The whole class, as a group, shall prepare, compile and submit digests of cases

penned by the incoming bar chairman, Justice Marvic Leonen, on Provisional Remedies
and Special Civil Actions.

Evy Construction and Development Corporation vs. Valiant Roll Forming Sales
Corporation (G.R. No. 207938, October 11, 2017, Leonen, J.)

On September 4, 2007, Evy Construction purchased a parcel of land covered by TCT

No. 134890 from certain Linda Ang. At the time of the sale, no lien or encumbrance was
annotated on the title. On November 20, 2007, Evy Construction registered the sale with
the Register of Deeds to which TCT No. 168590 was issued but contained the
annotation of the prior attachments by Valiant Corporation.

RTC decided in favor of Valiant and a writ of execution was issued against the property
covered by TCT No. 134890.

Evy Construction filed a third-party claim alleging that it had already filed with the sheriff
an Affidavit of Title/Ownership in accordance with Rule 57 of the Rules of Court.
However, Valiant posted an indemnity Bond to answer for any damages that Evy
Construction may suffer should the execution proceed.

By virtue of the writ of execution, the sheriff issued a Notice of Sale for TCT No. 134890
and eventually a Certificate of Sale was issued to Valiant as the winning bidder.

Evy Construction filed for annulment of execution and certificate of sale, with damages,
and application for temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to enjoin
the Register of Deeds from compelling it to surrender its copy of TCT No. 168590 and
from annotating any further encumbrances claiming that it would suffer great and
irreparable injury as potential investors interested in developing the property "would
back out of their investment plans if there was a cloud of doubt hovering over the title on
the property."

The Regional Trial Court denied the application as well as the Motion for
Reconsideration.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC holding that Evy Construction
failed to sufficiently establish its right to the issuance of a temporary restraining order.
The CA likewise pointed out that Evy Construction could still sue for damages if the trial
court eventually finds that the sale of the property was invalid or proceed against the
indemnity bond posted by Valiant for any damages it might suffer as a result of the sale.

The motion for reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this
Petition.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioner Evy Construction was denied due process when its
application for a writ of preliminary injunction was denied in the same proceeding as
its application for a temporary restraining order?

2. Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner’s
application for injunctive relief.

RULING:

1. No. A trial court may issue a temporary restraining order even without a prior hearing
for a limited period of 72 hours "if the matter is of extreme urgency and the applicant
will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury." In this instance, a summary hearing,
separate from the application of the preliminary injunction, is required only to
determine if a 72-hour temporary restraining order should be extended. A trial court
may also issue ex parte a temporary restraining order for 20 days if it shall appear
from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or irreparable
injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice."  The
trial court has 20 days from its issuance to resolve the application for preliminary
injunction or if no action is taken on the application for preliminary injunction during
this period, the temporary restraining order is deemed to have expired. Inversely
stated, an application for preliminary injunction may be denied even without the
conduct of a hearing separate from that of the summary hearing of an application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a
preliminary injunction may be granted, if it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of, or in requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

2. No. The grant or denial of a writ of preliminary injunction in a pending case rests in
the sound discretion of the court taking cognizance of the case since the
assessment and evaluation of evidence towards that end involve findings of facts left
to the said court for its conclusive determination. The trial court, in the exercise of its
discretion, denied petitioner's application for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction on the ground that petitioner would still have
sufficient relief in its prayer for damages in its complaint. Injunction is defined as "a
judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from
 doing a certain act." It may be filed as a main action before the trial court or as a
provisional remedy in the main action. The main action for injunction is distinct from
the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which cannot exist
except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a
matter of course, in an action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary
injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue. Under the law, the main
action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct
from, and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary
injunction, the sole object of which is to preserve the status quo until the merits can
be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or proceeding
prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the
termination of the action without the court issuing a final injunction. Thus, in
determining whether or not petitioner is entitled to injunctive relief, the courts would
have to pass upon the inevitable issue of which between petitioner and respondent
has the better right over the property, the very issue to be resolved in the main case.
The grant of an injunctive writ could operate as a prejudgment of the main case.
Therefore, its proper remedy is not the issuance of an injunctive writ but to thresh
out the merits of its Complaint before the trial court.In every application for
provisional injunctive relief, the applicant must establish the actual and existing right
sought to be protected. The applicant must also establish the urgency of a writ's
issuance to prevent grave and irreparable injury. Failure to do so will warrant the
court's denial of the application. Moreover, the application for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction may be denied in the same summary hearing as the
application for the issuance of the temporary restraining.

