The Fall of the Dictatorship

Philippine Standard Time:

Thursday, February 27, 2020 10:22:40 AM
source: PAGASA

I. Introduction

President Ferdinand E. Marcos assumed power on December 30, 1965, and became the second
president reelected to office in 1969. There were efforts to maneuver the 1971 Constitutional
Convention to permit his continuing in office.[1] With the swell of student radicalization and
increasing number of violent demonstrations, Marcos played up middle-class fears and used
these to justify the imposition of Martial Law on September 23, 1972 by virtue of Proclamation
No. 1081.

Martial Law was not just an invocation of the President’s emergency powers under the 1935
Constitution—Marcos went further to assume all governing powers, excluded civilian courts,
and systematically replaced the 1935 Constitution with the 1973 Constitution for his own ends.
The replacement of the Constitution was done under dubious circumstances.

First, Marcos ordered a viva voce plebiscite on January 10–15, 1973 in which the voting age was
reduced to 15 to ratify the new Constitution.[2] Military men were placed prominently to
intimidate voters. Reports indicated that mayors and governors were given quotas for “yes” votes
on the constitution and negative votes were often not recorded.[3] Results report that 90 percent of
the citizens have voted for the constitution even though some communities did not participate in
the “citizens assemblies.”[4] Over the next few years, Marcos would hold four more plebiscites—
in 1973, 1975, 1976, and 1978—through citizen assemblies to legitimize the continuation of
martial rule.[5]

Second, he intimidated the Supreme Court to approve it. Using the stick and carrot method on
the justices of the Supreme Court, President Marcos was able to force the Supreme Court to
uphold martial law and the new constitution. Previously, around 8,000 individuals, including
senators, civil libertarians, journalists, students, and labor leaders, were arrested and detained
without due process upon the declaration of martial law.[6] With many of them filing petitions to
the Supreme Court for habeas corpus, they challenged the constitutionality of the proclamation.
However, the Supreme Court issued its final decision, in Javellana v. Executive Secretary, which
essentially validated the constitution. This would be the final legitimizing decision on the
constitutionality of Martial Law: in G.R. No. L-35546 September 17, 1974, the Supreme Court
dismissed petitions for habeas corpus by ruling that martial law was a political question beyond
the jurisdiction of the court; and that, furthermore, the court had already deemed the 1973
Constitution in full force and effect, replacing the 1935 Constitution.

After the landmark decision, Chief Justice Roberto V. Concepcion went into early retirement, 50
days before his originally scheduled retirement date, in silent protest over the majority in
the Javellana v. Executive Secretary case. He argued against the validity of the new constitution
and its questionable aspects, together with Justices Claudio Teehankee, Calixto Zaldivar, and
Enrique Fernando.

Martial law imposed government control over all forms of media. On September 22, 1972,
Marcos issued Letter of Instruction No. 1, ordering the Press Secretary and Defense Secretary to
assume control over all media outlets. All periodicals were padlocked,[7] and media personalities
who had criticized Marcos, his family, or his administration were taken to Camp Crame without
any charges being filed. Among them were publishers Joaquin “Chino” P. Roces (Manila Times)
and Eugenio Lopez Jr. (Manila Chronicle), and columnists Max Soliven and Luis D. Beltran.[8]

Marcos issued at least eleven Presidential Decrees that suppressed press freedom. Journalists
who did not comply with the new restrictions faced physical threats, libel suits, or forced
resignation.[9] With such stringent censorship regulations, most of the periodicals that were
allowed to operate were crony newspapers, such as Benjamin Romualdez’s Times Journal, Hans
Menzi’s Bulletin Today, and Roberto Benedicto’s Philippine Daily Express. These newspapers
offered “bootlicking reportage” on the country’s economy while completely eschewing political
issues.[10]

Hence, President Marcos’ absolute rule had a “cloak of legality”[11] and incontestability, making
it nearly impregnable. However, specific factors converged and eventually led to the fall of the
dictatorship and the eventual restoration of democracy in the Philippines.

II. Factors that led to the Fall of the Dictatorship

A. Opposition to Martial Law in the 1970s

Popular anti-Marcos sentiment existed for the duration of Martial Law. According to David
Wurfel, there were three paramount types of opposition to martial law during the 1970s:
reformist opposition, revolutionary opposition, and religious opposition.[12]

Reformist Opposition

The reformist opposition, also known as the legal opposition, was composed of members of the
upper-middle class. Using nonviolent tactics, they advocated political (not necessarily
socioeconomic) reforms. However, the reformist opposition was not a united movement, but an
amalgamation of different middle- and upper-class groups who had different motives. It was for
this reason that Marcos tolerated them, so long as they were incapable of viably replacing him or
attaining the support of the masses.[13] David Wurfel writes:

Disunity within the reformist opposition also reflected the diversity of interests and the lack of
ideology within the middle class. The reformers shared certain values, such as support for the
rule of law, constitutional legitimacy, free elections, and the protection of personal freedoms, and
they agreed on the need to replace Marcos. But they agreed on little else. On nationalism, land
reform, and the autonomy of labor organizations there was everything from explicit demands to
complete silence. Once discussion went beyond the basic characteristics of the political process,
the question of what to reform was a divisive one.[14]

1978 was a watershed year for the reformist opposition because it was the first election year in
the country since 1969. The reformist opposition was divided on the issue of boycotting the
Interim Batasang Pambansa (IBP) elections set for April 7.

Senator Gerardo “Gerry” Roxas refused to reactivate the Liberal Party for the elections because
Marcos failed to address their concerns regarding electoral reform; to participate in such an
unfair election would have given it credibility, and the Martial Law regime undue legitimacy.
[15]
 Jose W. Diokno, a former Nacionalista and long-time critic of Marcos and Martial Law, was
also adamantly opposed to the IBP elections.[16]

The most prominent opposition movement that participated in the IBP elections was the newly
formed Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) party of former senator Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., who
was imprisoned at that time.[17] Ninoy was initially apprehensive about running in the election,
but he decided to push through with his candidacy to give the populace a chance to air out their
frustration against the government. He campaigned from his jail cell, even appearing for a 90-
minute television interview.[18] Ninoy’s candidacy inspired an outpouring of popular support that
culminated in a noise barrage on the evening before the elections. At 8:00 p.m., residents in
Metro Manila took to the streets, making whatever noise they could “to let Ninoy Aquino in his
prison cell know that the people had heard his message.”[19] They banged on pots and pans,
honked their car horns, and shouted their throats sore in support of Ninoy and LABAN.
[20]
 However, the elections were a total shutout for LABAN, with Marcos’ Kilusang Bagong
Lipunan (KBL) winning 91 percent of the seats in the IBP.[21]
Ninoy Aquino’s manifesto for the Lakas ng Bayan (LABAN) campaign for the elections.
Photo from Ninoy: The Willing Martyr by Alfonso P. Policarpio Jr.

