Saran and Peterson Beyond Brexit
Saran and Peterson Beyond Brexit
Saran and Peterson Beyond Brexit
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ABSTRACT
The European Union (EU) had been lurching from one crisis to the next even
before a majority of British voters expressed their desire to leave it. While staying
away from the Brexit debate itself, its implications for UK and EU, and the politics
and motivations in the run-up to the vote, this paper argues that at the very least
the referendum is a wake-up call for Europe to begin to address some of its
structural and operational shortcomings in a substantial manner. Accordingly, a
few observations from 'a' Indian perspective are put forth and may be worth
considering as the EU moves towards a renewed and reformed version of itself.
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BEYOND BREXIT: WHAT AILS THE EUROPEAN UNION?
Specifically, this paper reflects on three particular challenges the EU faces, and the
four fundamental weaknesses that continue to hobble it: that of being perceived
as a status-quoist power; of being unduly trans-Atlantic in its orientation; of
promoting values often at the expense of enlightened self-interest; and of a
persistent structural inability to communicate to the world at large.
1. INTRODUCTION
Rumours of the death of the European project are, as Mark Twain would have put
it, vastly exaggerated. Examples for its continued relevance and efficiency can be
found in the European Union's outreach to Iran that paved the way for a
diplomatic breakthrough, its continuing efforts to absorb Syrian war refugees,
and its clever geo-economic manoeuvres that have effectively contained Russia's
sphere of influence across Central and Eastern Europe. But the condition of the
union has, without question, deteriorated rapidly, to everybody's surprise. The
current period of flux is an ideal time for a dispassionate analysis. It is undeniable
that 'Brand EU' is taking a beating and it is time to unpack where the scepticism
and perceived frailty stem from.
The first of the three most visible challenges to the project has to be that this
strong collective of European nations has achieved only patchy social integration
within its members. The gastarbeiter model adopted by Germany in the 1960s and
70s may have addressed short-run labour problems but was not efficient in
assimilating newcomers into society. Furthermore, as former colonial powers, the
UK and France opened their doors to their former subjects (for a short period) but
their policies over time proved inadequate in addressing longstanding grievances.
None of the existing models in individual member states of the EU can be termed a
full success.
Muslims make for about four to five percent of Europe's population, with the
ratio considerably higher in France. According to the PEW Research Center, this
figure will rise to eight percent in 2030. European Muslims have long blamed
structural societal problems as key reasons behind a permanent 'Otherisation.'
This phenomenon effectively undermines their integration by overriding the
significant contributions of Muslim immigrants to the European project. As
noted French scholar Gilles Kepel remarked, neither the blood spilled by
Muslims from North Africa fighting in French uniforms during both World Wars
nor the sweat of migrant laborers, living under deplorable living conditions, who
rebuilt France (and Europe) for a pittance after 1945, has made their children ...
1
full fellow citizens.
Arguably, an immediate consequence is the emergence and consolidation of
radical Islamism and its twin, racist-rightist politics. At the very least there is
certainly a degree of resonance in certain constituencies. Consider the notable
rise of the far-right Front National (FN) in France, led by Marine Le Pen. In the
December 2015 regional French elections, 6.8 million French citizens one out
of ten voted for FN.2 The unabated rise of Le Pen and FN will be of significant
consequence in the French presidential elections of 2017. France is not alone in
seeing the rise of the extreme right. Austria just narrowly escaped the election of a
right-wing populist, Norbert Hofer, as president. They are now heading back to
the hustings, with an unpredictable outcome. From the UK Independence Party in
Britain and the Alternative for Germany in Germany, to Hungary under prime
minister Viktor Orbán, liberal EU is now grappling with two illiberal ideologies,
with all member states experiencing varying degrees of this new reality.
The EU's second challenge lies in the economic sphere, the touchstone of the
European integration project. The EU finds itself caught in the inevitable
confusion that comes from being a monetary union without being a fiscal union.