Note: The issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is considered an "extraordinary

event," being a ''strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy." Thus, the power to
issue the writ "should be exercised sparingly, with utmost care, and with great
caution and deliberation." An injunctive writ is granted only to applicants with "actual
and existing substantial rights" or rights in esse. Further, the applicant must show
"that the invasion of the right is material and substantial and that there is an urgent
and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage." Thus, the writ will
not issue to applicants whose rights are merely contingent or to compel or restrain
acts that do not give rise to a cause of action.

Bicol Medical Center and the Department of Health vs.

NOE B. BOTOR, et al. (G.R. No. 214073 October 4, 2017, Leonen, J.)
,

Prima facie evidence is evidence that is not rebutted or contradicted, making it good

and sufficient on its face to establish a fact constituting a party's claim or defense. 1

This resolves the Petition for Review 2 filed by Bicol Medical Center and the Department
of Health, assailing the February 28, 2014 Decision 3 and August 26, 2014 Resolution4 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 129806.

Camarines Sur Provincial Hospital (Provincial Hospital) was established in 1933 as a

25-bed provincial hospital located along Mabini Street, now Peñafrancia Avenue, Naga
City. The Camarines Sur Provincial Government eventually subsidized the operations of
a private hospital located at Concepcion Pequefia, Naga City and transferred the
Provincial Hospital there.5

Road Lot No. 3, which stretched from Panganiban Road to J. Miranda Avenue, is a
service road which leads to the Provincial Hospital. 6

The Provincial Hospital was eventually converted to the Bicol

Regional Training and Teaching Hospital (Training and Teaching Hospital). 7

Sometime in 1982, the Camarines Sur Provincial Government donated about five (5)
hectares of land to the Ministry of Health, now the Department of Health, 8 as evidenced
by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 13693. 9 The Training and Teaching Hospital
and Road Lot No. 3 were included in this donation. 10

The Training and Teaching Hospital became the Bicol Medical Center (BMC) in
1995.11 Sometime in 2009, BMC constructed a steel gate along J. Miranda Avenue to
control the flow of vehicle and pedestrian traffic entering the hospital premises. 12

On March 21, 2012, Dr. Efren SJ. Nerva (Dr. Nerva), BMC Chief I, issued Hospital
Memorandum No. 0310,13 which ordered the rerouting of traffic inside the BMC
Compound. Salient portions of this Memorandum read:

To: All Officials and Employees This Center

Subject: Traffic Re-routing inside the BMC Compound In line with the Traffic Re-routing
of the Center, the exit gate at the MCC Quarters shall be closed and the OPD Exit Gate
shall be used for the exit of pedestrians and motor vehicles effective April l, 2012.

For information and dissemination purposes. 14

This rerouting scheme closed the steel gate for vehicles and pedestrians along J.
Miranda Avenue, relocating it from the eastern side of the hospital to the western side
effective April 1, 2012.15 The relocation of this gate was implemented for security
reasons and to make way for "[m]assive development within the Complex." 16

The gate closure drew a lot of criticism from the community, and on May 19, 2012, Atty.
Noe Botor (Atty. Botor) wrote to Naga City Mayor John Bongat (Mayor Bongat), asking
for the reopening or dismantling of the gate for being a public nuisance. 17

The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Naga City passed a resolution authorizing Mayor

Bongat to dismantle the gate. 18 However, instead of dismantling it, Mayor Bongat filed a
Verified Petition with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction against BMC. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2012-0073 and raffled to Branch 24, Regional Trial
Court, Naga City.19

Atty. Botor, Celjun F. Yap, Ismael A. Albao, Augusto S. Quilon, Edgar F. Esplana II, and
Josefina F. Esplana (Intervenors) were allowed to intervene and submit their complaint-
in-intervention.20

A few months later, ground-breaking ceremonies for the construction of the Cancer
Center Building21 were conducted, with construction intended to begin in January 2013.
When fully completed, the Cancer Center Building would take over "about three-fourths
(3/4) of the width of Road Lot No. 3."22

On December 21, 2012, the Regional Trial Court denied Naga City's application for
injunctive relief, ruling that Naga City failed to prove a clear and unmistakable right to
the writ prayed for.23

