Format of Case Digest

Case Title: ________ v. ________

G.R. No. _____________________
Ponente: _____________________
Date of Promulgation: ________

FACTS: Statement of relevant facts.

ISSUES: Issues or questions raised in the case pertaining to criminal laws. An issue must be in question
format.
RULING: Statement of the Supreme Court's rationale in deciding the case.
CASES
1. People v. Abad, G.R. No. L-430, July 30, 1947

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. FRANCISCO M. ABAD (alias PAQUITO),

Defendant-Appellant.

Alejo Labrador for Appellant.

Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Jaime de los Angeles for Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW; TREASON; EVIDENCE; TWO-WITNESS RULE ADHERED TO AS TO EACH EXTERNAL
MANIFESTATION OF OVERT ACT. — The two-witness rule must be adhered to as to each and everyone
of all the external manifestations of the overt act in issue.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; FACTS NOT ALLEGED IN INFORMATION CANNOT BB PROVEN. — Evidence of supposed
treasonable acts not specifically alleged in the information, is not admissible. The fact that accused is
described therein as an informer is not enough, because the description is a conclusion made by the
author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged in the four counts.

3. ID.; ID.; MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; PERSECUTION BY GUERRILLAS; CASE AT BAR. — The fact that
the A family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution ending in the killing of L. A. P. and A. A.,
father and brother, respectively, of the accused, cannot be considered to mitigate appellant’s guilt as
they are not of a similar nature or analogous to those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

4. ID.; ID.; AGE; CASE AT BAR. — Appellant’s age can be considered. He was born on October 20, 1924,
and when he committed the acts alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he
was not yet 20 years old. The fact that his eldest brother, M, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and
another elder brother, F, was also in the service of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by
his widowed mother, the accused had to depend on M for his support, the same as the other members
of the family, are circumstances from which, in view of appellant’s immature age, did not allow him the
freedom of initiative and action which should be expected of a person who is aware of the full
consequences and responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant
with a mitigating circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal
Code.

1
DECISION

PERFECTO, J.:

In a decision penned by Judge Angel S. Gamboa, concurred in by Judges Jose Bernabe and Emilio
Rilloraza, all of them of the People’s Court, Accused Francisco Abad was found guilty of the complex
crime of treason with homicide and sentenced to death, to pay a fine of P15,000, to indemnify the heirs
of Osias Salvador in the amount of P2,000, and to pay costs.

The information charges appellant of the crime of treason as defined and penalized under article 114 of
the Revised Penal Code by giving aid and comfort to the Empire of Japan and the Japanese Imperial
Forces during the period comprised between December 24, 1943, and September 26, 1944, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"1. That on or about the 24th day of December, 1943, in the municipality and province aforesaid,
Francisco Abad (alias Paquito) the accused herein, serving as an informer and spy of the Japanese Army,
did then and there, join and participate in a raid conducted by about fifteen Japanese soldiers of the
Military Police at the house of Magno Ibarra, and did then and there apprehend the said Magno Ibarra,
charging him of possession of a revolver which had been previously surrendered by Magno Ibarra to the
Japanese authorities, but because of the insistence of the herein accused that Magno Ibarra still had the
revolver, the latter was confined in the Japanese garrison.

"2. That on or about March 11, 1944, in the same municipality and province aforesaid, the said Francisco
Abad (alias Paquito), as such informer of the Japanese Army, wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
treasonably did, then and there, cause the arrest and incarceration, for more than two months, of one
Mr. Francisco, whose first name is still unknown, for having remarked that the Americans would soon
return because many places in the Philippines had already been retaken.

"3. That on or about September 28, 1944, also in the municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the
herein accused, as such informer of the Japanese Army, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully,
feloniously and treasonably force, coerce, and compel Osias Salvador and his two brothers Epifanio
Salvador and Liberato Salvador to go, as they did go to the Japanese garrison where the said Osias
Salvador and his two brothers, at the instance of the herein accused and in his presence, were tortured
as guerrilla suspects, and although Epifanio and Liberato Salvador managed later to escape from
imprisonment, the said Osias Salvador was unable to do so and died from the tortures and injuries
inflicted upon him.

"4. That on or about November 12, 1944 and on the occasion of a stage show held in the said
municipality of Camiling, Province of Tarlac, the herein accused, taking advantage of his connection and
influence as informer and spy of the Japanese Army, did then and there unlawfully, wilfully and
feloniously hand over one Francisco Donato to the Japanese soldiers who slapped and kicked the said
Francisco Donato, for an incident in which the accused was entirely to blame in that the said accused
annoyed Flora Esteban, wife of Francisco Donato, by throwing sugarcane butts at her."cralaw virtua1aw
library

The lower court found the accused guilty on the first three counts.

Nine errors are assigned in appellant’s brief.

2
The first question raised by appellant is that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty on the
first count, notwithstanding the fact that only one witness testified o the overt act alleged therein.

Two witnesses were called by the prosecution to prove the first count, Magno Ibarra and his wife, Isabel.
The latter testified that when appellant, accompanied by his brother and Japanese soldiers, went to
their home, demanding the surrender of a revolver of her husband, the husband was out supervising the
harvest of their palay, and the latter happened to learn of the incident by information from the wife.
Magno could not, therefore, corroborate his wife as to the latter’s testimony concerning appellant’s
coming to their house.

The testimony of Magno Ibarra as to what happened to him in the garrison, where he was told by
appellant to produce his revolver, is not corroborated by his wife nor by anybody else.

The Solicitor General advances the theory that where the overt act is simple, continuous and composite,
made up of, or proved by several circumstances, and passing through stages, it is not necessary that
there should be two witnesses to each circumstance at each stage. The theory is not well taken. The
two-witness rule must be adhered to as to each and everyone of all the external manifestations of the
overt act in issue. Appellant’s going to the Ibarra house, in search of the revolver, is a single overt act,
distinct and independent from appellant’s overt act in requiring Magno Ibarra, when the latter went to
the galrison, to produce his revolver. Although both overt acts are inter-related, it would be too much to
strain the imagination if they should be identified as a single act or even as different manifestations,
phases, or stages of the same overt act. The searching of the revolver in the Ibarra house is one thing
and the requiring to produce the revolver in the garrison, another. Although both acts may logically be
presumed to have answered the same purpose that of confiscating Ibarra’s revolver, the singleness of
purpose is not enough to make one of two acts.

The lower court erred consequently in not pronouncing that the first count of the information was not
proven.

Whether accused caused the arrest and incarceration Fausto Francisco, as alleged in the second count of
the information, is the next question raised in appellant brief.

In the afternoon of March 10, 1944, while conversing with a group of about ten persons, Francisco, who
had just arrived from Manila, stated that the Americans were coming nearer to the Philippines and, on
noticing a Japanese plane flying over them, added that in the very near future they will see American
planes flying over the Philippines. The accused was among those present in the group. Jose Tamurrada
and Adriano Reyes were also among them. At night of the same day Francisco attended the dance held
in the auditorium of Palimbo, Camiling, on the occasion of the barrio fiesta. A group of Japanese
soldiers, accompanied by appellant and his brother Mariano, arrived. Appellant pointed at Francisco
saying, "That is the man;" whereupon, Francisco was arrested and was imprisoned for almost two and a
half months, during which time he was subjected to torture and made to undergo hard labor for being
an American propagandist. These facts were testified by several witnesses for the prosecution.

Appellant, who has resorted to an alibi as defense, made an almost exhaustive analysis of the
declarations of the witnesses for the prosecution in a forceful effort to discredit them. A careful reading
of said declarations leads us to the conclusion that they deserved credibility and by them it was proved
beyond all reasonable doubt that appellant was present in the group which in the afternoon heard

3
Fausto Francisco make statements in favor of the Americans and that he caused the arrest of Francisco
in the auditorium by pointing him to the Japanese soldiers who arrived with him at the place.

Among the arguments in appellant’s brief relating to the second count in question, the one in which
appellant alleges that no one has ever heard that, after the afternoon statements of Fausto Francisco,
appellant went to the Japanese garrison and informed the Japanese soldiers thereof, appears to be
stronger. In fact, there is no evidence as to what the appellant did during the time intervening between
when appellant heard Francisco’s afternoon statements and when appellant went at night to the
auditorium to have Francisco arrested by the Japanese soldiers accompanying him and his brother
Mariano. But the natural relationship between the two incidents makes unnecessary any evidence as to
appellant’s conduct and actions during the intervening period. Besides, it is not alleged in the
information that it was appellant who denounced Francisco to the Japanese for the afternoon
statements in question, and even if we should disregard any connection between the afternoon incident
in which appellant heard Francisco’s statements and the incident in which Francisco was arrested, and,
furthermore, even if we go to the extent of disregarding completely the first incident, the fact that
appellant caused the arrest of Francisco at the auditorium night dance, by pointing him as the man
sought for to the Japanese soldiers who accompanied him and his brother Mariano, in itself alone is
sufficient to find him guilty of adherence to the Japanese enemies and of giving them aid in the
attainment of their war purposes, among them the suppression of American or anti-Japanese
propaganda.

Upon this our conclusion, appellant’s insistence that there were well-known Japanese spies, instead of
him, who must have given the tip to the Japanese as to Francisco’s statements, is of no consequence.

The next question raised by appellant is the third count of the information upon which the appellant’s
brief dealt in three assignment of errors, 3, 4, and 5.

Liberato Salvador testified that in 1944 he was a member of Major Ramsey’s Guerrilla, which he joined
on March 5, 1942, he having been formerly in the Recruiting Division of the Philippine Army. On
September 28, 1944, he went to Camiling with his brother Osias to find out the strength of the Japanese
garrison stationed there, and to said effect "we brought along with us five gallons of coconut oil just
pretending to sell it in the public market in order that we; cannot be detected by the spies of our enemy,
the Japanese." Then they saw the accused "who was about five meters away from us." Felix Abad asked
for a ride back to Mangatarem. While Osias was talking with Felix, the accused "winked his eye and
then, immediately, Magdalera drew his revolver and pointed at me. He winked with a motion indicating
that I was to be captured. My brother Osias approached me. We were asked to raise our hands."
Because Liberato protested that he was not making any trouble and at first did not raise his hands,
Magdalera said: "No, you are a member of the guerrillas, you are fighting against the Japanese." Then
Epifanio Salvador approached his brother Liberato and told him: "Raise your hands because he is a spy
of the Japanese," referring to Cristoper Magdalera. Then Felix Abad suggested to Magdalera that the
Salvador brothers be brought to the Japanese garrison, 25 meters away from the market. The incident
took place at about 3 o’clock in the afternoon. At the garrison "we were tied up against the wall of the
building. At about 6 o’clock in the afternoon we were given water to drink (about five or six gallons) and
maltreated. They hung me and tied in the wrist with the rope around my neck. They hung me with my
toes barely touching the floor. Then they boxed me and beat me with a baseball bat until I was
uneonscious. I did not regain consciousness until they stuck a lighted cigarette in my face at about 8
o’clock already in the evening."cralaw virtua1aw library

4
When he regained consciousness, he heard his brothers shouting for help and groaning. Witness was
about six meters away from them, but he has not seen them being tortured because "I could not move."
After 8 o’clock in the evening, "we were brought again to the porch and tied our neck in the same way
they tied us before, with our hands tied at the back. At about 4 o’clock in the morning of the 29th, my
brother Epifanio Salvador, who was sitting side by side with Osias Salvador, was able to untie his rope
and then, all of a sudden Epifanio left us. The sentry who was just sitting in front of us with a rifle at fixed
bayonet was sleeping. When the sentry was awakened he asked: Where is your brother Epifanio
Salvador?’ I answered the sentry: ’I do not know.’ Then, at first he was planning to release us to look for
our brother Epifanio. We consented to be released, but the sentry changed his mind and got another big
rope with which he whipped us again right and left. Then they went to our house, the house of Epifanio,
and looked for him. And when they were not able to locate him they got my sister-in-law Inocencia
Manson de Salvador and she was also questioned as to where was my brother Epifanio, and tied up her
hands as they have done to us. After that, Osias Salvador and myself were brought to the room just
behind the one we were tied up and they got an electric wire and tied us again, but putting on a bench
and the bench was too short that the legs of my brother Osias was on top. We were tied and then rolled
with the wire from my head up to the head of my brother, aside from tying us from neck to leg. We
talked, my brother and I, to escape if we can. After ten minutes, a Japanese entered the garrison and he
had a bamboo with which whenever we asked for water and food they beat us. They questioned us:
’Where is the machine gun you are hiding? You are hiding six machine guns and automatic rifles; where
are the rifles and revolvers? Where are the Americans now?’ That was done to us many times. At about
5 o’clock in the afternoon one of the Japanese came to us and cut our hair and said: ’Kayo dalawa patay
mamayang gabi. We answered: ’Ngayon na.’ The Japanese said: ’No, tonight.’ Then in my struggle to
remove the rope around my leg I was able to untie it without my knowledge. One of the Japanese
entered to find out what we were doing, but he did not inspect me and left again. Although my hands
were bleeding, with my courage to live still I grabbed the electric wire and cut it through continuously
doing this (witness showing the act of twisting something with his fingers), and unbound myself. When
the sentry entered, I allowed the electric wire to be placed as it was. Then it was 6 o’clock (on
September 29) from the bells of the church. My brother Osias said: ’I can not escape, I am weak. My face
is bleeding. I cannot walk. If you are untied, the thing for you is to live, if you can run for your life. Never
mind for me. If I am dead, never mind. Now we are fighting our common enemy, the Japanese. I want
you to find out what will be the result of this war.’ Then he kicked me, because I was untied already up
to the knee. I tried to remove the rope at his back, but he said: ’No, I can not run.’ And he shouted: ’You
better run for your life.’ Then I saw one Japanese that heard that, and I jumped outside and when I fell
to the ground I saw another Japanese watching and shouting words that I can not understand. I just ran.
Between the municipal building and the street there was a barbed wire fence and jumped it over and
then passed to the rear of the municipal building, passing between the house of Mr. Javier and the
Treasurer’s, and then to the bank of the river. I passed under the bamboo groves and I went to the
house of my friend (Gregorio Javier) and I was able to go up and then fell down weak." Osias was the
commanding officer of the guerrilla unit in which Liberato was a second lieutenant and Epifanio, a
volunteer without grade. Since then Liberato did not see Osias any more, but he was able to locate
Epifanio in Bayambang, Pangasinan.

The testimony of Liberato Salvador was substantially corroborated by Epifanio Salvador on all what
happened from the afternoon of September 28, 1944, when they were rested in the market place up to
about 4 o’clock in the morning of September 29, when Epifanio was able to untie himself and escape
from the Japanese garrison, passing in front of a sleeping sentry two meters away from here the
Salvador brothers were tied.

5
Augusto Antonio testified that the accused told him that as Salvador was killed, bayoneted by a
Japanese soldier, behind the elementary school building, near the closet, where the corpse was later
buried. The information was given by the accused in 1945 when the Japanese were still ruling.

Appellant endeavors to discredit Liberato and Epifanio Salvador’s testimonies by trying to show the
improbability for Liberato to have seen the accused making signs to Cristoper Magdalera for their arrest
on the basis of the relative positions of witness and appellant and that Epifanio "apparently" was away
and came near the place where Liberato was being arrested only after Magdalera d pointed his pistol at
his back.

The fact that, while he was going southwest, he had seen the accused in the northeast making the sign
to Magdalera, is satisfactorily explained by Liberato by saying that "because a man wanted by the
Japanese begins to observe everything," and he had to observe "because I knew they were making
signs," and at that time the accused was "in the left side," and with respect to Epifanio, appellant’s
surmise that he v. as "apparently away" appears to be without basis if it is recalled that it was Epifanio
who advised Liberato to hold up his hands, when Liberato was refusing to do it, by saying, in allusion to
Magdalera, "he is a Japanese spy.

Appellant maintains also that it must have been Felix Abad whom the witnesses for the prosecution saw
winking his eye at Magdalera for the latter to arrest the Salvador brothers and not Francisco Abad. But
the theory cannot be maintained upon the positive and unequivocal testimonies of Liberato and
Epifanio pointing the accused as the one who made the sign. Appellant’s insistence to put the blame on
Felix Abad, by trying to show that it was he and not the accused who made the sign, even if accepted,
will not relieve appellant of all responsibility, because, according to the witnesses for the prosecution,
he went along with his brothers Mariano and Felix and Cristoper Magdalera in bringing the Salvador
brothers to the Japanese garrison where they were delivered by the accused himself, and it was
Francisco Abad who told the Japanese "that we were guerrillas."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the sixth assignment of error appellant complains that the lower court admitted evidence of supposed
treasonable acts of appellant but which are not specifically alleged in any of the counts of the
information.

Appellant points specifically to the testimony of Agustin de la Cruz, to the effect that in the month of
October, 1944, at around 11 o’clock, while witness and others were around a gambling table, appellant
came unnoticed w with six Japanese soldiers and demanded of those in the gathering the information of
the whereabouts of Lt. Riparip and Sgt. Juan Asuncion, both of the guerrilla army, and that sometime in
November, 1944, on the occasion of the shooting of Eustaquio Domingo, the accused was in the
Japanese garrison while the Japanese soldiers proceeded to the site of the shooting, gathered all the
males found thereabouts, bringing one of them, Benjamin Aremajo, to the garrison to be later dragged
to the plaza where he was beaten up, facts which were declared proven by the lower court.

The assignment is well taken as the above facts are not alleged in any of the four counts of the
information. The fact that accused is described therein as an informer is not enough, because the
description is a conclusion made by the author of the information based on the facts specifically alleged
in the four counts. The information alleged that the accused "adhered to and served as an informer of
the enemy, . . .giving them aid and comfort in the following manner, to wit:", — and then follow the four
counts.

6
Furthermore, even if the word "informer" in the information should justify the admission of the
evidence in question, the lower court erred in finding the facts proved when the testimony of Agustin de
la Cruz about them has not been corroborated by any other witness, thus violating the two-witness rule
in treason cases.

Appellant assigned as the seventh error of the trial court in finding him as an informer "on mere
assertions of witnesses to that effect without supporting treasonable acts and in making findings of fact
not supported by any evidence at all" and makes the complaint, specifically, in relation with the
following pronouncement in the appealed decision:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . The accused acted and served as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese army in
Camiling, directing his espionage activities or detecting and gathering informations about the activities
of members of the guerrilla organizations, of persons maintaining or providing for the support thereof
and of persons possessing firearms or in any other manner connected with the underground resistance
movements against the Japanese and spying on the movements of those persons who cherish the return
to the Philippines of the Americans, . . . Proofs adduced by the prosecution of the fact that the accused
had been acting as an informer and spy for and in the aid of the Japanese are highly convincing. One
after another the various witnesses for the prosecution has pointed his accusing finger at the accused to
have been an informer and spy of the Japanese army. . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The pronouncement appears to be based on the testimonies of Publio Dumaual, Rafael Guillerrno, and
Agustin de la Cruz, each one of whom testified about facts not alleged in any of the counts of the
information, and their testimonies on said facts appear not to be corroborated by another witness, as
required by the two with rule. The assignment of error is well taken.

Appellant complains in his eighth assignment of error that the court failed to take into acccount two
mitigating circumstances: the fact that the Abad family was persecuted by guerrillas, the persecution
ending in the killing of Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad, father and brother, respectively, of the
accused, and, appellant’s age.

On September 26, 1942, a group of around thirty guerrillas took the Abad family to the barrio of
Ketegan. On October 17, Lino Abad Pine and Antonio Abad were brought to the schoolhouse, and from
that time on the were never seen alive again. On January, 1943, the family was released minus the
above mentioned two members, and they proceeded to Camiling where Mariano Abad the eldest son,
was living, as explained by his widower mother, "to whom I could look after for support inasmuch as he
is my living eldest son. He was with the Japs because that was the last resort for him to do inasmuch as i
he did not do that he would have been killed by the guerrillas."cralaw virtua1aw library

These facts cannot be considered to mitigate appellant’ guilt as they are not of a similar nature or
analogous those mentioned in article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Appellant’s age can be considered. He u as born o October 20, 1924, and when he committed the acts
alleged in counts two and three, the latter on September 28, 1944, he was not yet 20 years old. The fact
that his eldest brother, Mariano, was the liaison officer of the Japanese and another elder brother, Felix,
was also in the service of the Japanese, coupled by the fact that, as stated by his widowed mother, the
accused had to depend on Mariano for his support, the same as the other members of the family, are
circumstances from which, in view of appellant’s immature age, did not allow him the. freedom of
initiative and action which should be expected of a person who is aware of the full consequences and

7
responsibility for his acts. The circumstances of this case justify crediting appellant with a mitigating
circumstance of similar nature to that of number 2 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.

Although we hold appellant as one of those responsible for the arrest of the Salvador brothers, we do
not agree with the lower court in finding him responsible also for the death of Osias Salvador, as,
according to the evidence, it was the escape of Epifanio, and later the escape of Liberato, which must
have enraged the Japanese to the extent of killing Osias Salvador, who, were he not so weak, had the
same chance as his brothers to escape. If his brothers did not escape, there is no ground to presume
that Osias would have been killed by the Japanese if we take into consideration that, after almost two
and a half months of confinement, the Japanese allowed Fausto Francisco to be released. There is
absolutely no evidence that appellant was present or had anything to do with the killing of Osias
Salvador.

Upon the conclusions we arrived at, it is not necessary to deal with the ninth assignment of error in
appellant’s brief.

Finding the accused guilty of the crime of treason as punished by article 114 of the Revised Penal Code
with the attendance of one mitigating circumstance, as provided in number 2 of article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code, with the modification of the lower court’s decision, we sentence him to 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal and to pay a fine of P5,000 and the costs.

Moran, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.

Paras, J., I reserve my vote. The decision in the Laurel case is not as yet final.

2. People v. Catantan, G.R. No. 118075, Sept. 5, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG, accused-appellant.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
EMILIANO CATANTAN and JOSE MACVEN URSAL alias "Bimbo" were charged with violation of PD No.
532 otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy and Highway Robbery Law of 1974 for having on 27 June
1993, while armed with a firearm and a bladed weapon, acting in conspiracy with one another, by
means of violence and intimidation, wilfully and feloniously attacked, assaulted and inflicted physical
injuries on Eugene Pilapil and Juan Pilapil Jr. who were then fishing in the seawaters of Tabogon,
Cebu, and seized their fishing boat, to their damage and prejudice.1
The Regional Trial Court of Cebu, after trial, found both accused Emiliano Catantan y Tayong and Jose
Macven Ursal alias "Bimbo" guilty of the crime charged and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua.2 Of
the duo only Emiliano Catantan appealed.
In his appeal, accused Catantan contends that the trial court erred in convicting him of piracy as the
facts proved only constitute grave coercion defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code and not piracy
under PD No. 532.
The evidence for the prosecution is that at 3:00 o'clock in the morning of 27 June 1993, the Pilapil
brothers Eugene, 21, and Juan Jr., 18, were fishing in the sea some 3 kilometers away from the shores of
Tabogon, Cebu. Suddenly, another boat caught up with them. One of them, later identified as the
accused Emiliano Catantan, bearded the pump boat of the Pilapils and leveled his gun at Eugene. With
his gun, Catantan struck Eugene on the left cheekbone and ordered him and Juan Jr. to " dapa."3 Then

8
Catantan told Ursal to follow him to the pumpboat of the Pilapils. There they hogtied Eugene, forced
him to lie down at the bottom of the boat, covered him with a tarpaulin up to his neck, stepped on him
and ordered Juan Jr. to ferry them to Daan Tabogon. They left behind the other pumpboat which the
accused had earlier used together with its passengers one of whom was visibly tied.
Noting that they were already far out into the sea, Eugene reminded Catantan that they were now off-
course but Catantan told Eugene to keep quiet or he would be killed. Later, the engine conked out and
Juan Jr. was directed to row the boat. Eugene asked to be set free so he could help but was not allowed;
he was threatened with bodily harm instead.
Meanwhile Juan Jr. managed to fix the engine, but as they went farther out into the open sea the engine
stalled again. This time Eugene was allowed to assist his brother. Eugene's hands were set free but his
legs were tied to the outrigger. At the point of a tres cantos4 held by Ursal, Eugene helped row the boat.
As they passed the shoreline of Nipa, they saw another boat. Catantan asked whose boat that was and
the Pilapils told him that it was operated by a certain Juanito and that its engine was new. Upon learning
this, Catantan ordered the Pilapil brothers to approach the boat cautioning them however not to move
or say anything.
On the pretext that they were buying fish Catantan boarded the "new" pumpboat. Once aboard he
ordered the operator Juanito to take them to Mungaz, another town of Cebu. When Juanito tried to
beg-off by saying that he would still pull up his net and harvest his catch, Catantan drew his revolver and
said, "You choose between the two, or I will kill you."5 Juanito, obviously terrified, immediately obeyed
and Ursal hopped in from the other pumpboat and joined Catantan.
But, as Ursal was transferring to the "new" pumpboat, its outrigger caught the front part of the
pumpboat of the Pilapils so he kicked hard its prow; it broke. The jolt threw Eugene into the sea and he
landed on the water headlong. Juan Jr. then untied his brother's legs and the two swam together
clinging to their boat. Fortunately another pumpboat passed by and towed them safely ashore.
Section 2, par. (d), of PD No. 532, defines piracy as "any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the
taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of the
complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a passenger or member
of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The offenders shall
be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided." And a vessel is construed in Sec. 2, par.
(b), of the same decree as "any vessel or watercraft used for transport of passengers and cargo from one
place to another through Philippine waters. It shall include all kinds and types of vessels or boats used in
fishing (emphasis supplied).
On the other hand, grave coercion as defined in Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code is committed by "any
person who, without authority of law, shall, by means of violence, prevent another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compel him to do something against his will, whether it be right or
wrong."
Accused-appellant argues that in order that piracy may be committed it is essential that there be an
attack on or seizure of a vessel. He claims that he and his companion did not attack or seize the fishing
boat of the Pilapil brothers by using force or intimidation but merely boarded the boat, and it was only
when they were already on board that they used force to compel the Pilapils to take them to some
other place. Appellant also insists that he and Ursal had no intention of permanently taking possession
or depriving complainants of their boat. As a matter of fact, when they saw another pumpboat they
ordered the brothers right away to approach that boat so they could leave the Pilapils behind in their
boat. Accordingly, appellant claims, he simply committed grave coercion and not piracy.
We do not agree. Under the definition of piracy in PD No. 532 as well as grave coercion as penalized in
Art. 286 of the Revised Penal Code, this case falls squarely within the purview of piracy. While it may be
true that Eugene and Juan Jr. were compelled to go elsewhere other than their place of destination,

9
such compulsion was obviously part of the act of seizing their boat. The testimony of Eugene, one of the
victims, shows that the appellant actually seized the vessel through force and intimidation. The direct
testimony of Eugene is significant and enlightening —
Q: Now, while you and your younger brother were fishing at the seawaters of Tabogon at that time, was
there anything unusual that happened?
A: Yes.
Q: Will you please tell the Court what that was?
A: While we were fishing at Tabogon another pumpboat arrived and the passengers of that pumpboat
boarded our pumpboat.
Q: Now, that pumpboat which you said approached you, how many were riding in that pumpboat?
A: Four.
Q: When you said the passengers of that pumpboat boarded your pumpboat, how did they do that?
A: They approached somewhat suddenly and came aboard the pumpboat (emphasis supplied).
Q: How many suddenly came aboard your pumpboat?
A: Only one.
Q: What did that person do when he came aboard your pumpboat?
A: When he boarded our pumpboat he aimed his revolver at us (emphasis supplied).
Q: By the way, when he aimed his revolver to you, did he say anything to you?
x x x           x x x          x x x
A: He said, "dapa," which means lie down (emphasis supplied).
COURT:
Q: To whom did he aim that revolver?
A: He aimed the revolver on me.
TRIAL PROS. ECHAVEZ:
Q: What else did he do?
A: Then he ordered his companion to come aboard the pumpboat.
Q: What did he do with his revolver?
A: He struck my face with the revolver, hitting the lower portion of my left eye.
Q: Now, after you were struck with the revolver, what did these persons do?
A: We were ordered to take them to a certain place.
Q: To what place did he order you to go?
A: To Daan Tabogon. 6
To sustain the defense and convert this case of piracy into one of grave coercion would be to ignore the
fact that a fishing vessel cruising in Philippine waters was seized by the accused by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons. As Eugene Pilapil testified, the accused suddenly approached them
and boarded their pumpboat and Catantan aimed his revolver at them as he ordered complaining
witness Eugene Pilapil to "dapa" or lie down with face downwards, and then struck his face with a
revolver, hitting the lower portion of his left eye, after which, Catantan told his victims at gun point to
take them to Daan Tabogon.
The incident happened at 3:00 o'clock in the morning. The sudden appearance of another pumpboat
with four passengers, all strangers to them, easily intimidated the Pilapil brothers that they were
impelled to submit in complete surrender to the marauders. The moment Catantan jumped into the
other pumpboat he had full control of his victims. The sight of a drawn revolver in his hand drove them
to submission. Hence the issuance of PD No. 532 designed to avert situations like the case at bar and
discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters. Thus we cite the succeeding "whereas" clauses of
the decree —
Whereas, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still committing acts
of depredations upon the persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel

10
from one place to another, thereby disturbing the peace, order and tranquility of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people;
Whereas, such acts of depredations constitute either piracy or highway robbery/brigandage which are
among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all countries; and,
Whereas, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating such acts of
depredations by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in view of eliminating all obstacle
to the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people.
The Pilapil brothers are mere fisherfolk whose only means of livelihood is fishing in sea waters. They
brave the natural elements and contend with the unknown forces of the sea to bring home a bountiful
harvest. It is on these small fishermen that the townspeople depend for the daily bread. To impede their
livelihood would be to deprive them of their very subsistence, and the likes of the accused within the
purview of PD No. 532 are the obstacle to the "economic, social, educational and community progress of
the people." Had it not been for the chance passing of another pumpboat, the fate of the Pilapil
brothers, left alone helpless in a floundering, meandering outrigger with a broken prow and a conked-
out engine in open sea, could not be ascertained.
While appellant insists that he and Ursal had no intention of depriving the Pilapils permanently of their
boat, proof of which they left behind the brothers with their boat, the truth is, Catantan and Ursal
abandoned the Pilapils only because their pumpboat broke down and it was necessary to transfer to
another pumpboat that would take them back to their lair. Unfortunately for the pirates their "new"
pumpboat ran out of gas so they were apprehended by the police soon after the Pilapils reported the
matter to the local authorities.
The fact that the revolver used by the appellant to seize the boat was not produced in evidence cannot
exculpate him from the crime. The fact remains, and we state it again, that Catantan and his co-accused
Ursal seized through force and intimidation the pumpboat of the Pilapils while the latter were fishing in
Philippine waters.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the conviction of accused-
appellant EMILIANO CATANTAN y TAYONG for the crime of piracy penalized under PD No. 532 and
sentencing him accordingly to reclusion perpetua, is AFFIRMED. Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

3. People v. Lovedioro, G.R. No. 112235, Nov. 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ELIAS LOVEDIORO y CASTRO, Defendant-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Ricafat Law Office for Accused-Appellant.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; ESSENTIALLY A CRIME OF MASSES INVOLVING CROWD ACTION. — The
gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. By its very
nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion is
that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they acquire
a political character.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CRIMES COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF POLITICAL END, ABSORBED. — Divested of its
common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different color by being

11
absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of murder. In deciding
if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our courts to ascertain
whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political motive of the act should
be conclusively demonstrated. It is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly proven. Both
purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crime. With either of these elements wanting,
the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act complained of were
committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing, robbing, or etc., were
accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it has been held that the
crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be absorbed by the crime
rebellion. If no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be convicted of the
common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and mere
membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of itself,
suffice.

3. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; BURDEN OF PROOF; BURDEN IN PROVING POLITICAL MOTIVE IN CRIMES
COMMITTED IN FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION LIES WITH THE ACCUSED. — The burden of demonstrating
political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of mind which the accused, better than any
individual knows. As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a
political motive lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. It must be
established by clear and satisfactory evidence.

4. CRIMINAL LAW; REBELLION; NOT ESTABLISHED WHERE KILLING WAS NOT POLITICALLY MOTIVATED.
— It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that
he was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which
would suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose.
Moreover, the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any
mention or allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. Even prosecution
eyewitness Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. In any
case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a
matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. Against appellant’s
attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record leaves the
impression that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently infused to
mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested areas, crimes
have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak of political
color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than ordinary
crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a
political motive for the killing of SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly
convicted appellant of the crime of murder.

5. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; TESTIMONY OF A SINGLE CREDIBLE WITNESS IS SUFFICIENT

TO CONVICT. — It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, scaled his fate, for it is
settled that the testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. Against
appellant’s claims that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative,
free from any signs of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused.

6. CRIMINAL LAW; MOTIVE; ABSENCE THEREOF DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONVICTION. — Neither may lack
of motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does
not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified

12
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony.

7. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY; BOLSTERED BY ABSENCE OF GRUDGE AGAINST ACCUSED. —

In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s case was furthermore bolstered by accused-
appellant’s admission in open court that he and the eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against
each other.

8. CRIMINAL LAW; QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES; TREACHERY; MANIFEST BY THE SUDDEN AND

WITHOUT WARNING ATTACK ON THE VICTIM. — Treachery was adequately proved in the court below.
The attack delivered by appellant was sudden, and without warning of any kind.

9. ID.; MURDER; PENALTY. — The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime committed is
murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and aggravating
circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua together with all
the accessories provided by law.

DECISION

KAPUNAN, J.:

Off-duty policeman SPO3 Jesus Lucilo was walking along Burgos St., away from the Daraga, Albay Public
Market when a man suddenly walked beside him, pulled a .45 caliber gun from his waist, aimed the gun
at the policeman’s right ear and fired. The man who shot Lucilo had three other companions with him,
one of whom shot the fallen policeman four times as he lay on the ground. After taking the latter’s gun,
the man and his companions boarded a tricycle and fled. 1

The incident was witnessed from a distance of about nine meters by Nestor Armenta, a 25 year old
welder from Pilar, Sorsogon, who claimed that he knew both the victim and the man who fired the fatal
shot. Armenta identified the man who fired at the deceased as Elias Lovedioro y Castro, his nephew
(appellant’s father was his first cousin) and alleged that he knew the victim from the fact that the latter
was a resident of Bagumbayan.

Lucilo died on the same day of massive blood loss from multiple gunshot wounds on the face, the chest,
and other parts of the body. 2 On autopsy, the municipal health officer established the cause of death as
hypovolemic shock. 3

As a result of the killing, the office of the provincial prosecutor of Albay, on November 6, 1992 filed an
Information charging accused-appellant Elias Lovedioro y Castro of the crime of Murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code. The Information reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 27th day of July, 1992, at more or less 5:30 o’clock in the afternoon, at Burgos
Street, Municipality of Daraga, Province of Albay, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, together with Gilberto Longasa, who is already charged in
Crim. Case No. 5931 before RTC, Branch 1, and three (3) others whose true identities are at present
unknown and remain at large, conniving, conspiring, confederating and helping one another for a
common purpose, armed with firearms, with intent to kill and with treachery and evident
premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire and shoot one SPO3 JESUS
LUCILO, a member of the Daraga Police Station inflicting upon the latter multiple gunshot wounds

13
causing his death, to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.

After trial, the court a quo found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder. The dispositive portion of said decision, dated September 24, 1993 states:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, this Court finds the accused ELIAS LOVEDIORO
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal, acting in conspiracy with his co-accused who are still at
large, of the crime of murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, and
hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua with all the accessories provided by
law; to pay the heirs of the deceased SPO3 Jesus Lucilo through the widow, Mrs. Remeline Lucilo, the
amount of Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos representing the civil indemnity for death; to pay the said
widow the sum of Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) Pesos representing reasonable moral damages; and to
pay the said widow the sum of Eighteen Thousand Five Hundred Eighty-Eight (P18,588.00) Pesos,
representing actual damages, without subsidiary imprisonment however, in case of insolvency on the
part of the said accused.

