EN BANC

A.M. No. 1334 November 28, 1989

ROSARIO DELOS REYES, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. JOSE B. AZNAR, respondent.

Federico A. Blay for complainant.

Luciano Babiera for respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against respondent on the ground of gross
immorality.

Complainant, a second year medical student of the Southwestern University

(Cebu), alleged in her verified complaint that respondent Atty. Jose B. Aznar, then
chairman of said university, had carnal knowledge of her for several times under
threat that she would fail in her Pathology subject if she would not submit to
respondent's lustful desires. Complainant further alleged that when she became
pregnant, respondent, through a certain Dr. Gil Ramas, had her undergo forced
abortion.

In compliance with the Resolution of the Court dated July 9, 1974, respondent filed
his Answer denying any personal knowledge of complainant as well as all the
allegations contained in the complaint and by way of special defense, averred that
complainant is a woman of loose morality.

On September 2, 1974, the Court Resolved to refer the case to the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation.

The findings of the Solicitor General is summarized as follows:

EVIDENCE FOR THE COMPLAINANT

Complainant Rosario delos Reyes testified that:

1) she was a second year medical student of the

Southwestern University, the Chairman of the Board of
which was respondent Jose B. Aznar (pp. 11, 15, tsn,
June 6, 1975);

2) she however failed in her Pathology subject which

prompted her to approach respondent in the latter's house
who assured her that she would pass the said subject (pp.
15,16, 26, 33, tsn, June 6, 1975);

3) despite this assurance, however, she failed (p. 33, tsn,

June 6, 1975);

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 4) sometime in February, 1973, respondent told her that
she should go with him to Manila, otherwise, she would
flunk in all her subjects (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6,
1975); ... ... ... ;

5) on February 12, 1973, both respondent and

complainant boarded the same plane (Exh. "A") for
Manila; from the Manila Domestic Airport, they
proceeded to Room 905, 9th Floor of the Ambassador
Hotel where they stayed for three days (Exhs. "K", "K-1"
to "K-6"; p. 55, tsn, June 6, 1 975);

6) after arriving at the Ambassador Hotel, they dined at a

Spanish restaurant at San Marcelino, Malate, Manila for
around three hours (pp 56-57, tsn, June 6, 1975);

7) they returned to the hotel at around twelve o'clock

midnight, where respondent had carnal knowledge of her
twice and then thrice the next morning (p. 59, tsn, June 6,
1975; pp. 154, 155 & 157, tsn, July 18, 1975);

8) complainant consented to the sexual desires of

respondent because for her, she would sacrifice her
personal honor rather than fail in her subjects (p.6l, tsn,
June 6, 1975); ... ... ...;

9) sometime in March, 1973, complainant told

respondent that she was suspecting pregnancy because
she missed her menstruation (p. 76, tsn, July 17, 1975); ...
... ...;

10) later, she was informed by Dr. Monsanto (an

instructor in the college of medicine) that respondent
wanted that an abortion be performed upon her (p.82, tsn,
July l7, 1975); ... ... ... ;

11) thereafter, Ruben Cruz, a confidant of respondent,

and Dr. Monsato fetched her at her boarding house on the
pretext that she would be examined by Dr. Gil Ramas
(pp. 87-88, tsn, July 17, 1975);

12) upon reaching the clinic of Dr. Ramas she was given
an injection and an inhalation mask was placed on her
mouth and nose (pp. 88-90, tsn, July 17, 1 975);

13) as a result, she lost consciousness and when she woke

up, an abortion had already been performed upon her and
she was weak, bleeding and felt pain all over her body
(pp. 90-91, tsn, July 17, 1975); ... ... ... (Rollo, pp. 38-40)

Monica Gutierrez Tan testified that she met complainant and a man
whom complainant introduced as Atty. Aznar in front of the
Ambassador Hotel (pp. 183-184, tsn, Sept. 10, 1975; Rollo, p. 41).

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Dr. Rebecca Gucor and Dr. ArtemioIngco, witnesses for the complainant, testified
that abdominal examinations and x-ray examination of the lumbro-sacral region of
complainant showed no signs of abnormality (Rollo, p. 42).