On February 22, 2013, the Regional Trial Court denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by the Intervenors.24

Only the Intervenors filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.25

On February 28, 2014, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and emphasized that
only a prima facie showing of an applicant's right to the writ is required in an application
for writ of injunctive relief.26

The Court of Appeals opined that the Intervenors were able to prove the public
character of Road Lot No. 3, considering that "the general public had been using [it]
since time immemorial," with even Dr. Nerva admitting that he passed through it when
he was young. The Court of Appeals also gave due weight to the 1970s Revised
Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map, which support the
Intervenors' assertion of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3. 27

The Court of Appeals concluded that Naga City and the Intervenors were able to
present prima facie evidence of their right to the writ. However, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that whether or not the Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll should
prevail over BMC's title over the property is a factual matter that should be threshed out
in the trial court.28 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals Decision read:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The

court a quo is hereby DIRECTED to issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction in
the case a quo.

SO ORDERED.29 (Emphasis in the original)

On August 26, 2014, the Court of Appeals 30 denied the motions for reconsideration filed
by BMC and the Department of Health. However, the Court of Appeals emphasized that
the injunction was not directed against the construction of the Cancer Center Building
but against the relocation of the service road and gate closure. 31

On September 29, 2014, petitioners BMC and the Department of Health filed this
Petition for Review on Certiorari32 before this Court. Petitioners claim that although
Road Lot No. 3 has been open to vehicles and pedestrians as BMC's service road, it
was never intended for use by the general public and was not owned by Naga City, as
evidenced by the certification issued by the Office of the City Engineer of Naga City. 33

Petitioners assert that they have set up a gate on Road Lot No. 3, which is closed' at
night, on weekends, and during holidays for security reasons and.for the welfare of
patients and hospital staff.34

Petitioners maintain that Dr. Nerva's closure of the road and relocation of the gate was
in preparation for the construction of the Cancer Center Building. 35 Thus, the preliminary
mandatory injunction issued by the Court of Appeals had the effect of halting
construction of a government project, a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1818 36 and
this Court's Administrative Circular No. 11-2000, which reiterated the prohibition on the
issuance of injunctions in cases involving government infrastructure projects. 37

Petitioners claim that the ₱5l,999,475.26 contract for the Cancer Center Building has
been awarded to OCM Steel Corporation, the winning contractor, and the Notice to
Proceed dated February 3, 2014 has been issued, signalling the mobilization stage of
the construction of the Cancer Center Building. 38

Petitioners emphasize that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the injunction over
the relocation of the service road and closure of the gate did not violate Presidential
Decree No. 1818 because the Cancer Center Building, a government project, will be
constructed right where the gate stands.39

Petitioners point out that the Cancer Center Building will be constructed along Road Lot
No. 3; hence, there is a need to close this road due to the excavation and construction,
which will make it dangerous for pedestrians and vehicles alike to pass through. 40
Petitioners likewise underscore that the intervenors, now respondents, failed to support
their claim that Road Lot No. 3 was a public road 41 or that they had a clear right to the
injunctive relief prayed for.42 Furthermore, respondents also allegedly "failed to prove
that the invasion of the [ir] right sought to be protected [was] material and substantial"
and that there was an urgent necessity for the issuance of the writ to prevent serious
damage.43

Finally, petitioners applied for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction to prevent the reopening of the gate since doing so would affect the
construction of the Cancer Center Building.44

On October 8, 2014, this Court issued two (2) Resolutions. The first
Resolution45 granted petitioners' motion for extension to file their petition. The second
Resolution46 issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the implementation of the
Court of Appeals February 28, 2014 Decision and August 26, 2014 Resolution, which
directed the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of mandatory preliminary injunction on
the closure of Road Lot No. 3. The second Resolution also required respondents to
comment on the petition.47

On January 13, 2015, respondents filed their Comment on the Petition, 48 where they
disputed petitioners' claim that Road Lot No. 3 was always a component or service road
of BMC. Respondents contend that Road Lot No. 3 existed as a public road long before
any hospital was constructed on it and assert that it remains to be a public road to this
day.49

Respondents also dispute petitioners' claim that the road closure was for the
construction of the Cancer Center Building since Dr. Nerva's memorandum was for no
other purpose than to reroute traffic within the hospital complex. 50

Respondents likewise point out that when they filed their intervention before the
Regional Trial Court and their petition before the Court of Appeals, there were still no
plans to construct the Cancer Center Building. Furthermore, BMC allegedly failed to
support its claim that there were indeed plans to build the Cancer Center
Building.51 Nonetheless, respondents explain that they are not against its construction
but are merely asking that it not be illegally built on a public road. 52

Finally, respondents ask that this Court lift its issued temporary restraining order against
the assailed Court of Appeals Decision and Resolution. 53

In its Resolution54 dated February 25, 2015, this Court noted respondents' comment and
denied their prayer to lift the temporary restraining order. It likewise directed petitioners
to file their reply to the comment.