With costs against the accused.

SO-ORDERED.

Hence, the instant appeal, in which the sole issue interposed is that portion of trial court decision finding
him guilty of the crime of murder and not rebellion.

Appellant cites the testimony of the prosecution’s principal witness, Nestor Armenta, as supporting his
claim that he should have been charged with the crime of rebellion, not murder. In his Brief, he
asseverates that Armenta, a police informer, identified him as a member of the New People’s Army.
Additionally, he contends that because the killing of Lucilo was "a means to or in furtherance of
subversive ends," 4 (said killing) should have been deemed absorbed in the crime of rebellion under
Arts. 134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code. Finally, claiming that he did not fire the fatal shot but
merely acted as look-out in the liquidation of Lucilo, he avers that he should have been charged merely
as a participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under paragraph 2 of Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code and should therefore have been meted only the penalty of prision mayor by the
lower court.

Asserting that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder, the Solicitor General
avers that the crime committed by appellant may be considered as rebellion only if the defense itself
had conclusively proven that the motive or intent for the killing of the policeman was for "political and
subversive ends." 5 Moreover, the Solicitor General contends that even if appellant were to be
convicted of rebellion, and even if the trial court had found appellant guilty merely of being a participant
in a rebellion, the proper imposable penalty is not prision mayor as appellant contends, but reclusion
temporal, because Executive Order No. 187 as amended by Republic Act No. 6968, the Coup D’etat Law,
prescribes reclusion temporal as the penalty imposable for individuals found guilty as participants in a
rebellion.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the crime committed was murder and not rebellion.

Under Art. 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act. No. 6968, rebellion is committed

14
in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[B]y rising publicly and taking arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Republic of the Philippines or any part
thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or depriving the Chief Executive or the
Legislature, wholly or partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives. 6

The gravamen of the crime of rebellion is an armed public uprising against the government. 7 By its very
nature, rebellion is essentially a crime of masses or multitudes involving crowd action, which cannot be
confined a priori within predetermined bounds. 8 One aspect noteworthy in the commission of rebellion
is that other acts committed in its pursuance are, by law, absorbed in the crime itself because they
acquire a political character. This peculiarity was underscored in the case of People v. Hernandez, 9
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common
crimes as may be committed to achieve a political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If
a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the purpose of removing from the
allegiance to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof, then it becomes
stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the
former acquires the political character of the latter.

Divested of its common complexion therefore, any ordinary act, however grave, assumes a different
color by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion, which carries a lighter penalty than the crime of
murder. In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, not murder, it becomes imperative for our
courts to ascertain whether or not the act was done in furtherance of a political end. The political
motive of the act should be conclusively demonstrated.

In such cases, the burden of demonstrating political motive falls on the defense, motive, being a state of
mind which the accused, better than any individual, knows. Thus, in People v. Gempes, 10 this court
stressed that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Since this is a matter that lies peculiarly with (the accused’s) knowledge and since moreover this is an
affirmative defense, the burden is on them to prove, or at least to state, which they could easily do
personally or through witnesses, that they killed the deceased in furtherance of the resistance
movement.

From the foregoing, it is plainly obvious that it is not enough that the overt acts of rebellion are duly
proven. Both purpose and overt acts are essential components of the crimes. With either of these
elements wanting, the crime of rebellion legally does not exist. In fact, even in cases where the act
complained of were committed simultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion, if the killing,
robbing, or etc., were accomplished for private purposes or profit, without any political motivation, it
has been held that the crime would be separately punishable as a common crime and would not be
absorbed by the crime rebellion. 11

Clearly, political motive should be established before a person charged with a common crime-alleging
rebellion in order to lessen the possible imposable penalty-could benefit from the law’s relatively benign
attitude towards political crimes. Instructive in this regard is the case of Enrile v. Amin, 12 where the
prosecution sought to charge Senator Juan Ponce Enrile with violation of P.D. No. 1829, 13 for allegedly

15
harboring or concealing in his home Col. Gregorio Honasan in spite of the senator’s knowledge that
Honasan might have committed a crime. This Court held, against the prosecution’s contention, that
rebellion and violation of P.D. 1829 could be tried separately 14 (on the principle that rebellion is based
on the Revised Penal Code while P.D. 1829 is a special law), that the act for which the senator was being
charged, though punishable under a special law, was absorbed in the crime of rebellion being motivated
by, and related to the acts for which he was charged in Enrile v. Salazar (G.R. Nos. 92163 and 92164) a
case decided on June 5, 1990. Ruling in favor of Senator Enrile and holding that the prosecution for
violation of P.D. No. 1829 cannot prosper because a separate prosecution for rebellion had already been
filed and in fact decided, the Court said:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The attendant circumstances in the instant case, however constrain us to rule that the theory of
absorption in rebellion cases must not confine itself to common crimes but also to offenses under
special laws which are perpetrated in furtherance of the political offense. 15

Noting the importance of purpose in cases of rebellion the court in Enrile v. Amin further underscored
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[I]intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he
harbored or concealed Colonel Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the
motive for the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social motives, that
is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of the crime of rebellion instead of
being punished separately.

It follows, therefore, that if no political motive is established and proved, the accused should be
convicted of the common crime and not of rebellion. In cases of rebellion, motive relates to the act, and
mere membership in an organization dedicated to the furtherance of rebellion would not, by and of
itself, suffice.

The similarity of some of the factual circumstances of People v. Ompad, Jr., 16 to the instant case is
striking. Two witnesses, both former NPA recruits identified the accused Ompad, alias "Commander
Brando," a known hitman of the NPA, as having led three other members of the NPA in the liquidation of
Dionilo Barlaan, a military informer, also in a rebel infested area. In spite of his notoriety as an NPA
hitman, Ompad was merely charged with and convicted of murder, not rebellion because political
motive was neither alleged nor proved.

As stated hereinabove, the burden of proof that the act committed was impelled by a political motive
lies on the accused. Political motive must be alleged in the information. 17 It must be established by
clear and satisfactory evidence. In People v. Paz and Tica we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That the killing was in pursuance of the Huk rebellion is a matter of mitigation or defense that the
accused has the burden of proving clearly and satisfactorily. The lone uncorroborated assertion of
appellant that his superiors told him of Dayrit being an informer, and his suspicion that he was one such,
is neither sufficient or adequate to established that the motivation for the killing was political,
considering appellant’s obvious interest in testifying to that effect. 18

Similarly, in People v. Buco, 19 the Court stressed that accused in that case failed to established that the
reason for the killing of their victim was to further or carry out rebellion. The evidence adduced by the
defense therein simply showed that appellant Francisco Buco was ordered by Tomas Calma, alias

16
"Commander Sol" to kill municipal mayor Conrado G. Dizon. However, the evidence likewise showed
that Calma was induced by an acquaintance, a civilian, to order the killing on account of private
differences over a ninety (90) hectare piece of land. The court attributed no political motive for the
killing, though committed by known members of the Hukbalahap movement. 20

People v. Dasig 21 has a factual milieu almost similar to the instant case. There, the Court held that "the
act of killing a police officer, knowing too well that the victim is a person in authority is a mere
component or ingredient of rebellion or an act done in furtherance of a rebellion." In Dasig the Court
however noted that the accused, who was charged with murder, not only admitted his membership with
the NPA but also executed an extrajudicial confession to the effect that he was a member of an NPA
"sparrow unit," a fact to which even the Solicitor General, in his brief therein was in agreement. The
Solicitor General’s brief in Dasig which this Court favorably quoted, noted that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

[T]he sparrow unit is the liquidation squad of the New People’s Army with the objective of overthrowing
the duly constituted government. It is therefore not hard to comprehend that the killing of Pfc. Manatad
was committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends of the NPA. 22

By contrast, the Solicitor General vigorously argues for a different result in the case at bench. He states
that accused-appellant’s belated claims to membership in the NPA were not only in substantial but also
self serving, 23 an averment to which, given a thorough review of the circumstances of the case, we fully
agree. He states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[In the case cited] the appellants, admittedly members of the NPA clearly overcame the burden of
proving motive or intent. It was shown that the political motivation for the killing of the victim was the
fact that Ragaul was suspected as an informer for the PC. The perpetrators even left a letter card, a
drawing on the body of Ragaul as a warning to others not to follow his example. It is entirely different in
the case at bar where the evidence for the appellant merely contains self-serving assertions and denials
not substantial enough as an indicia of political motivation in the killing of victim SPO3 Jesus Lucilo. 24

In the case at bench, the appellant, assisted by counsel, admitted in his extrajudicial confession to
having participated in the killing of Lucilo as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Q: What was that incident if any, please narrate?

A: July 27, 1992 at more or less 12:00 noon. I am at home, three male person a certain alias ALWIN,
ALIAS SAMUEL and the other one unknown to me, fetched me and told me to go with them, so I asked
them where, Alwin handed me a hand gun and same he stopped/call a passenger jeepney and told me
board on said jeepney. (sic)

Q: Please continue.

A.. Upon reaching Daraga, Albay fronting Petron Gasoline Station, we alighted on said jeep, so we walk
towards Daraga Bakery we stopped walking due to it is raining, when the rain stopped we continue
walking by using the road near the bakery. (sic)

Q: When you reached Daraga bakery, as you have said in Q.7 you used the road near the bakery where
did you proceed?

17
A: I am not familiar with that place, but I and my companion continue walking, at more less 4:30 P.M.
July 27, 1992 one of my companion told us as to quote in Bicol dialect to wit: ‘AMO NA YADI AN
TINAMPO PALUWAS’ (This is the place towards the poblacion), so, I placed myself just ahead of a small
store, my three (3) companion continue walking towards poblacion, later on a policeman sporting whit
T-shirt a khaki pant was walking towards me, while the said policeman is nearly approaching me, ALWIN
shot the said policeman infront of the small store, when the said policeman fell on the asphalted road,
ALWIN took the service firearm of the said policeman, then we ran towards the subdivision, then my
two (2) companions commanded a tricycle then we fled until we reached a hill wherein there is a small
bridge, thereafter Ka Samuel took the handgun that was handed to me by them at Pilar, Sorsogon. (sic)

Q: Do you know the policeman that was killed by your companion?

A: I just came to know his name when I reached home and heard it radio, that he is JESUS LUCILO. (sic)

Q: What is your participation in the ground?

A: Look-out sir.

Q: I have nothing more to asked you what else, if there is any? (sic)

A: No more sir.25cralaw:red

It bears emphasis that nowhere in his entire extrajudicial confession did appellant ever mention that he
was a member of the New People’s Army. A thorough reading of the same reveals nothing which would
suggest that the killing in which he was a participant was motivated by a political purpose. Moreover,
the information filed against appellant, based on sworn statements, did not contain any mention or
allusion as to the involvement of the NPA in the death of SPO3 Lucilo. 26 Even prosecution eyewitness
Nestor Armenta did not mention the NPA in his sworn statement of October 19, 1992. 27

As the record would show, allegations relating to appellant’s membership in the NPA surfaced almost
merely as an afterthought, something which the defense merely picked up and followed through upon
prosecution eyewitness Armenta’s testimony on cross-examination that he knew appellant to be a
member of the NPA. Interestingly, however, in the same testimony, Armenta admitted that he was
"forced" to pinpoint appellant as an NPA member. 28 The logical result, of course, was that the trial
court did not give any weight and credence to said testimony. The trial court, after all, had the
prerogative of rejecting only a part of a witness’ testimony while upholding the rest of it. 29 While
disbelieving the portion of Armenta’s testimony on appellant’s alleged membership in the NPA, the trial
court correctly gave credence to his unflawed narration about how the crime was committed. 30 Such
narration is even corroborated in its pertinent portions, except as to the identity of the gunwielder, by
the testimony of the appellant himself.

In any case, appellant’s claim regarding the political color attending the commission of the crime being a
matter of defense, its viability depends on his sole and unsupported testimony. He testified that, upon
the prodding of alias Alwin and alias Samuel, he joined the NPA because of the organization’s goals. 31
He claimed that his two companions shot Lucilo because he "had offended our organization," 32
without, however, specifying what the "offense" was. Appellant claimed that he had been a member of
the NPA for five months before the shooting incident. 33

18
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, appellant’s contentions are couched in terms so general
and non-specific 34 that they offer no explanation as to what contribution the killing would have made
towards the achievement of the NPA’s subversive aims. SPO3 Jesus Lucilo, a mere policeman, was never
alleged to be an informer. No acts of his were specifically shown to have offended the NPA.. Against
appellant’s attempts to shade his participation in the killing with a political color, the evidence on record
leaves the impression that appellant’s bare allegations of membership in the NPA was conveniently
infused to mitigate the penalty imposable upon him. It is of judicial notice that in many NPA infested
areas, crimes have been all-too-quickly attributed to the furtherance of an ideology or under the cloak
of political color for the purpose of mitigating the imposable penalty when in fact they are no more than
ordinary crimes perpetrated by common criminals. In Baylosis v. Chavez, Jr., Chief Justice Narvasa aptly
observed:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The existence of rebellious groups in our society today, and of numerous bandits, or irresponsible or
deranged individuals, is a reality that cannot be ignored or belittled. Their activities, the killings and acts
of destruction and terrorism that they perpetrate, unfortunately continue unabated despite the best
efforts that the Government authorities are exerting, although it may be true that the insurrectionist
groups of the right or the left no longer pose a genuine threat to the security of the state. The need for
more stringent laws and more rigorous law-enforcement, cannot be gainsaid. 35

In the absence of clear and satisfactory evidence pointing to a political motive for the killing of SPO3
Jesus Lucilo, we are satisfied that the trial court correctly convicted appellant of the crime of murder. 36
It is of no moment that a single eyewitness, Nestor Armenta, sealed his fate, for it is settled that the
testimony of one witness, if credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. 37 Against appellant’s claims
that he acted merely as a look-out, the testimony of one witness, his blood relative, free from any signs
of impropriety or falsehood, was sufficient to convict the accused. 38 Moreover, neither may lack of
motive be availing to exculpate the appellant. Lack or absence of motive for committing a crime does
not preclude conviction, there being a reliable eyewitness who fully and satisfactorily identified
appellant as the perpetrator of the felony. 39 In the case at bench, the strength of the prosecution’s
case was furthermore bolstered by accused-appellant’s admission in open court that he and the
eyewitness, his own uncle, bore no grudges against each other. 40

Finally, treachery was adequately proved in the court below. The attack delivered by appellant was
sudden, and without warning of any kind. 41 The killing having been qualified by treachery, the crime
committed is murder under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In the absence of any mitigating and
aggravating circumstances, the trial court was correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua
together with all the accessories provide by law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the trial court’s decision dated September 14, 1993, sentencing
the accused of Murder is hereby AFFIRMED, in toto.

SO ORDERED.

4. People v. Flores, et. al., G.R. No. 116488, May 31, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. AARON FLORES @ "RONITO", SULPECIO SILPAO y
ORTEGA @ "SULPING" and EDGAR VILLERAN y MAGBANUA, Accused-Appellants.

19
DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Detachment Commander of the 7th Infantry Brigade detailed at Barangay Tabu,
Ilog, Negros Occidental, and three (3) members of the local Citizen Armed Force Geographical Unit
(CAFGU) under his supervision, namely, Aaron Flores alias "Ronito", Sulpecio Silpao y Ortega alias
"Sulping" and Edgar Villeran y Magbanua, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Kabankalan,
Negros Occidental, Branch 61, with Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention. The information charged
as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

That on or about the 29th day of September, 1992, in the Municipality of Ilog, Province of Negros
Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
armed with high powered firearms conspiring, confederating and helping one another, by means of
force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, kidnap,
detain and keep under guard one SAMSON SAYAM y GEPANAO from Km 117, Hda. Shangrella (sic), Brgy.
Tabu, of the above-named municipality, and bring the latter to their detachment at Brgy. Tabu, under
restraint and against his will, without proper authority thereof, thereby depriving said victim of his civil
liberty since then up to the present.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

CONTRARY TO LAW. 1

All the four accused pleaded "Not Guilty" when arraigned. Trial ensued and, based on the testimonial
evidence presented, the trial court found the following antecedent facts to be undisputed.

On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was drinking beer at the store owned by
Terry Cabrillos located at Barangay Tabu, Ilog, Negros Occidental. Sgt. Wennie Tampioc, Aaron Flores,
Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran were at the same store drinking beer. Sayam joined the four accused
at their table. Sometime later, all the accused and the victim left the store and walked towards the
direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused left the store with Samson Sayam,
witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment
headquarters. 2 That was the last time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayam’s
mother and relatives, he has not been found.

It was the prosecution’s contention that on that fateful evening, all four accused hatched a conspiracy to
kidnap the victim and thereafter detain him at the detachment headquarters. They allegedly succeeded
in their plot and, the prosecution avers, to this day the accused have not released Samson Sayam. All the
accused, however, vehemently denied committing the acts charged.

The trial court held that the testimonial evidence failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence
of a conspiracy among the four accused. More specifically, the prosecution failed to show an apparent
common design by and among the accused to kidnap and detain Samson Sayam against his will. Thus,
the trial court proceeded to determine the individual liabilities of the four accused based on the degree
of their participation in the commission of the offense charged.

The trial court gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence that Samson Sayam was seen being forcibly
dragged out of the store and pulled towards the direction of the detachment headquarters by accused

20
Aaron Flores, Sulpecio Silpao and Edgar Villeran. Since Samson Sayam had not been seen nor heard from
since then, the trial court held that the three accused were responsible for the former’s disappearance.

As regards Wennie Tampioc, the trial court found that he left the store ahead of the three (3) co-
accused and, thus, had nothing to do with the disappearance of Samson Sayam. Notably, none of the
prosecution witnesses specifically or categorically mentioned Tampioc as among those who actively
participated in bringing Samson Sayam by force to their headquarters. Unlike his co-accused who are
natives of the place of the incident, Wennie Tampioc was newly assigned as Detachment Commander
and did not know Samson Sayam, such that no ill-motive was attributed to him by the trial court.
Likewise, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses Nelson Golez, on the one hand, and that of Carlos
Manlangit, on the other hand, conflict as to the kind of firearm allegedly carried by Tampioc. While
Golez stated that he was armed with an Armalite rifle, 3 Manlangit testified that Tampioc was armed
with a short firearm. 4

More importantly, the trial court found that the identity of Sgt. Tampioc as one of the perpetrators of
the crime was doubtful, because notwithstanding the fact that Nelson Golez knew Wennie Tampioc
even before September 29, 1992, 5 the original complaint filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial court of
Ilog Candoni, dated October 21, 1992, which was based on the affidavits of Golez and Carlito Manlingit,
did not mention Wennie Tampioc as one of the respondents. The said affidavits merely mentioned an
"unidentified member of the 7th IB, Philippine Army, assigned at Brgy. Tabu, detachment." At the time
of the execution of the affidavits, the witnesses could have known that Wennie Tampioc was a sergeant,
and that he was a commander of the detachment. Finally, the straightforward and emphatic manner in
which Wennie Tampioc testified inspired belief in the trial court’s mind. 6

On December 8, 1993, the trial court rendered the assailed judgment, the dispositive of which
states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Aaron Flores, Edgar Villeran and
Sulpecio Silpao GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention as defined and penalized in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and are each sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua; and there being no proof that Samson Sayam is dead, they are
ordered to pay him jointly and severally, or in the alternative, his heirs the sum of Fifty Thousand
(P50,000.00) Pesos as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the
costs of this suit.

The accused Wennie Tampioc is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.

The bail bonds of the said accused are ordered cancelled and the convicted accused ordered confined
pending appeal if they so file an appeal, in accordance with Administrative Circular No. 2-92, dated
January 20, 1992 of the Supreme Court.

SO ORDERED. 7

Two (2) separate appeals were brought before us. Accused-appellant Sulpecio Silpao raised the
following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT SULPECIO SILPAO OF THE CRIME OF
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION, UNDER ARTICLE 267, REVISED PENAL CODE.chanrob1es

21
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO, AS
AMONG THOSE WHO FORCIBLY BROUGHT SAMSON SAYAM TO THEIR HEADQUARTERS IN THE EVENING
OF 29 SEPTEMBER 1992 AND RESPONSIBLE FOR SAMSON SAYAM’S DISAPPEARANCE.

III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT CAFGU SULPECIO SILPAO GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE OFFENSE CHARGED.

On the other hand, Accused-appellants Aaron Flores and Edgar Villeran interposed a joint appeal based
on the sole error that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS AARON FLORES AND EDGAR VILLERAN
GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE.

After a thorough review of the facts and evidence adduced before the trial court, we find that accused-
appellants should be acquitted of the offense charged against them.

The crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention is defined and penalized under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. The elements of the offense are:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

1. That the offender is a private individual.

2. That he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty.

3. That the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal.

4. That in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library

(a) That the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days;

(b) That it is committed simulating public authority;

(c) That any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or

(d) That the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. 8

Clearly, Accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious
Illegal Detention, since the first element of the said crime is that the offender must be a private
individual. In the case at bar, Accused-appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the
alleged crime was committed.

The CAFGU was created pursuant to Executive Order No. 264 for the purpose of complementing the
operations of the regular force formations in a locality. 9 It was composed of civilian volunteers who

22
were tasked to maintain peace and order in their localities, as well as to respond to threats to national
security. As such, they were provided with weapons, and given the authority to detain or order
detention of individuals. 10

The Solicitor General recognizes the error of charging and convicting accused-appellants of Kidnapping
and Serious Illegal Detention for the reason that the appellants are not private individuals, but public
officers. As such, the Solicitor General submits that, under the facts alleged, Accused-appellants can only
be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention, defined and penalized in Article 124 of the Revised Penal
Code. The prosecution maintains that inasmuch as all the other elements of Arbitrary Detention were
alleged in the criminal information filed against the accused-appellants, they may still be convicted of
said crime.

Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains
a person. 11 Since it is settled that accused-appellants are public officers, the question that remains to
be resolved is whether or not the evidence adduced before the trial court proved that Samson Sayam
was arbitrarily detained by Accused-Appellants.

As far back as the case of U.S. v. Cabanag, 12 it was held that in the crime of illegal or arbitrary
detention, it is essential that there is actual confinement or restriction of the person of the offended
party. The deprivation of liberty must be proved, 13 just as the intent of the accused to deprive the
victim of his liberty must also be established by indubitable proof. 14 In the more recent case of People
v. Fajardo, 15 this Court reiterated the ruling in U.S. v. Cabanag, i.e., there must be uncontroverted
proof of both intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, as well as actual confinement or restriction.

Detention is defined as the actual confinement of a person in an enclosure, or in any manner detaining
and depriving him of his liberty. 16 A careful review of the records of the instant case shows no evidence
sufficient to prove that Samson Sayam was detained arbitrarily by Accused-Appellants. While the
prosecution witnesses testified that accused-appellants were seen walking with Samson Sayam toward
the direction of the detachment headquarters, there is no shred of evidence that he was actually
confined there or anywhere else. The fact that Samson Sayam has not been seen or heard from since he
was last seen with accused-appellants does not prove that he was detained and deprived of his liberty.
The prosecution, however, argues that Samson Sayam was deprived of his liberty when accused-
appellants forced him to go with them when they left the store of Jerry Cabrillos and brought him to the
detachment headquarters.

We assayed the testimonies of the prosecution’s main witnesses, namely, Carlito Manlangit and his son
Jerry Manlangit. Carlito Manlangit’s testimony was offered to prove that Samson Sayam was forcibly
taken from the store and that the latter tried his best to free himself from his abductors. And yet, all
that Carlito testified to was that he saw Samson Sayam crossing the street alone from the store of a
certain Moleng; that the four accused, who were armed, followed Sayam and asked for his residence
certificate; that the four accused apprehended Samson Sayam and brought him to the detachment
headquarters; and that he went home after he saw Samson Sayam talking to the accused. 17

It is readily apparent that Carlito Manlangit’s testimony failed to prove the stated purpose thereof, i.e.,
that Samson Sayam was taken forcibly to the detachment headquarters. To be sure, the witness did not
state that Samson Sayam was pulled, dragged, or coerced to go with Accused-Appellants. Neither did he
say that Samson Sayam was taken at gunpoint. There is also no relevant testimony to the effect that
Samson Sayam tried his best to free himself from the clutches of Accused-Appellants. For if that were

23
the truth, the reactions of Carlito Manlangit do not conform to human experience. If he really witnessed
Samson Sayam being apprehended, forcibly taken, and trying to free himself, it cannot be logically
explained why Carlito Manlangit just went home, 18 instead of doing anything to help Samson Sayam.
He admitted that he did not immediately report the incident to the authorities. 19 More telling is the
absence of testimony to the effect that Samson Sayam was being taken to the detachment headquarters
against his will, that he was protesting his apprehension, or that he was asking for help, considering that
there were other people within hearing and seeing distance. Most damaging is Carlito Manlangit’s
statement that he did not see Samson Sayam in the detachment headquarters with any or all of the
accused. 20 In fine, Carlito Manlangit’s testimony failed to prove that Samson Sayam was arbitrarily
detained or deprived of his liberty.

Jerry Manlangit, son of Carlito, also testified for the prosecution. According to him, he and Samson
Sayam went to Barangay Tabu to have a sack of palay milled on September 29, 1992. At around six in
the evening, while on their way home, they passed by the store of Terry Cabrillos to buy kerosene.
There, he saw the four accused drinking beer. Samson Sayam told him to go home because he had to
show his residence certificate and barangay clearance to accused-appellant Aaron Flores. Jerry
Manlangit then proceeded to his residence in Hacienda Shangrila, located about half a kilometer away
from the center of Barangay Tabu. Later, he told his father that Samson Sayam stayed behind and asked
him to fetch Samson. He also testified that he heard gunshots coming from the direction of the
detachment headquarters. 21

The testimony of Jerry Manlangit does not prove any of the elements of the crime of arbitrary
detention. Neither does it support nor corroborate the testimony of his father, Carlito, for they dealt on
a different set of facts. Jerry Manlangit did not see any of accused-appellant apprehend or detain
Samson Sayam. He did not even see if accused-appellant Flores really inspected the residence certificate
and barangay clearance of Samson Sayam. The rest of his testimony comprised of hearsay evidence, 22
which has no probative value. 23 In summary, Jerry Manlangit’s testimony failed to establish that
accused-appellants were guilty of arbitrary detention.

The prosecution also presented the testimony of Nelson Golez, who identified the four accused as the
persons with Samson Sayam, drinking inside the store of Terry Cabrillos. He also stated that following a
heated argument, the accused and Samson Sayam left the store and went towards the direction of the
detachment headquarters. He said that the accused were "holding and pulling" Samson Sayam "towards
the road." Ten minutes later, Nelson Golez heard a single gunshot followed by rapid firing. 24

On cross-examination, however, Nelson Golez did not affirm his earlier statement that the accused and
Samson Sayam were engaged in a heated argument. Rather, he said he did not hear them arguing as
they were leaving the store. Although Nelson Golez attested that Samson Sayam was protesting while
the accused were dragging him, he did not do anything to help Samson Sayam, who happened to be his
cousin.25cralaw:red

Again, no conclusion of guilt can be inferred from Nelson Golez’s testimony. First of all, he was unsure of
his assertion that there was an argument. The mere fact that Samson Sayam was being dragged towards
the road does not constitute arbitrary detention. There is no showing that Samson Sayam was
completely deprived of his liberty such that he could not free himself from the grip of the accused, if he
was indeed being held against his will. The incident transpired in a public place, where there were
people milling about, many of whom were his friends. It is puzzling that Samson Sayam did not cry out
for help. Nobody bothered to report the incident, if indeed it happened, to the barangay authorities. No

24
one else came forward to corroborate the testimony of Nelson Golez.

The testimony of Nelson Golez, by itself, lacks credibility. He wavered on material points, even as the
prosecution failed to substantiate by direct or corroborative evidence the bare testimony of Nelson
Golez.

It is basic and elemental that in criminal prosecutions, before the accused may be convicted of a crime,
his guilt must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Although the findings of fact made by trial courts are
generally not disturbed on appeal, if there are substantial facts which were overlooked but which may
alter the results of the case in favor of the accused, such facts should be taken into account by the
appellate court. 26 And where it appears that the trial court erred in the appreciation of the evidence on
record or the lack of it, the factual findings of the trial court may be reversed. 27

After thoroughly reviewing the records of this case and weighing the testimonial evidence on the scale
of creditworthiness and materiality, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution grossly insufficient
to sustain a conviction. Again, the fact of detention, whether illegal or arbitrary, was not clearly
established by credible evidence. There was no showing that Samson Sayam was locked up, restrained
of his freedom, or prevented from communicating with anyone. Likewise, there was no proof that there
was actual intent on the part of accused-appellants to arbitrarily deprive Samson Sayam of his liberty. It
is necessary that there must be a purposeful or knowing action by accused-appellants to restrain the
victim by or with force, because taking coupled with intent completes the crime of illegal or arbitrary
detention. 28

The prosecution, however, maintains that the evidence, even though circumstantial, sufficiently
establishes the guilt of the Accused-Appellants. It cites the following circumstances:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

1. On September 29, 1992, at about 6:00 o’clock in the evening, Accused-Appellants, together with their
companions Sergeant Tampioc and fellow CAFGU Sulpecio Silpao, were seen with Samson at the store of
Terry Cabrillos. Accused-appellants were having a drinking spree. Later, they were seen engaged in a
heated argument.

2. Thereafter, Samson was forcibly brought out of the store by accused-appellants by holding and pulling
him towards the road. From another angle, another prosecution witness saw accused-appellants on the
road arresting Samson.

3. Accused-appellants brought Samson towards the direction of the detachment of Brgy. Tabu.

4. Ten (10) minutes later, a gunshot was heard coming from the direction of the detachment followed by
rapid firing.

5. After the incident, Samson was never seen again or heard from. 29

As already discussed, the above-enumerated circumstances were not established by clear and
convincing evidence. And even if these acts were proven to be true, the combination of all these
circumstances would still not be able to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. To our mind,
the totality of these circumstantial evidence do not constitute an unbroken chain pointing to the fair and
reasonable conclusion that the accused-appellants are guilty of the crime charged.

25
For circumstantial evidence to be sufficient to support a conviction, all the circumstances must be
consistent with the hypothesis that the accused-appellants are guilty, and inconsistent with the
possibility that they are innocent. 30 Thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for

conviction if:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) There is more than one circumstance;

b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
31

The rule is clear that there must be at least two proven circumstances which in complete sequence leads
to no other logical conclusion than that of the guilt of the accused. 32 It is admitted that Samson Sayam
was seen drinking with accused-appellants on that fateful night. However, the circumstances that there
was a heated argument among them, and that the accused-appellants held and pulled Samson Sayam to
the road and brought him towards the direction of the detachment headquarters was not sufficiently
proven by material or relevant testimony.

Moreover, the circumstance that gunshots were heard on that night have no relevancy to the case. Even
if it were, it cannot be concluded that the gunshots came from the direction of the detachment
headquarters. The witnesses who testified that they heard the gunshots were at least half a kilometer
away from the center of the barangay, while the detachment headquarters itself was also some distance
from the barangay. At night, especially in the rural areas when all is quiet, loud sounds such as gunshots
reverberate and would seem to come from every direction. An ordinary person a kilometer away
cannot, with certainty, point to the exact location where the gunshots would be coming from. That
would otherwise be attributing expertise on such matters to the prosecution witnesses.

That Samson Sayam was never seen or heard from again cannot be the basis for the trial court to render
judgment convicting the Accused-Appellants. In fact, it has no bearing in this case because it is not one
of the elements of the crime of arbitrary detention. Consequently, only one relevant circumstance was
proved, i.e., that accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Samson Sayam. However, said
circumstance does not necessarily prove that they feloniously abducted him, then arbitrarily detained
him. 33

Moreover, mere suspicion that the disappearance of Samson Sayam was a result of accused-appellants’
alleged criminal acts and intentions is insufficient to convict them. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is the
required quantum of evidence. 34 An uncorroborated circumstantial evidence is certainly not sufficient
for conviction when the evidence itself is in serious doubt. 35 The prosecution was not able to prove a
possible motive why accused-appellants would arbitrarily detain Samson Sayam. In sum, there is no
unbroken chain of circumstances leading to the conclusion that accused-appellants are guilty. Since the
pieces of circumstantial evidence do not fulfill the test of moral certainty that is sufficient to support a
judgment or conviction, the Court must acquit the accused. 36

In the recent case of People v. Comesario, 37 we had occasion to rule that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw

26
library

Accused-appellant’s conviction by the trial court hinged on circumstantial evidence. To validly invoke
circumstantial evidence, it must be shown that there is more than one circumstance and the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven. The combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The circumstances must constitute an unbroken chain
of events that can lead reasonably to the conclusion pointing to the accused to the exclusion of all
others as the author of the crime. Logically, it is where the evidence is purely circumstantial that there
should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot
depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of guilt of the accused. Like a tapestry made of strands which create a pattern when
interwoven, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proved constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion
pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.

Accused-appellants enjoy the presumption of innocence until the contrary is proved. In the case at bar,
the pieces of testimonial evidence relied on by the prosecution and the trial court to support a
conviction have failed to overcome the constitutional precept of the presumed innocence of Accused-
Appellants. Among other grounds, not only is there a lot of room for reasonable doubt in regard to their
guilt, there is a virtual dearth of convincing evidence to prove that a crime had been committed.

