable, as well as the Joint Supply Area (JSA). It conducts a hand-
over with the logistics brigade in the JSA, who then supply materiel forward to the combat
brigades through TLRs and CSLRs. During the deployment phase of an operation, the
JFLogC is likely to be the supported logistic component. In a land-centric campaign, the
logistic brigade then becomes the supported logistic component and the JFLogC the
supporting logistic component. The doctrine for joint logistic operations is articulated in
JDP 4.00 Logistics for Joint Operations
27
.
67. Multinational Logistic Considerations . Multinational considerations are invariably
PY
complex and need to be agreed well in advance of an operation. These arrangements
may take the form of:
Logistic role specialisation, where one country provides a particular service or
O
a.
commodity for the whole force.
C
b. The appointment of a Logistic Lead Nation (LLN), which provides the logistic
support framework for the whole force. The LLN logistic brigade would receive plugs
ED
from other multinational brigade CSS elements.
c. Contributions to Multinational Integrated Logistic Units (MILU).
LL
d. Other bilateral agreements.

On multinational operations it is likely that a NSE will deploy to provide the national
O
sustainment focus, providing coordination and liaison between the UK, the force and
national elements within it. It is likely the JFLogC would provide this function. NATO
TR
logistic doctrine28 provides an effective basis for multinational logistic cooperation, though
this may not have universal application in other , non-NATO coalitions.
ad-hoc
68. . Rehabilitation is the restoration of fighting power

N
Rehabilitation and Regeneration
in order to prepare a unit or formation for redeployment. Regeneration is the immediate

O
resupply of a unit or formation in order to allow it to continue its primary task. The overall
divisional design for battle should take into account the probable requirement to carry out
C
rehabilitation or regeneration at some stage during the conduct of operations. The scale,
scope and depth of either activity will depend upon the condition of the formation, the
N
target level of fighting power to be recreated and the resources available, including time.
U
Annexes:
A. Domains and Dimensions.
B. CJIIM Integration.
27
DCDC, JDP 4.00 Logistics for Joint Operations Edition 3 (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2007).
28
NATO, AJP-4(A) Allied Joint Logistic Doctrine (2003).
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O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
Contents Page
ANNEX A TO
PART 2
DOMAINS AND DIMENSIONS
1. Domains. Whether conducting major combat operations or stabilisation, the
divisional commander will aim to achieve his intent through the conduct of actions in the
physical, virtual and cognitive domains.
2. Divisional Operations. The divisional HQ will prioritise, direct, synchronise and
resource actions, by its subordinate elements, in the physical domain. Simultaneously, it
will plan and conduct activities in the virtual and cognitive domains, in order to influence
outcomes elsewhere. An illustrative selection of actions within the domains are
summarised in table 2-A-1, below.
PY
‘The cognitive domain is the sphere in which human decision making occurs, such as a
result of assimilating knowledge acquired through thought, experience and sense. The
principal effects generated are upon will and understanding. The physical domain is the
O
sphere in which physical activity occurs and where the principal effects generated are
upon capability. The virtual domain is the sphere in which intangible activity occurs, such
C
as the generation, maintenance and transfer of information (for example, the internet is
part of the virtual domain). The principal effects generated are related to understanding.’
ED
JDP 01 (2nd Edition)
LL
Physical Domain Virtual Domain Cognitive Domain

• The conduct of the • Narrative development • The achievement of
physical battle across and media engagement understanding within the
O
the geographical to ensure that the HQ and the wider

framework of deep, division achieves deployed force through
TR
close and rear. campaign legitimacy actions in the physical and

and coalition unity. virtual domains.
Integration of fires and
N
•
other kinetic effects. • The management and • Psychological activities
exploitation of aimed at discrete target
O
• Grouping of forces to information within the audiences in order to

C
achieve the correct divisional HQ. influence perceptions and

balance. achieve behavioural
N
• OPSEC – in particular effects resulting from

• Sequencing the protection of the physical tactical actions.
U
manoeuvre. divisional HQ
information systems to • Key Leader Engagement
• Resource allocation. cyber attack. (KLE), to include leaders
within the local community
• Physical actions to • Electronic Warfare and at the political level in.
ensure freedom of (EW) – passive enemy
manoeuvre. information disclosure • Interaction with allied
as well as electronic nations as a part of the
• Physical actions to strike. overall coalition
ensure force protection management process.
levels.
• Consequence
2-A-1
Contents Page
Physical Domain Virtual Domain Cognitive Domain

management – the
• Transitioning from exploitation of tactical
major combat to actions in the physical
stabilisation. domain, as well as the
handling of negative
• Actions aimed at effects.
sustaining the force.
• Deception – principally
conducting actions that
will influence the enemy
into thinking and thus
acting in a way that is
against his interests.
PY
Table 2-A-1 – Illustrative Actions Within the Domains
O
3. Dimensions. Operations will also be conducted in one or more of seven
dimensions: maritime, land, air, space, information (including cyberspace),
C
electromagnetic and time. Adversaries accustomed to conducting unconventional or
asymmetric operations are likely to seek to exploit the boundaries between the seven
ED
dimensions. The division may hold the capabilities to operate in only some of the seven
dimensions, but must use its CJIIM inter-dependencies to maintain situational awareness
in the other dimensions and synchronise operational activities.
LL
‘Irregular opponents and regular opponents operating in unconventional ways, are likely to
be particularly agile in operating throughout and between the various dimensions and
O
environments. Commanders of more conventional forces should ensure that

interoperability and integration, between components for example, prevent the exploitation
TR
of inherently vulnerable seams and boundaries between dimensions of the operating

space’.
JDP 01 (2nd Edition)
N
O
C
N
U
2-A-2
Contents Page
1-B-2
)COSA
et acoll a y am CCA
. asrev eciv
PY
dna CCL eht ni tneserp eb lliw sOL ria muminim a sA
.testuo eht morf rehtegot dennalp eb tsum snoitarepo dnal dna riA
dna ria etargetni ylluf ot snaem eht sreviled COSA ,QH CCL eht htiw desuf nehW
.stceffe d nal
•
•
eh t ,QHFJ ro CCL
eh t sa gn itca si QH
vid eht fI .noitamrof
la noi tarep o tseh gih
eta picitra p secivres

o w t tsa el ta fo stnemele
hci hw n i sno itasi nagro
dna snoitarepo ,seitivitcA
.tnetni s’rednammoc fo gnidnatsrednu deliateD
O
.se it il iba pac ria fo tnemy olpme eht fo ev itcepsre p ed iw ert aeh t a srev il ed COSA
•
• ta tnese rp( COSA tnenopmoc riA
QH roirepus
tnioJ
.seitilibapac fo egnar fo gnidnatsrednu na dna staevac lanoitan fo noitacinummoC C •
QH sproc n i OL viD l ano ita ni tluM
•
sproc emas eht
. s s e n e r a w a l a n oi t a u ti s d e r a h S n iht iw sno isiv id
ED
•
. s e i t i l i b a p a c s’ r e h t o h c a e f o e g d e l w o n K • QH v i d ni sOL l ano itanitlum
.noitamrofni fo egnahcxe dna gniniart hguorht deveihca ytilibareporetnI • noitamrof gniknalF rehtO
.)laci sy hp dn a laru d ecorp , laci nhcet( edicirtarf fo ksir ecu der o t serusaeM •
.ssenerawa lanoitautis derahs hguorht deniag erutcip gnitarepo nommoC
.noitamrofni fo egnahcxe dna gniniart hguorht deveihca ytilibareporetnI
LL
. s n o i t a m r o f d ei ll a n i s e i t i l i b a p a c y e k o t
ssecca elbane ot smsinahcem fo tnemyolped eht hguorht deveihca ytilibareporetnI •
•
dna staevac KU fo erawa QH noitilaoc roirepus eht ekam tsum rednammoc
.snoitcirtser O
•
e h t , n o i ti d d a n I . el o h w a s a n o i s i v i d e h t d n a t n e m e l e e c r o f h c a e f o s e i t i l i b a p a c
gnitarepo eht tceffa yeht woh dna eseht dnatsrednu tsum ffats dna rednammoc
eht ,elbissop sa evitceffe sa si noisivid eht taht erusne ot redro nI .etiteppa
k s i r d n a s t a e v a c l a n o i t a n n w o s t i e v a h l li w r e n t r a p n o i t i l a o c h c a E . s e i ti li b a p a c d n a
TR sed agirb
e tan idrobus
e t a pi c i t r a p n o i t a n
eno naht erom fo stnemele
hci hw n i sno itasi nagro
d n a s n o i t a r e p o , s ei t i v i t c A
staevac lanoitan htiw etarusnemmoc sksat dna snoissim etairporppa fo noitacollA
snoita redi snoC y eK
• N
QH v i d ni sOL
ecafretnI
l ano ita ni tluM
tnemelE MIIJC
denibmoC
MIIJC
leveL lanoisiviD ta secafretnI MIIJC
O
.snoitaredisnoc
C
MIIJC yek emos htiw gnola ,level QH lanoisivid ta seussi dna secafretni MIIJC laitnetop fo egnar eht fo elpmaxe na sedivorp xenna sihT
.gnitcudnoc si noisivid eht noitarepo fo epyt eht no gnidneped yrav lliw QH lanoisivid eht ni snoitaredisnoc dna secafretni MIIJC ehT
N .1
NOITARGETNI MIIJC
U
2 TRAP
OT B XENNA
Contents Page
2-B-2
noissim UA
. p S s p O ai v C O P • m a e t g ni ni a r t U E
.d etarget n i to n tu b ,d ed een ecafretnI • noissim UE
.tnedneped ksaT noissim NU stnemeerga
PY
•
. n oi t a si l i b a t s o t O C M m o r f s e s s e r g o r p n o i t a r e p o s a p o l e v e d l li w t n e m e r i u q e R • AHCO NU la noi tan y b detaerc
. p S s p O ai v C O P • RCHNU sn oit asinagro esohT
.d etarget n i to n tu b ,d ed een ecafretnI • ma et y rtnuoc NU latnemnrevoG retnI
n osiail ffatS srotcartnoc rehtO
O n osiail ffatS
n osiail ffatS
sCMP
sOGN
C
. ) r g n E M O C D y l b i s s o p ( Q H v i D y b d e t c u d n o c n o si ai l l a n r e t x E n osiail ffatS sOI
•
.tnedneped ksaT • QH v id ni OL LOP VIC
esicxE
.QH viD eht ni debme ll iw DABATS ED
.tnedneped ksaT •
•
QH v id ni OL
)DA BATS( rosi vda
noi tasi li batS
dna smotsuC MH
ti nU noi tasi li batS
LL
.DIA SU elpmaxe roF
. C B T l e v e l h g u o h t l a d e b m e o t y l e ki l s e v i t a t n e s e r p e r D I f D
•
•
n osiail ffatS
ev i tatneserper DIfD
nosiail dnammoC
sei cnega
noi ti laoC
DIfD
OCF
O QH vid ni ffats
E MS deddebmE GS SM
n oi tarepooc
fo seerge d g n i y rav
sn oitacilpmi SIC
.ytiruces dna gnirahs noitamrofnI
sn oitacilpmi SIC
•
• TR n osiail ffatS
sei cnega
ecne gi ll etni
noi ti laoC
ht iw sae ra gn ip pal revo
ro emas e ht n i e tap icitrap
seicne ga elp itlum hcih w
ni sn oit arepo ro sei tiv itcA
.ytiruces dna gnirahs noitamrofnI
.tnadneped ksaT
•
• N n osiail ffatS
l l e c n o si ai l F S
QHCG / SIS
t nenopmoC FS
y c neg A retnI
.noitan eno naht erom morf stnemele
ecrof fo tnemevlovni eht dna noitarepo eht fo ytixelpmoc eht ,secrof suoibihpma
•
O
ll e C g ni n n al P ervueonam
fo tnemev lo vn i e ht ,d etaco lla elo r eht no gni dne ped QH v id eht tnemgu a y am CPA • C
su oibihpmA
maeT y rosiv dA
laro ttiL
. e s i t r e p x e g n i n n al p e r v u e o n a m r i a s r e vi l e D
. d e h c a t t a F H J r o s t n e m el e e c r o f A A f i Q H v i d t n e m g u a y a m T A T P M A
•
•
d n a g ni n n al P
erv ue ona M riA
N erv ueonam riA
.deri uqer sa no itatnemgua
r e h t r u f r o f si s a b e h t d n a g n i n n al p d e t a r g e t n i e l b a n e o t e c a f r e t n i e h t e d i v o r p y e h T
. y ti li bap ac gn inn alp
•
U
ri a d e t a r g e t n i r e v i l e d d n a f f a t s e r o c l a n o i si vi d e h t f o t r a p e r a f f a t s r i a d e d d e b m E • ffats ria deddebmE tnenopmoc riA
snoita redi snoC y eK ecafretnI tnemelE MIIJC MIIJC
Contents Page
3-B-2
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
1-B-2 elbaT
O
secafretnI MIIJC lanoisiviD - C
.stnemeri uqer lacidem
d n a S E , c i t si g o l , E O R , s r e v i r d l a c i t i l o p t n e r e f f i d h t i w e m o c l li w s e c r o f l a n o i t a n i t l u M
ni sOL deddebmE
N secrof
e t a p i ci t r a p n o i t a n e n o n a h t
erom fo seicnega ro secrof
.OTA N non fi snoi tacilpmi ecn arussa noitamrofni dn a SIC
. s k s a t d n a s n o i s s i m e t a i r p o r p p a f o n oi t a c o l l A
•
•
•
QH v i d ni sOL
QH v i d ni sOL
U
n oi tan tsoH
secrof
l ano ita ni tluM
eh t ere hw sno itasi nagro
dna snoitarepo ,seitivitcA
lanoitanitluM
terceS OTAN ,OE5 ,OEKU rof snoitacilpmi ecnarussa noitamrofnI • m a e t g ni ni a r t U A
snoita redi snoC y eK ecafretnI tnemelE MIIJC MIIJC
Contents Page
4-B-2
. e i l s e i c n e g a l l a s s o r c a s e i c n e d n e p e d r e t n i e r e h w d n a p a l r e v o s e i ti li b i s n o p s e r e r e h w y f i t n e d I •
.ngiapmac rediw eht ni stis snoitca evisneffo erehw dnatsrednU •
.mhtyhr larutluc dna cimonoce ,lacitilop nailivic htiw mhtyhr elttab yratilim fo noitargetni redisnoC •
.spihsnoitaler dliub dna etanidrooc ot deen lliw noisivid eht mohw htiw dna sevitarran
PY
yratnemelpmoc dna gnitepmoc ,esoprup dna setadnam rieht dnatsrednu ot redro ni sredlohekats yek fo tidua na tcudnoC •
. y t il i b i x e l f s n o i t a r e p o n o s t ni a r t s n o c t n e u q e s n o c
d n a ) t r o p p u s c i t si g o l r o f s r e ht o n o t n e d n e p e d e r a s n o i t a n h c i h w . g . e ( s e i c n e d n e p e d r e t n i c i t si g o l y e k d n a t s r e d n U
. n oi t a t i o l p x e t n e u q e s b u s d n a S N A L P N O C g n i d ul c n i p o e v i s n e f f o t r o p p u s o t e l b a s i n a l p c i t s i g o l t a h t e r u s n E
•
y cne ga-retnI
O
. s t n i a r t s n o c g n i t a r e p o d n a E O R t n e r e f f i d d n a t s r e d n u d n a e l t t a b p e e d l a n o i s i v i d o t n i s p o F S f o n o it a r g e t n i r e d i s n o C
.l arotti l eht ni g ni tarepo fi secrof suoibihp m a fo no isulcn i e ht re disnoC
•
•
C
.stnenopmoc tnereffid eht fo hcae eht morf dereviled stceffe fo noitaeniled dna noitargetni redisnoC
•
•
.stegrat esolc dna peed ot ria fo seitiroirp redisnoC •
.ILA evitceffe e lb ane ot eca lp ni serusaem MB e tairp orppa erusnE
ED
•
. y t i r o h t u a d n a s s e c o r p sl a v o r p p a t e g r a t e h t d n a t s r e d n U •
. n al p D I t a b m o c p o l e v e d d n a s t e s s a t n i o j l a n o i t a n i t l u m f o n o i t a r g e t n i e h t r e d i s n o C •
.ervueonam fo emehcs DNIF lanoisivid eht otni detargetni era seitilibapac RATSI tnioj taht erusnE
LL
•
.QH lanoisivid eht ot desinagro ksat era srennalp tnioj tneiciffus erusnE •
. 2C tn ioj eh t eg arev el dn a dn atsrednU • tnioJ
.stniartsnoc tnemniatsus rentrap noitilaoc redisnoC •
.stnemele lanoitanitlum fo tnemevlovni stroppus SIC erusnE
O •
.nalp OL redisnoC •
.stneme l e d enibmoc ll a n ee w t eb et an idro oc ot y ti li ba hsil batsE
TR
•
. y t i n u n o it il a o c n o s e c n e u q e s n o c d n a s e m o c t u o n o i s s i m f o s n o i t a c i l p m i r e d i s n o C •
.seitilibapac rebmem noitilaoc etanidrobus ot sksat dna noissim hctaM •
.setiteppa ksir lanoitan etanidrobus redisnoC •
.)cte EOR ,staevac lanoitan( snoitamrof etanidrobus ot snoissim etairporppa fo noitacollA N •
nI dna nwoD
. y ti nu n o iti la oc no no itare po eht fo tcapmi aidem e ht re disnoC O •
.den iatniam si y tiruces l an oit arepo erusnE •
.no itare po eht fo sisab la gel eh t dn atsrednU
C •
.srel ba ne dna secr u oser no iti la oc dn a l ano itan kcol nu o t redro ni no itarep o e tacov da ot d erape rp eB •
.tem era stneme riuqer noitamrofni la noi tan erusnE N •
.snoitcurtsni dnammoc noitilaoc htiw snoitcurtsni lanoitan esinorhcnyS •
.staevac lanoitan dna evitarran ,noitisop KU eht etalucitra dna dnatsrednU U •
tuO dna pU denibmoC
snoitaredisnoC MII JC lanoisiviD tnemelE MIIJC
snoitcA evisnefeD dnA evisneffO nI snoitaredisnoC MIIJC
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5-B-2
PY
O
C
snoitcA evisnefeD dna evisneffO ni snoitaredisnoC MIIJC –2-B-2 elbaT

ED .sei tiro htu a l ivic NH fo el or eh t dn atsrednU
. s e e g u f e r r o f y t i l i bi s n o p s e r N H d n a t s r e d n U
•
LL
•
.spoleved ti sa noitarepo eht fo emoctuo eht fo demrofni si NH taht erusne ot noitca ekaT •
.ev itarra n no ita n tsoh tsniaga stceffe y ra dnoces ev itag en dna semoct uo re disnoC •
.level etairporppa eht ta gninnalp ni dedulcni era dna elor etairporppa tub gnidael a evah NH erusnE •
.sksat dna snoissim etairporppa fo noitacolla dna nalp llarevo ni sEF NH fo noisulcnI
O •
.seegufer fo tnemeganam dna serutcurts ytiruces livic rof seitilibisnopser NH dnatsrednU •
. y ci l o p n o i t n e t e d d n a S R E P C , n o i t a r e p o r o f s i s a b l a g e l d n a w a l , e t i t e p p a k s i r l a n o i t a n N H d n a t s r e d n U
TR
•
.gn idnatsre dnu ll arev o dna secruose r ecne gi ll etn i NH ot sseccA •
.noitarepo eht ni etapicitrap ot secrof NH elbane ot llib gnidliub yticapac eht yfitnednI • l ano ita ni tluM
.noitarepo ot esimorpmoc tuohtiw derahs si noitamrofni taht erusnE
ecn euqe snoc po le ve d d na )cte spo n airatinamuh ,smaet gni nia rt( snoi tarep o n o noitca fo semoctuo elb issop re disnoC
N .snalp tnemeganam
.ycamitigel ngiapmac dnatsrednU
•
•
O .ecn eulfni
d n a s n o i t a r e p o n o i t a m r o f n i , w a l f o e l u r r o f s m s i n a h c e m d n a G S R S N U g n i d ul c n i e r u t c u r t s e c n a n r e v o g m i r e t n i y f i t n e d I
•
latnemnrev og-retnI
.secruos lla morf detadpu si erutcip taht erusne ot smsinahcem poleveD
C
. e r u t ci p g n i t a r e p o l a n oi s i v i d o t n i Q H C G d n a S I S m o r f t u p n i et a r g e t n I
•
•
.troffe noitasilibats mret regnol elbissop tsniaga snoitarepo fo semoctuo redisnoC
.sksat ”n oita sil iba ts toh“ ot sEF etacol lA
N •
•
.sn oisice d g nit egrat n i srotca n oi tasil ib ats ev lo vnI
. e l b i s s o p s a n o o s s a d e m u s e r e b n a c y ti vi t c a n o i t a s i l i b a t s t a h t e r u s n e o t s e r u s a e m r e d i s n o C
U •
•
•
. y t i r u c e s O I d n a O G N t s ni a g a n o i t a r e p o f o s e m o c t u o e l b i s s o p r e d i s n o C •
snoitaredisnoC MII JC lanoisiviD tnemelE MIIJC
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6-B-2
.no itaro tser la iti ni gn idnuF •
.srentrap latnemnrevog-retni fo sevitcejbo dna smia dnatsrednU • latnemnrev og-retnI
.no ita sina gro g ni targetn i eh t sa tca ot d erape rp eB •
. n oit a r ot s e r g n i r e v i l e d d n a g ni n n al p s n oi t a si n a g r o r o f y ti r u c e S
PY
•
.testuo eht morf gninnalp otni detargetni si yratilim taht
erusne dna srotca ycnega lapicnirp eht fo sevitcejbo dna smia evitaler eht dnatsrednU • y cne ga-retnI
. t n e n o p m o c d e t r o p p u s e h t e m o c e b y a m s c i t si g o L •
.ksat ot secruoser yratilim delliks yletairporppa fo noitacollA tnioJ s eitilic af dna s ecivres
O
.srentrap noitilaoc morf slliks ekopseb fo noisivorp redisnoC
. ) y t i c a p a c d n a s e i ti li b a p a c g n i t o n ( F S N H f o n o i t a r g e t n I
•
• denibmoC laitn ess e fo noitarotse r laitinI
C
.krow te n tnemegag n e dn a n osia il NH p ole veD
•
•
.se iti vi tisn es laru tluc d na laci til op NH dn atsrednU •
. w al NH dn atsrednU
ED
•
.ser utcurts d na t pecnoc ,se itiro irp y tiruces NH dn atsrednU • l ano ita ni tluM
.eta repo ot sren trap latnemnre v og-re tni el ban e o t y tiruceS • latnemnrev og-retnI
.eta repo ot srentra p y cn ega-re tni el ban e o t y tiruceS
LL
•
.sn oitis n art n oit arepo eht sa srotcart noc dna ffats y cn ega-retn i ni egrus a rof d erape rp eB • y cne ga-retnI
. s c i t si g o l d e r e vi l e d r o t c a r t n o c n i e s a e r c n i r o f d e r a p e r p e B •
.tesdnim fo e gnahc - QH er ugifnoce r ot era perp dna se l or la noi ti dart n on re disnoC •
.rehto na ot eno morf gnixelf fo tcapmi eht d natsred nu dna sn oi tarepo
ra er dna esolc ,pee d n eew teb stess a ecnal ab ,stessa y ek no dnamed esaercni eh t gn itoN O
.secrof no w ollof
• tnioJ
mrofni dna ecrof eht ssorca ytiliga litsni dna snossel tiolpxe yldipar ot serudecorp yfitnedI
.nalp tnem ega gne - y ti nu no iti la oc nia tniam ot hcaorpp a p ole veD
.nalp OL redisnoC
. t c a p m i t u o h ti w O A e h t s s o r c a e t a r e p o o t e l b a s i e v r e s e r t a h t e r u s n E
TR
•
•
•
.ksat d na noissim ot se it il iba pac E F la no ita n hctaM
.”kcohs cigetarts“ etagitim ot serusaem redisnoc dna etiteppa ksir lanoitan redisnoC
•
•
N
.ssam etaerc ot sEF gnillorer redisnoC
.)cte EOR ,staevac lanoitan( snoitamrof etanidrobus ot snoissim etairporppa fo noitacollA
•
•
O
. noi tasil ibats ot sn oit isnart n oi tarep o eht
sa ecapselttab dna tnemnorivne ni egnahc eht dnatsrednu dna etapicitna ot spets ekaT
•
C denibmoC lortnoc dna y tir uceS
noitaredisnoC MII JC lanoisiviD
•
N
tnemelE MIIJC noitc A lacitcaT
.srotca MIIJC
rehto fo troppus ni stessa fo gnicnalaber eht gniriuqer elor gnitroppus a tpoda ot ylekil si noisivid eht snoitarepo noitasilibats gniruD
U .2
noitasilibatS ni snoitaredisnoC MIIJC
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7-B-2
PY
O
C
noitasilibatS ni snoitaredisnoC MIIJC – 3-B-2 elbaT
.)CAVEDEM dna lacidem .g.e( snoitcnuf gnilbane fo noisivorP

ED
.erutcurtsarfn i fo no itcurtsnoC
.)tnemeganam
•
•
lennosrep ,ytilibatnuocca ,ecnailpmoc( smetsys gnitroppus fo tnempoleveD
LL
.t n e m p o l e v e d y ci l o p y ti r u c e s N H
. f f a t s l a ci n h c e t d n a g n i r o t n e m , g n i n i a r t f o n o i s i v o r P
.hc a orppa fo y t iun itn oc erusnE
•
•
•
. E O M d n a t n e m e r i u q e r R S S N H y fi t n e d IO
. s m a e t g n i n i a r t f o n o i s i v o r p d n a n al p g n i n i a r t m r e t r e g n o l f o n o i s i v o r P
•
• l ano ita ni tluM
latnemnrev og-retnI
TR
•
.)l ano ita nretnI sre id loS
dlihC ge( seicnega tnaveler htiw egagne dna yfitnedi – sreidlos dlihc dna elamef fo RDD • y cne ga-retnI
.ksa t ot sp oort n oi tan n w o d e lliks y l eta irporp pa etacol lA • tnioJ
.sei til ib apac n oi ti laoc ra luci trap re disnoC • N denibmoC RSS
.sOI dna snoitan rehto fo stnemtraped dael htiw nosiaiL •
.da el eht ekat nac seicn ega li vic ro NH n ehw enimrete d ot aire tirc y tiruces dn atsrednU •
O l ano ita ni tluM
. r e v o d n a h o t y a w h t a p d n a n al p e c n a n r e v o g mi r e t n i d n a t s r e d n U •
.ecnanrevog gnidrager dael eht ni ,eb lliw ro ,si ohw dnatsrednU • C latnemnrev og-retnI
.da el eht ekat nac seicn ega li vic ro NH n ehw enimrete d ot aire tirc y tiruces dn atsrednU • y cne ga-retnI
.ksat ot secruoser yratilim delliks yletairporppa fo noitacollA • N tnioJ
. noi til aoc fo y tirg etni ni ateR •
.ev oba lortn oc dn a y tiruceS rof sA • denibmoC
U sk sat e cnanrevog miretnI
. t s e n o o s N H o t r e v o d n a h f o t x e t n o c n i n al p p o l e v e D •
. g n i o d f o e l b a p a c y l l a u t c a e r a e w t a h w d n a d e ri u q e r s i t a h w g n i d n a t s r e d n U •
. s e c i v r e s l a i t n e s s e r o f s ei t i r o i r p g n i h s i l b a t s e n i t n e m e v l o v n i N H • l ano ita ni tluM
noitaredisnoC MII JC lanoisiviD tnemelE MIIJC noitc A lacitcaT
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8-B-2
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.gnikam noisiced otni detargetni era

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stnempoleved lacitilop taht erusne ot redro ni ,siht fo erawa eb tsum rettal eht gnivird esohT .senilemit gninnalp dna mhtyhr elttab
QH lanoisivid eht ot ecap tnereffid a ta nur ot ylekil si noitarepo na nihtiw opmet lacitilop ehT .opmeT dna mhtyhR elttaB .d
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.ecaps gnikrow htiw gnola elbaliava edam si SIC etairporppa dna tneiciffus taht erusne tsum sQH lanoisiviD
.tenretni eht dna TSERCERIF ot ssecca gnidulcni ,stnemeriuqer SIC cificeps evah ot ylekil era sGAP .stnemeriuqeR SIC .c
.noitautis lacitilop rediw eht fo txetnoc eht ni edam era snoitaredisnoc gninnalp yek taht erusne ot redro
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ni ,sllec gnitargetni eht htiw ylesolc krow ot deen osla yeht ,rednammoc eht htiw ylesolc krow ot ylekil era sGAP eht tslihW .desu
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tseb eb nac esitrepxe siht erehw saera esoht ni QH eht otni detargetni eb ot deen yehT .snoitarepo fo ertaeht eht nihtiw noitautis
lacitilop eht fo egdelwonk rediw a evah ot ylekil era sGAP ,secneirepxe dna stcatnoc ,selor rieht neviG .slleC gnitargetnI
.QH lanoisivid eht otni etargetni ylevitceffe tsom ot sGAP elbane lliw noitasirailimaf dna gniniart roirP .gniniarT roirP
.b
N .a
:ffats yek eseht
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fo noitargetni eht ediug dluohs slapicnirp gniwollof ehT .ertaeht ni QH rehgih eht ta noitatneserper kees ot ylekil si rettal eht hguohtla
,DIfD morf evitatneserper a ylbissop dna )DALUC( rosivdA larutluC eht ,)DAGEL( rosivdA lageL eht ,)DALOP( rosivdA yciloP eht
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,)DABATS( rosivdA noitasilibatS eht edulcni QH eht ni tneserp sGAP eht ,ecitcarp nI .)DIfD( tnempoleveD lanoitanretnI rof tnemtrapeD
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eht dna )OCF( eciffO htlaewnommoC dna ngieroF eht gnidulcni ,QH lanoisivid eht nihtiw detneserper eb ot ylekil era hcihw stnemtrapeD
tnemnrevoG rehtO hsitirB esoht ot srefer )GAP( tnemnrevoG ssorcA srentraP mret ehT .tnemnrevoG ssorcA srentraP .3
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snoitaredisnoC MIIJC lanoitiddA
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PART 3
DIVISIONAL TACTICAL ACTIONS
Introduction
1. Part 3 describes in detail the tactical actions that a division may execute whilst
conducting operations. These tactical actions may be performed by the division as a
single entity, or each of them may be conducted simultaneously by subordinate elements
within the division, orchestrated by the divisional HQ. A force may transition from one
tactical action to another without breaking contact with the enemy. The tactical actions are
structured with a short narrative, schematics, aides memoire and, where appropriate,
vignettes.
The four key tactical actions are described in Annexes A to D. Annex E summarises
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2.
Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI) and Annex F summarises the control of
demolitions.
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Annexes:
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A. Offensive Actions.
B. Defensive Actions.
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C. Stabilising Actions.
D. Enabling Actions.
E. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration.
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F. Control of Demolitions.
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ANNEX A TO
PART 3
OFFENSIVE ACTIONS
1. Purpose. The purpose of offensive action is to defeat the enemy through the use of,
or threat of, force. Success is achieved by shattering the enemy’s will and cohesion
through a combination of violent and non-violent activities. Offensive action requires the
application of the tactical framework of find, fix, strike and exploit.
2. Principles. The principles of offensive action are:
a. Concentrate the effects of force or the threat of force.
b. Seek surprise.
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c. Maintain security.
d. Achieve superiority of fires and other effects.
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e. Seize key terrain or targets vital to influencing perceptions.
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f. Exploit manoeuvre.
Plan to exploit success.
g.
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h. Keep it simple.
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i. Maintain a reserve.
Characteristics. Flexibility, speed and shock action are essential in the employment
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3.
of combat power. Superior tempo and momentum must be used to keep the enemy off
balance thus retaining the initiative. At the critical point in an attack, momentum may be
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more important than secure flanks. Few offensive actions develop as planned, therefore
commanders must seek to use agility to turn unexpected success to their advantage and
to exploit fleeting opportunities, as well as cope with unexpected reverses. This demands
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simple plans, sufficient fire support, well positioned engineers, uncommitted reserves close
at hand, as well as a sustainment plan that is flexible enough to support the action. Each
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discrete offensive action should be viewed as a continuous process of find, fix, strike and
exploit, aimed at breaking the cohesion and will of the enemy. The application of the
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manoeuvrist approach and mission command will be fundamental to achieving success.

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4. Context. An offensive action may affect not only the enemy but other audiences
whose support for our operation or campaign is essential. The wider operational context
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needs to be fully understood. A key consideration for the divisional commander is the
management of consequences that might unintentionally stem from the conduct of
offensive actions, where non-combatants become casualties or where critical or culturally
sensitive infrastructure is damaged or abused by our actions.
Appendix:
1. Offensive Actions.
Schematics
Aide memoire
Vignettes
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4-1-A-3
.sedagirb ot stessa .elpoep eht gnoma noitatiolpxe .tnemtimmoc retfa etutitsnocer ot eraperP •
.seraps fo gninoitisop drawroF • troppus ervueonam fo gniksat dna noitacollA • lacol yb dewollof nekatrednu eb yam evitcejbo .noissim dna
.sdrawnwod stessa SE fo noitacollA • .setuor ylppus gnidulcni eht no noitadilosnoc dna gnisinagroeR • noitautis no dneped lliw ezis dna erutcurtS •
.dootsrednu & tes ytirohtua lained tnempiuqE • ,tnempoleved etuor ,gnihcaerb – seitiroirp ER • .tiusrup a otni poleved yaM • .detcepxenu eht htiw laed ot – dettimmocnU •
.raelc tpek eb tsum setuoR • ?ssapyb ,hcaerb ,ssorc – selcatsbO • .noitca tnednepedni ecroF evreseR
troppuS tnempiuqE .ervueonam dnuorg fo gnicneuqeS • rof desinagro ksat secrof htiw ,sexa tnereffid .mutnemom sniatniaM •
.tiusrup / noitatiolpxe gnivom tsaf gnitroppus ?ecrof fo trap rof noitpo ervueonam riA • no tnorf daorb a no tuo deirrac eb dluohS • .trats ta dootsrednu ylluf eb ton yam sksat
yllaicepse ,elpicnirp 4-2-1 teem ot ytilibapac ervueonaM lautca hguoht – noissim cificeps a evah lliW •
PY
.tnemeriuqer .sseccus tiolpxe ot deksaT •
CAVEDEM / stessa tnemtaert fo gninoitisoP • .tiusrup dna ytiruces eht tsniaga decnalab eb ot
lacideM noitatiolpxe laitnetop troppus ot evom lliw snug sdeen hcihw ,lacitirc mutnemom gniniatniaM • ecroF nolehcE
.setuor ylppuser fo noitceleS • woh no noisiced dna AMA laitini fo noitceleS • .ymene eht nihtiw noisneherppa dna noisufnoc .ymene dessapyb sexiF •
.stnemeriuqer noitatiolpxe etapicitnA • .)?ksir eulb-no-eulb WE( sedon 2C dna sten gnitaerc ,ecnatsiser gninessel tsniaga ecnavda .ytiruces esab gnitarepo dna aera
?esnopser serif ,ATS tegraT .noitpeced ,gnimmaj – WE • dipar a yb desiretcarahc si noitatiolpxE • raer ,egarevoc pag ,noitcetorp knalf stcudnoC •
dipar rof sleehw no skcots tnacifingis niatniaM •
.skcots noitisop drawroF •
O
.deilppa yldlob dna cimanyd – MCSF •
.stceffe yradnoces
.sseccus suoiverp yb detaerc
seitinutroppo fo eruzies dlob dna noitingoceR •
ecroF ytiruceS
.noissim fo erutan
.trats ta deirrac seilppus tabmoc mumixaM •
.modeerf ylppus-er esimixam ot yrassecen fi
C
evitagen dna egamad laretalloc redisnoC •
.seitinutroppo AI tiolpxE •
noitatiolpxE
.detats eb tsum
no dneped lliw noitasinagro ksat dna htgnertS •
ecroF tluassA
sdrawnwod stessa citsigol lanoitidda etacollA • .ytilibapac serif noisicerp tiolpxE • ycilop gnissapyB .ksir seirrac tub ,mutnemom .llup ecceR •
.erutidnepxe noitinumma yrellitra evisnetxe .seitiroirp gnitegraT • sniatniam stnemele ymene llams gnissapyB • .ytiruces edivorp ,noitatiolpxe
rof eraperp – leuf dna omma esitiroirP •
.opmet niatniam ot ylppuser tneiciffe - SSC •
scitsigoL
tnemniatsuS
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.)yrettab retnuoc( serif htped rof tnemeriuqeR •
.egatnorf kcatta
eritne ssorca serif gnitroppus setanidrooc
noisivid ,elttab erif tcerid thgif sedagirB •
.stnemele ecrof ymene yortsed ro taefed yldipar

dna ymene eht no erusserp niatniam ot latiV •
:hguorhT thgiF -
dednetxerevo emoceb ton tsum ecrof ni kaerB •
tcudnoc ,mutnemom niatniam ot desu eb naC •

rehto fo ecneserp ,selcatsbo ,spag evisnefed
.srotca
,noitamrofni ymene ,setuor senimreteD •
.SREPC fo gnildnaH •
.serusaem noitcetorp NRBC •
.derotinom noitpeced ot noitcaer
ymene ,elbisualp ,decruoser - nalp noitpeceD •
.serusaem ecnallievrus retnuoC •
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.erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene erutpac - WE •
.PATS fo tnemeganam evitcA •
rewoperiF
.deriuqer fi sdrawnwod stessa
gnitacolla ,stessa noitcelloc fo tnemyolpeD •
.noitartenep
nediw ot ni kaerb retfa yllaretal dnapxE •
.egatnorf
worran a no htped ni derutcurts yllausU •
:nI kaerB ehT -
.ervueonam lufsseccus ot lacitirC •

ecnassiannoceR
sgnipuorG ecroF
secrof delcricne fo tuokaerB •
.CESPO •
.ytiruces CAVEDEM
.noitasilibats ot snoitisnart
gnithgifraw sa ylralucitrap – niarret namuH •
O tluassA ehT
snoitca gnilbane yb dedecerp eb yam kcattA •
tnieF dna noitartsnomeD •
tiusruP dna noitatiolpxE •
diaR •
gnidulcni ,ytiruces CoL ot secrof cificeps fo
gniksat dna seitiroirp noitcetorp –taerht °063 •
.sksat noitcetorp
rof sedagirb ot stessa ER fo noitacollA •
?noitaerc
.)s(evitcejbo fo erutan
,selcatsbo ,gniog ,setuor hcaorppa – niarreT •
.sevreser ,tnetni ,seitilibapac
,snoitisop ,shtgnerts ymene dnatsrednU •
.tnemnorivne cimanyd ylhgih yllaitnetop
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seriF tJ evisnetxe yb detroppus eb yaM •
.lacitirc eb lliw ytiruces gniniatniaM •
.sevreser dna ecrof nolehce fo gninoitisoP •
.noitamrof kcatta lanoisiviD •
hcaorppA
)gniliops ,retnuoc ,ytsah ,etarebiled( kcattA •

noitcA evisneffO level lanoisiviD fo sepyT
evreser a niatniaM •
elpmis ti peeK •
elcatsbo / snoitisop gniggid - seitiroirp
ER :noitadilosnoc dna noitasinagroeR •
.ER yb serutaef larutan ro selcatsbo
- erutcip ecnegilletni fo ecnanetniaM •
ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI
seicnega nailivic ,secrof suonegidni
N .lained erutcurtsarfnI •
.gnihcaerb elcatsbO •
.gninnalp lacitcat htiw tnerrucnoc
sseccus tiolpxe ot nalP •
ervueonam tiolpxE •
fo tnemecnahne / noitaerc – ytiruces knalF •
?noitaiva
,noitan tsoh ,snoitamrof gniknalf – nosiaiL •
serusaem lortnoc / tnemeganam niarret – MB •
O
eb yam – tnemyolped/tnemevom yranimilerP •
.secneidua tegrat fo egnar a ecneulfni
snoitpecrep gnicneulfni
ot lativ stegrat rehto dna niarret yek ezieS •
stceffe rehto dna serif fo ytiroirepus eveihcA •
,secrof dnuorg – stnemele ecrof ytiruces knalF •
?ecrof gnikcatta eht tcetorp
- sessergorp noitca sa seitiroirp DA fo egnahC •
noitca suoenatlumis tcudnoc ot nalP •
.nalp snoitacinummoC •
.rednammoc fo noitisop
C
ot ,sniamod evitingoc dna lautriv ,lacisyhp
ssorca ,seitivitca rebyc ,ELK ,AI ,noitpeced
,ervueonam ,serif tnioj fo esu sevlovnI •
ytiruces niatniaM •
esirprus keeS •
?stniop elbarenluv
,setuor ,AMA ,saera ylbmessa ,sRSM – stsixe
– htiw opmet esimitpo ot sQH erugifnoC •
troffE niaM enimreteD •
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.sseccus rof snoitidnoc sevreserp ro setaerC •
gnipahS
ecrof fo taerht ro ecrof fo stceffe etartnecnoC •
selpicnirP
taerht ria elbiderc fi seitiroirp DA enimreteD •
.muminim a sa ytiroirepus ria lacol eveihcA •
noitcetorP
etats dne enimreteD •
)lacigolohcysp( evitingoc dna )tnemegagne
sniamod
.gninnalp lacitcaT •
.deriuqer fi sgnipuorg ecrof fo tnemtsujdA •
.stnemele ecrof fo noitaraperp lacisyhP •
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ecnalab ffo ymene eht peek - opmet roirepuS •
seitinutroppo gniteelf tiolpxe ot ytiligA •
evitaitini eht fo noitneter dna eruzieS •
noitadilosnoc no sksat ylekiL - aidem( lautriv ,lacisyhp ni ervueonaM • noitaraperP kcohs dna esirpruS •
sehcaerb dna selifed ta tnemeriuqeR - )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoc MIIJC • .rehtona otni eno :yb desiretcarahc ecrof
lortnoc ciffart dna etuoR - dnammoC morf egrem ot dnet lliw taht segats tcnitsiD • ,fo taerht ro ,fo esu hguorht ymene taefed oT
:eciloP yratiliM • snoitaredisnoC gninnalP kcattA eht fo segatS esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :SNOITCA EVISNEFFO LANOISIVID
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Offensive Actions Conducted in Iraq by 1 (UK) Armd Div

During the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 1 (UK) Armd Div was tasked to seize the Al Faw
Peninsula, relieve 5 and 7 USMC RCTs around Az Zubayr and in the Rumaila Oilfield and
then block to the N and NE. Neither Basra nor Az Zubayr were initial objectives. It was,
however, considered that both locations would have to be entered at some stage. The
strategic objectives were gained within 19 days for relatively few coalition casualties.
Although Iraqi casualty figures are unknown, 2 203 prisoners of war were taken and many
of the remaining Iraqi armed forces deserted or disappeared. The fighting was
characterised by several significant BG level actions, which were conducted in and around
a large civilian population and against regular and irregular forces.
On the evening of 20 Mar, whilst 3 (US) Inf Div and 1 USMC Div advanced across the Iraqi
border, 3 Cdo Bde commenced operations on the Al Faw peninsula in conjunction with the
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USN Special Warfare Group. Meanwhile, armoured elements of 1 (UK) Armd Div followed
1 USMC Div into Iraq. The following day, 16 AA Bde relieved 5 RCT in the Rumaila
Oilfields and 7 Armd Bde conducted a limited attack to protect the right flank of 7 RCT,
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before establishing blocking positions. 3 Cdo Bde consolidated its blocking positions
across the mouth of the Al Faw peninsula and seized the town and port of Umm Qasr (this
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action was conducted by 15 MEU who were subordinated to 3 Cdo Bde).
7 Armd Bde maintained its blocking position in the Basra area, employing increasingly
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aggressive tactics. Enemy strong points were progressively eliminated and bases
established before a coordinated operation was mounted on 6 Apr, to secure large areas
of the city. 3 Cdo Bde attacked from the SE led by MBTs, seizing the presidential palace
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shortly after midnight on 7 Apr.

Meanwhile 16 AA Bde, which had secured the Rumaila oilfields after the departure of 1
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USMC Div, conducted a guard force action on its N flank. On 30 Mar the Bde began
engaging forward of its N boundary and inserted Pathfinder patrols N of the River
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Euphrates on 3 Apr to support the US Marines. The Bde occupied Ad Dayr on 7 Apr and
subsequently occupied Medinah and Qurnah and secured the bridges over the River
Tigris. 16 AA Bde linked up with US forces in Al Amarah on 11 Apr.
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From a Divisional perspective, several key issues relevant to the conduct of divisional
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offensive operations are illustrated by the actions conducted over this period:
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• Shock and Surprise and Inter-Component Fusion. The armoured raids

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conducted by BGs from 7 Armd Bde into Basra and Az Zubayr illustrate the fusion
of the land, air and SF components, as well as the importance of achieving shock
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and surprise. In one raid by 2 RTR BG on 26 Mar, an enemy command and control
centre was identified by HUMINT, confirmed by SF and then attacked by 8 x JDAMs
before being assaulted by an armoured squadron/company group. The
psychological as well as physical effect of this overwhelming force contributed to
success.
• Air Land Integration. Whilst 1 (UK) Armd Div did not enjoy a high priority for air
support, several key issues were highlighted. In order to achieve a high degree of
synergy, both air and land components needed to understand the effects that their
actions would have on the operations of the other. For example, the seizure of the
Al Faw Peninsula and the establishment of blocking positions around Basra,
prompted Iraqi attempts to counter-attack. This presented good targets to the
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coalition air forces. Divisional staff must understand how best to exploit the
availability of air assets. This stretches from having the right number of
appropriately trained staff able to exploit air planning procedures, to adopting a
flexible approach to the use of air assets when they unexpectedly become
available, as well as enabling the employment of air through the deployment of
forward air controllers. In Iraq, both this and coalition interoperability were achieved
through the deployment of Air and Naval Gunfire Liaison Company (ANGLICO)
teams from the adjacent USMC.
• Air Manoeuvre. US Army, USMC and British helicopters successfully conducted a
number of close aviation attack missions throughout the operation. Similarly, 3 Cdo
Bde conducted an adventurous and highly successful air assault on to the Al Faw
Peninsula on the night of 20-21 Mar. Lessons drawn from these operations indicate
that the conditions for success were set by the achievement of surprise, up to date
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intelligence, effective C2, combined and joint planning, as well as the rapid relief,
reinforcement, or withdrawal of the force before surprise had diminished.
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• Coalition Interoperability. British and US forces cooperated well and to a degree
of subordination not previously foreseen (15 MEU was subordinated to 3 Cdo Bde
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and 1 (UK) Armd Div to 1 MEF). The success of these command arrangements
can largely be attributed to the trust that developed through personal relationships,
as well as the trend of interoperability based on NATO and ABCA, which had been
developed on other operations.
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• Rear Area Security. With its mix of regular, irregular and insurgent forces, the
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operating environment presented an increased risk to what had previously been

deemed rear areas. There were several incidents of attacks taking place against
lightly armed force elements. Whilst some risk was accepted in the rear areas,
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RHQ and one squadron of the QDG along with 12 Regt RA had to be re-tasked to
provide security.
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• Hot Stabilisation. The requirement for force elements to be able to transition

rapidly to stabilisation support tasks was illustrated. Three units were allocated
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peace support tasks after 6 Apr. These tasks were allocated at short notice and with
no scope for any in theatre training .
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Further Reading:
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Crown Copyright: Operations in Iraq – An Analysis from the Land Perspective (Dec 04).
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1
Operations in Iraq – An Analysis from the Land Perspective
, dated Dec 04.
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1 (UK) Armd Div Area of Operations
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The Capture of Meiktila by 17th Division – an extract from “Defeat into Victory” by
Field Marshal Viscount Slim.
‘To revert to the 17th Division and 255 Tank Brigade, poised for the attack on Meiktila. The
reports Cowan was receiving warned him that the garrison of the town would be stronger
than first estimated and that, while the outer defences extended in an oval some three
miles by four and a half all round Meiktila, those on the west, where the two large lakes
covered much of the front, would be the most difficult to attack. He knew, also, that
considerable bodies of Japanese were roaming the neighbourhood and closing in on the
town. The need to seize Meiktila and the airfield on its eastern outskirts, before the enemy
could come in strength to the rescue, was urgent. He decided therefore to block the main
approaches with detachments a few miles out and using mobility, armour and air support
to the utmost, put in his main attacks from the north and east.
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Cowan’s moves were bold and flexible. On the morning of 28 February, leaving all but
essential fighting transport behind at Thabutkon, 63 Brigade, brushing aside light
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opposition, marched to an area about two miles north-west of Meiktila. From there it
pushed on its forward troops until they were in close contact with the western defences,
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while a strong roadblock was placed across the main road from Chauk. At the same time
the divisional artillery, with one battalion to help their protection, came into action about
two miles farther back, in a position from which the guns could support attacks on the town
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from any direction. 48 Brigade, moving astride the road from Thabutkon, struck at
Kasuya’s northern defences, but was held up until nightfall by one of the strongest enemy
positions around a monastery on the edge of the town.
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255 Tank Brigade, with two infantry battalions and a self-propelled twenty-five-pounder
battery under its command, moved rapidly by bounds round the north, north-east and east
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of Meiktila. The roads to Thazi and Pyawbwe were blocked and, after a most exhilarating
ten-mile sweep across country, the tanks and their infantry regrouped to the east of
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Meiktila. Cowan put the bulk of his artillery and air support at their disposal and well
coordinated, accurate and heavy bombardment and air strikes preceded the tanks as, with
the infantry on their tails, they roared to the assault. This armoured onrush was met by
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very heavy artillery, anti-tank and machine-gun fire from a deep screen of mutually
supporting bunkers and fortified houses.
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Cowan’s conduct of this difficult and divided battle was impressive. With his main attention
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fixed on the various assaulting brigades, he had at frequent intervals to glance over his
shoulder as ground and air reports of Japanese movements in the surrounding country
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were brought to him. He had, too, all the anxieties of an air supply line, which rested on
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precariously held landing strips, at a time when ammunition and petrol expenditure was at
its highest. Not least, he was very short of sleep and remained so for several days. Yet
throughout he was alert to every change in the situation on any sector and swung his air
and artillery support to meet and take advantage of it. His firm grip on his own formations
and on the enemy never faltered. To watch a highly skilled, experienced and resolute
commander controlling a hard-fought battle is to see, not only a man triumphing over the
highest mental and physical stresses, but an artist producing the effects in the most
complicated and difficult of all the arts. I thought as I watched what very good divisional
commanders I had’2.
2
Field Marshal Viscount Slim, .
Defeat into Victory
3-A-1-8
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ANNEX B TO
PART 3
DEFENSIVE ACTIONS
1. Defensive actions achieve success by defeating or deterring a threat, thus setting the
conditions for subsequent offensive action. The attacker may have the initiative, which
needs to be seized and retained by our own forces. A defensive action may see a
division, within a corps structure, engaged in major combat, preparing a strong defensive
position, as well as conducting pre-planned and opportunity offensive action.
Commanders must be resolute in their determination to seize and retain the initiative.
2. In a stabilisation mission, where the divisional HQ may be above the level of the fight,
defensive actions may need to be conducted albeit at a lower level within the overall
operational framework. As with offensive actions, lower level defensive actions aim to
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achieve effects primarily in the physical domain. Simultaneously the division may conduct
actions in the other domains including media engagement and psychological activities, in
order to shape perceptions and achieve influence outside the geographical limits of the
physical battle.
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3. Objectives. The objectives of a defensive action include:
C
a. To gain time. ED
b. To force enemy concentration, thus making him more vulnerable.
c. To write down the enemy’s offensive capability.
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d. To fix the enemy in order to enable offensive action elsewhere.

e. To retain vital ground or key terrain.
O
f. To provide a secure environment, thus enabling stabilisation activities.

