GR No.

188801, Oct 15, 2014 ]

ROSARIO MATA CASTRO v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO +

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be
a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere
procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that a spouse attempts
to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate
children must be personally notified through personal service of summons.
It is not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.

This is a petition for review on certiorari[1] assailing the decision[2] of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the petition for
annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The petition before the
appellate court sought to annul the judgment of the trial court that granted
respondents' decree of adoption.[3]

The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed Lemuel
Gregorio (Jéd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by Atty. Jose G.
Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario Mata Castro
(Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta Charissima M. Castro
(Joanne), also known by her baptismal name, "Maria Socorro M. Castro"
and her nickname, "Jayrose."

Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962 in Laoag
City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They had a child, Rose
Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to congenital heart disease
and only lived for nine days. Rosario allegedly left Jose after a couple of
months because of the incompatibilities between them.[4]

Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave birth to
Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as husband and wife for
about a year even if she lived in Manila and Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose
would visit her in Manila during weekends. Afterwards, they separated
permanently because Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies.
[5]
 She insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years
despite their separation(.)"[6]

On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition [7] for adoption before the Regional
Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he alleged that Jed and
Regina were his illegitimate children with Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio
(Lilibeth),[8] whom Rosario alleged was his erstwhile housekeeper.[9] At the
time of the filing of the petition, Jose was 70 years old.[10]

According to the Home Study Report[11] conducted by the Social Welfare

Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and respected family,
being one of the three children of former Governor Mauricio Castro.

He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. [12] The report
mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the marriage did not
produce any children.[13] It also stated that he met and fell in love with
Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear him two children, Jed on
August 1987, and Regina on March 1989.[14] Under "Motivation for
Adoption," the social welfare officer noted:

Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he was not
able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with the presence of
his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic] and it is his intention
to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .[15]

At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and Regina
temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte.[16] The children have allegedly been in
his custody since Lilibeth's death in July 1995.[17]

On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the adoption, [18] having ruled
that "[n]o opposition had been received by this Court from any person
including the government which was represented by the Office of the
Solicitor General."[19] A certificate of finality[20] was issued on February 9,
2006.

Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene V.

Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines.[21] In her complaint, she alleged that Jose had been
remiss in providing support for their daughter, Joanne, for the past 36
years.[22] She alleged that she single-handedly raised and provided financial
support to Joanne while Jose had been showering gifts to his driver and
alleged lover, Larry R. Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of
adopting Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's
knowledge and consent.[23] She also alleged that Jose made blatant lies to
the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children
with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his homosexual relationship with
Larry.[24]

In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose denies
being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her minority. He
alleged that he always offered help, but it was often declined.[25] He also
alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because they are his illegitimate
children. He denied having committed any of the falsification alluded to by
Rosario. He also stated that he had suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him
paralyzed. He alleged that his income had been diminished because several
properties had to be sold to pay for medical treatments.[26] He then
implored the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with
"justice and equity."[27]

On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos Norte. [28]

On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure with the Court of
Appeals, seeking to annul the October 16, 2000 decision of the trial court
approving Jed and Regina's adoption.[29]

In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
adoption sometime in 2005.[30] They allege that Rosario's affidavit of
consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K,"[31] was fraudulent.[32] They
also allege that Jed and Regina's birth certificates showed different sets of
information, such as the age of their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave
birth. They argue that one set of birth certificates states the father to be
Jose and in another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the
father to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover.[33] It was further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but the
legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at the time of
their birth.[34]

On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.

While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario and
Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is "no explicit
provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate child of the adopter . . .
should be personally notified of the hearing."[35]

The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme employed by

[Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his illegitimate children]
to the prejudice of the interests of his legitimate heirs" [36] but stated that its
hands were bound by the trial court decision that had already attained
"finality and immutability."[37]

The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent information
contained in the different sets of birth certificates required the
determination of the identities of the persons stated therein and was,
therefore, beyond the scope of the action for annulment of judgment. The
alleged fraud was also perpetrated during the trial and could not be
classified as extrinsic fraud, which is required in an action for annulment of
judgment.[38]

When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied on July
10, 2009,[39] they filed this petition.

The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1) show that the trial
court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the existence of extrinsic fraud.