In their Reply,55 petitioners reiterate their stand that Road Lot No. 3 is a private
property.56 Petitioners also rebut respondents' assertion that they only belatedly brought
up the construction of the Cancer Center Building because this project was
nonexistent.57 Petitioners attached photos58 to prove that the construction of the Cancer
Center Building was in progress.59

The single issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in directing the Regional Trial Court to issue a writ of preliminary injunction on the
closure of Road Lot No. 3.

The Petition is meritorious.

Department of Public Works and Highways v. City Advertising Ventures Corp. 60 defined
a writ of preliminary injunction as follows:

[A] writ of preliminary injunction is an ancillary and interlocutory order issued as a result
of an impartial determination of the context of both parties. It entails a procedure for the
judge to assess whether the reliefs prayed for by the complainant will be rendered moot
simply as a result of the parties' having to go through the full requirements of a case
being fully heard on its merits. Although a trial court judge is given a latitude of
discretion, he or she cannot grant a writ of injunction if there is no clear legal right
materially and substantially breached from a prima facie evaluation of the evidence of
the complainant. Even if this is present, the trial court must satisfy itself that the injury to
be suffered is irreparable.61

A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to:

[P]reserve the status quo ante, upon the applicant's showing of two important requisite
conditions, namely: (1) the right to be protected exists prima facie, and (2) the acts
sought to be enjoined are violative of that right. It must be proven that the violation
sought to be prevented would cause an irreparable injustice. 62

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides the instances when a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued:

Section 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may

be granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of
such relief consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or
acts complained of or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a
limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts

complained of during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant;
or
 (c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting
to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in
violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or
proceeding, and tending to render the judgment ineffectual.

Jurisprudence has likewise established that the following requisites must be proven first
before a writ of preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, may be issued:

(1) The applicant must have a clear and unmistakable right to be protected, that is a
right in esse;

(2) There is a material and substantial invasion of such right;

(3) There is an urgent need for the writ to prevent irreparable injury to the applicant; and
(4) No other ordinary, speedy, and adequate remedy exists to prevent the infliction of
irreparable injury.63

In satisfying these requisites, the applicant for the writ need not substantiate his or her
claim with complete and conclusive evidence since only prima facie evidence64 or a
sampling is required "to give the court an idea of the justification for the preliminary
injunction pending the decision of the case on the merits." 65

Tan v. Hosana66 defines prima facie evidence as evidence that is "good and sufficient

on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a
given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the· party's claim or defense and
which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient." 67

Spouses Nisce v. Equitable PCI Bank 68 then discussed the requisites and the proof
required for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction:

The plaintiff praying for a writ of preliminary injunction must further establish that he or
she has a present and unmistakable right to be protected; that the facts against which
injunction is directed violate such right; and there is a special and paramount necessity
for the writ to prevent serious damages. In the absence of proof of a legal right and the
injury sustained by the plaintiff, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction will be nullified. Thus, where the plaintiff's right is doubtful or disputed, a
preliminary injunction is not proper. The possibility of irreparable damage without proof
of an actual existing right is not a ground for a preliminary injunction.

However, to establish the essential requisites for a preliminary injunction, the evidence
to be submitted by the plaintiff need not be conclusive and complete. The plaintiffs arc
only required to show that they have an ostensible right to the final relief prayed for in
their complaint. A writ of preliminary i11iunction is generally based solely on initial or
incomplete evidence. Such evidence need only be a sampling intended merely to give
the court an evidence of justification for a preliminary injunction pending the decision on
the merits of the case, and is not conclusive of the principal action which has yet to be
decided.69

(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

To prove its clear legal right over the remedy being sought, Naga City presented before
the trial court the 1970s Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its
Identification Map which both identified Road Lot No. 3 as being in the name of the
Province of Camarines Sur.70 Witnesses' testimonies were also presented to
corroborate Naga City's claims of the public nature of Road Lot No. 3. 71

Respondents claimed that as members of the general public, they had every right to use
Road Lot No. 3, a public road.72

On the other hand, BMC presented TCT No. 13693, 73 which covered a total land area of
53,890m2 within Barrio Concepcion, Naga City with the Ministry of Health, now
Department of Health, as the registered owner. It is not disputed that Road Lot No. 3 is
part of the property covered by TCT No. 13693.