The periodic eruption of the Greek tragedy arises from this cleavage. Greece's
woes can be traced to two fundamental problems. One, its economy did not fulfil
the convergence criterion laid out in the Maastricht Treaty to begin with. In
January 1998, on the eve of the formation of the EU, the Greek inflation rate was
5.2 percent against the reference rate of 2.7 percent and the EU average at 1.6
percent; similar statistics hold for other macroeconomic parameters such as
public-debt/deficit-share-of-GDP, and interest rates. 3 Second, fiscal
independence meant that there was very little oversight from Brussels on Greek
spending or its lax attitude towards tax collection. The global financial crisis of
2007-2009 exacerbated these fundamental problems that are unlikely to go away
any time soon. But even when solved, individual European countries will have to
deal with the fact that compared to emerging countries such as China and India,
their economies will only stay relevant on a global level if tallied.4
Segments of EU's population already feel the heat. Part of the far-right
political discourse is based on the discontent of a new generation of Europeans
who know that they are the first after World War II to be economically less well off
than their parents. European democratic parties so far have failed to come up with
a new narrative to respond to the angst among these people and prevent them
from embracing regressive, authoritarian solutions.5
The third challenge to the EU is what can be called the return of history in the
form of Vladimir Putin. While the fall of the Berlin Wall was a moment of triumph
for Western Europe, developments thereafter have not progressed favourably,
especially since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis that culminated in the
annexation of Crimea in 2014. A deep misunderstanding aggravates the
situation. Europe believed that after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end
of the Cold War, it was now in a more friendly and settled neighbourhood. It
abdicated a realist position and did not invest in follow-through diplomacy that
could have produced different and more sustainable outcomes.
What is important is to draw the right conclusions from this mistake: The
belief that at the end of the binary world order one side prevailed (that is, Europe
and the US) is still part of a Cold War mindset and results in a winner-takes-all
proposition, limiting room for accommodation.
The rise of a multipolar world poses a whole new set of challenges, but Europe
has thus far failed to develop a new vision for itself and forge new alliances. For a
long time Giovanni Thomasi di Lampedusa's famous line, Everything needs to
change so that everything can stay the same 6 was the quintessential European
mantra. No more. The old continent with its shrinking population and low
economic growth rates will be only one centre of gravity in what emerges from the
current global disorder. If managed well, this need not be a disadvantage. But it
would mean rethinking the gospel of Monnet7 and a few long-cherished ideas of
what Europe is and should be, as articulated by its founding fathers.
Based on the above analysis, there are essentially four issues, from an Indian point
of view, that problematise what the EU could potentially offer to the world. To
begin with, as a brand, its perceived central proposition is behind the times. While
smaller countries and developing regions of the world are seeking collective
weight to reform the global order, the European project is seen as status-quoist,
primarily concerned with perpetuating its (members') entrenched interests.
From reforms of the UN Security Council (UNSC) to those of key Bretton Woods
institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), European powers are
seen to want more of the same.
Europe has two out of the five permanent seats in the UNSC, though only
representing seven percent of the world's population. It is clearly over-
represented in this particular marquee club. India's 2005 bid to a UNSC
permanent membership through an alliance with three other aspirants Brazil,
Japan and Germany fell by the wayside partly due to an obstructive strategy by
the UK and France.8 Both these powers supported Germany's bid, although given
the fact that Europe is already over-represented in the UNSC, UN General
Assembly members were unlikely to allow another European power to become a
permanent member. As one commentator noted, the UK and France were
effectively condemning the prospects of UNSC reform and thereby preserving
their permanent seats even longer. 9
European countries hold 26.45 percent of voting shares in the IMF while the
10
EU-28's share of world GDP is 17 percent, down from 30 percent in 1980.
Historically, the chief of the IMF has always been a European, much in the same
way that the World Bank chief is always, as a matter of norm, an American
candidate. The origin of these biases lies in the manner in which IMF and other
Bretton Woods institutions were created. These were shaped by the vision of two
men, British economist John Maynard Keynes and US Treasury official Harry
Dexter White. While Keynes argued for the need for a truly international clearing
currency the bancor White's vision was for a system which was attuned to
the interests of the US.11 The latter is what dominated the compromise at the end.
Many see this lack of European leadership as one (though not the only) reason
behind the slow pace of reforms of Bretton Woods institutions.