In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in its
application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a judgment.
[40]
 They argue that because of the fabricated consent obtained by Jose and
the alleged false information shown in the birth certificates presented as
evidence before the trial court,[41] they were not given the opportunity to
oppose the petition since the entire proceedings were concealed from them.
[42]

Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and

misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due process, notice,
and non-inclusion of indispensable parties.[43] They argue that the adoption
of illegitimate children requires the consent, not only of the spouse, but also
the legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter, and such consent
was never secured from Joanne.[44]

Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners could not

have been deprived of their day in court since their interest was "amply
protected by the participation and representation of the Solicitor General
through the deputized public prosecutor."[45]

Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through

publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also notice to the
world of the adoption proceedings.[46] They argue that since the alleged
fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot be said to be extrinsic
fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a ground for annulment of judgment.
[47]
 They also argue that petitioners were not indispensable parties because
adoption is an action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is
the state.[48]

The petition is granted.

Annulment of judgment under Rule 47

of the Rules of Civil Procedure 

Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may file an
action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or final orders and
resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts. This remedy will only
be available if "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner."[49]

In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of Appeals:[50]

A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so exceptional

in nature that it may be availed of only when other remedies are wanting,
and only if the judgment, final order or final resolution sought, to be
annulled was rendered by a court lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic
fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional in character, is not allowed to be
so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments,
orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud,
and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the
petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner. A petition for annulment that ignores or
disregards any of the safeguards cannot prosper.

The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment,

final order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards
the time-honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final
judgments, a solid corner stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts.
The doctrine of immutability and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose,
namely: (a) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus,
procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to
put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is
precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that has acquired
finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no longer to be modified
in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct an erroneous
conclusion of fact or of law, and whether the modification is made by the
court that rendered the decision or by the highest court of the land. As to
the latter, controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the rights
and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite
period of time.[51] (Emphasis supplied)

Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only two
grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of: extrinsic
fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery, and lack of
jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred by estoppel or
laches.[52]

Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over the
nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction over the
parties.[53] Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that which] prevents a
party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or
[that which] operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself
but to the manner in which it is procured."[54]

The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the trial

court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings, and the
favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.

Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings

vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the trial court
of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent as a requisite in the
proceedings.

Petitioners are correct.

It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the statute in

force at the time of the commencement of the action."[55] As Jose filed the
petition for adoption on August 1, 2000, it is Republic Act No.
8552[56] which applies over the proceedings. The law on adoption requires
that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock obtain not
only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children.

Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband must
first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his own children
born out of wedlock:

ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY

SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may adopt:

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following cases:

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the other; or

(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate son/daughter:

Provided, however, That the other spouse has signified, his/her consent
thereto; or

(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . . (Emphasis
supplied)

The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and wife must
file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is stated in In Re:
Petition for Adoption of Michelle P. Lim:[57]

The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means that joint
adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance
with the concept of joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate
child, it is but natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also
insures harmony between the spouses.[58]

The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation
where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children born out of wedlock.
In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary. However, the spouse
seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.

In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and

Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto separation. For
Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario must first signify her
consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did not validly obtain Rosario's
consent. His submission of a fraudulent affidavit of consent in her name
cannot be considered compliance of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario
been given notice by the trial court of the proceedings, she would have had
a reasonable opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.

The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children if they
are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552:

SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being properly

counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the following to the
adoption is hereby required:

(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or

over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis supplied)

The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it ensures

harmony among the prospective siblings. It also sufficiently puts the other
children on notice that they will have to share their parent's love and care,
as well as their future legitimes, with another person.

It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child and
that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption proceedings. Her
written consent, therefore, was necessary for the adoption to be valid.

To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the trial court

that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing Joanne from being
notified of the proceedings. As her written consent was never obtained, the
adoption was not valid.

For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by Republic

Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have been effected on
the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure that their substantive rights
are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice as in this case.
Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.

Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne
of the proceedings, it never validly acquired jurisdiction.

There was extrinsic fraud

The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud may
have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud, rather than
extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.

In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:[59]

Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in

litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the
defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his side of the
case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
such as by keeping him away from court, by giving him a false
promise of a compromise, or where the defendant never had the knowledge
of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an
attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat.
[60]
 (Emphasis supplied)

An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought within

four years from discovery.[61] Petitioners alleged that they were made aware
of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this petition on October 18, 2007
is within the period allowed by the rules.

The badges of fraud are present in this case.