There is no need even to assess the evidence of the defense, for the prosecution bears the onus to
distinctly and indubitably prove that a crime had been committed by Accused-Appellants. 38 It is
incumbent upon the prosecution to establish its case with that degree of proof which leads to no other
conclusion but conviction in an unprejudiced mind. The evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall
on its own merits for it cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. 39 Clearly, the prosecution in this case has failed to prove the guilt of accused-appellants
beyond reasonable doubt. In similar cases, this Court has often and consistently ruled that it is better to
acquit a guilty person than to convict an innocent one. 40

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellants are ACQUITTED.
Unless being held or detained for some lawful reason, Accused-appellants are ORDERED RELEASED
immediately. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court, within five (5) days from notice,
of the date and time when accused-appellants are released pursuant to this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

5. Soria, et. al. v. Desierto, et. al., G.R. No. 153524-25, Jan. 31, 2005
RODOLFO SORIA and EDIMAR BISTA, Petitioners, v. HON. ANIANO DESIERTO in his capacity as Head of the Office
of the Ombudsman, HON. ORLANDO C. CASIMIRO in his capacity as Deputy Ombudsman for Military, P/INS.
JEFFREY T. GOROSPE, SPO2 ROLANDO G. REGACHO, SPO1 ALFREDO B. ALVIAR, JR., PO3 JAIME D. LAZARO, PO2
FLORANTE B. CARDENAS, PO1 JOSEPH A. BENAZA, SPO1 FRANKLIN D. CABAYA and SPO4 PEDRO PAREL,
Respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Yet again, we are tasked to substitute our judgment for that of the Office of the Ombudsman in its
finding of lack of probable cause made during preliminary investigation. And, yet again, we reaffirm the

27
time-honored practice of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary investigations by our
prosecutory bodies absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion on their part.
Petitioners, thru a special civil action for certiorari,1 contend precisely that the public respondents herein
- officers of the Office of the Ombudsman - gravely abused their discretion in dismissing the complaint
for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code (Delay in the delivery of detained persons) against
private respondents herein, members of the Philippine National Police stationed at the Municipality of
Santa, Ilocos Sur.
From the respective pleadings2 of the parties, the following facts appear to be indubitable:
1. On or about 8:30 in the evening of 13 May 2001 (a Sunday and the day before the 14 May 2001
Elections3), petitioners were arrested without a warrant by respondents police officers for alleged illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition;
2. Petitioner Soria was arrested for alleged illegal possession of .38 cal. revolver (a crime which carries
with it the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period) and for violation of Article 261 par. (f) of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the Commission on Election Resolution No. 3328 (which carries
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than one [1] year but not more than six [6] years);
3. Petitioner Bista was arrested for alleged illegal possession of sub-machine pistol UZI, cal. 9mm and a .
22 cal. revolver with ammunition;
4. Immediately after their arrest, petitioners were detained at the Santa, Ilocos Sur, Police Station. It was
at the Santa Police Station that petitioner Bista was identified by one of the police officers to have a
standing warrant of arrest for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 issued by the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12272;
5. The next day, at about 4:30 p.m. of 14 May 2001 (Monday and election day), petitioners were brought to
the residence of Provincial Prosecutor Jessica Viloria in San Juan, Ilocos Sur, before whom a 'Joint-
Affidavit against them was subscribed and sworn to by the arresting officers. From there, the arresting
officers brought the petitioners to the Provincial Prosecutor's Office in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, and there at
about 6:00 p.m. the 'Joint-Affidavit was filed and docketed;
6. At about 6:30 in the evening of the same day, 14 May 2001, petitioner Soria was released upon the order of
Prosecutor Viloria to undergo the requisite preliminary investigation, while petitioner Bista was brought
back and continued to be detained at the Santa Police Station. From the time of petitioner Soria's
detention up to the time of his release, twenty-two (22) hours had already elapsed;
7. On 15 May 2001, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, petitioner Bista was brought before the MTC of
Vigan, Ilocos Sur, where the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 6 was pending. Petitioner Bista
posted bail and an Order of Temporary Release was issued thereafter;
8. At this point in time, no order of release was issued in connection with petitioner Bista's arrest for
alleged illegal possession of firearms. At 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day (15 May 2001) , an
information for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 4413-S,
was filed against petitioner Bista with the 4 th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur. At 5:00
in the afternoon, informations for Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition and violation of Article
261 par. (f) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to COMELEC Resolution No. 3328, docketed as
Criminal Cases No. 2269-N and No. 2268-N, respectively, were filed in the Regional Trial Court at
Narvacan, Ilocos Sur;
9. On 08 June 2001, petitioner Bista was released upon filing of bail bonds in Criminal Cases No. 2268-N
and No. 4413-S. He was detained for 26 days.
10. On 15 August 2001, petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman for Military Affairs a
complaint-affidavit for violation of Art. 125 of the Revised Penal Code against herein private
respondents.

28
11. After considering the parties' respective submissions, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered the
first assailed Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 dismissing the complaint for violation of Art. 125 of
the Revised Penal Code for lack of merit; andcralawlibrary
12. On 04 March 2002, petitioners then filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied for lack
of merit in the second assailed Resolution dated 25 March 2002.
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code states:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
Art. 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities. - The penalties
provided in the next preceding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall
detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial
authorities within the period of: twelve (12) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties,
or their equivalent; eighteen (18) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by correctional penalties, or
their equivalent; and thirty-six (36) hours, for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent.
In every case, the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allowed,
upon his request, to communicate and confer at any time with his attorney or counsel.
It is not under dispute that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Soria was arrested without warrant
are punishable by correctional penalties or their equivalent, thus, criminal complaints or information
should be filed with the proper judicial authorities within 18 hours of his arrest. Neither is it in dispute
that the alleged crimes for which petitioner Bista was arrested are punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent, thus, he could only be detained for 36 hours without criminal complaints
or information having been filed with the proper judicial authorities.
The sole bone of contention revolves around the proper application of the 12-18-36 periods. With
respect specifically to the detention of petitioner Soria which lasted for 22 hours, it is alleged that public
respondents gravely erred in construing Article 125 4 as excluding Sundays, holidays and election days in
the computation of the periods prescribed within which public officers should deliver arrested persons
to the proper judicial authorities as the law never makes such exception. Statutory construction has it
that if a statute is clear and unequivocal, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
attempts at interpretation.5 Public respondents, on the other hand, relied on the cases of Medina v.
Orozco, Jr.,6 and Sayo v. Chief of Police of 7 and on commentaries8 of jurists to bolster their position that
Sundays, holidays and election days are excluded in the computation of the periods provided in Article
125,9 hence, the arresting officers delivered petitioners well within the allowable time.
In addition to the foregoing arguments and with respect specifically to petitioner Bista, petitioners
maintain that the filing of the information in court against petitioner Bista did not justify his continuous
detention. The information was filed at 4:30 p.m. of 15 May 2001 but the orders for his release were
issued by the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, only on 08 June 2001.
They argued that based on law and jurisprudence, if no charge is filed by the prosecutor within the
period fixed by law, the arresting officer must release the detainee lest he be charged with violation of
Article 125.10 Public respondents countered that the duty of the arresting officers ended upon the filing
of the informations with the proper judicial authorities following the rulings in Agbay v. Deputy
Ombudsman for the Military ,11 and People v. Acosta.12 ςrνll
From a study of the opposing views advanced by the parties, it is evident that public respondents did not
abuse their discretion in dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint against private
respondents.
Grave abuse of discretion is such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment on the part of the public
officer concerned which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. 13 ςrνll

29
No grave abuse of discretion, as defined, can be attributed to herein public respondents. Their
disposition of petitioners' complaint for violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be said
to have been conjured out of thin air as it was properly backed up by law and jurisprudence. Public
respondents ratiocinated thus:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl  lαω  lιbrαrÿ
As aptly pointed out by the respondents insofar as the complaint of Rodolfo Soria is concerned, based
on applicable laws and jurisprudence, an election day or a special holiday, should not be included in the
computation of the period prescribed by law for the filing of complaint/information in courts in cases of
warrantless arrests, it being a 'no-office day. (Medina v. Orosco, 125 Phil. 313.) In the instant case, while
it appears that the complaints against Soria for Illegal Possession of Firearm and Violation of COMELEC
Resolution No. 3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan,
Ilocos Sur, only on May 15, 200[1] at 4:30 p.m., he had already been released the day before or on May
14, 2001 at about 6:30 p.m. by the respondents, as directed by Prov. Prosecutor Jessica [Viloria]. Hence,
there could be no arbitrary detention or violation of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code to speak of. 14
ςrνll
Indeed, we did hold in Medina v. Orozco, Jr.,15 that -
.. . The arresting officer's duty under the law was either to deliver him to the proper judicial authorities
within 18 hours, or thereafter release him. The fact however is that he was not released. From the time
of petitioner's arrest at 12:00 oclock p.m. on November 7 to 3:40 p.m. on November 10 when the
information against him for murder actually was in court, over 75 hours have elapsed.
But, stock should be taken of the fact that November 7 was a Sunday; November 8 was declared an
official holiday; and November 9 (election day) was also an official holiday. In these three no-office days,
it was not an easy matter for a fiscal to look for his clerk and stenographer, draft the information and
search for the Judge to have him act thereon, and get the clerk of court to open the courthouse, docket
the case and have the order of commitment prepared. And then, where to locate and the uncertainty of
locating those officers and employees could very well compound the fiscal's difficulties. These are
considerations sufficient enough to deter us from declaring that Arthur Medina was arbitrarily detained.
For, he was brought to court on the very first office day following arrest.
And, in Sayo v. Chief of Police of 16 --
.. . Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for
more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the
hour of arrest and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the
fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into
consideration.
As to the issue concerning the duty of the arresting officer after the information has already been filed in
Court, public respondents acted well within their discretion in ruling thus:ςηαñrοblεš  Î½Î¹r†υαl
lαω  lιbrαrÿ
In the same vein, the complaint of Edimar Bista against the respondents for Violation of Article 125, will
not prosper because the running of the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law for the filing of the
complaint against him from the time of his arrest was tolled by one day (election day). Moreover, he has
a standing warrant of arrest for Violation of B.P. Blg. 6 and it was only on May 15, 2001, at about 2:00
p.m. that he was able to post bail and secure an Order of Release. Obviously, however, he could only be
released if he has no other pending criminal case requiring his continuous detention.
The criminal Informations against Bista for Violations of Article 125, RPC and COMELEC Resolution No.
3328 were filed with the Regional Trial Court and Municipal Trial Court of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur, on May
15, 2001 (Annexes 'G and 'I', Complaint-Affidavit of Edimar Bista) but he was released from detention
only on June 8, 2001, on orders of the RTC and MTC of Narvacan, Ilocos Sur (Annexes 'J and 'K',
Complaint-Affidavit). Was there a delay in the delivery of detained person to the proper judicial
authorities under the circumstances? The answer is in the negative. The complaints against him was (sic)

30
seasonably filed in the court of justice within the thirty-six (36)-hour period prescribed by law as
discussed above. The duty of the detaining officers is deemed complied with upon the filing of the
complaints. Further action, like issuance of a Release Order, then rests upon the judicial authority
(People v. Acosta [CA] 54 O.G. 4739).17 ςrνll
The above disposition is in keeping with Agbay v. Deputy Ombudsman for the Military ,18 wherein we
ordained that -
.. . Furthermore, upon the filing of the complaint with the Municipal Trial Court, the intent behind Art.
125 is satisfied considering that by such act, the detained person is informed of the crime imputed
against him and, upon his application with the court, he may be released on bail. Petitioner himself
acknowledged this power of the MCTC to order his release when he applied for and was granted his
release upon posting bail. Thus, the very purpose underlying Article 125 has been duly served with the
filing of the complaint with the MCTC. We agree with the position of the Ombudsman that such filing of
the complaint with the MCTC interrupted the period prescribed in said Article.
All things considered, there being no grave abuse of discretion, we have no choice but to defer to the
Office of the Ombudsman's determination that the facts on hand do not make out a case for violation of
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code.
As we have underscored in numerous decisions --
We have consistently refrained from interfering with the investigatory and prosecutorial powers of the
Ombudsman absent any compelling reason. This policy is based on constitutional, statutory and practical
considerations. We are mindful that the Constitution and RA 6770 endowed the Office of the
Ombudsman with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutorial powers, virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention, in order to insulate it from outside pressure and improper
influence. Moreover, a preliminary investigation is in effect a realistic judicial appraisal of the merits of
the case. Sufficient proof of the guilt of the accused must be adduced so that when the case is tried, the
trial court may not be bound, as a matter of law, to order an acquittal. Hence, if the Ombudsman, using
professional judgment, finds the case dismissible, the Court shall respect such findings, unless clothed with
grave abuse of discretion. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by
innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it. In much the same way, the courts will be
swamped with cases if they will have to review the exercise of discretion on the part of fiscals or
prosecuting attorneys each time the latter decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint
by a private complainant.19 (Emphasis supplied)
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition dated 27 May 2002 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit. The Joint Resolution dated 31 January 2002 and the Order dated 25 March 2002 of the Office of
the Ombudsman are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

6. Clemente v. People, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011

MARK CLEMENTE Y MARTINEZ @ EMMANUEL DINO, PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, seeking to reverse the March 29, 2010 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) which denied

31
petitioner's appeal and affirmed the November 3, 2008 Judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 7, convicting petitioner of illegal possession and use of false bank notes under Article
168[3] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended. Also assailed is the CA Resolution dated October 14,
2010[4] denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Petitioner was charged before the RTC with violation of Article 168 of the RPC under an Information [5]
which reads:

That on or about August 5, 2007, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to use,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession and under his
custody and control twenty[-]four (24) pcs. [of] P500.00 bill with Markings ["] IIB-1" to "IIB-24",
respectively and specifically enumerated, to wit:
SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT SERIAL NO. PCS. AMOUNT
PX626388 1 P500.00 CC077337 1 P500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
BB020523 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 CC077337 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
PX626388 1 500.00 WW164152 1 500.00
BR666774 1 500.00 BR666774 1 500.00
UU710062 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00
CC077337 1 500.00 PX626388 1 500.00

Which are false and falsified.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued.

The version of the prosecution and the defense, as summarized by the CA, are as follows: [6]
The prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely: Jail Officer 1 (JO1) Michael Michelle Passilan,
the Investigator of the Manila City Jail; JO1 Domingo David, Jr.; and Loida Marcega Cruz, the Assistant
Manager of the Cash Department of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.

[Their testimonies established the following:]

Appellant is a detainee at the Manila City Jail. On August 7, 2007, at around 3:30 pm, an informant in the
person of inmate Francis dela Cruz approached JO1s Domingo David, Jr. and Michael Passilan. The
informant narrated that he received a counterfeit P500.00 bill from appellant with orders to buy a bottle
of soft drink from the Manila City Jail Bakery. The bakery employee, however, recognized the bill as a
fake and refused to accept the same. Consequently, JO1s David and Passilan, along with the informant,
proceeded to appellant's cell for a surprise inspection. Pursuant to their agreement, the informant
entered the cubicle first and found appellant therein, lying in bed. The informant returned to appellant
the latter's P500.00 bill. The jail guards then entered the cell and announced a surprise inspection. JO1
Passilan frisked appellant and recovered a black wallet from his back pocket. Inside the wallet were

32
twenty-three (23) pieces of P500.00, all of which were suspected to be counterfeit. They confiscated the
same and marked them sequentially with "IIB-2" to "II-B24". They likewise marked the P500.00 bill that
was returned by informant to appellant with "IIB-1". Appellant was consequently arrested and brought
out of his cell into the office of the Intelligence and Investigation Branch (IIB) of the Manila City jail for
interrogation.

Meanwhile, the twenty-four (24) P500.00 bills confiscated from appellant were turned over to the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas for analysis. Pursuant to a Certification dated August 7, 2007, Acting
Assistant Manager Loida Marcega Cruz of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas examined and found the
following bills as counterfeit, viz: one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number BB020523; six (6) P500.00 bills
with Serial Number BR666774; nine (9) P500.00 bills with Serial Number CC077337; five (5) P500.00 bills
with Serial Number PX626388; one (1) P500.00 bill with Serial Number UU710062; and two (2) P500.00
bills with Serial Number WW164152.

For the defense, appellant was the lone witness presented on the stand.

Appellant simply raised the defense of frame-up. He testified that in the afternoon of August 5, 2007, he
was inside his room located at Dorm 1 of the Manila City Jail. At around 3:00 pm, JO1 Michael Passilan
entered appellant's room while JO1 Domingo David, Jr. posted himself outside. Without any warning,
JO1 Passilan frisked appellant and confiscated his wallet containing one (1) P1,000.00 bill. JO1s David
and Passilan left immediately thereafter. Appellant was left with no other choice but to follow them in
order to get back his wallet. Appellant followed the jail officers to the Intelligence Office of the Manila
City Jail where he saw JO1 Passilan place the P500.00 bills inside the confiscated black wallet. Appellant
was then told that the P500.00 bills were counterfeit and that he was being charged with illegal
possession and use thereof. Appellant also added that JO1 Passilan bore a grudge against him. This was
because appellant refused to extend a loan [to] JO1 Passilan because the latter cannot offer any
collateral therefor. Since then, JO1 Passilan treated him severely, threatening him and, at times, putting
him in isolation.

After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The RTC gave
credence to the prosecution's witnesses in finding that the counterfeit money were discovered in
petitioner's possession during a surprise inspection, and that the possibility that the counterfeit money
were planted to incriminate petitioner was almost nil considering the number of pieces involved. [7] The
RTC also did not find that the jail officers were motivated by improper motive in arresting petitioner, [8]
and applied in their favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties considering
the absence of contrary evidence.  As to petitioner's defense of frame-up, the RTC held that the
purported frame-up allegedly staged by JO1 Passilan would not affect the prosecution's evidence since
the testimony of JO1 David could stand by itself.  The RTC likewise found that it was strange that
petitioner did not remonstrate despite the fact that he was allegedly being framed. [9]

As to the elements of the crime, the RTC held that the fact that the P500.00 bills found in petitioner's
possession were forgeries was confirmed by the certification issued by the Cash Department of the
Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, which was testified into by Acting Assistant Manager Loida A. Cruz. [10] The
RTC also ruled that petitioner knew the bills were counterfeit as shown by his conduct during the
surprise search and his possession of the bills. As to the element of intention to use the false bank notes,
the RTC ruled that the fact that petitioner intended to use the bills was confirmed by the information
received by the jail officers from another inmate. [11]

33
Aggrieved, petitioner sought reconsideration of the judgment. Petitioner argued that the evidence used
against him was obtained in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures. Petitioner also argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
because of the non-presentation of the informant-inmate, Francis dela Cruz, who could have
corroborated the testimonies of the jail officers.

Unconvinced, the RTC denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.  The RTC, however, only ruled that
there was no violation of petitioner's constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures
because the seizure was done pursuant to a valid arrest for violation of Article 168 of the RPC.  The trial
court pointed out that prior to the search, a crime was committed and the criminal responsibility
pointed to petitioner.[12]

On appeal before the CA, petitioner argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for violating Article 168 of the RPC. Petitioner contended that one of the elements of the crime
which is intent to use the counterfeit bills was not established because the informant Francis dela Cruz
did not take the witness stand.[13]

The CA, however, found the appeal unmeritorious and denied petitioner's appeal. [14] The appellate court
found that the fact the petitioner was caught in possession of twenty-four (24) pieces of fake P500.00
bills already casts doubt on his allegation that he was merely framed by the jail guards. The CA agreed
with the RTC that even without the testimony of JO1 Passilan, the testimony of JO1 David was already
sufficient to establish petitioner's guilt since petitioner did not impute any ill motive on the latter except
to point out that JO1 David was JO1 Passilan's friend. [15]

Regarding the element of intent to use, the CA found that there are several circumstances which, if
taken together, lead to the logical conclusion that petitioner intended to use the counterfeit bills in his
possession. The CA pointed out that jail officers were informed by inmate Francis dela Cruz that he
received a fake P500.00 bill from petitioner who told him to buy soft drinks from the Manila City jail
bakery. After Francis dela Cruz identified petitioner as the person who gave him the fake money, the jail
officers conducted a surprise inspection. Said inspection yielded twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit
P500.00 bills inside petitioner's black wallet, which was taken from his back pocket. The CA further held
that the non-presentation of Francis dela Cruz would not affect the prosecution's case because even
without his testimony, petitioner's intent to use the counterfeit bills was established. The CA added that
the matter of which witnesses to present is a matter best left to the discretion of the prosecution. [16]

Petitioner sought reconsideration of the above ruling, but the CA denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration in the assailed Resolution dated October 14, 2010. [17] Hence, the present appeal.

Petitioner raises the following assignment of errors, to wit:

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
CONVICTING PETITIONER OF THE CRIME CHARGED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO
PROVE AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE.
II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT EXCLUDING THE COUNTERFEIT BILLS SINCE THEY WERE DERIVED
FROM UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND SEIZURE.[18]

34
The petition is meritorious.

Generally, the trial court's findings are accorded finality, unless there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court has overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated, and
which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. The exception applies when it is
established that the trial court has ignored, overlooked, misconstrued or misinterpreted cogent facts
and circumstances which, if considered, will change the outcome of the case. [19]

Here, the Court finds that the RTC and the CA had overlooked certain substantial facts of value to
warrant a reversal of its factual assessments. While petitioner's denial is an intrinsically weak defense
which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credence, said defense must be
given credence in this case as the prosecution failed to meet its burden of proof.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. --
Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person
who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified
instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed
in said articles. [Emphasis supplied.]
The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or
certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or
other document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the
offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and (3) that he either used or
possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments. [20] As held in People v. Digoro,[21]
possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it
to constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must be with intent to use said
false treasury or bank notes.[22]

In this case, the prosecution failed to show that petitioner used the counterfeit money or that he
intended to use the counterfeit bills. Francis dela Cruz, to whom petitioner supposedly gave the fake
P500.00 bill to buy soft drinks, was not presented in court. According to the jail officers, they were only
informed by Francis dela Cruz that petitioner asked the latter to buy soft drinks at the Manila City jail
bakery using a fake P500.00 bill. In short, the jail officers did not have personal knowledge that
petitioner asked Francis dela Cruz use the P500.00 bill. [23] Their account, however, is hearsay and not
based on the personal knowledge.[24]

This Court, of course, is not unaware of its rulings that the matter of presentation of prosecution
witnesses is not for the accused or, except in a limited sense, for the trial court to dictate. Discretion
belongs to the city or provincial prosecutor as to how the prosecution should present its case. [25]
However, in this case, the non-presentation of the informant as witness weakens the prosecution's
evidence since he was the only one who had knowledge of the act which manifested petitioner's intent
to use a counterfeit bill. The prosecution had every opportunity to present Francis dela Cruz as its
witness, if in fact such person existed, but it did not present him. Hence, the trial court did not have
before it evidence of an essential element of the crime.  The twenty-three (23) pieces of counterfeit bills
allegedly seized on petitioner is not sufficient to show intent, which is a state of mind, for there must be
an overt act to manifest such intent.

35
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 29, 2010 and
Resolution dated October 14, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32365 are REVERSED and
SET-ASIDE. Petitioner Mark Clemente y Martinez alias Emmanuel Dino is hereby ACQUITTED of the
crime of Illegal possession and use of false bank notes defined and penalized under Article 168 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.

With costs de oficio.

7. Spouses Villamar v. People, G.R. No. 178652, Dec. 8, 2010

SPOUSES REVELO VILLAMAR AND CORAZON PENULIAR- VILLAMAR, PETITIONERS, VS. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.

RESOLUTION

CARPIO, J.:

This is a petition[1] for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.  The petition challenges
the 27 June 2007 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification the 11 August 2005 Decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial
Region 1, Branch 40, Dagupan City, in Criminal Case   No. 2005-0172-D, affirming the 8 February 2005
Decision[4] of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Judicial Region 1, Branch 1, Dagupan City, in
Criminal Case No. 42907.

On 20 April 1967, Elena Manantan (Elena) sold a parcel of land to her nine children: Cornelia Penuliar
(Cornelia), Simplicio Penuliar (Simplicio), Modesta Flores (Modesta), Eulalia Penuliar (Eulalia),
Hermogenes Penuliar (Hermogenes), Lucia Penuliar (Lucia), Pedro Penuliar (Pedro), Felipe Penuliar
(Felipe), and Jose Penuliar (Jose).  On 6 June 1983, Cornelia Eulalia, Hermogenes, Lucia, Pedro, and Jose
sold their share to Simplicio.  Modesta and Felipe did not sell their share.

On 7 September 1989, Simplicio sold his total share to his daughter, petitioner Corazon Penuliar-
Villamar (Corazon).  Corazon is married to petitioner Revelo Villamar (Revelo). Corazon and Revelo
possessed and registered with the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a signed
and notarized deed of sale dated 23 November 1989.  Notary Public Quirico Bachar notarized the deed.
In the deed, it was made to appear that all of Elena's children, including Modesta and Felipe, sold the
property to the spouses.  The signatures of Modesta, Hermogenes, and Lucia were forged.  Corazon and
Revelo alleged that "employees of the Assessor's Office" committed the falsification.

In 1999, Modesta discovered the 23 November 1989 deed of sale.  In an information[5] dated 7
September 2000, Second Assistant City Prosecutor Regulus V. Reyes charged Corazon and Revelo with
falsification of public document.

In its 8 February 2005 Decision, the MTCC found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
falsification of public document.  The MTCC sentenced the spouses to an indeterminate penalty of four
months and one day arresto mayor as minimum to three years, six months and 20 days prision
correccional as maximum, and to pay Modesta P20,000 moral damages.  The MTCC held that:

36
There is no question that the signature of the private complainant in the Deed of Sale, dated November
23, 1989 was falsified. In fact, even the accused admitted that indeed private complainant Modesta
Penuliar Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document.  But the accused maintain that they
could not be held guilty of the crime charged because they were not the ones who falsified the
document as it was prepared by somebody in the Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen,
Pangasinan without their knowledge.  The accused insisted that when they went to the said office to
register the Deed of Sale marked Exhibit 2, they were asked to leave it, and when they returned to get
their document, they were given another document particularly Exhibit A which is the reason why they
were charged with falsification because it appears in the said document that private complainant
Modesta Penuliar Flores was one of the signatories when, in fact, she was not.  In other words, the
accused maintain that they could not be held liable for falsification of public document because criminal
intent was lacking. But if the accused acted in good faith, why did they not immediately inform the
private complainant about the matter.  Moreover, they should not have received the falsified document
from the Assessor's Office knowing that it was not the document that was given to their office for
registration.  The actuation and the behavior of the accused negate their claim of innocence.  It is very
unusual that they entrusted such very important document to somebody whose name they don't even
know.  Furthermore, why did the accused waited [sic] for the advice of the Brgy. Captain of their place
to settle their problem with the private complainant.  Their silence work [sic] against them as it goes
against the principle that the first impulse of an innocent was [sic] when accused of wrongdoing is to
express his innocence at the first opportune time.  Besides, other than the self-serving testimonies of
the accused, no other evidence was presented by them to substantiate their pretense of innocence.  
They should have presented the person from the Assessor's Office who gave them Exhibit A to
corroborate their claim if indeed they have no hand in its falsification. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction
that the person who stood to benefit by the falsification of a public document and was in possession of
it is presumed to be the material author of the falsification.  Hence, the defense of good faith of the
accused is not acceptable as it is not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

All told, the prosecution has succeeded in rebutting the presumption of innocence accorded the accused
who, on their part, have dismally failed to substantiate their pretense of innocence. [6]

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the RTC.  In its 11 August 2005 Decision, the RTC found Corazon and
Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document.  The RTC held that:
After a careful review of the decision appealed from, the Court finds no reversible error committed by
the court a-quo as the same is duly supported by evidence.

The prosecutor's evidence has duly proved that the signature of the private complainant in the Deed of
Sale dated November 23, 1989 was falsified.  Even the accused admitted that indeed private
complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was not one of the vendors in the said document.

The accused, while admitting that private complainant Modesta Penuliar Flores was not one of the
vendors in the said document, they maintained that they could not be held guilty of the crime charged
because they were not the ones who falsified the document as it was prepared by somebody in the
Office of the Provincial Assessor of Lingayen, Pangasinan without their knowledge, and put up the
defense of good faith.

As correctly held by the Court a-quo, the actuation and behavior of the accused in not immediately
informing the complainant about the inclusion of her name in the subject Deed of Sale as one of the
vendors therein negate their claim of innocence.

37
The Court is in consonance with the ruling of the court a-quo that the person who stood to benefit by
the falsification of a public document and was in possession of it is presumed to be the material author
of the falsification.

As held by the Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Manansala (105 Phil. 1253), it is an established
rule that when a person has in his possession a falsified document and makes use of the same, the
presumption or inference is justified that such person is the forger. [7]

Corazon and Revelo appealed to the Court of Appeals.  In its 27 June 2007 Decision, the Court of Appeals
found Corazon and Revelo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of falsification of public document.   The
Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the MTCC's and RTC's decisions by adding one day to the
maximum penalty.  The Court of Appeals held that:
Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"Art. 172.  Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. -- The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 shall be imposed
upon:

"1.  Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial
document; and

x x x  x x x  x x x"

On the other hand, Article 171 of the same Code provides:

"Art. 171.  Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. -- The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:

"1.  Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

x x x  x x x  x x x"

From the foregoing, the elements of the crime of falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172 are: (i)
that the offender is a private individual; (ii) that he committed any of the acts of falsification
enumerated in Art. 171; and (iii) that the falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial
document.  All these elements are present in the instant case.

It is not disputed that Modesta's signature in the questioned Deed of Sale was forged.  Indeed,
petitioner-spouses admitted that Modesta and Felipe never participated in the sale of the property
subject of the Deed of Sale in their favor. They argue, however, that they were not the authors of the
falsification, claiming that the employees of the Assessor's Office of Lingayen, Pangasinan were the ones
who falsified the document.  They maintain that the deed of sale they submitted to the Assessor's Office
did not include Modesta as one of the vendors but when they returned to said Office after one month,
the employees therein gave them the questioned document which included Modesta as one of the

38
vendors.  We are not convinced.

That petitioners were the authors and/or masterminds of the falsification is presumed from the fact that
they actually benefited from it.  In Maliwat vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that in the
absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession of and who used a forged document is the
forger and therefore guilty of falsification.  "If a person had in his possession a falsified document and he
made use of it, taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the clear presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification."

In the instant case, petitioners failed miserably to rebut the above presumption.  Clearly, they were the
ones who benefited from the falsified document, the same having been executed in their favor.   To
emphasize, they were the ones who caused the registration of the deed of sale and were the ones who
received the falsified document from the Assessor's Office. Their bare-faced assertion that the
employees of the Assessor's Office committed the falsification is flimsy and unsupported by evidence.

In the first place, a comparison of the September 7, 1989 Deed of Sale allegedly submitted by petitioners
to the Assessor's Office and the falsified November 23, 1989 Deed of Sale returned to them by the said
Office reveals that the two documents are totally different from each other, both in the print or font of
the contents and the location of the names of the signatories.  We cannot, therefore, see how the
employees could have inserted the names of Modesta and Felipe in the questioned document, much
less falsified their signatures, without anyone noticing it.  What is taxing to the mind is: Why would the
employees include the names of Modesta and Felipe and falsify their signatures, and what could they
gain therefrom?[8]

Hence, the present petition.  Corazon and Revelo raise as issue that:
The facts of the case x x x is [sic] that petitioners were innocent of the existence of the falsified
document on the ground that what was submitted to the Office of the Assessos [sic], Lingayen,
Pangasinan to be the basis of the petitioners' ownership was a genuine document which truly did not
include the share of the private complainant, now the private respondent.  What was in the mind of the
perpetrators employees of the Assessor's Office whom petitioners sought assistance for the transfer of
the document in their favor was beyond their control as they were never informed beforehand of the
execution of the questioned document.[9]

The petition is unmeritorious.

Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court states that petitions for review on certiorari "shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth."  In Pagsibigan v. People,[10] the Court held that:
A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court should cover only questions of law.   Questions
of fact are not reviewable.  A question of law exists when the doubt centers on what the law is on a
certain set of facts.  A question of fact exists when the doubt centers on the truth or falsity of the
alleged facts.

There is a question of law if the issue raised is capable of being resolved without need of reviewing the
probative value of the evidence.  The issue to be resolved must be limited to determining what the law
is on a certain set of facts.  Once the issue invites a review of the evidence, the question posed is one of
fact.[11]

Whether Corazon and Revelo "were innocent of the existence of the falsified document" is a question of

39
fact.  It is not reviewable.

The factual findings of the lower courts are binding on the Court.   The exceptions to this rule are (1)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (2) when the findings are grounded on speculation; (3) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the factual findings are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admissions of the parties; (7)
when the Court of Appeals overlooked undisputed facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; (8) when the facts set forth by the petitioner are not disputed by the respondent;
and (9) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. [12]  Corazon and Revelo did not show that any of these
circumstances is present.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.  The Court AFFIRMS the 27 June 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 29524.

SO ORDERED.