In 1981, Marcos officially lifted Martial Law, but since all decrees issued during that time were
still in force, the lifting was merely a symbolic gesture. In the June presidential elections of that
year, he ran under the KBL, his main opponent being Nacionalist Alejo Santos. Unlike in the
1978 IBP elections, the reformist opposition was united in its stance to boycott the polls,labeling
it a sham after Marcos refused the conditions they had previously proposed, such as a minimum
campaign period, a purging of voters’ lists, equal time and space for the opposition, and a
reorganization of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).[22]

Revolutionary Opposition

The government’s use of communist and secessionist threats as justification for Martial Law
only contributed to the growth of the political opposition and the amassing of recruits to the New
People’s Army (NPA)[23] and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the provinces in the
1970s.[24]

When Martial Law was declared, the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was immediately
mobilized. Formed by students and politicians from Mindanao, its goal was to create the Bangsa
Moro Republik (Moro National Republic), composed of Mindanao, Sulu, and Palawan. The
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) attempted to seize their “illegal” firearms supplied by
Libya, sparking a war that lasted from 1973 to 1977.[25]

Over the course of the war, 13,000 people were killed while over a million were displaced. At
the height of the conflict, the government spent an estimated $1 million a day to contain the
rebellion. However, internal problems within the MNLF prevented them from exploiting
Marcos’ weakness. Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso write:

Its military leaders lacked combat experience and suffered major battlefield losses, while its
political leaders split along ethnic lines (Tausug versus Maguindanao) over tactical issues. As the
MNLF lost on the military front, its politician allies also began to defect, making separate peace
pacts with Marcos and presenting themselves as a “moderate alternative” to the revolutionary
Moro nationalists. Government overtures and the cooperation of conservative Arab states
eventually led to negotiations and a de facto cease-fire in 1977. The MNLF was no match for
Marcos diplomatically and the decline of Arab support made the continuation of conventional
warfare impossible. . . . By the time Marcos fell, the MNLF had lost its dynamism as well.[26]

In contrast, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) strengthened as Marcos’ dictatorship
weakened; as opposed to the Partido Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), which surrendered in 1974.
Following the principle of “centralized command, decentralized operations,” the CPP established
autonomous, regional, self-sustaining chapters all over the Philippines. Not only did this give
CPP cadres more freedom to experiment with tactics appropriate to their localities, it also helped
them survive the loss of many original leaders, either to prison or death.[27] In November, 1977,
the Armed Forces scored an important victory over the communist rebels with the capture of
Jose Maria Sison and other important party leaders leading to the disarray of the Communist
Party. But the triumph was short-lived and was too late as the influence of the CPP grew stronger
within the provinces.[28]

Party growth was fastest in areas where human rights violations were high due to military
presence. By the late 1970s, the CPP could claim a guerrilla force of 15,000, around the same
number of cadres, and a “mass base” of around one million. While AFP forces also experienced
rapid growth during this period and were better equipped, there was a difference between the
two. Gregg Jones writes that “[d]espite a high rate of illiteracy, communist soldiers could explain
why they were fighting and what they were fighting for. In contrast, most government soldiers
were poor peasants or slum dwellers who enlisted in the government army not out of political
conviction but because of economic deprivation.”[29]

Through the Kilusang Mayo Uno (the May First Labor Movement) and the League of Filipino
Students, the CPP was able to gather labor unions and solidify its control of important schools.
The CPP also made “anti-imperialist” alliances with nationalist senators like Lorenzo Tañada
and Jose Diokno, who could lend credibility and publicity to claims of the Marcos government’s
human rights violations.[30]

Religious Opposition

Martial Law also faced opposition from the religious sector. Mainline Protestant churches have
been vocal in their opposition of the dictatorship since 1972; by 1978, they were holding mass
protest actions, and by 1981, they held boycott campaigns for the April plebiscite and the June
presidential elections.[31] Meanwhile the Catholic Church, which sympathized with Marcos’ anti-
communism, maintained a position of “critical collaboration” while paying attention to the
opposition among its members.[32] This allowed it a degree of autonomy when it came to carrying
out their social projects, which focused on alleviating poverty and defending the poor against
communism. However, the provincial clergy started becoming radicalized after seeing the effects
of the Marcos dictatorship on the poor. They formed Christians for National Liberation, which
clandestinely used Church “social action” programs to get foreign funding through private donor
agencies that shared the same views.[33] Abinales and Amoroso write:

Church leaders were appalled by this radical infiltration, but could do little about it. To attack its
own rank and file for following the official Church position on human rights and social justice
would open the hierarchy to charges of supporting the dictatorship. A serious breach opened up
within the Philippine Church.[34]

When Jaime Cardinal Sin replaced the conservative Rufino Cardinal Santos as Archbishop of
Manila, one of his first acts was to issue a letter condemning the summary arrest of Jesuit Frs.
Jose Blanco and Benigno Mayo. They were arrested during a raid on the Sacred Heart Novitiate
in Novaliches, in 1974. Sin presided over a prayer vigil for the detained priests, “which more
than 5,000 persons attended, the largest anti-martial law protest at the time.” In 1975, Sin
declared his opposition to a Marcos decree “banning all labor strikes.” US President Gerald Ford
was visiting Manila, so Marcos beat a hasty retreat and confined the prohibition to strategic
industries. The harassment continued. Church-owned media, which had escaped closure in 1972,
was shut down in 1976–1977, among them the weekly newspaper and radio station of Bishop
Francisco Claver’s diocese in Bukidnon, Davao’s radio station, and Church magazines in
Manila. The government threatened to tax Church properties and subject them to urban land
reform. Sin’s policy of “critical collaboration” during this time began to give away to active
resistance, as the religious indignation spread over the continuing arrests and more of the clergy
became radicalized. Sin may have thought to steal the thunder from the radical priests by hurling
the bolts himself. Protestant groups began to rally against Marcos in 1978. By 1979, Sin was
firmly on the path to his preeminent role in the overthrow of Marcos.[35]

About 5,000 demonstrators, organized by students, attempted to march to Malacañan Palace on

October 10, 1976 to protest at four years of Martial Law imposed by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. Its main purpose was to protest at the referendum-plebiscite scheduled to take place on
October 16. Video from Associated Press.

On January 17, 1981, in an effort to calm the growing opposition of the Catholic Church,
President Marcos lifted martial law (if by name only) via Proclamation No. 2045 in preparation
for the first state visit of Saint Pope John Paul II on February 17, 1981.

[WATCH: Lifting of Martial Law, January 17, 1981]

On January 17, 1981, on Constitution Day (8 years after the 1973 Constitution was
promulgated), President Ferdinand E. Marcos decreed Martial Law officially lifted. In this
video excerpt, President Marcos reads from Proclamation No. 2045. Video from PTV4.

In the events leading to the important state visit, the Coconut Palace was commissioned by First
Lady Imelda Marcos to be built at the cost of ₱37 million as the guesthouse of the Pope.
However, the Pontiff refused, saying it was too ostentatious, given the state of the poor in the
country.[36] Moreover, during his visit in Malacañan Palace, the Pope delivered a speech
explicitly condemning the human rights violations committed under the regime. He said:

“Even in exceptional situations that may at times arise, one can never justify any violation of the
fundamental dignity of the human person or of the basic rights that safeguard this dignity.”[37]

Since then, the Catholic Church had withdrawn its support of the Marcos administration.