TR
4. Principles. The principles of defensive actions are:

N
a. Conduct offensive action in order to seize or regain the initiative.

O
b. Maintain all round defence in order to anticipate a threat from any direction.
C
c. Achieve mutual support to increase defensive strength and flexibility.

N
d. Achieve depth in order to prevent the effects of penetration.

U
e. Deception and concealment in order to deny the enemy understanding.

f. Maintain a reserve.
Types of Defensive Action
5. Mobile Defence. Mobile defence seeks to decisively defeat or destroy an attacking
enemy through manoeuvre coupled with offensive action. Greater depth is required, with a
corresponding trade-off in mutual support. Our own force mobility needs to be equal to or
greater than that of the enemy. There are 2 key force groupings:
a. Fixing Force. The fixing force will seek to degrade enemy capability, shape his
movement and reduce his ability to respond to the eventual strike. The fixing force
3-B-1
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must have sufficient combat power and mobility to find the enemy, draw him in and
contain him but not become overwhelmed.
b. Striking Force. The striking force aims to destroy or defeat the enemy and
should be cued on to the appropriate point in the enemy’s mass at the right moment.
The striking force requires sufficient combat power to defeat the enemy and thus may
be greater than 2/3 of the total available combat power. Sufficient understanding is
required in order to determine the appropriate point and time to execute the strike.
6. Area Defence. Area defence seeks to secure ground and deny it to the enemy. The
strike may not be a single decisive act, but may be a sustained attrition of the enemy
throughout his depth. Area defence will be preferred if own force mobility is less than that
of the enemy. Area defence concentrates combat power in key positions, which may
create undefended or weakly held space elsewhere. This space needs to be understood
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and how enemy forces within it may be shaped and struck. This will be particularly
challenging in complex terrain where enemy movement may be masked and where the
use of strike assets may become frustrated. Also, area defence risks the enemy retaining
the initiative, fixing and isolating the defensive positions and then defeating them in detail.
O
a. Covering Force. The covering force will seek to understand the enemy’s
C
purpose, deceive him, shape his movement and dislocate his forces, thus
undermining his will and cohesion. The covering force will handover the battle to the
ED
force in the main defensive area. The covering force should be supported by ISTAR
and joint fires.
b. Area Defence Force. The Area Defence Force will be positioned in the Main
LL
Defensive Area (MDA) and will hold ground using a matrix of defensive positions with
small, mobile reserves to conduct local counter attacks. The area defence force will
likely be most of the total force available. Defensive positions should be sited to
O
cover vital ground and key terrain. Mutual support will be critical in order to prevent
enemy penetration.
TR
c. Reserves. Reserves will counter attack to defeat any enemy breakthrough or

unforeseen threats. Formal counter attack options need to be considered,
N
resourced, properly planned and rehearsed. A counter attacking force may lack a full
understanding of the situation when committed, with success lying in tempo, seizing
O
the initiative and the rapid application of force.

C
Delaying Actions
N
7. Purpose. The intent of the delay is to slow an enemy’s advance and may be
imposed through the conduct of a mobile defensive battle, or by a hard fought area
U
defence. Often a covering force will conduct a delaying action as a prelude to a defensive
action, or during a withdrawal. Delaying actions tend to take place in unfavourable
conditions when the enemy has the initiative.
8. Types of Delaying Action. There are 2 types of delaying action:
a. Delay from Alternate Positions. A discrete element of a delaying force moves
from the first delaying position, through or around an occupied second delaying
position, in order to establish a third delaying position. This process is repeated as
necessary.
3-B-2
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b. Delay from Successive Positions. Elements of a delaying force disengage

from the first delaying position and move to establish a second delaying position.
Forces still in contact will then fight their way to the second delaying position.
9. Principles. The principles of delaying actions are:
a. Keep it simple.
b. Exploit manoeuvre.
c. Conduct offensive action.
d. Deceive the enemy.
e. Maintain contact with the enemy.
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f. Maintain freedom of action.
O
Appendix:
C
1. Defensive Actions.
Schematics ED
Aides memoire
Vignette
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3-1-B-3 .secrof .erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene :WE •

no wollof morf stnemele dael ymene reveS • SREPC fo gnildnaH • .PATS - sessenkaew/shtgnerts .tnemnorivne º063 ni dootsrednu
.serif tnioj htiw troppuS • .tnemnorivne °063 elbissop ni PF CoL / SSC • ,spag ,hcaorppa fo seuneva no sucof :RATSI • eb tsum ytilibarenluV .yradnuob raer
.elibom .ti ot noitcaer ymene rotinom .gniog ,selcatsbo lanoisivid eht ot ADM eht morf kcab sdnetxE •
dna detcetorp eb ot sdeen ecroF ekirtS • – elbisualp ,decruoser :nalp noitpeceD • larutan ,setuor ,niarret lacisyhp :EPI • saerA raeR
.etucexe ot kciuq – nalp elpmiS • .tnemlaecnoc dna egalfuomaC • .sAOC ylekil ,ecnavda fo sixa .ecrof gnirevoc eht morf revodnah retfa thguof
.noitca .noitisiuqca ecnegilletni ymene yned :CESPO • ,tnetni ,sevreser / secrof no wollof ,seitilibapac eb lliw elttab evisnefed evisiced eht erehW •
evisneffo ot noitisnart – noitanimluc ymenE • .ksir edicirtarf WE • yek ,ytivarg fo ertnec ,shtgnerts ymene :EPI • )ADM( aerA evisnefeD niaM
.detcudnoc
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kcattA retnuoC .NRBC • ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI eb lliw elttab ecrof gnirevoc eht erehw aera
.noissim htiw eunitnoc dluohs secrof detalosI • ?ecrof gnirevoc ,setuor .emit noitaraperp deriuqeR • eht – aera evisnefed niam eht fo drawroF •
.noitartenep ymene fo level emos tcepxE • ,saera nug ,snoitisop evisnefed :seitiroirp DA • .krowemarf snoitacinummoC • )AFC( aerA ecroF gnirevoC
.evreser emoceb yam ecroF gnirevoC • .stimrep emit fi thgin ta snoitisop eraperP • .rednammoC lanoisiviD fo noitisoP • snoitarepO fo aerA
.evitaitini eht gniniager ot laitnessE • .noitargetnI elcatsbO smrA denibmoC • .noisehoc
.aera evisnefed
niam ni ecnavda ymene skcehc hcihw
ecroF gnidnefeD / gnixiF ot revodnah elttaB •
O .sehcnert / selcatsbo
– sksat tnemevorpmi ytilibavivrus :sreenignE •
.noitcerid
yradnuob ,snoitamrof gniknalf :nosiaiL •
.secneuqesnoc – epols esrever / drawroF •
.)level GB – nwod 2( snoitisop fo gnitiS •
.noitartenep retnuoc ot evreser eliboM •
.ecrof mumixam htiw xiF •
.LOPR stcudnoc ecrof gnirevoC • C
yna morf kcatta tsniaga deraperp snoitisoP • ?noitasinagro ksat fo tnemtsujdA •
.erif gnikcolretni / gnippalrevO •
htped ssel – snoitisop gnitroppus yllautuM •
kcolB ehT .erif tceridni .skcatta retnuoc lacol lortnoc ot .ymene fo taht naht ssel eb yam ytilibom nwO •
.emit eht ta noitautis eht no dneped dna ecnallievrus yb derevoc spag erusnE • sedagirb ot ymonotua retaerg :ecnefeD aerA • .dnuorg ymene yned ot miA •
ED
lliw ecroF gnirevoC fo noitasinagro ksaT • noitcetorP .ksat ’ekirts‘ fo lortnoc :ecnefed eliboM • ecnefeD aerA
.ksat edagirb a ylbissoP • .snosrep decalpsid .detcudnoc eb ot si ecnefed woh enimreteD • .emit dna ecalp evisiced ta ekirtS •
.degagne ylevisiced emoceb ton seoD • dna seegufer fo tnemeganam / lortnoC • .niarret yek dna dnuorg lativ dnatsrednU • .ecrof mumixam - ekirts ,ecrof muminim - xiF •
.aera evisnefed niam ot sa ymene evieceD • .noitartenep sniamod .troppus lautum ssel - deriuqer htped retaerG •
.serif tnioj htiw troppuS • ymene retnuoc ot evreser fo ytilibarvueonaM • )lacigolohcysp( evitingoc dna )tnemegagne
.noitcurtsed mumixam gnitcilfni ,stpursid
dna setacolsid ,yaled sesopmi ecroF gnirevoC •
hcaorppA ehT
.ytiruces ecrof nwo ot staerht retnuoC •
LL
.skcatta gniliops / retnuoc lacol
tcudnoc ot ytilibarvueonam :ecnefed aerA •
.ytilibarvueonam ecrof ekirts :ecnefed eliboM •
?snoitilomed devreseR •
aidem( lautriv ,lacisyhp ni ervueonaM •

)B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoc MIIJC •
dnammoC
snoitaredisnoC gninnalP
.ymene eht fo taht

ot lauqe ro naht retaerg eb tsum ytilibom nwO •
.ymene yortsed / taefed ot si miA •
ecnefed eliboM
noitcA evisnefeD fo sepyT
.noitisop evisnefed eraperp dna etiS •
.serif tnioj htiw htped ni ymene kcattA •
.seitilibapac RATSI ymene elkcaT •
.stniop ekohc ylekil
yfitnedi ,lained etuor ,sreirrab :ytilibom ymenE •
.snoitaredisnoc tnemecnahne
O .detutitsnocer eb tsum dettimmoc
ecnO .stneve detcepxenu htiw laed - eliboM •
.evreser a niatniaM •
.gnidnatsrednu
.sreyalp yek ecneulfnI •
.stimrep emit fi slasraeher tcudnoC •
.emagraw – nalp evisnefed enifeR •
noitaraperP elttaB dna gnipahS
tcudnoC
dna ecnanetniam etuor ,ytilibom nwO •

.selcatsbo laicifitra / larutan ,dnuorg ,serif gnisu
saera gnillik niam otni ymene lennahc :epahS •
ervueonaM
TR sevreseR
.dnuorg tsol gnikater
rof ro noitartenep ymene rehtruf gnitneverp
ta demia skcatta retnuoc lacol tcudnoc
ot derutcurts eb lliw secrof – ecnefeD aerA •
ymene yned – tnemlaecnoc dna noitpeceD •

.noitartenep
fo stceffe tneverp – htped eveihcA •
.ytilibixelf dna htgnerts
.elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca ot detis lortnoc erif ,sedon 2C ,eccer - gnimmaj :WE •
.sten N .ytilibom dna rewop
tabmoc mumixam gnidivorp gnipuorg smra
evisnefed esaercni – troppus lautum eveihcA •
.noitcerid yna morf
taerht etapicitna - ecnefed dnuor lla niatniaM •
seitilibapac CAVEDEM / tnemtaert :lacideM •
.ytirohtua dna ycilop – lained tnempiuqE •
.drawrof ytilibapac riaper dna yrevocer :SE •
.)noitan tsoh ,noitalupop lacol( snoitaredisnoc
stceffe redro dnoces dna egamad laretalloC •
?ecroF gnirevoC
O
denibmoc tneiciffus fles a – ecnefeD eliboM •
.ecrof gnidnefed / gnixif eht htiw
aera evisnefed niam eht ni elttab eht sthgiF •
.evitaitini
eht niager / ezies ot noitca evisneffo tcudnoC •
selpicnirP
.)ecnefed elibom ni yksir(
skcots fo gnipmud drawrof :ecnefeD aerA •
.skcatta retnuoc dna ecroF
troppus ot drawrof snug emos noitisoP •
?esirprus eveihca ot dlohhtiw ro ylrae egagnE •
.seitilibapac
C
ecroF gnikcattA retnuoC / ekirtS
.rewop tabmoc elbaliava fo 3/2
naht erom eb yam ecrof eht – ecnefeD aerA •
.noitasilibats elbane ot ytiruces edivorp oT •
ekirtS rof omma dna leuf tneiciffus erusnE •
.ycneiciffus mumixam erusne
erif tcerid dna IAT ,AK ,nalp elcatsbo
htiw serif fo noitargetni - gnicneuqes tegraT •
N
.rewop tabmoc elbaliava fo 3/1
naht ssel eb yam ecrof eht – ecnefeD eliboM •
.niarret yek ro dnuorg lativ niater oT •
.erehwesle
noitca evisneffo gnilbane ,ymene eht xif oT •
ot ylppuser tneuqerf rof eraperp :scitsigoL •
.knil ylppus gninoitcnuf launitnoc niatniaM •
.noitca evisneffo
.sedon 2C ,yrettab
retnuoc ,secrof no wollof :stegrat htpeD •
.seitiroirp gnitegraT •
.aera evisnefed niam eht ni elttab eht sthgiF •
ecroF gnidnefeD / gnixiF
.ecnavda sih gnirud ymene eht gnivieced
U .ytilibapac s’ymene eht yortsed oT •
.ytilibarenluv - ymene eht etartnecnoc oT •
.emit niag oT •
tneuqesbus rof eraperp - daeha kooL • stegrat ot etairporppa AI dna citenik esU • dna gnisinagrosid ,gniyaled ,gnigagne sevitcejbO
.serots ecnefed fo noitacollA • .epahs dna dnefed ot deilppa ,gnivresbo yb elttab ecrof gnirevoc eht sthgiF •
.seitiroirP • eb ot sdeen rewoperif erehw enimreteD • ecroF gnirevoC .noitca evisneffo tneuqesbus rof snoitidnoc
tnemniatsuS rewoperiF sgnipuorG tnemelE ecroF tes dna taerht a reted ro taefed oT esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :SNOITCA EVISNEFED LANOISIVID
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LL
O
TR
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C
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6-1-B-3
.elpicnirp .)sten lortnoc erif ,2C ,eccer ymene
4-2-1 eveihca ot detis seitilibapac tegrat( noitpeced dna gnimmaj :WE •
CAVEDEM / tnemtaert :lacideM • .srotca rehto / noitalupop
.ytirohtua / ycilop :lained tnempiuqE • lacol no stceffe dna egamad laretalloC •
.riaper drawrof dna yrevocer :SE • ?ecrof gnirevoc
.depmud troppus ot drawrof snug emos noitisoP •
drawrof fi ymene ot kcots gnisol fo ksiR • .elttab .ytilibixelf
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.omma dna leuf :skcatta retnuoC • elibom ni noitacilppa cimanyd – MCSF • sseL .noitisop .snoitisop eht neewteb
.ylppuser tneuqerf rof eraperP • .)seitilibapac gnihcaerb / gnigdirb hcae eraperp ot emit .stnemele tilps eb ot secrof
.knil ,yrettab retnuoc ,DA ,2C ,eccer ymene sseL .noitisop yaled tabmoc elbaliava tneiciffusni era ereht snoitisoP
ylppuser gninoitcnuf launitnoc niatniaM • ,stegrat htped( seitiroirp gnitegraT • eht ot htped detimiL lla fo serif eht sessaM dna ediw si OA ehT evisseccuS morf yaleD
.noitca .stessa erif tcerid dna IAT ,selcatsbo
evisneffo tneuqesbus :daeha gnikooL • htiw etargetni - gnicneuqes tegraT •
O
.)evisnetxe .ymene epahs ot deilppa
eb ot ylekil noitinumma yrellitra fo esu( eb dluohs rewoperif erehw enimreteD •
leuf dna noitinumma :seitiroirp citsigoL •
tnemniatsuS
C
etairporppa AI dna sdohtem citenik esU •
.tegrat ot .serif dna .snoitisop
ecrof fo noitartnecnoc .ytilibixelf sesaercnI tnereffid neewteb

.SREPC fo gnildnaH • rewoperiF sseL .senil fo egassap .noitatilibaher rof emit tilps eb nac taht secrof
.tnemnorivne .sksat noitcetorp/ytiruces dna noitcelloc
ED
seriuqeR .noitanidrooc erom swollA .htped tneiciffus era ereht snoitisoP
taerht º063 ni ytilibarenluv dnatsrednU • neewteb stessa RATSI ecnalaB • suounitnoc seriuqeR ni gninoitisop swollA dna worran si OA ehT etanretlA morf yaleD
.)snoitisop .erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene – WE •
ymmud( noitcaer ymene rotinom .sessenkaew segatnavdasiD segatnavdA nehW esU noitcA gniyaleD fo epyT
– nalp noitpeced decruoser ,elbisualP • dna shtgnerts yfitnedI .spag ,hcaorppa
.noitisiuqca
ecnegilletni ymene retnuoc – CESPO •
.ksir edicirtarf WE •
.NRBC •
.)sedon 2C ,setuor ,saera
fo seuneva no sucof – RATSI •

larutan ,setuor ,niarret lacisyhp – EPI •
.tnetni ,AOC ,sevreser ,ecnavda fo
etar ,setuor ,sexa ,seitilibapac ,htgnerts
LL
.gniog ,selcatsbo
srotcaF - noitc A gniyaleD fo epyT
.ecnalab ffo si ymene eht nehw ro ,serif
yb detroppus ,noitisop evisnefed a hguorht noitca fo modeerf niatniaM •
nug ,snoitisop evisnefed( seitiroirp DA •
.noitargetni elcatsbo smra denibmoC •
ymene dnatsrednu ot deeN - EPI •
.tnemnorivne
O
LOPR a evlovni yam dna laicurc si tcatnoc
kaerb ot tnemom tcerroc eht gnigduJ •
tcatnoC gnikaerB
.noitisop gniyaled
dnoces siht ot yaw rieht
thgif neht lliw tcatnoc ni llits
.tcatnoc niatniaM •
ymene eht evieceD •
noitca evisneffo tcudnoC •
.snoitisop
evisnefed / selcatsbo fo noitcurtsnoc
– tnemevorpmi ytilibavivrus reenignE •
.serif tnioj / ecnallievrus - spag revoC •
noitcetorP
noitamrofni gnignahc yldipaR •

.laitnesse elarom gniniatniaM •
.ecnatsid elbaredisnoc a eb dluoc
tahw revo krowemarf noitacinummoC •
TR
.ymene eht yortsed ot seitinutroppo tiolpxe
dna detcepxenu eht htiw laeD : sevreseR -
.noitpeced
dna skcatta retnuoc ,selcatsbo ,snoitisop
era taht secrof ehT .noitisop

gniyaled dnoces a hsilbatse
ot evom dna noitisop gniyaled
tsrif eht morf egagnesid
ecrof gniyaled a fo stnemelE •
ervueonam tiolpxE •
elpmis ti peeK •
:selpicnirP
.snoitidnoc lacitcat
.)setuor evitanretla ,tnemevom
gnitcirtser( seegufer fo tnemeganaM •
.setuor yek fo esu ymene yneD •
.nalp MB poleveD •
.srevodnah elttab nalP •
.egats hcae
eht etacolsid dna tpursiD :
N
gnidloh ,serif egnar gnol gnitiolpxe yb ymene
secroF gniyaleD -
snoitisoP
evisseccuS morf yaleD
elbaruovafnu ni detcudnoc eb
ot dnet yeht dna evitaitini eht
?tnemevom
yranimilerp rof tnemeriuqeR •
ta airetirc tnemegagnesid poleveD •
.snoitamrof tnecajda htiw nosiaiL •
.degagne ylevisiced emoceb ton seoD .tpursidO
dna yaled ot seitinutroppo sezies dna ymene
eht no noitamrofni sedivorP : -
.yrassecen sa detaeper
gnieb ssecorp ehT .raer eht ot
sah yllausu ymene eht ,noitca
gniyaled a nI .noitca evisnefed
a ot edulerp a sa noitca
.selcatsbo larutan
evorpmi / esu – ytilibom ymene yneD •
.ytilibarvueonam nwo evorpmI •
.level GB – nwod owt gnitiS •
.niarret yek dna dnuorg lativ dnatsrednu
– snoitisop yaled fo noitceleS •
C
neercS ehT
:stnemele eerht fo stsisnoC •
noitcA gniyaleD ehT
rehtruf noitisop gniyaled driht
a hsilbatse ot redro ni ,noitisop
gniyaled a tcudnoc netfo
lliw ecrof gnirevoc A .elttab
.stessa troppus ervueonam
yb tnemecnahne / ecnanetniam etuoR •
.noitasinagro ksat enimreteD •
.)evisseccus
.enola tfel eb yam
taht strap eht dna derotinom eb ylno deen
N
gniyaled dnoces a dnuora ro
hguorht ,noitisop gniyaled tsrif
eht morf sevom ecrof gniyaled
evisnefed aera na gnitcudnoc
yb ro ,elttab evisnefed elibom
a fo tcudnoc eht hguorht
.seccer etuoR •
?snoitilomed evreseR •
.htped s’ymene tuohguorht.
ro etanretla( noitca gniyaled fo epyT •
.rednammoc
fo noitisop dna erutcurts QH •
taht saera eht ,detcudnoc eb lliw noitca eht
erehw enimreted ot sdeen rednammoc ehT •
noitaraperP elttaB dna gnipahS
U
eht fo tnemele etercsid A •
snoitisoP
etanretlA morf yaleD
desopmi eb yam yaleD •
.ecalp ekat ot snoitca
lacitcat rehto wolla ot redro ni
skcatta retnuoc / gniliops tcudnoC • .ecneulfni gniveihca fo snaem ecnavda s’ymene na wols oT •
.saera gnillik otni ymene lennahC • citenik non dna citenik lla redisnoC • noitcA gniyaleD a fo segatS noitcA gniyaleD fo sepyT :esopruP
.selcatsbo / serif htiw ymene epahS • )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoC MIIJC •
.htped ni yaleD • :dnammoC
ervueonaM SNOITAREDISNOC GNINNALP
ERIOMEM EDIA :SNOITCA GNIYALED LANOISIVID
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Delay And Defence – Withdrawal from Gazala and the First Battle Of El Alamein
During the Second World War, British strategic interests in Egypt were seriously
threatened by the defeat at Gazala in May/June 1942, where the commander of Panzer
Army Afrika, Erwin Rommel, used superior mobility to great advantage. Although Rommel
was taking considerable sustainment risk in mounting his offensive, the fall of Tobruk on
21 June meant that he now had a port that would enable him to shorten his supply lines as
he advanced east. Arguably, Rommel should have paused to allow Tobruk port to
become fully operational, however he felt that maintaining tempo, capturing fuel as he
advanced and keeping the British off balance was the better course of action.
CinC Middle East Command, General Claude Auchinleck, re-evaluated his options and
decided to defend a line atthEl Alamein, 100 km from Alexandria, which meant conducting a
delaying action, with the th8 Army, from the Libyan/Egyptian frontier, over a distance of 550
PY
km. At El Alamein, the 8 Army’s right flank would be anchored on the sea, while its left
flank, 65 km to the south, would be anchored on the Qattara Depression, an area where
the terrain prevented any form of armoured manoeuvre. The undulating ground, rising
O
gently from the sea to the Qattara Depression, was punctuated by a series of ridges that
were high enough to allow observation over the bulk of the defensive area.
C
Auchinleck also made two key organisational decisions. He maximised infantry mobility,
using all available transport in theatre and accelerated the development of centralising
ED
artillery control at the highest practical level. The 8 Army needed to be a highly mobile
th
field force, with sufficient firepower such that it could manoeuvre effectively against a
highly mobile opponent, without formations and units being caught in static positions and
LL
destroyed. Holding ground was not necessarily essential, but keeping the force intact was.
For the delaying action, XIII Corps held the frontier with 1st
South African Division, 10th
O
Indian Division and 7th Armoured Division as its mobile strike force. The corps was to hold
up the Panzer Army Afrika for as long as possible, maintain contact, but not to become
TR
decisively engaged. The corps was to break clean at the appropriate moment and
withdraw to the Mersa Matruh position, 300 km to the east, where a more significant battle
was envisaged. The South African Division was to withdraw all the way to El Alameinndand
N
re-group with XXX Corps who were preparing the Alamein defences. X Corps, with 2
New Zealand, 5th Indian and 50th Northumbrian Divisions was tasked to prepare the Mersa
O
Matruh position. Although a major battle, it was still designed to be a holding engagement.
Auchinleck was aware of the position’s weakness, with the risk of the 8 Army’s open left
th
C
flank being turned, as at Gazala. Being able to break clean and withdraw east in good
N
order, to an intermediate position at Fuka and then onto the main El Alamein defensive
line, was critical.
U
On 23 June, Panzer Army Afrika quickly outflanked XIII corps to its south. There was no
major action and XIII corps safely disengaged, destroying stock that could not be
withdrawn. Held up by fuel shortages and attacks by the Desert Air Force (DAF), Panzer
Army Afrika eventually started its attack at Mersa Matruh on 26 June. XIII Corps held the
south of the line and X Corps were in the north. Rommel’s intent was to cut the coast road
to the east of Mersa Matruh, effectively trapping X Corps. However, this was frustrated by
intense, concentrated artillery fire. XIII Corps was also attacked and their position
penetrated, though these initial penetrations were successfully checked.
Given the threat of imminent encirclement, the withdrawal order was given late on 27
June. Poor communications caused confusion and a near tragedy. XIII Corps
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commenced its withdrawal during the night, however X Corps did not receive the
withdrawal order until early on 28 June, by which time it had been encircled. X Corps
successfully broke out of its encircled position on the night of 28 June and commenced its
withdrawal eastwards, though suffering considerable losses in the process. The 8 Army
th
withdrew directly to El Alamein as the Fuka plan was abandoned.

Certain factors were shifting in Auchinleck’s favour. Lines of communication were
shortening, making re-supply easier. Rommel’s long supply lines were teetering on the
edge of failure, as well as being under constant attack from the DAF who were gaining
superiority in the air against a stretched Luftwaffe. Also, there was the new special forces
dimension. The SAS and the Long Range Desert Group (LRDG) were sent deep into the
enemy’s rear areas, striking logistics and Luftwaffe ground targets to good effect.
At El Alamein, work was underway on three fortified positions in the line. The Alamein box
PY
protected the north of the line and the coast road. The Bab el Qattara box sat in the
middle of the line south west of the important Ruweisat Ridge feature and at the edge of
the Qattara depression sat the Nagb Abu Dweis box. Realising the importance of the
O
Ruweisat Ridge feature, a fourth brigade sized box was created at Deir el Shein, at the
western end of the ridge.
C
XXX Corps was positioned in the north, with the 1st South African Division occupying the
Alamein box and the ground to the south down to Ruweisat Ridge. 1st Armoured Division
were positioned in depth,
ED
straddling the eastern end of Ruweisat Ridge, ready to act as a
mobile strike force. 18th Indian Infantry Brigade, recently arrived from Syria, occupied the
Deir el Shein box, protecting the western end of the Ruweisat Ridge. XIII Corps covered
LL
the southern half of the line with the 2 New Zealand Division occupying the Bab el
nd
Qattara box (now nicknamed the Kaponga box) and positions to the east. The depleted 5th
Indian Division occupied the Nagb Abu Dweis box on the edge of the Qattara Depression.
O
In depth, acting as a mobile strike force sat the depleted 7th Armoured Division. X Corps,
which had been badly mauled during the delaying action at Mersa Matruh was withdrawn
TR
to the Nile delta to commence defensive preparations should the El Alamein line not hold.
50 Northumbrian Division remained behind to act as the 8 Army’s reserve.
th th
N
Short of fuel, manpower, tanks and without a complete understanding of the 8th Army’s
dispositions, Rommel started his attack on 1 Jul 1942. His initial thrust aimed to break the
O
line south of the Alamein box, with the intent of cutting the coast road to the east of El
Alamein, with a second thrust exploiting south into the 8 Army’s rear areas. The coast
th
C
road thrust was halted by the strong defences in the Alamein box, coupled with intense,
N
massed concentrations of artillery fire. The force elements tasked to exploit south, already
hit by the DAF, unexpectedly ran into the Deir el Shein box covering the Ruweisat Ridge,
U
which stalled their ability to manoeuvre into the rear of the 8 Army. The Deir el Shein box
th
was eventually overrun at last light.

The next day, 2 July, Rommel ordered a continuation of the original plan. The force
elements tasked to cut the coast road were again stopped at the Alamein box, forcing
Rommel to rethink.
This hiatus gave Auchinleck an opportunity to take offensive action. 50th Northumbrian
Division were brought forward to reinforce the South Africans and together held the
northern German thrust. 1 Armoured Division was re-grouped
st
south to XIII Corps, to
spearhead a manoeuvre cutting into the German rear with 2nd New Zealand Division. Over
the next two days, the Panzer Army Afrika was stopped in its tracks. The momentum of
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Contents Page
XIII Corps eventually faltered due to a lack of resources (the remainder of X Corps being
on the Nile delta), however Rommel was forced to accept temporary defeat.
From the British perspective, the main defensive phase of the battle had finished. Over
the coming weeks, the 8th Army engaged in a tug of war with the Panzer Armyth Afrika and
there were a number of significant offensive actions, mostly initiated by the 8 Army. The
1st battle of El Alamein effectively ended on 31 July 1942 with both sides strengthening
their defensive positions, each having fought to a standstill. Rommel made one more
unsuccessful push to break the 8th Army line at Alam el Halfa at the end of August,
however by October the tide had shifted sufficiently to allow the 8 Army, now commanded
th
by General Montgomery, to initiate the Second Battle of El Alamein and go on the

offensive.
Key factors in the British Success at the First Battle of El Alamein include:
PY
• Sustainment. Rommel’s decision to press on immediately after the capture of
Tobruk proved critical as sustainment staff had advocated a six week halt. Tobruk
O
would have opened up shortened lines of communication from Greece, rather than
supplies, materiel and reinforcements coming from Italy, into the Libyan ports far to
C
the west. By contrast, British lines of communication were ever shortening.
The Deep Battle. The deep battle that was fought by the DAF, as well as special
•
ED
forces, heavily interdicted these long precarious land lines of communication,
drastically reducing the level of combat supplies reaching Rommel’s front line.
LL
• Manoeuvre. The 8th Army’s mobility issues were addressed sufficiently and timely
enough to be effective, as well as the idea that, in this particular situation, the force
was all important and not necessarily the ground being held. This mobility enabled
O
the delaying action from the Libyan/Egyptian frontier back to the El Alamein
position, where the accent shifted to a more positional defence.
TR
• Protection. The El Alamein position was chosen because it could not be

outflanked, limiting Rommel’s ability to manoeuvre.
N
Firepower. The introduction of the most up to date artillery communications and

O
•
fire control procedures enabled concentrations of fire that were hitherto unheard of.
C
• Reserves. Committing the 50th Northumbrian Division to bolster the right flank was
N
a key decision, as it enabled the re-grouping of the highly mobile 1 Armoured

st
Division to XIII Corps. This further enabled the initial offensive action by this
U
division, as well as the New Zealand division, that blunted Rommel’s attacks.
• Offensive Action. The divisions within the 8th Army actedth solely as tactical
formations within their respective corps. Auchinleck, as 8 Army Commander, used
these divisions either as ground holding anchors or as manoeuvre formations,
exploiting opportunities to stop the enemy and then to conduct offensive action.
Further Reading:
Holland, James: Together We Stand (Harper Collins, 2005).
Jackson, WGF: The North African Campaign 1940-43 (Redwood Burn Ltd, 1975).
Moorehead, Alan: The Desert War (Aurum Press Ltd, 2009. Hamish Hamilton, 1944).
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Contents Page
PY
The map above illustrates the distance over
O
which the 8 Army’s original withdrawal took
th
place from the Gazala line to the Libyan /
C
Egyptian border, followed by the delaying
ED action from the border to the El Alamein
position, via the engagement at Mersa
Matruh.
The map on the left shows some of the detail
LL
of the El Alamein position, noting key ridge

features and depressions, as well as
showing Rommel’s outline intent. The
O
northern thrust was aimed at cutting the

coast road, while the aim of the southern
TR
thrust was to exploit into the rear of the 8

th
Army. Rommel’s ability to manoeuvre was

severely constrained by the sea and the
N
Qattara Depression.
O
C
N
U
3-B-1- 9
Contents Page
ANNEX C TO
PART 3
STABILISING ACTIONS
1. Introduction. Stabilisation actions are defined as ‘Military operations which
contribute to order, security and control to set the conditions to allow the primacy of non-
military and indigenous organisations to develop accountable institutions and mechanisms
of government’ . Stabilisation operations may take place before, during and after major
1
combat, they will be operations in their own right and may including the following:
a. Non-combattant Evacuation Operations (NEO).
b. Peace Support Operations (PSO).
Disaster Relief.
PY
c.
d. Humanitarian Relief.
Security Sector Reform (SSR).
O
e.
Tactical Activities. Forces preparing for combat operations should also prepare for
C
2.
stabilisation. This will include hot stabilisation,2 through to the full restoration of
governance and SSR. There are four interrelated tactical activities within stabilisation,
ED
conducted within a framework of Information Activities and Outreach (IA&O):
a. Security & control.
LL
b. Initial restoration of essential services and facilities.

Interim governance tasks.
O
c.
Support to SSR.
TR
d.
3. Principles. The following principles apply to stabilisation actions:

Primacy of political purpose.
N
a.
Understand the human terrain.

O
b.
Secure the population.

C
c.
Gain and maintain popular support.

N
d.
Prepare for the long term.

U
e.
f. Unity of effort.
g. Integrate intelligence.
h. Neutralise the adversary / insurgent.
i. Operate in accordance with the law.
1
DLW, AFM Vol 1, Pt 9 Tactics for Stability Operations (Warminster: Army Publications, 2007), Amdt 1
(2013).
2
Restoring rule of law and humanitarian relief after major combat, leading onto subsequent stabilisation.
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j. Learn and adapt.

4. Supported and Supporting Departments. In a crisis, the military may not be the
main effort, but may conduct activities that create the conditions for other agencies to be
successful. Supported and supporting entities may change according to the agreed main
effort, with implications for command and control, responsibilities and funding.
5. Focus. The role of the divisional HQ is to coordinate, synchronise, prioritise and
resource the activities of the brigades under its command. It must, therefore, engage with
the host nation3 to understand its vision and how existing institutions work. It will also
need to understand the divide between divisional and brigade tasks. As a guide, the
following may help to differentiate division and brigade tasks:
a. Divisional HQ:
PY
(1) Planning, resourcing and coordinating the restructuring of host nation
Security Forces.
O
(2) ISTAR and targeting at divisional level.
Divisional level joint and combined operations, kinetic or otherwise.
C
(3)
(4) Coordinating and resourcing brigade actions with capabilities retained at

ED
the divisional level, such as command support, aviation, artillery, ISTAR and
sustainment assets, including the identification and committal of reserves.
Coordination with higher political and military authorities.
LL
(5)
(6) Future plans and contingency plans.

O
(7) Divisional IA&O, including the provision of metrics and the resources to
monitor and analyse influence outcomes.
TR
(8) Focus for media operations.

Synchronisation of military operations and information with the
N
(9)
development of essential services and the economy.

O
(10) Divisional rear operations.

C
b. Brigade HQ:
N
(1) Intelligence gathering and identifying sources of instability.

U
(2) The overwatch, training, supervision and mentoring of host nation security
forces.
(3) Security operations.
(4) Surge operations as required to restore law and order.
(5) Coordination with non-governmental organisations, civil ministries, donors,
reconstruction agencies and contractors.
3
It is down to the commander, with guidance from MOD, DfID and FCO, through JFC, to establish at what
level to engage with a host nation government. This may be at national, regional, or provincial level.
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(6) Border security (where appropriate until relieved by host nation security
forces).
(7) Infrastructure security until relieved by host nation security forces.
(8) Supporting media operations.
Stabilisation Planning Considerations
6. Command. Command in the CJIIM4 environment requires an integrated approach:
a. CJIIM. Coalition stabilisation operations will be subject to additional frictions.
Contributing nations may have strategic objectives that are not aligned with those of
UK. Their forces may operate under different remits and Rules of Engagement
(ROE) and chains of command may be complex. National agendas and the
PY
implications for the employment of troops must be understood and considered during
planning. Decision making is likely to be more complicated, slower and perhaps
more frustrating. National reporting chains should not be allowed to sideline the
O
coalition chain of command.
Integrated Approach. The requirement to conduct stability operations
C
b.
concurrently with war fighting will see divisional HQs absorbing additional specialist
support , which is likely to include: ED
(1) Additional Information Operations staff.
Operations Support.
LL
(2)
(3) Military Stabilisation and Support Group (MSSG).

O
(4) SSR.
TR
(5) Legal Advisor(s) (LEGAD).

(6) Policy Advisor(s) (POLAD).
N
(7) Operational Analysts (OA).

O
(8) Stabilisation Advisor (STABAD).

C
(9) Gender Advisors (GA).

N
(10) Cultural Advisors (CULAD).

U
c. Security Assistance Group (SAG). It should be noted that the MSSG,

STABAD, GA and CULAD form part of the Security Assistance Group (SAG), which
is under command of Force Troops Command (FTC).
Divisional staff may need to take on additional roles to enable the HQ to plan and execute
certain tactical activities. In particular support to SSR, interim governance tasks and the
restoration of essential services. Pre-deployment preparation should include role specific
individual training for staff and HQ collective training should include attached civilian and
4
See: DLW, Staff Officer’s Handbook (Land) (Warminster: Army Publications, 2012), section 1 for further
details.
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Contents Page
multinational staff5. As resources will never be unlimited, commanders and staff must
understand that a balance needs to be struck between force elements conducting core
military task related to the establishment and maintenance of security and those tasks that
constitute Military Aid to Civil Effects (MACE). The point where the balance lies will
depend on the security situation and the level of effort required to conduct the core military
tasks. As the security situation improves over time, or when host nation security forces
become more capable as part of SSR, more divisional force elements can be flexed to
support civil effects.
7. Information & Intelligence. Intelligence, particularly Human Intelligence (HUMINT),
is essential to the conduct of security tasks. It permits precise targeting and provides
wider situational awareness. Integral assets, such as field HUMINT Teams and Signal
Intelligence (SIGINT) teams, may6 be augmented by indigenous security forces and other
organisations (e.g. INTERPOL). The sharing of intelligence will help develop a climate of
PY
cooperation between multinational and indigenous forces, as well as other organisations.
8. Firepower.
O
a. ROE. Force must be applied within the ROE and legal advice should be sought
when planning its use. Force may achieve short term tactical gains, but may obstruct
C
long term objectives by having negative effects on unintended audiences.
Information Activities & Outreach. Information Activities & Outreach (IA&O)
b.
ED
enable the division to communicate with a range of target audiences, to influence
attitudes, perceptions and behaviour. This must be a joint approach involving Key
Leader Engagement (KLE) and effective messaging, linked to sound Target
LL
Audience Analysis (TAA). The division must coordinate messaging, but allow the
brigades to adapt their approaches for communication with the local population.
Effects may take some time to achieve and may be measured over months, as
O
opposed to the immediate effects that may be achieved in major combat. Any
information vacuum will be exploited by adversaries.
TR
9. Protection. In stability operations, protection should focus on 2 main areas:

N
a. Protect the Population. In Counter Insurgency (COIN) operations, the

population is the prize and must be provided with security that it trusts. Therefore
O
there must be a constant, effective presence of security forces, whether coalition or

indigenous, or a combination of the two. Threats to individuals that perpetuate the
C
abuse of human rights, stemming from cultural practices need to be considered.

N
b. Force Protection. Force protection decisions should be devolved to the lowest

possible level. The ability for a local commander to reduce the posture on the ground
U
will provide the population with greater confidence in local security, thus avoiding the
COIN Paradox, ‘The more you protect your force, the less secure you are’ . 7
c. Reputational Protection. Military police provide an independent investigative

capability that can respond to the reporting of matters of concern that may impact on
operational effectiveness. The appropriate and diligent investigation of such matters
5
All augmentees should arrive with the divisional HQ prior to Mission Specific Collective Training and
possessing the correct staff skills.
6
DLW, AFM Vol 1 Part 3 ISTAR (Warminster: Army Publications, 2011) contains more detail on Intelligence
activities.
7
DLW, AFM 1-10 Countering Insurgency (Warminster: Army Publications, 2010), 3-16.
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Contents Page
will ensure that the deployed division meets its statutory obligations under domestic
and international law.
10. Manoeuvre . During stabilisation, manpower and equipment may be used out of role.
For example, the re-rolling of artillery units as ground holding infantry units (less those
involved in ISTAR and precision strike), or as additional manpower to assist with
reconstruction projects.
Security and Control
11. Establishing and maintaining the rule of law is essential, particularly in hot
stabilisation, where host nation law and order institutions may not be functioning effectively
and where international police may not immediately be available. Responsibility for
enforcing law and order will likely fall to the military, therefore the divisional HQ will be
required to plan and resource accordingly. Consideration should be given to rerolling
PY
troops that are no longer employed in major combat.
. ADP Operations lists a number of headline tactical tasks associated
O
12. Military Tasks
with security and control. AFM Vol 1 Part 9 provides details for the conduct of these tasks
which are listed below:
C
a. Patrolling, route and convoy protection.
ED
b. Public Order Operations.
c. Cordon and Search.
LL
d. Separation of Hostile Forces.

Enforcement of Out of Bounds Areas.
O
e.
Curfews.
TR
f.
g. Prisoner and Detainee Handling . 8

N
h. Movement of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDP).

O
13. In order to achieve the required effects within these headline tasks, troops from the
deployed division may be required to conduct a range of kinetic activities, as well as IA&O
C
that will involve a wide range of capabilities and force elements.

N
Initial Restoration of Essential Services

U
14. Military effort to restore essential services and facilities may be required during hot
stabilisation. Restoration planning should be conducted early as part of the
comprehensive planning process, including an assessment of host nation infrastructure.
Quick-win solutions must be aligned with long term objectives, with resources identified
and allocated to conduct both. Responsibility for restoration tasks should be handed over
to appropriate civil agencies or host nation institutions as soon as is practicable, while
having contingency plans to retake the lead in periods, or in areas where the security
8
DCDC, JDP 1-10 Captured Persons (CPERS) (Shrivenham: MOD Publications, 2011), 2nd Edition provides
detailed guidance on the requirements, procedures and responsibilities concerning the handling of all
captured persons, regardless of their legal status.
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Contents Page
situation deteriorates. Empowered host nation personnel should be involved in

prioritisation and planning.
15. Coordination of Assets. It may be necessary to surge additional engineer
resources to a theatre in order to cope with the concurrent infrastructure demands of the
civilian population and the military. Engineers may be employed in the following ways:
a. Conducting existing infrastructure technical assessments.
b. Preparation of an emergency infrastructure plan.
c. Advising on targeting and effects.
d. Securing key infrastructure assets.
PY
e. Managing contracts processes.
f. Programme and project management.
O
g. Repair, maintenance and operation of infrastructure.
C
h. Re-establishment, training and mentoring host nation service institutions.
16. Host Nation Involvement. The divisional HQ must ensure that indigenous people,
ED
representing local society including men, women, tribal and religious groups, are involved
in decision making from the outset and ensure a host nation lead. As a guide, each policy
should consider the ‘by’ whom, ‘with’ whom and ‘through’ which local lead. Local and
LL
regional governance should set priorities and provide funding where appropriate.
Wherever possible, local labour should be used on reconstruction projects.
O
Interim Governance
TR
17. Introduction. The military will likely be in a supporting role, given that its primary
role will be security related. However a divisional HQ may be the only organisation able to
take responsibility for governing an area. JDP 3-50 Peace Support Operations identifies
that the military may be required to undertake civil administration tasks in support of a
N
weak host nation government, or in the absence of other administrative structures. The
O
divisional HQ should seek to hand responsibility for governance tasks to an appropriate

civil indigenous, or international organisation at the earliest opportunity. AFM Vol 1 Part 9
C
gives further detail on the conduct of interim governance.

N
18. Governance Considerations. Other Government Departments, such as the FCO,

as well as the host nation government and other international organisations (e.g. UN)
U
should take the planning lead. Considerations include:

a. Mandate. The mandate under which the force is operating will articulate
responsibilities and structures. Existing structures and legislation need to be clearly
understood and their ability to function effectively assessed. The subtleties of the
local environment must be understood.
b. Understanding. An analysis of existing power bases and the interrelationships
between them must be conducted. Equally, societal dynamics (including those of
gender) will enhance understanding.
19. Approach. Although there is no strict template for best practice in governance, the
following functions are likely to be required:
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Contents Page
a. Rule of Law. Rule of law must be established. Military forces may be required
to act as a police force, or to assist host nation police. They may also be tasked to
establish a judiciary and penal system, or protect and assist existing institutions.
Force elements must be given clear direction on how to respond to alleged serious
crimes, including war crimes.
b. Civil Authority. The immediate needs of the civil population, including
protection 9of the vulnerable, shelter, food, water, medical provision, sanitation, fuel
and power must be met. Committees comprising prominent local men and women
may provide a suitable means for determining needs and establishing priorities.
c. Communications. Communication is critical to the establishment of civil
authority and the rule of law. Elements hostile to the military force, or to the
supported civil authority, will exploit any information vacuum. Best use should be
PY
made of local expertise, structures and capabilities.
d. Resources. Military forces are not routinely configured for governance tasks,
therefore military support to governance must be adequately resourced to ensure
O
that troops can perform these activities. This will include the provision of information
on the civil authority being established and the role of the military. Resources should
C
be provided to enable local officials to resolve their own issues, ensuring that officials
are representative of society and will uphold human rights. Strict standards of
ED
accountability should be enforced to mitigate corruption. More detail on achieving
these functions is given below.
Protection of Existing Facilities. Early effort must be made to protect existing
LL
20.
government infrastructure. Failure to do so is likely to increase the resources and time

required to re-establish even basic host nation governance facilities and capability.
O
21. Use of Existing Institutions. The use of existing government institutions may
produce results quicker than establishing new ones. In order to provide an initial degree of
TR
governance, there may be a requirement to permit former, undesirable regime elements to

remain in post until they can be replaced by a suitable alternative at the earliest
opportunity. They should be supervised closely and must understand that human rights
N
are to be upheld.
O
22. Elections. The division may also support an Independent Electoral Commission
(IEC) in the staging of local or national elections. The temptation to hold early elections, in
C
order to meet deadlines and exit strategies, should be avoided. In the first instance, local
elections should be held to provide opportunities for local leaders to emerge and gain
N
credibility and experience. All men and women should be able to vote, with political parties
being encouraged to include men and women as representatives. Extended preparation10
U
periods facilitate the establishment of other aspects of civil society, such as a free press.
The role of the military in the facilitation of elections is likely to be an enabling one, dealing
with the provision of security and logistic support.
23. Coordination and Consistency. The activities of all agencies involved in the
provision and development of governance and capacity must be coordinated. A consistent
approach should be adopted by all actors.
9
Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs.
10
Dobbins et al. America’s role in Nation Building: From Germany to Iraq. RAND Corporation. 2003
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24. Control of Indigenous Security Forces. The development of a legitimate system

for the control of indigenous security forces must be included at the outset of any
governance activity.
Security Sector Reform
25. Definition. Security Sector Reform (SSR) describes the largely political process by
which effective security structures are developed in order to allow the citizens of a state to
live in safety. SSR is likely to be a core post conflict task, while as part of upstream
11
capacity building, it may contribute to conflict prevention in fragile or failing states. In all
cases it is the basis for longer term stability. SSR is affected by two broad issues: the
quality of governance in the state (the relationships between security institutions, wider
government and the public) and the competence and professionalism of those in the
security sector .12
PY
26. Principles. The following generic principles apply to the military’s involvement in the
reform of indigenous security forces: 13
O
a. Local Ownership. Reform must be ‘home grown’ and be representative of
wider society.
C
b. Application of a Strategic Reform Plan. The military contribution will be part
of a wider reform plan, which will influence priorities and the sequencing of reform.
ED
c. Legitimacy. Moral authority stems from the host nation government and must
reflect high standards of governance and observation of human rights.
LL
d. Optimum Delivery. Delivery requires adequately resourced training advisors

and mentors that can act as force developers. Continuity of effort is essential in
O
terms of personnel. Reform should start and finish as soon as possible.