While some European powers do realise that this posture may not be
sustainable witness their enthusiasm for the China-led Asian Infrastructure
Investment Bank they are either unwilling or unable to upend the existing
global governance order and allow it to be refashioned according to 21st century
realities.
The second issue seems to be Europe's conception of the map and its place in the
extant geography of the world. Europe must realise that its future is to a large
extent coupled to that of Asia's and Africa's. Instead of a serious institutional push
towards building a common future with the powers that will shape these two
regions, Europe has functionally de-hyphenated itself from both. When Europe
has engaged with these two regions it has done so myopically, based on its colonial
ruminations or as illustrated by its trade policies.
The EU and the US are currently negotiating the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) a wide-ranging free trade agreement that
mirrors the US-led Trans-Pacific Partnership in the Asia Pacific. Signing the TTIP
and not pushing ahead on important under-discussion bilateral FTAs, like the
India-EU Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement, will further orient European
economies to the US. Meanwhile China, the EU's second-largest trading partner,
is yet to be granted Market Economy Status (MES) by certain EU member states,
something that ought to be automatic by December 2016 as per China's 2001
WTO accession agreement.12 If China is not granted MES, and the TTIP is signed,
it will be clear to Asian states that the EU will continue to orient its trading
regimes to those of the US, to the detriment of Asia.
Geopolitically, the record of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
in engaging the Middle East and North Africa has been tepid, despite its
participation in the Mediterranean Dialogue and the Istanbul Cooperation
Initiative.13 This is odd, since terrorism and the unabated influx of migrants pose
some of the greatest challenges to Europe.14 Even when NATO engaged the Middle
East through these two mechanisms during the Libyan campaign in 2011, NATO's
promoters in the UNSC the US, the UK and France failed to secure a buy-in
from countries like Brazil and India. India's permanent representative to the UN
remarked that responsibility to protect cannot turn out to be a tool legitimizing
big power intervention on the pretext of protecting populations from the
violations of human rights and humanitarian law. 15 Indeed, Paris found multiple
reasons to consult Washington for guidance on its Syria policy, but found little
motivation to engage New Delhi. There is little doubt that if Paris had been in a
habit of seeking and heeding advice from India likely only if both countries saw
each other as important partners in their common periphery the situation in
the Middle East may have been remarkably different today, given India's
significantly different approach. The end result of the lack of policy convergence
between European and non-Western powers (India, for one, remained wary of the
Syrian intervention) has resulted in the former being perceived in non-Western
capitals as nothing more than a geopolitical appendage to the US.
Europe's penchant for trans-Atlanticism is a sentimental anachronism. While
many in Europe might believe that only a close alliance with the US can defend
what are perceived as Western values, such as democracy, human rights and a
market-based economy, the reality is quite the contrary. It is the very nature of
these values that make their imposition on others impossible without digressing
from their liberal ethos. The value-based alliance between the US and EU has only
reinforced the impression that Europe is too busy consolidating the old-boys' club
by any means to realise that the geopolitical centre of gravity is inexorably
marching eastwards. Obsessed with the Atlantic Order, Europe is near absent in
the great debates of the Indo-Pacific.
The corollary, therefore, is that EU and more broadly Europe are inefficient in
promoting their economic interests and are unable to stitch together new
partnerships to keep their periphery stable. A new engagement with the emerging
economies of Asia and Africa, a new partnership with them that will allow new
voices to manage the world economy and politics, and the realist appreciation that
such an engagement is not just a political compulsion but actually a credible
actualisation of the original objectives driving the European project, must now
form the basis of a revised set of European values.
This revision of the values discourse is essential as the old one is failing.