First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no relation to
any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City, llocos Norte. [62] Larry
and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6, Laoag City. [63] Jed and Regina
were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte.[64] Rosario and Joanne were
residents of Parañaque City, Manila.[65] The petition for adoption, however,
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.[66] The trial
court gave due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his
petition that he was a resident of Batac,[67] even though it is admitted in the
Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag City. [68]

Second, using the process of delayed registration,[69] Jose was able to secure

birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be the father and Larry
as merely the informant.[70] Worse still is that two different sets of
fraudulent certificates were procured: one showing that Jose and Lilibeth
were married on December 4, 1986 in Manila,[71] and another wherein the
portion for the mother's name was not filled in at all.[72] The birth
certificates of Jed and Regina from the National Statistics Office, however,
show that their father was Larry R. Rentegrado.[73] These certificates are in
clear contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial
court in support of his petition for adoption.

Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,[74] to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent of
Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and alleged to be
fraudulent.[75]

All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial court in
approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and Joanne from
participating in the proceedings or opposing the petition.

The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by Jose as

intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or perjured
testimonies"[76] presented during the trial. It failed to understand, however,
that fraud is considered intrinsic when the other party was either present at
the trial or was a participant in the proceedings when such instrument or
testimony was presented in court, thus:

[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that prevented a fair
and just determination of the case, but the difference is that the acts or
things, like falsification and false testimony, could have been litigated and
determined at the trial or adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic
fraud does not deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can
guard against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting to the
modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic applications. Indeed,
forgery of documents and evidence for use at the trial and perjury in court
testimony have been regarded as not preventing the participation of any
party in the proceedings, and are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic
fraud.[77] (Emphasis supplied)

When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the participation of

any other interested party, as in this case, then the fraud is extrinsic,
regardless of whether the fraud was committed through the use of forged
documents or perjured testimony during the trial.

Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a reasonable

opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and Joanne been allowed
to participate, the trial court would have hesitated to grant Jose's petition
since he failed to fulfill the necessary requirements under the law. There
can be no other conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court
granted the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.

The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 8552:

ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES

SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.     

 
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one (1)
 day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court shall be imposed on any
person who shall commit any of the following acts:
obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue influence,
(i)
fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar acts;
non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided by the
(ii)
law for adoption; or
subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger, abuse, or
(iii)
exploitation.
Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the birth of a
child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not his/her biological
(b) parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth, and shall be punished
by prision mayor in its medium period and a fine not exceeding Fifty
thousand pesos (P50.000.00). (Emphasis supplied)

Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of any of his

criminal liabilities.[78] Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to provide any
provision on the status of adoption decrees if the adoption is found to have
been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners also cannot invoke Article VI,
Section 19 of Republic Act No. 8552[79] since rescission of adoption can only
be availed of by the adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other
remedy in law other than the annulment of the judgment.

The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice. There is
reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never experienced the
love and care of a father, her parents having separated a year after her
birth. She has never even benefited from any monetary support from her
father. Despite all these adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical
degree from the University of the Philippines College of Medicine[80] and is
now working as a doctor in Canada.[81] These accomplishments, however,
are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to continue.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated October

16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17 in SP.
Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Reyes,* JJ., concur.