8. Tan v. Matsuura, G.R. No. 179003, Jan. 9, 2013

ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and CAROLINA T ANJUTCO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 195816
ANTONIO L. TAN, JR., Petitioner, v. JULIE O. CUA, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Antonio L.
Tan, Jr. (Tan) and docketed as:cralawlibrary
(1) G.R. No. 179003 which assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated February 6, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, entitled Yoshitsugu Matsuura & Carolina
Tanjutco v. Hon. Raul Gonzales, in his capacity as Acting Secretary of the Department of Justice and
Antonio L. Tan, Jr.; and
(2) G.R. No. 195816 which assails the CAs Decision 3 dated August 17, 2010 and Resolution 4 dated
February 23, 2011 in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, entitled Julie O. Cua v. Antonio L. Tan, Jr., Hon. Raul M.
Gonzales, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice and Hon. Ernesto L. Pineda, in his
capacity as Undersecretary of the Department of Justice.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 31, 1998, Tan filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) of Makati City a Complaint-
Affidavit5 charging the respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura (Matsuura), Atty. Carolina Tanjutco (Tanjutco)
and Atty. Julie Cua (Cua) of the crime of falsification under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), allegedly
committed as follows:cralawlibrary
2. On or about the period from 21 December 1996 to 09 January 1997, Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA,
Ms. HIROKO MATSUURA and Mr. RUBEN JACINTO have had stolen companys properties and my
personal belongings which were kept "under lock and key". Among those stolen was my pre-signed
DEED OF TRUST, whose date and number of shares, and the item witness were all in BLANK. As a result,
Criminal Case No. 98-040 for Qualified Theft was filed against Mr. & Ms. Matsuura and Mr. Jacinto, and
now pending before the Regional Trial Court (of Makati City) Branch 132;

40
3. In the said "blank" Deed of Trust, the entries as to the number of shares and the date of the
instrument were then inserted, that is, 28,500 as shares and 20th day of January, and the signatures of
Hiroko Matsuura and Lani C. Camba appeared in the item WITNESS, all without my participation
whatsoever, or without my consent and authority. A copy of the "filled in" Deed of Trust is attached as
Annex "A" and made part hereof;
4. Sometime on 19 June 1997, the said Deed of Trust, was made to be notarized by JULIE O. CUA, a
Notary Public for and in the City of Makati, and entered in her Notarial Register as Doc[.] No. 2; Page No.
1; Book No. 1 and Series of 1997, WHEN IN TRUTH AND IN FACT I HAVE NEVER APPEARED, SIGNED OR
TOOK [sic] MY OATH BEFORE THE SAID NOTARY PUBLIC AND ON THE SAID DATE OF NOTARIZATION
because the document (Deed of Trust) was stolen as earlier stated, and the relation between us (Mr.
and Ms. Matsuura, or Mr. Jacinto, and the undersigned) had become hostile and irreconcilable. A copy
of the notarized Deed of Trust is attached as Annex "B" and made part hereof.
5. Both documents (Annexes "A" and "B") were/are in the possessions of Mr. Matsuura and/or his
lawyer, CAROLINA TANJUTCO, who used these false documents in the cases involving us;
6. Without prejudice to the filing of other charges in the proper venues, I am executing this affidavit for
the purpose of charging Mr. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTY. CAROLINA TANJUTCO for violation of
Art. 172 (2) in relation to Art. 171 (6) of the Revised Penal Code with regard to Annex "A", and likewise
charging MR. YOSHITSUGU MATSUURA and ATTYS. CAROLINA TANJUTCO and JULIE O. CUA for violation
of Art. 172 (1) in relation to Art. 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, when through their concerted
actions they FALSELY made it appeared [sic] that the undersigned had participated in notarization of the
Deed of Trust (Annex "B") on 19 June 1997, and in both instances causing prejudice and damages to the
undersigned.6?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
The respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits.
Matsuura vehemently denied Tans charges. He countered that the filing of the complaint was merely a
scheme resorted to by Tan following their dispute in TF Ventures, Inc., and after he had obtained a
favorable resolution in a complaint for estafa against Tan. Matsuura further explained that the transfer
of the shareholdings covered by the subject Deed of Trust 7 was a result of Tans offer to compromise the
intra-corporate dispute. He insisted that it was Tan who caused the notarization of the deed, as this was
a condition for Matsuuras acceptance of the compromise. 8?r?l1
For her defense, Tanjutco argued that Tans admission of having pre-signed the subject deed only proved
that he had willingly assigned his shares in TF Ventures, Inc. to Matsuura. She also argued that Tan failed
to present any proof of her participation in the deeds falsification, and explained that she had not yet
known Matsuura at the time of the supposed notarization. 9?r?l1
For her part, Cua narrated that on June 19, 1997, a group that included a person who represented
himself as Antonio Tan, Jr. approached her law office for the notarization of the subject deed. Tan
presented his community tax certificate (CTC) as indicated in the subject deed of trust, then was sworn
in by Cua as a notary public. Cua claimed to have conducted her duty in utmost good faith, with
duplicate copies of the notarized deed reported to the Clerk of Court of Makati City. She denied having
any business or interest whatsoever with the law offices of Tanjutco. 10?r?l1
The Ruling of the City Prosecutor
On July 13, 1998, the OCP issued a Resolution 11 dismissing for lack of probable cause the complaint
against Matsuura and Tanjutco. It considered the fact that Tan had voluntarily signed the subject deed,
and further noted that "whether or not the same document is notarized, the deed has the effect of a
binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown." 12?r?l1
The complaint against Cua was also dismissed. For the OCP, Tan failed to overturn the presumption of
regularity attached to the notary publics performance of her official duty. Any irregularity attending the
execution of the deed of trust required more than mere denial from Tan. 13?r?l1

41
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting him to file a petition for review 14 with the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
The Ruling of the Secretary of Justice
On April 4, 2003, then Secretary of Justice Simeon A. Datumanong issued a resolution 15 denying the
petition. He ruled that no evidence was presented to show that the date, the number of shares and the
witnesses signatures appearing on the subject deed were merely inserted therein by the respondents.
Tans bare averments were insufficient to show the actual participation of the respondents in the alleged
falsification.
Undaunted, Tan filed a motion for reconsideration, which was granted by then Acting Secretary of
Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez in a Resolution 16 dated July 1, 2004. In finding probable cause to
indict the respondents for the crime of falsification, the DOJ noted that a copy of the deed of trust
attached by Matsuura and Tanjutco to Matsuuras Answer dated October 30, 1997 in an intra-corporate
dispute before the SEC was not yet notarized. Furthermore, the print and font of the deeds entries on its
covered shares and date remarkably differed from the other portions of the document. The Secretary
then held:cralawlibrary
It would appear that the subject deed of trust was indeed never notarized. If the said document was
purportedly notarized on June 19, 1997, the same notarized copy should have been presented by
respondent Matsuura. After all, his Answer filed before the SEC was made with the assistance of
respondent Atty. Tanjutco. There being none, it may be concluded that the notarization of the subject
deed of trust was indeed made under doubtful circumstances. 17?r?l1
The Secretary also held that Cua should have been alerted by the variance in the deeds print styles, and
the fact that the document was presented for notarization almost five months from the date of its
purported execution. The dispositive portion of the Secretarys resolution then reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby GRANTED. Resolution No. 189 (Series of 2003) is
hereby SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to file an information against
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco for violation of Art. 172 (2) in relation to
Art. 171 (6), RPC; and another information for violation of Art. 171 (2), RPC against respondents
Yoshitsugu Matsuura, Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and Atty. Julie Cua.
SO ORDERED.18?r?l1
The respondents moved for reconsideration. On April 4, 2005, then DOJ Undersecretary Ernesto L.
Pineda, signing on behalf of the Secretary of Justice, issued a resolution 19 affirming the presence of
probable cause against Matsuura and Tanjutco, but ordering the exclusion of Cua from the filing of
information. He ruled that Cua had exercised due diligence as a notary public by requiring from the
person who appeared before her a proof of his identification. The resolutions decretal portion
provides:cralawlibrary
Premises considered, the Resolution dated July 1, 2004 is hereby MODIFIED accordingly. The City
Prosecutor of Makati City is directed to move for the exclusion of respondent Julie Cua from the
information for violation of Art. 171 (2), Revised Penal Code, if any has been filed, and to report the
action taken within ten (10) days from receipt hereof. The motion for reconsideration filed by
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.20?r?l1
At this point, Matsuura and Tanjutco filed with the CA the petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 89346. The DOJs review of its resolution on Cuas case continued with Tans filing of a motion for
partial reconsideration. Finding merit in the motion, the DOJ again reversed itself and issued on
December 12, 2005 a Resolution21 with dispositive portion that reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion for partial reconsideration is GRANTED and resolution
dated April 4, 2005 is SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Makati City is hereby directed to include Atty.
Julie O. Cua in the information for violation of Article 171 (2) of the Revised Penal Code filed against

42
respondents Yoshitsugu Matsuura and Atty. Carolina Tanjutco and report to this Office the action taken
within ten (10) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.22?r?l1
Cuas motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting her to file with the CA the petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
The Ruling of the CA
The CA granted both petitions questioning the Secretary of Justices resolutions.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 89346, the CA held that given the elements of the crime, the actual participation of
respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco was not sufficiently alleged, and the element of damage was not
sufficiently shown. The dispositive portion of its Decision 23 dated February 6, 2007 reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the DOJ dated April 4,
2005 and July 1, 2004 are SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the City Prosecutor, Makati City dated July 13,
1998 in I.S. No. 98-C-15857-58 affirmed by the DOJ through Secretary Datumanong on April 4, 2003
STANDS.
SO ORDERED.24?r?l1
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied.
In CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, the CA held that Tan also failed to discharge the burden of proving probable
cause against Cua. For the appellate court, there was nothing on record that was sufficient to overcome
the presumption of regularity ascribed to both the subject deed as a public document and to Cuas
discharge of her official functions as a notary public. The dispositive portion of its Decision 25 dated
August 17, 2010 reads:cralawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Secretary of Justice dated
12 December 2005 and 8 May 2006 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Resolution of the Secretary of
Justice dated 4 April 2003 affirming the findings of the City Prosecutor is hereby UPHELD.
SO ORDERED.26?r?l1
Tans motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution 27 dated February 23, 2011.
The Present Petitions
Unsatisfied, Tan separately filed with this Court two petitions for review. G.R. No. 179003 assails the CAs
disposition of Matsuura and Tanjutcos petition, while G.R. No. 195816 assails the CAs decision in the
petition filed by Cua. From these petitions are two main issues for this Courts resolution:cralawlibrary
(a) whether or not the CA erred in taking cognizance of the two petitions filed before it, assuming the
role of a reviewing authority of the Secretary of Justice; and
(b) whether or not the CA erred in upholding the finding of the OCP that there exists no probable cause
to indict Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua for the crime of falsification.
This Courts Ruling
We emphasize that on February 13, 2012, this Court had already issued in G.R. No. 195816 a resolution 28
denying the petition, on the following bases:cralawlibrary
Considering the allegations, issues and arguments adduced in the petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Decision dated 17 August 2010 and Resolution dated 23 February 2011 of the Court of
Appeals, Manila, in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263, the Court resolves to DENY the petition for raising
substantially factual issues and for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed
judgment to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate jurisdiction. 29?r?l1
(Underscoring supplied, emphasis in the original)
Thus, the only pending incident in G.R. No. 195816 is Tans motion for reconsideration of the Courts
denial of his petition. In his motion, Tan reiterates the arguments he presented in the petition, yet
argues for the first time that the CA erred in granting Cuas motion for an additional period of thirty (30)
days within which to file her petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263. This allegedly violated the provisions of
A.M. 00-2-03-SC that amended Section 4, Rule 65 30 of the Rules of Court.

43
Tan also moved to consolidate G.R. No. 1958156 with G.R. No. 179003, which motion was allowed by
the Court.
Before ruling on the main issues, we address Tans argument that the CA erred in granting Cuas motion
for extension of time to file her petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 95263.
In Vallejo v. Court of Appeals, 31 we emphasized that the Court has allowed some meritorious cases to
proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules
of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that the strict and rigid
application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote
substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the
court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice,
rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties. 32 Thus, we
allowed the petition in Vallejo to proceed even if it was filed almost four (4) months beyond the
prescribed reglementary period under the rules.
Pursuant to the foregoing doctrine, in the interest of substantial justice, and given the merit that was
ascribed by the CA to Cuas petition, we sustain the appellate courts ruling on Cuas motion for extension
of time to file her petition for certiorari.
Courts possess the power to review findings of prosecutors in preliminary investigations.
On the first main issue, the petitioner contends that the CA should not have taken cognizance of the
petitions for certiorari filed before it because criminal proceedings shall not be restrained once probable
cause has been determined and the corresponding information has been filed in courts. Citing
jurisprudence, Tan argues that the institution of a criminal action in court depends upon the sound
discretion of the prosecutor.
The Court remains mindful of the established principle that the determination of probable cause is
essentially an executive function that is lodged with the public prosecutor and the Secretary of Justice.
However, equally settled is the rule that courts retain the power to review findings of prosecutors in
preliminary investigations, although in a mere few exceptional cases showing grave abuse of discretion.
Judicial power under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution covers the courts power to
determine whether there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government in the discharge of its functions.
Although policy considerations call for the widest latitude of deference to the prosecutors findings,
courts should not shirk from exercising their power, when the circumstances warrant, to determine
whether the prosecutors findings are supported by the facts or by the law. In so doing, courts do not act
as prosecutors but as organs of the judiciary that are exercising their mandate under the Constitution,
relevant statutes, and remedial rules to settle cases and controversies. Indeed, the exercise of the courts
review power ensures that, on the one hand, probable criminals are prosecuted and, on the other hand,
the innocent are spared from baseless prosecution. 33?r?l1
We then ruled in Tan v. Ballena 34 that while the findings of prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this
does not preclude courts from intervening and exercising our own powers of review with respect to the
DOJs findings. In the exceptional case in which grave abuse of discretion is committed, as when a clear
sufficiency or insufficiency of evidence to support a finding of probable cause is ignored, the CA may
take cognizance of the case via a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. 35?r?l1
Based on the grounds raised by the respondents in their petitions with the CA, the appellate courts
exercise of its power to review was also the proper and most prudent course to take after the Secretary
had successively issued several resolutions with varying findings of fact and conclusions of law on the
existence of probable cause, even contrary to the own findings of the OCP that conducted the
preliminary investigation. Although by itself, such circumstance was not indicative of grave abuse of
discretion, there was a clear issue on the Secretary of Justices appreciation of facts, which commanded a
review by the court to determine if grave abuse of discretion attended the discharge of his functions.

44
There is no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua.
The Court agrees with the CA that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion when
the latter ruled in favor of Tan, in his complaint against the respondents. Again, while the courts
generally accord respect upon the prosecutors or the DOJs discretion in the determination of probable
cause in preliminary investigations, the courts may, as an exception, set aside the prosecutors or DOJs
conclusions to prevent the misuse of the strong arm of the law or to protect the orderly administration
of justice.36?r?l1
We emphasize the nature, purpose and amount of evidence that is required to support a finding of
probable cause in preliminary investigations. Probable cause, for purposes of filing a criminal
information, has been defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a
crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. It is the existence of such
facts and circumstances as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he is to be
prosecuted. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. 37?r?l1
While probable cause should be determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the
evidence with care to prevent material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and
the guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary
expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless
charges.38?r?l1
G.R. No. 179003
The Court affirms the CAs finding of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Secretary of Justice in
reversing the rulings of the OCP that favored Matsuura and Tanjutco.
In the Resolutions dated July 1, 2004 and April 4, 2005, the Secretary of Justice directed the filing in
court of two informations against Matsuura and Tanjutco: one information for the crime of falsification
under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6) of the RPC, and another information for a violation of
Article 171 (2) of the RPC. These penal provisions read:cralawlibrary
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:cralawlibrary
xxx
(2) Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate.
xxx
(6) Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning.
xxx
Art. 172. Falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents. The penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000
pesos shall be imposed upon:cralawlibrary
xxx
(2) Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
xxx
In the first information, the charge was under Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6), for the alleged
insertions in the deed of trust on its number of covered shares, its date and the witnesses to the
instruments execution. In Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 39 we identified the elements of falsification under
Article 171 (6) of the RPC, to wit:cralawlibrary

45
(1) that there be an alteration (change) or intercalation (insertion) on a document;
(2) that it was made on a genuine document;
(3) that the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and
(4) that the changes made the document speak something false. 40?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
When these are committed by a private individual on a private document, the violation would fall under
paragraph 2, Article 172 of the same code, but there must be, in addition to the aforesaid elements,
independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. 41?r?l1
Logically, affidavits and evidence presented during a preliminary investigation must at least show these
elements of the crime and the particular participation of each of the respondents in its commission.
Otherwise, there would be no basis for a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. Probable cause can only find support in facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a
prosecution. Upon the Courts review, we affirm the ruling that Tan had failed to adequately show during
the preliminary investigation all the aforementioned elements of the offense.
Petitioner Tan was not able to establish when and how the alleged unauthorized insertions in the
subject document were effected, and that Matsuura and Tanjutco should be held liable therefor. To
warrant an indictment for falsification, it is necessary to show during the preliminary investigation that
the persons to be charged are responsible for the acts that define the crime. Contrary to this, however,
there were no sufficient allegations and evidence presented on the specific acts attributed to Matsuura
and Tanjutco that would show their respective actual participation in the alleged alteration or
intercalation. Tans broad statement that the deed was falsified after it was stolen by Matsuura merits no
consideration in finding probable cause, especially after the following findings of the OCP in his
Resolution dated July 13, 1998:cralawlibrary
Any alleged irregularity attending the execution of such a voluntary Deed requires more than mere
denial. Criminal Case [No. 98-040 (I.S. No. 97-20720) concerning Qualified Theft of Condominium
Certificate of Title, pre-signed checks and other personal belongings of complainant herein petitioner,
has already been recommended for dismissal by the Department of Justice on May 25, 1998, directing
the withdrawal of the information in the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 98-040. In said recommendation,
the principal subject matter is the alleged loss of condominium titles, and it appears that after the
implementation of the search warrant, only titles and the pre-signed checks were not recovered. There
is no mention of a missing Deed of Trust as claimed by complainant. 42?r?l1
Tan also sought to support his falsification charge by the alleged intercalations on the covered number
of shares and date of the deed, asking the OCP and Secretary of Justice to take notice that the print, font
style and size of these entries differed from the other portions of the document. However, it is not
unusual, as it is as a common practice, for parties to prepare and print instruments or contractual
agreements with specific details that are yet to be filled up upon the deeds execution. We are bound to
believe that such was the situation in Tans case, i.e., the document had blanks when printed but was
already complete in details at the time Tan signed it to give effect thereto, especially with the legal
presumption that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Otherwise, Tan would not have
voluntarily affixed his signature in the subject deed. In Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 43
we ruled:cralawlibrary
Under Section 3 (d), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, it is presumed that a person takes ordinary care of
his concerns. Hence, the natural presumption is that one does not sign a document without first
informing himself of its contents and consequences. Said presumption acquires greater force in the case
at bar where not only one document but several documents were executed at different times and at
different places by the herein respondent guarantors and sureties. 44 (Citation omitted and emphasis
supplied)

46
While the presumption can be disputed by sufficient evidence, Tan failed in this respect. We even find
no merit in his claim that the incomplete document was merely intended to convince Japanese friends
of Matsuura to extend credit to TF Ventures, Inc., as he failed to establish any connection between the
deed of trust and the credit sought.
It is then the Courts view that the petitioner had voluntarily executed the subject Deed of Trust, with the
intention of giving effect thereto. Even granting that there were insertions in the deed after it was
signed by the petitioner, no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had changed the
meaning of the document, or that their details differed from those intended by the petitioner at the
time that he signed it. The petitioners bare allegation that "the change was without his consent and
authority"45 does not equate with the necessary allegation that the insertions were false or had changed
the intended meaning of the document. Again, a violation of Article 172 (2), in relation to Article 171 (6),
of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the alteration or intercalation has changed the
meaning of the document.46?r?l1
Neither was there sufficient evidence to support the element of damage that was purportedly suffered
by Tan by reason of the alleged falsification. As correctly observed by the OCP:cralawlibrary
By his voluntary act of signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can be safely inferred that the
document speaks for itself. Whether or not the same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of
a binding contract between the parties. The element of damage has not been sufficiently shown. 47?r?l1
The Court emphasizes that the element of damage is crucial in the charge because the Secretary of
Justice directed the filing of the first information for an alleged falsification of a private document.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Secretary of Justices finding of probable cause against Matsuura
and Tanjutco was based solely on surmises and conjectures, wholly unsupported by legal and factual
bases. The CA then correctly nullified, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the resolutions that
were assailed before it. There is grave abuse of discretion when the respondent acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of his judgment, as when the assailed order is
bereft of any factual and legal justification. 48?r?l1
True, a finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or on evidence
beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would justify conviction. Nonetheless,
although the determination of probable cause requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction, it should at least be more than mere suspicion. And while probable cause should be
determined in a summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent
material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the guarantees of freedom
and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged
offenses and holding trials arising from false, fraudulent or groundless charges. It is, therefore,
imperative for the prosecutor to relieve the accused from the pain and inconvenience of going through a
trial once it is ascertained that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the
accused.49?r?l1
The Secretary of Justices directive upon the prosecutor to file the second information against Matsuura
and Tanjutco also lacked basis. It was premised on an alleged violation of Article 171(2) of the RPC, by
making it appear that Tan participated in an act or proceeding when as he claimed, he did not in fact so
participate. The elements of this crime are as follows:cralawlibrary
(1) that the offender is a public officer, employee or notary public;
(2) that he takes advantage of his official position;
(3) that he falsifies a document by causing it to appear that a person or persons have participated in any
act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. 50?r?l1 ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?br?rÿ
Since Matsuura and Tanjutco are both private individuals, they can be indicted for the offense only if it is
shown that they conspired with Cua, as a notary public, in the commission thereof.

47
Contrary to this requirement, however, the Secretary of Justice ordered in its Resolution dated April 4,
2005 the filing of the second information against Matsuura and Tanjutco, notwithstanding the order in
the same resolution to exclude Cua in the case. Such ruling evidently amounts to a grave abuse of
discretion because as correctly held by the CA:cralawlibrary
Article 171, RPC refers to falsification committed by a public officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastical
minister who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document, in this case, by causing it
to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate. Herein petitioners herein respondents Matsuura and Tanjutco, not being included in said
enumeration cannot, on their own, be held liable for aforesaid violation. They can be held liable therefor
only in conspiracy with one who is a public officer, employee, notary or ecclesiastical minister who,
taking advantage of his official position, falsified a document. On account of the exclusion of Atty. Julie
Cua from said charge, herein petitioners cannot be held liable for the charge. It is settled that there is
grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence, or
when executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. x x x. 51
(Emphasis ours)
The subsequent resolution of the Secretary of Justice to include Cua in the information, following a
separate motion for reconsideration by Tan and, we emphasize, only after CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 had
already been filed, was inconsequential to the grave abuse of discretion already committed by the
Secretary of Justice in its final disposition of the case against Matsuura and Tanjutco. The CA was tasked
in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 to determine the issue of whether or not the Secretary of Justice had
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
resolutions, in light of the rulings, findings and the bases used by the Secretary. In addition, even the CA
later declared in CA-G.R. SP No. 96263 that the Secretary of Justices order to pursue the case against
Cua amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 195816
We now rule on the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the Courts denial of the petition docketed
as G.R. No. 195816. After review, the Court affirms its earlier denial of the petition, given Tans failure to
show any reversible error committed by the CA. As correctly held by the appellate court, no probable
cause was established to support a falsification case against Cua.
We are bound to adhere to the presumption of regularity in Cuas performance of her official duty, and
to the presumption of regularity that is attached to the subject deed of trust as a public document. As
held by the OCP, even "[t]he records of the Notarial Division of the Clerk of Court, Makati City faithfully
reflects the duplicate copy of the subject Deed of Trust made and entered on June 19, 1997 executed by
Antonio L. Tan, Jr., as certified by Atty. Corazon Cecilia Pineda." 52 It needed more than a bare denial from
Tan to overthrow these presumptions. Adequate supporting evidence should have been presented to
support his assertions.
Tans denial that he personally appeared before Cua on June 19, 1997 deserved no weight in the
determination of probable cause. He failed to present any plausible explanation as to why it was
impossible for him to be at the notary publics office on said date. Neither did he deny that the CTC
indicated in the deeds jurat as evidence of identity actually belonged to him. The mere circumstance
that his relationship with Matsuura was already strained at the time of the deeds notarization miserably
failed to substantiate the claim that he could not have appeared before Cua. Matsuura had precisely
explained that the transfer of the shares of stock was part of an attempt to compromise a dispute that
existed between them. In addition, we have explained that the alleged theft of the document by
Matsuura was sufficiently rebutted during the preliminary investigation.
On the basis of the foregoing, the reasonable probability of the respondents participation in the
commission of the crime of falsification was not sufficiently established during the preliminary
investigation. Even the failure of Matsuura and Tanjutco to attach a notarized copy of the deed to their

48
pleading filed with the SEC fails to support a finding of probable cause. On the contrary, the
circumstance that an unnotarized copy of the deed was submitted to the SEC weakens the argument
that the alleged falsification and wrongful notarization was resorted to by the respondents to suit their
interests. It showed that the respondents believed in the value of
the deed to their case even if it was not notarized. We then affirm the CAs ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
96263 that the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion, by gross misapprehension of
facts, when it ordered the filing of the information against Cua. Although Tan assails the CAs grant of the
petition on such basis, jurisprudence provides that grave abuse of discretion refers not merely to
palpable errors of jurisdiction; or to violations of the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. It also
refers to cases in which, for various reasons, there has been a gross misapprehension of facts. 53?r?l1
WHEREFORE, the Court rules as follows:cralawlibrary
(1) In G.R. No. 179003, the petition for review is DENIED. The Court of Appeals' Decision dated February
6, 2007 and Resolution dated July 24, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89346 are AFFIRMED.
(2) In G.R. No. 195816, petitioner Tan's motion for reconsideration is DENIED. ???ñr?bl?š ??r†??l l?? l?
br?rÿ
SO ORDERED.

9. Galeos v. People, G.R. No. 174730-37, Feb. 9, 2011

G.R. Nos. 174730-37               February 9, 2011

ROSALIO S. GALEOS, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
G.R. Nos. 174845-52
PAULINO S. ONG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The consolidated petitions at bar seek to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 promulgated on August 18,
2005 by the Sandiganbayan convicting petitioners Paulino S. Ong (Ong) of eight counts and Rosalio S.
Galeos (Galeos) of four counts of falsification of public documents under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
The facts are as follows:
Ong was appointed Officer-in-Charge (OIC)-Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu on April 16, 1986.
He was elected Mayor of the same municipality in 1988 and served as such until 1998. 2
On June 1, 1994, Ong extended permanent appointments to Galeos and Federico T. Rivera (Rivera) for
the positions of Construction and Maintenance Man and Plumber I, respectively, in the Office of the
Municipal Engineer.3 Prior to their permanent appointment, Galeos and Rivera were casual employees
of the municipal government.
In their individual Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) for the year 1993, Galeos
answered "No" to the question: "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or of affinity to anyone working in the government?" while Rivera indicated
"n/a" on the space for the list of the names of relatives referred to in the said query. 4 The boxes for
"Yes" and "No" to the said query were left in blank by Galeos in his 1994 and 1995 SALN. 5 Rivera in his
1995 SALN answered "No" to the question on relatives in government. 6 In their 1996 SALN, both Galeos
and Rivera also did not fill up the boxes indicating their answers to the same query. 7 Ong’s signature

49
appears in all the foregoing documents as the person who administered the oath when Galeos and
Rivera executed the foregoing documents.
In a letter-certification dated June 1, 1994 addressed to Ms. Benita O. Santos, Regional Director, Civil
Service Commission (CSC), Regional Office 7, Cebu City, it was attested that:
This is to certify that pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991, all restrictions/requirements relative to creation of positions, hiring and issuance of
appointments, Section 325 on the limitations for personal services in the total/supplemental
appropriation of a local government unit; salary rates; abolition and creation of positions, etc.; Section
76, organizational structure and staffing pattern; Section 79 on nepotism; Section 80, posting of vacancy
and personnel selection board; Section 81 on compensation, etc. have been duly complied with in the
issuance of this appointment.
This is to certify further that the faithful observance of these restrictions/requirements was made in
accordance with the requirements of the Civil Service Commission before the appointment was
submitted for review and action.8 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above certification was signed by Ong and HR Officer-Designate Editha C. Garcia.
On October 1, 1998, the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Naga, Cebu filed a letter-complaint 9
before the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB)-Visayas against Ong (then incumbent Vice-Mayor of Naga),
Galeos and Rivera for dishonesty, nepotism, violation of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees and Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and for the crime of falsification
of public documents.
On August 11, 2000, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the recommendation of OIC-Deputy
Ombudsman for the Visayas that criminal charges be filed against Ong, Galeos and Rivera for falsification
of public documents under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in connection with the
Certification dated June 1, 1994 issued by Ong and the false statements in the 1993, 1995 and 1996
SALN of Rivera and the 1993, 1994, 1995 and 1996 SALN of Galeos. 10
On August 16, 2000, the following Informations 11 were filed against the petitioners:
Criminal Case No. 26181
That on or about the 14th day of February, 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In
the Government Service, as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each
other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos [being] the sister of the mother of accused
Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26182
That on or about the 15th day of February 1994, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the

50
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Service
as of December 31, 1993, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before
accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the
sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26183
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually
helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In
the Government Service, as of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making false statements in a
narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each
other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino
S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26184
That on or about the 1st day of February 1996, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service,
[a]s of December 31, 1995, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before
accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the
sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26185

51
That on or about the 5th day of February 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Federico T. Rivera] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Plumber I of the
Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In The Government Service,
[a]s of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Federico T. Rivera and subscribed and sworn to before
accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused Federico T. Rivera made it appear therein that he has no
relatives within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity working in the government, thereby
making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well
knew that they are related with each other, since accused Federico T. Rivera is related to accused
Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of affinity, the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife being the
sister of the mother of Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26186
That on or about the 3rd day of March, 1995, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S. Galeos]
accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and Maintenance Man of
the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the
offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating together and mutually helping with each other,
with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities, Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In the Government Services,
as of December 31, 1994, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed and sworn to before accused
Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in
truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each other, since accused
Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong, within the fourth degree of consanguinity, the
mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino S. Ong.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26187
That on or about the 11th day of March, 1997, in the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named [Paulino S. Ong and
Rosalio S. Galeos] accused, public officers, being the former Municipal Mayor and Construction and
Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity
and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving and confederating, together and mutually
helping with each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Sworn Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, Disclosure of Business Interests and Financial Connections and Identification of Relatives In
the Government Service, as of December 31, 1996, filed by accused Rosalio S. Galeos and subscribed
and sworn to before accused Paulino S. Ong, wherein accused made it appear therein that they are not
related within the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity thereby making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, when in truth and in fact, as accused very well k[n]ew that they are related with each
other, since accused Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused Paulino S. Ong within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, the mother of accused Rosalio S. Galeos being the sister of the mother of accused Paulino
S. Ong.

52
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26188
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the
former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation
to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to
Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC)-Region VII, Cebu City
dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there was a
faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules in the
appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, as Construction and Maintenance Man of the Office of the Municipal
Engineer, Naga, Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in
fact as accused very well knew that the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos was nepotic being made in
violation of the Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Rosalio S. Galeos is related to accused
within the fourth degree of consanguinity, since the mother of Rosalio S. Galeos is the sister of the
mother of accused, which Certification caused the approval of the appointment of Rosalio S. Galeos, to
the detriment of public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Criminal Case No. 26189
That on or about the 1st day of June, 1994, at the Municipality of Naga, Province of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, a public officer, being the
former Mayor of the Municipality of Naga, Cebu, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation
to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to falsify, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a public document, consisting of a Certification in the form of a letter addressed to
Mrs. Benita O. Santos, then Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission (CSC), Region VII, Cebu
City, dated June 1, 1994, a requirement in the approval of an appointment, certifying therein that there
was a faithful compliance of the requirement/restriction provided under the Civil Service Laws and Rules
in the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, a Plumber I of the Office of the Municipal Engineer, Naga,
Cebu, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when in truth and in fact as accused
very well knew that the appointment of Federico T. Rivera was nepotic being made in violation of the
Civil Service Rules and Laws on Nepotism, as Federico T. Rivera is related to accused within the fourth
degree of affinity, since the mother of Federico T. Rivera’s wife is the sister of the mother of accused,
which certification caused the approval of the appointment of Federico T. Rivera, to the detriment of
public interest.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the Joint Stipulation of Facts submitted to the court a quo, the accused made the following
admissions: (1) Ong was the Municipal Mayor of Cebu at all times relevant to these cases; (2) Ong is
related to Galeos, within the fourth degree of consanguinity as his mother is the sister of Galeos’
mother, and to Rivera within the fourth degree of affinity as his mother is the sister of the mother of
Rivera’s wife; and (3) Galeos and Rivera were employed as Construction and Maintenance Man and
Plumber I, respectively, in the Municipal Government of Naga, Cebu at all times relevant to these cases.
Ong likewise admitted the genuineness and due execution of the documentary exhibits presented by the
prosecutor (copies of SALNs and Certification dated June 1, 1994) except for Exhibit "H" (Certification
dated June 1, 1994 offered by the prosecution as "allegedly supporting the appointment of Rosalio S.
Galeos"12).13
As lone witness for the prosecution, Esperidion R. Canoneo testified that he has been a resident of
Pangdan, Naga, Cebu since 1930 and claimed to be friends with Ong, Galeos and Rivera. He knows the
mother of Galeos, Pining Suarez or Peñaranda Suarez. But when the prosecutor mentioned "Bining

53
Suarez," Canoneo stated that Bining Suarez is the mother of Galeos and that Bining Suarez is the same
person as "Bernardita Suarez." Ong is related to Galeos because Ong’s mother, Conchita Suarez, and
Galeos’ mother, Bernardita Suarez, are sisters. As to Rivera, his wife Kensiana, 14 is the daughter of
Mercedes Suarez who is also a sister of Conchita Suarez. He knew the Suarez sisters because they were
the neighbors of his grandmother whom he frequently visited when he was still studying. 15
Both Galeos and Rivera testified that they only provided the entries in their SALN but did not personally
fill up the forms as these were already filled up by "people in the municipal hall" when they signed
them.
Galeos, when shown his 1993 SALN, 16 confirmed his signature thereon. When he was asked if he
understood the question "To the best of your knowledge, are you related within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity to anyone working in the government?" he answered in the negative. He
claimed that the "X" mark corresponding to the answer "No" to said question, as well as the other
entries in his SALN, were already filled up when he signed it. When shown his SALN for the years 1994,
1995 and 1996, Galeos reiterated that they were already filled up and he was only made to sign them by
an employee of the municipal hall whom he only remembers by face. He also admitted that he carefully
read the documents and all the entries therein were explained to him before he affixed his signature on
the document. However, when asked whether he understands the term "fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity" stated in the SALNs, he answered in the negative. 17
Rivera testified that he was not aware that his wife was a close relative of the Municipal Mayor because
when he asked her, the latter told him that Ong was a distant relative of hers. Rivera added that it was
not Ong who first appointed him as a casual employee but Ong’s predecessor, Mayor Vicente
Mendiola.18
On the part of Ong, he testified that at the time he was serving as Municipal Mayor of Naga, he did not
know that he and Galeos are relatives, as in fact there are several persons with the surname "Galeos" in
the municipality. He signed Galeos’ 1993 SALN when it was presented to him by Galeos at his office.
There were many of them who brought such documents and he would administer their oaths on what
were written on their SALN, among them were Galeos and Rivera. He came to know of the defect in the
employment of Galeos when the case was filed by his "political enemy" in the Ombudsman just after he
was elected Vice-Mayor in 1998. As to Rivera, Ong claimed that he knows him as a casual employee of
the previous administration. As successor of the former mayor, he had to re-appoint these casual
employees and he delegated this matter to his subordinates. He maintained that his family was not very
close to their other relatives because when he was not yet Mayor, he was doing business in Cebu and
Manila. When queried by the court if he had known his relatives while he was campaigning considering
that in the provinces even relatives within the 6th and 7th degree are still regarded as close relatives
especially among politicians, Ong insisted that his style of campaigning was based only on his
performance of duties and that he did not go from house to house. Ong admitted that he had been a
resident of Naga, Cebu since birth. He could no longer recall those SALN of most of the employees
whose oaths he had administered. He admitted that he was the one who appointed Galeos and Rivera
to their permanent positions and signed their official appointment (Civil Service Form No. 33) but he was
not aware at that time that he was related to them. It was only after the filing of the case that he came
to know the wife of Rivera. As to the qualifications of these appointees, he no longer inquired about it
and their appointments were no longer submitted to the Selection Board. When the appointment forms
for Galeos and Rivera were brought to his office, the accompanying documents were attached thereto.
Ong, however, admitted that before the permanent appointment is approved by the CSC, he issues a
certification to the effect that all requirements of law and the CSC have been complied with. 19
On August 18, 2005, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision convicting Ong, Galeos and
Rivera, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the following:

54
In Criminal Case No. 26181, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S.
Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26182, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T.
Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26183, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S.
Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).1auuphil
In Criminal Case No. 26184, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T.
Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26185, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Federico T.
Rivera GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26186, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S.
Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26187, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong and Rosalio S.
Galeos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Falsification of Public Document as defined in
and penalized by Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances,
are hereby sentenced to each suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS,
FOUR (4) MONTHS, and ONE (1) DAY OF Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT

55
(8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to each pay a FINE of
FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 26188, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong NOT GUILTY for
Violation of Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code for failure of the Prosecution to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt; and
In Criminal Case No. 26189, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused Paulino S. Ong GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for Falsification of Public Document as defined in and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code and, there being no modifying circumstances, is hereby sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of
Prision Correccional medium as the minimum penalty to EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision
Mayor medium as the maximum penalty and to pay a FINE of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00).
SO ORDERED.20
In its Resolution21 dated August 28, 2006, the Sandiganbayan denied the motions for reconsideration of
Ong and Galeos. However, in view of the death of Rivera on August 22, 2003 before the promulgation of
the decision, the cases (Criminal Case Nos. 26182, 26184 and 26185) against him were dismissed.
In G.R. Nos. 174730-37, Galeos contends that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
1) . . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN
A NARRATION OF FACTS.
2) . . . IT DID NOT CONSIDER PETITIONER’S VALID DEFENSE OF GOOD FAITH AND LACK OF INTENT TO
COMMIT THE CRIMES IMPUTED.
3) . . . IT GAVE FULL CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF THE SOLE WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION. 22
In support of his assigned errors, Galeos argues that he did not make untruthful or false statements in
his SALN since a "statement" requires a positive averment and thus silence or non-disclosure cannot be
considered one. And even if they are considered statements, Galeos contends that they were not made
in a "narration of facts" and the least they could be considered are "conclusions of law." He also argues
that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to support the finding that he was aware of their
relationship at the time of the execution of the SALN. With the presence of good faith, Galeos avers that
the fourth element of the crime – the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the
wrongful intent of injuring a third person – is missing. He also faults the Sandiganbayan for its heavy
reliance on the uncorroborated testimony of the prosecution’s sole witness despite the fact that there
are aspects in his testimony that do not inspire belief.
On the other hand, in G.R. Nos. 174845-52, Ong argues that the Sandiganbayan erred when:
(a)
. . . IT HELD THAT THE SUBJECT DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE CONTAINED UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN A
NARRATION OF FACTS.
(b)
IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 26181-26187, [IT HELD] THAT A PERSON MERELY ADMINISTERING THE OATH
IN A DOCUMENT IS GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF FALSIFICATION BY MAKING UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN
A NARRATION OF FACTS.
(c)
. . . IN CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26189, … IT INFER[R]ED, DESPITE THE COMPLETE ABSENCE OF ANY RELEVANT
AND MATERIAL EVIDENCE, THAT RESPONDENT’S EXHIBIT "I" (OR PETITIONER’S EXHIBIT "8") REFERS TO
OR SUPPORTS THE APPOINTMENT OF FEDERICO T. RIVERA. 23
Ong similarly argues that the subject SALN do not contain any untruthful statements containing a
narration of facts and that there was no wrongful intent of injuring a third person at the time of the
execution of the documents. He contends that he cannot be held liable for falsification for merely
administering the oath in a document since it is not among the legal obligations of an officer
administering the oath to certify the truthfulness and/or veracity of the contents of the document.