TR
Situational Awareness
27. Understanding. A range of factors will shape a country’s approach to security,
including history, culture, circumstances, needs, priorities, political traditions, as well as the
N
societal roles of men and women. These factors, coupled with the causes of conflict, must
be understood in the context of a SSR programme, along with the values, aims, intentions,
O
responses, views and interrelations of local populations, factions, adversaries and

criminals. The motives and remits of other coalition members and civil agencies must
C
14
also be understood. As well as understanding all the stakeholders that play a part in
N
providing security, potential obstacles to SSR and the linkages between them, must also
be understood (e.g. certain individuals, groups, culture). This will be a major task for the
U
divisional HQ ISTAR staff, taking advice from both host nation agencies and NGOs.
28. Time. The SSR required to ensure long term stability may take significant time to
implement and may require cultural change that could take generations, therefore realistic
aspirations are required. Military involvement in SSR should be relatively short term,
however planning should be for the long term. The temptation to adopt short term, quick
win solutions that do not contribute to longer term goals must be avoided.
11
GFN-SSR Compendium of Good Practices on SSR
12
Joint Doctrine Note R provides the strategic level doctrine on SSR and
The Military Contribution to SS
covers the comprehensive cross government approach.

13
JDN/Tbc The Military Contribution to SSR
14
HIV/AIDS may also impact on the effectiveness of a nation’s security sector.
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29. Military Involvement in SSR. The scope of military support to SSR will vary
according to the level of reform required and the security environment. In an unstable
environment it is likely that the military will be required to initiate capacity building, which
will be conducted in line with reform criteria developed during the SSR pre-assessment.
The priority will be to ultimately establish a secure environment, preferably using
indigenous forces. Military activity is likely to be based as follows:
a. Professional military training at appropriate levels, including education of the
role of armed forces in a democratic society.
b. Education on human rights in the security sector.
c. The development of defence policies and the conduct of defence reviews.
The provision of technical assistance.
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d.
e. Strengthening defence resource management, as well as increasing

accountability in defence procurement.
O
f. Strengthening military personnel management systems.
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g. The development of infrastructure and specialist training facilities.
h.
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Support to the initial stages of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
(DDR) programmes.
Early provision of essential enabling functions such as MEDEVAC.
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i.
Planning the Military Input to SSR

O
30. Planning by the divisional HQ15 should address the need for SSR. This will include
an assessment of the threat to security, existing security sector capabilities, likely
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responsibilities and tasks of the security sector and an articulation of the characteristics of
the reformed security sector (role, function, primacy, size, structure, gender distribution,
equipment). From this, plans will state how SSR is to be implemented, including roles and
N
tasks for the military. Throughout this process, the host nation should participate as much
as is practicable. The structure of the new host nation security apparatus should reflect its
O
roles and functions.

C
Restructuring and Developing Indigenous Security Forces

N
31. The military contribution to a SSR programme is likely to focus on developing the
technical competence and capability of host nation armed forces by training, mentoring
U
and monitoring, from individual and section levels to ministry level. It may also involve the
creation of a security architecture and the development of relationships between different
elements of the indigenous security forces, which could include the police, prison services,
intelligence services, border and coast guards. Guidance must be sought from OGDs and
the Stabilisation Unit (SU). Wider institutional reform may also be required.
32. Reform of indigenous security forces will only form part of the overall SSR
programme. Other agencies will be involved in the wider development of relevant host
nation institutions in the security and justice systems. Military support to SSR must
integrate with this activity. The host nation may not agree or recognise the need for reform
15
See JWP 3-50 Chapter 4 and JDN The Military Contribution to SSR.
3-C-9
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in all aspects of its security sector, however reform in one area may stimulate demand for
change in other areas of the security sector. Such ‘entry points’ should be exploited
16
efficiently but sympathetically.

Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR)
33. DDR is one pillar of SSR. It follows a ceasefire agreement and is a mechanism to
remove weapons, reduce the number of combatants in an area and contribute to longer
term stability by reintegrating former combatants into society. Commanders must consider
both male and female combatants in DDR programmes, as well as child soldiers. Support
to remove child soldiers from the battlefield may be provided by the UN and children’s aid
agencies.
34. DDR is a political process where the military can play a role in providing safety,
security and freedom of movement, as well as the physical disarmament and destruction
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of weapons. There is no strict templated solution to a DDR programme, however it should
not be seen as a quick fix to a conflict. Reintegration relies on broader, longer term
economic development agendas, which for the UK will be overseen by the Department for
O
International Development (DfID).
C
Transfer of Security Responsibility
In response to improving indigenous self-reliance, a military force will conduct a
35.
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Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) to the host nation civil authorities, including
indigenous security forces . The TSR will have been stated in the campaign plan and the
17
conditions required to achieve it should be developed as an operation progresses. These

LL
conditions will cover the full range of security sector issues, including governance capacity,
rule of law and the economy, with reform in these areas being the domain of OGDs and
international organisations. Detailed planning will be needed to coordinate military
O
activities with these agencies.

TR
Appendix:
N
1. Divisional Stabilisation Actions.

Aide Memoire
O
Vignettes
C
N
U
16
For example the need to provide a HN armed forces with ROE may act as a catalyst for the establishment
of government oversight mechanisms and judicial reform.
17
Indigenous security forces may include military, police, border guards, coastguards and key installation
security forces.
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1-1-C-3
elbacitcarp sa hcum sa NH evlovnI - elbissop sa noos sa mrofer etelpmoC - )snoitaloiv sthgir namuh dna semirc tnemevom PD dna seegufeR -
)tnempiuqe ,noitubirtsid redneg tnempoleved detaler redneg ,semirc raw gnidulcni( gnildnah eeniated dna srePC -
,serutcurts ,ezis ,snoitcnuf ,selor( tcudorp ecrof dna gniniart decruoser ylreporP - emirc fo gnildnah gnidrager ecnadiug swefruc fo tnemecrofnE -
demrofer fo scitsiretcarahc ylekil ,sksat sthgir dna noitcerid deen lliw spoorT - saera sdnuob fo tuo fo tnemecrofnE -
dna seitilibisnopser ylekil ,seitilibapac namuh fo ecnavresbo dna sdradnats metsys lanep dna secrof elitsoh fo noitarapeS -
gnitsixe ,ytiruces ot taerht redisnoC - ecnanrevog hgih no desab ,ycamitigeL - yraiciduj tsissa ro hsilbatse ,ecrof ecilop hcraes dna nodroC -
tupnI yratiliM RSS gninnalP nalp mrofer cigetarts sa tca yllaitini ot evah yam yratiliM - redro cilbup fo ecnanetniaM -
rediw a fo trap noitubirtnoc yratiliM - liaverp tsum wal fo eluR -
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mrofer noitcetorp yovnoc dna etuor ,gnillortaP -
cimonoce lellarap sdeen noitargetnier yteicos rediw fo evitatneserper etalpmet ecitcarp tseb tcirts oN - :sksaT yratiliM yeK
:hcaorppa yratilim a tsuj toN - dna ssecorp eht fo pihsrenwo NH - :hcaorppA tabmoc rojam ni devlovni
)seicnega dia s’nerdlihc morf troppus( :RSS fo selpicnirP scitilop lanoiger/lacol dna erutluc regnol on spoort gnillor-er redisnoC •
sreidlos dlihc dna elamef redisnoC - serutcurts ytiruces fo ecnetepmoc dna ,scimanyd lateicos dnatsrednu tsuM - elbaliava eb tey
ecnanrevog fo ytilauq yb detceffa RSS • serutcurts
yteicos otni etargetnier dna
srebmun tnatabmoc ecuder ,snopaew
evomer ot smia :erifesaec tsoP -
O ssecorp lacitilop a yllaitnessE •
ytefas ni evil ot snezitic wolla ot serutcurts
evitalsigel gnitsixe fo ssenevitceffE -
sesab rewop gnitsixe esylanA -
ton yam secruoser ecilop lanoitanretnI •
muucav ytiruces elbissop
ni lacitirc wal fo elur niatniam / hsilbatsE •
RSS fo rallip yek A -
)RDD( noitargetnieR
C
ytiruces evitceffe fo tnempoleved ehT •
)RSS( mrofeR rotceS ytiruceS
etadnam yratilim dnatsrednU -
:snoitaredisnoC ecnanrevoG
lortnoC dna ytiruceS
dna noitasilibomeD ,tnemamrasiD elbissop sa noos sa seicnega livic snoitarepo raer viD •
)woleb ees( RDD ot troppuS - aidem eerf a sa hcus ,yteicos ro NH ot ksat revodnah ot kees dluohS • aidem eht htiw noitcaretnI •
CAVEDEM sa hcus snoitcnuf
gnilbane laitnesse fo noisivorP -
seitilicaf
gniniart dna erutcurtsarfni dliuB -
ED
livic fo stcepsa gnitroppus etatilicaF -
setadidnac
sa dnats ot degaruocne eb osla
dluohs ohw nemow edulcni ot gnitoV -
snosaer ytiruces rof saera niatrec ni sksat

noitartsinimda livic ekatrednu nac taht
noitasinagro ylno eht eb yam yratiliM •
dael gninnalp ekat dluohs NH ,NU
sseccus tnempoleved cimonoce dna

secivres laitnesse htiw AI esinorhcnyS •
sisylana gnicruoser ,EOM
gnipoleved gnidulcni ,O&AI level viD •
smetsys tnemeganam
lennosrep yratilim gnipoleveD -
tnemeganam ecruoser dna
ytilibatnuocca tnemerucorp gnipoleveD -
ecnatsissa lacinhcet fo noisivorP -
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level lanoitan ot roirp slevel
lacol ta selpicnirp citarcomed poleveD -
noitpursid tneverp ot dna stsimertxe
fo noitasimitigel tneverp ot snoitcele
ylrae dloh ot noitatpmet diovA -
,OCF – elor gnitroppus ni ylekil yratiliM •

ecnanrevoG miretnI
snoitutitsni ecivres
NH gnirotnem dna gnihsilbatse-eR -
SNALPNOC dna snalp erutuF •

seitirohtua rehgih htiw dro-oC •
sedagirb ecruoser dna dro-oC •
tfos ro citenik – snoitca level viD •
gnitegrat dna RATSI level viD •
dna seicilop ecnefed fo tnempoleveD -
sweiver )CEI( noissimmoC larotcelE
tnednepednI fo troppus deen yaM -
O ecnanetniam
dna riaper ,noitarepo erutcurtsarfnI -
dro-oc ,gnicruoser ,gninnalp - RSS •
:QH viD
sthgir namuh gnidulcni – rotces
ytiruces eht ni noitacude dna gniniarT -
RSS ni tnemevlovnI yratiliM
sexif kciuq diovA -
mret trohs eht rof eb dluohs tnemevlovni
snoitcelE
ytivitca ecnanrevog ot hcaorppa
tnetsisnoc deen devlovni seicnega llA -
sthgir namuh dlohpu ot laitnessE -
stnemele emiger remrof elbarisednu
TR stcartnoc eganaM -
tnemeganam tcejorp dna emmargorP -
stessa erutcurtsarfni yek eruceS -
nalp erutcurtsarfni ycnegreme ecudorP -
stnemssessa lacinhcet tcudnoC -
RSS ot troppuS •
sksaT ecnanrevoG miretnI •
noitarotser secivres laitnesse laitinI •
lortnoC dna ytiruceS •
:krowemarF
yratilim tub mret gnol eht rof nalP -
citsilaer eb tsum snoitaripsa mrofeR -
egnahc larutluc tnacifingis gniriuqer
fo secivres gniniater yliraropmet naem
yam hcihw ,snoitutitsni gnitsixe esU -
erutcurtsarfni cimonoce dna tnemnrevog
N :edulcni
sksaT .seicnega rehto htiw trecnoc
ni stessa dro-oc sreenignE lanoisiviD •
O&AI nihtiw seitivitcA lacitcaT
nalp ngiapmac ni detalucitra airetirc
RST - FSI dna seitirohtua NH ot RST
,emit elbaredisnoc ekat yam RSS -
elacsemiT
gnitsixe tcetorp ot laitnessE -
noitpurroc esiminim
O
stifeneb etomorp dna elpoep llet – AI •
ruobal lacol fo esu esimixaM •
a elbane ot serutcurts evitceffe etaerC •
etatS dnE
tcilfnoc fo esuaC -
seicnega rehto dna
srebmem noitilaoc fo stimer / sevitoM -
ot emiger ytilibatnuocca hsilbatsE -
ecnanrevog
ot troppus ecruoser yletauqedA -
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noisivorp gnidnuf dna gnikam noisiced
,seitiroirp gnittes ni elpoep NH evlovnI •
setaroireted noitautis ytiruces
RSS •
feileR nairatinamuH dna retsasiD •
OSP •
stnemele lanimirc
,seirasrevda ,snoitcaf ,snoitalupop
poleved ot muucav
noitamrofni wolla ton od – secneidua
fi niaga dael ekat ot deraperp eB •
NH ro seicnega livic ot elbacitcarp
N OEN •
:edulcnI
lacol neewteb spihsnoitaleR -
snoitnetni dna smia NH -
nemow fo sutats
tegrat yek ot ssergorp etacinummoC -
seitiroirp dna sdeen enimreted ot
seettimmoc lacol rotinom dna hsilbatsE -
sa ylrae sa ytilibisnopser revo dnaH •
sevitcejbo
mret gnol htiw sniw kciuq ngilA •
U 2 / 1-C-3 segap ees – selpicnirP •
.tnemnrevog fo
,seulav ,snoitidart lacitilop ,seitiroirp srebmem elbarenluv ylrae noitarotser smsinahcem dna snoitutitsni elbatnuocca
,sdeen ,secnatsmucric ,erutluc ,yrotsiH - erom eht yllaicepse ,noitalupop nalp dna erutcurtsarfni NH ssessA • fo tnempoleved rof snoitidnoc teS •
gnidnatsrednU lacol eht fo sdeen cisab eht teeM - noitasilibats toh gnirud ksat yratiliM • lortnoc dna ytiruces ,redro ot etubirtnoC •
3 traP snoitutitsni gnitsixe tsissa dna tcetorP - secivreS laitnessE fo noitarotseR :snoitarepo yratiliM
ot C xennA
ot 1 xidneppA ERIOMEM EDIA :SNOITCA NOITASILIBATS LANOISIVID
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Planning in Regional Command (South West) in 2014

Headquarters RC(SW) stood up in 2009 as the sixth of the ISAF regional HQs in
Afghanistan. It assumed C2 of the Helmand and Nimroz provinces, previously part of the
RC(S) area of operations. The 2* HQ was based around the core of a USMC MEF, from
either I or II MEF, in 12 month rotations. The MEF staff was augmented by coalition
members across all functional areas, with the DComd appointment tied to a British 1*
officer. The military staff totalled over 450 personnel but, with additional civilian
contractors and theatre enablers, the HQs’ footprint was in excess of 1,000 personnel.
The HQ operated as a Divisional HQ with brigade sized force elements, including the UK’s
TFH, under command. The staff were organised along standard NATO functional areas
designated C1 - C10 (the C prefix indicates combined). The additional functional area,
C10, was adopted in this campaign to cover SFA, overseeing the training and advising of
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the indigenous Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF). Within C3 Operations, the Fires
and Effects Coordination Cell (FECC) delivered all joints effect capabilities in a single
department.
O
Planning in the HQ was initiated by either orders from higher HQ (the 4* ISAF HQ or the 3*
C
ISAF Joint Command operational HQ), or through direction from the Commanding
General. C5 Plans maintained a planning horizon of greater than 90 days and would
establish an Operational Planning Team (OPT) for each new planning event. The OPTs
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were chaired by the C5 section, with representation from across all staff departments,
external agencies and LOs as required. OPTs used the USMC’s Planning Process to
develop and mature concepts. The C5 branch would hand off a fully, or partially
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developed plan to the C3 Future Operations (FOPS) staff, which had a planning horizon of
up to 90 days. FOPS refined the plan, produced orders and oversaw battle procedure.
The plan was then handed off to the C3 Current Operations (COPS) staff 24 to 48 hours
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before execution, for final refinement.

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The HQ maintained a recognisable weekly battle rhythm to support the planning and
execution of operations using a process of boards, committees and working groups to
enable the Commanding General and principal staff (OF5 level) to maintain situational
N
awareness and exercise C2. The key event was the Executive Planning Group (EPG),
chaired by the Commanding General, which was fed by two key boards: the Executive
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Assessments Board, which presented both generic campaign progress assessment and
also any other directed analysis to inform the command group and secondly, the Plans
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Management Steering Group, chaired by the COS and attended by the principal staff
which initiated and reviewed material destined for the EPG.
N
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The RC(S) Approach to Stabilisation

Whilst preparing to command RC(S) in Afghanistan in 2009/10, Maj Gen Carter produced
a set of operating instructions as guidance for the HQ Command Group and staff. The
instructions sought to provide guidance at the divisional or JTF level for operations in the
complex context of Afghanistan where “the traditional method of dividing force elements
between ‘shaping, decisive and sustaining’ or ‘deep, close, rear’ no longer provides the
clarity it once did on the relatively ordered symmetric battlefield” and where the staff were1
having to “integrate combined, joint, interagency and indigenous capabilities at all levels” .
What follows is a paraphrased and abridged summary of those instructions which serve as
an example of how a division can set itself to conduct stabilisation operations in the
contemporary operating environment.
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‘Philosophy. The campaign in Afghanistan is about the population and success will be
measured on meeting its needs better than the insurgent. Perception is as important as
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action and every action that is taken must have an impact on people’s minds and must
support the big idea. A broad understanding of the environment and human terrain must
C
set the context. The Afghan government must be at the forefront of combined activity and
whilst the paucity of Afghan capacity will inevitably create tension, this will have to be
managed carefully. The partnership with the Afghan government is the vital ground. The
ED
population must be separated from the insurgent and key to this will be a sophisticated
understanding of the insurgent.
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Execution. Offensive spirit is a pre-requisite for success. It does not imply attacking
indiscriminately, but rather implies a state of mind that is determined to seize and retain
the initiative. The commander’s intent must be understood at every level in order to allow
O
subordinates to take opportunities as they arise, thus increasing tempo. Balance must be
achieved in three key areas:
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• Between concentration of force and economy of effort.

N
• Between framework operations in support of the population and those operations

designed to have an effect beyond the framework.
O
C
• Between ANSF capacity building and what is committed to shape, clear, hold and
build.
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Tier 1 and 2 Operations. The command will distinguish between Tier 1 and Tier 2
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operations. In essence, Tier 1 is the close battle and Tier 2 is the deep and rear battles.
• Tier 1. Tier 1 operations are those that seek to establish local security, enable
governance, reconstruction and development and the rule of law through ‘shape,
clear, hold and build’ actions. They are conducted at the brigade level with the
planning horizon determined by the length of time taken to concentrate force and
mount the operation.
• Tier 2. Tier 2 operations are conducted at the regional level. They are mounted to
achieve decisive effect and seek to achieve physical separation, disruption and
1
Lieutenant General Nick Carter CBE DSO, The Divisional Level of Command .
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interdiction of the insurgent. With a planning horizon that extends well beyond what
is achievable for framework operations, Tier 2 operations can leverage the full
range of capabilities and enablers found at regional and theatre levels. They set
the conditions for success to be achieved in Tier 1 operations.
Unity of Effort. To achieve unity of effort, it must be understood that in coalitions, where
national contributions are deployed at the tactical level, there will always be a political
context and therefore a blurring of the tactical and strategic levels.
Information. Access to information to enable the decision making process is key.
However information requirements must be tuned frequently in order to ensure that they
remain relevant and do not clutter the process. A cross cutting “Prism Cell” will be
established under the COS to examine problems from a different angle, challenge
accepted wisdom and act as a focus for wider expertise. A measurement of effect system
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will be established to genuinely inform the decision making process.
Strategic Communications. Credibility will be gained by being as open as possible with
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information. This will involve declassification and disclosure beyond the comfortable
norms.’
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The Application of the Comprehensive* Approach in Iraq

From March 2003 to January 2005, an uneasy situation existed in Iraq where the regime’s
former administrators had been removed by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and
a number of different factions, with varying motivation, sought power. These dynamics
were difficult to understand, let alone influence and had an impact on security, making
implementation of the comprehensive approach problematic. In addition, the poor state of
the infrastructure in Southern Iraq and a failure to meet the expectations of the population
in the improvement of their living conditions, led to disaffection with the Coalition.
The principal UK Government institutions in Basra were MND(SE), the FCO led Consulate
and a DfID office. A Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), with leadership provided by
the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit, was established in February 2006 to draw together a
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range of UK and allied assets, reporting both to the Consul General and HQ MNF-I in
Baghdad. Falling under the risk management arrangements of the FCO, teams from
international consultancy firms provided most of the personnel for the DfID office and the
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PRT.
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In practice, implementation of the comprehensive approach in MND(SE) from January
2005 to Spring 2008 was varied. It was not until security significantly improved in 2008,
after Operation Charge of the Knights, that the potential of the comprehensive approach
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was realised in MND (SE). Once the PRT had been able to move back to Basra from
Kuwait, it was possible for the principals (GOC, Head PRT, Consul General and Head of
US Regional Embassy Office (REO)) to act as a formal coordinating mechanism. By the
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latter part of 2008, this was complemented by joint working groups and, where relevant,
joint delivery of joint projects. Many commentators, including US observers, consider that
from mid 2008, the tactical execution of the comprehensive approach in Basra was as
O
effective as that being achieved in the other MND areas, if not better.
TR
The relatively effective tactical implementation of the comprehensive approach in

MND(SE), during Operations TELIC 12 to 13, demonstrated that the principles of the
comprehensive approach were valid. Had it been possible to implement this approach
N
earlier, the land component’s ability to support the delivery of stabilisation activities could
have been enhanced.
O
Critical points regarding the application of the Comprehensive Approach include:

C
N
• Security and Governance. A full interagency, comprehensive approach must

combine security and governance.
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• Wider Approach. The approach is more than the delivery of reconstruction and
development programmes. It includes:
o Having a profound understanding of the situation, especially politics, power
and governance.
o Mobilising all the instruments of power to shape politics, governance,
security, rule of law, development and strategic communications.
• Levels of Implementation. It should be implemented at all levels strategic
(Whitehall, international), operational (PJHQ, theatre) and tactical (division down to
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company).
• Local Issues. Local as well as national governance issues must be taken into
account. 2
Further Reading:
Crown Copyright: Operations in Iraq, January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An
Analysis from the land Perspective, 29 Nov 10.
* The term ‘Comprehensive Approach’ has now been replaced by ‘Integrated Approach’.
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2
Operations in Iraq, January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An Analysis from the land Perspective, 29
Nov 10.
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The Military Contribution to SSR in Iraq

In Iraq, MND(SE) principally conducted Iraqi Army and Police Service training. The
Division sought to organise, equip and train them in order to allow Coalition forces to
transfer security to the Iraqi authorities. The transition policy was executed in southern
Iraq through a five-step process:
• Understand.
• Enable indigenous forces.
• Demonstrate.
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• Engage.
• Manage the consequences.
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A range of training and development activities were conducted by MND(SE), with the
C
Shaibah logistics base being developed into a Divisional training centre. As time went on,
both the coalition and MND(SE) tried to encourage Iraqi Army self reliance by reducing
access to coalition resources. ED
The indigenous security forces played a major role, albeit under coalition mentoring, in
supporting the January 2005 elections. By the middle of that same year, they were
LL
capable of policing major events, acting against Sunni extremists. However, they had
neither the will nor the capability to take on Shi’a militias. They also lacked some key
equipment, including body armour, helmets and machine guns, which eroded the
O
confidence required to confront well armed and determined adversaries.

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Although MND(SE) declared that SSR had to be the main effort, this was not always
possible in practice. The conflicting demands of force protection diverted training staff
away from the Iraqi Army. However, during Operation Charge of the Knights, MND(SE)
N
quickly reconfigured to deploy Military Transition Teams (MiTT), which, with their active
support to the Iraqi Army and shared risk, were successful. Subsequently, the increasing
O
capability and confidence of the Iraqi Army required MND(SE) to adjust its approach,
reducing profile and moving to a policy of partnering.
C
Key aspects of SSR include:

N
U
• Wider Context. The military contribution to SSR must be set in the context of a
wider approach.
• Security System. SSR is not just the development of security forces. It is also
reform and building capacity in a country’s full security and justice systems,
including the judiciary and prisons.
• Full Integration. The fundamental military capacity building lesson is that UK
forces must be embedded with indigenous troops in order to develop their capability
whilst in contact with the enemy.
• Situational Awareness. Embedding also delivers the leverage required to shape
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the conduct of indigenous force operations and provides greater situational

awareness . 3
Further Reading:
Crown Copyright: Operations in Iraq, January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An
Analysis from the Land Perspective, 29 Nov 10.
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3
Operations in Iraq, January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5 – 13) An Analysis from the Land Perspective, 29 Nov 10.
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ANNEX D TO
PART 3
ENABLING ACTIONS
1. Enabling actions link and facilitate other tactical actions. They have application
across the mosaic of conflict and are as relevant in a stabilisation operation as they are in
major combat, although the effects delivered in support of them may vary in intensity and
violence.
2. Many of the enabling actions have significant similarities and success lies in well
understood drills and procedures, applied intelligently.
Appendices:
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1. Reconnaissance.
2. Security.
3. Advance to Contact.
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Schematic
Aide Memoire
C
Vignette
4. Meeting Engagement. ED
Schematic
Aide Memoire
5. Link Up.
LL
Schematics
Aide Memoire
Vignettes
O
6. Relief of Troops.
Schematics
TR
Aides Memoire
7. Withdrawal.
Schematic
N
Aide Memoire
Vignette
O
8. March.
Schematic
C
Aide Memoire
9. Crossing and Breaching Obstacles.
N
Schematic
Aide Memoire
U
Vignette
3-D-1
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O
C
ED
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O
TR
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O
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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
RECONNAISSANCE
1. Purpose. Reconnaissance is undertaken to obtain information by visual observation,
or other detection methods, to enable decision making. It may be focused on a particular
phase of an operation, or it may be conducted as a sustained activity to help develop
understanding. The following paragraphs represent a summary of key reconnaissance
considerations and assets that are available within the division. The selection of the most
appropriate asset mix will depend upon the mission, the threat and the nature of the
operating environment, as well as the focus of the reconnaissance effort. More detail may
be found in AFM Volume 1, Part 3A Intelligence Surveillance Target Acquisition and
Reconnaissance (ISTAR), Dec 2011.
PY
2. Reconnaissance Assets. The resources required to conduct reconnaissance will
not exist solely at the divisional level, but may be tasked via the chain of command to
obtain information to support the divisional commander’s requirements. These resources
O
may be summarised as follows:
C
a. Armoured or Light Cavalry Regiments. Armoured or light cavalry regiments
are organic to combat brigades but certain tasks may be directed from the divisional
ED
level. They may be allocated additional tasks such as route protection or screening.
b. Close Reconnaissance. Close reconnaissance troops and platoons are
established at battle-group level and may be tasked by the divisional HQ, through
LL
their respective combat brigade.

Artillery Fire Support Teams (FST). FST are target acquisition assets and are
O
c.
well suited to the tasks of reconnaissance and surveillance, which may influence the
task organisation of a reconnaissance force. The same may also apply to Close Air
TR
Defence (CAD) platforms.

Engineers. Engineer reconnaissance elements are established in the Close
N
d.
Support Engineer Regiments that support each manoeuvre brigade. They will be
tasked to operate with brigade and close reconnaissance force elements, focusing on
O
mobility and counter mobility as well as terrain reconnaissance.

C
e. Military Police (MP). 1 MP Brigade forms part of Force Troops Command

(FTC). MP will conduct reconnaissance, alongside engineer reconnaissance
N
elements, to determine the suitability of routes prior to their activation.

U
f. Long Range Patrols (LRP). As part of the division’s intelligence, surveillance

and reconnaissance assets, long range patrols carry out enduring covert
surveillance, target acquisition and can conduct Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
g. Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). UAS provide a flexible capability
supporting reconnaissance and the overall ISTAR requirement.
h. Aviation. Placed within the division’s Joint Helicopter Force (JHF), aviation can
provide a highly effective reconnaissance platform, coupled with a potent attack
capability if correctly triggered. Aviation can manoeuvre in depth and is likely to
operate with, or in front of ground manned reconnaissance assets.
3-D-1-1
Contents Page
i. Electronic Warfare (EW). EW, including Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), can

collect information from passive enemy disclosure, particularly where it relates to
intent and actions, as well as monitoring Communications and Information Systems
(CIS).
j. Tactical Air. Though the asset may not be owned by the division, tactical air is
an integral part of the wider ISTAR effort and may be tasked to provide information
relevant to the commander.
k. Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear (CBRN). Though direction may
come from the divisional level, CBRN reconnaissance is an all arms task, aimed at
determining whether contamination has taken place and identifying the type of
contaminant, where possible.
Reconnaissance Planning Considerations.
PY
3.
a. Command.
O
(1) Battlespace Management (BM). Effective Fire Support Control
Measures (FSCM) and Airspace Control Measures (ACM) will require
C
consideration as reconnaissance tasks may be conducted in the immediate
vicinity of friendly forces, or short of the Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL).
Reconnaissance conducted in greater depth, beyond the FSCL, may be
ED
contained within a specifically designated area.
(2) Communications. A sound communications plan is essential, particularly
LL
as reconnaissance may be conducted over distance. Sufficient data capacity

will be required for the transmission of information and intelligence products.
O
b. Information and Intelligence.

TR
(1) The Understand Cell within the divisional HQ will need to determine the
most effective systems that should be used for a particular task. These may
include capabilities held by other components, or held at higher levels than the
division, such as tactical air assets, or national intelligence capabilities.
N
Firepower.
O
c.
Reconnaissance is likely to be conducted by stealth. However, a

C
(1)
manoeuvring reconnaissance force may have to fight for information or, given
its vulnerability, may require overwhelming fires to enable a break clean. The
N
task organisation of a reconnaissance force will contain FSTs able to call for
U
and control fires. The divisional staff must ensure that a robust fire support
communications plan is operating and that delivery systems with sufficient
ammunition are correctly positioned and ready to support.
d. Manoeuvre.
(1) Ground Manned Reconnaissance. Ground manned reconnaissance can
provide a 24 hour all weather capability that is largely resistant to technical
deception. Ground manned reconnaissance can also overcome many of the
challenges presented to airborne ISTAR in complex terrain. Consideration must
be given to task organisation in order to mitigate issues such as the need for
fires, communications over distance, obstacle crossing capability, sustainment
and the evacuation of casualties.
3-D-1-2
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(2) UAS. UAS are able to manoeuvre and are optimised for loitering on task
for lengthy periods. They are ideal for relatively high risk tasks, though use and
product quality can be adversely affected by weather. UAS fields of view are
narrow, therefore they need to be cued onto specific areas of interest.
(3) Aviation. When fitted with 2 external tanks, AH can typically operate out
to 250 km and loiter for 60 minutes, though the additional fuel weight will mean
a weapon effect trade off. Poor weather will affect sensor performance.
Protection must be considered including the selection of ingress and egress
routes over uncleared terrain. Aviation can operate outside the land component
battlespace and may be tasked by the joint force HQ.
(4) Tactical Air. Tactical air possesses a significant capability but can be
affected by poor weather. Products include reports (both verbal and written),
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imagery and Full Motion Video (FMV). Imagery will require to be analysed
within the Air Component HQ prior to release. The Divisional 1Air Liaison Officer
(DALO) within the HQ will request tactical air reconnaissance.
O
e. Protection.
C
(1) Vulnerability. Ground manned reconnaissance assets protect
themselves by stealth and dispersion. However, due to their limited numbers,
dispersal, protection and limited direct fire capability, they are vulnerable and
ED
consideration needs to be given to their reinforcement, or extraction should the
need arise. UAS, Aviation and Tactical Air are vulnerable to enemy air defence
and other direct fire weapons.
LL
(2) Combat Identification. It is vital that the division has a robust combat
identification plan in place to protect ground manned reconnaissance assets.
O
Due to their covert nature and proximity to enemy forces, they are uniquely
vulnerable to being mistaken for hostile troops.
TR
f. Sustainment.
Endurance and reach will depend on effective sustainment. Re-supply of
N
(1)
ground manned reconnaissance may be conducted by ground assets, support

O
helicopters or by air drop. With mounted reconnaissance elements,

consideration will be required with regard to how logistic support, equipment
C
support and medical support, including MEDEVAC, are to be conducted. A

decision must be made as to which force elements within the wider division are
N
responsible for the delivery of such support. Consideration must also be given
to the logistic footprint of supporting air and aviation assets.
U
1
Further detail on air reconnaissance can be found in: DLW, AFM Volume 1, Part 13 Air Land Integration
(Warminster: Army Publications, 2009).
3-D-1-3
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O
C
ED
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O
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O
C
N
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APPENDIX 2 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
SECURITY
1. Purpose. Security is critical to the protection of one’s own will and cohesion, as well
as maintaining freedom of manoeuvre, while hindering the enemy’s understand effort. The
requirement to achieve security is applicable across the mosaic of conflict, although the
manner in which it is achieved will depend upon the threat and the operating environment.
In stabilisation operations, the military component will enable inter-agency and host nation
operations through the provision of security. Security can be broken down into:
a. Physical Security. The organised system of adaptable Force Protection (FP)
measures, which includes the tactical employment of force elements during offensive
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manoeuvre, as well as the guarding of static locations (possibly including key host
nation infrastructure), routes and individual platforms.
Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC includes measures taken to preserve
O
b.
the secrecy of our own current actions and future plans, as well as those of inter-
agency and host nation partners.
C
2. Principles. The UK approach is based on the management of risk linked to a
ED
framework of protective measures. The UK approach includes:
a. An understanding of the hazards and threats.
LL
b. An analysis of the risk. Understanding likelihood and impact, thus enabling the
development of protection measures.
O
c. The coordination and integration of protection measures across components

and multi national elements.
TR
d. Flexibility to respond to changing circumstances.

Physical Security. Within an overall policy framework, the divisional commander
N
3.
must judge the acceptable levels of risk that balance force protection with tactical
O
effectiveness. Considerations will include:

The protection of own force movement by considering and adapting to the IED
C
a.
threat, using a range of techniques including Electronic Counter Measures (ECM).

N
b. The attack of specific IED networks as a preliminary action.

U
c. The number and types of vehicles able to move by road and the minimum
number of people per vehicle.
d. The use of alternative transport such as support helicopters.
e. ISTAR soak of routes to increase situational awareness.
f. The engineering and construction of protective infrastructure to defend against
direct and indirect fire.
g. Consideration of area and movement control such as framework patrolling,
Vehicle Check Points (VCP), route and convoy protection, control of refugee
3-D-2-1
Contents Page
movement and the imposition of curfews when necessary, cordon and search actions
and the enforcement of out of bounds areas.
h. The separation of hostile forces, and the handling of Captured Persons
(CPERS) in accordance with JDP 1-10.
4. Operational Security (OPSEC). OPSEC protects friendly information, thus
preventing the enemy from deducing our intentions. OPSEC methods include:
a. Camouflage and concealment.
b. Deception plans.
c. Protecting information systems.
PY
d. Controlling electronic emissions, including information passage over
unprotected communication structures and the control of information given to the
media.
O
e. The close hold of critical tactical or operational information, including access to
controlled areas within the HQ and the control of classified documents.
C
f. Vetting and controlling access of locally employed civilians and contractors.
ED
5. The Enemy Surveillance Threat. The more that is known about the enemy
surveillance threat and his capabilities, the easier they will be to counter. Sound
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment (IPE) will be critical to this task.
LL
a. Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE). The enemy is likely to concentrate his

ISTAR efforts on mobility corridors and avenues of approach, thus the surveillance
O
threat will be greater in those areas. Evaluation of the human terrain will assist in
identifying likely enemy HUMINT threats.
TR
b. Threat Evaluation. Basic intelligence data will identify the enemy’s ISTAR
capabilities, including characteristics and performance. This information, coupled
N
with the enemy’s assessed doctrinal courses of action, will enable deductions to be
made regarding his surveillance plan.
O
Threat Integration. Integrating the output from the BAE and the Threat
C
c.
Evaluation should identify how adversaries will conduct ISTAR, understanding which
areas are likely to be covered and with what capabilities. This will enable the
N
divisional commander to prioritise counter surveillance measures and will guide the
development of the counter surveillance plan.
U
6. Security Planning Considerations.

a. The CJIIM Environment. When selecting force protection measures the
divisional commander will need to take account of potentially different attitudes to risk
among other participating nations. The host nation may support our efforts by
guarding critical infrastructure or protecting main supply routes. Civilian
organisations play a key role in stabilisation, however their effectiveness may hinge
on the force protection provided to them.
3-D-2-2
Contents Page
b. Influence. Our force protection posture is likely to have an effect on key target
audiences. Potentially negative perceptions of this posture need to be considered,
whilst being able to effectively counter an enemy threat.
c. Counter Intelligence (CI). CI reduces, or eliminates the threat posed by
hostile intelligence services, organisations or individuals engaged in a range of
threatening activities. CI activities will seek to neutralise threats, or exploit
opportunities, by indentifying individuals who may be trying to target our capabilities.
Further information can be found in Joint Doctrine Note 1/14, Counter-Intelligence.
d. Cyber. Computer Network Defence (CND) is a critical element of force
protection. A sound CND plan is critical to retaining freedom of manoeuvre in the
virtual domain.
Information Assurance. Procedures and technical methods should be
PY
e.
enforced at all levels to reduce the risk to information security.

Media. The force protection implications of tactical incidents may be developed
O
f.
and amplified by the media, or expressed in an unwarranted and potentially

damaging light. This may be detrimental to our own forces, or may be a risk to a
C
successful operational outcome. Erosion of reputation and credibility may increase
the risk of our own forces being subject to attack.
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
3-D-2-3
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ED
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O
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N
O
C
N
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APPENDIX 3 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
ADVANCE TO CONTACT
1. An advance to contact is conducted in preparation for a subsequent offensive action.
The aim is to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy under the most favourable
conditions. Planning for an advance to contact should anticipate the possibility of a
meeting engagement occurring during the advance. In operations other than war, an
advance to contact may be conducted in order to establish the presence of the enemy in
an area to be stabilised, or to clear him out thereby establishing the conditions for the
conduct of subsequent stabilisation activities.
2. A successful advance to contact will depend upon the integration of the division’s
PY
ISTAR capabilities, the collection and management of information produced by these
capabilities and its ultimate exploitation. Capabilities may include ground manned
reconnaissance assets such as armoured cavalry, LRP, UAS, aviation, HUMINT sources,
as well as additional sources controlled above the divisional at theatre or national levels.
O
3. Principles. The principles of the advance to contact are:
C
a. Exploit information and intelligence.
ED
b. Anticipate future action.
c. Maintain balance and flexibility.
LL
d. Maintain pressure on the enemy.

O
e. Maintain momentum.
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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C
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O
C
N
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PY
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C
ED
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O
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C
N
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3-3-D-3
)seitiroirp( gnimmaj – kcatta cinortcelE :WE • evreser a niateR •
.sessergorp gnihcaer-revo fo erawa eB •
stessa gninniw elttab fo yrevoceR • ecnavda sa cimanyd eb ot sdeen MCSF • MCSF fo noitacilppa cimanyD •
drawrof .dennalp sa poleved ton yam ytiruces .noitamrof
riaper – seraps fo gninoitisop drawroF • tcatnoc – esnopser troppus erif fo ytilibixelF • dna SCC ,SSC ,SC htiw ksir emos tpeccA • tnecajda yb dedivorp eb yam ytiruces
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seitlausac tnempiuqe fo eerf setuor peeK •
troppuS tnempiuqE
.elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca
ot detis seitilibapac CAVEDEM / tnemtaerT •
lacideM
PY ..desu eb ot ytilibapac
troppus erif fo epyt suht dna deriuqer
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ymene htiw tcatnoc

niatniam dna mutnemom niatniam ,sevitcejbo
peed tceles tsum rednammoc lanoisivid ehT •
tiusrup a emoceb yam noitatiolpxE •
tiusruP dna noitatiolpxE
esirprus dna noitavresbo tsniaga ytiruces

raer dna knalf sedivorP :drauG raeR/knalF
.noitceted diova ot edih ot edih
morf ecnavda yaM .ymene yortsed ro taefed
ecnanetniam dna noitceles etuoR •
.seunitnoc
ecnavda sa skcots noitisop drawroF •
O ?troppus erif etaidemmi
fo level emos eetnaraug ot ecnavda
eht gnirud gorfpael seirettab nug lliW •
.noitca pu knil a gnitcudnoc yletamitlu ecrof
dnuorg eht htiw ,niarret yek gnizies ,noisivid
ot sekirtS .deriuqer fi secrofnier dna draug
ecnavda fo ervueonam ot stcaeR .tcatnoc
.trats ta seilppus tabmoc mumixaM • C
?)decnavda eb ot ecnatsid si rotcaf yek gnicnavda eht fo daeha deyolped neeb
no ytilibixelf mumixam timrep ot denoitisoP
.rewop tabmoc niam s’noisiviD :ydoB niaM
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ED
.leuf dna )yrellitra( omma esitiroirP • lliw ro ecnavda revoc ot yolped snug lliW • ecnavda eht eunitnoc dna pag a ecrof yb detroppuS .dael yrtnafni – yrtnuoc esolC
.opmet niatniam ot ylppuser kciuq – SSC • ?seitinutroppo AI citenik noN • ot detnuom eb ot deen lliw kcatta na ,noitisop .dael ruomra – yrtnuoc nepO .ydoB niaM eht
scitsigoL .esnopser etaidemmi evisnefed gnorts a gnidloh si ymene eht fI - fo stnemele gnidael eht yb dellortnoC .ydoB
tnemniatsuS na reviled ot desinagro ksat - seriF tJ / SO • ymene dessap-yb yortsed niaM fo ervueonam setidepxe dna ymene
.SREPC gnildnaH • rewoperiF ot deriuqer sa ydoB niaM eht fo stnemele
.CAVEDEM gnidulcni ,tnemnorivne
taerht °063 ni ytiruces aera raer dna etuoR •
?nalp noitpeceD .tnetni ruo gnidnatsrednu
morf ymene tneverp – CESPO •
LL
.erusolcsid noitamrofni evissap hguorht
ymene eht fo noitceted tiolpxe ot WE •
.seitinutroppo
serif tnioj kees tsum stessa dniF •
gnittimmoc ,noitca eht srotinom rednammoc

lanoisivid ehT .seriF tJ dna tcerid htiw ymene
dessap-yb eht sexif drauG ecnavdA ehT -
ecnavda
eht sexiF .ecroF gnirevoC htiw tcatnoc

sniatniam dna dniheb esolc stiS .ydob niam
rof ytiruces latnorf sedivorP :drauG ecnavdA
.troppus
.serusaem NRBC rof tnemeriuqeR •
.?ksat HA – sknalf no ytiruceS •
?selifed ,sQH ,setuor eb yam tcatnoc erehw noitacol dna sevreser
.snoitidnoc
elbaruovaf tsom rednu dehsilbatse
O eht eunitnoc ot redniamer eht gnissap
-yb dna ymene eht fo emos gniyortsed
,tcatnoc otni semoc ecroF gnirevoC ehT -
ervueonam dna seriF tJ / SO yb detroppuS
.selcatsbo dna niarret ,setuor ,)snoitacol
TR
/ htgnerts( ymene no noitamrofni sedivorP
,stnemele tabmoc – seitiroirp ecnefeD riA • ,ssam fo ertnec ,snoitisop niam s’ymene fo :eb thgim noitca .gnidnatsrednu spoleved yldipar tuptuo RATSI
noitcetorP gnidnatsrednu kees tsum rednammoc ehT • fo ecneuqes lacipyt A :tcatnoC no noitcA fo noisuF .stneserp ytinutroppo eht fi htped ni
.noitaluger ciffart ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI niarret yek gnizies ,spag tiolpxe dna etartenep
dna lortnoc tnemevom – eciloP yratiliM • ksat rof sgnipuorg ecrof ecnalaB • ecnavda ,ymene eht dnif stessa RATSI lanoisivid rehto
.snoitaredisnoc PD dna eegufeR • serusaem lortnoC • eht pu gnidloh si taht ymene yna htiw laeD -
N yb detnemgua ,stnemele ecceR .ssenerawa
.tnemevom fo modeerf .sreciffo nosiaiL fo esu redisnoC • )htiw tlaed eb ot deen lliw hcihw( snoitisop lanoitautis niag ot thgif ot evah yam taht ecrof
erusne – selifed dna selcatsbo yfitnedI • .hcram fo redro ymene ssap-yb ot ro setuor egnahC - elibom ylhgih ,decnalab A :ecroF gnirevoC
troppus ervueonam yb tnemevorpmi etuoR •
.stessa
.ciffart drawraer rof etuor etangiseD •
ni ytiroirp deen yam spuorg pu pets – sQH •
.tnetni s’rednammoc rehgih nihtiw
noitca ekat ot deen yam srednammoc hguoht
O deriuqer
fi elor drauG ecnavdA eht revo ekaT -
:ot stnemele wolla ot
:sgnipuorG ecroF
ciffart tnemniatsus
dna ciffart tabmoc rof setuor etangiseD •
– tcatnoc ot ecnavda ot detius sOGARF •
.strats
C
elbixelf yltneiciffus eb dluohs erutcurts ydoB
niaM ehT .elbaliava setuor fo rebmun eht dna
.mutnemom niatniaM
.ymene eht no erusserp niatniaM
•
•
.ytiruces dna ecnaraelc etuoR •
.ymene dessapyb htiw gnilaed
fo dohtem dna ycilop ssap-yb enimreteD •
noitca eht erofeb ecnavda eht fo etuor hcae
rof raelc eb tsum seitilibisnopser dnammoC •
sniamod
riehT :ydoB niaM dna drauG ecnavdA
N
dnuorg eht no dneped lliw gninoitisop evitaler .ytilibixelf dna ecnalab niatniaM
•
.noitca erutuf etapicitnA
•
.ecnegilletni dna noitamrofni tiolpxE
•
.tcatnoc no esnopser ervueonam
dlob reviled ot elba eb ot esinagro ksaT •
ecnalab niatniam ot esinagro ksaT •
.noitca lacitcat eht lortnoc dna dnatsrednu
.niarret yek gnizies ,noitartenep
peed ,setuor tnempolevne gniyfitnedi ,spag
gnitiolpxe dna gnidnif edulcni sksaT .sdlofnu
U :selpicnirP
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.tcatnoc tseb ot denoitisop eb tsum rednammoC • noitca eht sa ecnavda fo sexa eht gnipoleved eht rednu ymene eht htiw tcatnoc hsilbatse
ot esnopser elbixelf a elbane ot dna ecnalab )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoc MIIJC • ,dael lliw ecceR :noitcA ecroF gnirevoC -er ro ,gniniag fo mia eht htiw noitca evisneffo
niatniam ot sexa lareves no ecnavdA • dnammoC tneuqesbus rof noitaraperp ni detcudnoC •
ervueonaM snoitaredisnoC gninnalP :tcudnoC :esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :TCATNOC OT ECNAVDA
Contents Page
The advance into Kuwait by 1 (UK) Div, 25 to 27 February 1991 – extract from an
article in “Military Operations” by General Sir Rupert Smith.
The enemy had plenty of time to prepare their defence. They were deployed behind
substantial obstacles along the Saudi/Iraqi border and in considerable depth in Iraq and
Kuwait. The enemy forces in the depth of the defence were primarily the Iraq Republican
Guard. The VII Corps plan involved breaching the obstacle with 1 US Inf Div, then
advancing north with the other divisions to destroy the Iraq Republican Guard. I UK Div,
having passed through the breach and conducted a forward passage of lines through 1 US
Inf Div, was to guard the east and south flanks of VII Corp’s attack. I was to be reinforced
by a US artillery group.
On the basis that over time small fights won quickly incur the least logistic penalty, my
intention was to fight quick small battles concentrating all available firepower on each
PY
objective in turn to destroy or, if necessary and temporarily, delay the enemy. These small
objectives were to be attacked serially and at a high tempo by each brigade or battle group
in turn. Thus if one got into trouble the other could come to its help and the one not
O
engaged would be the focus of logistic support.
C
I intended to go in deep on a narrow front so as to gain the earliest possible contact with
enemy elements moving towards the Corps flank. Advantage was to be taken of long-
range engagements and night, where the division had technical superiority. Static enemy
ED
positions were to be bypassed and if the enemy were then to counter attack or more, my
groupings must be able to operate cut off from each other: they must be big enough in
terms of firepower, logistic and medical support to stand isolation.
LL
To this end I decided to fight three simultaneous battles. This is not new now, but for a
division to do this (at least in the British Army) was new then. I called them the Depth,
O
Contact and rear battles.