B. Marcos’ Health and the Issue of Succession

As early as 1979, the health of President Marcos had been deteriorating.[38] This was kept a secret
at first, but it was common knowledge then that Marcos was already sick, especially at the time
of the assassination of Ninoy Aquino.[39] Marcos’ health status worsened by mid-November of
1984. Blas Ople, Marcos’ Minister of Labor, divulged the situation for the first time on record on
December 3, 1984, saying that Marcos was “in control but cannot take major initiatives at this
time.” He stated that, “The health of our leader is undergoing certain vicissitudes, problems
which started a year ago.”[40] On October 28, 1985, according to congressional and US
intelligence sources quoted by the Washington Post, Marcos was diagnosed with an “incurable,
recurring sickness” called systemic lupus erythematosus.[41] This disease was further complicated
by Marcos’ diabetes.[42]

Marcos’ failing health, coupled with the looming threat from the anti-capitalist left, led to
widespread concern for a stable succession among the country’s economic elite—the main
beneficiaries of Martial Law’s crony capitalism.[43] The plebiscite held on April 7, 1981, ratified
the constitutional amendment creating the Executive Committee, composed of at most 14
members, at least half of which were Assemblymen.[44] The Committee was meant to be “a
stepping stone for future leadership in the country . . . a high-level training ground for future
Prime Ministers and Presidents.”[45] It was deemed necessary at that time because no one member
of the administration’s Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) was deemed capable of taking over for
President Marcos in the event of his death, resignation, or incapacitation; it was implied that the
Committee member who performed the best would be Marcos’ successor.[46] Contenders for the
presidency started positioning themselves to gain the upper hand. For instance, there were
attempts to discredit Prime Minister Cesar Virata and the programs associated with economic
technocrats, while Imelda Marcos’ strove to repair her tarnished image (especially in the
provinces) while pushing her son Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. further into the public eye.
[47]

However, Marcos’ deteriorating health necessitated clearer guidelines for determining a

successor. Another plebiscite on January 27, 1984, ratified the constitutional amendment
abolishing the Executive Committee and restoring the Office of the Vice President,[48] to be filled
in the upcoming 1987 elections[49]—which never came because Marcos announced snap elections
in 1985. The same plebiscite also designated the speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as acting
president should the presidency be vacated before the 1987 presidential elections.[50]
 Ou
sted President Marcos and Imelda Marcos in exile at the backyard of their villa
overlooking Honolulu, Hawaii on March 1988. Diagnosed with systemic lupus
erythematosus, he had several surgeries for kidney dialysis a year after this photo was
taken. Marcos died on September 28 of the same year, due to heart, kidney and lung
failure. Photo by Gamblin Yann.

C. The Collapse of the Philippine Economy

Economist James Boyce commented, “If the central aim of economic development is the
reduction of poverty, then the Philippine development strategy in the Marcos era was an abysmal
failure.”[51] In the last years of the Marcos regime, the Philippine economy was almost grinding
to a halt. This was so, despite the fact that the Marcos administration implemented its three-
pronged development strategy: (1) The green revolution[52] in agriculture[53], (2) growth and
diversity in agricultural and forestry exports, and (3) massive external borrowing. The profit
from these three strategies were amassed disproportionately to the wealthiest in the population,
thereby causing a large disparity between the rich and the poor.

In the case of agriculture, the higher rice yields saved land for export crops and saved foreign
exchange for non-rice imports, but these gains never trickled down to the poor. In addition, there
were government intervention, cronyism and monopolization of agricultural markets such as that
of sugar and coconut.[54] In these cases, key government agencies were managed by Marcos
associates and cronies, whose operations were not audited.[55]

Sugar was the country’s second most important export in the Marcos regime. Specifically, in the
mid-1970s, sugarcane plantations doubled to more than 500,000 hectares. This increase,
however, did not translate to an increase in harvest and profit, which led ultimately to a
stagnation and eventual decline in the mid-1970s.[56] As early as 1974, a government sugar
monopsony was established to participate in world trade and reap the benefits of increasing
world prices in sugar. When the sugar market declined in 1975 – 1976, the trading
responsibilities were transferred to PHILSUCOM[57] (Philippine Sugar Commission), headed by
Roberto Benedicto, and to NASUTRA[58] (National Sugar Trading Corporation), headed by an
associate of Marcos.

Under Benedicto’s chairmanship, the PHILSUCOM was empowered to buy, sell, and set prices
for sugar; and to buy and take over milling companies. He also set up the Republic Planter’s
Bank, which became the sugar industry’s main source of finance during that time.[59] For this,
Benedicto was accused of “using his position to great advantage over the past several years to
forge an economic fiefdom, to amass great wealth and to develop considerable political influence
in sugar growing areas”. The US Embassy reported that Benedicto had several profit
mechanisms:

 bribery; acceptance of payoffs or bribes from traders lobbying for guaranteed profit
margins of sugar prices in the domestic market.
 smuggling of sugar supplies; at least 600,000 metric tons of raw sugar was reportedly
missing from the NASUTRA warehouses
 withholding of taxes, PNP loan payments, as well as export trading costs;

These operations “amount to a significant and growing drain on the economy of the
country.”[60] Moreover, the sugar-marketing monopoly effectively protected the interests of the
sugar hacienderos close to Marcos, while small landowners bore the brunt of the crisis, causing
widespread starvation among sugar plantation workers (specifically in Negros), reaching the
international media.[61] Furthermore, other large-scale sugar owners grew resentful of President
Marcos because of the sugar-marketing monopoly that did his bidding and the subsequent land-
grabbing.[62] At the end of the Marcos regime, the Philippine sugar industry nearly collapsed. The
majority of the planters were in debt and sugarcane plantation dwindled.[63]

In the case of coconuts, beginning in 1973, the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)
monopolized export and increased coconut tax in order to stabilize market prices.[64] Coconut
marketing during the Marcos era was monopolized by a “single entity with effective control over
virtually all copra purchases and over the production and sale of coconut oil on the domestic and
export markets.”[65] This monopoly was technically made possible by Marcos’ presidential
decrees, providing for levies on all coconut production and an establishment of a bank. While
these changes were imposed to benefit the the coconut growers, in practice, the main
beneficiaries were Eduardo Cojuangco, the so called “Coconut King,” and Juan Ponce Enrile,
two of President Marcos’ closest associates.[66]

In in the case of foreign loans, the primary pretext was for Philippine domestic investment and
building public infrastructure. However, these loans were diverted to a few private companies,
all of which were under Marcos cronies, eroding the quality and quantity of domestic
investments; the rest were diverted to banks abroad. An example of striking evidence of this was
the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, which was built at the cost of $1.2 billion but never generated a
kilowatt of electricity under the Marcos regime. “The losers were the Philippine people,” writes
Raymond Bonner, “the poor, on whose behalf the billion dollars could have been better spent, as
well as the middle class and the wealthy, who would have to shoulder this economically
backbreaking colossus.”[67]