The evidence for the respondent as reported by the Solicitor General is

summarized as follows:

Edilberto Caban testified that:

1. In December, 1972, respondent Atty. Aznar stayed at

Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children; respondent
never came to Manila except in December, 1972; (pp. 8-
9,. tsn, Nov. 24, 1977);

2. He usually slept with respondent everytime the latter

comes to Manila (p. 13, tsn, Nov. 24, 1977; Rollo, pp.
42-43).

Oscar Salangsang, another witness for the respondent stated that:

1. In February, 1973, he went to Ambassador Hotel to

meet respondent; the latter had male companions at the
hotel but he did not see any woman companion of
respondent Aznar;

2. He usually slept with respondent at the Ambassador

Hotel and ate with him outside the hotel together with
Caban (pp. 8-9, 13-15, tsn, Jan. 13, 1978; Rollo, p. 43).

The Court notes that throughout the period of the investigation conducted by the
Solicitor General, respondent Aznar was never presented to refute the allegations
made against him.

In his Answer, respondent Aznar alleges that he does not have any knowledge of
the allegations in the complaint. As special defense, respondent further alleged that
the charge levelled against him is in furtherance of complainant's vow to wreck
vengeance against respondent by reason of the latter's approval of the
recommendation of the Board of Trustees barring complainant from enrollment for
the school year 1973-1974 because she failed in most of her subjects. It is likewise
contended that the defense did not bother to present respondent in the investigation
conducted by the Solicitor General because nothing has been shown in the hearing
to prove that respondent had carnal knowledge of the complainant.

Contrary to respondent's averments, the Solicitor General made a categorical

finding to the effect that respondent had carnal knowledge of complainant, to wit:

From the foregoing, it is clear that complainant was compelled to go

to Manila with respondent upon the threat of respondent that if she
failed to do so, she would flunk in all her subjects and she would
never become a medical intern (pp. 42, 50, tsn, June 6, 1975). As
respondent was Chairman of the College of Medicine, complainant
had every reason to believe him.

It has been established also that complainant was brought by

respondent to Ambassador Hotel in Manila for three days where he
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 repeatedly had carnal knowledge of her upon the threat that if she
would not give in to his lustful desires, she would fail in her
Pathology subject (Exhs. "A", "K", "K-1" to "K-6" pp. 51, 52, 55-59,
tsn, June 6, 1975);

xxxxxxxxx

On the other hand, respondent did not bother to appear during the
hearing. It is true that he presented Edilberto Caban and Oscar
Salangsang who testified that respondent usually slept with them
every time the latter came to Manila, but their testimony (sic) is not
much of help. None of them mentioned during the hearing that they
stayed and slept with respondent on February 12 to February 14, 1973
at Ambassador Hotel. ... ... ... Besides, Edilberto Caban testified that
respondent stayed at Ambassador Hotel with his wife and children in
December, 1972. The dates in question, however, are February 12 to
14, 1973, inclusive. His (Caban's) testimony, therefore, is immaterial
to the present case" (Rollo, pp. 43-44).

In effect, the Solicitor General found that the charge of immorality against
respondent Aznar has been substantiated by sufficient evidence both testimonial
and documentary; while finding insufficient and uncorroborated the accusation of
intentional abortion. The Solicitor General then recommends the suspension of
respondent from the practice of law for a period of not less than three (3) years.

On March 16, 1989, the Court Resolved to require the parties to Move in the
premises to determine whether any intervening event occurred which would render
the case moot and academic (Rollo, p. 69).

On April 12, 1989, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation and motion praying
that the case at bar be considered submitted for decision on the bases of the report
and recommendation previously submitted together with the record of the case and
the evidence adduced (Rollo, p. 75).

After a thorough review of the records, the Court agrees with the finding of the
Solicitor General that respondent Aznar, under the facts as stated in the Report of
the investigation conducted in the case, is guilty of "grossly immoral conduct" and
may therefore be removed or suspended by the Supreme Court for conduct
unbecoming a member of the Bar (Sec. 27, Rule 138, Rules of Court).

Respondent failed to adduce evidence sufficient to engender doubt as to his

culpability of the offense imputed upon him. With the exception of the self-serving
testimonies of two witnesses presented on respondent's behalf, the records are
bereft of evidence to exonerate respondent of the act complained of, much less
contradict, on material points, the testimonies of complainant herself.