TR
The Depth battle was to be commanded by my artillery commander. He was to

deploy, disrupt, divide and destroy the enemy so as to present easily digested bite
sized targets for the Contact Battle. All the artillery less that allocated to support the
N
Contact battle, the Reconnaissance Group and the attack aviation were grouped to
his command.
O
The Contact battle was to be fought by the two armoured brigade commanders, who
C
(reinforced with artillery, engineer support and with their own logistic and medical
N
elements) would be committed in turn to destroy enemy groupings.

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The Rear Battle was to be commanded by my Rear HQ whose objective was to

secure communications, establish area surveillance (including chemical and
biological) and if necessary convoy logistic and medical columns so as to ensure the
maintenance of the Depth and Contact battles. Grouped to this command were: the
Engineer Group (less those allocated to the support of the Contact battle), the AD
Artillery Group, reserve AFVs and the air portable infantry.
To command I split my HQ into a Forward and a Rear. The Forward HQ was split again
into an A and B, to allow for rapid movement in keeping up with the battle. To move
between A and B HQs I had a small rover group with an armoured escort. Alternatively I
flew with a formation of armed helicopters. I did not have a separate tactical HQ. I think if
you are fighting a battle and your HQ is too big to be tactical, make it smaller, don’t spawn
3-D-3-4
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another.
In the period leading up to the attack we conducted an intensive intelligence exercise to
understand not just where the enemy were but how they were organised. I anticipated they
would move to attack the corps flank. In the melee of such an action I wanted to be sure of
concentrating on the actual threat to the flank, rather than perhaps the nearest enemy
grouping to me. As a priority I wanted to destroy their capacity to act as a coherent whole.
This exercise was frustrating and difficult. The deception plan required VII Corps to remain
hidden in the desert. We could not collect information ourselves and we were reliant on
CENTCOM resources. We were a low priority. Nevertheless by the time we attacked we
had located a number of groupings and I had formed an idea as to their organisation.
By dawn after the passage of lines, the Deep Battle had reconnaissance units overlooking
a group of enemy we called LEAD, some 90 km from the breach. Columns of armoured
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vehicles could be seen driving down from the north to join LEAD. We know now that we
were seeing the counter attack force assembling before advancing towards the breach
some 24 hours after the event. A strong wind was lifting the sand and it was not flying
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weather. The Deep battle now covered and area of about 90x40 sq kms. In the Contact
Battle three enemy groupings had already been destroyed and a brigade was about to be
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committed to deal with another group. The Deep battle moved an MLRS battalion into line
with the leading battle group that was reorganising after a successful assault on a group
called ZINC and attacked LEAD. Subsequently, as the weather cleared, aviation and
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aircraft joined the attack and the enemy counter attack was defeated. During the next 24
hours the brigades destroyed a number of enemy groups in turn and every artillery unit
was in action in either the Deep battle or supporting the Contact Battles. It was pleasing to
LL
seen the plan come together . 1

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1 (UK) Armoured Division Scheme of Manoeuvre
1
General Sir Rupert Smith, Journal of Military Operations, Winter 2012
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APPENDIX 4 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
MEETING ENGAGEMENT
1. A meeting engagement occurs when two forces meet unexpectedly while
manoeuvring. Success lies in gaining the initiative as quickly as possible, fixing the
enemy, manoeuvring assertively and engaging decisively. The force with the most
effective decision-action cycle is likely to prevail. A meeting engagement could occur
when encountering the enemy during an advance to contact, when on the march, when
counter attacking or encountering the enemy reserve after a successful breakthrough.
2. At the divisional level it is unlikely that forces will unexpectedly meet given the
employment of extensive ISTAR assets capable of delivering significant levels of Shared
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Situational Awareness (SSA). A meeting engagement may take place at a lower
command level and in environments where extensive ISTAR capabilities do not
necessarily deliver a significant advantage. There may be implications for the division with
regard to deploying additional resources to the engagement, such as ISTAR, Offensive
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Support (OS) or Joint Fires, thus ensuring our own forces are able to prevail.
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3. Principles. The principles of the meeting engagement are:
a.
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Seize and retain the initiative.
b. Be flexible.
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c. Anticipate enemy intent.

Maintain balance.
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d.
e. Concentrate combat power.

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f. Achieve tempo.
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3-4-D-3
tnempiuqe gninniw elttab fo yrevoceR • .tiusrup ro noitatiolpxe rof eraperp htped sih tuohguorht
.drawrof .erusolcsid ot drawrof neercs dna noitca eht dnoyeb ymene htiw laed ot hguorht
riaper – seraps fo gninoitisop drawroF • noitamrofni evissap hguorht ymene evom dluohs ,ydob niam eht nihtiw ssap secrof no wollof dna
troppuS tnempiuqE eht fo noitceted eht tiolpxe ot WE • morf ro ecrof gnirevoc eht morf rehtie ymene eht sexif noisivid ehT •
.elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca ot detis .seitinutroppo ,stnemele eccer ,drawrof gnikooL • dnah
seitilibapac CAVEDEM / tnemtaerT • serif tnioj kees tsum stessa dniF • .knalf etisoppo reppu eht niag ot gnitrats si
lacideM noitasinagro ksat s’noisivid eht ekirts ot gnirvueonam dna regnorts si ecrof ymene eht
PY
.noitatiolpxe dna tiusrup fo roirp rof snoitacilpmi htiw noitamrofni mih tneverp ot dna ymene eht fi ecnefed ytsah a fo noitpodA •
secneuqesnoc eganam ot deraperp eB • rof thgif ot deen yam ecceR • xif ot desu eb osla yam noitaiva kcatta ro tiusrup
.leuf dna )yrellitra( omma esitiroirP • tnetni ,secrof stnemele ecrof dnuorG .noitaiva kcatta / noitatiolpxe ot snoitisnart
noitautis gnignahc no wollof ,ssam fo ertnec ,snoitisopsid ro stnemele ecrof dnuorg yb demrofrep noisivid eht dna detaefed
yldipar ot dnopser ot elba eb tsuM • niam s’ymene eht dnatsrednu ylkciuq ot eb yam taht ksat a si hcihw ,detcetorp ylevisiced si ymene ehT •
scitsigoL
tnemniatsuS
SREPC gnildnah •
O
kees tsum rednammoc ehT .noitamrofni
etarucca rof deen tnegru na si erehT •
eb ot eriuqer lliw sknalf sti ,ekirts
ot servueonam ydob niam eht sA •
noitcurtsed ro taefed lautneve
ecnavda lanoisivid
gniunitnoc a htiw delpuoc
ymene eht fo tnemeriter ehT •
decnalab niameR • C ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI
ekirts fo noitcerid dna ekirts ot tnetni sih tuoba gnirb dna mih etacolsid ,lliw semoctuO elbissoP
.serusaem NRBC rof tnemeriuqeR • ot sa ymene evieced – nalp noitpeceD • s’ymene eht kaerb ot eb lliw ekirts siht drauG raeR / knalF •
.?HA rof ro stnemele ssenevitceffe secuder QH gnivoM • fo mia ehT .ymene eht ekirts dna knalf ydoB niaM •
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ecrof dnuorg rof ksat – ytiruces knalF • noitca fo testuo ta a ot evom ot desu eb ylekil lliw ecnavda drauG ecnavdA •
?polevne ot gniyrt ymene – sknalF • ylekil ASS decuder – noitca fo modeerf lanoisivid eht fo ydob niam ehT • ecroF gnirevoC •
DAC fo tnemyolped – taerht riA • ecnahne ot cimanyd eb ot deen MCSF • sedon 2C tcatnoc ot ecnavda eht rof sA
noitcetorP tnetni s’rednammoc dna stessa troppus erif ymene ,secrof no sgnipuorG ecroF
snoitaredisnoc PD dna eegufeR •
stessa troppus ervueonam yb
tnemecnahne dna ecnanetniam etuoR •
ytiruces
tneuqesbus dna ecnaraelc etuoR •
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rehgih nihtiw tca ot deriuqer eb
yam srednammoc – sOGARF fo esU •
.tnetni s’rednammoc rehgih nihtiw
noitca ekat ot deen yam srednammoC •
sniamod )lacigolohcysp(
wollof tegrat ot desu ro ,elttab esolc eht

troppus ot desu eb yam seriF tJ / SO •
knalf eht ni ymene
eht gnikirts ot edulerp a sa nolehce
gnidael ymene eht xif ot desu eb yam
pihsredael dlob dna noitiutni

ot deraeg noitca lacitcat a si tI •
liaverp ylekil lliw
elcyc AD tsekciuq htiw ecroF •
?eccer fo esu evisserggA •
?HA fo esU •
.ymene dessapyb htiw laed
evitingoc dna )tnemegagne
ecneulfni gniveihca fo snaem
O draug ecnavda dna ecrof gnirevoc ehT •
elbissop sa yltneiciffe sa detanimessid
eb ot deen sredro detneiro ksat kciuQ •
ylevissergga
tcaer ot ylekil ymenE •
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noisufnoc dna soahC •
ot woh dna ycilop ssap-yb enimreteD • citenik non dna citenik lla redisnoC • tnetni llarevo emit fo kcal •
.tcatnoc ot esnopser ervueonam dlob .noitca eht lortnoc s’rednammoc rehgih eht htiw tnetsisnoc noitamrofni fo kcaL •
reviled ot elba eb – noitasinagro ksaT • dna dnatsrednu tseb ot denoitisop eb dluohs noitca eht tcudnoc ot scitsiretcarahC
ecnalab niatniam - noitasinagro ksaT • eb tsum rednammoc lanoisiviD • woh ot sa noisiced s’rednammoc ehT •
ervueonaM noitca eht etapicitnA • N .ecnalab ffo mih peek .opmet niatniaM •
)seitiroirp( dnammoC dna ymene eht ekirts ot ylgnidrocca tcaer rewop tabmoc etartnecnoC •
gnimmaj – kcatta cinortcelE :WE • snoitaredisnoC gninnalP dna elbissop sa ylkciuq sa ecalp gnikat si ecnalab niatniaM •
LFR sa tca seiradnuoB .secrof
gnicnavda fo daeha LFC – MCSF •
stegrat fo gnihctiws
evreser a niateR •
gnihcaerrevo fo erawa eB •
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tahw fo gnidnatsrednu na poleved tsum
rednammoc ehT .niw ylekil lliw elcyc
noitca noisiced tsetsaf eht htiw ecrof eht
tnetni ymene etapicitnA •
.elbixelf eB •
.evitaitini eht niater dna ezieS •
dipar eriuqer yam noitautis lacitcat
- esnopser troppus erif fo ytilibixelF •
MCSF fo noitacilppa cimanyD •
ytiruces dna
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,noitautis eht fo erutan citoahc eht dna
noitamrofni fo kcal laitini eht etipseD •
:selpicnirP
.)sedon 2C ,yrettab retnuoc
,secrof no wollof( seitiroirp gnitegraT •
egamad laretalloc dna stceffe redro
SCC ,SSC ,SC htiw ksir emos tpeccA •
troffE
niaM s’noisivid eht no etartnecnoC •
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.tnetni dna seitilibapac
,snoitisopsid ,ymene eht fo ezis
eht enimreted ot eb lliw stessa RATSI
.level lanoisivid ta noitca lacitcat
siht etanimile ylekil lliw ASS
gnitluser dna seitilibapac RATSI
dnoces dednetninu fo ssenerawA •
?sdohtem citenik
sa llew sa AI rof tnemeriuqer a ereht sI •
senil fo egassap drawrof a diovA •
ymene htiw tcatnoc niatniam dna
mutnemom niatniam ,sevitcejbo peed
rehto htiw gnola ,ksat etaidemmi riehT •
.ymene
eht htiw tcatnoc ekam ot noisivid eht
UtnerruC . tcatnoc ot ecnavda
gnirud spahrep ,gnirvueonam
elihw teem yllatnedicca
na
.esnopser etaidemmi na reviled tceles tsum rednammoc lanoisivid ehT • htiw stnemele ecrof tsrif eht eb ylekil lliw secrof gnisoppo nehw
ot desinagro ksat - seriF tJ / SO • tiusrup a emoceb yam noitatiolpxE • ecrof gnirevoc eht fo stnemele ecceR • srucco tnemegagne gniteem A •
rewoperiF tiusruP dna noitatiolpxE tcudnoC :esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :TNEMEGAGNE GNITEEM
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APPENDIX 5 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
LINK UP
1. A link up is an action where forces join up in enemy controlled or contested territory
and is the establishment of contact between two or more friendly formations. It may be
necessary to destroy an enemy between formations before contact can be established.
Link up operations may be conducted when expanding an area of operations, or when
rapidly establishing a presence in a new location.
2. A link up will be typically conducted to:
a. Join a ground manoeuvre force with an air manoeuvre force, or an infiltration
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force inserted in the enemy’s rear area.
b. Complete the encirclement of an enemy force.
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c. Relieve or assist the break out-of encircled forces.
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4-5-D-3
ecrof yranoitats
ot troppus lacidem lanoitidda rof nalP • secrof gnirvueonam fo lortnoC •
elpicnirp .)pu knil
4-2-1 eveihca ot detis CAVEDEM / tnemtaerT • ta selcatsbo ecrof yldneirf gnidulcni( gnihcaerb
lacideM elcatsbo ,tnemevorpmi etuor – sreenignE •
ytirohtua / ycilop – lained tnempiuqE • .ytilibom
stnemeriuqer SE ecrof yranoitats dnatsrednU • ,noitcetorp ,rewoperif - ecrof ervueonam
seitlausac
tnempiuqe fo lavomer – nepo setuor peeK •
seraps fo gninoitisop drawroF •
riaper drawrof dna yrevocer – SE •
troppuS tnempiuqE
PY dnuorg rof etairporppa tsom ruomrA •
ervueonaM
ksir edicirtarf WE dnatsrednU •
gnitegrat( noitpeced dna gnimmaj :WE •
)seitiroirp
.dediova eb tsum ymene delcricne eht fo epacsE.•
.rehto hcae yfitnedi dna etacol ot kees dluohs secrof htob fo stnemele
ecceR .dellortnoc eb ot sdeen ecnavda hcae fo deeps eht ,egrevnoc secrof owt eht sA •
setuor ylppus fo ecnanetniaM •
ssol tneuqesbus dna kcatta fo ksir
O stceffe redro dnoces dna
egamad laretalloc rof laitnetop dnatsrednU •
.egrevnoc ot detcepxe era secrof
owt eht erehw yradnuob eht no dehsilbatse eb dluohs stniop pu knil etanretla dna yramirP •
secroF gnivoM owT – pU kniL
tsniaga ecnalab – kcots fo gnipmud drawroF •
ylppuser tneuqerf rof eraperP •
C )sedon 2C
,yrettab retnuoc( serif htped rof tnemeriuqeR •
knil .ecrof .pu knil tsop yletaidemmi

tnemniatsus gninoitcnuf launitnoc niatniaM • yranoitats sa llew sa secrof dnuorg gnicnavda ecrof yranoitats eht ot sdeen tnemniatsus eht rof retac ot deen ylekil lliw ecrof pu knil ehT •
tneuqesbus fo stnemeriuqer ot daeha kooL •
noitca
dekcots ylluf tratS •
modeerf ylppuser esimixam
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ot troppus suounitnoc dna etaidemmi
erusne ot snug fo tnemevom dna gninoitisoP •
.ksir edicirtarf hgih – MCA / MCSF •
seitiroirp gnitegrat poleveD •
.detnioppa eb tsum rednammoc

llarevo na ,nioj secrof owt eht fI .ecrof yranoitats eht htiw nioj yam ti ro ,noissim tneuqesbus
a tcudnoc ot no evom yam ecrof pu knil eht ,dehsilbatse neeb sah pu knil eht retfA •
.ecrof yranoitats eht fo stnemele ytiruces htiw
ot sdrawnwod stessa gnitacolla redisnoC •
leuf dna omma - seitiroirP •
.ecrof yranoitats
fo stnemeriuqer rof retac ot ecrof pu kniL •
.tcatnoc ot ecnavda / noitca evisneffo
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stegrat ot etairporppa AI dna citenik esU •
rewoperiF
.troffE niaM ot secruoser RATSI etacollA •
erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene – WE •
.EPI etadpU •
stcesretni ecrof pu knil eht fo ecnavda fo sixa eht erehw dehsilbatse eb dluohs stniop pu kniL •
.pu knil eht tceffe ot hcaerb ot deen
lliw ecrof pu knil eht taht selcatsbo evitcetorp detcurtsnoc evah yam ecrof yranoitats ehT •
.ymene eht morf erusserp elbaredisnoc rednu eb yam ohw
,ecrof yranoitats eht fo troppus ni seriF tJ / SO edivorp ot deraperp eb tsum ecrof pu knil ehT•
ot ralimis snoitaredisnoc - secrof gnirvueonaM •
scitsigoL
tnemniatsuS
niarret namuH •
.selcatsbo ,gniog ,setuor – niarreT •
O :secroF yranoitatS dna gnivoM – pU kniL
..snoitan tnereffid owt morf eb yam secrof pu knil eht erehw
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.sgnikram dna sepyt tnempiuqe ,tnetni
SREPC gnildnaH • ,seitilibapac ,shtgnerts ,snoitacol ymenE • noitilaoc a fo trap sa gnitarepo nehw lacitirc ylralucitrap si DI tabmoC .ycneuqerf nommoc
NRBC • ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI a no tcatnoc ni eb dluohs secrof htob fo stnemele pu kniL .laitnesse si DI tabmoC evitceffE •
noitcaer ymene rotinom secrof lanoitan .pu knil no edicirtarf diova ot redro ni laitnesse si MCSF evitceffe fo noitacilppa ehT •
- decruoser dna elbisualp :nalp noitpeceD • itlum htiw seussi ytilibareporetni dnatsrednU • .ylppa lliw tcatnoc ot ecnavda eht ot gnitaler sgnipuorg
serusaem ecnallievrus retnuoC •
serusaem CESPO •
CAVEDEM gnidulcni ,sCoL
nalp nosiail dna noitacinummoc poleveD •
)MCSF fo erutcurts ,sgnimit
,tcatnoc fo noitacol ,sevitcejbo ,seiradnuob
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ecrof fo erutcurts eht dna snoitaredisnoc gninnalp ,tcudnoc ,selpicnirp ehT .secnavda
evitcepser rieht gnirud stnemele ecrof ymene htiw laed dna retnuocne ot deraperp eb
tsum erofereht dna tcatnoc ot secnavda gnitcudnoc ylevitceffe era secrof gnirvueonam ehT •
ylralucitrap ,)secrof ralugerri dna raluger morf(
tnemnorivne taerht °063 ni noitcetorp etuoR •
,ecnavda fo sexa( serusaem lortnoC •
.noissim tneuqesbus
O .noitca eht ot tcaer ot
laitnetop s’ymene eht esiminim ot redro ni elbissop sa ylkciuq sa detceffe eb dluohs pu kniL •
.devlovni secrof eht rof snoitca
selcatsbo fo noitaerc
ro serutaef larutan fo tnemecnahne reenignE •
ytiruces knalF •
fo txetnoc ni nevig noissim pu kniL •
.ASS niater QH gnitanidrooC •
.detalucitra eb tsum dnammoc
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tneuqesbus eht fo txetnoc eht ni demarf eb dluohs noitca pu knil a tcudnoc ot noissim ehT •
:lareneG
stniop elbarenluv ,selifed ,stniop pu
knil ,stnemele tabmoc ,setuoR – seitiroirp DA •
serusaem noitingocer / DI tabmoC •
emussa ot rednammoc llarevo rof airetirC •
.noitca fo trats ot
roirp deriuqer fi rednammoc llarevo etangiseD •
N tcudnoC
!yrotirret dleh ymene ni ecalp sekat noitcA •
noitcetorP
sehcaerb
.sniamod
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.secrof yldneirf delcricne fo tuokaerb eht tsissa ot ro ,ecrof ymene
na fo tnemelcricne eht etelpmoc ot nekatrednu yllausu si secrof gnivom owt neewteb pu kniL •
.ecrof noitartlifni na htiw ro ,stnemele ecrof ervueonam ria dna ervueonam
dna stniop ekohc ,selifed ta tnemeriuqeR - )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoc MIIJC • dnuorg neewteb ecalp sekat yllausu ecrof yranoitats a dna ecrof gnivom a neewteb pu kniL •
lortnoc ciffart dna tnemevoM - :dnammoC .yrotirret detsetnoc ro ,dleh ymene ni rehtegot nioj secrof owt erehw noitca nA •
:eciloP yratiliM • SNOITAREDISNOC GNINNALP :esopruP
ERIOMEM ED I A :PU KNIL
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Link Up - Operation Market Garden

Operation Market Garden was launched on 17 September 1944. The intent was to open
up a corridor across the Netherlands, to Arnhem and then to exploit into the Ruhr industrial
area of Germany. If successful, such exploitation may have ended the second world war
by Christmas 1944. The operation involved airborne troops capturing key bridges over the
major Dutch waterways along the corridor, coupled with an advance by ground forces with
British XXX Corps in the lead. As XXX Corps advanced, it would successively link up with
the airborne forces until it reached Arnhem. XXX Corps was expected to be in Arnhem
within 2 days. The timeline, however, was ambitious and allied planning had failed to take
into account a number of factors that were ultimately to lead to operational failure.
XXX Corp’s Guards Armoured Division crossed the start line at 1435 hrs on 17 September
covered by a large artillery concentration and were quickly in contact with German forces
that were stronger than anticipated. The resulting delay meant that there would be no link
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up with the 101 Airborne Division until the next day at the earliest. Further, the Germans
st
had blown the highway bridge over the Wilhelmina Canal at Son, five miles north of
Eindhoven, one of the 101 Airborne Division’s key objectives.
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The Guards Armoured Division continued the advance early on 18 September, however
they were again heavily engaged by the Germans south of Eindhoven. Progress was
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eventually made when large scale artillery support became available. During the fighting,
reconnaissance elements of the Guards Armoured Division were able to flank the German
ED
positions and make contact with the 101 Airborne Division. The link up was
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straightforward and without incident, but 18 hours behind schedule. Engineers were now
tasked to go forward with their bridging equipment and construct a crossing at Son.
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It was vital that the Guards Armoured Division advanced as quickly as possible. Further
up the corridor, the 82 Airborne Division had successfully captured most of their
nd
objectives. However, strong German resistance had so far prevented the capture of the
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highway bridge at Nijmegen, only 18 kilometres from Arnhem and even threatened the
viability of the 82 Airborne Division’s overall position. The divisional HQ understood they
nd
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could not expect to link up with the Guards Armoured Division until 19 September at the
earliest.
At 0645 hrs on the 19 September, the Guards Armoured Division crossed the newly
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constructed bailey bridge at Son, thirty six hours behind schedule. Less than two hours
later, reconnaissance elements of the division made the link with the 82 Airborne Division
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at Grave. The American paratroopers, taking no chances, halted the advancing British
armoured cars with warning fire. The Nijmegen bridge eventually fell to the allies on the
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evening of 20 September. However, the terrain north of Nijmegen was more suited to
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infantry than tanks and it was more heavily defended than expected, with the lead
elements of the Guards Armoured Division now becoming heavily engaged and having no
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room to manoeuvre off road due to the poor ground conditions. The infantry of 43
(Wessex) Division were tasked to take the lead, supported by the Guards Armoured
Division tanks and reconnaissance vehicles. However, 43 (Wessex) Division were still 20
miles to the south of Nijmegen struggling up the single route that XXX Corps was
advancing along.
At the furthest point of the corridor, the position of the 1 British Airborne Division was
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precarious. They had landed in an area occupied by the II SS Panzer Corps, whose
existence around Arnhem had not been fully understood. The division had expected to be
relieved after two days, but could hold out for perhaps four days if necessary. However,
the Germans had already forced the 1 British Airborne Division into a reducing perimeter
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around Oosterbeek, to the west of Arnhem, with its base anchored on the Lower Rhine
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river. Opposite this base, on the south bank of the river, sat elements of the Division’s 1st
Polish Parachute Brigade, also under heavy pressure from the Germans.
The advance north from Nijmegen eventually stepped off at 0830 hrs on 22 Sep and was
quickly halted by strong resistance, which took most of the day to overcome. A
reconnaissance squadron from 2 Household Cavalry made a tenuous link up with the
nd
Poles, however this could not be consolidated. The decision was made at XXX Corps to
send forward a battlegroup task force, based around 43 (Wessex Division’s) 5 Battalion
th
the Duke of Cornwall’s Light Infantry (5DCLI), coupled with a squadron of Dragoon Guards
from the Guards Armoured Division. The battlegroup was tasked to link up with the Poles,
reinforce the Oosterbeek perimeter and deliver much needed combat supplies. The
battlegroup started its dash forward on the evening of 22 Sep and met no opposition on its
journey. It took the battlegroup only half an hour to reach the Poles at the village of Driel.
However, at this point, unaware of the existence of mines laid by the Polish defenders, one
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of the tanks of the Dragoon Guards was destroyed.
Although operation Market Garden failed, the link up actions were broadly successful.
Although the final link up did not provide the springboard to reinforce the Oosterbeek
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perimeter as intended, it did provide the platform that enabled the eventual withdrawal of
the remnants of the 1 British Airborne Division on 25 Sep.
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Key points include:
• Combat Identification. The link up actions highlight the importance of sound
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combat identification, particularly given the multi national dimension to the
operation. While the link up with the 101 Airborne Division was relatively
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uncomplicated, the link up with the 82 Airborne Division was more problematic
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and nearly resulted in fratricide.

• Communication and Liaison. The link up actions also highlight the need for
sound communications and liaison, which may have prevented loss at the final link
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up with the Poles. Interestingly, the link up between the Guards Armoured Division
and the 101 Airborne Division was consolidated by extensive use of the well
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st
developed Dutch telephone network, aided by indigenous, irregular forces in the

form of the Dutch resistance.
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Further Reading:
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Ryan, Cornelius: A Bridge too Far (Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1974).

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Evans, Martin: The Battle for Arnhem (Pitkin, 1998).

Buckingham, William: Arnhem 1944 (Temps publishing Ltd, 2002).
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APPENDIX 6 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
RELIEF OF TROOPS
1. Introduction. The relief of troops occurs when one force takes over the actions or
activities of another. Relief is undertaken when a force is unable to continue its mission,
has accomplished its mission, is required in another area, is due for rotation, or is not
suitable to conduct a new task.
2. Purpose. Relief is conducted to sustain the overall level of combat power and
involves a transfer of responsibility between forces for a subsequent tactical action.
3. Characteristics. In all relief actions the in-place force prepares for, briefs and
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accommodates the needs of the other force, in order to ensure continuity. The required
level of operational capability must be maintained. During any relief action, there will be a
period when congestion increases the vulnerability of the forces involved. Two parallel
command systems will be operating for a time, therefore the possibility of disorientation
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and confusion is significant. Relief of troops may take place during the transition period of
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an operation, when responsibility for security operations is handed over to a host nation.
4. CJIIM. In a multinational environment language and procedural differences will
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necessitate the use of liaison officers and guides. This may also impact on joint planning
where security aspects may mean certain systems and documents are protectively marked
such that they cannot be shared with allies. Control of fire support is likely to require
specific liaison. The handover of key relationships, including those with host nation actors
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and inter-agency representatives, is a key part of any relief operation.

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5. Relief in Place. A Relief in Place (RIP) is an action where a force is replaced by an

incoming force, which then assumes the mission of the relieved force. The action should
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take place during reduced visibility, ideally at night. There are 2 types of RIP:
a. Deliberate. Plans and liaison personnel need to be exchanged. A detailed
reconnaissance will be conducted by the incoming force, with the outgoing force
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delivering a detailed briefing. Formal written orders will be produced.

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b. Hasty. Rapidly planned and executed, with liaison personnel being left by the
outgoing force to assist the incoming force. Key force elements will remain with the
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incoming force until plans are fully coordinated.

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6. Forward Passage of Lines. A Forward Passage of Lines (FPOL) is an action where

a force advances or attacks through another force. The in-place force provides the
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advancing force with tactical and logistic support. A FPOL will be used if an attack is to be
continued with fresh forces, to facilitate a breakout through a bridgehead force, if a force
being relieved is closely engaged with the enemy, or if a relieving force has to take
possession of suitable terrain in order to continue the battle. A clear understanding of the
split in responsibilities is essential.
7. Rearward Passage of Lines. A Rearward Passage of Lines (RPOL) is an action in
which a withdrawing force, possibly in contact, moves rearwards through the defensive
position of another force. A RPOL may be conducted as part of a delaying action, during a
withdrawal, as a means of relieving a force that can no longer continue its mission, or as a
means of changing the type of force facing the enemy. Movement to the rear is likely to be
3-D-6-1
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more difficult than in a FPOL as there may be a greater desire for urgency that will impact
on detailed liaison, planning and preparation. Also, the withdrawing force may have been
in action and may thus be disorganised, as well as fatigued, withdrawing from an enemy
that may be pressing hard. Friendly force recognition will be a critical issue.
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4-6-D-3
.ecnaraelc )sten serif / sedon 2C( ekirts WE •
etuor dna yrevocer tnempiuqE - .seirettab gniogtuo yb deipucco ylsuoiverp .etelpmoc .)noitarucsbo fo tluser
.snoitallatsni fo esU - esoht dna snoitisop nug detacol ydaerla diovA • noitanidrooc litnu ecrof gniveiler htiw niamer a sa ro thgin ta sa hcus ytilibisiv
.troppus NH fo sliateD - .seirettab lennosreP .feiler fo noitanidrooc htiw tsissa detimil fo snoitidnoc( erefretni
.tropsnart noitamrof rehgih fo esU -
.stinu tnemniatsus fo tnemevoM -
.)01-1 PDJ wai( SREPC fo refsnarT -
:edulcni tsum nalp tnemniatsuS •
)ecrof deveiler morf( seitlausac fo
PY lanoitidda htiw epoc ot sAMA fo noitceleS – MB •
.PIR fo dne llit troppus ni niamer snug gniogtuO •
.revodnah litnu snug lortnoc spG caT gniogtuO •
.troppus ot ydaer
dna PIR fo trats ot roirp denoitisop snug gnimocnI •
ot ecrof gniogtuo yb tfel lennosrep nosiaiL •

.snoitarepo
tabmoc rojam ot ylralucitrap seilppA •
.detucexe dna dennalp yldipaR •
feileR ytsaH
ot elba tsael era ymene

eht nehw ecalp ekat dluohS •
.snoitacinummoc
dna sediug ,nosiail
rof deen eht no sisahpme
rebmun rehgih gniviecer fo ytilibissoP -
elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca ot
detis CAVEDEM / tnemtaert :lacideM •
O .erutcurtsarfni noitan tsoh
dna noitalupop lacol no stceffe redro dnoces evitagen
dna egamad laretalloc rof laitnetop dnatsrednU •
ytiruces suonegidni htiw noitaroballoc
dna noitarepo eht gnidnuorrus seussI -
.secrof ecalp lliw ytilibareporetni htiw
seussi dna egaugnaL .noitilaoc
.PIR C .AI dna seriF tJ fo esU • .seussi noitan tsoH -
a nihtiw snoitan etarapes
neewteb ecalp gnikat si feiler
fo tnemecnemmoc ot roirp tnemhsinelper rewoperiF .)stcilfnoc ,cimonoce a fi ro ,thgin ta ecalp gnikat

htiw stsissa ecrof gniogtuO • .yrammus ecnegilletnI tnerruc deeN • ,lacitilop ,suoigiler ,larutluc ,ytiruces( si feiler ytsah a fi ylralucitrap
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.dehsinelper ylluf .)erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene evissap tiolpxe( WE dna niarret namuh eht gnitceffa seussI - ,ksir a si noisufnoC •
noitca eht trats tsum ecrof gnimocni nA • PATS ,nalp noitcelloc ,selcyc RATSI fo noitpurretni oN • .secneidua tegrat yeK - .ksir noitcetorp ecrof eht
tnemniatsuS ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI .lacol dna lanoitan ecuder ot elbissop sa ylkciuq sa
.NRBC • .airetirc dnammoc fo revodnaH - htob snoitailiffa rieht dna sredael yeK - ecalp ekat dluohs noitca ehT •
.ymene evieced ot redro
ni ytivitca lamron eunitnoc – CESPO •
.noitcaer
ymene rotinoM .decruoser ylreporp dna
elbisualp eb tsum – nalp noitpeceD •
LL .nalp snoitacinummoC -
kcots dna tnempiuqe gnidulcni nalp tnemniatsuS -
.revodnah
.DAC -
.CESPO -
noitcelloc ecnegilletni dna sliated RATSI -

.nalp
.dnammoc
fo refsnart eht ralucitrap ni ,sgnimiT -
.deveiler
.noitcetorp ecrof
gnidrager ksir fo eerged a yrrac
lliw hcihw noitca eht gnirud
rucco lliw noitsegnoc yraropmet
,snoitarepo tabmoc rojam nI •
.sreenigne yb selcatsbo
dna sreirrab fo revodnah deliateD •
.setuor
.MCSF – MB -
.tnemeganam niarret – MB -
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.seriF tJ dna SO -
gnieb ton stnemele ecrof fo sliateD -
.feiler fo ecneuqeS -
.nalp dna nwodyal SSC -
scitsiretcarahC
ytilibapac lanoitarepo niatniaM •
feiler / saera drawrof – seitiroirp DAC •
.DAC fo tnemyolped
gniriuqer aera detsegnoc ot taerht riA •
noitcetorP
.seitrap ecnavdA -
.stnemegnarra ecnassiannoceR -
.stnemegnarra nosiaiL -
.senil lortnoC -
TR .setuor dna seitilicaf yek fo noitacol eht
dna aera eht nihtiw nwodyal ecrof ehT -
.ecrof ni serusaem noitpeced gnidulcni
,snalp dna sredro lanoitarepo tnerruC -
stceffe niatsuS •
ytiunitnoc niatniaM •
:selpicnirP
.elbaliava fi
tropsnart QH roirepus fo esu nommoC •
.noitca eht
.setuoR -
.emarf emiT -
:gnitalupits nalp secudorp QH roirepuS •
N .stcepsa RSS ,cimonoce
,lacitilop ,suoigiler ,larutluc ,ytiruces
edulcni ot noitautis lanoitarepo rediw ehT -
.snoitisopsid emas eht ,yllaitini
,htiw dna seiradnuob emas
eht nihtiw ,ecrof deveiler eht
rof rewoperif esimixam ot yllaitneuqes
deveiler stnemele SO dna tabmoC •
.seitrap ecnavda
htob neewteb nalp snoitacinummoc dna nosiaiL •
.PIR fo doirep rof detacolloc eb dluohs srednammoC •
.secrof O
.noitautis lacitcat tnerruC -
ot ,noitamrofni laitnesse fo revodnah
:edulcni
sa noissim emas eht semussa
yllareneg ecrof gnimocni ehT •
.noitasilibats
dna seitrap eccer fo tnemevoM •
.setuor laretal no tnemevom diovA •
.revodnah litnu elbisnopser rednammoc gniogtuO •
.snoitacilpmi lanoitan itlum dna ytilibareporetnI •
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deliated a rof dedeen si emit tneiciffuS •
.QH gnillortnoc
sa llew sa snoitarepo tabmoc
rojam ot seilppa taht noitca
.nalp lortnoc ciffart dna tnemevoM •
.ciffart gniogtuo dna
gnimocni etarapes - gninnalp etuoR •
.FSI htiw ytiunitnoc gniniarT •
.noitasilibats ni laitnesse
spihsnoitaler ecneidua tegrat yek fo ytiunitnoC •
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yb decudorp eb ot eriuqer sredro deliateD •
.ecrof gnimocni yb eccer deliateD •
.ecrof gniogtuo
lacitcat a si ecalp ni feiler ehT •
.rewop tabmoc
fo level llarevo s’ecrof a niatsus
.aera feiler
eht ni noitsegnoc ot eud noitceted fo ksir
eht dna ytilibapac ni noitcuder ,deeps
.sniamod )lacigolohcysp( evitingoc dna
)tnemegagne aidem( lautriv ,lacisyhp ni ervueonaM •
yb detcudnoc eb ot eriuqer sgnifeirB • U
.degnahcxe
eb ot deen lennosrep nosiail dna snalP •
ot redro ni nekatrednu si ecalp
ni feileR .ecrof gnimocni na yb
rotces a ni decalper si ecrof a
neewteb ecnalab eveihca ot deeN • dnammoC feileR etarebileD fo trap ro lla erehw noitca nA •
ervueonaM snoitaredisnoC gninnalP tcudnoC :esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :ECALP NI FEILER
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6-6-D-3
.noitca tiusrup .erusolcsid noitamrofni evissap ymene – WE •
/ noitatiolpxe rof stnemeriuqer redisnoC .elpicnirp 4-2 .ytiunitnoc noitcelloC • .devlovni
-1 eveihca ot detis CAVEDEM / tnemtaert :lacideM • .ecnegilletni ecalp-ni tiolpxE • era snoitan noitilaoc etarapes
.)ytitnauq erutidnepxe ylekil ot eud omma .tnetni ,snoitisopsid owt fi ytilibareporetni dna egaugnal
yrellitra ylralucitrap( omma dna leuf – seitiroirP • ,htgnerts ,snoitacol ymene ylralucitrap gnidnuorrus seussi ralucitrap
.LOPF gnitcudnoc ot roirp ecrof gnicnavda ,yrammus ecnegilletnI tnerruc deeN • eb yam erehT .ecrof ecalp-ni eht
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fo tnemhsinelper lluf stcudnoc ecrof ecalp-nI • ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI dna ecrof gnicnavda eht neewteb
.stnemeriuqer noitatiolpxe etapicitna dna mutnemom .DL dnoyeb dnammoc semussa QH • yrassecen eb lliw snoitacinummoc
fo ecnanetniam troppus tsum tpecnoc tnemniatsus • .lortnoc ciffart htiw ecrof ecalp-ni stsissA • dna nosiail evisnetxE •
.ecrof gnicnavda eht rof tcatnoc ot ecnavda .lortnoc tnemevom nwo rof elbisnopseR • .ecrof gnicnavda eht fo
eht ro snoitca evisneffo ot snoitaredisnoc ralimiS • .ecrof ecalP-nI htiw esu dnal stcilfnoceD • tnemhsinelper lanif eht rof dedeen
O tnemniatsuS .sQH etanidrobus htiw sesiaiL • eb ylekil lliw aera ecrof ecalp-ni eht
.ksir edicirtarf WE • .ecrof nihtiw aera ylbmessa drawrof A •
.NRBC • ecalP-nI fo QH htiw QH drawrof setacolloC • .noissim
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.)noitarucsbo( .ytiroirp sekaT • tneuqesbus sti rof desinagro ksat
ytilibisiv wol ni ro thgin ta noitca tcudnoC • ecroF gnicnavdA eb ot sdeen ecrof gnicnavda eht sa
.ytivitca lamron eunitnoc ecrof ecalp-nI – CESPO • .ecrof gnicnavda fo tnemhsinelpeR • strats noitca eht erofeb detelpmoc
.noitcaer ymene .egnar ni llits snug tslihw troppus eriF •
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eb ot deen sgnipuorg ecroF •
rotinoM .elbisualp dna decruoser – nalp noitpeceD • .nalp erif ruoh-h erp llit troppus eriF • .noitca eht rof troppus erif
.ecrof gnicnavda ot .saera ylbmessa drawrof fo noisivorP • esimixam ot redro ni ecrof ecalp
feirb elcatsbo deliated edivorp sreenigne ecalp-nI • .sediug fo noisivorP • -ni eht fo aera eht nihtiw yolped
.)?setuor .DL fo drawrof dna ot pu DA lacoL • dluohs yrellitra ecrof gnicnavdA •
,ecrof ecalp-ni ,ecrof gnicnavda – seitiroirp noitcetorp(
DAC fo tnemyolped – aera detsegnoc ot taerht riA •
noitcetorP
.tnemeganam ciffart dna lortnoc tnemevoM •
)DL gnissorc retfa dna ot roirp(
LL .seiradnuob nihtiw lortnoc ciffarT •
.DL ot setuor dna ytiruces DL •
.noitanidrooc ecceR •
.yrammus ecnegilletni tnerruc fo noisivorP •
ecroF ecalP-nI
.devlovni era noitilaoc

a nihtiw snoitan owt fo secrof eht
fi ylralucitrap ,yaled dna noisufnoc
rof laitnetop elbaredisnoc si erehT •
stessa troppus ervueonam yb tnemecnahne etuoR •
.seitlausac rof etuor esreveR •
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fi ecnerefnoc gnitanidrooc LOPF trohs a tsoH •
.stimrep emit
.ecrof ecalp-ni
eht fo aera eht ni noitsegnoc diova
ot redro ni tnemevom diulf elgnis
.sleehw dna skcart rof setuor etarapeS •
.saera ecalp-ni deipucconu hguorht LOPF tcudnoC •
.tcatnoc ot ecnavda
eht ro snoitca evisneffo ot snoitaredisnoc ralimiS •
ervueonaM
TR .lortnoc tnemevoM -
.tnemniatsuS -
.serusaem noitpeceD -
.tnemeganam niarret :MB -
.DA -
a ni ecalp ekat dluohs noitca ehT •

.noitca
eht fo noitarud eht rof ytiruces
sedivorp ecrof ecalp-ni ehT •
tcudnoC
?sten serif ,sedon 2C – seitiroirp tegrat :kcatta WE •
.strats nalp erif ruoh-H erp
nehw ecrof gnicnavda ot SO fo lortnoc revodnaH •
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.stnemeriuqer RATSI -
.seitrap ecnavdA -
.ecceR -
.noitatiolpxe
tcudnoc ot ecrof daehegdirb a
.ot elba era yeht sa gnol sa
rof troppus stessa SO .egnar fo tuo ecrof gnicnavda
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.nosiaiL -
.senil lortnoC -
hguorht sevom ecrof tuokaerb A •
.noitarepo na eunitnoc ot redro
llit seunitnoc ecrof ecalp-ni morf troppus erif tceriD •
.sessergorp
ecnavda sa deilppa yllacimanyd – MCSF •
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.sVR -
.setuoR -
.troppuS eriF -
ni niarret elbatius fo noissessop
ekat ot sdeen ecrof gniveiler ehT •
.ymene eht htiw degagne ylesolc
.seirettab gniogtuo yb deipucco ylsuoiverp
esoht dna snoitisop nug detacol ydaerla diovA :gnirevoc nalp secudorp QH gnillortnoC •
.sgnimiT - N si deveiler gnieb ecrof ehT •
.secrof hserf htiw deunitnoc
.seirettab lanoitidda rof sAMA fo noitceleS – MB •
.erutcurtsarfni noitan tsoh dna noitalupop
lacol eht gnivlovni stceffe redro dnoces evitagen
.sniamod evitingoc
dna lautriv ,lacisyhp ni ecneulfni gniveihca
fo snaem citenik non dna citenik lla redisnoC •
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eb ot si ecnavda na ro kcatta nA •
:nehw
desu si dna ecrof ecalp-ni na
dna egamad laretalloc fo ytilibissop eht dnatsrednU • )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoC MIIJC • hguorht dessap si ecrof gnicnavda
.AI dna seriF tJ • dnammoC na erehw noitca na si LOPF A
rewoperiF snoitaredisnoC gninnalP esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :)LOPF( SENIL FO EGASSAP DRAWROF
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8-6-D-3 .ecnaraelc
etuor dna yrevocer tnempiuqE - .niarret namuh dna niarret
:edulcni lacisyhp ,tnetni ,snoitacol ,snoitisopsid .dootsrednu dna raelc eb tsum elttab
tsum nalp tnemniatsus ecrof ecalp-nI • ,shtgnerts ymene eb lliw sucoF • eht fo tcudnoc eht rof ytilibisnopser
.degagne ylivaeh neeb evah yam ecrof troffe RATSI etanidrooc ot QH gnillortnoC • dnammoc fo egnahc ehT •
gniwardhtiW .elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca ot ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI .QH ecrof
detis CAVEDEM / tnemtaert :lacideM • .enil revodnah ecalp-ni eht dna QH gnillortnoc eht
)noitinumma yrellitra elttab ot tnemevom nwo rof elbisnopseR • ot raelc si ecrof sih taht troper neht
ylralucitrap( omma dna leuf – seitiroirP •
.noitinumma dna leuf gnieb seitiroirp
htiw ecrof gniwardhtiw fo tnemhsinelper PY
lluf rof snalp ecrof ecalp-nI •
.stessa
.ecrof ecalp-ni
ot stnemele eccer dna sOL fo evom ylraE •
ecrof ecalP-nI htiw QH drawrof setacolloC •
.ymene eht gnidrager
.QH
dluohs eH .ecrof ecalp-ni eht hguorht
dessap sah ecrof gniwardhtiw
eht fo tsal eht nehw wonk tsum
rednammoc ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT •
.seitlausac ecrof gniwardhtiw
.devloser
eb ot deen lliw taht ytilibareporetni
dna egaugnal gnidnuorrus seussi
eb ot ylekil era erehT .noitilaoc
a nihtiw gnitarepo seitilanoitan
laitnesse non fo lawardhtiw ylraE •
tnemniatsuS
SREPC fo gnildnaH •
O erutcip ecnegilletni etad ot pu sedivorP •
ecroF gniwardhtiW
.ecrof gniwardhtiw fo tnemhsinelpeR •
htiw laed lliw ecrof ecalp-nI .leuf
dna noitinumma ylralucitraP .aera
raer ecrof ecalp-ni eht hguorht sevom
tnereffid fo era ecrof ecalp-ni eht dna
ecrof gniwardhtiw eht fi ylralucitrap
,noitsegnoc gnitabrecaxe ,yaled dna
NRBC • C .yrevocer tnempiuqE • ti sa ecrof ecalp-ni eht yb dehsinelper noisufnoc rof laitnetop eht si erehT •
)noitarucsbo( ytilibisiv .noitaucave dna tnemtaert ytlausaC • si ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT • .noitcetorp
wol ni ro thgin ta noitca rof nalP • .sediug ,stniop kcehc – lortnoc ciffarT • .deveihca si kaerb ecrof ot ksir mret trohs a gnisop
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.CESPO • .aera raer dna noitisop evisnefed hguorht eht tniop eht ta ecrof gniwardhtiw ,ecrof ecalp-ni eht fo aera evisnefed
.noitcaer ymene rotinoM .elbisualp spag dna setuor kram dna hsilbatsE • eht morf elttab eht revo ekat eht ni noitsegnoc yraropmet
dna decruoser eb tsum nalp noitpeceD • .revodnah no troppus erif fo lortnoC • ot ydaer eb tsum ecrof ecalp-nI • yb desiretcarahc si LOPR A •
.ecrof gniwardhtiw ecroF ecalP-nI .noitsegnoc eudnu tneverp ot pleh .drah gnisserp dna
dniheb esolc eb yam ymene ehT -
ot feirb reirrab – sreenignE •
.noitilomed evreser fo gniriF •
.)seitiroirp( DAC fo tnemyolped
– aera detsegnoc ot taerht riA •
noitcetorP
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.stimrep noitautis eht dna emit fi ecnerefnoc
gnitanidrooc LOPF trohs a tsoH •
.tnemniatsuS -
.serusaem DA -
.DI tabmoC -
lliw hcihw ,tnemevom diulf dellortnoc

eno eb dluohs egassap ehT •
.noitca
lacitcat tneuqesbus a rof evreser
a sa tca ot eb yam hcihw ,ksat
.desinagrosid dna deugitaf eb yam

spoort erofereht dna noitca ni neeb
evah yam ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT -
.gnignellahc
.tnemeganam etuor dna lortnoc ciffarT •
.ytiroirp etuor
sah – tlah ton seod ecrof gniwardhtiW •
.tnemeganam dnal dna MCSF :MB -
.seitrap ecnavdA -
.ecceR -
O txen sti rof ydaer aera tnemyolped
ro aera noitartnecnoc txen sti ot evom
lliw ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT .noitsop
DI tabmoC dna eccer ,nosiail
ekam yam detcudnoc eb ot deen
yam noitca eht hcihw ta deeps ehT -
.lawardhtiw ot snoitaredisnoc ralimiS •
ervueonaM
.sten serif ,sedon 2C – ekirts WE •
.ecrof gniwardhtiw
.lortnoc tnemevom dna setuoR -
.serusaem noitpeceD -
.sVR -
.seitilibisnopser
TR evisnefed s’ecrof ecalp-ni eht fo
elddim eht hguorht naht rehtar sknalf
eht no eb yllaedi dluohs ecrof ecalp
-ni eht hguorht egassap fo stnioP •
:esuaceb LOPF a naht tluciffid erom

eb ot ylekil si raer eht ot tnemevoM •
scitsiretcarahC
fo tnorf ni denoitisop-er LFC – MCSF •
.ecrof ecalp-ni fo raer ni AMA
deen lliw snug ecrof gniwardhtiW – MB •
noitilomed evreser dna reirraB -
.troppuS eriF -
.stnemeriuqer RATSI -
N .seriF
tnioJ tnacifingis yb delbane eb ot
deen yam hcihw ,enil revodnah elttab
.noitca lawardhtiw a fo trap sA -
.noissim
sti htiw eunitnoc ot elbanu si taht
.elttab evisnefed ecrof
ecalp-ni troppus ot drawrof yats ot deen
yam stessa SO ecrof gniwardhtiW •
.sgnimiT -
.nalp snoitacinummoC -
.senil lortnoc rehtO -
O
fo drawrof naelc kaerb a eveihca
dluohs ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT •
.ylrae aera drawrof eht raelc ot
ecrof a gniveiler fo snaem a sA -
.niarret nodnaba
ot deriuqer si ecrof a nehW -
.naelc kaerb elbane ot deen
seriF tnioJ dna SO .ecrof gniwardhtiw
.airetirc dnammoc fo egnahC -
.enil revodnah elttaB -
C
detcerid eb lliw ohw stinu tnemniatsus
eb yllamron lliw stnemele tsrif ehT •
.ymene eht gnicaf si taht ecrof fo
epyt eht gnignahc fo snaem a sA -
revoc ot drawrof yolped stessa SO •
.lawardhtiw eht gnirud
troppus erif ot snoitaredisnoc ralimiS •
.nosiail dna ecceR -
.noitisop gniviecer fo noitacoL -
:gnirevoc nalp secudorp QH gnillortnoC •
snoitidnoc ni ro thgin ta eb yam hcihw
,ti htiw erefretni ot elba tsael si ymene
N
.)noitarucsbo( ytilibisiv detimil fo .ecrof gnirevoc a fo elor eht
gnimrofrep si ecrof gniwardhtiw eht
erehw ,noitca gniyaled a fo trap sA -
.erutcurtsarfni noitan tsoh
dna noitalupop lacol eht gnivlovni stceffe
redro dnoces evitagen dna egamad
.sniamod evitingoc dna
lautriv ,lacisyhp ssorca ecneulfni gniveihca
fo snaem citenik non dna citenik redisnoC •
eht nehw emit a ta LOPR eht tcudnoc
dluohs ecrof gniwardhtiw ehT •
.elbissop sa noos sa ecrof
U :detcudnoc eb yam LOPR A •
.ecrof rehtona fo noitisop evisnefed
eht hguorht sessap ,ymene eht htiw
laretalloc fo ytilibissop eht dnatsrednU • )B xennA 2 traP( snoitaredisnoc MIIJC • gniwardhtiw eht morf dehctapsed tcatnoc ni netfo ,ecrof gniwardhtiw
.AI dna seriF tnioJ • dnammoC eb dluohs seitrap eccer dna nosiaiL • a erehw noitca na si LOPR A •
rewoperiF snoitaredisnoC gninnalP tcudnoC :esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :)LOPR( SENIL FO EGASSAP DRAWRAER
Contents Page
APPENDIX 7 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
WITHDRAWAL
1. Introduction. Withdrawal occurs when a commander seeks to disengage from the
enemy. A withdrawal should be planned and conducted in such a way as to minimise
interference from the enemy and to preserve fighting power. The ability to transition
rapidly to an offensive or defensive posture must be retained. Maintenance of morale
during a withdrawal is essential to success.
2. Purpose. A withdrawal will normally be directed by a superior commander and may
be conducted for the following reasons:
PY
a. To avoid defeat, or to avoid battle in unfavourable tactical circumstances.
b. If an objective has been achieved and there is no further reason to maintain
contact.
O
To draw the enemy into an unfavourable tactical posture.
C
c.
d. To conform to the movements of adjacent friendly forces.