In 1973, Marcos decided that the Philippines had to have a nuclear power plant—then considered
the hallmark of a modern nation—because it fit in with Marcos’ ostentatious vision of himself
and the country. However, such an endeavor at that time was problematic: at best, the power
plant would have generated power for only 15 percent of Luzon’s population. Security was
another issue: there were four active volcanoes located within 100 miles from the proposed site.
Furthermore, the Philippines was one of the poorest nations setting out on the nuclear path; only
Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea were building nuclear power plants in East Asia, and they were
far better off economically and technologically.[68]

The power plant was the largest and most expensive construction project in the country’s history.
Given the monumental expense, funding the project out of the government’s treasury was
impossible, so the government turned to Export-Import Bank in Washington, DC, for assistance.
In 1975, $277 million in direct loans and $367 million in loan guarantees was approved by Ex-
Im Bank chairman William J. Casey, one of Marcos’s biggest supporters. It was the largest loan
package the bank had approved anywhere.[69]

Westinghouse Electric initially submitted a vague, undetailed $500 million bid for two plants.
General Electric, on the other hand, submitted four full volumes detailing cost and specifications,
conducted nuclear power seminars in Manila, and invited Philippine officials to visit its plant in
California. Marcos, brooking no opposition, gave the contract to Westinghouse. After
Westinghouse secured the contract, it submitted a serious proposal amounting to $1.2 billion for
just one reactor—almost 400 percent higher than the original bid of $500 million. Marcos was
guaranteed a cut of nearly $80 million, which Westinghouse transmitted through Marcos crony
Herminio Disini using a “maze of channels, cutouts, and stratagems.”[70] Raymond Bonner
elaborates:

Disini owned a construction company, which he had purchased with a government-backed loan
and which had been awarded, without bits, a cost plus fixed fee contract for all civil construction
at the nuclear power plant site. The price of the equipment for the project “was inflated, as a way
to cover the cost of the fees to Disini,” a lawyer who worked on the project explained to Fox
Butterfield of The New York Times. Westinghouse set up a subsidiary in Switzerland, which
funneled the money into Disini’s European bank accounts. The Swiss subsidiary, after entering
into the deal with the Philippine government, assigned the contract to the Westinghouse
International Projects Company, which had been established solely to handle the Philippine
project. Westinghouse International, in turn, entered into a subcontract with the Westinghouse
Electric Corporation, the parent company in Pittsburgh. Westinghouse officials repeatedly denied
any wrongdoing with the project.[71]

By 1986—more than a decade and $1.2 billion later—the power plant was still not operational.
[72]
Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Photo courtesy of Vinnell Belvoir Corporation.

The old economic elite, whom President Marcos called the “oligarchy,” relatively tolerated the
systematic favoritism of the administration on crony companies. This changed In 1981, when
Filipino Chinese business tycoon Dewey Dee of the Binondo Central Bank left the country for
Canada, leaving nearly P600 million in debt, seriously compromising the crony corporations.
Government banks announced a rescue fund of approximately P5 billion in credit and equity
capital, which the old elite found unfair, launching a barrage of public criticism.[73]

The impoverishment of the economy led to the loss of support of the middle class and the small-
time landowners and farmers in the regions on the Marcos administration. Poverty, aside from
human rights violations by the military, also became a means for rebel groups to recruit citizens
to their cause. In 1978, the strength of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) grew from
6,900 to over 20,000 regulars.[74] In 1980, the New People’s Army formed 26 guerrilla fronts
with over 16,000 regulars, and the Communist Party of the Philippines have attracted 40,000
mass activists.[75]

D. The Assassination of Ninoy Aquino

After three years of exile in the United States, Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino Jr., the foremost leader
of the Marcos opposition, decided to come back to the Philippines, intending to restore
democracy in the country and convince President Marcos for an orderly succession. Previously,
Aquino had been incarcerated by the military for seven years before being released for bypass
surgery in the United States. Ninoy Aquino’s conversation with journalist Teodoro Locsin Jr.
before he went back to the Philippines was revealing.[76] He was quoted as saying:

“I’ll go to Marcos, if he’ll see me. I’ll appeal to his sense of history, of his place in it. He would
not be publishing all those books of his if he did not care for the judgment of history, if he did
not want to look good in it. And that would be possible, I’ll tell him, only if there was an orderly
restoration of democracy and freedom for our people. Otherwise, there would be only revolution
and terrible suffering. I give the moderate opposition five years to restore democracy, after that
there will be only the Communists as an alternative to Marcos or his successor. I’ll offer my
services to him, but my price is freedom for our people.”[77]

He departed from Boston on August 13, 1983. Despite news of a death threat, Ninoy maintained
in an interview on August 21, 1983 that “if it’s [my] fate to die by an assassin’s bullet, then so
be it.  […] [I have] to suffer with our people and  [I have] to lead them.”

Ninoy Aquino’s assassination. Photo taken from Ninoy: Ideals & Ideologies 1932-1983.

Aquino landed in the Manila International Airport via China Airlines Flight 811 at 1:05 p.m. on
August 21, and was escorted by armed men out of the plane. Minutes later, gunshots were heard.
The former senator was shot dead by an assassin’s bullet to the head. When the news of Ninoy’s
death spread, approximately seven million came to his funeral procession on August 31, the
biggest and longest in Philippine history. This singular event further eroded the people’s support
of the Marcos regime.

E. The Failure of the Snap Election of 1986

In the first week of November 1985, when President Marcos was interviewed in the David
Brinkley Show, he stated his intention to call for a snap election, even going so far as to invite the
members of the US Congress to observe, calling the accusation of fraud as unfounded.[78] This, it
seems, was an attempt to consolidate support and show the United States the legitimacy of the
Marcos administration. The announcement for a snap election within three months was ahead of
schedule; the next regular elections were supposed to be held in 1987. The President was
overconfident; he disregarded the objections of his family, his Cabinet, and his party.[79] Even
First Lady Imelda Marcos, who was abroad at the time, was also reportedly taken aback by the
announcement.[80] However, as recent scholarship suggests, this confidence only showed his
isolation from the people whose support on his administration had already waned. Marcos’ Labor
Minister, Blas Ople writes:

He (Marcos) couldn’t say that he was beleaguered and encircled, that he was losing the support
of Washington and the international community and that he needed a breakthrough to reestablish
his ability to govern. He was never that frank with us but we knew why.[81]

Marcos had to consolidate his forces if the election would go to his favor. As it was before the
declaration of Martial Law, Marcos needed the support of the military. While acting Chief of
Staff General Fidel V. Ramos was next in line as the Chief of Staff, the president knew that he
needed Fabian Ver back. Ver was on leave, as he was being prosecuted in the Aquino-Galman
murder case. By December 2, 1985, Ver and 26 other suspects were acquitted in a legal decision
that caused public outrage.[82]

Meanwhile, prior to the snap election announcement, a “Convenor Group” was formed,
composed of Lorenzo Tañada, Jaime V. Ongpin, and Cory Aquino, to select a presidential
candidate for the opposition. Cory was regarded as the rightful candidate, the “people’s choice,”
who was also promoted by Jaime Cardinal Sin.[83] For fear of being left out, Salvador Laurel of
the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO) and Eva Kalaw of the Liberal Party
(LP) formed the National Unification Committee’s (NUC).[84] Laurel was nominated by the
NUC’s Nominating Convention held at the Araneta Coliseum as the presidential candidate of the
opposition party for the coming Snap elections.[85]