56
Neither can he be made liable for falsification regarding the letter-certification he issued since there was
no evidence adduced that it was made to support Rivera’s appointment.
In the Joint Memorandum filed by the Ombudsman through the Office of the Special Prosecutor of the
Sandiganbayan, it was pointed out that Galeos categorically admitted during his testimony that before
affixing his signature on the subject SALN, he carefully read its contents and the entries therein have
been explained to him. Moreover, the admission made by Ong during the pre-trial under the joint
stipulation of facts indicated no qualification at all that he became aware of his relationship with Galeos
and Rivera only after the execution of the subject documents. The defense of lack of knowledge of a
particular fact in issue, being a state of mind and therefore self-serving, it can be legally assumed that
the admission of that particular fact without qualification reckons from the time the imputed act, to
which the particular fact relates, was committed. As to mistaken reliance on the testimony of
prosecution witness, the analysis and findings in the assailed decision do not show that such testimony
was even taken into consideration in arriving at the conviction of petitioners. 24
With respect to Ong’s liability as conspirator in the execution of the SALN containing untruthful
statements, the Special Prosecutor argues that as a general rule, it is not the duty of the administering
officer to ascertain the truth of the statements found in a document. The reason for this is that the
administering officer has no way of knowing if the facts stated therein are indeed truthful. However,
when the facts laid out in the document directly involves the administering officer, then he has an
opportunity to know of their truth or falsity. When an administering officer nevertheless administers the
oath despite the false contents of the document, which are known to him to be false, he is liable, not
because he violated his duty as an administering officer, but because he participated in the falsification
of a document.25
After a thorough review, we find the petitions unmeritorious.
Petitioners were charged with falsification of public document under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states:
Art. 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. — The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee,
or notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact
so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
x x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
The elements of falsification in the above provision are as follows:
(a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. 26
In addition to the afore-cited elements, it must also be proven that the public officer or employee had
taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification. In falsification of public document, the
offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when (1) he has the duty to make
or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document; or (2) he has the official custody
of the document which he falsifies. 27 Likewise, in falsification of public or official documents, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. 28

57
Falsification of Public Document
by making untruthful statements
concerning relatives in the
government service
All the elements of falsification of public documents by making untruthful statements have been
established by the prosecution.
Petitioners argue that the statements "they are not related within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" and "that Section 79 of the Local Government Code has been complied with in
the issuance of the appointments" are not a narration of facts but a conclusion of law, as both require
the application of the rules on relationship under the law of succession. Thus, they cite People v.
Tugbang29 where it was held that "a statement expressing an erroneous conclusion of law cannot be
considered a falsification." Likewise, in People v. Yanza, 30 it was held that when defendant certified that
she was eligible for the position, she practically wrote a conclusion of law, which turned out to be
incorrect or erroneous; hence, she may not be declared guilty of falsification because the law violated
pertains to narration of facts.
We disagree.
A conclusion of law is a determination by a judge or ruling authority regarding the law that applies in a
particular case. It is opposed to a finding of fact, which interprets the factual circumstances to which the
law is to be applied.31 A narration of facts is merely an account or description of the particulars of an
event or occurrence.32 We have held that a certification by accused officials in the Statement of Time
Elapsed and Work Accomplished qualifies as a narration of facts as contemplated under Article 171 (4)
of the Revised Penal Code, as it consisted not only of figures and numbers but also words were used
therein giving an account of the status of the flood control project. 33
In this case, the required disclosure or identification of relatives "within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity" in the SALN involves merely a description of such relationship; it does not call
for an application of law in a particular set of facts. On the other hand, Articles 963 to 967 of the Civil
Code simply explain the concept of proximity of relationship and what constitute direct and collateral
lines in relation to the rules on succession. The question of whether or not persons are related to each
other by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth degree is one of fact. Contrary to petitioners’
assertion, statements concerning relationship may be proved as to its truth or falsity, and thus do not
amount to expression of opinion. When a government employee is required to disclose his relatives in
the government service, such information elicited therefore qualifies as a narration of facts
contemplated under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Further, it bears to stress
that the untruthful statements on relationship have no relevance to the employee’s eligibility for the
position but pertains rather to prohibition or restriction imposed by law on the appointing power.
Since petitioner Galeos answered "No" to the question in his 1993 SALN if he has relatives in the
government service within the fourth degree of consanguinity, he made an untruthful statement therein
as in fact he was related to Ong, who was then the municipal mayor, within the fourth degree of
consanguinity, he and Ong being first cousins (their mothers are sisters). As to his 1994, 1995 and 1996
SALN, Galeos left in blank the boxes for the answer to the similar query. In Dela Cruz v. Mudlong, 34 it was
held that one is guilty of falsification in the accomplishment of his information and personal data sheet if
he withholds material facts which would have affected the approval of his appointment and/or
promotion to a government position. By withholding information on his relative/s in the government
service as required in the SALN, Galeos was guilty of falsification considering that the disclosure of such
relationship with then Municipal Mayor Ong would have resulted in the disapproval of his permanent
appointment pursuant to Article 168 (j) (Appointments), Rule XXII of the Rules and Regulations
Implementing the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which provides:

58
No person shall be appointed in the local government career service if he is related within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to the appointing power or recommending authority.
Section 7 (e), Rule V of the Implementing Rules of Book V, Executive Order No. 292 otherwise known as
the Administrative Code of 1987, provides that the CSC shall disapprove the appointment of a person
who "has been issued such appointment in violation of existing Civil Service Law, rules and regulations."
Among the prohibited appointments enumerated in CSC Memorandum Circular No. 38, series of 1993
are appointments in the LGUs of persons who are related to the appointing or recommending authority
within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity. 35
The Omnibus Rules on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions (CSC Memorandum Circular No. 40,
series of 1998 dated December 14, 1998) contain a similar prohibition under Rule XIII, Section 9:
SEC. 9. No appointment in the national, provincial, city or municipal governments or any branch or
instrumentality thereof, including government owned or controlled corporations with original charters
shall be made in favor of a relative of the appointing or recommending authority, or of the chief of the
bureau or office or of the person exercising immediate supervision over the appointee.
Unless otherwise provided by law, the word "relative" and the members of the family referred to are
those related within the third degree either of consanguinity or of affinity.
In the local government career service, the prohibition extends to the relatives of the appointing or
recommending authority, within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity.
xxxx
The nepotism rule covers all kinds of appointments whether original, promotional, transfer and
reemployment regardless of status including casuals and contractuals except consultants. (Emphasis
supplied.)
The second element is likewise present. "Legal obligation" means that there is a law requiring the
disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. 36 Permanent employees employed by local government
units are required to file the following: (a) sworn statement of assets, liabilities and net worth (SALN);
(b) lists of relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity in government service; (c)
financial and business interests; and (d) personal data sheets as required by law. 37 A similar requirement
is imposed by Section 8 (B) of Republic Act No. 6713 otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, thus:
(B) Identification and disclosure of relatives38. – It shall be the duty of every public official or employee to
identify and disclose to the best of his knowledge and information, his relatives in the Government in
the form, manner and frequency prescribed by the Civil Service Commission.
Section 11 of the same law penalizes the violation of the above provision, either with imprisonment or
fine, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold public office.
Such violation if proven in a proper administrative proceeding shall also be sufficient cause for removal
or dismissal of a public official or employee, even if no criminal prosecution is instituted against him.
The evidence on record clearly showed that Galeos’ negative answer reflected in his SALN is absolutely
false. During the trial, both Ong and Galeos admitted the fact that they are first cousins but denied
having knowledge of such relationship at the time the subject documents were executed. The
Sandiganbayan correctly rejected their defense of being unaware that they are related within the fourth
degree of consanguinity. Given the Filipino cultural trait of valuing strong kinship and extended family
ties, it was unlikely for Galeos who had been working for several years in the municipal government, not
to have known of his close blood relation to Ong who was a prominent public figure having ran and won
in the local elections four times (three terms as Mayor and as Vice-Mayor in the 1998 elections), after
serving as OIC Mayor of the same municipality in 1986 until 1988.
The same thing can be said of Ong, whose unbelievable claim that he had no knowledge that a first
cousin (Galeos) was working in the municipal government and appointed by him to a permanent
position during his incumbency, was correctly disregarded by the Sandiganbayan. It was simply

59
unthinkable that as a resident of Naga, Cebu since birth and a politician at that, he was all the time
unaware that he himself appointed to permanent positions the son of his mother’s sister (Galeos) and
the husband of his first cousin (Rivera). Indeed, the reality of local politics and Filipino culture renders
his defense of good faith (lack of knowledge of their relationship) unavailing. Despite his knowledge of
the falsity of the statement in the subject SALN, Ong still administered the oath to Galeos and Rivera
who made the false statement under oath. The Sandiganbayan thus did not err in finding that Ong
connived with Galeos and Rivera in making it appear in their SALN that they have no relative within the
fourth degree of consanguinity/affinity in the government service.
Conspiracy need not be shown by direct proof of an agreement of the parties to commit the crime, 39 as
it can be inferred from the acts of the accused which clearly manifest a concurrence of wills, a common
intent or design to commit a crime.40 In this case, Ong administered the oaths to Galeos and Rivera in
the subject SALN not just once, but three times, a clear manifestation that he concurred with the making
of the untruthful statement therein concerning relatives in the government service.
Falsification by making
untruthful statements
in the Certification re:
compliance with the
prohibition on nepotism
As chief executive and the proper appointing authority, Ong is deemed to have issued the certification
recommending to the CSC approval of Galeos’ appointment although he admitted only the authenticity
and due execution of Exhibit "I". Since Ong was duty bound to observe the prohibition on nepotistic
appointments, his certification stating compliance with Section 79 41 of R.A. No. 7160 constitutes a
solemn affirmation of the fact that the appointee is not related to him within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity. Having executed the certification despite his knowledge that he and Rivera
were related to each other within the fourth degree of affinity, as in fact Rivera was his cousin-in-law
because the mother of Rivera’s wife is the sister of Ong’s mother, Ong was guilty of falsification of public
document by making untruthful statement in a narration of facts. He also took advantage of his official
position as the appointing authority who, under the Civil Service rules, is required to issue such
certification.
The importance of the certification submitted to the CSC by the proper appointing authority in the local
government unit, regarding compliance with the prohibition against nepotism under R.A. No. 7160
cannot be overemphasized. Under Section 67, Book V, Chapter 10 of the Administrative Code of 1987, a
head of office or appointing official who issues an appointment or employs any person in violation of
Civil Service Law and Rules or who commits fraud, deceit or intentional misrepresentation of material
facts concerning other civil service matters, or anyone who violates, refuses or neglects to comply with
any of such provisions or rules, may be held criminally liable. In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy, 42
we held that mere issuance of appointment in favor of a relative within the third degree of
consanguinity or affinity is sufficient to constitute a violation of the law. Although herein petitioners
were prosecuted for the criminal offense of falsification of public document, it becomes obvious that the
requirement of disclosure of relationship to the appointing power in the local government units simply
aims to ensure strict enforcement of the prohibition against nepotism. 1avvphil
Relevant then is our pronouncement in Dacoycoy:
Nepotism is one pernicious evil impeding the civil service and the efficiency of its personnel. In
Debulgado, we stressed that "[T]the basic purpose or objective of the prohibition against nepotism also
strongly indicates that the prohibition was intended to be a comprehensive one." "The Court was
unwilling to restrict and limit the scope of the prohibition which is textually very broad and
comprehensive." If not within the exceptions, it is a form of corruption that must be nipped in the bud or
abated whenever or wherever it raises its ugly head. As we said in an earlier case "what we need now is

60
not only to punish the wrongdoers or reward the ‘outstanding’ civil servants, but also to plug the hidden
gaps and potholes of corruption as well as to insist on strict compliance with existing legal procedures in
order to abate any occasion for graft or circumvention of the law." 43 (Emphasis supplied.)
The prosecution having established with moral certainty the guilt of petitioners for falsification of public
documents under Article 171 (4) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, we find no legal ground to
reverse petitioners’ conviction.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated August 18, 2005 of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case Nos. 26181-26187 and 26189 is AFFIRMED.
With costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

10. People v. Siton, G.R. No. 169364, September 18, 2009

G.R. No. 169364               September 18, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
EVANGELINE SITON y SACIL and KRYSTEL KATE SAGARANO y MEFANIA, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
If a man is called to be a street sweeper, he should sweep streets even as Michelangelo painted, or
Beethoven composed music, or Shakespeare wrote poetry. He should sweep streets so well that all the
hosts of Heaven and Earth will pause to say, here lived a great street sweeper who did his job well.
– Martin Luther King, Jr.
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari is the July 29, 2005 Order 1 of Branch 11, Davao City
Regional Trial Court in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 granting respondents’ Petition for Certiorari
and declaring paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code unconstitutional.
Respondents Evangeline Siton and Krystel Kate Sagarano were charged with vagrancy pursuant to Article
202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code in two separate Informations dated November 18, 2003, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 and raffled to Branch 3 of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Davao City. The Informations, read:
That on or about November 14, 2003, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-mentioned accused, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously wandered and
loitered around San Pedro and Legaspi Streets, this City, without any visible means to support herself
nor lawful and justifiable purpose.2
Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. — The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable
purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.

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Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this articles shall be punished by arresto
menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium
period to prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both,
in the discretion of the court.
Instead of submitting their counter-affidavits as directed, respondents filed separate Motions to Quash 3
on the ground that Article 202 (2) is unconstitutional for being vague and overbroad.
In an Order4 dated April 28, 2004, the municipal trial court denied the motions and directed respondents
anew to file their respective counter-affidavits. The municipal trial court also declared that the law on
vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the State’s police power and justified by the Latin maxim "salus
populi est suprem(a) lex," which calls for the subordination of individual benefit to the interest of the
greater number, thus:
Our law on vagrancy was enacted pursuant to the police power of the State. An authority on police
power, Professor Freund describes laconically police power "as the power of promoting public welfare
by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property." (Citations omitted). In fact the person’s
acts and acquisitions are hemmed in by the police power of the state. The justification found in the Latin
maxim, salus populi est supreme (sic) lex" (the god of the people is the Supreme Law). This calls for the
subordination of individual benefit to the interests of the greater number.In the case at bar the affidavit
of the arresting police officer, SPO1 JAY PLAZA with Annex "A" lucidly shows that there was a prior
surveillance conducted in view of the reports that vagrants and prostitutes proliferate in the place
where the two accused (among other women) were wandering and in the wee hours of night and
soliciting male customer. Thus, on that basis the prosecution should be given a leeway to prove its case.
Thus, in the interest of substantial justice, both prosecution and defense must be given their day in
Court: the prosecution proof of the crime, and the author thereof; the defense, to show that the acts of
the accused in the indictment can’t be categorized as a crime. 5
The municipal trial court also noted that in the affidavit of the arresting police officer, SPO1 Jay Plaza, it
was stated that there was a prior surveillance conducted on the two accused in an area reported to be
frequented by vagrants and prostitutes who solicited sexual favors. Hence, the prosecution should be
given the opportunity to prove the crime, and the defense to rebut the evidence. 1avvphi1
Respondents thus filed an original petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Regional Trial Court of
Davao City,6 directly challenging the constitutionality of the anti-vagrancy law, claiming that the
definition of the crime of vagrancy under Article 202 (2), apart from being vague, results as well in an
arbitrary identification of violators, since the definition of the crime includes in its coverage persons who
are otherwise performing ordinary peaceful acts. They likewise claimed that Article 202 (2) violated the
equal protection clause under the Constitution because it discriminates against the poor and
unemployed, thus permitting an arbitrary and unreasonable classification.
The State, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that pursuant to the Court’s ruling in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,7 the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines apply only to free speech cases
and not to penal statutes. It also asserted that Article 202 (2) must be presumed valid and constitutional,
since the respondents failed to overcome this presumption.
On July 29, 2005, the Regional Trial Court issued the assailed Order granting the petition, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PRESCINDING FROM THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED. Paragraph
2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code is hereby declared unconstitutional and the Order of the court
a quo, dated April 28, 2004, denying the petitioners’ Motion to Quash is set aside and the said court is
ordered to dismiss the subject criminal cases against the petitioners pending before it.
SO ORDERED.8
In declaring Article 202 (2) unconstitutional, the trial court opined that the law is vague and it violated
the equal protection clause. It held that the "void for vagueness" doctrine is equally applicable in testing

62
the validity of penal statutes. Citing Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,9 where an anti vagrancy
ordinance was struck down as unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States, the trial
court ruled:
The U.S. Supreme Court’s justifications for striking down the Jacksonville Vagrancy Ordinance are
equally applicable to paragraph 2 of Article 202 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, to authorize a police officer to arrest a person for being "found loitering about public or semi-
public buildings or places or tramping or wandering about the country or the streets without visible
means of support" offers too wide a latitude for arbitrary determinations as to who should be arrested
and who should not.
Loitering about and wandering have become national pastimes particularly in these times of recession
when there are many who are "without visible means of support" not by reason of choice but by force
of circumstance as borne out by the high unemployment rate in the entire country.
To authorize law enforcement authorities to arrest someone for nearly no other reason than the fact
that he cannot find gainful employment would indeed be adding insult to injury. 10
On its pronouncement that Article 202 (2) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution, the
trial court declared:
The application of the Anti-Vagrancy Law, crafted in the 1930s, to our situation at present runs afoul of
the equal protection clause of the constitution as it offers no reasonable classification between those
covered by the law and those who are not.
Class legislation is such legislation which denies rights to one which are accorded to others, or inflicts
upon one individual a more severe penalty than is imposed upon another in like case offending.
Applying this to the case at bar, since the definition of Vagrancy under Article 202 of the Revised Penal
Code offers no guidelines or any other reasonable indicators to differentiate those who have no visible
means of support by force of circumstance and those who choose to loiter about and bum around, who
are the proper subjects of vagrancy legislation, it cannot pass a judicial scrutiny of its constitutionality. 11
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the sole issue of:
WHETHER THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DECLARING
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ARTICLE 202 (2) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE 12
Petitioner argues that every statute is presumed valid and all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
favor of its constitutionality; that, citing Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan,13 the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines have special application to free-speech cases only and are not appropriate for testing the
validity of penal statutes; that respondents failed to overcome the presumed validity of the statute,
failing to prove that it was vague under the standards set out by the Courts; and that the State may
regulate individual conduct for the promotion of public welfare in the exercise of its police power.
On the other hand, respondents argue against the limited application of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines. They insist that Article 202 (2) on its face violates the constitutionally-guaranteed rights to
due process and the equal protection of the laws; that the due process vagueness standard, as
distinguished from the free speech vagueness doctrine, is adequate to declare Article 202 (2)
unconstitutional and void on its face; and that the presumption of constitutionality was adequately
overthrown.
The Court finds for petitioner.
The power to define crimes and prescribe their corresponding penalties is legislative in nature and
inherent in the sovereign power of the state to maintain social order as an aspect of police power. The
legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful provided that no
constitutional rights have been abridged.14 However, in exercising its power to declare what acts
constitute a crime, the legislature must inform the citizen with reasonable precision what acts it intends
to prohibit so that he may have a certain understandable rule of conduct and know what acts it is his
duty to avoid.15 This requirement has come to be known as the void-for-vagueness doctrine which

63
states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the
first essential of due process of law."16
In Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC,17 the Court recognized the application of the void-for-vagueness
doctrine to criminal statutes in appropriate cases. The Court therein held:
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the
fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a
facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to
Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189 – the provisions upon which
petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to
petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there
must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not
conjectural or anticipatory.18
The first statute punishing vagrancy – Act No. 519 – was modeled after American vagrancy statutes and
passed by the Philippine Commission in 1902. The Penal Code of Spain of 1870 which was in force in this
country up to December 31, 1931 did not contain a provision on vagrancy. 19 While historically an Anglo-
American concept of crime prevention, the law on vagrancy was included by the Philippine legislature as
a permanent feature of the Revised Penal Code in Article 202 thereof which, to repeat, provides:
ART. 202. Vagrants and prostitutes; penalty. – The following are vagrants:
1. Any person having no apparent means of subsistence, who has the physical ability to work and who
neglects to apply himself or herself to some lawful calling;
2. Any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering
about the country or the streets without visible means of support;
3. Any idle or dissolute person who lodges in houses of ill-fame; ruffians or pimps and those who
habitually associate with prostitutes;
4. Any person who, not being included in the provisions of other articles of this Code, shall be found
loitering in any inhabited or uninhabited place belonging to another without any lawful or justifiable
purpose;
5. Prostitutes.
For the purposes of this article, women who, for money or profit, habitually indulge in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be prostitutes.
Any person found guilty of any of the offenses covered by this article shall be punished by arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, and in case of recidivism, by arresto mayor in its medium period to
prision correccional in its minimum period or a fine ranging from 200 to 2,000 pesos, or both, in the
discretion of the court.
In the instant case, the assailed provision is paragraph (2), which defines a vagrant as any person found
loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping or wandering about the country or
the streets without visible means of support. This provision was based on the second clause of Section 1
of Act No. 519 which defined "vagrant" as "every person found loitering about saloons or dramshops or
gambling houses, or tramping or straying through the country without visible means of support ." The
second clause was essentially retained with the modification that the places under which the offense
might be committed is now expressed in general terms – public or semi-public places.
The Regional Trial Court, in asserting the unconstitutionality of Article 202 (2), take support mainly from
the U.S. Supreme Court’s opinion in the Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville 20 case, which in essence
declares:
Living under a rule of law entails various suppositions, one of which is that "[all persons] are entitled to
be informed as to what the State commands or forbids." Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U. S. 451, 306 U. S.
453.

64
Lanzetta is one of a well recognized group of cases insisting that the law give fair notice of the offending
conduct. See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 269 U. S. 391; Cline v. Frink Dairy Co.,
274 U. S. 445; United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81. In the field of regulatory statutes
governing business activities, where the acts limited are in a narrow category, greater leeway is allowed.
Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, 342 U. S. 337; United States v. National Dairy Products Corp.,
372 U. S. 29; United States v. Petrillo, 332 U. S. 1.
The poor among us, the minorities, the average householder, are not in business and not alerted to the
regulatory schemes of vagrancy laws; and we assume they would have no understanding of their
meaning and impact if they read them. Nor are they protected from being caught in the vagrancy net by
the necessity of having a specific intent to commit an unlawful act. See Screws v. United States, 325 U. S.
91; Boyce Motor Lines, Inc. v. United States, supra.
The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which, by modern standards, are normally innocent.
"Nightwalking" is one. Florida construes the ordinance not to make criminal one night's wandering,
Johnson v. State, 202 So.2d at 855, only the "habitual" wanderer or, as the ordinance describes it,
"common night walkers." We know, however, from experience that sleepless people often walk at night,
perhaps hopeful that sleep-inducing relaxation will result.
Luis Munoz-Marin, former Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that "loafing" was a national
virtue in his Commonwealth, and that it should be encouraged. It is, however, a crime in Jacksonville.
xxxx
Persons "wandering or strolling" from place to place have been extolled by Walt Whitman and Vachel
Lindsay. The qualification "without any lawful purpose or object" may be a trap for innocent acts.
Persons "neglecting all lawful business and habitually spending their time by frequenting . . . places
where alcoholic beverages are sold or served" would literally embrace many members of golf clubs and
city clubs.
Walkers and strollers and wanderers may be going to or coming from a burglary. Loafers or loiterers
may be "casing" a place for a holdup. Letting one's wife support him is an intra-family matter, and
normally of no concern to the police. Yet it may, of course, be the setting for numerous crimes.
The difficulty is that these activities are historically part of the amenities of life as we have known them.
They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been,
in part, responsible for giving our people the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of
creativity. These amenities have dignified the right of dissent, and have honored the right to be
nonconformists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spirits, rather
than hushed, suffocating silence.
xxxx
Where the list of crimes is so all-inclusive and generalized as the one in this ordinance, those convicted
may be punished for no more than vindicating affronts to police authority:
"The common ground which brings such a motley assortment of human troubles before the magistrates
in vagrancy-type proceedings is the procedural laxity which permits 'conviction' for almost any kind of
conduct and the existence of the House of Correction as an easy and convenient dumping-ground for
problems that appear to have no other immediate solution." Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its
Administration, 104 U.Pa.L.Rev. 603, 631.
xxxx
Another aspect of the ordinance's vagueness appears when we focus not on the lack of notice given a
potential offender, but on the effect of the unfettered discretion it places in the hands of the
Jacksonville police. Caleb Foote, an early student of this subject, has called the vagrancy-type law as
offering "punishment by analogy." Such crimes, though long common in Russia, are not compatible with
our constitutional system.
xxxx

65
A presumption that people who might walk or loaf or loiter or stroll or frequent houses where liquor is
sold, or who are supported by their wives or who look suspicious to the police are to become future
criminals is too precarious for a rule of law. The implicit presumption in these generalized vagrancy
standards -- that crime is being nipped in the bud -- is too extravagant to deserve extended treatment.
Of course, vagrancy statutes are useful to the police. Of course, they are nets making easy the roundup
of so-called undesirables. But the rule of law implies equality and justice in its application. Vagrancy laws
of the Jacksonville type teach that the scales of justice are so tipped that even-handed administration of
the law is not possible. The rule of law, evenly applied to minorities as well as majorities, to the poor as
well as the rich, is the great mucilage that holds society together. 21
The underlying principles in Papachristou are that: 1) the assailed Jacksonville ordinance "fails to give a
person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute;"
and 2) it encourages or promotes opportunities for the application of discriminatory law enforcement.
The said underlying principle in Papachristou that the Jacksonville ordinance, or Article 202 (2) in this
case, fails to give fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct, finds no application here because
under our legal system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. 22 This principle
is of Spanish origin, and we adopted it to govern and limit legal conduct in this jurisdiction. Under
American law, ignorance of the law is merely a traditional rule that admits of exceptions. 23
Moreover, the Jacksonville ordinance was declared unconstitutional on account of specific provisions
thereof, which are not found in Article 202 (2). The ordinance (Jacksonville Ordinance Code § 257)
provided, as follows:
Rogues and vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging; common gamblers, persons who
use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common night walkers, thieves, pilferers or
pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling
places, common railers and brawlers, persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without
any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gaming houses, or places where
alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habitually living upon the earnings of
their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in the Municipal Court shall
be punished as provided for Class D offenses.
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jacksonville declared the ordinance unconstitutional, because such
activities or habits as nightwalking, wandering or strolling around without any lawful purpose or object,
habitual loafing, habitual spending of time at places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, and
living upon the earnings of wives or minor children, which are otherwise common and normal, were
declared illegal. But these are specific acts or activities not found in Article 202 (2). The closest to
Article 202 (2) – "any person found loitering about public or semi-public buildings or places, or tramping
or wandering about the country or the streets without visible means of support" – from the Jacksonville
ordinance, would be "persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful
purpose or object." But these two acts are still not the same: Article 202 (2) is qualified by "without
visible means of support" while the Jacksonville ordinance prohibits wandering or strolling "without any
lawful purpose or object," which was held by the U.S. Supreme Court to constitute a "trap for innocent
acts."
Under the Constitution, the people are guaranteed the right to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.24 Thus, as with any other act or offense, the requirement of probable cause provides
an acceptable limit on police or executive authority that may otherwise be abused in relation to the

66
search or arrest of persons found to be violating Article 202 (2). The fear exhibited by the respondents,
echoing Jacksonville, that unfettered discretion is placed in the hands of the police to make an arrest or
search, is therefore assuaged by the constitutional requirement of probable cause, which is one less
than certainty or proof, but more than suspicion or possibility. 25
Evidently, the requirement of probable cause cannot be done away with arbitrarily without pain of
punishment, for, absent this requirement, the authorities are necessarily guilty of abuse. The grounds of
suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion
that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e.,
supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith of the peace officers making the arrest. 26
The State cannot in a cavalier fashion intrude into the persons of its citizens as well as into their houses,
papers and effects. The constitutional provision sheathes the private individual with an impenetrable
armor against unreasonable searches and seizures. It protects the privacy and sanctity of the person
himself against unlawful arrests and other forms of restraint, and prevents him from being irreversibly
cut off from that domestic security which renders the lives of the most unhappy in some measure
agreeable.27
As applied to the instant case, it appears that the police authorities have been conducting previous
surveillance operations on respondents prior to their arrest. On the surface, this satisfies the probable
cause requirement under our Constitution. For this reason, we are not moved by respondents’
trepidation that Article 202 (2) could have been a source of police abuse in their case.
Since the Revised Penal Code took effect in 1932, no challenge has ever been made upon the
constitutionality of Article 202 except now. Instead, throughout the years, we have witnessed the
streets and parks become dangerous and unsafe, a haven for beggars, harassing "watch-your-car" boys,
petty thieves and robbers, pickpockets, swindlers, gangs, prostitutes, and individuals performing acts
that go beyond decency and morality, if not basic humanity. The streets and parks have become the
training ground for petty offenders who graduate into hardened and battle-scarred criminals. Everyday,
the news is rife with reports of innocent and hardworking people being robbed, swindled, harassed or
mauled – if not killed – by the scourge of the streets. Blue collar workers are robbed straight from
withdrawing hard-earned money from the ATMs (automated teller machines); students are held up for
having to use and thus exhibit publicly their mobile phones; frail and helpless men are mauled by thrill-
seeking gangs; innocent passers-by are stabbed to death by rowdy drunken men walking the streets;
fair-looking or pretty women are stalked and harassed, if not abducted, raped and then killed; robbers,
thieves, pickpockets and snatchers case streets and parks for possible victims; the old are swindled of
their life savings by conniving streetsmart bilkers and con artists on the prowl; beggars endlessly pester
and panhandle pedestrians and commuters, posing a health threat and putting law-abiding drivers and
citizens at risk of running them over. All these happen on the streets and in public places, day or night.
The streets must be protected. Our people should never dread having to ply them each day, or else we
can never say that we have performed our task to our brothers and sisters. We must rid the streets of
the scourge of humanity, and restore order, peace, civility, decency and morality in them.
This is exactly why we have public order laws, to which Article 202 (2) belongs. These laws were crafted
to maintain minimum standards of decency, morality and civility in human society. These laws may be
traced all the way back to ancient times, and today, they have also come to be associated with the
struggle to improve the citizens’ quality of life, which is guaranteed by our Constitution. 28 Civilly, they are
covered by the "abuse of rights" doctrine embodied in the preliminary articles of the Civil Code
concerning Human Relations, to the end, in part, that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the
latter for the damage.29 This provision is, together with the succeeding articles on human relations,

67
intended to embody certain basic principles "that are to be observed for the rightful relationship
between human beings and for the stability of the social order." 30
In civil law, for example, the summary remedy of ejectment is intended to prevent criminal disorder and
breaches of the peace and to discourage those who, believing themselves entitled to the possession of
the property, resort to force rather than to some appropriate action in court to assert their claims. 31 Any
private person may abate a public nuisance which is specially injurious to him by removing, or if
necessary, by destroying the thing which constitutes the same, without committing a breach of the
peace, or doing unnecessary injury.32
Criminally, public order laws encompass a whole range of acts – from public indecencies and
immoralities, to public nuisances, to disorderly conduct. The acts punished are made illegal by their
offensiveness to society’s basic sensibilities and their adverse effect on the quality of life of the people
of society. For example, the issuance or making of a bouncing check is deemed a public nuisance, a
crime against public order that must be abated. 33 As a matter of public policy, the failure to turn over the
proceeds of the sale of the goods covered by a trust receipt or to return said goods, if not sold, is a
public nuisance to be abated by the imposition of penal sanctions. 34 Thus, public nuisances must be
abated because they have the effect of interfering with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property by
members of a community.
Article 202 (2) does not violate the equal protection clause; neither does it discriminate against the poor
and the unemployed. Offenders of public order laws are punished not for their status, as for being poor
or unemployed, but for conducting themselves under such circumstances as to endanger the public
peace or cause alarm and apprehension in the community. Being poor or unemployed is not a license or
a justification to act indecently or to engage in immoral conduct.
Vagrancy must not be so lightly treated as to be considered constitutionally offensive. It is a public order
crime which punishes persons for conducting themselves, at a certain place and time which orderly
society finds unusual, under such conditions that are repugnant and outrageous to the common
standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society, as would engender
a justifiable concern for the safety and well-being of members of the community.
Instead of taking an active position declaring public order laws unconstitutional, the State should train
its eye on their effective implementation, because it is in this area that the Court perceives difficulties.
Red light districts abound, gangs work the streets in the wee hours of the morning, dangerous robbers
and thieves ply their trade in the trains stations, drunken men terrorize law-abiding citizens late at night
and urinate on otherwise decent corners of our streets. Rugby-sniffing individuals crowd our national
parks and busy intersections. Prostitutes wait for customers by the roadside all around the metropolis,
some even venture in bars and restaurants. Drug-crazed men loiter around dark avenues waiting to
pounce on helpless citizens. Dangerous groups wander around, casing homes and establishments for
their next hit. The streets must be made safe once more. Though a man’s house is his castle, 35 outside
on the streets, the king is fair game.
The dangerous streets must surrender to orderly society.
Finally, we agree with the position of the State that first and foremost, Article 202 (2) should be
presumed valid and constitutional. When confronted with a constitutional question, it is elementary that
every court must approach it with grave care and considerable caution bearing in mind that every
statute is presumed valid and every reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of its
constitutionality.36 The policy of our courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume
that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing
to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain, this presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers which enjoins upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments.
The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the Philippines, a law has been

68
carefully studied, crafted and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was
finally enacted.37
It must not be forgotten that police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as
the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not
repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth,
and for the subjects of the same. The power is plenary and its scope is vast and pervasive, reaching and
justifying measures for public health, public safety, public morals, and the general welfare. 38 As an
obvious police power measure, Article 202 (2) must therefore be viewed in a constitutional light.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of Branch 11 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City in Special Civil Case No. 30-500-2004 declaring Article 202, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code
UNCONSTITUTIONAL is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Let the proceedings in Criminal Cases Nos. 115,716-C-2003 and 115,717-C-2003 thus continue.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

11. Torres v. People, 656 SCRA 486

MARINA TORRES, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Respondents.

Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Solicitor Irene
Montano-de los Angeles for Respondents.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; ESTAFA; REIMBURSEMENT OF AMOUNT EMBEZZLED; DOES NOT EXTINGUISH

CRIMINAL, LIABILITY OF THE ACCUSED; EXEMPTS THE ACCUSED ONLY FROM CIVIL LIABILITY. — At the
time the promissory note was executed, it is clear that petitioner had already committed the crime of
estafa, so that even full payment of the value of the piece of jewelry misappropriated by her could not
extinguish her criminal liability. The following decisions on this matter clearly show petitioner’s
contention to be without merit: "Subsequent agreements between the parties with respect to the civil
liability arising from the commission of a crime does not affect the right of the government to prosecute
the criminal notwithstanding complete restitution of the property injured." (U.S. v. Mendozana, 2 Phil.
353, 376) "It is well settled in this jurisdiction that payment made subsequent to the commission of the
crime of estafa does not alter the nature of the crime committed, nor does it relieve defendant from the
penalty prescribed by law." (Javier v. People, 70 Phil. 550,552-553) "The reimbursement of the amount
embezzled exempts the accused only from civil liability ." (People v. Velasco, 42 Phil. 75 81)

DECISION

DIZON, J.:

In the Court of First Instance of Manila petitioner, Marina A. Torres, was charged with estafa. After due
trial upon a plea of not guilty, she was convicted and sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and one (1) day of prisión correccional,
to indemnify the offended party, Anita M. Garcia, in the sum of P850.00, with subsidiary imprisonment

69
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. Not satisfied with the decision, she appealed to the Court of
Appeals where, in due time, decision was rendered affirming that of the trial court, with costs. Again,
not satisfied with this last decision, she took the appeal now before Us, claiming that the Court of
Appeals committed the following errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
"I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS ALREADY A CONSUMMATED CRIME OF
ESTAFA, AS DEFINED AND PENALIZED BY ARTICLE 315, PARAGRAPH 1 (b) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE,
ON SEPTEMBER 30, 1959, UPON PETITIONER’S MERE FAILURE TO RETURN THE JEWELRY ON SAID DATE
AS AGREED UPON EVEN IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY EVIDENCE OF CONVERSION OR MISAPPROPRIATION
ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PROMISSORY NOTE ENTERED INTO BY THE
PARTIES ON NOVEMBER 13,1959 DID NOT ALTER THE NATURE OF PETITIONER’S OBLIGATION UNDER
THE ORIGINAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT CONVICTING THE
DEFENDANT-PETITIONER,"

The facts found by the Court of Appeals — which may not now he reviewed — are stated in its decision
as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On August 14, 1959, Marina A. Torres received from Anita M. Garcia, in the latter’s residence at 2179
Mabuhay, Sta. Ana, Manila, a white yellow gold pair of earrings studded with 10 diamonds valued at
P1,050.00 to be sold for cash on an overprice commission basis, with the obligation to deliver the
proceeds or return the jewelry within 30 days thereafter, or up to September 13, 1959. In order to be
sure that the jewelry would not be taken to another place for negotiation and would always remain
within the owner’s immediate supervision. Miss Garcia charged the defendant with the obligation of
reporting it at every 3-day interval. Having bought this pair of earrings from defendant Torres herself, in
her capacity as agent of the former owner, complainant did not think it necessary to demand from
defendant the execution of a written acknowledgment receipt. On her part defendant Torres does not
deny having received the pair of earrings in question nor the conditions under which it was delivered,
although she claims it to be untrue that a period has been fixed for its sale or return. She admitted,
however, that she "had been bringing this jewelry to Miss Garcia very frequently to report to her." (Tsn.
18.) Complainant Garcia testified that after defendant had reported once on August 17, 1959 in
accordance with their verbal agreement, she thereafter disappeared and failed to show up again.
Disturbed by the persistent failure to locate and contact Torres at the latter’s abode during the various
times she had gone to defendant’s address, Garcia thereupon made efforts to ascertain the actual
whereabouts of the herein defendant in vain. But on September 15, 1959, Garcia somehow succeeded
to talk with the defendant. In order to dissipate complainant’s doubts and misgivings, defendant Torres
on this occasion assured Garcia that the pair of earrings was still in her (Torres’) possession by explaining
that, if she was not yet able to sell the jewelry in question it was because of factors beyond her control
such as her husband’s illness and hospitalization and the change of address of the prospective buyer.

70
Complainant Garcia was so impressed by defendant’s story that she finally agreed to accommodate her
by approving her request for an extension of 15 days, or until September 30, 1959, within which to
comply with the obligation under the agreement. On October 1, 1959, the day following the lapse of the
extension period, defendant Torres did not appear but somehow complainant succeeded in
communicating with her and this time she told her (Torres) bluntly and frankly that she wanted the
earrings back, otherwise "if you cannot give me the jewelry, I will sue you." (Tsn. 2.) In meeting this
verbal demand which appeared this time to be serious and determined, defendant Torres again
endeavored to soothe Miss Garcia’s disquietude, saying: "Don’t worry because the money is with me
already; only I cannot come because my husband is still in the hospital." (Tsn. 2.) Fifteen days after the
expiration of the extended period, or, to be exact, on October 15, 1959, instead of coming in person to
offer the proceeds of the sale or to return the earrings to the complainant, the herein defendant sent
over her sister, Mrs. Rosario Fariña, to plead with the complainant for a further extension, intimating at
the same time the futility of a criminal prosecution in view of the fact that defendant Torres must have
misused the proceeds of the sale in connection with her husband’s illness and hospitalization. Despite
the plea by Mrs. Fariña on behalf of her sister, the record failed to show that complainant yielded to the
supplication.

Finding herself in quandary, with a criminal prosecution dangling over her head, defendant Torres was
constrained to appear at Garcia’s residence on November 13, 1959, that was 1 month and 13 days after
the extention had lapsed, to plead with the latter to please accept a promissory note for the value of the
jewelry in question. Accompanied by Mrs. Rosario Fariña, her sister. the latter offered herself to act as
guarantor for Torres’ liability in the proposed promissory note. At first the complainant was not
disposed to accent the proffer but when defendant Torres confessed to Atty. Hermenegildo Atienza,
Miss Garcia’s counsel, that she had in fact used the proceeds of the sale for her husband’s medical
treatment, she finally decided to follow Atty. Atienza’s advice by accepting promissory note Exhibit 1
which defendant and her sister signed on the same date. By the terms of the promissory note,
defendant Torres specifically admits that the sum of P1,050.00 therein contained is "the value of the
diamond earrings which Mrs. Marina Torres received from Miss Garcia on consignment to be sold with
the obligation to return said earrings or the proceeds of the same." While the promissory note provides
for the payment of the aforesaid amount installments of P300.00 on November 20; (b) P250.00 on
December 20; (c) P250.00; on January 20, 1960; and (d) P250.00 on February 20, 1960, yet it is
uncontroverted fact that the herein defendant only paid the sum of P200.00 on November 14 (Exhibit
2). When, during the trial, defendant Torres was asked who she did not comply with the promissory
note Exhibit 1, all she could mumble by way of an elusive answer was to blame complainant Garcia for
having filed a case against her in the Fiscal’s office (tsn. 16). But this explanation is without merit, for the
record of this case shows that the information which brought about the present criminal prosecution
was not filed until September 27, 1960, almost a year after the execution of the promissory note (Exhibit
1). (Annex "A" ; Appellants’ brief, pp. 21-25 Emphasis ours)."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon the errors allegedly committed by the court of Appeals, it is clear that the following are the only
questions to be resolved: firstly, whether upon the evidence of record, petitioner may be held guilty of
the consummated crime of estafa; secondly, whether or not petitioner may still be held criminally liable
after the execution by her of a promissory note — now in the record as Exhibit 1 — in payment of the
value of the earrings studded with diamonds subject matter of the criminal offense she was charged
with and found guilty of, by the Court of First Instance of Manila and by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner’s contention in connection with the first issue is that the Court of Appeals did not make any
positive finding of fact regarding the conversion or misappropriation by her of the earrings mentioned

71
heretofore, for which reason she was erroneously convicted of estafa, contrary to the ruling laid down in
Concepción v. People, 74 Phil. 63.

We find the above contention to be without merit. It is clear from the decision of Court of Appeals that
it actually found and declared that on October 1, 1969 when the complainant was told by the offended
party that she would charge her criminally in court if she did not give back the earrings delivered to her
for sale or its value, petitioner told her not to worry because she had the money already; "only I cannot
come because my husband is still in the hospital." (t.s.n., p. 2).

Then on October 15 of the same year, instead of seeing the complaining witness in person to deliver the
alleged proceeds of the sale of the jewelry or to return the latter, petitioner sent over her sister. Mrs.
Rosario Fariña, to plead with the complaining witness for a further extension, her sister intimating at the
same time the futility of any criminal prosecution, because petitioner must have misused the proceeds
of the sale due to the illness and hospitalization of her husband.

Then, on a subsequent occasion, faced with the serious threat of a criminal prosecution, petitioner was
constrained to personally see the complaining witness on November 13, 1959, that is, more than one
month after the expiration of the extension granted to her, on which occasion she pleaded with her to
accept a promissory note for the value of the jewelry in question, payment of which would be
guaranteed by her sister, Mrs. Fariña. The complaining witness, at first, was not disposed to accept such
proposal, but when petitioner confessed to Atty. Hermenegildo Atienza, complaining witness’ counsel,
that she had, in facts used the proceeds of the sale of the earrings to defray the expenses of her
husband’s medical treatment, she finally accepted the promissory note.

Upon these facts petitioner argues that her liability, if any, was reduced to a mere civil liability. This is
untenable. At the time the promissory note was executed, it is clear that petitioner had already
committed the crime of estafa, so that even full payment of the value of the piece of jewelry
misappropriated by her could not extinguish her criminal liability. The following decisions or this matter
clearly show petitioner’s contention to be without merit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Subsequent agreements between the parties with respect to the civil liability arising from the
commission of a crime does not affect the right of the government to prosecute the criminal
notwithstanding complete restitution of the property injured." (U.S. v. Mendoza, 2 Phil. 353, 376).

"It is well settled in this jurisdiction that payment made subsequent to the commission of the crime of
estafa does not alter the nature of the crime committed, nor does it relieve defendant from the penalty
prescribed by law." (Javier v. People, 70 Phil. 550, 552-553).

"The reimbursement of the amount embezzled exempts the accused only from civil liability." (People v.
Velazco, 42 Phil. 75 81)."cralaw virtua1aw library

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed, with costs.

12. People v. Abdul, G.R. No. 186137, June 26, 2013

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 186137               June 26, 2013

72
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DATU NOT ABDUL, Defendant-Appellant.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Datu Not Abdul (appellant) brings this Notice of Appeal 1 dated 4 August 2008 before the Supreme Court,
assailing the Decision2 dated 14 July 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02783 for
being contrary to facts, law, and jurisprudence. The said CA Decision affirmed the Decision 3 dated 5
March 2007 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 24621-R
finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No.
9165.
The sole issue before us is whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-
of-custody rule.
The facts according to the prosecution are as follows:
On 25 June 2005, Police Officer 2 Daniel E. Akia (PO2 Akia) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency-
Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received a telephone call from an informant reporting the
illegal drug activities of appellant. Acting on this information, PO2 Akia met with the informant and
brought her to the PDEA office for an interview, in the course of which she disclosed that appellant
would be coming from Agoo, La Union to meet her between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. of that day. Losing
no time, Police Senior Inspector Paul John A. Mencio (P S/Insp. Mencio), together with Senior Police
Officer 4 Marquez K. Madlon (SPO4 Madlon) and Police Officer 2 Erwin M. Garcia (PO2 Garcia), planned
and prepared for a buy-bust operation that was to take place in the afternoon of that day. The team
agreed that PO2 Akia would pose as the buyer and bring with him two pieces of ₱500-peso bills and
some fake money. They also agreed that the signal for the other police officers to arrest appellant was
when PO2 Akia grabbed him.4
The police officers, together with the informant, then proceeded to San Vicente, Baguio City. Upon
arriving there, SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hid, while PO2 Akia and the informant stood along the
sidewalk. After twenty minutes, appellant arrived on board a taxi. The informant touched PO2 Akia’s
back to let him know that the passenger of the cab was their target. Appellant got out of the taxi and
approached the informant, who introduced the police officer as her friend. PO2 Akia asked appellant
how much shabu the latter brought, and appellant replied that he had shabu worth ₱6,500. Appellant
pulled out of his pocket a medium-sized, transparent, heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white
crystalline substance and handed it to PO2 Akia, who subsequently handed the buy-bust money to the
former. Appellant started to count it, but soon realized that he was being paid with fake money. PO2
Akia immediately grabbed him and announced that the former was a PDEA agent. Upon seeing the
signal, SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hurried to the scene and assisted PO2 Akia in arresting appellant.
Afterwards, the police officers brought him to the PDEA office, where the operation was documented
and the arrest report and the Affidavits of the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the
item seized from appellant was made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice
(DOJ), the media, and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with the initials
"MKM, DEA, EMG" and Exhibit "A."5
The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera
Administrative Region for analysis. The forensic analyst, PO2 Juliet Valentin Albon (PO2 Albon),
examined the substance inside the sachet. She issued a chemistry report numbered D-057-05 which
found that the plastic sachet with markings "A, MKM, DEA, EMG" contained 1.85 grams of a white
crystalline substance; and that a qualitative examination gave a positive result for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. 6
Thus, an Information was filed on 30 June 2005, which reads:

73
That on or about the 25th day of June, 2005, in the City of Baguio, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell, and /or distribute to PO1 Daniel E. Akia, Jr., a member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency, based at Melvin Jones, Harrison Road, Baguio City, who passed as buyer, one (1)
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing methamphetamine hydrochloride commonly known as
"shabu," a dangerous drug, weighing 1.85 grams for an agreed amount of ₱6,500.00, without any lawful
authority in violation of the aforecited provision of law. 7
Appellant entered a plea of "not guilty" during his arraignment, after which trial on the merits ensued. 8
During the pretrial conference, both parties admitted that a forensic chemist had examined the
substance allegedly confiscated from respondent, that it was found positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride, and that the forensic chemist prepared a report thereon. 9
The prosecution presented the testimonies of PO2 Akia, PO2 Garcia, and SPO4 Madlon. 10 It also offered
in evidence the money used during the buy-bust operation, the dangerous drug allegedly recovered, and
the chemistry report on the dangerous drug retrieved from respondent. 11 On the other hand, the
defense presented the testimonies of appellant and Norma Abdul, his aunt. 12
Through the testimonies of appellant and his aunt, the defense alleged that the former was a victim of a
frame-up.13 It contended that appellant was a native of Cotabato City who went to visit his uncle in La
Union. After spending a few weeks in that place, he visited Baguio City with a friend. There, he was
apprehended by three men, who brought him to the PDEA office where he was forced to admit that he
was engaged in selling shabu. He kept denying the accusation, but the police officers continued to keep
him in custody. When his aunt visited him, she told him that the police officers were demanding ₱20,000
for his release. However, she was able to give them only ₱5,000. As a result, appellant was not
discharged and, instead, a criminal case was filed against him. 14
The RTC held that the straightforward testimonies of the prosecution witness, PO2 Akia, clearly
established the identity of appellant as the seller, the object being shabu, and the consideration of
₱6,500. Also established were the delivery of the illegal drug and the payment for it. 15 Furthermore, the
trial court ruled that there was a presumption of regularity in the performance of the duties of the PDEA
officers, because there was no reason for them to impute such a serious charge to the accused. 16 Hence,
it found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and sentenced him to suffer life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000, as well as the costs of suit. 17
Aggrieved, appellant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal 18 dated 16 March 2007, citing errors of
fact and law in the RTC Decision.
In his Brief19 dated 16 November 2007, appellant argued that the RTC failed to take into account the
glaring inconsistencies in the testimonies of the three police officers. 20 He said that PO2 Akia and PO2
Garcia testified that there were only three members of the buy-bust operation team. 21 However, SPO4
Madlon asserted that it had four members. 22 Further, PO2 Akia testified that he handed the drugs over
to SPO4 Madlon after the arrest of appellant. 23 According to PO2 Akia, SPO4 Madlon kept the evidence
from the time of the arrest to the time appellant was brought to the office. 24 On the other hand, SPO4
Madlon testified that the drugs were turned over by PO2 Akia to their team leader P S/Insp. Mencio. 25
Appellant also asserted that the buy-bust operation team failed to follow the guidelines for drug
operations, as SPO4 Madlon testified that he did not place any markings on the plastic sachet of shabu
at the place where the arrest took place, but only marked it at the office. Also, the testimonies of PO2
Akia and PO2 Garcia were silent as to when and where the marking of the shabu took place. This
omission, according to appellant, cast grave doubt on the identity of the subject specimen allegedly
recovered from him, which may not have been the same one presented in evidence. 26
To rebut the arguments of appellant, the state, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG),
presented its Appellee’s Brief.27 It argued that inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance or weight thereof. 28 Also,

74
appellant is not allowed to question, for the first time on appeal, the admissibility of evidence on the
ground of a violation of the rule on the chain of custody. 29
The CA, citing considerable parts of the RTC’s Transcript of Stenographic Notes (TSN), affirmed the RTC’s
finding that the prosecution was able to sufficiently establish the elements of an illegal sale of
dangerous drugs.30 It considered the inconsistencies pointed out by appellant as trivial matters that had
no bearing on the crime charged. 31 It likewise found that appellant had failed to adduce clear and
convincing evidence to support his defense of frame-up. 32 Lastly, it held that he could not raise on
appeal the issue of noncompliance with the chain-of-custody rule if he had failed to do so before the
trial court.33
Undeterred, appellant filed before this Court his Notice of Appeal, dated 04 August 2008.
In a Resolution dated 04 March 2009, the Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs, if
they so desired.34
Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief 35 dated 21 May 2009, in which he reiterated the failure of the
prosecution to show compliance with the rule on the chain of custody as required by Republic Act No.
9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. On the other hand, appellee manifested that all the
issues raised had already been discussed in its Brief before the CA and, hence, would no longer file any
supplemental brief.36
THE COURT’S RULING
Although we recognize and laud the CA’s thorough discussion, the records of the case point to
significant lapses in the chain of custody of the confiscated sachet. These evidentiary gaps cast
reasonable doubt on the identity of the corpus delicti that would compel us to acquit appellant.
DISCUSSION
Points of law, theories, issues, and arguments should be brought to the attention of the trial court, as
these cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 37 An exception to this rule arises when there is plain
error.38 An instance of plain error is overlooking, misapprehending, or misapplying facts of weight and
substance that, if properly appreciated, would warrant a different conclusion. This case falls under this
exception because the CA, in appreciating the facts, erred in affirming the RTC’s ruling that there was
compliance with the rule on the chain of custody.
The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the corpus delicti presented
in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved from the accused or from the
crime scene.39 This rule, when applied to drug cases, requires a more stringent isapplication, because
the corpus delicti – the narcotic substance not readily identifiable and must be subjected to scientific
analysis to determine its composition and nature. 40 Malillin v. People41 explains this rigorous standard
when it comes to the chain of custody of narcotic substances:
xxx the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would
include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
was offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how
and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession,
the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the
chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering, alteration or
substitution.42 However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard. 43 Nonetheless, two crucial
links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be marked in the presence of the accused
and immediately upon confiscation. This marking must be supported by details on how, when, and
where the marking was done, as well as the witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the

75
seized drugs at every stage – from confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station,
conveyance to the chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated. 44
The records are replete with instances of noncompliance with the foregoing.
The time and place of the marking
was never established.
Although the item confiscated from appellant had undoubtedly been marked, no evidence was
presented to adequately indicate when, where, and how it was marked.
The testimony of PO2 Akia never established when he marked the plastic sachet and who witnessed his
act. His statements as to its marking are limited to the following:
Q Anyway, you said that you were handed a medium sized sachet, did you place any marking on this
sachet?
A Yes, sir my initial.
Q And what would those initial be?
A DEA and Exhibit A, sir.
Q I am showing you Exhibit A, a sachet of shabu with marking DEA, MKM, ENG, are these the same
markings that you placed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what does MKM stands for?
A Marquez K. Madlon, sir.
Q How about ENG?
WITNESS
A Erwin N. Garcia, sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
Q And DEA?
A My initial, sir.45
Not only was SPO4 Madlon’s testimony deficient in the same way as that of PO2 Akia’s; the former also
averred that he was unaware of when the other police officers marked the item, viz:
WITNESS:
A I remember it was Akia who gave me for marking, Sir.
ATTY. AWISAN:
Q You did not place any marking at the shabu at the place of the arrest?
A I don’t know to my co-arresting officers but it was in our office where I put my initials, Sir.
Q So the shabu was marked at your office and the initials of the arresting were placed on that shabu?
A I don’t know with my co-officers but for me it was in our office,
Sir.46
With respect to PO2 Garcia, he never articulated that he had marked the plastic sachet, even if his
initials "EMG" were on it. Neither did he corroborate his colleagues’ testimonies about the marking of
the plastic sachet.47
It was unclear who had custody of
the drug after PO2 Akia confiscated
it from appellant.
PO2 Akia said that he was the one who received the plastic sachet filled with white crystalline substance
from appellant. However, the statements of PO2 Akia, PO2 Garcia, and SPO4 Madlon vary as to whom
the plastic sachet was given after its confiscation from appellant.
PO2 Akia mentioned that he gave the plastic sachet to SPO4 Madlon, to wit:
Q Anyway, you said that you were handed a medium sized sachet, did you place any marking on this
sachet?
A Yes, sir my initial.

76
Q And what would those initial be?
A DEA and Exhibit A, sir.
Q I am showing you Exhibit A, a sachet of shabu with marking DEA, MKM, ENG, are these the same
markings that you placed?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what does MKM stands for?
A Marquez K. Madlon, sir.
Q How about ENG?
WITNESS
A Erwin N. Garcia, sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
Q And DEA?
A My initial, sir.
Q And this was the same item the accused handed to you in exchange with the buy bust money and the
boodle money?
A Yes, sir.
Q And at what point in time did you hand this to Officer Madlon?
A After Officer Garcia has placed him under arrest and Officer Garcia has stated his constitutional rights,
sir.
Q And that was conducted in the area?
A Yes, sir48
This testimony was supported by that of PO2 Garcia, as follows:
Q How about the drugs subject of this case?
A It was also turned over to SPO4 Madlon, Sir.
PROS. CATRAL:
Q So it was SPO4 Madlon who kept the evidence from that point up to the time you brought the accused
to your office?
A Yes, Sir.
Q For proper documentation and dispensation of this case?
A Yes, Sir.49
Yet, SPO4 Madlon, the person to whom PO2 Akia had allegedly handed the plastic sachet, refuted this
testimony on the witness stand:
Q How about the alleged shabu which the accused sold to Akia who held those items in custody?
A I remember it was immediately turned over by Akia to our team leader, Sir.
Q But you said that only you and officer Garcia who went to their place?
A Together with our team leader PSI Mencio, Sir.
Q And Akia gave the shabu to PSI Mencio also at the place of arrest?
A Yes, Sir.
ATTY. AWISAN:
Q And, of course, you saw Akia gave that item to PSI Mencio
A Yes, Sir.
Q And what did PSI Mencio do with the shabu which was allegedly sold to Akia by the accused?
A He held it and after effecting the arrest...I don’t know because after the arrest of the suspect I went
immediately to Station 8 to inform the operation, Sir.
Q Where did PSI Mencio bring the shabu which was allegedly handed to him by Akia?
A I did not see it particularly when Akia gave this shabu to PSI Mencio, however, after arriving at our
office when I asked the evidence that was the time Akia informed me that the shabu was in the
possession of our team leader, Sir.

77
xxxx
Q So from the place of arrest at San Vicente Barangay you never saw the shabu subject of this case
again, is it not?
A Just after the arrest of the suspect I saw in the possession of Akia, however just after the arrest I went
to coordinate the operation at Station 8, Sir.
Q So you never saw the shabu at your office?
A During the inventory and it was brought for marking, Sir.
Q Who brought out the shabu?
A Akia, Sir.
Q Not Mencio?
WITNESS:
A I remember it was Akia who gave me for marking, Sir. 50
Furthermore, the Joint Affidavit of Arrest 51 executed by PO2 Garcia and SPO4 Madlon asserts that the
poseur-buyer PO2 Akia had turned the plastic sachet over to the team leader, PSI Mencio. The pertinent
part of the affidavit reads:
7. The Poseur-Buyer surrendered the medium size, transparent plastic sachet containing suspected
dangerous drug (shabu) to the Team Leader.
xxxx
9. Confiscated dangerous drugs were labeled and was submitted at the Crime Laboratory Service, Camp
Baco Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for chemical analysis. 52 x x x.
This inconsistency, contrary to the CA’s ruling, is not a trivial matter that is irrelevant to the
crime.1âwphi1 The assertion of PO2 Akia that he gave the plastic sachet to SPO4 Madlon and the latter’s
denial of this assertion shows that they failed to secure the integrity of the plastic sachet and its
contents after confiscating it from appellant. This failure opens up the possibility of corruption or
alteration of the confiscated item.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to show and substantiate the identity of the person who carried the
plastic sachet from the location of the buy-bust operation to the police station, who kept it before it was
transmitted to the laboratory, who received it after the examination, and who stored it until it was
brought to court.
Evidentiary gaps in the chain of
custody of the confiscated plastic
sachet cast reasonable doubt on its
integrity.
All the foregoing facts show that there were substantial evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the
plastic sachet. Hence, these facts put into question the reliability and evidentiary value of the contents
of the alleged confiscated plastic sachet from appellant – if indeed it was the same as the one brought to
the laboratory for examination, found positive for shabu, and then presented before the RTC. It was a
grave error for the CA to rule that there was an unbroken chain of custody simply because the plastic
sachet had been marked, inventoried, sent to the crime laboratory for analysis, and found positive for
shabu, despite the fact that the integrity of the confiscated item throughout the entire process had
never been established. It is of no moment either that appellant stipulated the existence of Chemistry
Report No. D-057-05, as this report did not amount to an admission of the identity of the contents of the
plastic sachet. Instead, it merely proved the existence and authenticity of the request for a laboratory
examination, and its result had no bearing on the required chain of custody from the time of seizure of
the plastic sachet.53
As we have held in People v. Sanchez, 54 "it is fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused."
We take this opportunity to remind all courts what we have elucidated in People v. Tan: 55

78
x x x "By the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need for entrapment procedures, the use of
shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of marijuana or grams of heroin can be
planted in pockets or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all
drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great." Thus, the courts have been exhorted to be extra vigilant in
trying drug cases lest an innocent person is made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug
offenses. Needless to state, the lower court should have exercised the utmost diligence and prudence in
deliberating upon accused-appellants’ guilt. It should have given more serious consideration to the pros
and cons of the evidence offered by both the defense and the State and many loose ends should have
been settled by the trial court in determining the merits of the present case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 14 July 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. Appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of the failure of the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he
is being confined for another lawful cause. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director, Bureau
of Corrections, Muntinlupa City for immediate implementation. The Director of the Bureau of
Corrections is directed to report to this Court within five (5) days from his receipt of this Decision, the
action he has taken.
SO ORDERED.

13. People v. Castro, 652 SCRA 393

G.R. No. 187496               February 06, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal 1 of the November 27,2008 Decision 2 of the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in
CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00173-MIN, which affirmed the Regional Trial Court's (RTC) July 26, 2005
Consolidated Decision3 in Criminal Case Nos. 056-07-2004 and 057-07-2004, wherein accused-appellant
MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA (Manalao) was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Sections
5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.
In two separate Informations filed before Branch 7, RTC ofLanao del Norte, Manalao was charged with
violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002. The pertinent portions of the Informations, both dated June 15, 2004, are hereby quoted as
follows:
Criminal Case No. 056-07-2004:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004, Purok 6, Barangay Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law did, then and there willfully and feloniously sell and deliver one (1) Deck of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU weighing more or less 0.1 gram to a Police Poseur/Buyer in
the amount of ₱200.00, said accused knowing the same to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or
SHABU, a dangerous [drug].4
Criminal Case No. 057-07-2004:
That on or about the 15th day of June 2004, Purok 6, Barangay Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being
authorized by law did, then and there willfully and feloniously have in his possession and control Three
(3) Decks of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU weighing more or less 0.4 [grams], said
accused knowing the same to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU, a dangerous [drug]. 5

79
Manalao pleaded not guilty to both charges upon his arraignment 6 on August 9, 2004.
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed on a joint trial of the cases as filed. 7
During the trial, the prosecution put on the witness stand Senior Police Inspector Mary Leocy Jabonillo
Mag-abo, the Forensic Chemist who conducted the qualitative examination of the items seized from
Manalao;8 and Police Officer 1 (PO1) Michael Solarta, a detached member of the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) assigned with the Provincial Intelligence and Investigation Division of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) in Pigcarangan, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, who was part of the team that
conducted the buy-bust operation against Manalao. 9
PO1 Solarta said that their office had received reports of Manalao’s drug pushing and using activities in
the area of Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Thus, upon instructions of their Officer-in-Charge, 10 Police
Inspector (P/Insp.) Renato Salazar, they prepared to conduct an entrapment or buy-bust operation
against Manalao. PO1 Solarta narrated that on June 15, 2004, the buy-bust operation team composed of
P/Insp. Salazar, Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Expedito Daulong, and himself, prepared two ₱100.00 bills
as drug money by having them signed by P/Insp. Salazar and then photocopying them. At around seven
in the evening, the team, together with a civilian agent who was to act as the poseur-buyer, proceeded
to the carenderia of Josephine Tamarong, located along the national highway, Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao
del Norte. At the carenderia, the team pretended to be customers and had some coffee while waiting
for Manalao, who arrived at around 8:00 p.m. PO1 Solarta, who claimed to have been only around three
to four meters away from the scene, testified that when Manalao arrived, the civilian agent immediately
established contact with him. Following a brief conversation, the civilian agent handed Manalao the buy-
bust money and in turn, Manalao "got something from his pocket, opened it, and gave something" to
the civilian agent. After the "give and take" transaction, the civilian agent approached the buy-bust
team, who without delay arrested Manalao. During the arrest, the buy-bust team introduced themselves
to Manalao and bodily searched him, from which three decks of shabu and money, including the buy-
bust money of two pieces of ₱100.00 bills, were recovered. Manalao, together with the items seized
from him, were brought to the police station. Thereafter, P/Insp. Salazar marked the seized items in
front of the other apprehending officers and Manalao. PO1 Solarta, aside from narrating his account of
the entrapment operation, also identified the certificate of inventory of the items seized from Manalao,
which he enumerated to be one deck of shabu, three decks of shabu, two ₱100.00 bills, and one small,
black and white, lady’s purse. He likewise identified the shabu presented in court to be the same one
recovered from Manalao and examined by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo. 11
For the defense, Manalao testified that it was on June 9, 2004 and not June 15, 2004 that he was
arrested. He claimed that in the evening of June 9, 2004, he went to take his supper at a restaurant at
Purok 6, Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Before he could enter the restaurant, his friend, Paquito Pido, along
with two more companions, arrived. His nephew likewise arrived. Manalao said that his nephew was
asking for money, thus he requested Paquito to have his ₱500.00 bill changed into smaller bills. Paquito
did so, but in return, he asked Manalao to hand a wrapped item to a certain Mr. Posadas, who at that
time was shouting from a distance. Manalao obliged Paquito, who by then had already left with his
companions towards Poblacion. Five minutes later, Manalao saw P/Insp. Salazar’s vehicle approaching,
who after passing by him, alighted from the vehicle together with PO1 Solarta. Thereafter, Manalao said
that he was cuffed, brought to the police station, and then frisked. Manalao then admitted that more
than ₱600.00 was taken from him, including the ₱500.00 Paquito had changed into ₱100.00 bills. 12
On July 26, 2005, the RTC convicted Manalao in a Consolidated Decision on Criminal Case Nos. 056-07-
0224 and 057-07-2004, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused MALIK MANALAO y ALAUYA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime in violation of Section 5, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and sentences him to a penalty of Life Imprisonment and
to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. And accused is also

80
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt [of] having violated Section 11, Article II, of the same Act, and
imposes upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision
Mayor as minimum to Twelve (12) Years and One (1) Day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum, and as
fine of ₱300,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. If in case of possible
commutation of sentences or not, he is entitled to the benefits of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
for his preventive imprisonment that he suffered.
The subject Methamphetamine Hydrochloride and/or paraphernalia are ordered confiscated in favor of
the government and to be turn[ed] over to the Dangerous Drugs Board within 15 days from date hereof.
The Warden of the BJMP, Tubod, Lanao del Norte, is ordered to bring and deliver the living body of
accused to the Bureau of Corrections or National Penitentiary, Muntinlupa City, Metro Manila, within 15
days from the date of the promulgation of decision. 13
Aggrieved, Manalao appealed14 to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the RTC failed to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals was not persuaded, and on November 27, 2008, it
affirmed in toto15 the RTC in its Decision in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00173-MIN.
Issue
Manalao is now before this Court, assigning 16 the same lone error he raised before the Court of Appeals,
to wit:
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE
FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 17
In support of his assigned error, Manalao posits the following arguments:
1. The sale of the drugs was not established;18 and
2. The chain of custody of evidence of the drugs was not established. 19
Manalao asseverates that the prosecution failed to establish that the sale of the dangerous drug ever
took place since none of the prosecution witnesses saw the alleged transaction between him and the
civilian agent. Manalao contends that the civilian agent who posed as the buyer should have been
presented in court because PO1 Solarta, the only one who testified to witnessing the buying and selling
of the shabu, did not even see what the civilian agent supposedly bought from him as PO1 Solarta could
only see Manalao giving "something" to the civilian agent, as he said so during his testimony. 20
Manalao also claims that the buy-bust team did not follow the proper procedure in the custody and
control of seized drugs as they failed to mark, make an inventory, and photograph the confiscated drugs
immediately and at the place of the incident. 21
This Court’s Ruling
This Court has reviewed with scrutiny the records of the case and has found no reason to overturn the
courts a quo.
Manalao was charged and convicted for the sale and possession of dangerous drugs in violation of
Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The law
provides:
SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of
Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. - The penalty of life
imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten
million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall
sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport
any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity
involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.
The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a
fine ranging from One hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade,

81
administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
controlled precursor and essential chemical, or shall act as a broker in such transactions.
xxxx
SEC. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. - The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging
from Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00) to Ten million pesos (₱10,000,000.00) shall be
imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall possess any dangerous drug in the
following quantities, regardless of the degree of purity thereof:
(1) 10 grams or more of opium;
(2) 10 grams or more of morphine;
(3) 10 grams or more of heroin;
(4) 10 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride;
(5) 50 grams or more of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu";
(6) 10 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;
(7) 500 grams or more of marijuana; and
(8) 10 grams or more of other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to,
methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA) or "ecstasy," paramethoxyamphetamine (PMA),
trimethoxyamphetamine (TMA), lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), gamma hydroxybutyrate (GHB), and
those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any therapeutic
value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as determined and
promulgated by the Board in accordance to Section 93, Article XI of this Act.
Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalties shall be graduated
as follows:
(1) Life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five
hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"
is ten (10) grams or more but less than fifty (50) grams;
(2) Imprisonment of twenty (20) years and one (1) day to life imprisonment and a fine ranging from Four
hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00) to Five hundred thousand pesos (₱500,000.00), if the quantities
of dangerous drugs are five (5) grams or more but less than ten (10) grams of opium, morphine, heroin,
cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine
hydrochloride or "shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy,"
PMA, TMA, LSD, GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives,
without having any therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic
requirements; or three hundred (300) grams or more but less than five hundred (500) grams of
marijuana; and
(3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
Three hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00) to Four hundred thousand pesos (₱400,000.00), if the
quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of opium, morphine, heroin, cocaine or
cocaine hydrochloride, marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil, methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu," or other dangerous drugs such as, but not limited to, MDMA or "ecstasy," PMA, TMA, LSD,
GHB, and those similarly designed or newly introduced drugs and their derivatives, without having any
therapeutic value or if the quantity possessed is far beyond therapeutic requirements; or less than three
hundred (300) grams of marijuana.
Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs
The elements necessary to successfully prosecute an illegal sale of drugs case are:
(1) [T]he identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and
(2) [T]he delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. 22 (Citation omitted.)