ED
e. To allow the force to be deployed elsewhere.
f. To place the force in a position where it can be better sustained.
LL
3. Principles. The principles of withdrawal actions are:

Maintain strict control.
O
a.
Develop a simple plan.

TR
b.
N
d. Conduct offensive action.

O
e. Remain flexible.
C
N
U
3-D-7-1
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PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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3-7-D-3 .sten serif ,sedon 2C – ekirts WE

ecrof gniwardhtiw fo tnorf ni LFC – MCSF .spoort gniwardhtiw
naelc kaerb fo tniop ta HA dna SAC fo noitargetnI • eht morf decrofnier eb ot evah lliw yeht
.ytirohtua / ycilop lained tnempiuqE • ?secrof no wollof ,demlehwrevo gnieb ksir spoort gnirevoc eht fI •
.raelc setuor peeK • ,sten serif ,sedon 2C deifitnedi – serif htpeD • .noitisop etaidemretni
.yrevocer tnempiuqE • seitiroirp gnitegraT • hcae ta detaeper si ecneuqes ehT •
troppuS tnempiuqE .naelc kaerb elbane ot ymene .yrassecen fi noitca gniyaled a tcudnoc
.elarom fo ecnanetniam rof lacitirC • xif ot deen - stceffe etartnecnoc seriF tnioJ • dna egagnesid neht lliw spoort gnirevoC • elbixelf niameR •
PY
.degagne .erutcurtsarfni noitan .troppus erif tnacifingis noitca evisneffo tcudnoC •
ylivaeh neeb evah yam ecrof gniwardhtiW • tsoh dna noitalupop lacol no stceffe evitagen eriuqer yam hcihw ,kaerb naelc a eveihca ytiruces niatniaM •
.elpicnirp 4-2 elbissop dna egamad laretalloc fo gnidnatsrednU • ot si mia ehT .spoort drawrof yb dewollof nalp elpmis a poleveD •
-1 eveihca ot detis CAVEDEM / tnemtaerT • AI dna seriF tnioJ • tsrif wardhtiw lliw stnemele raeR .spoort lortnoc niatniaM •
lacideM rewoperiF gnirevoc hguorht wardhtiw lliw stinu buS • :selpicnirP
.noitcurtsed rof nalp ro ,ylrae stessa
SSC gnivom yb erutpac kcots tneverP •
.)yrellitra
O
.erusolcsid noitamrofni evissap ymene – WE •
.)noitpeced dia dna noitamrofni
rehtag ot( erutsop RATSI trevo niatniaM •
.noitpeced fo trap sa deyalpsid
eb tsum enituor dna ruoivaheb lamroN •
.noitisop niam ni secrof
.sseccus ot lacitirc eb
lliw ytilibom ecrof nwo dna rewoperiF .tuor
ylralucitrap( leuf dna omma – seitiroirP • C
deifitnedni neeb sah lawardhtiw taht srotacidnI • dniheb noitats pu ekat lliw spoort gnirevoC • a tneverp ot laitnesse eb lliw pihsredael
elbacitcarp sa noos sa ecrof hsinelpeR • .tnetni dna noitacol ,snoitisopsid .snoitisop wen ot traped tsubor dna elarom dooG .segatnavda sih
scitsigoL ,shtgnerts ymene no ecnegilletni suounitnoC • sreenigne ,seitrap noitaraperp ,seitrap ecceR • tiolpxe ot tnaw lliw dna egatnavda ria dna
tnemniatsuS lawardhtiw fo ecneuqeS dnuorg htob evah yam ymene eht erehw
ED
SREPC gnildnaH • .serusaem lortnoC • .noitca eht gnirud gnipuorger diova dna ,esrever lacitcat a retfa detcudnoc yllausU
.snoitaredisnoc taerht º063 • .tnemeganam dnal dna MCSF – MB • noitca eht fo trats eht erofeb esinagro ksaT • tcatnoC ni lawardhtiW
.NRBC • .tirips evisneffo esisahpmE • sgnipuorG
.ytilibisiv .egatnorf tnerehoc a niatniaM • .noitca evisneffo fo tcudnoc ehT - .hcram a ot yaw ralimis a ni desinagro
wol ni ro thgin ta lawardhtiw rof nalP •
.ytivitca lamron eunitnoc – CESPO •
.ytiruces etuoR •
.sseccus
enimreted ot noitcaer ymene rotinom
LL.kaerb naelc a eveihcA •
.snoitaredisnoc elaroM •
.deriuqer pihsredael tsuboR •
.sniamod evitingoc
.noitaucave
ytlausac ylralucitrap ,noitartsinimda dooG -
drawrof gniniamer srednammoC -
.demrofni sknar lla gnipeeK -
yb ,deniatniam si elarom doog taht lacitirc si tI •
eb ot ylekil si tnemeriter a eroferehT

.tcatnoc fo tuo si taht ecrof a yb ymene
eht morf yawa tnemevom a si tnemeriter A
tnemeriteR
- decruoser dna elbisualp :nalp noitpeceD •
.selcatsbo / sreirrab fo noitavitca dna
dna lautriv ,lacisyhp ssorca ecneulfni gniveihca
fo snaem citenik non dna citenik redisnoC •
O .ytilibaliava poort yb derepmet eb ot deen yam
elaroM .noitisop tneserp sti
ni deniatsus eb regnol on nac ecrof a fI •
noitilomed evreser fo gnirif - sreenignE •
.snoitisop wen ,setuor ,aera
drawrof – seitiroirP .DAC fo tnemyolpeD •
noitcetorP
.tnemeganam etuor dna lortnoc ciffarT • ni degagne ylevisiced gnieb tuohtiw wardhtiw ot
dnammoC
snoitaredisnoC gninnalP
.tabmoc
TR
snoitisop etaidemretni dna niam fo noitaraperP
.ytiruces rof deen eht tsniaga decnalab
eb tsum noitisop wen eht fo noitaraperp ylraE •
noitisoP niaM weN
.spoort tabmoc sih troppus ot yrellitra sih
.erehwesle ecrof eht fo esu eht wolla oT •

.secrof tnecajda
fo stnemevom eht ot mrofnoc oT •
.secnatsmucric
elbaruovafnu rednu elttab diova oT •
.snoitisop etaidemretni rof tnemeriuqeR •
.ytilibom ymene retnuoC •
.tnemecnahne ytilibom reenignE •
noisivid eht wolla lliw taht snoitidnoc eht etaerc ot
seitivitca gnipahs tcudnoc lliw noitamrof rehgiH •
gnipahS
N
evom ot deen tsum ymene eht taht hcus raer
eht ot hguone raf tub ,snoitaraperp gnimusnoc
emit ekatrednu dna kcatta ot yolped ot ymene
.tcatnoc
niatniam ot tnemeriuqer on si ereht
dna deniag neeb sah evitcejbo na fI •
.ciffart fo lortnoc dna tnemeganaM •
.snosrep
.elbaliava eb lliw sevreser ro spoort gnirevoc
taht ylekilnu si tI .derotser lortnoc dna esinagro-er
O
eht ecrof ot hguone gnorts eb tsum snoitisop
etaidemretnI .snoitisop etaidemretni aiv ro
.taefed htiw denetaerht si ecrof a fI •
:snosaer gniwollof eht rof detcudnoc
decalpsid dna seegufer rof setuoR •
.setuor laretaL •
.skcart dna sleehw rof setuoR •
lliw yeht erehw ti dniheb saera ylbmessa detceles
ot noitisop wen siht hguorht kcab thgif lliw tcatnoc
ni spoorT .ereht evom lliw elttab etaidemmi eht ot
C
,noitisop wen ot tcerid eb yam lawardhtiw ehT •
snoitisoP
.sgnimit nalp lawardhtiw eht fo sisab eht mrof
eb yam lawardhtiW .rednammoc roirepus
sih fo noitcerid ro tnemeerga eht tuohtiw
rednammoc a yb nevig eb yllamron
.setuor lawardhtiw fo noitangiseD •
.snoitilomed evreser
dettimmoc ton spoort llA .thgif dna dnats ot hcihw
no raer eht ot noitisop a esoohc lliw rednammoc
N
lliw taht emit eht si hcihw ,ymene eht ot deined
eb ot sah noitisop eht hcihw ot pu emit ehT •
ton lliw redro lawardhtiw A .ecnallievrus
dna eccer ,serif tceridni yb deniatniam
/ selcatsbo fo noitavitca ,setuor lawardhtiw
fo tnemecnahne ,noitisop wen eraperp
– sksat ot spoort reenigne fo ecnalaB •
ehT .tnorf tcatni na niatniam ot mia dluohs
rednammoc ehT .erudecorp elttab denilmaerts
a ni gnitluser ,gninraw etauqeda tuohtiw dna
s’ecrof eht ot evom lliw taht seitrap noitaraperp
dna eccer rof tpecxe ,tnemevom drawraer
U
.noitisop wen eb llits yam tcatnoc ,nekorb neeb
evah lliw smra tabmoc htiw tcatnoc tcerid
hguohtlA .rednammoc sti fo lliw eht htiw
.sreenigne ,seitrap ylitsah tuo deirrac eb ot evah yam lawardhtiw A • on eb lliw ereht hcihw erofeb emit ehT • ecnadrocca ni ymene na morf segagnesid
noitaraperp ,eccer fo erutraped ylraE • lawardhtiW ytsaH sgnimiT yeK ecrof a nehw srucco lawardhtiw A
ervueonaM tcudnoC tcudnoC esopruP
ERIOMEM EDIA :LAWARDHTIW
Contents Page
Withdrawal – Operation Market Garden

The Allies launched operation Market Garden on 17 September 1944, intending to open
up a corridor through the Netherlands to enable exploitation into the Ruhr industrial area of
Germany. However, by 24 September it was clear that the 1 British Airborne Division
st
would be forced to withdraw from the Oosterbeek perimeter near Arnhem, where it found
itself underndrelentless pressure from II SS Panzer Corps. The intended link up with XXX
Corps of 2 British Army had failed to produce the conditions where the perimeter could
be reinforced and resupplied. 1st British Airborne Division had been defeated and now
faced complete annihilation if a withdrawal could not be effected as soon as possible. The
withdrawal, “Operation Berlin”, was to commence during the night of 25 September.
1st British Airborne Division had been forced into a thumb shaped pocket centred on the
western half of the town of Oosterbeek, with its base, about 1.5 km wide, anchored on the
north bank of the Lower Rhine river. The south bank of the river was held by 43 (Wessex)
PY
Division, part of XXX Corps, as well as the remaining Polish paratroopers that had
dropped on 21 September.
By the morning of 25 September, 1st British Airborne Division was down to an effective
O
strength of less than 2,500. The GOC, Major General Urquhart, understood that
withdrawal across the Rhine would be problematic given that the river was nearly 400
C
metres wide at the perimeter base. His plan was designed around the “collapse of a paper
bag”, where the troops at the top of the perimeter would thin out first, falling back on the
ED
troops positioned nearer the river, who would be among the last to cross.
Security. The plan called for a number of measures aimed at achieving security,
deceiving the enemy and masking the fact that a withdrawal was taking place:
LL
• Small groups would stay on the perimeter and remain firing for as long as possible to
enable withdrawing troops to slip away. These groups would include wounded men
who were not able to walk, but who could still fire a weapon.
O
• The guns of the divisional artillery, 1st Airlanding Light Regiment RA, would continue to
TR
fire for as long as possible.

• The withdrawal would be supported by all the available guns of XXX Corps.
• The already established pattern of radio communications would carry on.
N
• The Military Police guarding the German prisoners of war would maintain patrolling for
O
as long as possible and would be among the last to leave.

• Due to the risk of capture, information on the withdrawal was limited to certain senior
C
officers on a need to know basis (troops on the northern part of the perimeter were
N
informed of the withdrawal 15 minutes before pulling out).

• Withdrawal timings were to be strictly adhered to in order to prevent congestion at the
U
river bank, potentially presenting the Germans with a highly vulnerable target.
Withdrawing troops were to be guided to the river bank by soldiers from the Glider Pilot
Regiment, in accordance with a meticulous schedule, where they were then directed
into boats by “beachmasters” provided by XXX Corps.
• The orders stated that during the withdrawal engaging the enemy was to be avoided
unless it was absolutely necessary.
Offensive Action. The overall withdrawal plan called for covering troops to cross the river
and hold the base of the perimeter to facilitate the withdrawal of the airborne troops. This
covering task fell to 4th Dorsets. However, during their crossing, most of the boats ferrying
the Dorsets were swept downstream in the very strong current. The small number of
3-D-7-4
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Dorsets that were able to reach the perimeter were not able to act as a coherent covering
force. However, some of the Dorsets that were swept downstream were able to regroup
and mount a hasty diversionary attack to the west of the perimeter. This attack, coupled
with a large deception fire plan by XXX Corps even further to the west, gave the Germans
the impression that a major crossing of the Lower Rhine was taking place, thus drawing
their attention away from the withdrawal
Deception. Prior to the withdrawal commencing, the weather took a turn for the worse,
with heavy rain and high winds affecting the whole area. This was advantageous as it
further helped to mask the British intent. While troops were moving down to the river bank,
there were inevitable skirmishes with the Germans, however nothing that gave the
Germans an understanding of what was actually taking place. Under the light of their
flares, the Germans were aware of the increased ferrying activity and their mortar and
machine gun fire caused casualties among the withdrawing troops and the troops
PY
operating the boats. However, the Germans assumed that the ferrying activity was
actually bringing more troops into the perimeter, rather than taking troops out.
Flexibility. As the withdrawal action progressed, boats were put out of action by enemy
O
fire, which caused a degree of congestion in the embarkation area, as the evacuation rate
slowed down. Casualties were incurred as the Germans adjusted mortar and machine
C
gun fire onto this area. Instead of waiting for a dwindling number of boats to take them
across the river, many troops decided to swim to safety. By 0200 hrs on 26 September,
the remaining ammunition in the perimeter was blown up and the gunners removed the
ED
breach blocks from the guns. Those few troops that were still in the perimeter at first light
were withdrawn under cover of a smoke screen laid by XXX Corps artillery.
Thus ended Operation Market Garden, with 2,163 troops from 1st British Airborne Division
LL
being withdrawn from the Oosterbeek perimeter, along with 150 Poles and 75 Dorsets.
The withdrawal was a success, in part due to divisional planning staff focusing on control,
coupled with measures aimed at maintaining security and deceiving the enemy.
O
TR
Further Reading:
Ryan, Cornelius: A Bridge too Far (Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1974).
N
Evans, Martin: The Battle for Arnhem (Pitkin, 1998).

Buckingham, William: Arnhem 1944 (Temps publishing Ltd, 2002).
O
C
N
U
3-D-7-5
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APPENDIX 8 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
MARCH
1. A march is designed to move a force efficiently to its place of tactical employment in
the best possible condition to execute its subsequent mission. During a march contact is
not expected but force elements should nonetheless be prepared for it. When planned
and conducted efficiently a march adds tempo to operations. The regulation of a march is
essential, particularly when carried out by a division. Regulation may be carried out by a
number of organisations within the division, including reconnaissance forces and the Royal
Military Police (RMP). The disciplined conduct of the march remains secondary to the
success of the subsequent mission.
PY
2. When conducting a march it may be necessary to consider the movement of allies,
host nation forces, inter-agency partners and contractors. The last two elements may
require the security of our own forces during the march.
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
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N
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PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
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3-8-D-3
.tnemeganam dna noitaluger ciffarT •
.gnideef dna leuf ylralucitrap ,tnemhsinelpeR • .laitnesse si ciffart fo lortnoc
sertneC troppuS yovnoc dna saera ruobrah fo gninoitisoP •
PY
.snalp yrevocer dna riaper elciheV •
.elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca ot detis seitilibapac CAVEDEM dna tnemtaerT •
:tnemniatsuS
.noitcetorp NRBC •
.CESPO •
.sdrac etuoR -
dna deef nac spoort erehw dna leuf htiw hsinelper
nac hcram eht no stinu erehw saera ruobraH -
locotorp gnitropeR -
..tser
dna tnemeganam ehT .yletaidemmi htiw
tlaed dna detroper eb dluohs snoitpurretni
detcepxenU .hcram eht ni devlovni secrof
rehto no tcapmi evitagen a evah lliw sgnimit
dna setuor morf snoitaiveD .hcram eht
O.noitcetorp etuor DA •
.sdrauG knalF •
..sgnimit dennalp evitcepser
rieht dna hcram eht gnitcudnoc stnemele ecrof
fo ecneuqes eht gniliated elbaT tnemevoM -
tuohguorht laitnesse si :enilpicsiD hcraM •
.noitautis lacitcat
eht no dneped lliw dedivorp noitcetorp
C
.ecroF gnirevoC •
:noitcetorP .sruoted dennalpnu fo level dna erutcurts ehT .noitcetorp eriuqer
.setuor yrtnuoc ssorc fo esU • htiw laed ot snoitca dna snalp ycnegnitnoC - stnemele ecrof gnivom lla :noitcetorP •
.stessa reenigne noitisop-erP • .detapicitna eb yam hcram eht .ssenidaer tabmoc fo level hgih a ta eb
ED
.tnemevorpmi dna ecnanetniam etuor reenignE • fo noitpursid erehw saera ni sruoted dennalP - ot evah spoort nehw desu tseb era srotceS
.snoitcirtser tnemevoM • .slortaP daoR - tnemevoM .yrtnuoc ssorca evom ro ,setuor
:ervueonaM .stnioP lortnoC ta nemstnioP - elbaliava lla esu ot evom eht gnitucexe
.TSF hctawrevo / rohcnA • .ffats lortnoc tnemevom rednammoc eht wolla :srotceS tnemevoM •
lanoisivid yb dennam yllausu stsoP ciffarT - .hcram
sa hcram eht morf yolped nac ro troppus erif edivorp ot yolped nac SO • LL
?HA dna SAC elbaliavA •
.)serif fo ycaidemmi ot drager htiw ffo edart( htiw deriuqer
.etuor eritne revoc ot ylekilnu SO •
.MCSF rof tnemeriuqeR •
.ffats tsovorp
lanoisivid yb decalp yllamron gningis etuoR -
.tnemyolpme lacitcat
fo ecalp rieht ot lortnoc nwo rieht rednu evom yeht
eht fo noitarud eht ecuder dna snmuloc

hcram eht fo htgnel eht ecuder ,ytilibixelf
esaercni ot redro ni elbissop reverehw
desu eb dluohs setuor elpitlum :setuoR •
.erutcurtsarfni noitan tsoh dna noitalupop lacol eht
tceffa yam taht egamad laretalloc dna stceffe redro dnoces redisnoC •
O
tniop hcihw ta ,ecalp detangised rieht ta hcram eht
ffo emoc ot stinu wolla stnioP esaeleR elpitluM -
.deeps dna ecneuqes nevig rieht ni evom
.stlah gnidulcxe
,evom ot detcepxe era secrof hcihw
ta deeps egareva eht :hcraM fo etaR •
.secneidua tegrat ot etairporppa AI dna seriF tJ esu ot deraperp eB •
,NRBC ,reenignE – stnemele ecnassiannocer etuor tsilaiceps fo esU •
:rewoperiF
.detadpu yllaunitnoc noitautis ymenE •
.PMR TR
stinu taht tniop trats eht morf si tI .lortnoc nwo
rieht rednu stniop trats detangised rieht ot evom
srednammoc tinU .nmuloc hcram evitcepser rieht
gninioj stnemele ecrof rof stnioP tratS
:edulcni serusaem lortnoC .elbissop sa rennam
elpitluM -
.tinu rojam
ro puorgelttab a fo htgnel eht deecxe ton
dluohs hcihw ,slaires hcram otni dedivid bus
era snmuloc hcram gnol :slaireS hcraM •
.nmuloc hcram a
.ecnassiannocer etuor rof SAU fo esU •
.nalp RATSI detargetnI •
:ecnegilletnI dna noitamrofnI
N
a tneiciffe sa ni detcudnoc si hcram eht taht
erusne ot redro ni laitnesse si ciffart fo lortnoc ehT
mrof rednammoc elgnis a rednu etuor elgnis
a gnola gnihcram secrof :nmuloC hcraM •
.troppus nwodkaerb
etaidemmi dna lortnoc ciffart nwo edivorp ot elpmaxe rof - hcram
lortnoC tnemevoM dna ciffarT
TOLF morf
O ygolonimreT
.ymene
eht gnirud seitilibisnopser rieht dnatsrednu dluohs gnivom stinu ehT •
.hcram eht fo dne eht ta etucexe ot deriuqer eb lliw yeht noissiM
eht rof sredro deliated nevig neeb evah dluohs gnivom stinu ehT •
yawa stnemele ecrof sevom etuor nwod eht elihw
,TOLF sdrawot noisivid eht sevom etuor pu ehT •
C eht htiw tcatnoc otni emoc ot deraperp
eb dluohs tub ,tcepxe ton dluohs secroF •
sniamod evitingoc dna lautriv ,lacisyhp ssorca
ecneulfni gniveihca fo snaem citenik non dna citenik lla redisnoC •
.noitsegnoc laitnetop
diova ot setuor laretal setuor laretal esu yam
dna setuor elpitlum gnola hcram lliw noisivid ehT •
N .noissim eht fo noitelpmoc lufsseccus
eht ot yradnoces si enilpicsid hcraM •
.noissim sti etucexe ot noitidnoc elbissop
:dnammoC .slaires
hcram fo rebmun a otni dedivid bus eb yam
taht nmuloc hcram a mrof lliw ecrof lanoisivid A •
U
tseb eht ni sevirra ti taht os ,tnemyolpme
lacitcat fo ecalp sti ot yltneiciffe ecrof
a evom ot redro ni detcudnoc si hcraM A •
:snoitaredisnoC gninnalP tcudnoC :esopruP
E R I O M E M E DI A : H C R A M
Contents Page
APPENDIX 9 TO
ANNEX D TO
PART 3
CROSSING AND BREACHING
OBSTACLES
1. Introduction. An obstacle is a natural or man made restriction to movement,
requiring specialist engineer capabilities or munitions to overcome it, coupled with specific
drills. A coordinated series of obstacles is known as a barrier. Avoidance should be the
primary aim, with the secondary aim being to cross where the enemy least expect, where
there is little or no opposition. This will not always be possible and an opposed crossing
may be necessary. Best use should be made of existing crossings. Reconnaissance is
important to determine the terrain, the nature of the obstacle and to gain detailed
information regarding how it is being defended. The division may need to cross an
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obstacle during major combat operations, as well as during stabilisation.
2. Obstacle Types. The most common obstacles include rivers, canals and minefields
O
(including concentrated Improvised Explosive Device (IED) belts) but may also include soft
or marshy ground, craters and ditches, vertical steps and steep slopes, contaminated
C
areas (CBRN or industrial), extended wire entanglements, debris, flooding and inundation.
3. Purpose. An obstacle crossing is usually conducted during an advance or an attack
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but may also be conducted during a withdrawal. The characteristics of crossing and
breaching actions highlight the importance of own force cohesion, as well as the
importance of breaking the will and cohesion of the enemy if a crossing is to be successful.
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The purpose is to project combat power across an obstacle in order to maintain

momentum and retain the initiative.
O
4. Principles. Movement must be strictly controlled to avoid congestion at what will

inevitably become a choke point. Once across the obstacle, exploitation must be as rapid
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as the tactical situation allows. Principles include:

a. Maintain momentum.
N
b. Achieve surprise.
O
C
d. Deceive the enemy.

N
e. Build in redundancy.
U
f. Develop a simple plan.

g. Ensure effective command and control.
5. In a deliberate crossing action, 3 specific areas make up the crossing location:
a. Crossing Area. The crossing area is a specific area bounded by an entry line
and an exit line, within which sit a number of crossings. The depth of the crossing
area will depend on the terrain. However, as a guide the entry and exit lines should
be approximately 3 km from the obstacle on each bank. In the vicinity of the crossing
area there should be sufficient routes of the right classification leading to the
obstacle, as well as lateral routes. Waiting areas should be designated, where force
3-D-9-1
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elements can halt prior to being called to cross. In the vicinity of the crossing area
dispersed assembly areas should be selected where force elements can be held prior
to being called forward and where they can be replenished. The establishment of a
crossing area prevents a potentially dangerous build up of forces near to the
obstacle, enables flexible movement control and gives the engineers freedom within
a designated space.
b. Crossings. Where resources permit, the number of crossings should be twice
that required by the traffic flow, creating redundancy. The expansion of the
bridgehead should provide cover from observation and direct fire, enabling the
engineers to construct the crossings in relative safety.
c. Bridgehead. The bridgehead should consist of defensible terrain of sufficient
depth to prevent the enemy from interfering with the crossing, as well as acting as a
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base for subsequent exploitation.
6. Delaying Actions. An obstacle crossing during a delaying action will generally
follow the following stages:
O
Withdrawal. Force elements not required to support the immediate battle are
C
a.
withdrawn across the obstacle, using existing and constructed crossings. Crossings
may be designated as reserved demolitions. Obstacles to enemy movement may be
ED
constructed, improved or activated.
b. Delay. Forces engaging the enemy are withdrawn, supported by fire from the
home bank as well as joint fires. Bridges and ferries are then dismantled or
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destroyed. The last troops may have to swim or be transported by boat or support
helicopter.
O
7. Breaching Actions. The purpose of a breaching action is to project combat power

across a defensive barrier, such as a minefield or an IED belt, in order to maintain
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momentum and retain the initiative. Breaching may be conducted by hand or by using
mechanical or explosive means. The breaching of an enemy minefield or IED belt is likely
to be opposed. The principles are similar to those of a water crossing action.
N
O
C
N
U
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O
C
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O
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N
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C
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4-9-D-3 .ten reenigne dna ten lortnoc tnemevom .gnissorc ot setuor evorpmI .selcatsbo
,ten dnammoc lacitcat :snoitacinummoC • knalf dna sgnissorc tcurtsnoc :sreenignE •
.dehsilbatse eb dluohs stsop yrevocer .snoitacilpmi ecruoser reenigne – tuokaerb .troppus erif fo
dna ciffarT .dekram eb dluohs senal dehcaerB • tsop tnempoleved dna tnemevorpmi etuoR • .ecroF daehegdirB dna ecroF ecalP
noitartnecnoc dna secruoser reenigne ,ecaps -nI htob htiw LOPF stcudnoC .daehegdirb
.dedeen eb ot ylekil serif gnimlehwrevO • .seitiroirp – aera daehegdirb ,setuor gnidrager snoitacilpmi
.thgin ta hcaerb ,yllaedI • gnissorc nihtiw dna gnihcaorppa hcram fo redrO • eht morf drawrof stiolpxe :ecroF tuokaerB •
tub ,elbixelf erom egatnorf edagirb owT .segats noitadilosnoc dna pu dliub stcudnoc
.stnemegdol hsilbatse dna ssorc ot nolehce .)ervueonam ria/staob tluassa( ssorc .mutnemom ecuder yam tub ,relpmis egatnorf
tluassa rof senal nepo ot dedeen eb lliw sreenigne ot nolehcE tluassA ecroF daehegdirB elbanE • dna daehegdirb sdnapxE :ydoB niaM -
edagirb eno a no gnissorc :egatnorF • .noitcurtsnoc gnissorc stcetorp dna knab
dna ruomra ,yrtnafni fo ecrof gnihcaerb A .deriuqer .noitsegnoc diova ot evom dellortnoC •
PY
.selcihev degamad dna seitlausac raf no stnemegdol sniag :nolehcE tluassA -
secruoser reenigne tsilaiceps fo esu evisnetxe .hcram fo redro ni tnorf ta stessa gnigdirB • tcartxe ot pool esreveR .secruoser reenigne
,noitaraperp ,eccer deliateD .mutnemom fo ssol ervueonaM .ecroF ecalP-nI htiw LOPF tcudnoc taht
htiw sgnissorc fo rebmun ecnalaB .deriuqer spuorg owt fo stsisnoc :ecroF daehegdirB •
tnatluser htiw deriuqer eb yam hcaerb etarebileD • .noitpeced/gnimmaj – WE • sgnissorc elpitlum - ycnadnuder :sgnissorC •
.ylekil gnihcaerb dnah fi denimreted .serif noitpeced rof tnemeriuqeR • .knab raen morf gnissorc
.noitatiolpxe tneuqesbus dna pu ot troppus erif sedivorp :ecrof ecalP-nI •
eb dluohs dleifenim a fo noitisopmoc tcaxE • ?ylppuser omma - ekoms ytrA fo esu degnolorP • dliub troppus ot hguone egral :daehegdirB •
.enal lortap a hcaerb dluohs eccer elbissop
fI .sliated ymene dna seiradnuob ,htped ,epyt
O .snoitaredisnoc egamad laretalloC •
.MCSF •
.dnefed ot elbatius knab raf
,troppus erif rof elbatius knab raen :dnuorG •
sgnipuorG tnemelE ecroF
.)mutnemom
,ecneserp elcatsbo yfitnedi dluohs eccer dna EPI •
.slevel dnammoc rewol ta snoitca tnednepedni
C .seitiroirp gnitegraT •
.secneidua tegrat
srotcaF lacitcaT dna lacinhceT htiw ksir ecnalab( stimrep noitautis
etairporppa no AI sa llew sa citenik redisnoC • lacitcat sa noos sa tuokaerB :noitatiolpxE •

suoenatlumis fo rebmun a eb ot sdneT • .daehegdirb otni ,elcatsbo ssorca .noitatiolpxe elbane ot daehegdirb
.tleb DEI ro dleifenim a sa hcus .noitarucsbo dna rewoperif ,saera ylbmessa morf tnemevom slortnoc dna
ED
gnimlehwrevo rof tnemeriuqer – gnissorc desoppO • nihtiw esab mrif hsilbatse :noitadilosnoC •
reirrab evisnefed a revo rewop tabmoc fo noitcejorp setuor sngiS .saera ylbmessa ,saera gnitiaw .daehegdirb
eht – noitca gnissorc a ot elpicnirp ni ralimiS • rewoperiF ,ten lortnoc tnemevom a sehsilbatse ,ecivda otni stnemegdol sdnapxe :pu dliuB •
gnihcaerB .erusolcsid noitamrofni ymene – WE • lortnoc tnemevom sedivorP .QH tnemiger .HS ro gnidrof ,gnitaob ,gnimmiwS
.niarret namuH • PM fo stnemele fo stsisnoC .rednammoC .knab raf no tnemegdol sniag :tluassA •
.drawrof riaper – seraps fo gninoitisop drawroF •
.ytirohtua lained tnempiuqE •
.nepo dna raelc tpek stniop ekohc dna setuoR •
troppuS tnempiuqE
.ecroF tuokaerB ot troppus lacidem redisnoC •
LL
.sehcaorppa ,gniog ,)laretal gnidulcni( setuoR •
reenignE( elcatsbo fo erutan dna niarret lacisyhP •
.)eccer
.sevreser ,tnetni
,seitilibapac ,snoitisopsid ,shtgnerts – ymenE •
llarevO htiw QH gnillortnoC ta stis yllausu

:QH noitasinagrO lortnoC tnemevoM •
.aera gnissorc
nihtiw troppus gnissorc dna tnemeganam
niarret ,lortnoc tnemevom ,ytiruces
.tluassa
laitini dna eccer rof ytiruces :hctawrevO •
segatS - gnissorC retaW etarebileD
.seitlausac esiminim
.elpicnirp 4-2-1 eveihca
ot detis seitilibapac CAVEDEM / tnemtaerT •
lacideM
?)knab raf /knab raen( dednefed aera gnissorc sI •
O rof elbisnopseR .egatnorf edagirb a revo
gnissorc fi ylralucitraP . QH ecroF daehegdirB
dna esirprus eveihca ot spoort detnuomsid
yb tuo deirrac :gnihcaerB trevoC •
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.seitinutroppo noitatiolpxe - daeha gnikooL • ot detageled eb yam :QH aerA gnissorC • .noitisop evisnefed s’ymene na
.stnemeriuqer ecroF tuokaerB etapicitnA • .snoitacilpmi noitan tsoH • .drawroF viD ro niaM viD :QH gnillortnoC • ni dlohtoof a gnidivorp ,elcatsbo na etartenep
.elbissop sa elcatsbo ot esolc sa skcots noitisoP • .snoitamrof gniknalf – nosiaiL • erutcurtS sretrauqdaeH ot ecrof a swolla :gnihcaerB tluassA •
.gnissorc ot roirp seilppus tabmoc mumixaM • .noitacolla niarret – tnemeganam ecapselttaB • .noitaraperp dna gninnalp deliated sevlovnI
.modeerf ylppus-er esimixam .stceffe redro dnoces yticapac egdirb nihtiw era selcihev erusne dna .htgnerts ymene ro ytixelpmoc ,ezis elcatsbo
– yrassecen fi sdrawnwod stessa citsigol etacollA •
.leuf dna )serutan yrellitra( omma esitiroirP •
.ylppuser tfiws troppus tsum tpecnoc SSC •
evitagen fo ksir dna noitalupop fo ytimixorP •
.noitcaer ymene
rotinom – )elbisualp ,decruoser( nalp noitpeceD •
N
ffats lortnoc tnemevom tsissA .saera gnitiaw
ni detacol - ER :srellortnoC aerA gnitiaW •
.elcatsbo eht ssorca tnemevom
ot eud yrassecen eb yam :etarebileD •
.secruoser detimil htiw hcram
fo enil eht morf ecalp sekat yllausu :ytsaH •
scitsigoL
tnemniatsuS
.saera gnitiaw
,saera ylbmessa ,setuor ,eludehcs gnissorc ,nalp
O
lortnoC .sgnissorc niatniam dna etarepo
,poleved – ER :srednammoC gnissorC •
gnissorC fo sepyT
?sknalf/aera gnissorc tcetorp ot selcatsbo etaerC
.noitarucsbo – ytilibisiv decuder ni ro thgin ta ssorC
.saera gnitiaw ,saera ylbmessa ,setuor ,taerht °063
•
•
•
tnemevom ,noitisopmoc ecrof ,snoitacol gnissorc
laudividni ,aera gnissorc edulcni - nalp gnissorC •
.gnissorc fo noitarud rof serutcurts QH •
C
.pu tes ten snoitacinummoc
reenigne serusne dna srettam
detaler reenigne lla no sesivda - pG rgnE SC
.lortnoc dna dnammoC
.ycnadnudeR
.yticilpmiS
.ytiruceS
.noitpeceD
.esirpruS
.CESPO
.NRBC
.ytiruces knalF
•
•
•
?tahw seod ohw – sgnipuorg tnemele ecroF •
?owt ro edagirb eno – egatnorF •
.ecroF daehegdirB
N
dmoC eb ot ylekiL :rednammoC reenignE •
eht sa detanimon
edagirb eht ot detageled eb yam gninnalp
.mutnemom fo ecnanetniaM
selpicnirP
.setuor dna aera gnissorc – ecnefeD riA
noitcetorP
.woleb dna level edagirb
• ?desopponu - ti stcepxe tsael ymene
eht nehw dna erehw edam eb gnissorc a naC •
?desu eb sgnissorc gnitsixe naC •
deliated :rednammoC ecroF daehegdirB • U
.noitca lacitcat eht fo
noitucexe dna gninnalp rof elbisnopser si dna
.lawardhtiw a fo trap eb yam tub ,kcatta
ro ecnavda na gnirud detcudnoc netfO •
.ti emocrevo ot snoitinum ro
ta snoitcnuf lortnoc tnemevom rof tnemeriuqeR - ?ssorc ro ssapyB • nalp gnissorc seussI .rednammoC lanoisiviD tnempiuqe tsilaiceps gniriuqer tnemevom
QH lortnoC tnemevoM - dnammoC eht yllamron :rednammoC llarevO • ot noitcirtser edam nam ro larutan A •
:ecilop yratiliM • snoitaredisnoC gninnalP - gnissorC retaW seitilanosreP 2C yeK elcatsbO
E R I O M E M E DI A : G N I H C A E R B D N A G N I S S O R C E L C A T S B O L A N O I S I V I D
Contents Page
Obstacle Crossing
The British experience from the Second World War pointed to a significant crossing action
taking about four days from securing initial lodgements to breakout, such as the crossing
of the Seine at Vernon by 43 (Wessex) Division, in August 1944 (see AFM Volume 1, Part
1B, Brigade Tactics, page 6-I-16).
In this vignette, several critical obstacle crossings undertaken during the Second World
War are considered, comparing the British and US experiences with those of the Soviet
Union.
In March 1945, the Rhine crossing enabled the allied thrust into the industrial Ruhr during
the closing stages of the war. Operation Plunder took place where the Rhine is 200
metres wide on average, with parts widening to 300 metres and with an average current of
3 knots. There was an airborne dimension to the action, intending to enable exploitation
eastwards, preventing German artillery from interfering with the crossing and blocking the
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arrival of German reinforcements. A smoke screen was generated to conceal crossing
preparation activities. The smoke screen stretched for 66 miles, using 8500 zinc chloride
smoke generators and 450,000 gallons of fog oil.
O
15th (Scottish) Division was the bridgehead force for XII Corps. The division had trained
and prepared for the crossing, conducting extensive exercises on the River Maas. Much
C
went wrong in these exercises, which enabled the division to take essential corrective
action. The division was also supported by specialist equipment including duplex drive,
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amphibious Sherman tanks, as well as “Buffalo” amphibious personnel carriers. Also,
forming part of the division was a large “Bank Group”, a specially formed organisation
comprising signals, medical, vehicle recovery and movement control troops. The division
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was supported by an extensive and heavy artillery preparation from 6 field regiments, 4
medium regiments and 4 heavy AA batteries. This large gun group could also be
reinforced by additional firepower from the Army Group Royal Artillery (AGRA). If
O
required, all of this artillery could beth concentrated on single, specific targets. Following a
substantial artillery preparation, 15 (Scottish) Division commenced their crossing of the
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Rhine at 0200 hrs, 24 March 1945, under cover of darkness. While the artillery
preparation had been effective, there were still pockets of ferocious German resistance,
particularly from the Fallschirmjager. The airborne element of the operation had a
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significant disruptive effect on the Germans and ground force elements made a successful
link up with the airborne forces during the afternoon of 24 March. The Germans counter
O
attacked the developing bridgehead during the night, though by 0700 the next morning the
British position had been stabilised.
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In the advance to Rome in 1943/44, the allies were presented with a major obstacle on the
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German held Gustav Line - the Rapido river. It was less than 20 metres wide, however it
was steep banked, with a strong current, 8 to 12 feet deep and had no existing bridges. In
U
January 1944, the 5 US Army was to strike the Gustav Line along the Rapido, intending
th
to break the German line and exploit up the Liri valley towards Rome.
The 36th (Texas) Division spearheaded the II US Corps. In the division’s area, the near
bank was a flat flood plain, bare for about a mile, with few suitableth routes down to the river.
On the far bank, the ground elevated giving the well prepared 15 Panzer Grenadier
Division a dominating view. The Commanding General of the Texan division had deep
misgivings about conducting the action at ththis point, which he discussed with II Corps
Commander and the Commander of the 5 US Army, Lieutenant General Mark Clark.
However, it was decided that the action was to go ahead as originally planned.
The Texans assaulted on 20 January 1944. Given the enemy strength, it was decided that
the assault echelon would cross the Rapido at night, understanding that command and
3-D-9-5
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control would be problematic and that fire support may be less effective. Despite the cover
of darkness and supporting fire from the divisional and corps artillery, German artillery
engaged the assault echelon as it was moving over the open ground approaching the
river. Casualties mounted, confusion prevailed and vital crossing equipment was
destroyed. About 400 men were able to get across the river on one footbridge, however
they were not able to secure any serious lodgement. This single footbridge was soon
destroyed, trapping the men on the far bank.
A follow up attack was scheduled for 21 January, which stepped off at 1600 hrs. In one
regimental area, a battalion minus was able to get across during the night, however
casualties were heavy. Another battalion was also able to cross, however by noon on 22
January both battalions were short of ammunition and had been pushed back against the
river by the Germans. In the other regimental area, 2 battalions managed to cross,
however during the day they were eventually surrounded. By 2200 hrs on 22 January,
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fighting on the far bank of the Rapido effectively ceased. The crossing had failed. On the
far bank, the Germans counted 430 US dead and 770 prisoners, most of whom were
wounded. There were a further 900 US casualties on the home bank of the Rapido.
German casualties amounted to 64 dead and 179 wounded.
O
Soviet “bridgeheads everywhere” doctrine focused on anticipation and pre-emption, with
C
the aim of seizing crossings unopposed and developing multiple bridgeheads well in
advance of when they were actually required. While the British used the yardstick of 4
days from lodgement to breakout, the Soviets could measure this time in weeks and
ED
months. The Red Army achieved this pre-emption by assembling “Forward Detachments”,
which were highly mobile, capable, all arms groupings of up to brigade strength. A
Forward Detachment would be tasked to exploit forward, ignore all other fighting, establish
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a bridgehead unopposed at the next obstacle and hold it until reinforced, or relieved.
During this period of defending the bridgehead, Soviet engineers in the Forward
Detachment would construct crossings, usually using local resources found close to the
O
crossing area. The high tempo achieved by the Forward Detachment doctrine often
unbalanced the Germans.
TR
The crossing of the Oder at Kienitz on 31 January 1945 is considered a model crossing by
the Red Army. At Kienitz, the Oder is 300 metres wide and was iced over at the time. The
ground favoured the defence, however the tempo generated by the Forward Detachment
N
breaking out from the Vistula was such that the crossing was unopposed. Due to the Oder
being frozen, the assault echelon of the Forward Detachment was able to walk across the
O
river pushing their artillery and mortars. The Soviets were able to develop the bridgehead
C
for a full day before the first German counter attack came at them, however initial counter
attacks were poorly organised and lacked firepower (bear in mind, the mass of the
N
German combat power was still fighting the Red Army on the Vistula, 500 km to the east).
The bridgehead held and continued to do so for more than 2 months, during which time
U
Red Army sappers were able to build several well constructed wooden crossings in
relative safety, enabled by the depth of the bridgehead. The Soviet breakout from the
Oder bridgehead and the push towards Berlin commenced on 16 April 1945.
Key Considerations . Key obstacle crossing considerations include:
• Determine whether the crossing is necessary or whether it can be bypassed.
• Can a crossing be made where the enemy is weak or non existent?
• Can existing, intact crossings be used?
• Do not underestimate the time, resources and the level of preparation required to
conduct a successful divisional crossing, particularly if opposed.
3-D-9-6
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Further Reading :
Saunders, Tim: Operation Plunder (Pen and Sword Military, 2006).
Rawson, Andrew: Rhine Crossing – Operation Varsity (Pen and Sword Military, 2006).
Blumenson, Martin: Bloody River (Texas A&M University Press, 1998).
Le Tissier, Tony: Zhukov at the Oder (Stackpole Military Series, 2008).
Duffy, Christopher: Red Storm on the Reich – The Soviet March on Germany (Routledge,
1991)
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3-D-9-7
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ANNEX E TO
PART 3
DIVISIONAL COMBINED ARMS
OBSTACLE INTEGRATION
‘The first thing to do is to get all the units to realise the value of obstacles and how they
may save their lives; at present they regard them as some curious black magic the
sappers play with and which is a great nuisance to everyone.’
Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery of Alamein
1. Combined Arms Obstacle Integration (CAOI) is an all arms approach to obstacle

planning. It ensures the effective combination of direct fire, indirect fire and manoeuvre,
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engineer effort and ground to meet the commander’s aim.
PLANNING PRINCIPLES
O
2. The Commander states what effect he wants to have on the enemy in a specific area,
whilst retaining freedom of movement for own forces.
C
3. Terrain and natural obstacles are considered first. Man-made obstacles, observation
ED
and weapon systems are then superimposed and integrated to achieve the required effect.
Obstacles must be observed and covered by fires. The tasking of ISTAR and fires assets
will be a key planning consideration for the divisional staff. Given the absence of mines,
future obstacles are likely to be ditches. Ditches take a considerable amount of time to
LL
dig, which must be factored into planning.