Meanwhile, Cory Aquino announced her intention to run if a snap election was to be held, and if
she had the support of a million citizens.[86] She was successful in gaining this support. The
opposition, therefore had two frontrunners: Aquino, and former Senator Salvador “Doy” Laurel.
However, in the same year, on December 7, Laurel decided to give way to Aquino. Though
initially reluctant, Laurel was eventually convinced that their tandem was the only way the
opposition stood a chance against the overwhelming influence of Marcos and the Kilusang
Bagong Lipunan (KBL), and decided to run as Aquino’s vice president. In Teodoro L. Locsin
Jr.’s article in the Philippine Free Press, Cory served as the “symbol of unity.” He further wrote:

“Cory would be the presidential candidate, and Doy who had spent substance and energy to
create ex nihilo a political organization to challenge the Marcos machine must subordinate
himself as her running mate.”
Aquino and Laurel ran together under the United Nationalist Democratic Organization (UNIDO).
[87]

President Ferdinand E. Marcos attends a rally prior to the Snap Elections. Photo by
Peter Charlesworth.
Cory Aquino with her son, Benigno S. Aquino III. on the campaign trail, 1986. Photo
from Teddy Locsin Jr.

During the 1986 snap elections, President Ferdinand E. Marcos used gender as an issue in his
campaign broadcast against rival for the presidency, Corazon C. Aquino. This broadcast warns
that a woman would not be able to handle the challenges of the post.

Businessman Jose Concepcion headed a group of concerned citizens to revive the National
Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL), established in 1957 after the fraud of the 1949
Presidential election, as the citizens’ watchdog on the counting of votes. It had a successful run
in the legislative elections of 1984, releasing an unofficial untampered count. KBL attempted to
discredit NAMFREL, but due to international pressure, COMELEC gave the watchdog
organization official observer status.[88]

Massive poll fraud and rampant cheating marred the vote on the day of the elections, February 7,
1986. Thousands of registered voters—who had voted successfully in previous elections—found
their names suspiciously missing from the lists.[89] Approximately 850 foreign correspondents
flew in to observe,[90] including a delegations headed by U.S. senators and congressmen, who
saw vote rigging happen.[91] On February 9, 35 COMELEC employees and computer operators at
the COMELEC Tabulation Center walked out in protest due to the wide discrepancy between the
computer tabulation and the tally board, showing blatant manipulation of electoral results.[92] In
the countryside, precincts were hounded by the military and ballot-rigging was rampant.
NAMFREL, in turn, showed Aquino in the lead with almost 70 percent of the votes canvassed.

Afraid of ruling party goons who have been known to snatch ballot boxes to throw them
away or to stuff them with favorable manufactured votes, vigilantes form human
barricades for boxes being brought from precincts to municipal halls for official tally.

Photo by Ben Avestruz, People Power: The Philippine Revolution of 1986.

On February 9, 1986, thirty-five tabulators manning the COMELEC’s quick count
computer terminals walked out during the 1986 snap elections. Photo from Bantayog
Museum.

LIST OF 35 TABULATORS WHO WALKED OUT

Linda (Kapunan) Mario Lavin

Rory Asuncion Zoe Castro
Angeles-Hill
Myrna “Shiony” Thess Baltazar-Roberto
Bot Bautista Charles Chan
Asuncion-Binamira
Jane Rosales-Yap Erlyn Barza Nori Bolado Euly Molina-Legro
Nitro Palomares-
Cooly Culiat-Medina Rubi Macato-Slater Erick Celestino Castro
Alicia Torres Dennie Estolas- Marissa Contreras- Maite de Rivera
Vista Legaspi
Achie Concepcion- Bing Romero-Justo
Ernie Alberto Bambi Flor-Sena
Jimenez
Marisa Briones- Vangie Saludares
Maleen Cruz-Ngan Naz Gutierrez III
Allarey
Marissa Almendral Mina Fajardo Bergara Luchie Lavin Irma Sunico-Buno
Gi Antonio-Silva Jules Valderrama Celine Vinoya-Rivera
By February 15, 1986, in an unprecedented announcement that was met with public outrage, the
Batasang Pambansa proclaimed Marcos and Arturo Tolentino as the winners of the presidential
and vice-presidential race respectively, by virtue of Resolution No. 38. Opposition assemblymen
walked out of the Session Hall in protest.

Twenty-six parliamentary members walk out from the floor of the National Assembly just
before the assembly proclaimed President Ferdinand Marcos winner of the February 7
election. The official tally had Marcos the victor over Corazon Aquino by 1.5 million
votes. Photo by Jun Brioso.

This led to the opposition’s indignation rally in Luneta the next day where Cory Aquino spoke to
around two million people in Luneta, in what would be known as the Tagumpay ng Bayan rally.
At the event, Aquino called for massive civil disobedience and boycott of Marcos-crony owned
companies and products. The Aquino-Laurel ticket also proclaimed victory.
The International Observer Delegation, composed of 44 delegates from 19 different countries
who observed the electoral process, also released their report citing disturbing anomalies in the
election results and subsequent intimidation of voters.[94]

Supporters of Cory Aquino and Salvador Laurel holding a ‘Victory of People’ or

‘Tagumpay ng Bayan’ rally, February 16, 1986. Photo from LIFE Photo Collection.

February 25 was chosen as the day of President Marcos’ inauguration.[95] As inaugural invitations
were sent to the diplomatic corps, none of embassies sent their congratulatory remarks to
Marcos, except for Soviet ambassador Vadim Shabalin, who was apparently in Malacañan for a
courtesy call. When President Marcos informed him of the supposed result of the election, the
ambassador offered his compliments, which is now cited as a grave diplomatic error.[96] The
silence of foreign governments alarmed the administration.

On February 22, 1986, Marcos sent Labor Minister Blas Ople and Executive Secretary Alejandro
Melchor to the United States, and sent J.V. Cruz and Presidential Assistant for General
Government Jacobo Clave to Europe, in a last ditch effort to legitimize his win in the presidency.
Roberto Benedicto and Arturo Tolentino were to be sent to Japan, and the ASEAN countries
respectively.[97]
Because of the calls for a boycott of crony companies announced by Cory Aquino, San Miguel
Corporation fell in the stock market. The Manila Bulletin also lost a significant number of
readers.

F. Coup Plot by the RAM

The Reform the Armed Forces Movement (RAM) emerged in 1982 as a small, secret group
intent on strengthening military rule through a coup d’état.[98] Initially, it was composed of
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile and a handful of regular officers from the Philippine
Military Academy (PMA), who harbored resentment against General Fabian Ver, the Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).