BMC likewise presented a certification74 from the City Engineer of Naga City which read:

This is to certify that the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit gate of
Bicol Medical Center is not included in the list of Inventory of City Road[s] of Naga City.

Given this 14th day of December 2012 for record and reference purposes. 75

A careful reading of the records convinces this Court that respondents failed to
establish prima facie proof of their clear legal right to utilize Road Lot No, 3. Whatever
right they sought to establish by proving the public nature of Road Lot No. 3 was
rebutted by the Department of Health's certificate of title and the City Engineer's
categorical statement that "the road from Panganiban Drive up to the entrance and exit
gate of [BJ\1C] was not included in the list" of city roads under Naga City's control. 76

Instead of merely relying on a tax map and claims of customary use, Naga City or
respondents should have presented a clear legal right to support their claim over Road
Lot No. 3.

Executive Secretary v. Forerunner Multi Resources, Inc. 77 explained that a clear legal

right which would entitle the applicant to an injunctive writ "contemplates a right 'clearly
founded in or granted by law.' Any hint of doubt or dispute on the asserted legal right
precludes the grant of preliminary injunctive relief." 78

Absent a particular law or statute establishing Naga City's ownership or control over
Road Lot No. 3, the Department of Health's title over the BMC compound must prevail
over the unsubstantiated claims of Naga City and respondents. Department of Health's
ownership over Road Lot No. 3, with the concomitant right to use and enjoy this
property, must be respected.

Respondents likewise cannot rely on the supposed customary use of Road Lot No. 3 by
the public to support their claimed right of unfettered access to the road because
customary use is not one (1) of the sources of legal obligation; 79 hence, it does not ripen
into a right.

II

This Court finds that the Court of Appeals erred in limiting prima facie evidence merely
to the evidence presented by Naga City and respondents and in disregarding altogether
petitioners' evidence,80 which had the effect of squarely rebutting Naga City and
respondents' assertions. The Court of Appeals failed to appreciate the nature of the
ancillary remedy of a writ of preliminary injunction as against the ex parte nature of a
temporary restraining order.

During the hearing for the application for writ of preliminary injunction, the trial court
correctly weighed the evidence presented by both parties before dismissing Naga City's
application:

On 21 December 2012, the court a quo handed down the first assailed Order denying
the application for injunctive relief. According to said court, Naga City failed to comply
with the jurisprudential requirements for the issuance of said injunction, to wit: 1) the
right of the complainant is clear and unmistakable; 2) the invasion of the right is material
and substantial; and 3) urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious
damage.

Anent the first requirement, the court a quo noted that even on the assumption that the
1970's Revised Assessor's Tax Mapping Control Roll and its Identification Map were
both authentic documents, the same would not overcome BMC s ownership of the
property as evidenced by its title. BAMC’s title covers all property within its bounds,
which naturally included Road Lot No. 3.

The court a quo thereafter proceeded to conclude that since Naga City failed to clearly
establish its right over the said road, then logically, it would not also be able to show
compliance with the second requisite, which necessitates a material and substantial
invasion of such right.

On the third requirement, the court a quo took into consideration the testimonies of two
of the herein petitioners, Eliza M. Quilon (hereinafter Quilon) and Josefina F. Esplana
(hereinafter Esplana), who both have businesses in the area and who said that their
respective enterprises started suffering from losses after the closure of Road Lot No. 3.
However, according to the court a quo, the losses of Quilon and Esplana hardly qualify
as irreparable injury required by jurisprudence in granting the writ of preliminary
injunction. This is so, as the court declared, because the alleged business losses that
had been purportedly caused by the closure of Road Lot No. 3 were easily subject to
mathematical computation.81 (Emphasis supplied)

Writs of preliminary injunction are granted only upon prior notice to the party sought to
be enjoined and upon their due hearing.1âwphi1 Rule 58, Section 5 of the Rules of
Court provides:

Section 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception. - No preliminary

injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought
to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified
application that great or irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter
can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary injunction was
made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period
of twenty (20) days from service on the party or person sought to be enjoined, except as
herein provided. Within the said twenty-day period, the court must order said party or
person to show cause, at a specified time and place, why the injunction should not be
granted, determine within the same period whether or not the preliminary injunction
shall be granted, and accordingly issue the corresponding order.