In a deliberate defence, major obstacles are planned at the highest level, but must be
O
4.
confirmed in detail on the ground by units. In hasty defence it may be necessary to

decentralise planning down to sub unit level to allow timely defensive preparations. All
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demolitions must be controlled in accordance with the procedures outlined in Annex E to

this chapter, Control of Demolitions.
N
OBSTACLE POLICY AND PLANNING – NORMANDY 1944

O
The balance between counter mobility and mobility. In the allied bridgehead, 51st
Highland Division of 1 Corps had laid a large tactical minefield to defeat German counter
C
attacks. The subsequent British offensive, Operation GOODWOOD, by 8 Corps (three

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armoured divisions), was launched from the 1 Corps area. Their assembly and
deployment were significantly delayed due to the minefield. Had several minefield gaps
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and covert lanes been built in from the start, this delay would have been reduced, allowing
better concentration of force by all arms.
The case for no minefields. In post-war interviews with two opposing commanders from
Operation GOODWOOD, the British attacker suggested that the German defence would
have gained more by laying minefields. The successful German commander disagreed.
He wanted maximum manoeuvre and to be free of the confusion that minefields can bring.
Additionally, the German higher command felt that natural and man made obstacles were
enough for their mobile defence.
3-E-1
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5. Planning Responsibilities.
Tactical Action in Conflict Remarks
Function/Staff Duties Before During After
Branch
Information Develop and Understand Keep IPE current Consolidate all Handover to
and issue IPE higher intent records of IPE another
Intelligence? and constraints for handover formation or
including the for post
Understand? host nation conflict
action
G5 Future Set policy Coordinate Monitor CAOI and Handover of
Plans for Obstacle development of STAP. Anticipate plans as
Planning CAOI ways to strike and required to Host
exploit by manoeuvre Nation or other
using crossings, gaps formation
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and lanes.
Combat Arms Confirm Make own Conduct operations Some
O
plan and plans, making use of CAOI. obstacles
integrate coordinate Use RE guides for are built by
STAP and passage of obstacles non RE1
C
CAOI. Build manoeuvre
obstacles as
required
ED
Engineers Advise and Build RE Maintain CAOI both Handover all For de-
build Obstacles for mobility and records of mining and
obstacles counter mobility. obstacles other tasks
LL
Create space as
required.
O
Table 3-E-1 - CAOI Planning Responsibilities

TR
6. Obstacles are classified as existing or reinforcing:

Existing Obstacles. Existing obstacles can be subdivided into natural (rivers
N
a.
and swamps), or man made (canals, ditches, steps, patterned and scatterable
minefields2, craters, felled timber or abatis and wire fences).
O
Reinforcing Obstacles. Reinforcing obstacles enhance existing obstacles and

C
b.
are classified as tactical or protective:

N
(1) Tactical Obstacles. Tactical obstacles are part of the divisional plan and
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are designed to reduce the enemy’s ability to manoeuvre whilst not hindering
ours. Tactical obstacles are built by engineers.
(2) Protective Obstacles. Designed and constructed by all arms units to
assist in local close protection.
1
Described in detail in Military Engineering, Volume 2 All Arms Guide to Field Engineering 2010
2
The UK is a signatory to the 1997 Ottawa Convention which prohibits the use of anti-personnel land mines.
It currently has no stocks of anti-tank mines, scatterable or otherwise. However, allies and adversaries may
not be signatories to the Convention and may possess and use mines.
3-E-2
Contents Page
7. Obstacles are referenced to the Target Area of Interest (TAI) they are designed to
support. The obstacle group shown below supports the turn effect required of 20
Armoured Brigade's TAI 003 (TAI 20/003). Part of the mission statement for the engineers
might well be a task defined only as: "TAI 001, 002, 003". No further order is required as
the effect is clear from the graphic and the edges of the TAI marked on the map indicate
where the commander wishes to achieve that effect. The engineers, taking account of any
barrier restrictions in that area, integrate their own planning with the subordinate unit
concerned to achieve the required effect.
T A I 2 0 /0 0 3
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O
C
ED
Figure 3-E-1 - Obstacle/TAI Linkage
LL
8. Target. Commanders and their staff must understand which element of the enemy
force is being targeted so that obstacles can be designed and sited appropriately.
O
9. Location. Obstacle location is vital to intent. It ties the desired effect and the target
into the scheme of manoeuvre. Commanders and their staff must understand the location
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of obstacles to ensure that the desired effect occurs at the right place, to the right target.
10. Obstacle Effects. These are the effects that a specific obstacle group is required to
N
have on the enemy. Effects are: disrupt, turn, fix, or block. A combination of effects may
be required to achieve the overall intent. These effects are described in detail in
O
subsequent paragraphs.
C
11. Disrupt. Disruption is designed to break up the enemy, reducing his tempo and
encouraging the premature commitment of his breaching assets. It should also create an
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element of surprise and uncertainty by deceiving the enemy as to the exact location of the
MDA. The effect of disruption is illustrated in Figure 3-E-2.
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3-E-3
Contents Page
The short arrow

indicates where
Disrupt the enemy is
impeded by
obstacles.
Long arrows
indicate
where by-pass
is allowed for
subsequent
attack by
manoeuvre.
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O
Figure 3-E-2 - The Disrupt Effect
C
12. Turn. Turning aims to divert an enemy towards ground of our own choosing. This
effect is developed by placing a series of obstacles, combined with fires, that encourage
bypassing in the direction desired. At the start of the turn, obstacles should tie into
ED
restrictive terrain and should appear more complex than those in the direction of the turn.
The enemy force should bounce off successive obstacles in the desired direction.
Commanders may use the turn effect on the flanks of killing areas. The turn effect is
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shown in Figure 3-E-3.

O
TR
Turn The heel of the

arrow is the
N
anchor point.
The direction
of the arrow
O
indicates the
desired
direction of
C
the turn
N
U
Figure 3-E-3 - The Turn Effect

13. Fix. The intention of fixing is to slow an attacker within a specified area, normally a
killing area. It is used to give formations time to find and strike enemy forces throughout
the depth of the killing area. The fix effect is shown in Figure 3-E-4.
3-E-4
Contents Page
The irregular
Fix part of the
arrow indicates
where the
enemy is
slowed down
by the
obstacles
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O
Figure 3-E-4 - The Fix Effect
C
14. Block. A blocking effect requires complex obstacles to stop an attacker along a
specific avenue of approach, thus assisting in his complete destruction. Commanders
may use the blocking effect to close an avenue of approach that leads out of a killing area.
ED
The block effect is shown in Figure 3-E-5.
LL
The cross of the T

indicates the
width of the block,
O
normally
anchored on
Block geographical
TR
features. Enemy direction

The stem of the T
should point
towards the
direction the enemy
N
is advancing from.
The length of the
O
stem indicates the

range at which
friendly forces will
C
seek to have an
effect on them.
N
U
Figure 3-E-5 - The Block Effect

15. Obstacle Resources. Early planning increases the chance of stores being available
when the engineers move into the area. An accurate resource assessment is made
through battlefield area evaluation within the IPE, based on linking required obstacle
effects to the width of the avenues of approach. Engineers will develop this estimate and
will assist in determining priorities.
3-E-5
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OBSTACLE CONTROL MEASURES

16. Effective use of obstacle control measures ensures that divisional commanders do
not constrain subsequent formation manoeuvre. Obstacle control measures are
designated as zones, belts and groups. Restrictions would include limiting the types of
obstacles used, or controlling timings (not before, or not after times). Subordinate
commanders may impose additional restrictions, but cannot relax a higher commander’s
restrictions.
17. Obstacle Zones. Obstacle zones are usually controlled at divisional level. They
may be identified alpha-numerically. They do not normally include an obstacle effect
graphic.
18. Obstacle Belts.
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a. Zones may be sub-divided into obstacle belts, where the employment of
obstacles will normally be controlled at divisional or brigade level. Obstacle belts
within each zone are numbered and are given an obstacle effect graphic. More than
O
one obstacle belt may be assigned to a brigade or unit, but, where possible, obstacle
belts should not cross unit boundaries.
C
b. Lower level commanders must only place obstacles within the obstacle belts
ED
designated by their controlling headquarters. Although obstacle belts limit the area
authorised for obstacles, they still allow commanders sufficient latitude to develop
detailed obstacle plans based on reconnaissance and detailed planning.
LL
19. Obstacle Groups.

An obstacle group is one or more obstacles sited together to provide a specific
O
a.
obstacle effect and which sits within an obstacle belt. A battlegroup commander will
designate obstacle groups to ensure that individual obstacles are placed in
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accordance with his intent.

b. Obstacle groups are not areas. They are specific locations for groups of
N
obstacles. Commanders show obstacle groups using obstacle effect graphics, which
establish the relative locations of individual obstacles on the ground. The graphic
O
indicates the anchor points to existing terrain and the general line of the obstacle
placement. In almost all circumstances, an obstacle group graphic will link to a TAI
C
on the decision support overlay.

N
c. Obstacle groups are planned within the limits of the battlegroup’s obstacle
emplacement authority (zone or belt). Obstacle groups may, however, be used by
U
higher formations to define specified aspects of the commander’s intent eg

designating a bridge as a reserve demolition.
OBSTACLE RECORDING AND NUMBERING
20. Once an obstacle effect has been specified, staff and subordinate commanders can
begin planning the detailed design of obstacle groups and the detailed siting of individual
obstacles in each group. When the obstacle plan has been agreed, responsibility for the
emplacement of each obstacle will be delegated, normally to the engineers. Each planned
obstacle must be assigned a unique obstacle number for command and control reporting.
Allocation of obstacle numbering is normally controlled by divisional engineer staff who will
3-E-6
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also maintain a record of the status of all obstacles. Figure 3-E-6 is a summary of
obstacle control measures and numbering.
Emplacement
Obstacle Control Authority Obstacle Graphic Examples
Measure
From To
OBSTACLE
Letter ZONE
Force Designation
Corps
Zone Corps Div OBSTACLE A OBSTACLE

EFFECT BELTS
Div Bde (Optional, 1
PY
but not
normal)
O
Number
3
C
Designation
Corps Div 2
Belt Div Bde ED
OBSTACLE
Bde BG EFFECT
(Optional,
LL
but normal)
O
OBSTACLE GROUPS
Letter in an obstacle belt
TR
Designation
Div Bde
3
N
Group Bde BG
A
O
BG Coy/
C
Sqn B C
N
U
Restrictions Incorporated into Examples:

the emplacement no buried mines; obstacle free; no SCATMIN;
authority SCATMIN short delay only; reserve obstacle; etc
Figure 3-E-6 - Obstacle Design and Numbering
3-E-7
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O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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ANNEX F TO
PART 3
CONTROL OF DEMOLITIONS
1. A number of key terrain features are likely to be critical to the movement of a division,
including bridges, routes or minefield lanes. Closure of such features will require a
preliminary or reserved demolition. Because error may be potentially catastrophic, the
orders concerning all aspects of demolitions must be simple, clear and easily understood
by commanders and staffs.
TERMINOLOGY
2. Authorised Commander. The authorised commander is the commander who has
the authority to order the firing of a demolition. He may delegate this authority to a
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subordinate commander, in which case the subordinate becomes the authorised
commander.
Preliminary Demolition Target. A preliminary demolition is a target, other than a
O
3.
reserved demolition target, which is earmarked for demolition and can be executed
immediately after preparation, provided that prior authority has been granted.
C
4. Reserved Demolition Target. A reserved demolition is a target, the destruction of
ED
which must be controlled at a specific level of command because:
a. It plays a vital part in the tactical or operational plan.
LL
b. The structure itself is important.

The demolition may be executed in the face of the enemy.
O
c.
Demolition Guard. A demolition guard is a force that ensures a demolition is not

TR
5.
captured, or sabotaged by an enemy, before it has been successfully fired. The demolition
guard commander is responsible to the authorised commander for the operational
command of all troops on the demolition site, including the demolition firing party.
N
6. Demolition Firing Party. A demolition firing party is technically responsible for a

O
demolition. It is normally an engineer party and is required for preliminary as well as

reserved demolitions.
C
7. Documentation. Orders for the firing of all demolition targets are recorded on an AF
N
W9811. This form is prepared by the authorised commander's staff. It contains the orders
and coordinating instructions for the demolition guard commander and the firing party
U
commander. The AF W9811 also contains procedures for the delegation of authorised
powers.
PROCEDURES
8. The authorised commander, having made his plan, will select those demolition
targets that he wishes to be reserved and those that he considers to be preliminary. The
list of targets is then passed to subordinate formation commanders, who may select further
demolition targets to suit their own tactical situations. These extra targets are normally
subject to the approval of the authorised commander.
3-F-1
Contents Page
9. Preliminary Demolitions. Three options are available to the authorised commander

for firing preliminary demolitions:
a. Immediately after preparation, provided that political clearance has been given.
b. Upon receipt of the order (for example, a codeword) from higher formation.
c. By delegating the order to fire to a subordinate commander. The authorised
commander may also include in the AF W9811 the proviso that the demolition may
be fired on the initiative of the firing party commander if the enemy is in the act of
capturing the demolition.
10. Communications. In order to fire preliminary demolitions, there must be direct
communications between the firing party and the engineer commander, who will pass
down the authorised commander's order to fire. It is the responsibility of the engineer
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commander to ensure that communications are provided and maintained.
Reserved Demolitions. More detailed instructions are required in the case of
O
11.
reserved demolitions and will be issued on the AF W9811. A number of points must be
considered when completing AF W9811:
C
a. Demolition Guard. A demolition guard must be provided to ensure the security
of a reserved demolition. The size and composition of the guard will be decided by
ED
the authorised commander, who will also issue orders to the demolition guard
commander on AF W9811.
LL
b. Firing the Demolition. Two options are available to the authorised

commander for firing the demolition. The demolition may be fired upon receipt of a
code, or by delegation of the order to fire to a subordinate commander. He may also
O
add the proviso that the demolition can be fired without the receipt of a code, if the
enemy is in the act of capturing the demolition. Once the demolition is fired, the
TR
demolition guard commander should sign the AF W9811 and return it to the
authorised commander. He and the firing party commander are also required to
report the success or otherwise of the demolition.
N
Communications. It is the responsibility of the authorised commander to

O
c.
provide and maintain communications between himself and the demolition guard
commander. In practice this is often best achieved by the use of a personal liaison
C
officer with suitable communications. Delegation of authorised powers from one

commander to another should not take place until the latter has established his own
N
communications with the demolition guard commander.

U
12. Changes of State. Demolitions are normally prepared to state 1 (safe). Preliminary
demolitions are normally changed to state 2 (armed) immediately before firing. Reserve
demolitions are normally changed to state 2 (armed) some time before the anticipated time
of firing, to ensure prompt reaction when firing is ordered. Changes of state must be
ordered by the authorising commander.
13. Time to Fire. Changes of state take time to implement. Therefore, there will be a
time delay between receipt of the order to fire and the actual firing of a demolition. Such
delays must be communicated to the authorised commander by the demolition guard
commander and allowances must be made by authorised commanders to allow adequate
time for orders to be put into effect.
3-F-2
Contents Page
CONCLUSION
14. Procedures for the firing of demolitions must be clearly understood by commanders,
staffs and parties at the demolition sites. They are quite straightforward provided correct
staff procedures are followed. NATO standardisation agreements are to be enforced and
will be particularly relevant when demolitions may involve forces of different nations. In all
cases, the provision of suitable liaison and communications will be vital.
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
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O
C
ED
LL
O
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N
O
C
N
U
Contents Page
ANNEX G TO
PART 3
CAPTURED PERSONS
1. Captured Persons (CPERS). Recent experience has shown that CPERS of all
categories may be captured in significant numbers within an operational area. The term
CPERS covers all individuals who are captured and held by UK Armed forces on
operations overseas, whether they are prisoners of war, internees, or detainees that fall
into other categories. UK and international law requires that all CPERS are treated
humanely.
2. JDP 1-10 Captured Persons. JDP 1-10 is the capstone doctrine for all UK CPERS
activities. It provides clear guidance on command and staff responsibilities, planning,
PY
reporting and monitoring requirements, as well as treatment standards. All activities
concerning CPERS must be consistent with JDP 1-10.
Detention Authority. If held at the divisional level, the Detention Authority should
O
3.
rest with an individual of OF5 rank, who is at arms length and independent from the
commander and his staff. If it is not clear cut at the point of capture, the Detention
C
Authority may be called upon to determine what category CPERS should fall within and
whether their capture should be exploited for intelligence purposes.
ED
4. SO3 CPERS. The principal staff officer in the divisional HQ with responsibilities for
overseeing the handling and treatment of CPERS is the SO3 CPERS. A qualified and
experienced subject matter expert in this field, the post of SO3 CPERS is a critical “plug”
LL
within the divisional HQ structure. The responsibilities surrounding the handling and
treatment of CPERS is distinct form those responsibilities held by the Detaining Authority.
O
5. External Scrutiny. The commander needs to be aware of the wide range of national
and international, non-military organisations that play a pivotal role in overseeing the
TR
treatment of CPERS. These organisations include the International Commission for the
Red Cross (ICRC), the Committee for the Prevention of Torture (established under the EU
Convention for the Prevention of Torture) and the UN High Commissioner for Human
N
Rights. This short list is not exhaustive. Media organisations will take a close interest in
the handling and treatment of CPERS as this is a matter of legitimate public interest.
O
However it needs to be understood that CPERS must not be made the object of public
curiosity.
C
N
6. Prohibited Techniques. There are five prohibited techniques that must never be
used on CPERS, for whatever purpose. These prohibited techniques are:
U
a. Use of Stress Positions. A stress position is a physical posture that is painful,

extremely uncomfortable, or exhausting to maintain and which a captured person is
forced to adopt.
b. Hooding. Placing a cover, including a sandbag, over a captured person’s head
is prohibited at any time.
c. Excessive Noise. Captured persons must not be subject to unnecessary,
excessive noise.
d. Sleep Deprivation. Captured persons must not be deprived of the minimum
sleep and rest requirement.
3-G- 1
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e. Deprivation of Food and Water. Captured persons must not be deprived of

the minimum food and water requirement.
7. Risk Mitigation . There is a significant risk to the reputation of a deployed force that
may have a consequent impact on campaign legitimacy and thus campaign success, if the
handling and treatment of CPERS is not conducted appropriately. This risk is highest at
the point of capture and reduces as individuals are processed through unit holding areas
and onward to the formal CPERS Holding Facility. Risk mitigation measures include:
a. Sound governance and oversight by the chain of command, supported by
expert divisional staff such as the Provost Marshal, legal adviser and SO3 CPERS.
b. The use of expert personnel such as Service Police and custody staff trained
and dedicated to the task of handling CPERS.
PY
c. Officers and soldiers who have been well trained in handling CPERS at the
point of capture and at unit custody level.
O
d. The swift movement of CPERS from the point of capture to the CPERS Holding
Facility.
C
e. Separate chains of command for personnel involved in holding and
administering CPERS and personnel who have responsibilities for intelligence
ED
gathering and exploitation.
The thorough investigation by Service Police of all alleged CPERS abuses.
LL
f.
O
TR
N
O
C
N
U
3-G-2
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PART 4
A Historical Perspective of the Division in the British Army
By
Dr Paul Latawski
Department of War Studies
Royal Military Academy Sandhurst
Introduction
‘A Division of an Army, shall consist of not less than two,
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or more than three Brigades, and be 1commanded
by a Lieutenant General’.
Maj Gen John Gaspard Le Marchant, 1802
O
The British Army first adopted the Division in 1807. The glossary definition of the Division
C
describes it as ‘a major administrative and tactical unit/formation which combines in itself
the necessary arms and services required for sustained combat, larger than a
regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps’.2 The Division’s qualities, however, extend
ED
beyond its capacity for sustained combat. The Division is a formation that has the
capability to have an impact on the battlefield at both the operational and tactical levels.
Within its structure the Division possesses a balanced mixture of arms and services that
LL
provides all the necessary ingredients for its subordinate units to engage in combined
arms manoeuvre. The Division’s key components include multiple subordinate brigades,
divisional level supporting units and critically a headquarters capability. The level of
O
command of a Divisional headquarters is versatile enough that it can direct the Division as
a tactical entity on the battlefield, as was typical in the two World Wars, or command the
TR
land component in a theatre wide counter-insurgency campaign, as occurred in Borneo.

Field Marshal William Slim described the Division as ‘one of the four best commands in the
Service . . . the smallest formation3 that is a complete orchestra of war and the largest in
N
which every man can know you’.

O
Despite the fact that the division has been a key formation in the British Army for over two
centuries, there4 is no overarching historical study, either official or academic, of its history
C
and evolution. The historiography of the British Army contains works that give snippets of
the division in different periods, but only within the broader story of the Army’s
N
development or operations. The most abundant literature related to the Division is the
U
divisional history. Devoted to the story of a particular Division, such works are often limited
in scope to a defined period in the given formation’s history. Moreover, the Divisional
history, like the regimental history, does not offer necessarily much in the way of balanced
critical analysis. Both often gloss over issues and events that may offer useful lessons and
insights but that sit uncomfortably with the favoured narrative. Such a yawning gap in
1
Maj Gen John Gaspard Le Marchant, An Outline for the Formation of a General Staff to the Army, Royal Military College, 1802, pp.
265-266, quoted with the kind permission of Sir Francis Le Marchant, document held by the Central Library, Royal Military Academy
Sandhurst.
2
AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), Edition 2012 Version 2, NATO Standardization Agency, 2012,
p. 2-D-9.
3
Field Marshal Viscount Slim, Defeat into Victory, (London: 1956), p. 3.
4
For the United States Army studies exist for both the division and brigade. See: Richard W. Kedzior, Evolution and Endurance: The
U.S. Army Division in the Twentieth Century, (RAND: Arroyo Center, 2000) and John J. McGrath, The Brigade: A History, Its
Organization and Employment in the US Army, (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2004).
4-1
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historical literature on the Division will not be filled with this effort. Nevertheless, the
intention here is to make a start by providing a brief historical overview of the Division in
the British Army. Thethessay will proceed chronologically by examining: 1) the origins of
the Division in the 18 century, 2) the Division in the British Army from 1807 to 1914, 3)
the British Division in the two World Wars, 4) the Cold War British Division and 5) the Post
Cold War British Division. Within this chronological progression, the aim is to provide
historical analysis and insight built around three interrelated themes: continuity and change
in the role of the division, evolution of the divisional structure/organisation and the nature
of divisional command in order to identify enduring trends and themes.
Origins of the Division
The modern military division was a product of warfare during the European enlightenment
in the 18th century. The origins of the 5‘divisional system’ occurred in a period of innovation
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and change between 1740 and 1780. The Seven Years War (1756-1763) was critical in
seeing the division’s acceptance in the order of battle of many European armies. The
invention of the division, therefore, was not the product of one particular source, but of
O
th
multiple efforts in European armies of the 18 century. Figures such as Prince Henry of
Prussia, Field Marshal Franz Lacy or French officers such as Pierre de Bourcet and
C
Jacques A. H. Guibert did much to introduce the division to their respective armies and
provide important conceptual thinking for its employment.6 Following on from this 18th
century legacy, Napoleon Bonaparte honed the division as an effective military formation
ED
and by 1805 was7
utilizing multi-divisional corps capable of extended manoeuvre on a
theatre scale.
LL
The reasons for the division’s entry into the order of battle of 18th century armies were
driven by tactical considerations. At the beginning of the century, the conduct of battle was
organisationally shaped more by tradition than rational organisation. Factors such as
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seniority of officers and precedence shaped the composition and deployment of units in
the line of battle rather than tactically sound dispositions and balanced structures that
TR
would lend themselves more readily to command and control. The birth of the division was
a response to this problem. According th
to Christopher Duffy, the significance of the
ensuing change was to transform 18 century armies from ‘medieval blobs’ into rationally
N
organised entities built around the division.8 In addition, the emergence of the division
created significant new opportunities for extended operational manoeuvre. The origins of
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the division may have been a means of improving tactical performance on the battlefield
but it also offered considerable ‘operational potential’.9 By the end of the revolutionary
C
wars, the division became a self-sustaining and balanced formation of all arms capable of
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fighting independently at the tactical level. This characteristic conferred greater security
during movement and meant that at the operational level, an army could safely manoeuvre
U
its divisions along separate lines of march to be ‘reunited on the decisive point’.10 The
increased complexity of organising such manoeuvre gave rise to the need for a divisional
staff system and11more efficient signals organisation to direct and coordinate the movement
of the formation. The emergence of the division also made possible the establishment of
5
See: Christopher Duffy, The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987).
6
Robert S. Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 93-97, 178-179 and
255-257.
7
David Chandler, The Campaigns of Napoleon, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson Ltd., 1995), pp. 184-186 and Quimby, The
Background of Napoleonic Warfare, p. 344.
8
Christopher Duffy, ‘Organising War: The Origins of the Divisional System’, War Discussion Group (WARDIG), Department of War
Studies, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 3 July 2013.
9
Claus Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art 1740-1813: From Frederick the Great to Napoleon, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 33.
10
Quimby, The Background of Napoleonic Warfare, p. 178.
11
Telp, The Evolution of Operational Art 1740-1813, p. 25.
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longer-standing relationships with subordinates

th
that facilitated more effective exercise of
divisional command. Thus, the rise of the 18 century divisional system saw the
development of key attributes that endure to the present day. The division delivered both
tactical and operational effect, was self-sustaining and possessed sophisticated command
and control embodied in a headquarters capability.
The Division in the British Army: 1807-1914
In the British Army, the division entered the order of battle later than in continental
European armies. The earliest employment of a divisional organisation was in Sir John
Moore’s operations against Copenhagen in 1807. In his expedition to Denmark,12he
organised four divisions each consisting of two infantry and one cavalry brigade. Prior to
Copenhagen, no larger organisation than a brigade was fielded. In Flanders and Holland
for movement multiple brigades were organised into ‘columns’ which were by 1807
PY
resembling the division in function.13 It was the Duke of Wellington in the Peninsula
campaign, however, who established the division as standard formation in the British Army
structure. In a General Order issued by the Adjutant General’s Office at14 Abrantes on 18
O
June 1809, Wellington created one cavalry and four infantry divisions.
C
Peninsula Campaign: Wellington’s Divisions
Between 1809 and 1814 Wellington employed a maximum of ten divisions in the Peninsula
ED
campaign. Organisationally, although the numbers of brigades in each division evolved
over time, most of Wellington’s infantry divisions consisted of three brigades. The single
exception was the 1st Division that for specific periods was a square division of four
LL
brigades. Both the Light and Cavalry Divisions were exceptions 15

possessing fewer or more
brigades respectively on a generally lower manpower base. The manpower strength of
each division fluctuated with none of the divisions following a mandated template. Taking
O
the strength of the divisions at three Peninsula campaign battles, Busaco (27 September
1810), Fuentes de Onoro (3-5 May 1811) and Salamanca (22 July 1812), the average
TR
strength of Wellington’s divisions was between 5,000 and 6,000 men or approximately the
strength ofth a British brigade today. At Salamanca Wellington’s
th
strongest infantry16division
was the 5 Division with 7,091 men and his weakest the 7 Division with 5,185.
N
Wellington was only able to raise a ten division force in the Peninsula campaign because
O
he was able to incorporate a Portuguese brigade in seven of his ten divisions and for a
time into an eighth division. Only the 1st Division had all British brigades. The Light
C
division’s two brigades integrated Portuguese Caçadores directly into their order of
N
battle.17 The high level of integration of Portuguese formations into British divisions was
achieved through the leadership of seconded British officers who were gradually
U
supplanted by Portuguese officers, common training and the utilisation of British arms and
equipment. Maj Gen William Carr Beresford was made a Portuguese Marshal and at
Wellington’s direction and with British financial resources, expanded and reshaped the
Portuguese Army into a force that was interchangeable with its British counterpart on the
12
Gregory Fremont-Barnes, ‘The British Army’, in: Gregory Fremont-Barnes (ed.), Armies of the Napoleonic Wars, (Barnesley, South
Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2011), p. 129.
13
S.G.P. Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula 1809-1814, (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1957), pp. 51-52. Ward claims, but provides no specific examples, that ‘divisions had been known in 1779 and 1780 in
America’. (p. 51)
14
General Orders: Spain and Portugal: April 27th to December 28th, 1809, Vol. I, (London: 1811), pp. 70-71.
15
Data compiled from: C. T. Atkinson, ‘Appendix II Divisional and Brigade Organization and Changes, 1809-1814’, in: C.W.C. Oman,
Wellington’s Army 1809-1814, (London: Edward Arnold, 1913), pp. 343-373.
16
Data compiled from: Julian Paget, Wellington’s Peninsular War: Battles and Battlefields, (London: Leo Cooper, 1996), pp. 101, 110,
133, 163 and 179.
17
Data compiled from: Atkinson, ‘Appendix II Divisional and Brigade Organization and Changes, 1809-1814’.
4-3
Contents Page
field of battle. By 1811, 213 British officers served in the Portuguese Army that totalled
36,000 men. The reformed Portuguese Army effectively doubled Wellington’s strength and
figured prominently in the final stages of the campaign in 1813-1814.18 The integration of
coalition partners into a British led multinational division was first pioneered in the British
Army in the Peninsula campaign. It was driven by a British Army having to wage a
European war on a relatively small manpower base and with global commitments.
Common doctrine, training and equipment underpinned the successful integration of
Portuguese brigades in British divisions.19
In the course of the Peninsula campaign, thirty-six officers held divisional command in
Wellington’s army. Some of these officers held divisional command for extended periods
while others were in temporary command for a matter of weeks.20 Leadership of a division
in this period was a dangerous business where the formation commander often and very
literally led his division from the front. Not surprising, churn in divisional command often
PY
resulted from wounds received on the battlefield or illness brought on by the rigours of
campaigning. Of Wellington’s 36 divisional commanders approximately twelve were
wounded in action and another twelve had to relinquish command due to illness of being
O
unfit - - two thirds of all the divisional commanders who served under Wellington in the
Peninsula campaign. Despite the numbers of casualties among divisional commanders,
C
only one died on operations: Maj Gen Robert Craufurd, of the Light Division who
succumbed to wounds received at Ciudad Rodrigo (24 January 1812).21
ED
Divisional commanders ran their divisions of 5,000-6,00022men in the Peninsula campaign
from a headquarters that possessed only about 15 staff. While this number only included
the principal military officers and Commissary General Members of staff, the headquarters
LL
presumably included other supporting personnel such as servants, cooks and grooms. The
overall numbers, even with such additions, still made for a small headquarters
establishment. By 1814, the divisional organisation and staff evolved so that it included
O
artillery, engineer, medical and, for a short time, signals elements. As S. P. G Ward has
noted,23Wellington’s division began to resemble the British division that ‘took the field in
TR
1914’.
In Wellington’s Shadow: Crimean War 1853-1856
N
In the wake of the Napoleonic wars, the division disappeared from the peace-time order of
O
battle of the British Army. By the middle of the nineteenth century, the Army had reverted
to a ‘highly individual collection of regiments’ with the result that there were ‘no divisional
C
24
or brigade formations’. As Hewth Strachan has argued the division in British military
N
thought in the first half of the 19 century was seen less as an operational instrument of
‘grand tactics and strategy’ of the Napoleonic era than as something that existed to
U
facilitate logistics when an army was large.25 The need for reform, however, was
recognised by some of the British Army leadership of the period [See Box 1]. Despite
voices calling for reform, division remained in the first half of the nineteenth century as
18
Malyn Newitt, ‘The Portuguese Army’, in: Gregory Fremont-Barnes (ed.), Armies of the Napoleonic Wars, pp. 221-222.
19
Ibid., pp. 212-229.
20
Data compiled from: Atkinson, ‘Appendix II Divisional and Brigade Organization and Changes, 1809-1814’.
21
Data on divisional commanders compiled from relevant entries of the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, (Oxford: University
Press, 2004) and T.A. Heathcote, Wellington’s Peninsular war Generals and Their Battles: A Biographical and Historical Dictionary,
(Barnesley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Military, 2010).
22
Ward, Wellington’s Headquarters: A Study of the Administrative Problems in the Peninsula 1809-1814, p. 198.
23
Ibid., p. 161.
24
Lt Col H. Moyse-Bartlett, ‘The British army in 1850’, in: Harold E. Raugh Jr. (ed.), The British Army 1815-1914, (Aldershot: Ashgate:
2006), p. 50.
25
Hew Strachan, From Waterloo to Balaclava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, 1815-1854, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), p. 2.
4-4
Contents Page
something to be reconstituted without prior preparation and only at the onset of a conflict.
Such was to be the case in the Crimean War (1853-1856).
Box 1: Mid 19th Century Thinking on the Division: Memorandum by Prince George, Duke of
Cambridge.
Except: ‘Observations on the Organization of the British Army at Home’, December 1852
It will no doubt be generally admitted that no army can be considered as in a proper state to take
the field, however good its component parts may be, unless it has some organisation on a more
extended scale than the mere formation of Regiments and Batteries, in fact unless a Brigade and
Divisional system be introduced, which is to be found in every continental army. . . it will there be
found that no force is considered as complete unless it be based on the principle of a due
admixture of the three several arms of the service, viz. Artillery, Cavalry, and Infantry, these to be
PY
divided26into Brigades and then into Divisions under a General who is made responsible for the
whole.
O
Lord Raglan led the British expeditionary force deployed against the Russians in the
C
Crimean peninsula. His force consisted of six divisions: the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Infantry
Divisions, the Light Division and the Cavalry Division. Each of these27 divisions consisted of
two brigades and had an overall strength of about 5,000 men each. The state of the art
ED
of the organisation, employment and command of the division in the British Army was
shown to have advanced little in the Crimean war. Four of the six divisional commanders
had served under Wellington during the Napoleonic wars while the remaining two had little
LL
operational experience. As in the case of the earlier Peninsula campaign, divisional

command remained a dangerous and arduous business. Of the six divisional
commanders appointed at the onset of operations in the Crimea, two were wounded in
O
action, three invalided home as a result of wounds or illness28and one recalled due to
disagreements with the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Raglan. The 64 year old Maj Gen
TR
George Cathcart was the only divisional commander to be killed in action. Trying to
retrieve a deteriorating situation during the Inkerman battle, Cathcart was perhaps the last
British divisional commander to fall while leading troops in close contact with the enemy.29
N
The last words attributed to him were ‘I fear we are in a mess. We must try the bayonet’.
O
Expeditionary Division: Egypt 1882

C
The next war to see a division employed was in the British intervention in Egypt in 1882.
The intervening years between the end of the Crimean war had seen some important
N
changes as to the place of the division in the peacetime order of battle of the British Army.
U
By 1875, the division entered the Army organisation, albeit on paper, as the division and
corps became part of mobilisation arrangements for the Army. The change had taken
place as a result of the influence of the Prussian Army’s campaigns in30the 1860s and
1870s which saw the efficient mobilisation of large formations for war. In 1882, the
26
‘Observations on the Organisation of the British Army at Home’, December 1852. Document in: Col. Willoughby Verner, The Military
Life of H.R.H. George, Duke of Cambridge, (London: John Murray, 1905), p. 39. See also Giles St. Aubyn, The Royal George 1819-
1904: The Life of H.R.,H. Prince George Duke of Cambridge, (London: Constable, 1963), pp. 57-58 and Hew Strachan, Wellington’s
Legacy: The Reform of the British Army 1830-54, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), pp. 160-161.
27
A. J. Barker, The Vainglorious War 1854-56, (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), pp. 294-297, Gen Sir Edward Hamley, The
War in the Crimea, Fifth Edition, (London: Seeley and Co., Limited, 1892), p. 31 and Philip Warner, The Crimean War: A Reappraisal,
(London: Arthur Barker Limited, 1972), pp. 19-21.
28
Data on divisional commanders compiled from relevant entries of the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.
29
As quoted in: Barker, The Vainglorious War 1854-56, p. 187.
30
A. W. Preston, ‘British Military Thought, 1856-1890’, in: Raugh Jr. (ed.), The British Army 1815-1914, pp. 383-384.
4-5
Contents Page
British Army deployed three divisions to Egypt: 1st and 2nd Infantry and a cavalry Division
all of two brigades. The Indian Army supplied the second brigade to the Cavalry Division
with Imperial troops reprising the role of the Portuguese Army in bulking up divisional
manpower. The size of the divisions continued to vary in numbers but the establishments
had clearly grown with the 1st Infantry Division at 7,850 and the 2nd Division at 8,616. Only
the Cavalry Division reflected manpower levels of earlier in the century at 3,087.31
Organisationally, the divisions sent to Egypt now contained in their structures cavalry,
artillery, commissariat, transport and medical units and as such represented a significant
advance in the combining of arms in the British
32
division as compared to those employed in
the Peninsula campaign and the Crimea. Command and control of the division also
enjoyed more staff and resources. The two infantry divisions had headquarter
establishments of 57 men, 41 horses and 15 or 16 tents of various types.33 Sadly,
development of headquarters capability was not matched by the harmony among the
PY
senior leadership on the campaign. Lt Gen Sir Garnet Wolseley, the Commander-in-Chief,
did not have good relations with two of the 34three divisional commanders and the disdain
was reciprocated certainly in one instance. One of the three divisional commanders, Lt
O
Gen G. H. S. Willis, was wounded in action at the battle of Tel al-Kabir (13 September
1882) providing a further reminder of how divisional command in the nineteenth century
C
was largely exercised not from a headquarters but from the sharp end of battle.
Turning Point: Boer War 1899-1902
ED
The second Boer war (1899-1902) was the last hurrah of the nineteenth century British
army division. The conflict saw the largest deployment of divisions since the Peninsula
LL
campaign. A total of eleven British infantry divisions

35
and one cavalry division fought in the
campaign against the Boers in South Africa. The divisions all operated with two
subordinate brigades. As was the case throughout the nineteenth century, the manpower
O
levels varied from division to division. This is despite the fact that the36mobilised pre-Boer
war division had theoretical paper strength of just over 10,000 men. The actual shortfall
TR
in divisional strength can be illustrated by a selection of manpower levels in five ofththe

divisions in Southth Africa in February 1900: 1st Division 7,400, 6th Division
37
6,700, 7
Division 7,900, 9 Division 7,400 and the Cavalry Division 8,000. The divisional
N
headquarters was only slightly larger than that of38the divisions deployed to Egypt in 1882
with 67 men, 46 horses and two ‘other vehicles’.
O
The military careers of the generals leading the divisions in South Africa had been shaped
C
mostly in colonial expeditions. The larger number and scale of formations they
N
commanded was largely outside their previous experience. Holding command

appointments of the twelve divisions were 17 officers many of whom remained in their
U
31
Lt Commander Caspar F. Goodrich, Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt 1882, Office of Naval Intelligence,
Bureau of Navigation, Navy Department 1883, (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1883), p. 104 and Col J. F. Maurice, Military
History of the Campaign of 1882 in Egypt, Prepared in the Intelligence Branch of the War Office, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1882), p. 114.
32
Goodrich, Report of the British Naval and Military Operations in Egypt 1882, p. 100.
33
Ibid., pp. 99-100.
34
M. J. Williams, ‘The Egyptian Campaign of 1882’, in: Brian Bond (ed.), Victorian Military Campaigns, (London: Hutchinson, 1967), p.
254 and Lt Gen Sir Edward Hamley, commander of the 2nd Infantry Division and noted military intellectual felt slighted by Wolseley to
the extent that their disagreements turned into a polemic waged in print. See: Jay Luvaas, The Education of an Army: British Military
Thought, 1815-1940, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), pp. 154-158.
35
This number does not include the Colonial Division.
36
Lt Col James Moncrieff Grierson, Scarlet into Khaki: The British Army on the Eve of the Boer War, (London: Greenhill Books, 1988),
p. 115. This is a reprint of the book that was first published anonymously in 1899.
37
L. S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, (London: Sampson Low, Marston and Company Ltd.,
1905), p. 377.
38
Grierson, Scarlet into Khaki, p. 115.
4-6
Contents Page
positions for most of the campaign. Despite the high level of continuity in divisional
command, two divisional commanders were invalided home, one captured and one
sacked. Unlike earlier nineteenth century39conflicts, causalities were low with only two
generals wounded leading their divisions.
There was no shortage of criticism of the quality of British generalship at many levels of
command with40divisional commanders not spared approbation at the time or
subsequently. Field Marshall Earl Roberts, in testimony provided to the Royal
Commission on the War in South Africa on 5 December 1902, cited one of the key reasons
behind failures in formation command during the war in South Africa: ‘we fail to train our
generals and staff in control and administration of the larger bodies which they may have
to handle in the field’.41 Also evident in British Army operations in South Africa were span
of command problems caused by corps commanders not utilizing divisional headquarters
and struggling to control the myriad of lower level formations and units. Maj Gen Sir H. E.
PY
Colville, who held divisional command in the Boer war, believed that an ‘Army Corps is too
cumbersome for one man to deal with’. In line with this view, Colville argued that the
division was the largest controllable tactical entity. Furthermore he believed that divisional
O
commanders only needed to be given higher intent and then to be given the freedom to
carry it out.42
C
The nature of the Boer opponent did not really provide much opportunity for the utilisation
of the division as a complete tactical entity in a conventional force on force manner that
ED
would be characteristic of the two world wars. In one aspect the British use of the division
in South Africa presaged the way in which the division would be employed in an area
security role as experienced in some of the post Second World War insurgencies. This
LL
can be seen in the example of the deployment of Lt Gen N. G. Lyttelton’s 9th Division to
secure part of the lines of communications east of Pretoria running from Middelburg
(divisional headquarters) through Belfast, to Machadodorp and on to Lyndenburg. This
O
security role required nearly 25,000 troops along a line running43about 160km (100 miles)
with the division supplying only a portion of the deployed units. These deployments,
TR
however, tended to break down divisional control of the static subordinate units. Mobile
‘columns’ operated alongside the44units assigned static security roles to manoeuvre against
Boer units operating in the area. Despite the necessary distribution of a division’s units
N
over a wider area in a security role when fighting an insurgency, even in the South African
war there remained the need for effective command and control of these units to be
O
provided by a divisional headquarters. Paradoxically, the system that evolved in the later
period of the South African war neither utilized the division effectively as a tactical entity
C
nor developed its command and control potential for providing area security when dealing
N
with insurgents.
U
Overall the South African war represented a culmination in the nineteenth century British
Army’s employment of the division. The short-comings of the British divisional model
throughout the nineteenth century were the product of the fact that the division was a
formation that only sprang to life at the outbreak of war. As in the case of the Egyptian
39
Data on divisional commanders compiled from relevant entries of the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography.
40
See for example: L. S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Volume II, (London: Sampson Low,
Marston and Company Ltd., 1902), pp. 36-38 and Field Marshal Lord Carver, The National Army Museum of the Boer War, (London:
Sidgwick and Jackson, 1999), pp. 253-259.
41
Testimony Field Marshal Earl Roberts on 5 December 1902 in: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission on the War
in South Africa, Volume I, CD. 1790, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1903), p. 453.
42
Testimony given by Maj Gen Sir H. E. Colville on 26 February 1903 in: Minutes of Evidence Taken Before the Royal Commission on
the War in South Africa, Volume II, CD. 1791, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1903), p. 289 and 294.
43
History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Volume III, (London: Hurst and Blackett Limited, 1908), pp. 553-555.
44
L. S. Amery (ed.), The Times History of the War in South Africa 1899-1902, Volume IV, (London: Sampson Low, Marston and
Company Ltd., 1906), pp. 90-91 and Carver, The National Army Museum of the Boer War, pp. 201-202.
4-7
Contents Page
intervention of45 1882, the divisions sent out to South Africa only ‘came into existence on
mobilisation’. These divisions in peacetime were no more than paper formations lacking
organizational substance. The experience of the Boer war, however, set in train reforms in
the British Army that would see the birth of the division as a permanent peacetime
formation in the British Army.
Birth of the Modern Division: Haldane Reforms
The decade before the First World War was a period of significant reform for the British
Army. Richard Burton Haldane who became the Secretary of State for War in December
1905 was the person who would be responsible for a programme of far-reaching change to
the British Army of the period.46 The drivers for change were varied and included the
problems identified in the recent campaign in South Africa,47the need for increased military
efficiency and a desire to seek economies in expenditure. In addition, Lord Kitchener
PY
launched reforms in 1905 to the Indian Army order of battle that reorganised48the force to
include nine permanent peacetime infantry divisions each of three brigades. The net
effect of all of these factors led Haldane to establish the division as a permanent part of
O
the peacetime order of battle of the British Army. The Haldane reforms established six
large infantry divisions and one cavalry division. The regular standing divisions in wartime
C
would be augmented in wartime by the mobilisation of fourteen divisions of the new
territorial force.49 By the eve of the First World War, the peace establishment of the
infantry divisions stood at 17, 484 men and 48 guns. The divisions were organised into
ED
three square brigades of four battalions of infantry.50
Paralleling the establishment of the division as a permanent peacetime organisation in the
LL
British Army was the development of doctrine before the First World War. The introduction
of the Field Service Regulations 1909 (FSR 1909) marked a major step in a more coherent
approach to the problem of war fighting. Significant as this doctrinal publication was, the
O
FSR 1909 nevertheless had little to say specifically related to the employment of the
division. Instead the FSR 1909 focused more on issues such as orders, movement,
TR
tactical functions and operational environments. The FSR 1909 chapter ‘inter-
communication and orders’ provides an example of a divisional order illustrating the 51
tendency to focus on theory rather than practical application in formation or unit context.
N
In only one place in FSR 1909 can one find a specific reference to the employment of the
division that suggests carrying a lesson forward from the South African war. In the chapter
O
on ‘movements by land and sea’, the FSR 1909 stressed the importance of not
fragmenting formations as fighting entities: ‘the organization of the force must be
C
considered, so that divisions and brigades are not broken up, except when this is
N
absolutely unavoidable’.52
U
45
Maj Gen E. A. Altham, The Principles of War, (London: Macmillan and Co., Limited, 1914), p. 38.
46
See: Richard Burton Haldane, An Autobiography, (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1929), pp. 168-209 and Viscount Haldane, Before
the War, (London: Cassell and Company, LTD., 1920), pp. 156-182.
47
John Gooch, ‘Haldane and the “National Army”’ in: Ian F.W. Beckett and John Gooch (eds.), Politicians and Defence: Studies in the
Formulation of British Defence Policy, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1981), pp. 69-86, ‘The Military System of the Future
in the British Empire, Communicated by Desire of the Secretary of State for War, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution,
Vol. LI, No. 355, (September 1907), pp. 1067-1075 and Edward M. Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, (Edinburgh: University Press,
1980), pp. 48-62.
48
The Army in India and Its Evolution, (Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India: 1924), pp. 27-30 and T. A. Heathcote, The
British Military in India: The Development of British Land Forces in South Asia 1600-1947, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: The Praetorian
Press, 2013), pp. 149-150.
49
Spiers, Haldane: An Army Reformer, p. 81 and p. 106.
50
Maj A. F. Becke, Order of Battle of Divisions Part 2A The Territorial Force Mounted Divisions and the 1st-Line Territorial Force
Divisions (42-56), (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1936), p. 150.
51
Field Service Regulations Part I Operations 1909 (Reprinted with Amendments, 1914), War Office, 10th November 1914, pp. 28-29.
52
Ibid., p. 48. This was a key point stressed in: Altham, The Principles of War, p. 39.
4-8
Contents Page
Although the FSR 1909 provided no specific guidance on the role and employment of the
division in war, these practical matters still had to be addressed and were subject of
considerable discussion in the pages of The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
(JRUSI). Between 1909 and 1913 articles by serving officers considered the problems of
signals, 53artillery, engineers and the use of mechanical transport within the context of the
division. One anonymously written JRUSI article in 1913 stressed the important
consequences falling out of the intellectual ferment regarding the development of the
division in the run-up to the First World War: ‘the influences which have been, and are,
gradually transforming a division from a mere collection of units into an organized “higher
unit”’.54 The nineteenth century journey that saw the division begin its life in the Peninsula
war as a perennial wartime formation and evolving into a permanent balanced tactical
entity reached completion just in time for the challenges posed by two world wars.
PY
The Division in the World Wars, 1914-1945
Steep Learning Curve: First World War
O
The outbreak of the First World War in August 1914 led to an unprecedented expansion of
the British Army into a force comparable to other major continental European powers.
C
From the rather modest base of the seven divisions of the British Expeditionary Force
(BEF) at the outbreak of war, the Army would eventually raise a force that at its maximum
extent numbered ninety divisions. The creation of such a greatly expanded force
ED
presented enormous challenges in organisation, training and command. Moreover, as
with so many problems faced by the British Army during the Great War, the process of
development of command, organisation and employment of the division took place in
LL
‘white heat’ of war.55

Excluding the Dominion and Imperial formations that served in the war, the British Army
O
created in the course of the First World War 90 divisions, a force that was over twelve
times the size of the BEF at the beginning of the conflict. The service of the majority of
TR
these divisions was in northwest Europe; 53 British divisions or 58% of the total raised
served only in France and Belgium. An additional 13 divisions or 14% served in another
theatre in addition to northwest Europe. When all the divisions that served in France and
N
Belgium are taken together they numbered 63 divisions or 72% of all the divisions raised in
the war. In other theatres, 11 divisions or 12 % of those created served in places such as
O
the Balkans, the Middle East or providing garrisons in India and around the Empire. Only
8% of all divisions never left the United Kingdom seeing no operational service.56
C
N
In broad terms, only three types of division existed during the First World War: infantry,
cavalry and mounted divisions. By a wide margin, the infantry division was the numerically
U
dominant formation. Between 1914 and 1918, five changes to the composition of the
infantry division took place. The war establishments were 18,179 (1914), 18,122 (1916),
19,372 (1917) and 16,035 (1918). Between 1914 and 1917 the infantry division
maintained its three square brigade organization of four infantry battalions. In 1918 this
53
Col R.U.H. Buckland, ‘The Training of the R.E. Field Companies of a Division’, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution ,
Vol. LIV, No. 887, (May 1910), pp. 598-612, Capt. Sir T.A.A.M. Cuninghame, ‘The Supply of the Division in the Field, with Special
Reference to the Use of Mechanical Transport’, , Vol. LVI, No. 407, (January 1912),
The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
pp. 9-36, Col F.J. Davies, ‘The Communications of a Division in the Field’, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. LIII,
No. 887, (July 1909), pp. 885-900, and Capt W.F. Weber, ‘The Employment of Divisional Artillery’, The Journal of the Royal United
Service Institution, Vol. LIV, No. 885, (March 1910), pp. 355-363.
54
“N”, ‘The Organization of a Division’, , Vol. LVII, No. 427, (September 1913), p.
The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution
1163.
55
Simon Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat into Victory, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), p. 19.
56
Data on divisions compiled from: , Parts 1-3, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935-1945).
Order of Battle of Divisions
4-9
Contents Page
changed to a three infantry battalion structure within each of the three brigades. The loss
of three infantry battalions from the57division accounted for the overall drop in divisional
manpower by over 3,000 soldiers.
The most marked change to the composition was in the area of firepower. In 1914 the
organic artillery in the division organization was 76 guns; by 1918 the numbers dropped to
48 guns. The reduction in guns did not mean a diminution of artillery available to the
division as it had been shifted to centrally controlled units. Moreover, the introduction of
trench mortars, which numbered 36 in the division by 1918, was compensation in part for
the reduction in artillery strength. The most striking examples of an increase in divisional
firepower can be seen in the numbers of machineguns. In the divisional table of
organization machine guns increased from 24 in 1914 to 400 in 1918.58
The scale and speed in creating new divisions for wartime service created enormous
PY
problems in divisional command. Fortunately, the challenges affecting various levels of
command, including the division, have received detailed analysis in Simon59 Robbins
ground-breaking work . The difficulties
O
British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-18
in finding suitable command cadre for the division was clearly illustrated by the problems
encountered in the main theatre of the war for the British Army - France. Only 5% of the
C
total of serving officers in France60during the war had any pre-war experience of command
of a division or larger formation. Moreover, among the divisional commanders who
served in France during the war only about 50% had attended the Staff College in
ED
Camberley.61 As a consequence, the making of a good or bad divisional commander was
down to how they learned or did not learn from their wartime experience. Similarly,
divisional headquarters staff lacked experience as the pool of trained staff officers was far
LL
outstripped by the numbers of staff positions to be filled.62

The number of divisional command appointments held across the 90 divisions raised in the
O
First World War was 527 officers. About 10% (53 officers) who held divisional command
were wounded, sick, invalided, incapacitated, killed in action or died during military
TR
63
service. Determining the percentage of divisional commanders who were only temporary
appointments, who were promoted, sacked or left for other reasons is difficult to measure
in the absence of detailed analysis of each and every individual who held divisional
N
command. Nevertheless, given the problems of finding suitable commanders , it is

estimated that between 20% and 33% of generals holding Army, Corps and Divisional
O
command changed each year between 1915 and 1918 on the Western front. Furthermore
the staggering percentage of 68% of divisions in France in the last two years of the war
C
64
had one or more changes in commander. The level of turnover was very high but
N
understandable given the expansion of the army and the lack of experienced or trained
cadre to fill the divisional command appointments.
U
Field Marshall Haig in his diary wrote on 28 October 1916 that ‘the fighting of a division
depends on the qualities and spirit of its commander’.65 The exercise of divisional
command in the First World War, however, did not always find conditions suitable for those
57
, Parts 1 The Regular British Divisions, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935), pp. 126-127.
58
.
Ibid
59
Simon Robbins, , (London: Frank Cass, 2005).
British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918: Defeat into Victory
60
.,
Ibidp. 52.
61
., p. 37.
Ibid
62
., p. 35.
Ibid
63
Data on divisional commanders compiled from: , Parts 1-3, (London: His Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1935-
1945).
64
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918 , p. 63.
65
Quoted from Haig diary entry 28 October 1916 in: Gary Sheffield and John Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters
1914-1918 , (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), p. 249.
4-10
Contents Page
generals easily to make their mark in command. Divisional commanders often suffered
from direct interference or ‘micromanagement’ from army and corps level. While some of
this can be seen as an appropriate function of these command levels,66 such interventions
stifled initiative and burdened and frustrated divisional commanders. If divisional
commanders faced challenges generated higher up the command chain, conditions in the
First World War were not always conducive for a divisional commander to exert command
and control over his subordinate formations and units. Difficulties in communication in the
conditions of trench warfare did not always
67
provide timely or accurate information upon
which to direct and fight the division. The lack of situational awareness was also a
function
68
of the unwillingness of the divisional commanders to go forward and visit the
front. The nineteenth century divisional commander operating from the sharp end of
battle had given way to a more sedentary exercise of command in the early twentieth
century more dependent on signals69 technology wired into headquarters in order to react to
events on more distant battlefield.
PY
Alongside the problems of divisional command were also important strides forward. One
significant factor aiding the improvement in the performance of divisional command was
O
through the development and imparting of coherent doctrine and lessons learned. The
experience of battles in 1914-1916 was translated into lessons learned and applied to
C
what was the British Army’s first division specific doctrine. For divisions fighting on the
Western front the pamphlet SS135 Instructions for the Training of Divisions for Offensive
Action provided coherence and commonality of approach for divisions in the attack. SS135
ED
dealt with the problems of fighting through a trench system and70beyond and discussed
means of ensuring effective command and control at all levels. It can be argued that
SS135 was doctrine designed to address the specific conditions found in the Western front
LL
rather than discussing in the round the employment of the division. Nevertheless it
introduced systematic training for the division which contributed to the eventual operational
success on the battlefield and led to the marked improvement in the performance of the
O
divisional level of command in the last two years of the war.