The divide between PMA-trained regulars and officers from the Reserve Officers’ Training
Corps (ROTC) was already evident in the early years of Martial Law. Marcos appointed ROTC
officers to the top positions in the army, navy, and air force, passing over senior PMA graduates.
[99]
 When Ver succeeded Romeo Espina as Marcos’ Chief of Staff, Ver was quick to isolate his
rivals. “Ignoring merit or seniority,” writes Alfred McCoy, “he played upon ethnicity, blood, and
school ties to pick favorites for key commands.”[100] Himself an alumnus of the University of the
Philippines reserve program, he promoted former reservists and retained them even after their
mandatory retirement, thus stifling the upward mobility of PMA-trained regulars.[101]

By early 1985, the RAM was a fully organized group with a leadership committee of 11 men and
a membership base of around three hundred. Although relatively small, the RAM had the support
of a majority of AFP officers, especially the PMA regulars.[102] By the middle of the year, the
RAM went public, yet popular suspicion regarding the movement’s integrity arose due to its
inclusion of former military torturers.[103] Still, most media outlets ignored their human rights
record, choosing instead to paint the RAM as reformers.[104]

Plans for a Christmas coup in 1985 were started in August, but when President Marcos
unexpectedly called for snap elections in November,[105] RAM leaders had to rethink their
strategy, and the coup was postponed for the following year. When Marcos was proclaimed the
winner in the fraudulent February 7 elections, the RAM leaders agreed to launch their coup at
2:00 a.m. (“H-hour”) on Sunday, February 23, 1986.[106]

The plan was as follows: At 1:30 a.m., Colonel Gregorio “Gringo” Honasan and twenty
commandos would cross the Pasig River on rubber rafts and break into the Malacañan Palace,
arresting President Marcos and Imelda. At 2:00 a.m. Lieutenant Colonel Eduardo “Red”
Kapunan would command a hundred-man strike team to attack the security compound on the
southern bank of the Pasig. Using smoke grenades as cover, they would detonate bombs and kill
General Fabian Ver. The explosions would serve as a signal for two motorized RAM columns to
break through the gates of the security compound. Major Saulito Aromin’s 49th Infantry
Battalion would launch a simultaneous maneuver, posing as pro-Marcos reinforcements to
reinforce Honasan’s commandos and secure the Palace. At 2:30 a.m, the Presidential Security
Command would transmit false orders to eight pro-Marcos battalions in the capital to keep them
from moving. At the same time, Colonel Tito Legazpi would capture Villamor Airbase and radio
RAM units in the provinces to fly to Manila. At 3:00 a.m., just an hour after the coup’s launch,
Enrile would issue Proclamation No. 1, establishing a revolutionary government.[107]

Yet for all the RAM leaders’ confidence in their plan, they did not have the command experience
to successfully carry out the complicated operation, after almost ten years of sitting in air-
conditioned offices.[108] And to make matters worse, Ver knew of the coup. On the Thursday
before the planned coup, he summoned his senior officers and engineered a trap. He ordered a
navy demolition team to plant bombs and mines along the palace riverfront. As the rebels made
their way toward the palace on rafts, Ver would blind them with powerful spotlights. Marcos’
son, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr., would be brought out with a loud hailer, giving the
rebels a final chance to surrender. If the rebels did not stand down, they would be blown sky
high.[109]

The rebels only realized that their plan had been compromised on the Friday night before the
coup, when Honasan and Kapunan saw a large number of troops amassing at Malacañang. They
informed Enrile about the situation, and the assault on the palace had to be called off.[110]
The map used by General Fabian Ver to plan out the attack on Camp Crame and Camp
Aguinaldo, superimposed onto a current aerial photograph of the area. This map was
drawn on a blackboard and remains on display in the Presidential Museum and Library.

Faced with only two options—dispersing or regrouping—Enrile chose the latter as the “more
honorable” option.[111] He announced his defection from Marcos on Saturday night in a press
conference at Camp Aguinaldo, alongside Lieutenant General Fidel V. Ramos, Ver’s deemed
successor.[112] In the first critical hours of the uprising, RAM leaders called on former PMA
classmates and comrades, pleading for support or at the very least neutrality, thus undermining
Marcos’ defenses.[113]

At 9:00 p.m., Jaime Cardinal Sin made his famous announcement over Radio Veritas,
beseeching the people to bring food and gather at Camps Aguinaldo and Crame to support Enrile
and Ramos. An hour later, Enrile finally reached Cory Aquino via telephone.[114] Aquino was at
an anti-Marcos rally in Cebu City. She was informed of the coup[115], but she was also suspicious
of Enrile’s motives. Half a day later, she announced her support for the rebellion and asked the
people to help.[116]

On that first night, people came to EDSA by the thousands with whatever provisions they could
offer: pans of pancit, boxes of pizza, tins of biscuits, bunches of bananas.[117] Edwin Lacierda,
presidential spokesperson of President Benigno S. Aquino III, was there to witness: “More than a
rally,” he recalls, “all of us came to EDSA to break bread and fellowship with all who were
willing to stand in the line of fire and take the bullet, as it were, for freedom and change of
government.”[118]

Thus began the four-day EDSA People Power Revolution. The revolution was a peaceful one,
with soldiers being coaxed with food, prayers, flowers, and cheers by people from all walks of
life who sat, stood, and knelt in prayer in front of the tanks.[119] For instance, on February 24, the
government-controlled Channel 4 was liberated by women who were sent into the compound to
negotiate with the loyalist soldiers.[120] Church-owned radio station Radio Veritas did a marathon
coverage of the revolution; disc jockey June Keithley, who averaged seventeen hours on air daily
over the four days, kept the public informed in between airings of Ang Bayan Ko, Tie a Yellow
Ribbon, and a curiously resurrected political jingle from the 1950s called Mambo Magsaysay.[121]

In the evening of February 22, Marcos  personally telephoned General Prospero Olivas five
times, ordering him to disperse the crowd at Camp Aguinaldo, because their presence would
complicate an assault. A mentee of Ramos, Olivas feigned compliance and countermanded
Marcos’ orders. Marcos then turned to General Alfredo Lim, the Metrocom district commander,
but Lim was also loyal to Ramos and disregarded Marcos’ orders.[122]

In addition to the reluctance of Marcos’ officers, Marine Commandant Artemio Tadiar also
pointed out the military incompetence of Ver’s plan, saying, “Every inch of the palace was
occupied, literally.” “There were […] over eight thousand men packed so tightly in the narrow
streets around the palace that they had no room to maneuver, and reinforcements were still
arriving.”[123]

On February 24, at 5:00 a.m., Marcos was heard over the radio, “We’ll wipe them out. It is
obvious they are committing rebellion.”[124] On that Monday morning, government troops headed
by Marine battalions began their advance to Camp Crame from different directions as a dozen of
helicopters encircled the camp. At 6:20 a.m., the tensed crowd around the Constabulary
Headquarters waited with uncertainty as the helicopters approached.[125] Wurfel narrates one of
the pivotal events of People Power as fear turned into loud cheers from the crowd:

When eight helicopters circled over Camp Crame on Monday morning, fears of bombardment
were still high, but they landed and joined the rebels. This was probably the military turning
point; thereafter military defections took place at an increasing pace. Yet Ver threatened to bomb
and strafe Camp Crame, and Marcos held a press conference where he insisted, “I don’t intend to
step down as President. Never, never!”

