Honor Moslares v.

Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 129744; June 26, 1998
Ponente: Melo, J.

Facts:

On February 19, 1991, Honor Moslares, petitioner herein, purchased three units of Toyota
Corolla 1600 from Toyota Bel-Air, Inc which were thereupon registered under three names, his
name, the Manila Construction Development Corporation of the Philippines, and under the name
of Austra-Phil Homes Inc. In payment thereof, petitioner issued a check dated on May 24, 1991
with the amount of P 1,425,780.00. However, the check was dishonored since it was said for
having been drawn from insufficient funds. Thus, the petitioner was charged for violation of
Batas Pambansa bilang 22 (BP 22) and for Estafa. It should be noted that the hearings of this case
were postponed for several times either at the instance of both parties or motu proprio by the
Court. On the scheduled date of the presentation of evidence by petitioner, the latter failed to
appear but was represented by a newly retained lawyer by the name of Atty. Dionisio Landero,
who claimed that he was not yet familiar with the case and is therefore not ready to proceed with
the trial. As a result, the trial court set the promulgation of the decision on Oct. 30, 1995. On Oct.
9, 1995, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration however, on Oct. 26, 1995 the trial court
already issued its assailed decision with five major statements. First, the petitioner did not attend
the presentation of evidence for the prosecution nor for the defense. Second, the petitioner did not
testify but only presented one witness Third, the petitioner changed his lawyer four times every
time the Court ordered the case for decision for their party to gain a delay. Fourth, the number of
times the presentation for evidence has been cancelled and lastly, the finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt upon the accused. On Nov. 14, 1995, an appeal was filed by petitioner but was
denied by the lower court. On Mar. 14, 1996, petitioner filed for review with the CA but was
treated as one for certiorari. On Oct. 3, 1996, the petitioner filed a motion to post bail. On Nov.
29, 1996, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for review and denied the petition to post
bail. Motions for reconsideration were also denied.

Issues:

1. Whether or not Moslares waived his right to present evidence.

Ruling:

In the first issue, the Court ruled in favor of the accused. While it is true that the right to present
evidence may be waived expressly or impliedly, it cannot be said that petitioner had waived said
right due to postponements sought by him. The intention and the willingness of petitioner to
present evidence can be gleaned from the fact that he had already presented one witness and has
other witnesses ready for presentation. Although this was delayed, it should be taken into
consideration that those postponements were for meritorious reasons, such as illness of the
petitioner and his counsel, petitioner's confinement at a hospital, ongoing negotiations between
the parties, and substitution of counsel. The rights of an accused during trial are given paramount
importance in our laws and rules on criminal procedure. Among the fundamental rights of the
accused is the right to be heard by himself and counsel. This right has been recognized and
established in order to make sure that justice is done to the accused. It should be noted that no
court of justice under our system of government has the power to deprive him of that right. The
CA could have ordered the trial court to reopen the case for the presentation of the petitioner's
evidence. As it was stated by the Court, "The grant of a reasonable continuance would have been
sounder judicial discretion to ferret out the truth, than to have a speedy disposition of the case, but
at the expense of a fundamental right."

As to the second issue, the Court also favored the contention of the petitioner. In reference to the
last sentence of Sec.6 Rule 120 of the Rules of Court,

"If the judgment is for conviction, and the accused's failure to appear was without justifiable cause, the
court shall further order the arrest of the accused, who may appeal within fifteen (15) days from notice
of the decision to him or his counsel."

This means that whether or not the absence of the accused during promulgation is justified, the
right to appeal is not lost, the only requirement being that the notice of appeal must be filed
within 15 days notice of the judgment.

As to the last issue, the CA erred in denying the petitioner's application for bail. It should be
noted that the petitioner did not commit any violation to deprive him of his right to bail. As per
the findings of the Court, the petitioner was not convicted of an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment where bail is not a matter of right on the part of
petitioner nor of discretion on the part of the Court. Neither has he been convicted of an offense
punishable by imprisonment of six to twenty years where bail becomes a matter of judicial
discretion and may be denied if any of the following circumstances are present:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
has violated the conditions of his bail without valid jurisdiction;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole or under conditional pardon
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit another
crime.
In this light, petitioner's admission to bail becomes imperative and indispensable, moreso because of
petitioner's deteriorating health.

People of the Philippines vs. Frisco Holgado

Facts:

Frico Holgado, the appellant herein, was charged with slight illegal detention because he
did feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain a certain Artemia
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving the
victim of her personal liberty. On May 8, 1948, the trial commenced and during the trial,
the Court asked the appellant if he does have an attorney. It was asked by these words,
“Do you have an attorney or are you going to plead guilty?” To which the appellant
replied, “I have no lawyer and I will plead guilty.” the Court then asked to arraign the
accused. It should be noted that a certain Mr. Numeriano Ocampo was also involved
since the appellant stated that his plea of guilty was due to the instruction of Mr. Ocampo.
Having found that the latter has nothing to do with the case, the trial court rendered
judgment by ordering that the appellant be charged with the crime of kidnapping and
serious illegal detention.