Effectively, the tyranny of values whether it is as self-proclaimed champions of
human rights, or of liberal multiculturalism has, in recent years, cost Europe in
real-politik currency. Europe's promotion of norms was driven by self-interest in
the past. A world remade in its own image was a self-serving agenda from the
colonial era to the Cold War, with tangible material benefits. Its coercive
assimilation of migrants in its own image took forward the same agenda. The
British mission civilisatrice liberal beliefs driven by religious beliefs or the
French promotion of egalité and fraternité by force, if necessary or Bismarck's
nationalism all had the hallmarks of great-power politics, and not of the
visionary designs of the philosophers and the physiocrats. 16
What Europe has engaged in since is either promotion of self-determined
values and norms divorced from immediate political interests; or the hypocrisy of
The above problems are compounded by the fact that 'Brand EU' has a serious
marketing and communication problem. Brussels has made very little effort to
engage the world beyond the borders of Europe in any meaningful way, to great
EU public diplomacy has been fairly ineffective in large parts of Asia and
Africa. Positive messages that the EU could communicate to countries and regions
to its east have been muted, crowded out by narratives emerging from euro-
sceptics in Britain and the US. Therefore, the EU seems to be in the news in
countries like India mostly for the wrong reasons. It is time Europe take a hard
look at its messaging, the medium, and at the concrete steps it needs to take to
establish and reinvent itself among such constituencies. All the more, Brussels
needs to do it alone without expecting favours or support from London or
Washington.
While the EU project originated from, and belongs to the 20th century, its success
and relevance will nonetheless help shape the 21st century, a period that may well
witness the rise of Asia. The EU, therefore, must ensure that it brings on board a
larger set of stakeholders who are co-invested in this period and by implication in
a new European project.
This requires a broader understanding of the project itself. For too long it has
been shaped by a limited understanding of its own identity that was sometimes
called a Christian club. This version of European identity might have suited
some interests for some time, but it is outdated and needs rebooting. History is
witness that European identity was always shaped by intensive exchange with its
larger region and that periods of voluntary seclusion were usually not the most
fruitful ones. Outreach to the external regions and to new constituencies within
must be the new mantra for the EU.
The EU also needs a paradigmatic shift in its policy towards Russia. While a
reversion to the Cold War mindset may seem to be the easiest way out of the
current stand-off with Moscow, it is certainly not the most productive. While the
Crimean genie cannot be put back in the bottle, the EU must aim for a partnership
of equals with Russia in the future. This will most probably require extensive
dialogue, much of which will fail, and several rounds of negotiations, many of
which will lead nowhere. It may need to swallow some bitter pills, and that may be
difficult. But the alternative, a new cold war or hot peace, will be costly and
painful.
Further, the EU needs its own rebalance to Asia. This new pivot to Asia cannot
be an adjunct to the US policy but must be shaped by EU's three principal
dependencies on the Asian continent economics, security and people
(migrants). Sustainable economic growth, the fight against terrorism and social
peace in Europe all depend to a large extent on relations with various African and
Asian countries and communities. It is high time to make ties with Asia a priority
in EU foreign policy and allocate the necessary intellectual and financial resources
for the effort. The economic imperative that drives Europe towards the East must
effectively also come to define its strategic consensus. The stability of the region,
and indeed the world's economic engine, are premised on the conduct of major
powers in Asia, whether China, Russia or India. The post-war trans-Atlantic
regime was built on the edifice of economic necessity, which transformed into a
shared understanding of security concerns. History may not repeat itself and
China is certainly no replacement for the US on this count but Europe should be
as invested in the future of the Asian Century as it was in the post-war global
order.
And last but not least: The EU must communicate beyond the elite. This is true
for its diplomacy as well as for its domestic communications. Selling a relationship
to the elite in India or China is perhaps already successful to an extent. The
outreach challenge, however, is to make the EU understandable to the masses that
remain more conversant with European countries rather than with the EU itself
and whose appreciation of the collective is limited to the Schengen visa. Investing
in greater number of and deeper university exchanges, engagement with the
vernacular media, and using digital outreach all need to be embraced to achieve
this. The core determinant must be the ability to transmit a polysemic message
from the EU.
ENDNOTES:
1. Robert S. Leiken, Europe's Angry Muslims, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2005,
http://www.cfr.org/religion/europes-angry-muslims/p8218.
2. Ian Bremmer, Marine Le Pen Lost a Battle But May Win the War in France, Time,
December 14, 2015, http://time.com/4147837/marine-le-pen-france-regional-
elections/.
3. Dominick Salvatore, International Economics: Trade and Finance (Hoboken, NJ: John
Wiley, 2011).
4. Jeanna Smialek, These Will be the World's 20 Largest Economies in 2030,
Bloomberg, April 10, 2015, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-
10/the-world-s-20-largest-economies-in-2030#media-4.
5. Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik, Brigitte Mrai (ed.), Right Wing Populism in Europe.
Politics and Discourse (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
6. Giuseppe Tomasi die Lampedusa, The Leopard (London: Collins, 1960).
7. Samir Saran and John C. Hulsman, Wake up to the real world, EU!, ORF
Commentary, May 11, 2012, http://www.orfonline.org/research/wake-up-to-the-
real-world-eu/.
8. Kishore Mahbubani, To the New Order, Strategically, Indian Express, February 4,
2014.
9. Ibid.
10. Share of IMF voting rights computed from IMF Executive Directors and Voting
Power, IMF, updated April 27, 2016, https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/
memdir/eds.aspx. EU-28 share of GDP statistics from Sam Ashworth-Hayes, The
EU has Shrunk as a Percentage of the World Economy, FullFact, June 9, 2015,
https://fullfact.org/europe/eu-has-shrunk-percentage-world-economy/.
11. Jamie Martin, Were We Bullied, London Review of Books 35, no. 22 (2013),
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n22/jamie-martin/were-we-bullied.
12. Shi Zinqin, China-EU Relations: Crisis and Opportunity, The Diplomat, March
15, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/china-eu-relations-crisis-and-
opportunity/.
13. Christopher S. Chivvis, NATO's Southern Exposure, Foreign Affairs, April 17,
2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2016-04-17/nato-s-southern-
exposure.
14. Ibid.
15. Michael J. Boyle, The Coming Illiberal Order, Survival 58, no. 2 (2016), 53.
16. Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2003), 8.
17. Shazia Aziz Wuelbers, The Paradox of EU-India Relations: Missed Opportunities in
Politics, Economics, Development, and Culture (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2011)
98-105.
18. Burqa ban five years on - 'We created a monster', The Local.fr, October 12, 2015,
http://www.thelocal.fr/20151012/france-burqa-ban-five-years-on-we-create-a-
monster.
19. Britta Petersen, Demystifying the Refugee Crisis, Or Why Europe needs A New
renaissance, The Wire, February 19, 2016, http://thewire.in/2016/02/19/why-
europe-needs-a-new-renaissance-22059/.
20. The German historian Michael Borgolte, for example, argues that Islam belongs to
the foundations of European and German culture, Qantara, May 19, 2016,
http://de.qantara.de/inhalt/historiker-borgolte-der-islam-gehoert-zu-den-
fundamenten-europaeischer-und-deutscher-kultur. Also on this topic: When
Europe loved Islam , Foreign Policy, May 5, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/
2016/05/05/when-europe-loved-islam-interwar-weimar-republic-wilmersdorf-
mosque/.
21. Rajendra K. Jain, India-EU Strategic Partnership: Perceptions and Perspectives,
NFG Working Paper 10, July 2014, 17, http://www.diss.fu-berlin.de/docs/
servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/FUDOCS_derivate_000000004250/wp1014-
india-eu-strategic-partnership_0.pdf.
22. David Ward with Oliver Carsten Fueg and Alessandro D'Armo, A Mapping Study of
Media Concentration and Ownership in Ten European Countries (Hilversum:
Commissariaatvoor de Media, 2004), 25, http://77.87.161.246/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/A-Mapping-Study-of-Media-Concentration-and-
Ownership-in-Ten-European-Countries.pdf.
23. Amrit Dhillon, Deutsche Welle seeks more visibility, The Hoot, March 18, 2016,
http://www.thehoot.org/media-watch/media-business/deutsche-welle-seeks-
more-visibility-9240.
24. The Hybrid War: Russia's Propaganda Campaign Against Germany, Der Spiegel,
February 5, 2016, http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/putin-wages-
hybrid-war-on-germany-and-west-a-1075483.html.
25. Reginald Dale, Most U.S. Media Get an "F" for EU Coverage, Center for Strategic
and International Studies Blog, April 29, 2016, http://csis.org/blog/most-us-
media-get-f-eu-coverage.
26. In India, pranayam is a set of breathing techniques within the yogic system that
ensures good health and clarity of mind.
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