At 8:30 a.m., government troops broke into the rear of Camp Aguinaldo and trained their
howitzers and mortars on Camp Crame. By 9:00 a.m., General Josephus Ramas gave the Fourth
Marine brigade the “kill order” while civilians were still inside, but the brigade’s commander
Colonel Braulio Balbas hesitated. Instead, he told Ramas, “We’re still positioning the
cannons.”[126] Ramas would ask Balbas to attack four times, and each time, Balbas stalled.
Marcos lost control of the Marines.[127]

At around the same time, a rebel frigate anchored at the mouth of the Pasig River had its guns
aimed at Malacañan, just three kilometers away. Earlier that morning, Naval Defense Force chief
Commodore Tagumpay Jardiniano told his men that he had declared himself for Enrile and
Ramos. His men stood up and applauded, and Marcos lost control of the navy.[128]

At 9:15 a.m., Marcos, together with Ver appeared on television for a Press Conference. Ver
requested Marcos permission to attack Camp Crame. But Marcos postured on TV to restrain Ver,
saying, “My order is to disperse without shooting them.”[129] However, when Marine
commandant General Artemio Tadiar met with Ver later, Ver confirmed that Marcos approved
the kill order on Crame.[130]

Following a rocket attack from the rebel helicopters, General Ver radioed the wing commander
of the F-5 fighters in Manila, ordering them to bomb Camp Crame. Francisco Baula, the
squadron leader and RAM member, answered sarcastically: “Yes, sir, roger. Proceeding now to
strafe Malacañang.”[131] At 1:00 p.m., General Ver gave secret orders to Major General Vicente
Piccio to launch an air attack on Camp Crame, to which General Piccio replied, “But, sir, we
have no more gunships. They have just been destroyed.”[132] Marcos lost control of the air force.

After Marcos lost complete control of the military, his presidency came to an end the following
day, on February 25, 1986.
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (right) is joined by Lieutenant General Fidel V.
Ramos as he announces his defection from the Marcos administration. Photo taken
from Bayan Ko!

III. Conclusion

From February 22 to 25, 1986, hundreds of thousands of people amassed at Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue (EDSA), Metro Manila’s main thoroughfare, calling for the peaceful ouster of the
dictator. On February 25, 1986, Corazon C. Aquino and Salvador H. Laurel took their oaths in
Club Filipino as President and Vice President respectively. Meanwhile, Marcos was inaugurated
in the Ceremonial Hall of the Malacañan Palace and delivered his inaugural address in Maharlika
Hall (now Kalayaan Hall) on that same day. Rocked by key military and political defections and
the overwhelming popular support for Aquino, Marcos was forced to depart with his family a
few hours later for exile in Hawaii, effectively ending Marcos’ two-decade long dictatorial rule.

By March 1986,[133] intelligence sources surfaced indicating that President Marcos was planning
to stage widespread bombing and arson operations throughout Manila, so he could impose
another martial law—called “Operation Everlasting.” The plan was to neutralize all opposition
by arresting all opposition leaders, the entire executive council of NAMFREL[134] and the RAM
rebels in a planned concentration camp in Caballo Island near Corregidor.[135] Hence, the EDSA
People Power Revolution averted a resumption of an oppressive regime that would have
curtailed the country’s civil liberties in the years to come.
The Philippines had its “longest day” on February 25, 1986, as it started the day with
virtually no president, had two presidents by noon, and one president before midnight.
TOP, oath taking as President by Corazon C. Aquino at Club Filipino before Associate
Justice Claudio Teehankee. BOTTOM, President Ferdinand E. Marcos sworn in Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino in the Ceremonial Hall, Malacañan Palace.