82
Simply put, the prosecution must establish that the illegal sale of the dangerous drugs actually took
place together with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the dangerous drugs seized in
evidence.23
It is clear from the records that the prosecution was able to establish the above elements.
Manalao was positively identified by PO1 Solarta, who knew him even before the operation, as the one
who sold the seized shabu subject of this case to the poseur-buyer. Manalao was caught in flagrante
delicto in the entrapment operation conducted by the PNP of Tubod, Lanao del Norte. Moreover, the
corpus delicti of the crime was also established with certainty and conclusiveness. Manalao handed to
the poseur-buyer one deck of shabu upon his receipt of the ₱200.00 buy-bust money. In People v.
Legaspi, 24 this Court said:
The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money
successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction between the entrapping officers and Legaspi.
(Citation omitted.)
Manalao’s insistence that the non-presentation of the civilian agent, who posed as the buyer, weakens
the prosecution’s case is without merit. In People v. Berdadero,25 this Court, presented with the exact
query, held:
The appellant’s final contention that the failure to present the poseur-buyer is fatal and entitles him to
an acquittal, again fails to impress. The non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if there is no
other eyewitness to the illicit transaction. The testimonies of PO3 Balmes and PO2 Villas sufficiently
established that the appellant is guilty of selling a dangerous drug. Their referral to the shabu handed by
the appellant to the poseur-buyer as "something" merely indicates that at the time of the sale, they
could only presume that the specimen sold by the appellant was shabu since they were conducting a
buy-bust operation. They still had to submit the specimen to the crime laboratory for testing which later
tested positive for shabu. Thus, the fact that the poseur-buyer was not presented does not weaken the
evidence for the prosecution. (Citation omitted.)
This Court would also like to emphasize the fact that Manalao himself testified that when the police
officers recovered some money from him, P/Insp. Salazar, immediately, without leaving his sight, took
out the photocopy of the buy-bust money and told him to compare it to the two ₱100.00 bills found on
him.26 Manalao admitted, both in his direct and cross-examination, that the serial numbers of the bills
obtained from him matched the serial numbers of the bills in the photocopy. 27 Moreover, while he
claimed that he only had ₱500.00 with him, with ₱400.00 meant for his nephew and ₱100.00 meant for
him, he contradicted himself by saying that the police officers recovered more than ₱600.00 of his
money on his person.28
Chain of Custody of Evidence
Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 outlines the procedure on the chain of
custody of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs, viz:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. – The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]

83
The foregoing is implemented by Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. — The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.] (Emphasis supplied.)
A perusal of the law reveals that failure to strictly comply with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 will
not render an arrest illegal or the items seized from the accused inadmissible in evidence. What is
crucial is that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are preserved for they will be used
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused. 29
In People v. Llanita and Buar,30 this Court elucidated on the concept of "chain of custody" and, quoting
People v. Kamad, 31 enumerated the different links that must be proven to establish it:
"Chain of Custody" means the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or
controlled chemicals or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from
the time of seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in
court for destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity
and signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when
such transfer of custody was made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.
In the case of People v. Kamad, the Court had the opportunity to enumerate the different links that the
prosecution must prove in order to establish the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation, namely:
First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the
apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized by the forensic chemist to the
court. (Citations omitted.)1âwphi1
In the case at bar, the Court finds that the prosecution was able to establish that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated illegal drugs had been maintained. P/Insp. Salazar, who was one of
the apprehending officers, marked the seized items in front of Manalao and the other apprehending
officers. P/Insp. Salazar, who was also the investigating officer, thereafter signed a request for the
laboratory examination of the seized drugs, which was received by Forensic Chemist Mag-abo, together
with the items enumerated therein. She then testified in open court on how her examination confirmed
that the seized items, which she submitted in court, tested positive for shabu.

84
Besides, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered or
meddled with, the presumptions that the integrity of such evidence had been preserved and that the
police officers who handled the seized drugs had discharged their duties properly and with regularity
remain.32 The burden to overcome such presumptions lies on Manalao, and this Court finds that he
failed to do so.
Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
When prosecuting an illegal possession of dangerous drugs case, the following elements must be
established: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited
drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed
the drug.33
The prosecution was able to satisfy all the foregoing elements during the joint trial of the cases. The
three decks of shabu subject of the case for illegal possession of drugs were validly obtained upon
searching Manalao after he was arrested in flagrante delicto for the illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The
following section in Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 13. Search incident to lawful arrest. — A person lawfully arrested may be searched for
dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.
Mere possession of a prohibited drug, without legal authority, is punishable under Republic Act No.
9165.34 Since Manalao failed to adduce any evidence showing that he had legal authority to possess the
seized drugs, then he was correctly charged with its illegal possession.
We have time and again· looked upon the defense of denial with disfavor for being easily fabricated.
Since Manalao failed to give this Court anything more than his bare assertions, his defense of denial
must necessarily be rejected. 35
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the November 27, 2008 Decision of the
Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00173-MIN.
SO ORDERED.

14. People v. Romy Lim, G.R. No. 231989, Sept. 4, 2018

G.R. No. 231989

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
ROMY LIM y MIRANDA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal is the February 23, 2017 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01280-
MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision 2 of Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Case Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy
Lim y Miranda (Lim) guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9165, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
In an Information dated October 21, 2010, Lim was charged with illegal possession of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without
being authorized by law to possess or use any dangerous drugs, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully,
criminally and knowingly have in his possession, custody and control one (1) heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug,

85
with a total weight of 0.02 gram, accused well-knowing that the substance recovered from his
possession is a dangerous drug.
Contrary to, and in violation of, Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 3
On even date, Lim, together with his stepson, Eldie Gorres y Nave (Gorres), was also indicted for illegal
sale of shabu, committed as follows:
That on or about October 19, 2010, at more or less 10:00 o'clock in the evening, at Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating together and mutually helping one another, without being authorized by law to sell,
trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any
dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, criminally and knowingly sell and/or offer for
sale, and give away to a PDEA Agent acting as poseur-buyer One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing Methamphetamine hydrochloride, locally known as Shabu, a dangerous drug, with a
total weight of 0.02 gram, accused knowing the same to be a dangerous drug, in consideration of Five
Hundred Pesos (Php500.00) consisting of one piece five hundred peso bill, with Serial No. FZ386932,
which was previously marked and recorded for the purpose of the buy-bust operation.
Contrary to Section 5, Paragraph 1, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. 4
In their arraignment, Lim and Gorres pleaded not guilty. 5 They were detained in the city jail during the
joint trial of the cases.6
The prosecution presented Intelligence Officer (IO) 1 Albert Orellan, 101 Nestle Carin, 102 Vincent
Orcales, and Police Senior Inspector (PSI) Charity Caceres. Aside from both accused, Rubenia Gorres
testified for the defense.
Version of the Prosecution
Around 8:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, IO1 Orellan and his teammates were at Regional Office X of the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA). Based on a report of a confidential informant (CI) that a
certain "Romy" has been engaged in the sale of prohibited drugs in Zone 7, Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan de
Oro City, they were directed by their Regional Director, Lt. Col. Edwin Layese, to gather for a buy-bust
operation. During the briefing, IO2 Orcales, IO1 Orellan, and IO1 Carin were assigned as the team leader,
the arresting officer/back-up/evidence custodian, and the poseur-buyer, respectively. The team
prepared a ₱500.00 bill as buy-bust money (with its serial number entered in the PDEA blotter), the
Coordination Form for the nearest police station, and other related documents.
Using their service vehicle, the team left the regional office about15 minutes before 10:00 p.m. and
arrived in the target area at 10:00 p.m., more or less. IOI Carin and the CI alighted froin the vehicle near
the comer leading to the house of "Romy," while IO1 Orellan and the other team members disembarked
a few meters after and positioned themselves in the area to observe. IOI Carin and the CI turned at the
comer and stopped in front of a house. The CI knocked at the door and uttered, "ayo, nong Romy."
Gorres came out and invited them to enter. Inside, Lim was sitting on the sofa while watching the
television. When the CI introduced IO1 Carin as a shabu buyer, Lim nodded and told Gorres to get one
inside the bedroom. Gorres stood up and did as instructed. After he came out, he handed a small
medicine box to Lim, who then took one piece of heat-sealed transparent plastic of shabu and gave it to
IO1 Carin. In turn, IO1 Carin paid him with the buy-bust money.
After examining the plastic sachet, IO1 Carin executed a missed call to IO1 Orellan, which was the pre-
arranged signal. The latter, with the rest of the team members, immediately rushed to Lim's house.
When they arrived, IO1 Carin and the CI were standing near the door. They then entered the house
because the gate was opened. IO1 Orellan declared that they were PDEA agents and informed Lim and
Gorres, who were visibly surprised, of their arrest for selling dangerous drug. They were ordered to put
their hands on their heads and to squat on the floor. IO1 Orellan recited the Miranda rights to them.
Thereafter, IO1 Orellan conducted a body search on both. When he frisked Lim, no deadly weapon was
found, but something was bulging in his pocket. IO1 Orellan ordered him to pull it out. Inside the pocket

86
were the buy-bust money and a transparent rectangular plastic box about 3x4 inches in size. They could
see that it contained a plastic sachet of a white substance. As for Gorres, no weapon or illegal drug was
seized.
IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white substance,
and a disposable lighter. 101 Carin turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought from Lim.
While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. Despite exerting efforts to secure the
attendance of the representative from the media and barangay officials, nobody arrived to witness the
inventory-taking.
The buy-bust team brought Lim and Gorres to the PDEA Regional Office, with IO1 Orellan in possession
of the seized items. Upon arrival, they "booked" the two accused and prepared the letters requesting for
the laboratory examination on the drug evidence and for the drug test on the arrested suspects as well
as the documents for the filing of the case. Likewise, IO1 Orellan made the Inventory Receipt of the
confiscated items. It was not signed by Lim and Gorres. Also, there was no signature of an elected public
official and the representatives of the Department of Justice (DOJ) and the media as witnesses. Pictures
of both accused and the evidence seized were taken.
The day after, IO1 Orellan and IO1 Carin delivered both accused and the drug specimens to Regional
Crime Laboratory Office 10. IO1 Orellan was in possession of the sachets of shabu from the regional
office to the crime lab. PSI Caceres, who was a Forensic Chemist, and Police Officer 2 (P02) Bajas7
personally received the letter-requests and the two pieces of heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance. PSI Caceres got urine samples from Lim and Gorres and
conducted screening and confirmatory tests on them. Based on her examination, only Lim was found
positive for the presence of shabu. The result was shown in Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM-I96 and I97-
2010. With respect to the two sachets of white crystalline substance, both were found to be positive of
shabu after a chromatographic examination was conducted by PSI Caceres. Her findings were reflected
in Chemistry Report No. D-228-2010. PSI Caceres, likewise, put her own marking on the cellophane
containing the two sachets of shabu. After that, she gave them to the evidence custodian. As to the buy-
bust money, the arresting team turned it over to the fiscal's office during the inquest.
Version of the Defense
Around 10:00 p.m. on October 19, 2010, Lim and Gorres were in their house in Cabina, Bonbon, Cagayan
de Oro City. Lim was sleeping in the bedroom, while Gorres was watching the television. When the latter
heard that somebody jumped over their gate, he stood up to verify. Before he could reach the door,
however, it was already forced opened by the repeated pulling and kicking of men in civilian clothing.
They entered the house, pointed their firearms at him, instructed him to keep still, boxed his chest,
slapped his ears, and handcuffed him. They inquired on where the shabu was, but he invoked his
innocence. When they asked the whereabouts of "Romy," he answered that he was sleeping inside the
bedroom. So the men went there and kicked the door open. Lim was then surprised as a gun was
pointed at his head. He questioned them on what was it all about, but he was told to keep quiet. The
men let him and Gorres sit on a bench. Lim was apprised of his Miranda rights. Thereafter, the two were
brought to the PDEA Regional Office and the crime laboratory. During the inquest proceedings, Lim
admitted, albeit without the assistance of a counsel, ownership of the two sachets of shabu because he
was afraid that the police would imprison him. Like Gorres, he was not involved in drugs at the time of
his arrest. Unlike him, however, he was previously arrested by the PDEA agents but was acquitted in the
case. Both Lim and Gorres acknowledged that they did not have any quarrel with the PDEA agents and
that neither do they have grudges against them or vice-versa.
Rubenia, Lim's live-in partner and the mother of Gorres, was at her sister's house in Pita, Pasil,
Kauswagan the night when the arrests were made. The following day, she returned home and noticed
that the door was opened and its lock was destroyed. She took pictures of the damage and offered the
same as exhibits for the defense, which the court admitted as part of her testimony.

87
RTC Ruling
After trial, the R TC handed a guilty verdict on Lim for illegal possession and sale of shabu and acquitted
Gorres for lack of sufficient evidence linking him as a conspirator. The fallo of the September 24, 2013
Decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:
1. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1073, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating
Section 11, Article II of R.A. 9165 and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from twelve [12] years and one [1] day to thirteen [13] years, and to pay a Fine in the amount of Three
Hundred Thousand Pesos [P300,000.00] without subsidiary imprisonment in case of non-payment of
Fine;
2. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ROMY LIM y MIRANDA is hereby found GUILTY of violating
Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165, and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT
and to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00].
3. In Criminal Case No. 2010-1074, accused ELDIE GORRES y NAVE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense
charged for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The Warden of the
BJMP having custody of ELDIE GORRES y Nave, is hereby directed to immediately release him from
detention unless he is being charged of other crimes which will justify his continued incarceration. 8
With regard to the illegal possession of a sachet of shabu, the RTC held that the weight of evidence
favors the positive testimony of IO1 Orellan over the feeble and uncorroborated denial of Lim. As to the
sale of shabu, it ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the identity of the buyer, the seller, the
money paid to the seller, and the delivery of the shabu. The testimony of IO1 Carin was viewed as
simple, straightforward and without any hesitation or prevarication as she detailed in a credible manner
the buy-bust transaction that occurred. Between the two conflicting versions that are poles apart, the
RTC found the prosecution evidence worthy of credence and no reason to disbelieve in the absence of
an iota of malice, ill-will, revenge or resentment preceding and pervading the arrest of Lim. On the chain
of custody of evidence, it was accepted with moral certainty that the PDEA operatives were able to
preserve the integrity and probative value of the seized items.
In so far as Gorres is concerned, the R TC opined that the evidence presented were not strong enough to
support the claim that there was conspiracy between him and Lim because it was insufficiently shown
that he knew what the box contained. It also noted Chemistry Report No. DTCRIM 196 & 197-2010,
which indicated that Gorres was "NEGATIVE" of the presence of any illicit drug based on his urine
sample.
CA Ruling
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision. It agreed with the finding of the trial court that the
prosecution adequately established all the elements of illegal sale of a dangerous drug as the collective
evidence presented during the trial showed that a valid buy-bust operation was conducted. Likewise, all
the elements of illegal possession of a dangerous drug was proven. Lim resorted to denial and could not
present any proof or justification that he was fully authorized by law to possess the same. The CA was
unconvinced with his contention that the prosecution failed to prove the identity and integrity of the
seized prohibited drugs. For the appellate court, it was able to demonstrate that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the confiscated drugs were not compromised. The witnesses for the prosecution
were able to testify on every link in the chain of custody, establishing the crucial link in the chain from
the time the seized items were first discovered until they were brought for examination and offered in
evidence in court. Anent Lim's defense of denial and frame-up, the CA did not appreciate the same due
to lack of clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by an improper motive.
Instead the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty was applied.
Before Us, both Lim and the People manifested that they would no longer file a Supplemental Brief,
taking into account the thorough and substantial discussions of the issues in their respective appeal

88
briefs before the CA.9 Essentially, Lim maintains that the case records are bereft of evidence showing
that the buy-bust team followed the procedure mandated in Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
Our Ruling
The judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside, and Lim should be acquitted based on reasonable
doubt.
At the time of the commission of the crimes, the law applicable is R.A. No. 9165. 10 Section 1(b) of
Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 1, Series of 2002, which implements the law, defines chain of
custody as -
the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals or plant
sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of
seizure/confiscation to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized item shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and use in court as evidence, and the final
disposition. 11
The chain of custody rule is but a variation of the principle that real evidence must be authenticated
prior to its admission into evidence. 12 To establish a chain of custody sufficient to make evidence
admissible, the proponent needs only to prove a rational basis from which to conclude that the
evidence is what the party claims it to be. 13 In other words, in a criminal case, the prosecution must
offer sufficient evidence from which the trier of fact could reasonably believe that an item still is what
the government claims it to be. 14 Specifically in the prosecution of illegal drugs, the well-established
federal evidentiary rule in the United States is that when the evidence is not readily identifiable and is
susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a more stringent foundation
entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it improbable that the
original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or tampered with. 15 This
was adopted in Mallillin v. People, 16 where this Court also discussed how, ideally, the chain of custody
of seized items should be established:
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an
exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who
touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what
happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition
in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the
precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same. 17
Thus, the links in the chain of custody that must be established are: (1) the seizure and marking, if
practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; (2) the turnover
of the seized illegal drug by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; (3) the turnover of the
illegal drug by the investigating officer to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and ( 4) the
turnover and submission of the illegal drug from the forensic chemist to the court. 18
Seizure and marking of the illegal
drug as well as the turnover by the
apprehending officer to the
investigating officer
Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 states:
Sec. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia

89
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public
official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.] 19
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of R.A. No. 9165 mandates:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DO.T), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that
noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. 20
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 10640 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it
essentially incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled
precursors and essential chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall
be conducted at the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizures: Provided, finally, That noncompliance of these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator
Grace Poe admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to
safeguard the integrity of the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of
said section resulted in the ineffectiveness of the government's campaign to stop increasing drug
addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the courts." 21 Specifically, she cited that "compliance
with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For one, media representatives are
not always available in all comers of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For another, there
were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts
apprehended."22 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station
is also very limiting. Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were
apprehended."23

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Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in
drug-related cases due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for "certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing
law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation." 24 In his Co-sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local
and international syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability
to mount a counter-assault to apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a)
impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the
proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.
xxxx
Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize
this in 2002 where the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the
inventory and photography of seized illegal drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized
illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of drug syndicates at the place of
seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed has to include a
location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.
It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to
be conducted either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
law enforcers. The proposal will provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs
since a safe location makes it more probable for an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to
be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal of drug cases due to technicalities.
Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or
confiscation is invalid or illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could
prove that the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of
the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable grounds." There are instances wherein
there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the absence of these
witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a
public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or
scared.25
We have held that the immediate physical inventory and photograph of the confiscated items at the
place of arrest may be excused in instances when the safety and security of the apprehending officers
and the witnesses required by law or of the items seized are threatened by immediate or extreme
danger such as retaliatory action of those who have the resources and capability to mount a counter-
assault.26 The present case is not one of those.
Here, IO1 Orellan took into custody the ₱500.00 bill, the plastic box with the plastic sachet of white
substance, and a disposable lighter. IO1 Carin also turned over to him the plastic sachet that she bought
from Lim. While in the house, IO1 Orellan marked the two plastic sachets. IO1 Orellan testified that he
immediately conducted the marking and physical inventory of the two sachets of shabu. 27 To ensure
that .they were not interchanged, he separately marked the item sold by Lim to 101 Carin and the one
that he recovered from his possession upon body search as BB AEO 10-19-10 and AEO-RI 10-19-10,
respectively, with both bearing his initial/signature. 28
Evident, however, is the absence of an elected public official and representatives of the DOJ and the
media to witness the physical inventory and photograph of the seized items. 29 In fact, their signatures
do not appear in the Inventory Receipt.
The Court stressed in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro: 30
The prosecution bears the burden of proving a valid cause for noncompliance with the procedure laid
down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended. It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance

91
thereto in such a way that during the trial proceedings, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying
any perceived deviations from the requirements of law. Its failure to follow the mandated procedure
must be adequately explained, and must be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. It
should take note that the rules require that the apprehending officers do not simply mention a
justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on
the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized items. Strict adherence to Section 21 is
required where the quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule, since it is highly susceptible to planting,
tampering or alteration of evidence.31
It must be alleged and proved that the -presence of the three witnesses to the physical inventory and
photograph of the illegal drug seized was not obtained due to reason/s such as:
(1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area; (2) their safety
during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory
action of the accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official
themselves were involved in the punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure
the presence of a DOJ or media representative and an elected public official within the period required
under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code prove futile through no fault of the arresting officers, who
face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and urgency of the
anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape. 32
Earnest effort to secure the attendance of the necessary witnesses must be proven. People v. Ramos33
requires:
It is well to note that the absence of these required witnesses does not per se render the confiscated
items inadmissible. However, a justifiable reason for such failure or a showing of any genuine and
sufficient effort to secure the required witnesses under Section 21 of RA 9165 must be adduced. In
People v. Umipang, the Court held that the prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed
in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law for "a sheer statement that representatives
were unavailable without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to
look for other representatives, given the circumstances is to be regarded as a flimsy excuse." Verily,
mere statements of unavailability, absent actual serious attempts to contact the required witnesses are
unacceptable as justified grounds for noncompliance. These considerations arise from the fact that
police officers are ordinarily given sufficient time - beginning from the moment they have received the
information about the activities of the accused until the time of his arrest - to prepare for a buy-bust
operation and consequently, make the necessary arrangements beforehand knowing full well that they
would have to strictly comply with the set procedure prescribed in Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police
officers are compelled not only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince
the Court that they exerted earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the
given circumstances, their actions were reasonable. 34
In this case, IO1 Orellan testified that no members of the media and barangay officials arrived at the
crime scene because it was late at night and it was raining, making it unsafe for them to wait at Lim's
house.35 102 Orcales similarly declared that the inventory was made in the PDEA office considering that
it was late in the evening and there were no available media representative and barangay officials
despite their effort to contact them. 36 He admitted that there are times when they do not inform the
barangay officials prior to their operation as they might leak the confidential information. 37 We are of
the view that these justifications are unacceptable as there was no genuine and sufficient attempt to
comply with the law.
The testimony of team-leader IO2 Orcales negates any effort on the part of the buy-bust team to secure
the presence of a barangay official during the operation:
ATTY. DEMECILLO:

92
xx xx
Q x x x Before going to the house of the accused, why did you not contact a barangay official to witness
the operation?
A There are reasons why we do not inform a barangay official before our operation, Sir.
Q Why?
A We do not contact them because we do not trust them. They might leak our information. 38
The prosecution likewise failed to explain why they did not secure the presence of a representative from
the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the arresting officer, IO1 Orellan, stated in his Affidavit that they
only tried to coordinate with the barangay officials and the media, the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses failed to show that they tried to contact a DOJ representative.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses also failed to establish the details of an earnest effort to
coordinate with and secure presence of the required witnesses. They also failed to explain why the buy-
bust team felt "unsafe" in waiting for the representatives in Lim's house, considering that the team is
composed of at least ten (10) members, and the two accused were the only persons in the house.
It bears emphasis that the rule that strict adherence to the mandatory requirements of Section 21(1) of
R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR may be excused as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the confiscated items are properly preserved applies not just on arrest and/or seizure by reason of a
legitimate buy-bust operation but also on those lawfully made in air or sea port, detention cell or
national penitentiary, checkpoint, moving vehicle, local or international package/parcel/mail, or those
by virtue of a consented search, stop and frisk (Terry search), search incident to a lawful arrest, or
application of plain view doctrine where time is of the essence and the arrest and/or seizure is/are not
planned, arranged or scheduled in advance.
To conclude, judicial notice is taken of the fact that arrests and seizures related to illegal drugs are
typically made without a warrant; hence, subject to inquest proceedings. Relative thereto, Sections 1
(A.1.10) of the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and Regulations directs:
A. I. I 0. Any justification or explanation in cases of noncompliance with the requirements of Section 2I
(1) of R.A. No. 9I65, as amended, shall be clearly stated in the sworn statements/affidavits of the
apprehending/seizing officers, as well as the steps taken to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized/confiscated items. Certification or record of coordination for operating units other than
the PDEA pursuant to Section 86 (a) and (b), Article IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 9I65 shall be presented. 39
While the above-quoted provision has been the rule, it appears that it has not been practiced in most
cases elevated before Us. Thus, in order to weed out early on from the courts' already congested docket
any orchestrated or poorly built up drug-related cases, the following should henceforth be enforced as a
mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance
with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must state the
justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/ confiscated i terns.
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the
investigating fiscal must not immediately file the case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the
case for further preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable cause.
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may exercise its discretion to
either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of
probable cause in accordance with Section 5,40 Rule 112, Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 23, 2017 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR
HC No. 01280-MIN, which affirmed the September 24, 2013 Decision of Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
Cagayan de Oro City, in Criminal Cases Nos. 2010-1073 and 2010-1074, finding accused-appellant Romy

93
Lim y Miranda guilty of violating Sections 11 and 5, respectively, of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, accused-appellant Romy Lim y Miranda is ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt, and is ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless he is being lawfully
held for another cause. Let an entry of final judgment be issued immediately.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Superintendent of the Davao Prison and Penal Farm, B.E.
Dujali, Davao del Norte, for immediate implementation. The said Director is ORDERED to REPORT to this
Court within five (5) days from receipt of this Decision the action he has taken.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Justice, as well as to the
Head/Chief of the National Prosecution Service, the Office of the Solicitor General, the Public Attorney's
Office, the Philippine National Police, the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the National Bureau of
Investigation, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. Likewise, the
Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to DISSEMINATE copies of this Decision to all trial courts,
including the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.

15. People v. Coronado and Adobar, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JENNIFER GA-A Y CORONADO, Accused,

AQUILA "PAYAT" ADOBAR, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
This is an Appeal1 filed pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court from the Decision 2 dated
July 31, 2015 (assailed Decision) of the Court of Appeals, Twenty-Second (22 nd) Division (CA) in CA-G.R.
CR HC No. 01192-MIN. The assailed Decision affirmed in toto the Judgment3 dated July 25, 2013
rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch 25 (trial court), in Criminal Case (CC)
No. 2011-485, which found accused-appellant Aquila 4 "Payat" Adobar (Adobar) guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, 5 otherwise known as the
"Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002." 6

The accusatory portion of the Information7 filed on June 1, 2011 against Adobar reads:
That on or about May 9, 2011[,] at about 11:00 in the morning, more or less, at 32 nd Street, Ramonal
Village, [Barangay] Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law to sell, trade, dispense
and give away any dangerous drugs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and illegally sell, trade,
dispense and give away to another one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance, to PDEA Agent Naomie Siglos, who acted as poseur-buyer, which after a
confirmatory test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory, said sachet is found positive of the presence
of 0.03 grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug commonly known as shabu, in
consideration of Five Hundred pesos (Php500.00) with Serial No. MR443620 which is recorded as
marked money in a buy bust operation.

Contrary to and in Violation of Section 5 Article II of R.A. 9165. 8

Adobar's co-accused, Jennifer Ga-a y Coronado (Ga-a), was charged on May 12, 2011 in two (2) other
separate Informations for violation of Sections 11 9 and 1510, respectively, both of Article II of RA 9165.
On September 27, 2011, she pleaded not guilty 11 to both offenses charged and trial as against her
commenced.

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Meanwhile, Adobar remained at large until he was apprehended via an alias warrant of arrest 12 on
February 13, 2012.13 Upon his arraignment on April 2, 2012, Adobar entered a plea of "not guilty." 14

As the cases against both accused arose out of the same incident, the parties adopted in the present
case (Criminal Case No. 2011-485) the testimonies of the witnesses already called to the stand in
Criminal Case Nos. 2011-422 to 423 prior to Adobar's arrest. Thereafter, joint trial on the three (3) cases
continued as to the remaining witnesses for both prosecution and defense. 15
The Facts

Version of the Prosecution:

The prosecution presented the following witnesses: Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Agents
1) IO1 Naomie Siglos (IO1 Siglos); 2) IO3 Alex Tablate (IO3 Tablate); 3) IO1 Nestle Carin (IO1 Carin); 4)
Police Chief Inspector (PCI) Erma Salvacion - Sampaga (PCI Sampaga); and 5) Punong Barangay Dometilo
Acenas, Jr. (Punong Barangay Acenas). 16

The prosecution dispensed with the testimony of PCI Sampaga, the forensic chemist, 17 after the defense
stipulated on certain matters. 18

The prosecution made the following narration of facts:

On May 9, 2011, at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning, a team of PDEA Regional Office X agents,
Cagayan de Oro City (collectively, buy-bust team), organized a buy-bust operation against Adobar and
his live-in partner based on information from a Confidential Informant (CI), who came to said office that
morning, and from the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) National Drug Information System
watchlist of drug personalities which included Adobar. 19 In the meeting, assignments were made as
follows: IO1 Siglos as poseur-buyer, IO3 Tablate as apprehending and investigating officer and the rest of
the agents as back-up. IO1 Siglos was given a buy-bust money of one (1) piece of Five Hundred Pesos
(P500.00) bill.20

After the briefing, the buy-bust team proceeded to the residence of Adobar at 32 nd St., Ramonal Village,
Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City in two (2) unmarked service vehicles. 21 Upon arrival, at about 11:00
o'clock in the morning, they parked the vehicles about 20 to 30 meters away from Adobar's residence.
IO1 Siglos and the CI alighted and walked towards Adobar's house, outside of which a man, identified by
the CI as Adobar, was standing.

The CI introduced IO1 Siglos to Adobar as a friend who was interested to buy shabu (subject drugs).
Adobar asked IO1 Siglos how much worth of shabu she wanted to buy and the latter answered P500.00,
while handing the buy-bust money to Adobar. Upon receipt of the money, Adobar excused himself to
get the "item" inside the house. In less than a minute, 22 Adobar came back and handed to IO1 Siglos one
heat-sealed transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected to be shabu.23 After
examining the sachet, IO1 Siglos rubbed the back of her head, signaling her colleagues to respond to the
scene.

Upon seeing the signal, IO3 Tablate, who earlier positioned himself about ten (10) meters away from the
group of IO1 Siglos24 and who witnessed the exchange between IO1 Siglos and Adobar, 25 alerted the rest
of the team.26 The team responded and rushed towards Adobar, with IO3 Tablate shouting "dapa,
dapa[,] PDEA!"27 Adobar ran inside his house and locked the front door behind him. 28 The buy-bust team

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forced open the door, cleared the ground floor then proceeded to the second floor where they found a
small window through which they suspected Adobar to have escaped. 29 The buy-bust money was not
recovered.

In another room on the same floor, 30 IO3 Tablate found Ga-a. Near her were seventeen (17) pieces of
transparent sachets containing suspected shabu together with other drug paraphernalia on top of a
table.31 Upon inquiry, Ga-a introduced herself as Mecaella, the live-in partner of Adobar, and claimed
that the shabu on the table were from Adobar. 32

Meanwhile, IO1 Siglos held custody of the subject drugs seized from Adobar until the same was turned
over to IO3 Tablate for marking by the latter.

After "clearing" Adobar's house, IO3 Tablate called for Camaman-an Punong Barangay Acenas, media
representative Rondie Cabrejas of Magnum Radyo 33 (media representative) and an unidentified
representative from the Department of Justice (DOJ). 34 Thereafter, the sachets of suspected shabu,
including the subject drugs, were marked 35 with IO3 Tablate's initials, "AMT." 36 After the marking, IO3
Tablate proceeded with the inventory of the seized items (including the subject drugs) on the table
where the seventeen (17) sachets were found, 37 and prepared the Inventory of Seized Items/Confiscated
Non-Drugs (Inventory)38 in the presence of Ga-a. 39 Photographs40 of the seized drugs, the room where
they were found and the accomplishment of the Inventory were then taken. 41 It appears from the
prosecution's submissions that among the three (3) witnesses summoned, only Punong Barangay
Acenas and the media representative arrived at Adobar's house and witnessed 42 and signed the
Inventory.43

The buy-bust team and Ga-a proceeded to the PDEA RO-10, with IO3 Tablate in possession of all seized
items, including the subject drugs. 44 Upon arrival, IO3 Tablate prepared a request for the examination of
the seized items with the Regional Crime Laboratory Office 10 (crime lab) 45 and personally delivered said
items thereto.46

Version of the Defense

The defense called to the stand accused-appellant Adobar and accused Ga-a who narrated the following
pertinent facts:

In the morning of May 9, 2011, Ga-a was alone cooking her lunch inside the house of Adobar where she
was a tenant when she heard a loud pounding on the door. 47 Suddenly, about ten (10) armed persons
entered the house. After introducing themselves as PDEA agents, 48 they proceeded to search the house 49
and destroyed Ga-a's belongings 50 while looking for a certain "Payat." 51 Ga-a was likewise bodily
searched by a woman.52 She was then invited to go to the PDEA office and as they were about to leave,
the agents called for a barangay official. 53 Ga-a claimed that the evidence presented by the prosecution
were "planted" by the PDEA agents.54

Adobar, on the other hand, testified that on May 9, 2011, he went to Opol at 5:00 o'clock in the morning
to buy fish for vending.55 He then took the same to Abellanosa St., Cagayan de Oro City where he stayed
until he went home at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, when the fish were sold out. 56 When he
arrived at his house, he noticed that the door was destroyed and the belongings inside were
disarranged.57 He was likewise informed by the neighbors that Ga-a was arrested by PDEA agents 58 but
he did not think to report the incident to the police as he was unschooled. 59 On February 12, 2012, he

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was arrested while selling fish under the bridge in Abellanosa St. 60

The Ruling of the trial court

In the Judgment dated July 25, 2013, the trial court found Adobar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense charged and imposed upon him the penalty of Life Imprisonment with a fine of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

In a two-paragraph discussion, the trial court held that under the circumstances, there was probable
cause to arrest Adobar. As between his and the prosecution's conflicting versions of facts, the latter's
was more believable. No discussion was made on the compliance by the PDEA team with the required
procedures under relevant laws, rules and regulations particularly, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165,
albeit such was raised as an issue by the defense. 61

On the other hand, the trial court acquitted accused Ga-a in both Criminal Case Nos. 2011-422 and
2011-423, holding that the PDEA agents had no probable cause to search and arrest her. Moreover, the
urine sample taken from Ga-a and the results of the chemical examination made thereon showing the
same positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride are inadmissible in evidence, being fruits of the
poisonous tree.62

The fallo of the trial court Judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds that:

1. In Criminal Cases Nos. 2011-422 and 2011-423, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby ACQUITTED of the offenses
charged. The Warden of the BJMP having custody of JENNIFER C. GAA is hereby directed to
immediately release her from detention unless she is accused of other crimes which will justify her
continued incarceration.

2. In Criminal Case No. 2011-485, accused AQUILO ADOBAR a.k.a. "Payat" is GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT of the offense defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 as
charged in the Information, and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of Life Imprisonment and
to pay the Fine in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos [P500,000.00], without subsidiary
penalty in case of non-payment of fine.

Let the penalty imposed on accused Adobar be a lesson and an example to all who have the criminal
propensity, inclination and proclivity to commit the same forbidden act that crime does not pay, and
that the pecuniary gain and benefit, as well as the perverse psychological well being which one can
derive from selling or manufacturing or trading drugs, or other illegal substance, or from using, or
possessing, or just committing any other acts penalized under Republic Act 9165, cannot compensate for
the penalty which one will suffer if ever he is prosecuted and penalized to the full extent of the law.

SO ORDERED.63 (Emphasis in the original)

Adobar appealed to the CA via Notice of Appeal.64 He filed his Brief65 dated January 3, 2014, while the
People, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Brief66 dated April 28, 2014. In a
Resolution67 dated June 18, 2014, the CA considered Adobar to have waived his right to file a Reply Brief.

The Ruling of the CA

97
In the assailed Decision, the CA affirmed in toto the trial court Judgment as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Judgment dated July 25,2013 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.68
The CA held that the prosecution adequately proved all the elements of the crime. It held that the
prosecution sufficiently established all the links in the chain of custody as to remove doubt on the
integrity of the subject drugs.

Anent the alleged failure of the PDEA agents to comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 as the
media and DOJ representatives, respectively, were not presented to testify on the Inventory which they
supposedly witnessed, the CA held that this lapse did not render the subject drugs seized inadmissible
because the prosecution had duly shown that its integrity and evidentiary value were preserved.
According to the CA, substantial adherence - not strict adherence - to the requirements of Section 21
suffices and the same was satisfied by the PDEA agents.

Hence, this recourse.

In lieu of filing supplemental briefs, Adobar and the People filed separate Manifestations dated July 4,
201669 and June 16, 2016,70 respectively, foregoing their right to file supplemental briefs as they have
exhausted their arguments in their respective Briefs filed before the CA.
Issue

The main question thrown to the Court for resolution is whether or not accused-appellant Adobar is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of sale of illegal drugs as defined and punished under Section 5, Article II
of RA 9165.
The Court's Ruling

The Appeal has merit.

Adobar is charged with selling 0.03 gram of dangerous illegal drugs, in particular, Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride colloquially known as shabu. At the outset, RA 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Acts of 2002, being the law in place at the time of the commission of
the offense and being more favorable to the accused than its successor, RA 10640, 71 shall apply in this
case.