However, and subject to the provisions of the preceding sections, if the matter is of
extreme urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, the
executive judge of a multiple-sala court or the presiding judge of a single sala court may
issue ex parte a temporary restraining order effective for only seventy-two (72) hours
from issuance but he shall immediately comply with the provisions of the next preceding
section as to service of summons and the documents to be served therewith.
Thereafter, within the aforesaid seventy-two (72) hours, the judge before whom the
case is pending shall conduct a summary hearing to detem1ine whether the temporary
restraining order shall be extended until the application for preliminary injunction can be
heard. In no case shall the total period of effectivity of the temporary restraining order
extended twenty (20) days, including the original seventy-two hours (72) hours provided
herein.

In the event that the application for preliminary injunction is denied or not resolved
within the said period, the temporary restraining order is deemed, automatically
vacated. The effectivity of a temporary restraining order is not extendible without need
of any judicial declaration to that effect and no court shall have authority to extend or
renew the same on the same ground for which it was issued.

However, if issued by the Court of Appeals or a member thereof, the temporary

restraining order shall be effective for sixty (60) days from service on the party or person
sought to be enjoined. A restraining order issued by the Supreme Court or a member
thereof shall be effective until further orders.

Thus, Rule 58 requires "a full and comprehensive hearing for the determination of the
propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction," 82 giving the applicant an
opportunity to prove that great or irreparable injury will result if no writ is issued and
allowing the opposing party to comment on the application.

On the other hand, a temporary restraining order that is heard only with the evidence
presented by its applicant is ex parte, but it is issued to preserve the status quo until the
hearing for preliminary injunction can be conducted, Miriam College Foundation,
Inc v. Court of Appeals83 explained the difference between preliminary injunction and a
restraining order as follows:

Preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior

to the judgment or final order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to
perform to refrain from performing a particular act or acts. As an extraordinary remedy,
injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally
availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.
A preliminary injunction persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.

The basic purpose of restraining order, on the other hand, is to preserve the status quo
until the hearing of the application for preliminary injw1ction. ; Under the former A§5,
Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A§S, Batas Pambansa Blg. 224, a judge
(or justice) may issue a temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty days
from date of issue. If before the expiration of the 20-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary order would thereby be deemed
automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for
preliminary injunction within the said 20 days, the temporary restraining order would
automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to
that effect being necessary. In the instant case, no such preliminary injunction was
issued; hence, the TRO earlier issued automatically expired under the aforesaid
provision of the Rules of Court.84 (Citations omitted)

It is true that some issues are better threshed out before the trial court, such as if the
donation to the Department of Health by the Camarines Sur Provincial Government
contained an encumbrance for the public to continue using Road Lot No. 3, or the
validity of this donation.85 The Court of Appeals, however, erred when it completely
disregarded the evidence presented by petitioners, reasoning out that the question of
whether or not Naga City's evidence should prevail over BMC's title over the property
was supposedly a factual matter that should be threshed out in the trial court. 86

By focusing solely on Naga City and respondents' evidence to determine if there

was prima facie evidence to issue the writ of preliminary injunction while the case was
being heard in the lower court, the Court of Appeals misappreciated the nature of a writ
of preliminary injunction. To reiterate, a preliminary injunction is an ancillary remedy
issued after due hearing where both parties are given the opportunity to present their
respective evidence. Thus, both their evidence should be considered.
As it is, absent a finding of grave abuse of discretion, there was no reason for the Court
of Appeals to reverse the trial court's denial of respondents' application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents were unable to present prima
facie evidence of their clear and unmistakable right to use Road Lot No. 3.

WHEREFORE, this Court resolves to GRANT the Petition. The assailed February 28,
2014 Decision and August 26, 2014 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 129806 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The temporary restraining order issued by this Court in its October 8, 2014 Resolution is
made PERMANENT.