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Endnotes
[1]
 “Editorial:Constitutional Convention or Malacañang Kennel?” Philippine Free Press, January
22, 1972, accessed February 18, 2016, link.
[2]
 Presidential Communications Development and Strategic Planning Office
(PCDSPO), Philippine Electoral Almanac, rev. and exp. edition (Manila: PCDSPO, 2015), 115.
[3]
 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay, (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
Press), 116.
[4]
 Ibid.
[5]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 116-120.
[6]
 Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution:
Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-
Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 26.
[7]
 Rosalinda Pineda Ofreneo, The Manipulated Press: A History of Philippine Journalism Since
1945  (Mandaluyong City: Cacho Hermanos Inc., 1984), 135.
[8]
 D. H. Soriano, Amadeo R. Dacanay, Paulina F. Bautista, and R. R. Marcelino, The Roces
Family, Publishers: With a History of the Philippine Press (Quezon City: Islas Filipinas
Publishing, 1987), 125; Dominador D. Buhain, A History of Publishing in the
Philippines (Quezon City: Rex Book Store, 1998), 98.
[9]
 Gerald Sussman, “Politics and the Press: The Philippines Since Marcos,” Philippine
Studies 36, no. 4 (1988): 495.
[10]
 Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” 30.
[11]
 Ibid. 29.
[12]
 David Wurfel, Filipino Politics: Development and Decay (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila
University Press, 1988), 204.
[13]
 Ibid., 205.
[14]
 Ibid.
[15]
 Ibid., 208-209.
[16]
 Ibid., 206.
[17]
 Manuel F. Martinez, Aquino Vs. Marcos: The Grand Collision (Quezon City: Manuel F.
Martinez, 1987), 342.
[18]
 Ibid., 340-341.
[19]
 Emmanuel S. de Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” in Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo
Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-Tirol, eds., Dictatorship and Revolution: Roots of People’s
Power (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 70.
[20]
 Ibid.
[21]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 122.
[22]
 Ibid., 125.
[23]
 Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines (Pasig City: Anvil
Publishing, 2005), 217.
[24]
 Ibid., 219; Benigno Aquino Jr., “Jabidah! Special Forces of Evil,” Official Gazette of the
Republic of the Philippines. March 28, 1968, accessed November 27,
2015, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-senator-
benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972 (September 21, 1972); “Third
Republic,” Official Gazette of the Republic of the Philippines, accessed November 27,
2015, http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/.
[25]
 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 217.
[26]
 Ibid., 217 and 219.
[27]
 Ibid., 219.
[28]
 Manuel Quezon III, “Road to EDSA”, Today Newspaper, February 25, 1996, February 22,
2016, http://mlq3.tumblr.com/post/3415013093/the-road-to-edsa.
[29]
 Gregg Jones, Red Revolution: Inside the Philippine Guerrilla Movement (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1989), 225-226.
[30]
 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220.
[31]
 De Dios, “The Erosion of the Dictatorship,” 128.
[32]
 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 220.
[33]
 Ibid.
[34]
 Ibid.
[35]
 Manuel L. Quezon III, “The Road to EDSA,” Today, February 25, 1996, accessed February
18, 2016, link.
[36]
 Katherine Ellison, Imelda: Steel Butterfly of the Philippines, (Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse,
Inc., 1988), 206.
[37]
 “One can never justify any violation of rights’: John Paul II stands up to a dictator,” GMA
News Online, April 27, 2014, accessed February 16, 2016, link.
[38]
 Alfred W. McCoy, Closer than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military
Academy (London and New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999), 226.
[39]
 Editorial, “If,” Philippine Free Press, August 23, 1986, link.
[40]
 “Aide confirms illness of Marcos,” The New York Times, December 4, 1984, accessed
February 10, 2016, link.
[41]
 “Marcos reported stricken by fatal illness,” Chicago Tribune, October 18, 1985, accessed
February 10, 2016, link.
[42]
 “Marcos seriously ill with rare disease lupus, U.S. sources say,” Los Angeles Times, January
17, 1986, accessed February 10, 2016, link.
[43]
 Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 235.
[44]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 123.
[45]
 Muego, “The Executive Committee in the Philippines,” 1159.
[46]
 Ibid.
[47]
 Ibid., 1167.
[48]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 128-129.
[49]
 Carolina G. Hernandez, “Reconstituting Political Order,” in Crisis in the Philippines: The
Marcos Era and Beyond, ed. John Bresnan (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986),
182.
[50]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 130.
[51]
 James K. Boyce, The Political Economy of Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos
Era,  (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1993), 347.
[52]
 The Green Revolution was a strategy of introducing new rice technologies to Philippine
agriculture, utilizing scientific research of international agencies and applying it to Philippine
crops such as rice.
[53]
 Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 90-91.
[54]
 John M. Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice: The Politics of Adjustment in the Third
World  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990), 232.
[55]
 Ibid., 233.
[56]
 Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 169-170.
[57]
 Ibid., 210.
[58]
 Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232.
[59]
 Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 210.
[60]
 Ibid., 211.
[61]
 Ibid., 180.
[62]
 Jeffrey Riedinger, Agrarian Reform in the Philippines: Democratic Transitions and
Redistributive Reform, (California: Stanford University Press, 1995), 130.
[63]
 Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 212.
[64]
 Nelson, Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, 232.
[65]
 Boyce, Growth and Impoverishment in the Marcos Era, 205.
[66]
 Ibid,, 205.
[67]
 Ibid., 348.
[68]
 Raymond Bonner, Waltzing with a Dictator: The Marcoses and the Making of American
Policy (New York, NY: Times Books, 1987), 264.
[69]
 Ibid., 265.
[70]
 Ibid., 267.
[71]
 Ibid.
[72]
 Ibid., 265.
[73]
 Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 238.
[74]
 Abinales and Amoroso, State and Society in the Philippines, 219; Aquino, “Jabidah! Special
Forces of Evil,” http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/1968/03/28/jabidah-special-forces-of-evil-by-
senator-benigno-s-aquino-jr/; Proclamation No. 1081 s. 1972; “Third
Republic,” http://www.officialgazette.gov.ph/featured/third-republic/.
[75]
 Rigoberto Tiglao, “The Consolidation of the Dictatorship,” in Dictatorship and Revolution:
Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-De Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-
Tirol (Manila: Conspectus Foundation Inc., 1988), 66.
[76]
 Teodoro M. Locsin, “The Conscience of the Filipino: The Sacrifice,” Philippine Free Press
Online, August 20, 1986, accessed February 16, 2016, link.
[77]
 Ibid.
[78]
 Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” in Dictatorship and Revolution:
Roots of People’s Power, eds. Aurora Javate-de Dios, Petronilo Bn. Daroy, and Lorna Kalaw-
Tirol (Metro Manila: Conspectus Foundation, 1988), 176.
[79]
 Ibid., 180.
[80]
 Gemma Nemenzo Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 180.
[81]
 Ibid., 177.
[82]
 Ibid., 185.
[83]
 Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 296.
[84]
 David G. Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine
Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1991), 131.
[85]
 “Salvador Laurel Diary,” Philippine Diary Project, June 12, 1895, link.
[86]
 Wurfel, 183.
[87]
 PCDSPO, Philippine Electoral Almanac, 132.
[88]
 Almendral, “The Fall of the Regime,” 200.
[89]
 Ibid., 201.
[90]
 Ibid.
[91]
 Table: Composition and Distribution of U.S. Observer Delegations for the February 7, 1986
Presidential Elections, January 15 to February 15, 1986, from the reconstructed files of
COMELEC, Office of the President/National Media Production Center-International Center, and
Embassy of the Philippines, Washington, D.C..
[92]
 COMELEC Employees’ Union, “COMELEC UNION: 1986 poll employees’ walkout
provided spark for EDSA People Power Revolt,” InterAksyon.com, February 24, 2013, accessed
February 11, 2016, link.
[93]
 Reynaldo Santos, “1986 COMELEC Walkout Not about Cory or Marcos,” Rappler, February
25, 2013, accessed February 15, 2016, link.
[94]
 International Observer Delegation, A Path to Democratic Renewal: A Report on the February
7, 1986 Presidential Election in the Philippines,  accessed February 17, 2016, link.
[95]
 Nick Joaquin (Quijano de Manila), The Quarter of the Tiger Moon: Scenes from the People
Power Apocalypse (Manila: Book Stop, 1986), 11.
[96]
 Leszek Buszynski, Gorbachev and Southeast Asia (New York, NY: Routledge, 1992), link.
[97]
 Joaquin, TheQuartet of the Tiger Moon, 13.
[98]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 231.
[99]
 Ibid., 225.
[100]
 Ibid., 227.
[101]
 Ibid., 229-230.
[102]
 Ibid., 232.
[103]
 Ibid., 237
[104]
 Ibid., 233.
[105]
 Ibid., 233-234.
[106]
 Ibid., 241.
[107]
 Ibid., 237-238.
[108]
 Ibid., 238.
[109]
 Ibid., 241.
[110]
 Ibid., 243.
[111]
 Joaquin, The Quarter of the Tiger Moon, 19.
[112]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244.
[113]
 Ibid., 245.
[114]
 Angela Stuart-Santiago, “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link.
[115]
 Cory Aquino was informed by Bel Cunanan, ibid.
[116]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers 246.
[117]
 Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 19.
[118]
 Edwin Lacierda, “Where were you?” Rappler, February 25, 2015, accessed February 17,
2016, link.
[119]
 Wurfel, Filipino Politics, 305.
[120]
 Joaquin, The Quartet of the Tiger Moon, 62.
[121]
 Ibid., 44.
[122]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 244.
[123]
 Ibid., 248.
[124]
 Angela Stuart-Santiago “Chronology of a Revolution,” accessed on February 18, 2016, link.
[125]
 Ibid.
[126]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251.
[127]
 Ibid.
[128]
 McCoy, 250.
[129]
 Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link.
[130]
 Ibid., McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251.
[131]
 McCoy, Closer than Brothers, 251-252.
[132]
 Santiago, “Chronology of the Revolution,” link.
[133]
 Associated Press News Archive, “Military reveals arson, bombing plot during Marcos’ last
days with Am-Philippines”, March 6, 1986, accessed on February 22,
2016, http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1986/Military-Reveals-Arson-Bombing-Plot-during-
Marcos-Last-Days-With-AM-Philippines/id-6f34fa5e77ac9e74672552beed788564
[134]
 Beth Day Romulo, Inside the Palace: The Rise and Fall of Ferdinand and Imelda
Marcos, (Feffer & Sons, 1987), p. 223-225.
[135]
Bryan Johnson, Four Days of Courage: The Untold Story of the Fall of Marcos, (Canada:
McClellan and Stewart, 1987), 267