TR
Despite the formidable array of challenges associated with effective divisional command
during the First World War, in 1917 and 1918 the British Army developed divisional
commanders who could take on and prevail against their German opponents.71 As the war
N
progressed, more effective professional leadership emerged grounded in hard earned

battle experience. Better selection and promotion of experienced officers gradually
O
transformed the divisional tier of command. One important measure of the transformation
was the average age of divisional commanders. In August 1914 it was 55 years of age
C
72
and by November 1918 the average age had dropped to 49. It was a more experienced,
N
confident and youthful divisional commander that led the British Army to victory at the end
of the First World War.
U
66
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, pp. 32-33 and Andy Simpson, Directing Operations: British Corps
Command on the Western Front, (Stroud, Gloucestershire: Spellmount, 2006), p. 199.
67
John Lee, ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge 20 September 1917’, in: Gary Sheffield and
Dan Todman (eds.), Command and Control on the Western Front: The British Army’s Experience 1914-1918, (Staplehurst, Kent:
Spellmount Limited, 2004), pp. 119-139.
68
Quoted from Haig diary entry 11 April 1917 in: Sheffield and Bourne (eds.), Douglas Haig War Diaries and Letters 1914-1918, p. 279.
69
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, pp. 77-78.
70
Ibid., p. 95 and Lee, ‘Command and Control in Battle: British Divisions on the Menin Road Ridge 20 September 1917’, pp. 120-124.
71
Robbins, British Generalship on the Western Front 1914-1918, p. 59.
72
Ibid., pp. 214-215.
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Divisions Fighting as Divisions: Second World War
The demobilisation of the British Army returned it to a posture that had been familiar
enough in the nineteenth century with home and Imperial defence once again the chief
focus. Although the British Army would experiment with mechanization in the interwar
years, serious preparation for the possibility of another European war was precluded by
political priorities, economic crisis and financial parsimony limiting resources until the
1930s. As a consequence, with another world war73looming in the late 1930s, the Army
found itself possessing only five regular divisions. When war broke out, the British Army
had, once again, to undergo a dramatic expansion of the numbers of divisions as was the
case in the previous war. As a result of ‘desperate expedients’ in September 1939, the
British Army had a divisional base of two armoured, seven regular infantry and74twenty-four
first and second line territorial divisions upon which to build the wartime force. At least
the Army had its earlier experience in the First World War to draw upon.
PY
Counting only British (excluding Dominion and Imperial) divisions, the British Army raised
46 divisions between 1939 and 1945. Reflecting the demands of a global conflict, British
O
Army divisions in the Second World War had a more complex pattern of deployments
involving multiple theatres. Northwest Europe in many ways was the most important
C
theatre for the United Kingdom but only 25% of the divisions raised in the war fought in
that theatre. In contrast 40% of all divisions served in other theatres even if a percentage
of them also were on operations in Northwest Europe in the last two years of the war. A
ED
significant proportion of all divisions, 33%, did not see any operational service in the war.
To put this in perspective, the British Army fought the Second World War with about 30
divisions in globally scattered theatres. This ceiling of about 30 British divisions engaged in
LL
combat is half the

75
number of divisions that were in combat on the Western front between
1914 and 1918.
O
The Second World War saw a greater variety of divisional types. These included
armoured, airborne, cavalry, infantry and a ‘mixed’ division. The ten armoured divisions
TR
created were a new innovation to the British Army’s order of battle. As a new formation it
underwent nine revisions to its organisation as a result of wartime experience. The
changes to its two brigade structure in the course of the war saw a reduction of tank
N
numbers and a better balance established between armour and infantry in the formation to
76 The 1944 armoured division had 14,964
achieve better combined arms cooperation.
O
men.77 The 79th Armoured Division was a singular highly specialised formation that utilised
specialist armoured vehicles. It did not fight as a tactical entity but attached its units to
C
78
other formations in support of operations. The airborne division was also a new addition
N
to the order of battle. Only two divisions were raised: the 1st and 6th Airborne Divisions.
With its troops air transported into battle, it had to be light and as a consequence lacked
U
firepower and sustainability. It was a small division with only 12,215 men.79 The singular
cavalry division had only a fleeting existence before being reorganised into an armoured
division.80
73
Brian Bond and Williamson Murray, ‘The British Armed Forces 1918-39’, in: Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray (eds.), Military
Effectiveness Volume II: The Interwar Period, (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1988), p. 107. For a fuller account see: Brian Bond, British
Military Policy between the Two World Wars, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).
74
David French, Raising Churchill’s Army: The British Army and the War against Germany 1919-1945, (Oxford: University Press, 2001),
p. 187.
75
Data on divisions compiled from: H F Joslen, Orders of Battle The British Army 1939-1945, MLRS Books, pp. 11-107.
76
Ibid., pp. 3-7.
77
George Forty, Companion to the British Army 1939-1945, (Stroud, Gloucestershire: 1998), p. 162.
78
Ibid., pp. 65-66.
79
Ibid., p. 168.
80
Joslen, Orders of Battle The British Army 1939-1945, p. 33.
4-12
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The most numerous division types were the infantry division. The organisation of the
British infantry division underwent relatively minor revision in the course of the war. It
consisted of three infantry brigades with each containing three infantry battalions. 81The
manpower of the infantry division grew in wartime from 13,863 to 18,347 by 1945. The
only major diversion from this pattern was the mixed division of 1942, which consisted of
two infantry brigades and a tank brigade. Only five divisions adopted
82
this structure and
reverted to the standard three infantry brigade pattern in 1943. Something akin to the
‘mixed’ division emerged in the Italian theatre, but official preference was for independent
tank brigades to be attached to infantry divisions as required.
Compared to the First World War division, the infantry division of the Second World War
was a more mobile formation and one possessing more organic firepower. No longer a
formation that relied on horse traction for moving its vehicles, the infantry division of 1945
had 4,330 wheeled and tracked motor vehicles of all types.83 Utilization of animal transport
PY
occurred only in theatres such as Burma where environmental conditions made them more
effective than motor vehicles. The organic divisional firepower available in the Second
World War was also considerably higher than in the previous world war. The field artillery
O
assigned to the British infantry division in 1945 amounted to 72 guns and when anti-tank
guns are included in the totals, 182 guns overall. Light and medium machine guns on
C
establishment numbered over 1,300 which was over three times the number contained in
the 1918 British infantry division.84 ED
One of the significant consequences of the increased resources organic to the division in
terms of thousands of vehicles conferring mobility and the greatly enhanced firepower was
major increase in the logistical requirements to sustain an operational division. As the post
LL
war British official study on Administrative Planning indicated a division of 16,000 men
required an additional 24,000 to sustain it. Thus the Second World War ‘divisional slice’
amounted to 40,000 men in total.85 The increase in fighting power and capacity to
O
manoeuvre of the Second World War British Army division came at a price. The need for
sustainment placed greater demands on scarce manpower resources as the real
TR
manpower bill was much higher than the nominal divisional establishment.
The operational employment of the British division was very much shaped by the two
N
dominant military figures to emerge in the British Army during the war: Field Marshal
Bernard Montgomery in the Mediterranean and Northwest Europe theatres and Field
O
Marshal William Slim in the Far East theatre. The combination of the nature of opponents
and operational environments influenced how they believed the division should be trained
C
and utilised on the field of battle. The dominant theme in Montgomery’s thinking was that
N
‘Divisions must fight86as Divisions under their own commanders, with clear-cut tasks and
definite objectives’. Montgomery’s analysis of the North Africa campaign prior to his
U
arrival was that too much fragmentation of divisions ‘into bits and pieces’87 had frittered
away the concentrated fighting power of the division as a tactical entity. In a letter to the
Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Gen Alan Brooke in early 1943, Montgomery set out in
some detail how he thought divisions of the British Army ought to be organised. He
outlined the need for three types of formations: the armoured division, the motorised
81
Ibid., pp. 131-132.
82
Forty, Companion to the British Army 1939-1945, p. 160.
83
Joslen, Orders of Battle The British Army 1939-1945, p. 132.
84
Ibid.
85
Col H.W. Wilson (compiler), Administrative Planning, (London: The War Office, 1952), p. 62 and p. 181.
86
Montgomery’s Address to the Middle East Staff College, Haifa, 21 September 1942 in: Stephen Brooks (ed.), Montgomery and the
Eighth Army: A Selection from the Diaries, Correspondence and other Papers of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery of Alamein,
August 1942 to December 1943, (London: Army Records Society, 1991), p. 53.
87
Montgomery’s Diary Notes on Situation in Eighth Army, 12 August to 23 October 1942 in: Ibid., p. 24.
4-13
Contents Page
division and the infantry division. The motorised division was in many respects the most
interesting although it did not make it into the British Army’s wartime order of battle.
Montgomery thought that it should consist of an armoured car regiment, an armoured 88
regiment and two motorised infantry brigades of the pattern found in armoured divisions.
In terms of proportion of infantry to armour, Montgomery’s idea for a motorised division
pointed to the idea of the post war mechanised division. While Montgomery was correct in
emphasizing the combat power of the division that was fought as a coherent tactical entity,
his aversion to fragmenting brigades and units rather inhibited89the development of
combined groupings such as battle groups within the division. This was particularly true
in the British pattern armoured divisions. Battlefield experience in 21st Army Group in 1944,
however, caused him to accept the need for flexibility but it did not lead him to the logical
conclusion to change the organisation90
of armoured divisions to facilitate unit level
combined arms tactical groupings.
PY
The Far East theatre proved to be less conventional and more flexible in its approach to
the organisation and employment of the division. As noted earlier, Slim believed that the
division was a ‘complete orchestra of war’, but at the same time he also thought that it
O
should possess the ability to play a wide repertoire. While sharing Montgomery’s view of
the need to fight divisions as cohesive tactical entities, the challenging terrain, vast
C
distances, underdeveloped transportation infrastructure and a fluid battle space required a
more versatile concept of the division. In the wake of the defeats of British forces in
Malaya and in the early part of the Burma campaign, divisions in the Far East were made
ED
lighter and reduced to two brigades and given less motor transport and more pack animals
in what were designated ‘Animal and Motor Transport Divisions’. These formations were
more suitable for the mountainous jungle terrain of western Burma and eventually five
LL
divisions were reorganised along these lines by the end of 1942.91 More radicalth
modifications took place as the campaign developed. By 1944, when Slim’s 14 Army
was in the ascendency over the Japanese, the requirement for divisions to be able to
O
engage in a range of operations without reorganisation grew. The versatility of the new
divisional model was summarized in the South East Asia Command Headquarters
TR
Conference Minutes of 14 January 1944:

With the organisation suggested . . . it will be possible to utilise various
N
portions of the division for operations according to the nature of the country
and also under conditions of air transport and amphibious operations, without
O
further modifications in organisation.92

C
The division in the Far East evolved to be more air transportable, to be used in amphibious
N
operations and, as the mountainous terrain of eastern Burma opened up on to plains, to

conduct conventional manoeuvre operations. Reflecting the 360° battlefield threat posed
U
by the Imperial Japanese Army, the reorganization of the division

93
in the Far East by 1944
also saw the addition of a divisional HQ protection battalion.
88
Letter to Gen Alan Brooke, 12 January 1943 in: Ibid., pp. 114-121.
89
Tripoli Tactical Talks, 15-17 February 1943 in: Ibid., p. 146.
90
The Armoured Division in Battle, 21 Army Group, Holland, December 1944, pp. 7-8.
91
T.R. Moreman, The Jungle, the Japanese and the British Commonwealth Armies at War. 1941-45, (London: Frank Cass, 2005), pp.
55-56.
92
South East Asia Command (SEAC) Headquarters Conference Minutes, 14 January 1944, The National Archives, Kew, [hereafter
TNA] AIR 23/3020 and SEAC Meeting, 14 May 1944, TNA, Kew, AIR 23/3041, . See also: Maj Gen S. Woodburn Kirby, The War
Against Japan: Volume III, The Decisive Battles, (London: Her Majesty’ Stationary Office, 1961), p. 40, pp. 461-462 and Gen S.
Woodburn Kirby, The War Against Japan: Volume IV, The Reconquest of Burma, (London: Her Majesty’ Stationary Office, 1965), pp.
25-26.
93
Daniel P. Marston, Phoenix from the Ashes: The Indian Army in the Burma Campaign, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 2003), pp.
170-171.
4-14
Contents Page
Doctrine for the British division was much more developed and tailored to the needs of
divisional types. In the course of the war, Army Training Instructions (ATI) and Military
Training Pamphlets (MTP) emerged for infantry and armoured divisions. The MTPs for
infantry divisions tended to be organised around tactical functions. For example MTP No
23 Part II dealt with the ‘Infantry Division in the Defence’94Part IX the ‘Infantry Division in the
Attack’ and Part X the ‘Infantry Division in the Advance’. Doctrine for the armoured
division, not unexpectedly as a new formation type, underwent an evolutionary process
until a definitive MPT 41 emerged in three parts in 1943.95 Second World War doctrine for
the division was remarkably compact with many pamphlets less than 50 pages in length
and in a pocket sized format. Given the length of the pamphlets, the focus was often on
principles rather than detailed tactics, techniques and procedures. While British doctrine
commendably evolved as the war progressed and operational lessons were incorporated,
dissemination of doctrine was not necessarily consistently done or reflected in training in
some theatres such as among the formations based in the United Kingdom pre-invasion of
PY
France in June 1944. Amongst the varietyst of doctrinal publications were also theatre
generated pamphlets for the division. 21 Army Group in late 1944 produced its own
divisional doctrine reflecting Montgomery’s thinking: ‘Some Notes on the96Conduct of War
O
and the Infantry Division in Battle’ and ‘The Armoured Division in Battle’. Although its
content made its way into post 97war British Army doctrine, it highlighted the lack of central
C
grip on doctrine dissemination.
The formation level training for the British division was a vital ingredient for operational
ED
success. The progress of divisional training was to some degree facilitated by early
reverses in the war, the expulsion from France in 1940 and the withdrawal from Burma in
1942. These events created time for divisions to be more systematically and
LL
comprehensively trained as they took place in the relative sanctuary of the United
Kingdom and India. Formation training, however, required large expanses of land
because of the increased mobility and range of weapons operated by divisions.98 In the
O
United Kingdom, availability of sizeable training areas was constrained by official policy to
keep as much land as possible in cultivation to grow much needed food in order to free
TR
99
shipping to carry other commodities. Despite these problems multi and single division
exercises took place between 1941 and 1944.100 Other theatres had far fewer constraints
with the Middle East and Far East having more land available for formation training.
N
On the surface, command of the Second World War British Army division experienced a
O
repeat of some of the problems seen in the previous world war. The expansion in the
number of divisions once again witnessed considerable numbers of officers cycled in and
C
out of command appointments. About 340 officers held divisional command for varying
N
periods in the 46 British Army divisions raised during the Second World War. Because of
changes in the way data was collected regarding the British Army’s order of battle, it is not
U
possible to easily determine what percentage of these divisional commanders left their
94
Operations, Military Training Pamphlet No. 23, Part II – The Infantry Division in the Defence, 1942, The War Office, 23 March 1942,
Operations, Military Training Pamphlet No. 23, Part IX – The Infantry Division in the Attack, 1941, The War Office, 21 July 1941 and
Operations, Military Training Pamphlet No. 23, Part X – The Infantry Division in the Advance, 1941, The War Office, 22 September
1941.
95
The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Divisions and Its Components, Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 1 - The Tactical
Handling of Armoured Divisions, The War Office, July 1943; The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Divisions and Its Components,
Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 2 - The Armoured Regiment, The War Office, February 1943; and, The Tactical Handling of the
Armoured Divisions and Its Components, Military Training Pamphlet No. 41, Part 3 – The Motor Battalion, The War Office, June 1943,
96
21st Army Group, Some Notes on the Conduct of War and The Infantry Division in Battle, Belgium, November 1944 and 21st Army
Group, The Armoured Division in Battle, Holland, December 1944.
97
On the issue of doctrine dissemination see: Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army 1940-1944: From Dunkirk to
D-Day , (London: Cass, 2000), pp. 8-17.
98
Col J.W. Gibb (compiler), The Second World War 1939-1945: Training in the Army, TNA, WO277/36, p. 196.
99
Ibid.
100
Place, Military Training in the British Army 1940-1944, p. 19.
4-15
Contents Page
post because of illness, being wounded or killed in action.101 Nevertheless, there is

evidence that because of the scale of wartime expansion, the senior leadership in the
British Army had concerns about the quality of commanders of higher formations. Alan
Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff in a diary entry for 31 March 1942 stated that:
‘Half of our Corps and Divisional Commanders are totally unfit for their appointments, and
yet if I were to sack them
102
I could find no better! They lack character, imagination, drive and
power of leadership’. Developing competent divisional commanders was a problem
remedied largely through wartime experience, time and appointments by senior officers.
Just as Montgomery and Slim were influential in shaping the organisation of the British
division in the Second World War, so too did they shape the exercise of divisional
command in their respective theatres. Each of them had very distinct approaches in
shaping those who served under them in divisional command. Montgomery believed in a
‘very firm grip on his military machine’ with his divisional commanders having to meet his
PY
expectations not the least in delivery of his plans. He had decided views on the need for
younger men to hold higher command and was willing103 to sack those he lacked confidence
in but was loyal and supportive to those he appointed. Slim in contrast was far more
O
comfortable in allowing his divisional commanders to act independently within his overall
intent, reflecting a different culture of command (See Box 2). Despite these very different
C
expectations placed on divisional commanders, the men occupying these command
appointments ultimately succeeded or failed on their own qualities. Field Marshal William
Slim, echoing Haig’s 1916 comment on divisional commanders, wrote in his104memoir that
ED
‘all good divisions – and bad ones – reflected its commander’s personality’.
LL
Box 2: Montgomery and Slim on the Exercise of Divisional Command

Montgomery: ‘firm grip on his military machine’
O
‘It is essential to understand that all men are different. . . Therefore all divisions are different. In the
TR
1914-1918 war if ten divisions were needed for an offensive, the staff would take the ten most
easily assembled. But a division develops an individuality of its own, which the higher commander
must study and thus learn the type of battle each is best at. Once I grasped this essential fact of
difference, I used to match the troops to the job; having studied the conditions of any particular
N
battle which was impending, I would employ in it divisions whose men were best suited to those
conditions, and preferred them’.
O
105
Slim: ‘less rigidly controlled and more individualistic’

C
‘Compared with those in Europe, the combat forces used in Burma were not large . . . the greatest
N
number of divisions I ever had under my command in action at one time was eighteen. They fought
U
on a front of seven hundred miles, in four groups, separated by great distances, with no lateral
communications between them and beyond tactical support of one another. My corps and divisions
were called upon to act with at least as much freedom as armies and corps in other theatres.
Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work
101
Data on divisional commanders compiled from: H F Joslen, Orders of Battle The British Army 1939-1945, MLRS Books, pp. 11-107.
102
Diary Entry 31 March 1942 in: Alex Danchev and Daniel Todman (eds.), Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke, War Diaries 1939-1945,
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2001), p. 243.
103
Stephen Ashley Hart, Colossal Cracks: Montgomery’s 21st Army Group in Northwest Europe, 1944-45, (Mechanicsburg, PA:
Stackpole Books, 2007), p. 157.
104
Field Marshal Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory, (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), p. 145.
105
The Memoirs of Field Marshal The Viscount Montgomery, (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 78.
106
Field Marshal Viscount William Slim, Defeat into Victory, (New York: Cooper Square Press, 2000), pp. 541-542.
4-16
Contents Page
out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time they
developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to
act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information of changing circumstances without reference to
their superiors’.106
The Division in the Cold War 1945-1989
The reduction in strength in the Army following the Second World War was not as
precipitous as experienced in the interwar years. The combination of sprawling global
commitments and the early emergence of the Cold War Soviet threat ensured that the
division remained in the order of battle of the British Army. Despite the continuing
commitments and new threats, the reduction in the numbers of divisions was inevitable for
economic reasons. By April 1951, the Army fielded three armoured and five infantry
PY
divisions. The deployment of these formations placed three divisions in Germany in the
British Army of the Rhine (BAOR), one in the Middle East, two in the Far East and two
based in the United Kingdom.107 The eight division total survived in the 1950s but began to
O
decline in the 1960s as brigades came to predominate in overseas deployments. Only in
the Far East did a single division endure until the winding down of east of Suez
C
commitments in the late 1960s. From the early 1970s until the end of the 108 Cold War in
1989 the British Army consistently maintained four or five active divisions.
ED
In the decade immediately following the end of the Second World War, doctrine and
thinking on the division represented something of a consolidation of the wartime
experience. The Infantry Division in Battle (1950) and The Armoured Division in Battle
LL
(1952) replaced the multiple bookletsst

of wartime divisional doctrine. Both of these
publications drew heavily on the 21 Army Group pamphlets on the same subjects
produced in 1944 but also incorporated wider views on the wartime operational
O
experience. Interestingly, this doctrine provided, perhaps for the first time, an official
definition of the division and guidance on the exercise of divisional command [Box 3]. The
TR
wartime experience on the employment and organization of the division, however, was
soon to be challenged by the post war strategic environment and technological changes
impacting on the conduct of war.
N
O
Box 3: Command: Cultivating an Esprit de Division

C
1. The division is the basic fighting formation of the Army. The infantry division contains in its
organization balanced elements of all arms and services other than armour. Armour, however,
N
other than the divisional anti-tank regiment, will be added when circumstances require, usually in
the form of one independent armoured brigade to a division.
U
2. The division is the highest formation within which the commander can have real personal
contact with the soldiers under his command. The division is his to make or mar. By his
personality, powers of leadership, and abilities as a trainer and commander, he can instil into all
ranks of the division the confidence necessary to make an efficient fighting machine. Confidence
produces high morale, which together are battle winning factors.
3. The divisional commander must ensure that the staffs and units work as a happy team and so
create the right atmosphere throughout the division. Different commanders will run things in
different ways, but this does not matter so long as the team spirit is there and the commander is
107
‘Size and Shape of the Armed Forces’, 30 October 1950, TNA, Kew, CAB 129/42.
108
Date on numbers of divisions taken from Statements on Defence Estimates 1970-1983, TNA, Kew and The Military Balance covering
the years 1972-1989.
4-17
Contents Page
clear and decided in what he wants. In battle, control is exercised by personal visits by the
divisional commander to brigade commanders and by conferences with the divisional staff and
commanders of the supporting arms. In this way he can retain a grip on the battle and keep his
subordinate commanders and staff informed of his intentions, both immediate and future.
4. . . . the personality of the commander plays a large part. He must make himself known to all
ranks by short talks out of battle and by personal visits during battle. By meeting and talking to
them both in the front line and in the rear areas he will automatically gain their confidence and
cultivate this essential esprit109de division. All ranks must feel pride in wearing the division sign on
their clothing and vehicles.
The strategic environment in the Cold War introduced a significant dichotomy in terms of
the type of formations required to meet likely contingencies. Formation organization in
Europe was very much focused on the challenges posed by the Soviet threat. In the early
PY
1950s, some figures believed that the British division had become too big and unwieldy
with too many vehicles and men as a result of wartime experience. 110
They argued that the
time had come to make the division more streamlined and agile. Although these
O
arguments were grounded in a desire to develop formations more suited to manoeuvre on
the battlefield, a more significant driver for change was the advent of atomic and nuclear
C
weapons. A big division, particularly when concentrated, presented a large and vulnerable
target for tactical nuclear weapons. As such, any divisional reorganization suggested the
ED
need for a more dispersed force with more mobile and survivable command and control
capability. Yet what made sense in addressing the threat of tactical nuclear weapons did
not necessarily provide the density of force and firepower necessary to meet the large
Soviet conventional armoured threat. In the second half of the 1950s, this dilemma 111
LL
prompted considerable debate and experimentation regarding divisional organization. If

anything, the debate demonstrated that there would 112
be no easy solution to this
conundrum, if in fact there was any solution at all.
O
TR
The global aspect of British security commitments favoured infantry formations that were
much lighter for ease of air transportability, capable of operating in more austere, less
developed regions of the world and yet could still prevail against less formidable
conventional or unconventional opponents. Formation mobility to enhance speedy
N
deployment was seen as being of critical importance. As a consequence of these

O
requirements, after 1957, the brigade group became in effect the most important formation
being seen as adaptable enough to meet the Soviet threat in north west Europe and
C
113
tailored for operating in Africa, the Middle East or Far East. The brigade group was
‘capable of being self-contained’ logistically which was an attribute that flexibility met the
N
114
needs of European conditions and those of the wider world. The ‘brigade group’ was
seen as the right-sized formation for the most likely contingencies of an internal security
U
109
The Infantry Division in Battle, War Office Code 1857, The War Office, 10 March 1950, p. 10.
110
See: Capt B,H. Liddell-Hart, ‘How to Quicken Manoeuvre and Gain Flexibility in Land Warfare’, The Army Quarterly Vol. LX, No. 2
(July 1950), pp. 181-195 and Maj W.N.R. Scotter, ‘Streamlining the Infantry Division’, The Journal of the Royal United Service
Institution, Vol. XCVIII, No. 592, (November 1953), 597-602. Slim similarly noted that without air supremacy ‘tail-heavy formations’
would find it difficult to manoeuvre. See: Slim, Defeat into Victory, p. 540.
111
Maj A.F.J.G. Jackson, ‘Fighting Formations of the Future’, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. C, No. 598, (May
1955), 229-235, Alfred Klinkrade, ‘British Tactics in Nuclear War or “Do Not Stray into Hoopoeland”’, The BritishthArmy Review, No. 7
(September 1958), pp. 60-63, Maj Gen J.W. Hackett, ‘”The Dread Arbitrament” (Thoughts on War in the Mid-20 Century)’, The British
Army Review, No. 7 (September 1958), pp. 6-12, Col D.C. Mullen, ‘British Army of the Rhine New Divisional Organization Trials’, British
Army Review, No. 2 (March 1956), pp. 6-15, Lt Col N.E.V. Short, ‘The Organization of the Division in a Nuclear War’, , The Journal of
the Royal United Service Institution, Vol. CI, No. 602, (May 1956), 263-270, and Lt Gen Sir Dudley Ward, ‘Divisional Organization’,
British Army Review, No. 3 (September 1956), pp. 4-7.
112
See: David French, Army, Empire and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy 1945-1971, (Oxford: University Press, 2012),
pp. 198-241.
113
Ibid., p. 204.
114
Notes on the British Army 1961, WO Code No. 9696, The War Office, 6 February 1961, p. 5.
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nature in British overseas territories or in the case of military intervention in a state. As a

Chiefs of Staff paper argued in the mid 1960s:
Our land forces would not initially be involved on a scale greater than one
reinforced brigade group. However, we do not visualise intervening in less
than brigade group strength initially in circumstances where we are likely 115
to
meet organised well-armed opposition; to do so could well court disaster.
The shift of the formation centre of gravity to the ‘brigade group’, however, did not spell the
end of the division but it did reshape it in two important ways. Firstly, the divisional
sustainment and supporting arms were devolved to the brigade level making the division in
essence a headquarters capability. This change is illustrated by the Notes on the British
Army 1961 which, no longer described the division as a formation, but as a headquarters
capability possessing ‘no organic supporting or administrative units’. Moreover, the
PY
divisional
116
headquarters was still able to exercise control over as many as four brigade
groups. Secondly, a move toward the brigade group also gave rise to a new divisional
organization designed to fulfil a requirement to reinforce rapidly overseas theatres by air
O
transport. In 1955, the decision was announced to create a ‘strategic reserve’ that would
lessen the need for large overseas garrisons and yet could be dispatched quickly to
C
trouble spots around the world. 117 The core of the land component of the strategic reserve
was to be the UK based 3rd Division with 118
the mission of meeting ‘unforeseeable world-wide
commitments and contingency plans’. The organization and equipment of the division
ED
was intended to provide ‘the Bde Gp with strategic119 mobility, tactical mobility,
rd
and the fire
power necessary to undertake its tasks overseas’. Although the 3 Division could
deploy and fight as a division (with three brigades), its role was to provide tailored forces
LL
for deployment. As Lt Col Hubert Penrose, GSO1, described 3rd Division’s role: ‘We were
to be a great military supermarket, from which the planning staffs could select any
combination of120units and sub-units with which to meet a variety of overseas
O
emergencies’.
TR
The brigade group and the strategic reserve role of 3rd Division would eventually lose their
places in British Army thinking by the late 1960s as a major shift in defence policy ended
Britain’s east of Suez role. With the role of the division in the British Army firmly parked in
N
Germany on the north European plain, formation evolution in the last thirty years of the
Cold War (1959-1989) was driven by the well-established problem of meeting the Soviet
O
threat, in both its conventional and nuclear guises. In terms of command and control,
survivability of headquarters or at least redundancy by creating backups was an ongoing
C
theme in divisional organization and reorganization. For example in 1961, a divisional

N
headquarters could be divided into at least four elements : ‘main, alternative main/HQRA
and rear headquarters’ with the additional possibility of deploying a ‘small tactical
U
headquarters’.121 Twenty years later, the theology of headquarters tables of organization

continued to be a source of study. The basic structure, however, still consisted of main,
alternate, tactical and rear headquarter components.122 Efforts to make formation
headquarters more mobile and smaller meant increasing discomfort for formation
115
Chiefs of Staff Committee, Defence Planning Staff, The United Kingdom’s Intervention Capability, 9 December 1964, TNA, DEFE
6/93.
116
Notes on the British Army 1961, p. 5.
117
Statement on Defence 1955, TNA, Kew, CAB 129/73, p. 10.
118
Chiefs of Staff Committee, The Definition and Composition of the Strategic Reserve, 13 February 1964, TNA, Kew, DEFE 25/176, p.
2.
119
Tactical Mobility Trials 1959 Southern Command Directive, 20 January 1959, TNA, Kew, WO 32/17428, p. 1.
120
Lt Col Hubert Penrose, GSO1, 3rd Division as quoted in Robin McNish, Iron Division: The History of the 3rd Division, (London: Ian
Allan Ltd.) p. 151.
121
Notes on the British Army 1961, p. 5.
122
BAOR Study Team Final Report Phase 1 Part 1 Armoured Division Headquarters and Signal Regiment, 1 September 1981, DCDC.
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commanders and their headquarters staff. As Maj Gen Mike Reynolds suggests by
anecdotes recounting his experience on formation exercises, the rudimentary conditions
for headquarters staff were as likely to result in poor morale and degraded
123
performance as
the headquarters being rendered inoperable by Soviet military action.
By the middle of the 1970s, the quest to make headquarters more survivable prompted
some major organizational changes to the armoured divisions in Germany. The decision
was taken to eliminate brigades. Independent brigades were now relabelled as a ‘field
force’. Within armoured divisions, brigade headquarters disappeared. This de-layering of
command levels, however, demonstrated
124
in trials irresolvable span of command problems
for the divisional commander. To reintroduce the missing command level, two ‘task
force headquarters’ commanded
125
by brigadiers ‘to exercise direct operational command of
battlegroups’ emerged. The task force could be described as ‘basically a small brigade
of variable size’.126 By the early 1980s, task forces127disappeared quietly with brigades once
PY
again re-entering the British Army order of battle.
In Europe, the BAOR saw its divisions grow increasingly heavierrd and become exclusively
O
armoured or mechanized in the course of the Cold War. Even 3 Division based in the UK
would evolve away from its light, deployable infantry composition to that of a mechanised
C
128
formation. Driven by the nature of the Soviet threat, more mobile and armoured
divisions were seen to maximize the British contribution to NATO as well as being
operationally more relevant to the threat. From the 1970s onward to the end of the Cold
ED
War, the armoured division was the only divisional type deployed in Germany. The
manpower and vehicles possessed by the British Cold War armoured division fluctuated
as a result of a series of reorganizations. In 1946 the armoured division had 17,165 men,
LL
in the late
129
1970s this dropped to 9,336 and by the early 1980s this increased again to
14,900. The numbers of tanks similarly varied over time; 1946 – 338 tanks, 1976-78 –
132 tanks and 1983 – 228-285 tanks. The numbers of brigades in the armoured divisions
O
130
were mainly two but sometimes three in the last decade of the Cold War Increased
firepower and effective combined arms organisation at the unit level meant that the British
TR
armoured division delivered considerably more combat power than its Second World War
counterpart.
N
In the 1960s, the next major revision of doctrine altered the structure of formation doctrine.
Instead of having specific formation doctrine publications for infantry or armoured
O
divisions, a more generic approach was taken 131 with an emphasis on tactical functions
applicable at various formation and unit levels. By the early 1970s, this doctrine evolved
C
to be relabelled ‘formation tactics’ and continued the emphasis on tactical functions as

N
applied ‘at formation, and particularly at brigade level’.132 A separate doctrine publication
discussed command and control at formation level. The 1961 version set out
U
responsibilities and layouts of divisional

133
headquarters within the context of broader
principles of command and control. Its 1969 successor placed more stress on the
123
Maj Gen Mike Reynolds, Soldier at Heart: Private to General, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2013), pp. 221-
222 and pp. 240-241.
124
Armoured Divisions 1938-1991, no date, Army Historical Branch, London.
125
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1977, 31 January 1977, TNA, Kew, CAB 129/194/13, p. 37.
126
Reynolds, Soldier at Heart: Private to General, p. 220.
127
Statement on the Defence Estimates 1981, 16 March 1981, TNA, Kew, CAB 129/24/4, p. 3.7.
128
Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, Leading from the Front: The Autobiography, (London: Bantam Press, 2010), pp. 185-186.
129
Armoured Divisions 1938-1991.
130
Ibid., p. 3.
131
The Land Battle Part 3 Tactics, Non-Nuclear Operations, Army Code No. 9637, Ministry of Defence, 27 May 1964.
132
Land operations, Volume II – Non-Nuclear Operations, Part 1 – Formation Tactics, Army Code No. 70633 (Part 1), Ministry of
Defence, March 1971, p. 1.
133
The Land Battle, Part 2 Command and Control 1961, War Office Code No. 9637 (Part 2), The War Office 3 November 1961,
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Contents Page
problem of dispersal of the divisional headquarters because it was 134

seen to be ‘too large
and vulnerable for all its components to be in the same location’. Overall, 1960s
revision of doctrine moved away from a focus that treated the division as a balanced all
arms formation to a headquarters capability, placed over assigned subordinate formations
and units as required.
Because of the on-going perceived Soviet threat, formation exercises occurred regularly.
Instthe early 1950s some of these took place overseas such as Ex Triangles that pitted the
1 Division against 3rd Division in the Suez Canal zone.135 By the later stages of the Cold
War, divisional exercises took place on a regular basis only in Germany. Some of these
exercises trialled reorganizations of the divisional order of battle.136 Despite the difficulties
encountered in training in Germany due to the damage caused by the exercising of large
bodies of men and vehicles, divisional137exercises kept alive the skills needed to command
and manage a division on operations.
PY
The Cold War saw more preparation for war at the divisional level than actual operational
employment. Nevertheless, the relatively few examples of divisional operations
demonstrated versatility in the roles that a division could undertake. These included an
O
area security role on internal security operations, war fighting in limited war and the
capacity to integrate joint and multinational components into the divisional construct. The
C
most frequent employment of the division was in the area security role or as a
headquarters
th
for internal security and
st
counter-insurgency operations. The deployment of
the 6 Airborne Division and the 1 Division in Palestine in the138closing stages of the British
ED
mandate provides a good example of the division in this role. In such operations the
divisional headquarters’ command and control capability was utilised to manage what was
a mostly static operation covering a defined area. Indeed, as the span of command
LL
widened for a theatre headquarters, the need to insert the divisional layer of command
became necessary as illustrated by operations in Borneo in the 1960s:
O
At the outset of the Confrontation the Director of Operations was also the
Land Force Commander. However, the administrative load placed upon the
TR
Army staff proved too great and needed overhauling. HQ 17 Division was
accordingly brought over to Labaun and the Commander assumed the 139
title of
Commander Land Forces Borneo with single service responsibilities.
N
Although the Joint Theatre Headquarters would eventually absorb 17 Division’s

O
headquarter functions (including staff), Borneo and earlier counter-insurgency operations

demonstrated the value of140the division’s command and control capabilities when applied to
C
other types of operations.

N
Two Cold War conflicts saw the division employed in a war fighting role. The first of these
U
was the multinational

st
Commonwealth Division in the Korean war (1950-1953). The
formation of the 1 Commonwealth Division in July 1951 represents something of a high
134
Land Operations, Volume I – The Fundamentals, Part 2 – Command and Control, Ministry of Defence, 28 April 1969, p. 15.
135
Gen Sir Nigel Poett, Pure Poett, (London: Leo Cooper, 1991), p.110.
136
For example: Ex Quarter Final (8-23 October 1982) in: Statement on the Defence Estimates 1983, (London: Her Majesty’s Stationary
Office, 1983), p. 37.
137
Doctrine even provided guidance on how to manage damaged caused by an exercise, see: Training for War Pamphlet No. 3
Collective Training, Ministry of Defence, 1981, chapter 3.
138
For a description of these operations see: Gen Sir Horatius Murray, ‘A Very Fine Commander’ The Memoirs of General Sir Horatiusth
Murray, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Pen and Sword Books Ltd., 2010), pp. 212-223 and Maj R.D. Wilson, Cordon and Search: With 6
Airborne Division in Palestine, (Aldershot: Gale and Polden Limited, 1949).
139
Joint Report on the Borneo Campaign, 27 January 1967, Army Historical Branch, London.
140
Ibid.
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Contents Page
point in the military cooperation of British and Dominion forces.141 The success and ease
in fielding this multinational formation was built on a strong foundation of common doctrine,
training, equipment and recent shared wartime experience. Organized as an infantry
division, it contained one British and one Canadian brigade with the third ‘Commonwealth’
brigade made up of one Australian and two British battalions.142 In terms of national
components in the division, the United Kingdom provided 58% 143
of the personnel, Canada
(22%), Australia (14%), New Zealand (5%) and India (1%).
Creating the 1st Commonwealth Division meant that Britain and its Commonwealth
partners maximized their influence and autonomy of operation within the wider United
States dominated stUN coalition. Maj Gen A. J. H Cassels resolutely defended the
autonomy of the 1 Commonwealth 144
Division to conduct operations in its own manner
within wider coalition intent. Moreover, he possessed, like many commanders operating
in a multinational coalition, a ‘red card’ where he was able to appeal to his own national (in
PY
this case Commonwealth) chain of command if he was ordered to do145something that would
‘imperil the safety . . . to a degree exceptional in war’ of his division. The experience of
the Commonwealth division does demonstrate that coalition management of a
O
multinational divisional sized formation is likely to take place in two arenas; within the
wider coalition framework and within the coalition present in the division itself.
C
The Falklands war in 1982 provides the second example in the Cold War period of
a division utilized in conventional military operations. The division was an ad hoc formation
ED
and was a division by virtue of the divisional headquarters it provided
th
to the land force
consisting of 3 Commando Brigade and 5 Infantry Brigade. The 5 Infantry Brigade was
added to the land force later in the force generation process and its suitability for the
LL
operation as well as its performance were subsequently questioned.146 Maj Gen Jeremy
Moore, a Royal Marine officer of thirty-five years experience was appointed Commander
Land Forces Falklands Islands (CLFFI) with his command all but a division in name.
O
Although there had been Royal Marine officers who held divisional command during the
world wars, it was a distant historical precedent. The appointment of Jeremy Moore
TR
highlighted the fact that this division would be a joint formation both in terms of its troops
on the ground and its headquarters directing operations. As the Royal Navy was the
critical enabler to the land force, having a Royal Marine like Moore meant having a
N
formation commander who understood the maritime context.147 Moore took with him a
headquarters staff of eighty and operated afloat from HMS Fearless.148 Much as the 1st
O
Commonwealth Division grew out of the operational features and needs of the Korean war,
so too did the joint division that served in the Falklands. Despite the ad hoc quality of the
C
division, it provided essential command and control necessary to bring the land operations
N
to a successful conclusion.
U
In the forty plus years of the Cold War, it is difficult to make generalisations about the
exercise of divisional command as the numbers of divisions deployed operationally
141
Jeffrey Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War: An Alliance Study, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988),
p. 185.
142
Anthony Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the Korean War Volume. II: An Honourable Discharge, (London: HMSO, 1995), pp. 437-
440.
143
Grey, The Commonwealth Armies and the Korean War, p. 104.
144
Lt Gen Sir A. James H. Cassels, ‘The Commonwealth Division in Korea’, The Journal of the Royal United Service Institution, Vol.
XCVIII, No. 591, (August 1953), p. 369.
145
Farrar-Hockley, The British Part in the KoreanthWar Volume. II, p. 442.
146
See: Nicholas van der Bijl and David Aldea, 5 Infantry Brigade in the Falklands, (Barnsley, South Yorkshire: Leo Cooper, 2003).
147
Sir Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign Volume II: War and Diplomacy, (London: Routledge, 2005),
p. 32 and Martin Middlebrook, Operation Corporate: The Falklands War, 1982, (London: Viking, 1985), p. 181.
148
Harry G. Summers Jr., ‘Ground Warfare Lessons’, in: Bruce W. Watson and Peter M. Dunn (eds.), Military Lessons of the Falkland
Islands War: Views from the United States, (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1984), p. 74.
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represents a very small sample. In the relatively few cases of divisional command
exercised in the 1950s, a number of the figures involved would hold multiple division
command appointments. Both Maj Gen A. J. H Cassels and Maj Gen H Murray
commanded divisions latestin the Second World War, again in the internal security role in
Palestine and finally the 1 Commonwealth Division in Korea. A gap of roughly thirty years
would pass before Maj Gen Jeremy Moore would exercise divisional command in the
Falklands. Because active divisions were maintained throughout the Cold War, the large
pool of officers who commanded divisions in the forty plus year period was significant, not
the least for maintaining the competencies necessary for a divisional capability in the
British Army. Apart from the 3rd Division’s development as an air transportable strategic
reserve, most of the organisational development concerned the armoured divisions that
were based in Germany. Despite being relatively small, the operational experience of the
division in the Cold War period served to highlight its versatility in war-fighting, in internal
security/counter insurgency and to operate as a multinational and joint formation.
PY
Post Cold War Division
O
Since 1989, the division has had a prominent place on a number of post Cold War
operations of the British Army. Its operational employment has been driven by a more
C
outward looking global policy of successive governments and the requirements of
stabilisation operations or campaigns conducted against distant regional adversaries. The
numbers of divisions in the British Army’s order of battle was effectively halved from the
ED
four of the late Cold War period to just two active divisions.149 In practice, this force level
has meant that the maximum effort of the British Army was one division for a short rather
than enduring operation.150 Apart from reducing the numbers of active divisions, the end
LL
of the Cold War saw the disappearance of the Soviet threat which was a major driver for
regular formation exercises in Germany. Taking a division’s worth of troops and
equipment on exercise is an expensive business requiring considerable expenditure,
O
training time and large areas of land to exercise on. The end of the Cold War meant that
all of these things would be less available.
TR
The first major post Cold War deployment of a British division was Operation Granby in the
first Gulf war (1990-1991). The decision to build up the United Kingdom’s land contribution
N
to a division was made in November 1990. 1 (UK) Armoured Division, once in theatre,
consisted of 4th and 7th Armoured brigades with considerable additional assets that added
O
151
firepower and provided necessary logistic capabilities. The divisional structure was non-
standard and required much cobbling together of men and equipment from the BAOR to
C
deliver in theatre an operationally effective formation. Given its expeditionary nature, Op

N
Granby saw 34,000 personnel 152

and 14,700 vehicles associated with 1 (UK) Armoured
Division deployed to theatre. As the post operational narrative indicates, the campaign
U
lasted 42 days and actual153

combat operations of the British land force were successfully
concluded in 100 hours. Given the fact that the last time a formation of this size was
employed operationally in the Middle East was the Second World War, there were many
lessons to be learned (or re-learned) not the least regarding sustainment on an
expeditionary operation distant from home base. One major lesson that was re-learned
was one from the Korean War regarding the importance of having a division within a much
149
covering the years 1993-2012.
The Military Balance
150
Strategic Defence Review: Modern Forces for a Modern World, Ministry of Defence, July 1998, p. 32, p, 38 and p. 144 and Securing
Britain in an Age of Uncertainty: The Strategic Defence and Security Review, Ministry of Defence, July 1998, p.25.
151
Operation Granby: An Account of the Gulf Crisis 1990-91 and the British Army’s Contribution to the Liberation of Kuwait, Ministry of
Defence, 1991, pp. 3-3-3-4
152
The manpower figures may be those of the ‘divisional slice’. Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from the Land Perspective, Army Code
71816, 2004, p. 2-7.
153
Operation Granby: An Account of the Gulf Crisis 1990-91 and the British Army’s Contribution to the Liberation of Kuwait, p. 5-20.
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larger coalition structure. Indeed, the British theatre commander, Gen Sir Peter de la
Billière recognised the importance of 1 (UK) Armoured Division providing influence within
the coalition and operational autonomy.154 Op Granby also was the first operational
employment of the British Army’s manoeuvre warfare doctrine and its concept was evident
in the planning of Maj Gen Rupert Smith, GOC 1 (UK) Armoured Division.155 The
functioning of the divisional headquarters was along the lines developed in the late Cold
War with the division having a main and rear headquarters with each having an alternate
backup for survivability.
156
The headquarters were ‘all armoured’ and moved ‘six times’ in the
course of operations. Op Granby also illustrated what was to become a post Cold War
trend of increasing size and complexity of formation headquarters and movement away
from the survivable, mobile and redundant headquarters model of the Cold War. Apart
from Op Granby, in the wake of the first Gulf War, a Royal Marine led task force
(divisional) headquarters deployed to command Operation Haven in northern Iraq. Maj
Gen Robin Ross RM commanded British forces on a humanitarian relief operation
PY
between April and July 1991.157
South East Europe from 1995 to 2005 saw the next major post Cold War British
O
deployment of divisional capability. The conflicts that attended the break-up of Yugoslavia
led to a major international response that included British Army operations within a NATO
C
led international force in Bosnia, Macedonia and Kosovo. In the case of Bosnia, the British
Army eventually provided a divisional headquarters and a brigade to Multinational Division
Southwest (MND-SW) of the NATO led Implementation Force (IFOR) and its successor
ED
Stabilisation Force (SFOR) between 1995 and 2004.158 The role of the NATO-led force in
Bosnia was to conduct a stability operation to enforce and then assist in the consolidation
of the Dayton Peace Agreement. The experience provided by IFOR/SFOR was very
LL
different from the historical multinational British-led divisions of the Peninsula war or Korea
as these multinational formations enjoyed comparatively high levels of cohesion. In
Bosnia, exercising command and control in a multinational formation with a non-
O
warfighting mission, but with numerous national and international actors and agendas to
accommodate meant high levels of complexity159and more obstacles to surmount in
TR
achieving a coherent approach to operations.