Issue:

Whether or not the Court conducted the proceedings with no irregularity.

Ruling:

The trial court conducted the proceedings with irregularities. First, there was a violation
on Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court wherein, under this provision, there are four
important duties that the Court must comply with:
1. It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have an attorney before being arraigned;
2. After giving him such information, the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney;
3. If he desired and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign counsel de oficio to defend him; and
4. If the accused desires to prove an attorney of his own, the court must grant him a reasonable time therefore.

Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The question asked by
the court, as mentioned earlier, did not only fail to inform the accused of his right to have
an attorney but also it could have been construed by the accused as a suggestion from the
court that he plead his guilt if he had no attorney. This is a denial of fair trial and is in
violation of the principles of justice guaranteed by the Constitution and those are, “No
person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law” and that
all accused “shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel.”
Another irregularity is that, the offense charged to the accused was named SLIGHT
ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of judgement, the accused was charged with
the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. It should be noted that the fiscal
only accused the appellant of the crime of slight illegal detention and that there appears to
be no evidence presented by either party as well as the accused-appellant already pleaded
guilty. The trial judge must have deduced the sentence,

People v. Dramayo
GR. No. L- 21325; Oct. 29, 1971
Ponente: Fernando, J.
Facts:

In the morning of January 9, 1964, the two accused-appellants (Pableo Dramayo and
Paterno Ecubin) were in the company of the victim, Estelito Nogaliza. They went to their
chief of police to shed light on a robbery committed in the house of the victim five days
before. The response of the appellants was in the negative as they themselves were the
prime suspects. At about 7:00 o'clock of the same day, while they were in the house of
their co-accused, Priolo Billona, the accused, Pableo Dramayo, invited for a drinking
session all the other co-accused namely, Francisco Billona, Modesto Ronquilla,
Crescencio and Severo Savandal. Then, Dramayo brought up the idea of killing Estelito
Nogaliza so that he could not testify in the robbery case. The idea was for Dramayo and
Ecubin to ambush Estelito, who was returning from Sapao, Surigao del Norte. The others
were to station themselves nearby. Soon, the victim was seen and upon seeing him,
Dramayo stopped him with a request for a cigarette. It was then that Ecubin hit him with
a piece of wood on the side of the head near the right ear. Dramayo's participation
consisted of repeated stabs with a short pointed bolo as the victim lay weaken from the
blow of Ecubin. It was Dramayo also who warned the rest of the group to keep their
mouths sealed as to what had just happened. Dramayo was also the one who calmly went
to the house of the widow of the victim and informed her that he had seen the cadaver of
the victim. The barrio lieutenant and the chief of police were duly notified. The latter,
upon noticing blood stains on the trousers of Dramayo, asked him to explain. Dramayo
answered that it was due to her daughter's skin ailment leading to his trousers being filled
with blood stains. The lower court found Pableo Dramayo and Paterno Ecubin as guilty
beyond reasonable doubt on the crime of murder, qualified by the circumstance of
evident premeditation, as aggravated by night time, and imposes upon each of the said
accused the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The other accused were not convicted as the
two of them, Crescencio Savandal and Severo Savandal were utilized as state witnesses,
and the other three, Priolo Billona, Francisco Billona and Modesto Ronquilla were
acquitted.

Issue:

Whether the accused-appellants should also be acquitted.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial Court. It is to be admitted that the
starting point is the Presumption of Innocence. The presumption of innocence
safeguarded the appellants. It should be noted that accusation is not, according to the
fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. However, the presumption of innocence could
not come to their rescue as it was overcome by the proof that was offered by the
prosecution. The definition of reasonable doubt should be taken into consideration in
matters like this. As it was held from the 1903 decision of US v. Reyes,
"Reasonable doubt is meant that which of possibility may arise, but it is doubt engendered by an
investigation of the whole proof and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easy
upon the certainty of guilt. Absolute certain of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any
carnal charge but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition
of proof regular to constitute the offense."

If no reasonable doubt has been established against the appellants, then they would have
been acquitted as well together with the other five defendants. The principal contention is
clearly untenable. There were instances when the Court, provided that there is conspiracy
as an allegation against the other five defendants, did hold the party or parties responsible
for the commission of the crime charged. There is a moral certainty having arisen as to
their capability. The fact that the two appellants were duly convicted of robbery against
the property of the deceased, proves to be a factor as to the reason why they want to do
away with the victim.