While respondent denied having taken complainant to the Ambassador Hotel and
there had sexual intercourse with the latter, he did not present any evidence to
show where he was at that date. While this is not a criminal proceeding, respondent
would have done more than keep his silence if he really felt unjustly traduced.

It is the duty of a lawyer, whenever his moral character is put in issue, to satisfy
this Court that he is a fit and proper person to enjoy continued membership in the
Bar. He cannot dispense with nor downgrade the high and exacting moral

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standards of the law profession (Go v. Candoy, 21 SCRA 439 [1967]). As once
pronounced by the Court:

When his integrity is challenged by evidence, it is not enough that he

denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome
the evidence for the relator (Legal and Judicial Ethics, by Malcolm, p.
93) and show proofs that he still maintains the highest degree of
morality and integrity, which at all times is expected of him. ... In the
case of United States v. Tria, 17 Phil. 303, Justice Moreland, speaking
for the Court, said:

An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the

State. If he does not perform that duty, he may not always expect the
State to perform it for him. If he fails to meet the obligation which he
owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things, he is
hardy indeed if he demand and expect that same full and wide
consideration which the State voluntarily gives to those who by
reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This is particularly so when
he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him (Quingwa SCRA 439
[1967]).

The Solicitor General recommends that since the complainant is partly to blame for
having gone with respondent to Manila knowing fully well that respondent is a
married man ,with children, respondent should merely be suspended from the
practice of law for not less than three (3) years (Rollo, p. 47).

On the other hand, respondent in his manifestation and motion dated April 18,
1989 alleges that since a period of about ten (10) years had already elapsed from
the time the Solicitor General made his recommendation for a three (3) years
suspension and respondent is not practicing his profession as a lawyer, the court
may now consider the respondent as having been suspended during the said period
and the case dismissed for being moot and academic.

We disagree.

Complainant filed the instant case for disbarment not because respondent reneged
on a promise to marry (Quingwa v. Puno, supra). More importantly. complainant's
knowledge of respondent's marital status is not at issue in the case at bar.
Complainant submitted to respondent's solicitation for sexual intercourse not
because of a desire for sexual gratification but because of respondent's moral
ascendancy over her and fear that if she would not accede, she would flunk in her
subjects. As chairman of the college of medicine where complainant was enrolled,
the latter had every reason to believe that respondent could make good his threats.
Moreover, as counsel for respondent would deem it "worthwhile to inform the
Court that the respondent is a scion of a rich family and a very rich man in his own
right and in fact is not practicing his profession before the court" (Rollo, p. 70),
mere suspension for a limited period, per se, would therefore serve no redeeming
purpose. The fact that he is a rich man and does not practice his profession as a
lawyer, does not render respondent a person of good moral character. Evidence of
good moral character precedes admission to bar (Sec.2, Rule 138, Rules of Court)
and such requirement is not dispensed with upon admission thereto. Good moral
character is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to continue in the

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practice of law. The ancient and learned profession of law exacts from its members
the highest standard of morality (Quingwa v. Puno, supra).

Under Section 27, Rule 138, "(a) member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, ... " In Arciga v.
Maniwang (106 SCRA 591, [1981]), this Court had occasion to define the concept
of immoral conduct, as follows:

A lawyer may be disbarred for grossly immoral conduct, or by reason

of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. A member of
the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as

to what is grossly immoral conduct or to specify the moral
delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of
continuing as a member of the bar. The rule implies that what appears
to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be the
immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as 'that which is willful, flagrant,

or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
the good and respectable members of the community' (7 C.J.S. 959).

Where an unmarried female dwarf possessing the intellect of a child

became pregnant by reason of intimacy with a married lawyer who
was the father of six children, disbarment of the attorney on the
ground of immoral conduct was justified (In re Hicks 20 Pac. 2nd
896).

In the present case, it was highly immoral of respondent, a married man with
children, to have taken advantage of his position as chairman of the college of
medicine in asking complainant, a student in said college, to go with him to Manila
where he had carnal knowledge of her under the threat that she would flunk in all
her subjects in case she refused.

WHEREFORE, respondent Jose B. Aznar is hereby DISBARRED and his name is

ordered stricken off from the Roll of Attorneys.

SO ORDERED.