The evolving crisis in South East Europe led to Operation Agricola in 1998-1999.
N
Deploying to Macedonia and later to thKosovo were two British Army brigades: initially 4th
Armoured and later reinforced with 5 Airborne. The multinational force assembled in
O
Macedonia was under the command of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) led by Lt
Gen Mike Jackson. The initial role of the NATO force was to secure Macedonia from any
C
expansion of the conflict in Kosovo. This mission evolved into a possible forcible entry into
N
Kosovo or a benign entry as part of an international agreement. The latter option

eventually materialised with the British brigades forming part of the NATO-led Kosovo
U
Force (KFOR). The deployment of British troops amounting to a division did not rd
see them
grouped operationally under a divisional headquarters. When headquarters 3 Division
154
Gen Sir Peter de la Billière, Storm Command: A Personal Account of the Gulf War, (London: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 82.
155
Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 154-155.
156
Maj Gen Rupert Smith, ‘The Land Battle’, in: Command in War: Gulf Operations, Whitehall Paper Series, Royal United Services
Institute for Defence Studies, 1992, pp. 55-57.
157
Maj Gen R Ross, ‘Some Early Lessons from Operation Haven’, The RUSI Journal, Vol. 136, No. 4, (Winter 1991), pp. 19-25.
Similarly, Maj Gen David Pennefather led a Royal Marine supplied administrative headquarter for the Rapid Reaction Force deployed to
support UNPROFOR in Bosnia in 1995. See: Stephen Prince and Kate Brett, ‘Royal Navy Operations off the Former Yugoslavia:
Operation Sharp Guard, 1991-1996’, in: Sandra J. Doyle (ed.), You cannot Surge Trust: Combined Naval Operations of the Royal
Australian Navy, Canadian Navy, Royal Navy, and United States Navy, (Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 2013), p. 72.
158
Michael Clarke and Andrew Duncan, Replacing SFOR in Bosnia:Options for DFOR in 1998, London Defence Studies 43, Centre for
Defence Studies, December 1997, pp. 4-9 and NATO Handbook, Public Diplomacy Division, 2006, pp. 145-147.
159
John Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations, The Royal United Services Institute, Whitehall Report 1-08, (London:
2008), pp. 3-5.
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Contents Page
subsequently deployed to Macedonia, its GOC, 160Maj Gen Richard Dannatt, was in the role
of Commander British Forces (COMBRITFOR). When KFOR moved into Kosovo, the
command and control arrangements were effectively those of a corps headquarters
running a range of multinational formations and units including the two British brigades. In
post operational reports, 4th Armoured and 5th Airborne brigade both identified problems
with the span of command and the need for a divisional headquarters to rectify it.161
The most recent deployment of a British Army Division occurred
th
in Iraq in 2003. In Op
Telic, 1 (UK) Armoured Division had in its order of battle 7 Armoured, 16 Air Assault and
3 Commando Brigade. Manpower for the division amounted to 32,000 accompanied by
15,000 vehicles. The figure of 32,000 may in fact be the ‘divisional slice’ in theatre by
including support elements not formally part of 1 (UK) Division’s order of battle.162 Maj Gen
Robin Brims, GOC 1 (UK) Armoured Division put his manpower strength at around
22,000.163 The division cannot be said to be fully armoured insofar as two of its brigades
PY
were light. In composition the division was also joint as it included 3 Commando Brigade
and some of the division’s manoeuvre was launched from Royal Navy shipping in the
Persian Gulf. As was the case with every British divisional deployment in the post Cold
O
War period, the composition of the division did not follow any standard divisional template.
C
Following on from 1 (UK) Armoured Division was the establishment of a British led
Multinational Division South East (MNDSE) in Iraq from 2003 to 2009. Given the duration
of the operation, one of the key challenges facing the UK was sustaining the headquarters
ED
of MNDSE on the base of only two active British Army divisions. MNDSE had a
stabilization mission which included countering insurgents and factional militias. At its peak
strength, the Division contained a British brigade, an Italian brigade (with a Romanian
LL
component), and a series of battlegroups supplied by Australia, Denmark and Holland

along with smaller contingents from other countries. This multinational division was run
along similar lines to that of SFOR in Southeast Europe but included more than simply
O
coalition military forces. MNDSE integrated civilian agencies of coalition members, Iraqi
local authorities and indigenous Iraqi security forces giving the division a wider command
TR
and control challenge that went well beyond purely military matters. Such an array of
civilian and military partners represented a step change in the complexity of activity 164
undertaken by a British divisional headquarters engaged in a stabilization operation.
N
Doctrine for the division followed the trajectory of the late Cold War Army Field Manuals
O
under the rubric of Formation Tactics. The structure of the doctrine combined issues of
command with tactical functions at the formation level in the first post Cold War revision of
C
165
Formation Tactics in 2002. The next revision of Formation Tactics followed the same166
N
pattern with stability operations added reflecting post Cold War operational experience.
The most radical change to the structure of divisional doctrine, however, began in 2010
U
with Formation Tactics starting to be replaced by two separate pamphlets for brigade and
division. This approach marked a return to specific doctrine for the division that was last
160
Gen Sir Richard Dannatt, Leading from the Front: The Autobiography, (London: Bantam Press, 2010), p. 189 and Gen Sir Mike
Jackson, Soldier: Theth Autobiography of General Sir Mike Jackson, (London: Bantam Press, 2007), p. 245.
161
Brig W.R. Rollo, 4 Armoured Brigade Post Operational Report Op AGRICOLA, February-August 1999, 14 July 1999 and Brig A.R.
Freer, 5th
Airborne Brigade Post Operational Report Op AGRICOLA, 6 June-14 July 1999, 14 July 1999, Army Historical Branch.
162
Operations in Iraq: An Analysis from the Land Perspective, Army Code 71816, 2004, p. 2-7.
163
Maj Gen Robin Brims, ‘Operation TELIC and the British Army in the Iraq Campaign of 2003: A Personal View’, Australian Army
Journal, Volume III, Number 1, (Winter 2004-2005), p. 96.
164
Operations in Iraq January 2005 – May 2009 (Op TELIC 5-13): An Analysis from the Land Perspective, Army Code 71937, Ministry
of Defence, 29 November 2010, pp. 7-8.
165
Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 1 Formation Tactics (Provisional Edition), Army Code 71587 (Revised
2002), Ministry of Defence, 2002.
166
Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 1 Formation Tactics, Army Code 71587, Ministry of Defence, Issue
2.0, July 2012.
4-25
Contents Page
utilized in the Army doctrine pamphlets of the 1950s. More ground-breaking, however,
was the introduction of the introduction of a dedicated pamphlet for the brigade - a first in
the history of British Army doctrine. 167
Historical Insights: The Division in the British Army
For over two hundred years the division has served in the order of battle of the British
Army. In the period from the Napoleonic wars to the Boer war, the division was somewhat
ephemeral entity insofar as it only existed in wartime. In the twentieth century, the division
became an established formation in peacetime and gained a substantial legacy of wartime
experience and well developed doctrine to guide its command and employment. Indeed
the last two centuries have provided the division in the British Army with a remarkable
diversity of operational experience in multiple environments and against a range of
conventional and unconventional adversaries. The question, however, remains as to what
PY
historical insights can be identified from the history of the division in the British Army?
O
The Bespoke Division
The division in the nineteenth century was an ad hoc formation, created only after the
C
outbreak of conflict and fielded with a variety of structures and strengths. The world wars
saw a largely successful standardization of the divisional structure even if it included
multiple types and would evolve in response to operational experience. Since the end of
ED
the Second World War, however, the British Army has tended to deploy bespoke divisions,
irrespective of the existing organizational template. In the Cold War, both examples of
warfighting divisions in the Korean and Falklands wars were shaped by the circumstances
LL
of the campaign with the former conflict producing a unique multinational formation and the
latter conflict an improvised joint formation. Both of these examples underscore how
integrating allies, partners and other fighting services can be difficult to template and may
O
require tailored solutions. In the succession of campaigns since the end of the Cold War,
British divisions fielded in their orders of battle a mixture of brigade types: the first Gulf
TR
War (1990-91) armoured + mechanised, Macedonia-Kosovo (1999) armoured + airborne

and in the second Gulf War (2003) armoured + air assault + commando. Although this
pattern does not match the improvisation attending the generation of the division in the
N
nineteenth century, it does have implications insofar as it runs counter to the benefits
accrued by training together and having continuity in structures. In striking a balance
O
between continuity in structures and tailoring a division to campaign requirements, a

standard divisional structure might be made larger but more flexible with a wider pool of
C
brigades types available to shape the divisional order of battle as circumstances and the
N
nature of the operation dictates.

U
The Multinational Division
It is striking how the multinational division has been a reoccurring feature in the history of
the British Army. Indeed, when Wellington established the division in the Army’s order of
battle during the Peninsula campaign, one of the key attributes of the majority of his
formations was the inclusion of a Portuguese brigade. Although the divisions of the Indian
Army and other Imperial formations have been beyond the scope of this paper, they
represent a continuity element insofar as they integrated indigenous and British troops into
effective fighting formations. The Commonwealth Division in the Korean War represents
something of an apogee of collaboration between Britain and the Dominions but was a
167
Army Field Manual Volume 1 Combined Arms Operations, Part 1B Brigade Tactics, Army Code 71982 (2012) , Ministry of Defence,
Issue 2.0, July 2007.
4-26
Contents Page
highly successful integration of British troops with those of other countries down to the unit
level. Since the end of the Cold War, the British Army has been involved in leading
multinational formations on operations in Bosnia and Iraq in the 1990s and 2000s. These
multinational formations have been markedly different in construction than those of earlier
periods having a much smaller British contribution as a proportion of the division. These
divisions included a larger range of national contributors with the concomitant increase in
complexity and divergent military practice to be integrated on operations. What the
historical legacy the multinational division in the British Army indicates are two very
different models of such a formation. The first is that of a highly integrated formation with
common doctrine, capabilities and a high degree of interoperability both in terms of
materiel and culture. The second is that of a complex and less coherent organization
where the application of doctrine, command and control is less directive than consensual
in practice. The first may be more preferable to work with from a military point of view but
the second is more likely to arise if recent operations are any indication of future trends.
PY
Integrated Division
O
The complexity of actors to be incorporated into a division had grown beyond the
multinational dimension in recent conflicts. It is also important to note that the division
C
historically has not operated in isolation from the other two armed services. Indeed, as the
Falklands in 1982 and Iraq in 2003 demonstrate the division can be thought of in varying
degrees as a joint formation. The addition of more layers of complexity in recent
ED
operational experience means that the division now embraces more actors including UK
government agencies and organizations of other countries. This is the product of the
emergence of the combined, joint, intra-governmental, inter-agency and multinational
LL
(CJIIM) environment. The implications of this shift in operational environment are

significant for the capabilities of the division as stressed in the Future Land Operating
Concept:
O
The land component will operate in a CJIIM environment and must be able to
TR
fuse and share situational awareness by contributing to a common operating

picture. This will be enabled through long-standing relationships with other
government departments and cross-government bodies that must all
N
routinely train together.168

O
The emergence of what can be termed the Integrated Division with its new levels of
complexity and including as it does a mixture of national and international, civilian and
C
military actors, is something new and outside the broad historical experience of the
N
division in the British Army. The division has been designed to relieve its subordinate
formations of the impact of complexity but at some point this complexity may become too
U
great for the division to deal with. At this stage divisional commanders will need to
consider elevating responsibility for complexity to the next level of command, transferring it
to a CJIIM actor or mitigating the effect.
Divisional Command and Doctrine
It is difficult to generalize on the nature of divisional command in the British Army in the
past two centuries. In part this is because the exercise of leadership at all levels of
command has similar core attributes that will apply whether one is commanding a platoon
or a division. Determining the specific factors and problems associated with the divisional
Joint Concept Note 2/12 Future Land Operating Concept, The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, Ministry of Defence,
168
May 2012, p. 2-20.
4-27
Contents Page
level of command is a more challenging task because of a relative lack of empirical studies
to draw on. Former divisional commanders in their memoirs seldom reflect on their
experiences and, as noted in the introduction, it has not been the subject of much
academic study. A detailed examination of the nature of divisional command in the
Second World War and Cold War could draw on a large sampling command appointments
and operational experiences to gain historical insight but such detailed academic (or
official) work has yet to be undertaken. What can be said about the nature of divisional
command is that it has grown more complex in the last two 169
centuries and requires the
cultivation of attributes that go well beyond military ones.
Doctrine for the division first emerged and was consolidated in the two world wars and
continued to develop from this formative base. Divisional doctrine has ebbed and flowed
around several conceptual approaches. As a result of the experience of the world wars,
doctrine focused on the division as a balanced tactical entity that was fought as a unified
PY
body on operations. In the Cold War period, doctrine would shift away from a purely
unitary formation focus to develop conceptual thinking that emphasized the division as a
headquarters capability to be placed over a mix of subordinate formations and units that
O
were more self-contained having been given what were previously centrally controlled
divisional assets. This doctrinal approach had utility whether a division was engaged in
C
warfighting or an internal security/counter insurgency operation providing area security.
Later, doctrine shifted to the ‘formation’ rubric that emphasized common tactical functions
for both brigade and division. Doctrine, however, seems to have come the full circle to be
ED
once again division specific although now addressing the complexity shaping divisional
operations.
LL
The Division as an Instrument of Military Power

The enduring utility of the division is undoubtedly grounded in its versatility as a formation.
O
As stressed at the outset of this paper, the division is a flexible enough military instrument
to be fought as a unified tactical or operational entity, to function in an area security role in
TR
a counter-insurgency campaign or as a headquarters capability orchestrating stabilization

operations in the increasingly complex CJIIM environment. More significant, however, is
the division as a national instrument of land power. Globally, only about twenty-nine states
N
can claim to have functioning divisions in their orders of battle. The vast majority of these
divisional capabilities are limited to a territorial defence role or to serve as larger
O
administrative bodies akin to military districts. Countries that have the capacity to deploy
and operate a division outside national territory are comparatively few. Based on
C
demonstrated capability, only about three states can deploy divisions outside their national
N
territory but only in areas contiguous to national frontiers. A similar small number of states
can lay claim to the capability of170deploying a division in the wider global arena and the
U
United Kingdom is one of them. From a historical perspective, this enduring and unique
divisional capability provides the United Kingdom with an important instrument of national
military power.
169
Lt Gen Nick Carter, ‘The Divisional Level of Command’, The British Army Review, Number 157, (Summer 2013), pp. 14-17 and
Kiszely, Coalition Command in Contemporary Operations, pp. 21-24.
170
Data on divisional capability compiled from: The Military Balance 2012, (London: The International Institute of Strategic Studies,
2012).
4-28
Contents Page
INDEX
Subject Page
1-2-4 hour principle 2-32,
1 Artillery Brigade
st
1-10, 1-11,
1st Intelligence Surveillance and 1-12, 2-27, 2-28,
Reconnaissance Brigade
1stst Military Police Brigade 1-12, 2-12, 3-D-1-1,
1nd (UK) Division 1-9, 1-10, 1-11, 2-31,
2rd Medical Brigade 1-12,
3 (UK) Division 1-9, 1-10, 1-11,
4Ds 2-34,
7 Air Assault Battalion REME 2-31,
PY
7 Signal Group 1-11,
8 Engineer Brigade 1-11,
8 Field Company (Parachute) 2-31,
O
11thth Signal Brigade 1-11,
16th Air Assault Brigade 1-12, 2-32,
C
16 Medical Regiment 2-32,
101 Logistic Brigade 1-11, 2-31,
102 Logistic Brigade ED 1-11, 2-31,
A
LL
ACOS Sustain 2-9, 2-30,

Adaptable Force (AF) 1-9,
Advance to Contact 3-D-1, 3-D-3-1,
O
- Principles 3-D-3-1,
African Union 2-2,
TR
Air 2-1,
Air Command 2-2,
Air Component 2-2, 2-18, 2-23, 2-25,
N
Air Component Commander 2-25,

Air Component Command HQ
O
Air Defence (AD) 1-11, 2-18, 2-19,

- Active AD 2-18,
C
- Close Air Defence (CAD) Regiment 2-18,

- Defensive Counter Air (DCA) 2-18,
N
- Divisional Air Defence Cell (DADC) 2-18,

U
- Ground Based Air Defence (GBAD) 1-11, 2-18, 2-19,

- Joint Force Air Defence Commander 2-18,
- Passive AD 2-18,
- Short Range Air Defence (SHORAD) 2-18,
Air Interdiction (AI) 2-26,
Air Land Integration 2-15, 2-23, 2-25,
Air Manoeuvre (AM) 1-11, 2-15,
- Air Assault Brigade 2-15,
- Air Assault Task Force 2-15,
- Attack Helicopters (AH) 2-16, 2-17, 2-23,
- Capabilities 2-15, 2-26,
- Force elements 1-9, 1-12,
Index - 1
Contents Page
- ISTAR 2-15,
- Joint Aviation Group 1-12,
- Joint Helicopter Force 1-12,
- Planning and Advisory Team (AMPTAT) 2-16,
- Planning Considerations 2-16,
Air Point of Departure (APOD) 2-35,
Air Support Operations Centre (ASOC) 2-23, 2-25, 2-26,
Air Tasking Order (ATO) 2-25, 2-26,
Airspace Management 2-10,
Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) 1-3,
Amphibious 2-2,
- Planning Cell 2-2,
Anglo French CJEF 1-4,
Armoured Cavalry Regiments 3-D-1-1,
PY
Armoured Close Support Battalions (REME) 1-11,
Armoured Medical Regiments 1-11,
Army 2020 1-1, 1-9,
O
- Structure 1-9,
Artillery 1-10, 2-16, 2-18, 2-23,
C
- Fire Support Teams (FST) 3-D-1-1,
- Manoeuvre Areas (AMA) 2-24,
Assistant Commander Medical ED 2-32,
Aviation 2-23, 3-D-3-1,
- Attack 2-23,
- Capabilities 2-26
LL
- Reconnaissance 2-28, 3-D-1-1, 3-D-1-3,

- Support 2-31,
O
B
TR
Battle
- Close 1-5, 2-1, 2-3,
- Deep 1-5, 1-8, 2-1, 2-5, 2-23,
N
- Of the narratives 1-2, 1-6,

- Rear 1-5, 2-1,
O
Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) 2-25, 3-D-1-1,

Battlefield Area Evaluation (BAE) 2-27,
C
Battlefield Helicopters (BH) 2-16,

Battlespace 2-15,
N
Battlespace Area Evaluation (BAE) 3-D-2-2,

U
Battlespace Management 2-5, 2-10, 2-16, 2-24, 3-D-1-2,

Behaviour(s) 1-6,
Breaching Actions 3-D-9-2,
Bridgehead 3-D-9-2,
Brigade(s)
- Artillery 1-10,
- Combat 1-4, 1-10,
- Delivery of tactical effect 1-4,
- Engineer 1-11,
- Focus 1-4,
- Sustainment 1-11,
Index - 2
Contents Page
C
Campaign Authority 2-22,
Campaign legitimacy 2-1, 2-2, 2-20, 2-21,
Campaign Narrative 2-22, 2-25,
Capacity building 1-7,
Captured Persons (CPERS) 2-12, 2-13, 3-D-2-2, 3-G-1,
- Prohibited Techniques 3-G-1,
- Risk Mitigation 3-G-2,
- SO3 CPERS 3-G-1, 3-G-2,
Carter, Major General Nick 1-6,
Carter, Lieutenant General Nick 2-14, 3-C-1-3,
CBRN 2-19, 2-28, 2-34, 3-D-1-2, 3-D-9-1,
- Toxic Industrial Materials (TIM) 2-19,
PY
Civil Affairs 1-12,
CJIIM 1-8, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 3-C-3, 3-D-2-2, 3-D-6-1,
- Command authority 2-3,
O
- Coordination 2-3,
- Integration 1-8, 2-15, 2-21, 2-B-1,
C
Close Air Support (CAS) 2-23, 2-26,
Close Reconnaissance 3-D-1-1,
Close Support (CS) ED 2-23,
- Artillery Regiments 1-10,
- Engineer Regiments 1-11, 3-D-1-1,
- Logistic Regiments (CSLR) 1-11, 2-31,
LL
- Battalions (REME) 1-11, 2-31,

Coalition 2-20, 2-22,
- ICS 2-12,
O
- Management 2-3,
- Partners 2-1,
TR
Collateral Damage 2-22,

Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) 2-25,
- Negative Second Order Effects 2-25,
N
Combat Identification 2-20, 3-D-1-3,

Combat Service Support (CSS) 2-16, 2-30, 2-33,
O
- Estimate 2-33,
- Factors 2-34,
C
- Framework 2-34,
Combat Support (CS) 2-16,
N
Combined 2-1, 2-B-1,

U
Combined Air Operations Centre 2-26,

Combined Arms Obstacle Integration 3-1, 3-E-1,
(CAOI)
- Principles 3-E-1,
Command 2-3,
- Authority 2-3,
- Divisional level of 1-3, 2-4,
- Span of 1-4,
- Support 1-11, 2-10,
- Tactical function 2-3,
Commander(s) 2-3,
- As an operator 2-4,
Index - 3
Contents Page
- Information requirements 2-3,

- National contingent 2-4,
- Role of the 2-3,
- Personal involvement 2-4,
Commander’s Initiative Group 2-11,
Commando Logistic Regiment 2-31,
Components
- Air 1-3,
- Land 1-3, 1-4,
- Logistic 1-3,
- Maritime 1-3,
- Special Operations 1-3,
Composite Air Operation (COMAO) 2-27,
Computer Network Defence (CND) 3-D-2-3,
PY
Consequence Management 2-1, 2-22, 2-25,
Contemporary Operating Environment 2-23,
(COE)
O
Contractor support 2-4, 2-13,
Control of Demolitions 3-1,
C
Core Functions (Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit) 2-15,
Corps 1-3,
COS ED 2-9, 2-10, 2-11,
- as the Senior Information Officer 2-28,
Counter Command Activity 1-6,
Counter Battery 2-24,
LL
Counter Improvised Explosive Devices (C- 2-21,

IED)
- Attack the Network 2-21,
O
- Defeat the Device 2-21,

- Prepare the Force 2-21,
TR
Counter Indirect Fire (C-IDF) 2-19,

Counter Insurgency (COIN) 3-C-4,
Counter Intelligence (CI) 3-D-2-3,
N
Counter Rocket, Artillery and Mortar 2-19,

(C-RAM)
O
Crossing and Breaching of Obstacles 3-D-1, 3-D-9-1,

C
Crossing Area 3-D-9-1,

- Advisor (CULAD) 3-C-3,
N
Cyber 2-14, 2-20, 3-D-2-3,

U
- Roles 2-20,
- Security 2-20,
- Threats 2-20,
Cyberspace 2-20,
D
DCOM 2-9,
DCOM Command Support 1-11,
DCOM Engineering 2-10,
DCOM Information and Communication 2-9,
Services
Index - 4
Contents Page
DCOM Intelligence and Surveillance 2-10,

DCOM Joint Fires and Information 1-11, 2-9, 2-18, 2-23, 2-25,
Decision / Action Cycle 1-4, 2-9,
Decision Support Cell 2-11,
Decisive Act 2-1,
Defence Engagement 1-9, 1-10,
Defensive Actions 3-1, 3-B-1,
- Area Defence 3-B-2,
- Mobile Defence 3-B-1,
Delaying Actions 3-B-2, 3-D-9-2,
- Delay from Alternate Positions 3-B-2,
- Delay from Successive Positions 3-B-3,
Demolition(s)
- Authorised Commander 3-F-1,
PY
- Changes of State 3-F-2,
- Control of 3-F-1,
- Documentation 3-F-1,
O
- Firing Party 3-F-1,
- Guard 3-F-1, 3-F-2,
C
- Preliminary 3-F-1, 3-F-2,
- Procedures 3-F-1,
- Reserved ED 3-F-1, 3-F-2,
Deployment Sequence 2-12,
Detention Authority 2-11, 3-G-1,
Dimensions 1-1, 2-10, 2-14, 2-A-2,
LL
Disarmament Demobilisation and 3-C-10,

Reintegration (DDR)
Disaster Relief 3-C-1,
O
Division(al) 1-3,
- Air Liaison Officer (DALO) 3-D-1-3,
TR
- Employment 1-4,
- Information Services 2-11, 2-12,
- Focus 1-3,
N
- Headquarters 1-10, 1-11, 2-5

- Advance 2-6,
O
- Forward 2-5, 2-6, 2-13,

- Main 1-11, 2-5, 2-6, 2-9, 2-13, 2-30,
C
- Processes 2-7,
- Roles and responsibilities 1-4,
N
- Staff 2-8,
U
- Step Up 2-6,
- Tactical 2-5, 2-6, 2-13,
- Level 1-4, 2-4,
- Scalable 1-4, 1-10,
- Standing Operating Instructions (SOIs) 2-7,
- Support Unit 2-13,
- Versatility 1-4,
Domains 1-1, 2-1, 2-10, 2-14, 2-A-1,
- Physical 1-1, 1-7, 2-1, 2-7, 2-10, 2-13, 2-15, 2-30,
2-A-1,
- Virtual 1-1, 1-7, 2-5, 2-7, 2-10, 2-13, 2-15, 2-30,
2-A-1,
Index - 5
Contents Page
- Cognitive 1-1, 1-7, 2-1, 2-7, 2-10, 2-13, 2-15, 2-17,

2-A-1,
Domestic Support 2-22,
E
Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS) 2-20, 2-23,
- Blue on Blue 2-20,
Electronic Attack 2-13,
Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) 2-20, 3-D-2-1,
Electronic Warfare (EW) 1-12, 2-14, 2-22, 2-23, 2-28, 3-D-1-2,
Electronic Warfare Signals Intelligence 2-28,
(EWSI)
Enabling Actions 3-1, 3-D-1,
PY
Engineer Reconnaissance 2-13,
Engineers 1-11, 3-D-1-1,
Equipment Support 1-11, 2-31,
O
- Armoured Close Support Battalion 1-11, 1-9,
- Aviation Support 2-32,
C
- Force Support (FS) Battalion 1-11,
- Principles 2-31,
European Union (EU) ED 2-2,
Evacuation of Casualties 2-34,
Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) 1-11,
LL
F
Field Hospital 1-12, 2-32,
O
Firepower 2-22, 2-23, 3-C-4, 3-D-1-2,

- Area Fires 2-23,
TR
- Concentration 2-23,
- Fire Support Teams (FST) 2-23, 2-24,
- Naval Gunfire Support 2-23,
N
- Precision Strike 1-6, 1-10, 2-23,

- Tactical Function 2-22,
O
Fire Support Coordination Line (FSCL) 2-26, 3-D-1-2,

Fire Support Coordination Measures 2-24,
C
(FSCM)
Fires 1-6, 1-7, 2-14, 2-15, 2-22,
N
- Concentration 2-15,
U
- Matching to Targets 2-24,

- Switching 2-15,
Force Logistic Regiments (FLR) 1-11, 2-31,
Force Protection 3-2-1-1,
Force Support (FS)
- Battalion (REME) 1-11, 2-32,
- Engineer Regiment 1-11,
Force Troops 2-6,
Force Troops Command (FTC) 1-9, 1-10, 3-C-3, 3-D-1-1,
Forward Passage of Lines 3-D-6-1,
Forward Repair 2-34,
Forward Support Group (FSG) 2-12, 2-31,
Index - 6
Contents Page
Friendly Fire 2-20,

Functional Cells 2-7, 2-8,
Functional Commanders 2-7,
Functional Points of Entry 2-8,
G
Gearing 1-1,
- Operational 1-1, 1-3, 1-4,
Gender 1-12,
Geographic Cell 2-27,
Geographical Framework (Deep, Close, 2-10, 2-14, 2-23,
Rear)
Geospatial Information (GEOINF) 2-27,
PY
Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) 2-27,
Ground Manned Reconnaissance 3-D-1-2,
O
H
C
Hierarchy of wisdom 1-1, 2-8,
Host Nation 2-1, 2-3, 2-12, 2-14, 3-C-2, 3-C-3, 3-C-4,
ED 3-C-5, 3-C-6, 3-C-7, 3-C-8, 3-C-9, 3-C-10,
Human Intelligence (HUMINT) 2-28, 3-C-4, 3-D-2-2, 3-D-3-1,
Humanitarian Relief 3-C-1,
LL
I
Immediate Replenishment Groups (IRG) 2-31,
O
Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 3-D-2-1, 3-D-9-1, 3-D-9-2,

Indigenous Security Forces 3-C-4, 3-C-8, 3-C-9,
TR
Influence 1-6, 1-7, 1-8, 2-4, 2-13, 2-22, 2-25, 2-27,

2-28, 3-D-2-3,
Information Activities and Outreach (IA&O) 1-7, 2-9, 2-10, 2-13, 2-14, 2-15, 2-22, 2-23,
N
2-24, 3-C-4,
Information Activity (IA) 2-5,
O
Information and Intelligence 3-D-1-2,

C
Information Exploitation (IX) 2-27, 2-28,

Information Gathering Assets 2-28,
N
Information Management (IM) 2-27, 2-28,

U
- Processing and Fusion 2-28,

Information Operations 1-5, 2-5,
Information Requirements (IR) 2-28,
Information Services 2-11, 2-12,
Infrastructure Support 1-8,
Initial Restoration of Essential Services 3-C-1, 3-C-5,
Integrating Cells 2-7, 2-8, 2-9, 2-28, 2-30,
- CuOps 2-7, 2-9, 2-16, 2-18, 2-25, 2-28,
- FuOps 2-7, 2-9, 2-16, 2-18, 2-25, 2-28,
- FuPlans 2-7, 2-9, 2-16, 2-18, 2-25, 2-28,
Integration 1-6, 2-1, 2-2, 2-3, 2-5, 2-7, 2-10,
- Air and Aviation 2-25,
Index - 7
Contents Page
- Challenge of 2-2,
- CIS 2-3,
- CJIIM 2-9, 2-15, 2-B-1,
- Communication 2-2,
- Inter Agency 2-4,
- Narratives 2-3,
Intelligence 1-12, 2-7, 2-27,
- Cycle 2-27,
Intelligence Preparation of the Environment 2-19,
(IPE)
Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition 1-12,
and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)
Inter Agency 2-2, 2-B-2,
Inter Governmental 2-2, 2-B-2,
PY
Interim Governance Tasks 3-C-1, 3-C-6,
Interoperability 2-2, 2-3, 2-7, 2-11, 2-24,
ISTAR 2-7, 2-9, 2-16, 2-17, 2-19, 2-24, 2-25, 2-27,
O
2-28, 2-29, 3-D-1-1, 3-D-1-2, 3-D-2-1,
3-D-2-2, 3-D-4-1,
C
- Base 2-28,
- Planning Considerations ED 2-28, 2-29,
J
Joint 2-1, 2-4, 2-B-1,

LL
Joint Action 1-7, 2-5, 2-7, 2-10, 2-14, 2-25,

- Model 1-5, 2-22,
Joint Aviation Group (JAG) 1-12, 2-16,
O
Joint Effects 2-5, 2-9, 2-22, 2-23,

- Fusion of fires and IA&O 2-10,
TR
- Integration 2-10,
- Joint Effects Cell 2-24,
- Psychological Methods 2-22, 2-23,
N
Joint Fires 1-8, 1-10, 2-13, 2-23, 2-24, 3-D-4-1,

- Integration 1-8, 2-23, 2-24,
O
Joint Fires and Influence Group 2-9, 2-23,

Joint Force Logistic Component (JFLogC) 2-32, 2-34, 2-35,
C
Joint Helicopter Command (JHC) 1-9,

Joint Helicopter Force (JHF) 1-12, 2-16, 2-23, 3-D-1-1,
N
- Roles 2-16,
U
Joint Operational Area (JOA) 2-33,

Joint Prioritised Defended Asset List 2-18,
(JPDAL)
Joint Supply Area (JSA) 1-12, 2-35,
Joint Task Force (JTF) 1-3, 2-8,
- Joint Task Force HQ 1-4, 2-32,
K
Key Enablers 2-6,

Key leader Engagement (KLE) 1-6, 2-14, 3-C-4,
Index - 8
Contents Page
Land Component 2-25,

Latawski, Dr Paul 4-1,
Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) 2-24,
- Principles 2-24,
Level of the Fight, the 1-8, 2-4,
Liaison Officers 2-11,
Light Cavalry Regiments 3-D-1-1,
Link Up 3-D-1, 3-D-5-1,
Logistic 1-11,
- Brigade Commander 2-30,
- Close Support Logistic Regiments 1-11, 2-31,
(CSLR)
PY
- Force Logistic Regiments (FLR) 1-11, 2-31,
- Lead Nation (LLN) 2-35,
- Principles 2-32,
O
- Theatre Support Logistic Regiments 1-11,
(TLR)
C
Long Range Patrols (LRP) 3-D-1-1, 3-D-3-1,
M
ED
Manoeuvre 1-1, 1-3, 1-4, 1-7, 1-9, 1-11, 2-19, 1-5, 1-6,
1-7, 1-8, 1-10, 1-11, 1-12, 2-5, 2-8, 2-13,
LL
2-14, 2-17, 2-22, 2-23, 3-C-5, 3-D-1-2,

- Air 1-10, 1-11, 2-15,
- Challenge of sustaining 2-14,
O
- Forms of 2-14,
- Ground 2-15,
TR
- Integrated 2-15,
- Littoral 2-23,
- Support 2-15, 2-21,
N

Manoeuvrist Approach 2-22,
O
March 3-D-1, 3-D-8-1,

Maritime 2-2,
C
- Air 2-2,
- Component 2-2,
N
- Component Command HQ 2-2,

U
Measurement of Effect (MoE) 2-25,

MEDEVAC 3-D-1-3,
Media 1-12, 2-5, 2-14, 2-22, 3-D-2-3,
Medical 1-11, 1-12, 2-32,
- Field Hospital 1-12, 2-32,
- Regiments 1-11, 2-32,
- Support 2-32, 2-34,
Meeting Engagement 3-D-1, 3-D-4-1,
Messaging 2-1,
Military Aid to Civil Effects (MACE) 3-C-4,
Military Intelligence (MI) 1-9,
Index - 9
Contents Page
Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion 2-28,

Military Police (MP) 1-12, 2-13, 2-22, 3-D-1-1, 3-D-8-1,
Military Provost Service (MPS) 2-13,
Mission Threads 2-12,
Modular Approach 2-6,
Montgomery, Field Marshal Viscount 3 E-1,
Mosaic of Conflict 1-2, 1-6,
Multinational 2-2, 2-4, 2-B-3,
- Integrated Logistic Units (MILU) 2-35,
- Logistic Considerations 2-35,
- Operations 2-2,
- Risk 2-5,
Multi Role Signal Regiments (MRSR) 1-11, 2-10,
PY
N
National Caveats 2-4,
O
National Support Elements (NSE) 2-33, 2-35,
NATO Force Structure Joint Task Force 1-3,
C
Naval Gunfire Support (NGS) 2-23,
Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations 3-C-1,
(NEO) ED
O
LL
Obstacle Control Measures 3-E-6,

- Belts 3-E-6,
- Groups 3-E-6,
O
- Zones 3-E-6,
Obstacle Effects 3-E-3,
TR
- Block 3-E-5,
- Disrupt 3-E-3,
- Fix 3-E-4,
N
- Turn 3-E-4,
Obstacle Recording and Numbering 3-E-6,
O
Obstacles 3-E-2,
- Protective 3-E-2,
C
- Reinforcing 3-E-2,
- Tactical 3-E-2,
N
Offensive Action(s) 1-8, 3-1, 3-A-1,

U
Offensive Support (OS) 3-D-4-1,

Offensive Support Group (OSG) 1-10, 2-18,
Operational CIS (OpCIS) 2-11,
Operational Intelligence Support Group 2-28,
(OISG)
Operational Security (OPSEC) 3-D-2-1, 3-D-2-2,
Organisation for Security and Cooperation 2-2,
in Europe (OSCE)
P
Partners Across Government (PAGs) 2-9, 2-28,

Index -10
Contents Page
Peace Support Operations (PSO) 3-C-1,

People centric approach 1-5, 1-7,
Perceptions 1-6, 1-7,
Phase 0 1-9,
Physical Security 3-D-2-1,
Plan, Refine, Execute, Evaluate (PREE) 2-7, 2-8, 2-10,
Plug and Socket 2-6, 2-7,
Policy Advisor (POLAD) 2-9,
Port and Maritime 2-31,
Postal and Courier 2-31,
Protect the Population 3-C-4,
Protection 2-17, 2-32, 2-34, 3-D-1-3,
- Force Protection 2-17, 2-21, 3-C-4,
- Operational Security (OPSEC) 2-17,
PY
- Physical protection 2-21,
- Reputational protection 2-17, 2-20, 2-21, 3-C-4,
O
Psychological Operations (PsyOps) 1-12,
Psychological Methods 2-22, 2-23,
C
Psychological Support Element (PSE) 2-23,
R
ED
Rail Point of Departure (RPOD) 2-35,
Reachback 2-6,
LL
Reaction Force (RF) 1-9, 2-31,

Readiness 1-9, 1-10,
Real Life Support (RLS) 2-13,
O
- Divisional Support Unit (DSU) 2-13,

Rear Area Security 2-34,
TR
Rear Area Surveillance Plan 2-34,

Rearward Passage of Lines 3-D-6-1,
Reconnaissance
N
- Assets 3-D-1-1,
- Enabling Action 3-D-1,
O
- Planning Considerations 3-D-1-2,

Red Team 2-11,
C
Regeneration 2-35,
Rehabilitation 2-34, 2-35,
N
Relationships 2-6,
U
Relief in Place 3-D-6-1,

Relief of Troops 3-D-1, 3-D-6-1,
Requests for Information (RFI) 2-28,
Replenishment 2-34,
Risk 2-4,
- Appetite 2-5, 2-17, 2-22,
- Assessment 2-22,
- Authority to Manage 2-5,
- Culture 2-5,
- Management 2-5,
- Multinational 2-5,
- Sustainment 2-30,
Index -11
Contents Page
- Understanding 2-5,
Rule of Law 3-C-7,
Rules of Engagement (ROE) 2-3, 2-22, 3-C-4,
S
Scalable 2-6,
Sea Point of Departure (SPOD) 2-35,
Security 3-D-1, 3-D-2-1,
- Planning Considerations 3-D-2-2,
Security and Control 3-C-1, 3-C-5,
Security Assistance Group (SAG) 1-12, 2-15, 3-C-3,
Security Sector Reform (SSR) 3-C-1, 3-C-3, 3-C-8,
PY
Service Justice System 1-12,
Shaping 2-1,
Shaw, Major General Jonathan 1-8,
O
Signal Intelligence (SIGINT) 2-28, 3-C-4, 3-D-1-2,
Slim, Field Marshal Viscount 3-A-1-8,
C
Smith, General Sir Rupert 1-5, 2-4, 3-D-3-4, 3-D-3-5,
Special Forces (SF) 2-2, 2-28,
Specialist Investigation ED 2-13,
Stabilisation 1-7,
- Advisor (STABAD) 3-C-3,
- Planning Considerations 3-C-3,
LL
- Unit (SU) 3-C-9,

Stabilising Actions 3-1, 3-C-1,
- Principles 3-C-1
O
Standing Operating Instructions (SOI) 2-7,

Support to Governance 1-7,
TR
Support to Security Sector Reform (SSR) 3-C-1,

Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) 2-26,
Surveillance 1-12,
N
Surveillance and Target Acquisition (STA) 1-8, 1-12,

Sustain Cell 2-9,
O
Sustainment 2-29, 2-30, 3-D-1-3,

- CSS Estimate 2-33,
C
- CSS Factors 2-34,

- CSS Framework 2-34,
N
- Forward Support Group (FSG) 1-12, 2-31,

U
- Functional Areas 2-30,

- Joint Supply Area (JSA) 1-9,
- Planning Considerations 2-34,
- Priorities 2-34,
- Protection 2-34,
- Risk 2-30,
T
Tactical Actions 3-1,

Tactical Air 3-D-1-2, 3-D-1-3,
Index -12
Contents Page
Tactical CIS (TacCIS) 2-11, 2-12, 2-13,

Target Area of Interest (TAI) 3-E-2,
Target Audience(s) 1-6,
Target Audience Analysis (TAA) 2-23, 3-C-4,
Targeting 2-10, 2-24, 2-25,
- Decide, Detect, Deliver, Assess Cycle 2-24,
(D3A)
- Factors 2-25,
- Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyse Cycle 2-24,
(F3EA)
- Principles 2-24,
- Priorities 2-24, 2-25,
- Targets Approvals Board 2-10,
- Targets Development Board 2-10,
PY
- Time Sensitive Targeting 2-5,
Tempo
Theatre Logistic Regiment (TLR) 2-31,
O
Thompson, Major General Julian 2-29,
Transfer of Security Responsibility (TSR) 3-C-10,
C
U
United Nations (UN)

ED 2-2, 2-22,
Unity of effort 2-4,
Understand(ing) 1-5, 1-6, 1-7, 1-10, 2-2, 2-3, 2-4, 2-6, 2-7,
LL
2-24, 2-26, 2-27, 3-C-6, 3-C-8,

- Physical Environment 2-27,
- Red, White, Green, Blue 2-7,
O
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) 1-12, 2-18, 2-19, 2-28, 2-32, 3-D-1-1,
3-D-3-1,
TR
- Armed 2-23,
Upstream Capacity Building 1-2,
N
V
O
Vehicle Check Points (VCP) 3-D-2-1,

C
W
N
War amongst the people 1-5,

U
Weapon Locating Radar (WLR) 2-28,

Withdrawal 3-D-1, 3-D-7-1, 3-D-9-2,
Index -13
PY
O
C
ED
LL
O
TR
N
O
C
Comments and suggestions for improving this document

are welcomed.
N
The sponsor of this publication is:

SO1 Tac Doc Pubs
U
Directorate of Land Warfare, Land Warfare Centre,

Imber Road, Warminster BA12 0DJ
T +44 (0) 1985 848764

M 94381 8764
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ARMY FIELD MANUAL VOLUME 1 PART 1A

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Commander Land Forces

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Army Code 71587

ARMY FIELD MANUAL

This publication supersedes

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS & CONDITIONS OF RELEASE

As directed by Director Land Warfare.

Telephone +44(0)1985 848764.

Amendment Number Date Amended Initials

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

3. It is impossible to predict the exact character of future operations. AFM Divisional

e-based videos and demonstrations.

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Annex A Domains and Dimensions 2-A-1

Part 3 Divisional Tactical Actions

Annex A Offensive Actions 3-A-1

Types of Defensive Action 3-B-1

Delaying Actions 3-B-2

Stabilisation Planning Considerations 3-C-3

Initial Restoration of Essential Services 3-C-5

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Meeting Engagement 3-D-4-1

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

e. A hierarchy of wisdom to deal with complexity based on professional experience

security challenges. The operating environment is likely to be volatile and unpredictable

particularly given the evolution of international law.

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

Figure 1.1 – The Mosaic of Conflict

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

8. Configuration. The land forces’ configuration must be appropriate to the operational

Force (JTF) or theatre framework. It is ‘the smallest formation that is a complete

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

b. As a UK division, conducting an intervention operation within a NATO or

c. As a UK led Anglo-French Combined Joint Expeditionary Force (CJEF) division

e. As a 2*command node for a complex intervention operation, acting as

11. Roles and Responsibilities of the Divisional Level. Irrespective of its

b. To integrate and usually command joint, contractor-provided, inter-agency and

multinational capabilities. The divisional HQ is Air-Land by design. 10

c. To plan and execute several tactical engagements simultaneously in a

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

d. To routinely command the enablers that allow manoeuvre to be executed by

timing and consequences rather than items.

Gen Sir Rupert Smith

a. An essential pre-requisite for people-centric operations is an understanding that

Handling Instructions: For MOD Use Only

b. Having gained an understanding of the operating environment, the divisional

response to circumstances, political imperatives and the actions of adversaries.

division must be agile in concurrently conducting these activities, understanding the