*
 Designated acting member per Special Order No. 1844 dated October 14,
2014.
[1]
 Rollo, pp. 3-29.
[2]
 Id. at 37-62. The decision was penned by Associate Justice Remedios A.
Salazar-Fernando (Chairperson) and concurred in by Associate 'Justices
Rebecca De Guia-Salvador and Rosalinda Asuncion Vicente of the Special
Former Seventh Division.
[3]
 Id. at 37.
[4]
 Id. at 38-39 and 48.
[5]
 Id. at 39 and 48.
[6]
 Id. at 49.
[7]
 Id. at 109-110.
[8]
 Id. at 109.
[9]
 Id. at 52.
[10]
 Id. at 79.
[11]
 Id. at 79-82.
[12]
 Id. at 80.
[13]
 Id. at 79-80.
[14]
 Id. at 80 and 83-84.
[15]
 Id. at 80.
[16]
 Id. at 81.
[17]
 Id. at 80.
[18]
 Id. at 87-90.
[19]
 Id. at 87.
[20]
 Id. at 91.
[21]
 Id. at 168-173.
[22]
 Id. at 168.
[23]
 Id. at 169-170.
[24]
 Id. at 171.
[25]
 Id. at 174.
[26]
 Id. at 175-176.
[27]
 Id. at 176.
[28]
 Id. at 122.
[29]
 Id. at 38.
[30]
 Id. at 9.
[31]
 Id. at 14.
[32]
 Id. at 40.
[33]
 Id. at 153-158 and 226-227.
[34]
 Id. at 41 and 136.
[35]
 Id. at 59.
[36]
 Id. at 59-60.
[37]
 Id. at 60.
[38]
 Id. at 60-61.
[39]
 Id. at 98-99.
[40]
 Id. at 13.
[41]
 Id. at 14-15.
[42]
 Id. at 18.
[43]
 Id. at 22.
[44]
 Id. at 26-27.
[45]
 Id. at 306.
[40]
 Id. at 307.
[47]
 Id. at 311 and 313.
[48]
 Id. at 313.
[49]
 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, sec. 1.
[50]
 G.R. No. 161122, September 24, 2012, 681 SCRA580 [Per J. Bersamin,
First Division].
[51]
 Id. at 586-587, citing People v. Bitanga, 552 Phil. 686, 693 (2007) [Per
J. Austria-Martinez, Third Division]; Fraginal v. Heirs of Toribia
Belmonte Paranal, 545 Phil. 425, 432 (2007) [Per J. Austria- Martinez,
Third Division]; Macalalag v. Ombudsman, 468 Phil. 918, 923 (2004) [Per
J. Vitug, Third Division]; Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 622
Phil. 215, 231 (2009) [Per J. Bersamin, En Bane]; Peña v. Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS), 533 Phil. 670, 689-690 (2006) [Per J.
Chico-Nazario, First Division]; Gallardo-Corro v. Gallardo, 403 Phil. 498,
511 (2001) [Per J. Bellosillo, Second Division].
[52]
 RULES of Civil Procedure, Rule 47, sec. 2 and sec. 3.
[53]
 Barco v. Court of Appeals, 465 Phil. 39, 57 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, Second
Division].
[54]
 Bulawan v. Aquende, G.R. No. 182819, June 22, 2011, 652 SCRA 585,
594 [Per J. Carpio, Second Division], citing Alaban v. Court of Appeals,
507 Phil. 682, 694 (2005) [Per J. Tinga, Second Division].
[55]
 Republic v. Court of Appeals and Zenaida Bobiles, G.R. No. 92326,
January 24, 1992, 205 SCRA 356, 363 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division],
citing Ramos, et al. v. Central Bank of the Philippines, 148-B Phil. 1047,
1066 (1971) [Per J. J.B.L. Reyes, En Bane].
[56]
 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998.
[57]
 606 Phil. 82 (2009) [Per J. Carpio, First Division].
[58]
 Id. at 89-90, citing Republic v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June 8, 1994,
233 SCRA 9, 13 [Per J. Puno, Second Division].
[59]
 G.R. No. 187409, November 16, 2011, 660 SCRA 323 [Per J. Reyes,
Second Division].
[60]
 Id. at 327, citing Amihan Bus Lines, Inc. v. Romars International Gases
Corporation, G.R. No. 180819, July 5, 2010, 623 SCRA 406, 411 [Per J.
Nachura, Second Division].
[61]
 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, Rule 47, sec. 3.
[62]
 Rollo, p. 139.
[63]
 Id. at 138.
[64]
 Id. at 88.
[65]
 Id. at 4-5
[66]
 Id. at 87-90.
[67]
 Id. at 109
[68]
 Id. at 80.
[69]
 Id. at 155 and 158.
[70]
 Id. at 153 and 156.
[71]
 Id. at 154 and 157.
[72]
 Id. at 153 and 156.
[73]
 Id. at 226-227
[74]
 Id. at 80.
[75]
 Id. at 14. The allegedly fraudulent affidavit of consent was not attached
in the rollo.
[76]
 Id. at 61.
[77]
 Pinausukan Seafood House v. Far East Bank and Trust, G.R. No.
159926, January 20, 2014 [Per J. Bersamin, First Division], citing Ybañez
v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 643, 656 (1996) [Per J. Francisco, Third
Division] and Strait Times Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 356 Phil. 217, 226
(1998) [Per J. Panganiban, First Division].
[78]
 Rev. Pen. Code, art. 89.
[79 ]
 Article VI of Rep. Act. No. 8552 provides:

SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the adoptee,

with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over eighteen (18)
years of age but is incapacitated, as guardian/counsel, the adoption may be
rescinded on any of the following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a)
repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c) sexual
assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations.

Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not be subject to
rescission by the adopter(s). However, the adopter(s) may disinherit the
adoptee for causes provided in Article 919 of the Civil Code.
[80]
 Rollo, p. 169.
[81]
 Id. at 5.