Section 3(ii), Article I of RA 9165 defines "selling" as any act of giving away any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any other consideration. In the
context of a buy-bust operation, its elements are 1) that the transaction or sale took place between the
accused and the poseur buyer; and 2) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is
presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.72

Anent the latter element, proof beyond reasonable doubt must be adduced in establishing the corpus
delicti - the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated illicit drug. 73 It is important that the State
establish with moral certainty the integrity and identity of the illicit drugs sold as the same as those
examined in the laboratory and subsequently presented in court as evidence. 74 This rigorous
requirement, known under RA 9165 as the chain of custody, 75 performs the function of ensuring that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. 76

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In turn, Section 21 of RA 9165 is a critical means to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody 77 by
providing for the procedures to be followed in the seizure, custody and disposition of confiscated, seized
and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia. Section 21 of RA 9165 provides:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant
Sources of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia
and/or Laboratory Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs,
plant sources of dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as
instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for
proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and
any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia
and/or laboratory equipment, the same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a
qualitative and quantitative examination;

(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath by the
forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the receipt of the
subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous
drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the completion of testing within
the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be provisionally issued stating therein the
quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a
final certification shall be issued on the completed forensic laboratory examination on the same within
the next twenty-four (24) hours; (Emphasis supplied and italics in the original)
Filling in the details as to where the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items should be
made is Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9165 (IRR) which reads:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the
accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given
a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office
of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The same likewise provides for a saving clause in case of noncompliance with the requirements of RA
9165 and the IRR, thus:
xxx Provided, further, that non-compliance with these requirements under Justifiable grounds, as long
as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said
items; (Emphasis supplied)

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The foregoing is echoed in Section 2(a) of the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) Regulation No. 1, Series of
2002, to wit:
a. The apprehending team having initial custody and control of dangerous drugs or controlled chemical
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment shall immediately, after the seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of:
(i) the person from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized or his/her representative or
counsel;

(ii) a representative from the media;

(iii) a representative from the Department of Justice; and,

(iv) any elected public official;

who shall be required to sign copies of the inventory report covering the drugs/equipment and who
shall be given a copy thereof; Provided that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of
the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of seizure without warrant; Provided
further that non-compliance with these requirement under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team
xxx.
In sum, the applicable law mandates the following to be observed as regards the time, witnesses and
proof of inventory in the custody of seized dangerous illegal drugs:
The initial custody requirements must be done immediately after seizure or confiscation;
The physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence of:
the accused or his representative or counsel;
a representative from the media;
a representative from the DOJ; and
any elected public official.
The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the:
place where the search warrant is served; or
at the nearest police station; or
nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless
seizure.
In People v. Dela Cruz,78 it was explained that compliance with the chain of custody requirement
provided by Section 21 ensures the integrity of confiscated drugs and related paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity ( e.g., weight) of the
substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly
causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the personls alleged
to have been in possession of or peddling them.

Compliance with the requirements forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of
evidence in any manner. Non compliance, on the other hand, is tantamount to failure in establishing the
identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, thus,
engendering the acquittal of an accused. 79

However, the law allows such non-compliance in exceptional cases where the following requisites are
present: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on strict compliance;

100
and (2) the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team.80 In these exceptional cases, the seizures and custody over the confiscated items
shall not be rendered void and invalid.

Against the foregoing legal backdrop, the Court had exhaustively studied the records and is of the
considered view that the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti are compromised.

The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165, particularly as to the
presence of the three (3) witnesses immediately after seizure and confiscation of the illegal drugs.

In no uncertain words, Section 21 requires the apprehending team to "immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph [the seized illegal drugs] in the presence of the
accused xxx or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof."

The phrase "immediately after seizure and confiscation" means that the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs must be at the place of apprehension and/or seizure. If this is not
practicable, it may be done as soon as the apprehending team reaches the nearest police station or
nearest office.81

In all of these cases, the photographing and inventory are required to be done in the presence of any
elected public official and a representative from the media and the DOJ who shall be required to sign
an inventory and given copies thereof. By the same intent of the law behind the mandate that the
initial custody requirements be done "immediately after seizure and confiscation," the aforesaid
witnesses must already be physically present at the time of apprehension and seizure - a requirement
that can easily be complied with by the buy-bust team considering that the buy-bust operation is, by its
very nature, a planned activity. Simply put, the buy-bust team had enough time and opportunity to bring
with them these witnesses.

In other words, while the physical inventory and photographing is allowed to be done "at the nearest
police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case
of warrantless seizure," this does not dispense with the requirement of having the DOJ and media
representative and the elected public official to be physically present at the time of and at or near the
place of apprehension and seizure so that they can be ready to witness the inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs "immediately after seizure and confiscation."82

The reason is simple, it is at the time of arrest or at the time of the drugs' "seizure and confiscation" that
the presence of the three (3) witnesses is most needed. It is their presence at that point that would
insulate against the police practice of planting evidence. 83 In People v. Mendoza,84 the Court ruled:
xxx Without the insulating presence of the representative from the media or the [DOJ], or any elected
public official during the seizure and marking of the sachets of shabu, the evils of switching, "planting" or
contamination of the evidence that had tainted the buy-busts conducted under the regime of RA No.
6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972) again reared their ugly heads as to negate the integrity and
credibility of the seizure and confiscation of the sachets of shabu that were evidence herein of the
corpus delicti, and thus adversely affected the trustworthiness of the incrimination of the accused. xxx 85
(Italics in the original)

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In the present case, none of these three (3) witnesses under Section 21 were present at the time the
subject drugs were allegedly confiscated from Adobar. Upon the other hand, only two (2) of the three
(3) were summoned by the team and were actually present during the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items.

The testimony of Punong Barangay Acenas, which was, in fact, offered by the prosecution for the sole
purpose of proving that he was present during the inventory and that he signed the inventory receipt, 86
supports the conclusion that he arrived only after the subject drugs were already confiscated, thus:
[ATTORNEY ECHANO:]
Q But, you will admit that [when] the PDEA went inside the house, you were not present?
A When I arrived at the area, all the agents were already in the second floor of the house.
Q When did you receive the call from the PDEA agents?
A Immediately after the arrest [of Ga-a] and seizure.
Q How many minutes did it take you before you arrived?
A About 15 minutes from our residence, Sir.
xxxx
[TRIAL COURT:]
Q In other words, Captain Acenas, when you arrived there, the accused [Ga-a] was already arrested?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q The items were already on top of the aparador?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Was the Inventory already prepared ready for your signature or the Inventory was prepared when
you were there already?
A When I arrived, they started the Inventory, Your Honor.87 (Emphasis supplied)
To recall the prosecution's narrative, Ga-a was arrested after the buy-bust was made against Adobar,
i.e., after the subject drugs were taken from him by IO1 Siglos. Clearly, Punong Barangay Acenas was
summoned only sometime after the attempted arrest of Adobar and the alleged confiscation of the
subject drugs from his person. According to Punong Barangay Acenas, he arrived at the scene about
fifteen (15) minutes from such call, when the agents were already settled on the second floor of
Adobar's home, ready for inventory. This is confirmed by IO3 Tablate who testified that he phoned in
the witnesses only after "clearing" the alleged crime scene, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
xxxx
Q What did you do with the drugs on the table?
A After clearing, before I actually made the markings[,] we called up the barangay captain or one of
the members of the team, the barangay captain, member from the media and also the
representative from the DOJ and upon their arrival it was the time when I actually made the

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 markings to the evidence.
xxxx
Q And then what else after marking, labelling the sachets of shabu and the paraphernalia, what
happened next, Mr. Witness?
A After the inventory was signed by the witnesses, upon arrival of (sic) the office after the booking I
also prepared a request for the crime lab and then I myself was the one who delivered the evidence
to the crime lab.88 (Emphasis supplied)
Notably, while IO3 Tablate testified that all three (3) insulating witnesses came, observed and signed the
inventory, this testimony is contradicted by the records which reveal that only the signatures of Punong
Barangay Acenas and the media representative actually appear on the inventory document. 89 In this
regard it should also be noted that only Punong Barangay Acenas was presented in court to testify.

Other than the above quoted testimony of IO3 Tablate, no sign of the presence of the DOJ
representative appears on record. In fact, the Affidavit 90 dated May 10, 2011 of IO3 Tablate belies the
presence of a DOJ Representative even during the inventory, thus:
I, INTELLIGENCE OFFICER-3 ALEX M. TABLATE, xxx do hereby depose and say:

xxxx

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself
conducted in the very table itself where said items were found in plain view in the 2 nd floor of the house
of the suspects, the same were witnessed by the Barangay Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and
by a representative from the media through Magnum Radio.91 (Additional emphasis supplied)
To reiterate, the three (3) insulating witnesses must be present at the time of seizure of the drugs such
that they must be at or near the intended place of arrest so they can be ready to witness the inventory
and photographing of the seized items "immediately after seizure and confiscation." These witnesses
must sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. In the present case, from the evidence of the
prosecution itself, none of the witnesses were present during the seizure and confiscation of the
subject drugs. Moreover, only two (2) of them - the punong barangay and the media representative -
witnessed the photographing and signed the inventory.

On this note, considering that at the point of seizure, i.e., the first link in the "chain of custody,"
irregularities were already attendant, it becomes futile to prove the the rest of the links in the chain.
Simply put, since "planting" of the drugs was already made possible at the point of seizure because of
the absence of all three (3) insulating witnesses, proving the chain after such point merely proves the
chain of custody of planted drugs.

Adobar's flight serves as a waiver of his right to be present during the initial custody requirements of
Section 21 of RA 9165, but does not excuse compliance by the buy-bust team with the presence of the
three (3) insulating witnesses therein.

Apart from the three (3) insulating witnesses, Section 21 requires that the physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs by the apprehending team immediately after confiscation and seizure
be likewise made in the presence of, "the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel."92

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The question arises: what if the person from whom the drugs were seized escaped? This obtains in the
present case. From the prosecution's narration, Adobar successfully evaded arrest despite the efforts of
the buybust team to apprehend him.93 He remained at large until his subsequent apprehension on
February 13, 2012 via an alias warrant of arrest.

If the story of the prosecution is to be believed, the escape of accused Adobar serves as a waiver of his
right to be present during the physical inventory and photographing of the drugs allegedly seized from
him. The prosecution cannot be burdened by the accused's escape provided that reasonable efforts
were made to apprehend him, as what appears in the present case. The buy-bust team cannot be
reasonably expected to secure the presence of the accused's representative or counsel at the time of
confiscation and during the buy-bust operation, considering the clandestine nature of such operations.
In the same vein, after such escape, it should be difficult, if not impossible, for the buy-bust team to find
a counsel or representative for the accused before the initial custody requirements which Section 21
mandates to be performed "immediately after" the confiscation.

As such, the prosecution is excused from complying with the requirement of Section 21 as to the
presence of the accused during the initial custody requirements, i.e., physical inventory and
photographing of the seized drugs. However, it is not excused as to the presence of the three (3)
insulating witnesses, i.e., the DOJ and media representative and elected public official. The buy-bust
team must still secure the presence of these insulating witnesses, and the prosecution must still prove
such presence, not only during the inventory and photographing but likewise at the time of and at or
near the intended place of confiscation and seizure of the subject drugs.

In the same vein, the buy-bust team need not secure the presence of the accused during the marking of
the seized drugs as his escape serves as a waiver of his right to witness the same. As will be extensively
discussed below, although Section 21 is silent as to the matter of marking of seized drugs,
jurisprudence94 teaches that consistency with the chain of custody rule requires the same to be done in
the presence of the accused.

The prosecution failed to trigger the saving clause under the IRR of RA 9165. Its noncompliance with
Section 21 cannot be excused; the identity of the corpus delicti is not established.

To be sure, strict compliance with the prescribed procedure under Section 21 is required as a rule. 95 The
exception to this rule is found in the saving clause under Section 21 (a), Article II of the IRR of RA 9165 96
which requires the following: (1) the existence of justifiable grounds to allow departure from the rule on
strict compliance; and (2) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending team. 97

If these two (2) requisites are present and the saving clause is successfully triggered, the confiscated
items shall not be rendered void and invalid. This allows the prosecution to establish the identity of the
corpus delicti despite failure of the apprehending team to physically inventory and photograph the drugs
at the place of arrest and/or to have the DOJ and media representative and elected public official
witness the same.

On the first element, it has been emphasized that the prosecution must first recognize any lapses on the
part of the apprehending officers and thereafter explain the cited justifiable grounds. 98 Moreover, the
justifiable explanation given must be credible.99 Breaches of the procedure contained in Section 21

104
committed by the police officers, left unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the corpus delicti had been compromised.100

Hence, to successfully trigger the saving clause, the prosecution must satisfy its two-pronged
requirement: first, acknowledge and credibly justify the non-compliance, and second, show that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item were properly preserved. The Court held in Valencia
v. People:101
Although the Court has ruled that non-compliance with the directives of Section 21, Article II of R.A. No.
9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case, the prosecution must still prove that (a) there is a
justifiable ground for the non-compliance, and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items
were properly preserved. Further, the non-compliance with the procedures must be justified by the
State's agents themselves. The arresting officers are under obligation, should they be unable to comply
with the procedures laid down under Section 21, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, to explain why the
procedure was not followed and prove that the reason provided a justifiable ground. Otherwise, the
requisites under the law would merely be fancy ornaments that may or may not be disregarded by the
arresting officers at their own convenience. 102
In this case, the prosecution did not acknowledge the lapses, much less offer a credible and justifiable
ground for the failure of the buy-bust team to comply with Section 21. No explanation was advanced as
to why none of the insulating witnesses was present at the time of seizure and confiscation of the
subject illegal drugs. Neither do the records show any justification as to why no DOJ representative was
secured to witness the photographing and physical inventory of the seized drugs. Worse, the
prosecution did not even concede such lapses. The affidavit of IO3 Tablate shows the indifference of the
prosecution on its failure to comply with Section 21, thus:
That IO-1 SIGLOS turned over to me, IO-3 TABLATE the one (1) piece of heat-sealed transparent sachet
containing white crystalline substance also suspected to be shabu, which was the subject of the buy bust
earlier transacted.

That during the inventory of the seized items/evidence recovered, which I, IO-3 TABLATE myself
conducted in the very table itself where said items were found in plain view in the 2 nd floor of the house
of the suspects, the same were witnessed by the Barangay Captain himself of Brgy. Camaman-an and by
a representative from the media through Magnum Radio.

That at the PDEA Regional Office-10, the arrested female suspect formally identified herself as Jennifer
C. Ga-a, 22 years old, single and a resident of Ramonal Village, Brgy. Camaman-an, Cagayan de Oro City
while the other suspect who was able to elude arrest despite earnest effort to apprehend him was
formally identified as Aquilo Adobar, 48 years old, married and a resident of the same barangay. The
latter suspect is a targetlisted personality as per PDEA National Drugs Information System (NDIS). 103
(Emphasis in the original)
Hence, considering the prosecution neither acknowledged nor explained its noncompliance with Section
21, the first prong was not satisfied, thus leading to the inevitable conclusion that the saving clause was
not triggered. Accordingly, there is no point anymore in determining if the second prong had been
satisfied - i.e., proving the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drugs.

To be sure, from the records, outside the non-compliance with Section 21, the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized illegal drugs are heavily tainted. The second prong, even if the Court allows proof of
such despite failure to prove the first prong, seems difficult if not impossible to establish in light of the
serious irregularities in the transfer of custody of the seized illegal drugs.

105
Proving the second prong of the saving clause - the integrity of the seized illegal drugs - despite non-
compliance with Section 21 requires establishing the four links in the chain of custody: First, the seizure
and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.104

In the present case, there was failure to mark the seized illegal drugs immediately after confiscation due
to the palpable gap between the confiscation of the drugs to its subsequent marking which the
prosecution utterly failed to explain.

Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the
items after they have been seized. In People v. Beran,105 the Court held that while the matter of marking
of the seized illegal drugs in warrantless seizures is not expressly specified in Section 21, consistency
with the chain of custody rule requires that such marking should be done (1) in the presence of the
apprehended violator and (2) immediately upon confiscation, to wit:
What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rule do not expressly specify is the matter of
"marking" of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the "chain of
custody" rule requires that the "marking" of the seized items-to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence-should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violator (2) immediately upon confiscation. This step initiates the
process of protecting innocent persons from dubious and concocted searches, and of protecting as well
the apprehending officers from harassment suits based on planting of evidence under Section 29 and on
allegations of robbery or theft. xxx106 (Emphasis in the original)
It is vital that the seized contrabands are immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the
specimens will use the markings as reference. The Court has held:
Crucial in proving [the] chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they are seized from the accused. Marking after seizure is the starting point in the
custodial link, thus it is vital that the seized contraband[s] are immediately marked because succeeding
handlers of the specimens will use the markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to
separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time
they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating[,] switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

Long before Congress passed RA 9165, this Court has consistently held that failure of the authorities
to immediately mark the seized drugs raises reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti
and suffices to rebut the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties, the doctrinal
fallback of every drug-related prosecution. 107 (Additional emphasis supplied)
In the present case, a considerable period of time intervened between the confiscation of the subject
drugs and its subsequent marking - which was unaccounted for by the prosecution. This gaping hiatus is
brought about by the failure of the poseur buyer, IO1 Siglos, to credibly account for her whereabouts
and the handling of the subject drugs from the time she confiscated the same from Adobar to the time
she turned it over to IO3 Tablate for marking. The marked inconsistencies in her testimonies taken on
April 23, 2012 and November 6, 2012 fail the test of credibility.

106
On April 23, 2012, IO1 Siglos testified that when her colleagues responded to the scene, she inspected
the area with them and then, without much delay, followed IO3 Tablate upstairs for the marking, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
xxxx
Q And then after you made that pre-arranged signal of rubbing your back head, what happened?
A After a few minutes[,] the back up team rushed up.
Q What happened next?
A And then when they arrived we checked the area and then after we checked the area I followed
them and then I went up stairs to give the buy-bust evidence to the arresting officer, Sir.
xxxx
Q You said that after you touched your head the arresting officer arrived, and then Tablate went
upstairs?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How many minutes after Tablate went upstairs, how many minutes you followed Tablate?
A About 3-4 minutes, Sir.108 (Emphasis supplied)
This is in contrast to her testimony on November 6, 2012 where she stated under oath that when the
back-up team arrived, she proceeded to the team's service vehicle, about 10-15 meters away, and
therein waited for a considerable time while the back-up team chased after Adobar and searched the
premises. She only went back to the house and handed the subject drugs to IO3 Tablate when it was
time for the physical inventory, thus:
[PROSECUTOR VICENTE:]
xxxx
Q After you rubbed the back part of your head, what happened next?
A I noticed that the operatives rushed up to the area, Sir.
xxxx
Q So[,] when the operatives arrived, what did Aquillo (sic) Adobar do?
A He went upstairs, Sir.
Q He run?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And he was chased by the operatives?
A Yes, Sir.
xxxx
Q What did you do?

107
 A I went outside going to our service vehicle, Sir.
Q How far was the service vehicle parked from the house?
A More or less 10-15 meters, Sir.
xxxx
Q Why you did not go with them when they chased the accused?
A Because my tasked (sic) is only a [poseur] buyer, Sir.
Q You said that the accused handed to you the sachet of shabu, what did you do with it?
A I handed to the arresting officer, IO3 Tablate during the inventory, Sir.
Q But you said you went to the vehicle?
A Yes, Sir.
Q You waited there?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And then, when did your team conduct an inventory?
A After the searched (sic), Sir.
Q So[,] after you went to the vehicle, you went back to the house?
A Yes, Sir.109 (Emphasis supplied)
The significance of this contradiction in IO1 Siglos' testimony cannot be overemphasized. Being the first
custodian in the chain and having held onto the then unmarked seized drugs for a considerable lapse of
time, IO1 Siglos must clearly and convincingly account for her handling and care of the subject drugs
before turning them over to IO3 Tablate for marking. In this, she failed, thus, effectively creating an
obvious but unexplained break in the chain. Hence, assuming that the illegal drugs which went into the
chain are actually the same drugs seized from Adobar's person, i.e., assuming the same were not
planted at the point of seizure, there remains that great possibility of switching while the same were in
IO1 Siglos' custody.

The foregoing conflicting narrations, seemingly trivial when viewed in isolation, cast very serious doubts
on the veracity of the prosecution's overall narrative when juxtaposed against the procedural lapses of
the buybust team and its abject failure to justify said lapses.

Courts must be extra vigilant in trying drugs cases.

Unfortunately, the CA and the trial court glossed over these obvious irregularities which attended the
present buy-bust operation and the resulting confiscation of the subject drugs.

The CA, while seemingly recognizing the lapses in observing Section 21, 110 simply dismissed the same
"because it was shown by the prosecution that the integrity and evidentiary value of the specimens
were properly preserved by the buy-bust team." 111 In other words, the CA excused the failure of the buy-
bust team to comply with Section 21 on the basis of the second prong of the saving clause (that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the subject drugs are established) but ignoring altogether the first

108
prong (absence of justifiable reasons for the procedural lapses). The CA justifies its decision to excuse
this nonobservance of Section 21 by ruling that only substantial adherence thereto is required. 112

This position taken by the CA is mistaken. To reiterate, the procedure enshrined in Section 21 is a
matter of substantive law and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality. 113
Substantive law requires strict observance of these procedural safeguards. 114 Courts, in resolving drugs
cases must keep in mind this mandate and the peculiar nature of buy-bust operations being susceptible
to police abuse as discussed by the Court, thus:
xxx a buy-bust operation has a significant downside that has not escaped the attention of the framers of
the law. It is susceptible to police abuse, the most notorious of which is its use as a tool for extortion. In
People v. Tan, this Court itself recognized that by the very nature of anti-narcotics operations, the need
for entrapment procedures, the use of shady characters as informants, the ease with which sticks of
marijuana or grams of heroin can be planted in pockets of or hands of unsuspecting provincial hicks, and
the secrecy that inevitably shrouds all drug deals, the possibility of abuse is great. xxx115 (Italics in the
original)
For this, the Court has instructed lower courts to exercise extra vigilance in trying drugs cases "lest an
innocent person be made to suffer the unusually severe penalties for drug offenses." 116 The presumption
that regular duty was performed by the arresting officers simply cannot prevail over the presumption of
innocence granted to the accused by the Constitution. It is thus incumbent upon the prosecution to
prove that the accused is indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt. 117

At this point, it is well to emphasize that this case involves a meager 0.03 gram of shabu. Courts must
employ heightened scrutiny, consistent with the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt, in
evaluating cases involving miniscule amounts of drugs as they can be readily planted and tampered
with.118 Consistent with this, in People v. Segundo119 involving the same amount of drugs as the case at
hand (0.03 gram), the Court emphasized the extra caution that law enforcers must observe in preserving
the integrity of small amounts of seized drugs, thus:
To sum, "[l]aw enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity in the chain
of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia." Thus, "[t]his is especially true when
only a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs is alleged to have been taken from the accused."

Although the miniscule quantity of confiscated illicit drugs is solely by itself not a reason for acquittal,
this instance accentuates the importance of conformity to Section 21 that the law enforcers in this case
miserably failed to do so. If initially there were already significant lapses on the marking, inventory, and
photographing of the alleged seized items, a doubt on the integrity of the corpus delicti concomittantly
exists. xxx120 (Emphasis supplied)
Adobar's defense of denial is concededly weak and uncorroborated. This weakness, however, does not
add strength to the prosecution's case as the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own
weight. Well-entrenched in jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of an accused must rest not on
the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the evidence of the prosecution. 121

Based on the foregoing and following the Court's precedents as discussed above, the Court is
constrained to reverse Adobar's conviction.

The prosecution failed to prove the corpus delicti of the crime due to the serious lapses in observing
Section 21 of RA 9165 and the concomitant failure to trigger the saving clause. Anent the latter point,
the prosecution utterly failed to acknowledge and credibly justify its procedural lapses and was unable
to prove the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized drugs. Adobar's innocence, as presumed and

109
protected by the Constitution, must stand in light of the reasonable doubt on his guilt.

To conclude, the Court issues anew a reminder: The prosecution arm of the government has the duty to
prove, beyond reasonable doubt, each and every element of the crime charged. In illegal drugs cases,
this includes proving faithful compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165, being fundamental to establishing
the element of corpus delicti. In the course of proving such compliance before the trial courts,
prosecutors must have the initiative to not only acknowledge, but also justify, any perceived
deviations from the procedural requirements of Section 21.122

As no less than the liberty of an accused is at stake, appellate courts, this Court included, must, in
turn, sift the records to determine if, indeed, the apprehending team observed Section 21 and if not, if
the same is justified under the circumstances. This, regardless if issues thereon were ever raised or
threshed out in the lower court/s, consistent with the doctrine that appeal in criminal cases throws the
whole case open for review and the appellate court must correct errors in the appealed judgment
whether they are assigned or not. 123 If, from such full examination of the records, there appears
unjustified failure to comply with Section 21, it becomes the appellate court's bounded duty to acquit
the accused, and perforce, overturn a conviction. 124

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 31, 2015 of the CA in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
01192-MIN is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Aquila "Payat" Adobar is hereby ACQUITTED
for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He is ordered immediately
RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other lawful cause.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, for immediate
implementation. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to report to this Court, within five
(5) days from receipt of this Decision, the action he has taken. Copies shall also be furnished to the
Director General of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency for his information.

SO ORDERED.

Additional cases for case digest assignment:

1. Ibañez v. People, G.R. No. 190798, Jan. 27, 2016
RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ, AND DANIEL "BOBOT" IBAÑEZ, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

On appeal is the September 25, 2009 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285
which affirmed with modifications the July 17, 2007 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
255 of Las Piñas City, convicting Ronald Ibañez (Ronald), Emilio Ibañez (Emilio) and Daniel "Bobot"
Ibañez (Bobot) (collectively, petitioners) of the crime of frustrated homicide.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Facts

For allegedly stoning, hitting and stabbing Rodolfo M. Lebria (Rodolfo), the petitioners together with
their co-accused, Boyet Ibañez (Boyet) and David Ibañez (David), who have remained at large, were

110
charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information3 dated October 11, 2001. The
accusatory portion thereof reads:

"That on or about 15th day of July, 2001, in the City of Las Piñas, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together, acting in
common accord and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill and without justifiable
cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, stone, hit with an spade
and stab with bladed weapons one RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, thereby inflicting upon him physical injuries,
thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of Homicide as a consequence
but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused,
that is, by the timely and able medical assistance rendered to said RODOLFO M. LEBRIA, which
prevented his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW."

After posting their bail bond at P24,000.00 each, Ronald, Bobot and Emilio were released on bail.4
Arraignment of Ronald and Bobot was held on May 9, 2002. Emilio was, in turn, arraigned on December
10, 2002. All the petitioners entered a plea of not guilty to the crime charged.5 After termination of pre-
trial on April 23, 2003,6 trial on the merits immediately followed. In the course of trial, two versions of
what transpired on the early morning of July 15, 2001 surfaced. These conflicting versions of the
incident, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Version of the Prosecution

In his narration, Rodolfo claimed that Ronald and his sons Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David were his
neighbors in CAA, Las Pinas City. Rodolfo recalled that he had visitors on the day of the incident. When
his guests left at around 1:00 a.m. of July 15, 2001, Rodolfo accompanied them outside his house. After
about thirty minutes and as he was about to go inside, Rodolfo noticed some garbage in front of his
house. Addressing nobody in particular, Rodolfo uttered in the vernacular "bakit dito tinambak ang
basiira sa harap ng aking bah ay na malawak naman ang pagtataponan ng basura?"7 Emilio and Boyet,
who was then present and angered by what they heard, threw stones at the private complainant hitting
him twice on the forehead. With blood oozing from his forehead, Rodolfo went inside his house to
cleanse his face obscured by blood and emerged again, this time, carrying a 2" x 2" (dos por dos) piece
of wood. Rodolfo was caught off guard when he was hit on the head with a shovel by another accused,
David.8 Then, Ronald held Rodolfo, rendering him helpless, as Boyet and Bobot simultaneously stabbed
him in the abdomen.9 At this point, Rodolfo fell to the ground, lying flat and eventually lost
consciousness. When he regained consciousness, Rodolfo found himself at the Las Pinas District Hospital
(LPDH) but was later on transferred to the Philippine Genera] Hospital (PGH) for the much-needed
surgical procedure. At the PGH, Rodolfo was operated on, confined for nine days and incurred hospital
expenses amounting to P30,000.00.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

PO2 Sulit testified that he was the investigating police officer who took the statements of Rodolfo's
daughter Ruth Ann Lebria (Ruth) and Rodolfo's wife, Salvacion Lebria (Salvacion) when they went to the
police station to complain about the incident. PO2 Sulit disclosed that when he asked Ruth and Salvacion
why Rodolfo was not with them, he was informed that Rodolfo was still undergoing medication and
treatment for the injuries suffered from the petitioners. PO2 Sulit also testified that he endorsed the

111
complaint against the petitioners to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas for proper
disposition.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

To corroborate Rodolfo's testimony, the prosecution presented Ruth and Salvacion as witnesses.

Ruth testified that she actually witnessed the entire incident which she admitted was preceded by the
utterance made by his father.12 Her testimony on how Ronald, Emilio, Bobot, Boyet and David ganged
up on her father and who among them stoned, hit, held and stabbed Rodolfo perfectly matched the
latter's sworn declarations.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Salvacion, who was also home on that fateful morning, confirmed the beating and stabbing her husband
endured in the hands of the petitioners and their co-accused. Salvacion also submitted receipts in the
total amount of P2,174.80, representing the medical expenses incurred for the treatment of Rodolfo's
injuries resulting from the incident.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prosecution presented the Medico-Legal Certificate issued by the Records Division of the PGH
showing that Rodolfo suffered multiple stab wounds in the abdomen and underwent an exploratory
laparotomy,15 the standard surgery in abdominal trauma cases involving life-threatening
injuries.16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Version of the Defense

To refute the accusations against them, the petitioners offered an entirely different scenario.

Not only did he deny the allegations against him but Ronald even claimed that he was the one who was
stabbed by Rodolfo. Ronald averred that the incident happened within the vicinity of his home, which
was about four meters away from the house of Rodolfo.17 When Ronald heard Rodolfo shouting at
around 2:00 a.m., he tried pacifying Rodolfo by telling him that they would just talk later in the day.
Unappeased, Rodolfo allegedly destroyed the bicycle belonging to Ronald's son-in-law. Rodolfo then
attacked Ronald by stabbing him on his right arm. It was during this time that Ronald's son, Bobot, came
to his rescue but was prevented from doing so as Bobot was also struck with a knife by Rodolfo. Ronald
and his son instituted a criminal complaint against Rodolfo for attempted homicide but nothing came
out of it. In support of his testimony, Ronald presented a picture taken the day after the incident
showing a slipper purportedly belonging to Rodolfo and a balisong. Ronald further insisted that all the
other accused were not around as they were residing elsewhere at that crucial time.

Bobot testified that he immediately rushed outside his house, which is located beside his father's, upon
hearing Ronald shout, "Tulungan mo ako, ako'y sinaksak"18 However, he was not able to save his father
as he himself was stabbed twice with a knife by Rodolfo. A struggle for the possession of the knife
between Bobot and Rodolfo ensued and in the process, the latter accidentally sustained a stab wound in
the abdomen. Still, Bobot asserted that it was Rodolfo who ran away from the scene of the crime.
Meanwhile, Ronald had already left for the nearby police detachment to seek help.

Accused Emilio, for his part, interposed denial and alibi as his defenses. He emphatically denied that he
threw a stone at Rodolfo. On the date and time of the incident, Emilio claimed that he was working
overtime as a laborer in Moonwalk, Las Piñas City, which is one kilometer away from the crime scene.

112
He argued that he was just unfortunately dragged into this case which had nothing to do with him at
all.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The defense likewise proffered two medical certificates to support the petitioners' claims. The July 15,
2001 medical certificate issued by Dr. Ma. Cecilia Leyson (Dr. Leyson), of the Ospital ng Maynila,
declared that Ronald's body bore lacerations and hematoma at the time she attended to him.
Nevertheless, Dr. Leyson acknowledged that she had no idea how the injuries were sustained by Ronald.
The other medical certificate dated March 20, 2006 was issued by Dr. Renato Borja (Dr. Borja), a
physician affiliated with the Paranaque Community Hospital where Bobot was taken after getting
injured. Based on the hospital records, Dr. Boria testified that Bobot had sustained wounds on the head
and chest, possibly caused by a sharp instrument.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Petitioners' Representation in the Trial Court Proceedings

In view of the petitioners' allegation that they were denied of right to counsel, a narration of petitioners'
representation in the trial court proceedings is imperative.

During the arraignment on May 9, 2002, Ronald and Bobot were assisted by Atty. Bibiano Colasito, who
was selected as their counsel de oficio only for that occasion. At his arraignment on December 10, 2002,
Emilio appeared with the assistance of Atty. Antonio Manzano (Atty. Manzano), who was then
appointed by the trial court as counsel de oficio for all the accused. In the pre-trial conference that
followed, Atty. Manzano appeared for the petitioners. Atty. Manzano was informed that the trial for the
presentation of prosecution evidence was set on June 18,2003.

Both Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit completed their respective testimonies during the June 18, 2003 hearing.
However, Atty. Manzano failed to appear at the said hearing despite prior notice. Likewise, Ronald, one
of the petitioners, absented himself from the same hearing. As a result, the RTC issued the June 18, 2003
Order,21 the pertinent portion of which reads:

Due to the failure of Atty. Manzano to appear in today's proceeding despite due notice and so as not
to delay the proceedings herein, his right to cross-examine the said two (2) witnesses is deemed waived.
At the same time, Atty. Manzano is hereby fined the amount of P2,000.00 for his absence in today's
proceedings despite the fact that the same has been previously set and known to him, without even
filing any motion or pleading regarding his inability to appear herein which clearly indicates a show of
disrespect to the authority of this Court.

Let a warrant of arrest be issued against accused Ronald Ibañez for failing to appear in today's hearing
despite notice and the bond posted by him for his provisional liberty confiscated in favor of the
government. As such, the bondsman BF General Insurance Company, Inc., is hereby directed to produce
the body of the said accused within thirty (30) days from receipt of this Order and to show cause why no
judgment should be rendered against the bond.

The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation and the Director of the Criminal Investigation
Service Command, PNP, Camp Crame, are hereby directed to explain within five (5) days from receipt of
this Order why the warrants of arrest issued against Boyet Ibañez and David Ibañez remain
unimplemcnted and/or no return submitted to this Court.

113
Thereafter, Atty. Manzano withdrew as petitioners' counsel de oficio. In its Order22 dated September 3,
2003, the trial court appointed Atty. Gregorio Caneda, Jr. (Atty. Caneda) as the new counsel de oficio of
the petitioners. On the same date, Atty. Caneda conducted the cross-examination of Ruth and even
expressed his desire to continue with the cross-examination of said witness on the next scheduled
hearing. In the hearing of September 17, 2003, Atty. Caneda appeared for the petitioners but Bobot and
Emilio did not show up. This prompted the trial court to issue the corresponding warrants for their
arrest and the bonds posted by them for their provisional liberty were ordered confiscated in favor of
the government. Despite the continued absence of his clients, Atty. Caneda religiously attended the
succeeding hearings. On November 5, 2003, upon his request, the trial court relieved Atty. Caneda of his
designation as counsel de oficio for the petitioners.

Per the trial court's Order23 dated February 10, 2004, Atty. Ma. Teresita C. Pantua (Atty. Pantua), of the
Public Attorney's Office, was designated as the petitioners' counsel de oficio. However, Atty. Pantua's
designation was recalled upon her manifestation that she had previously assisted Rodolfo in initiating
the present case. In her stead, the trial court appointed the petitioners' current counsel de oficio, Atty.
Juan Sindingan (Atty. Sindingan).

Since then, Atty. Sindingan has been representing the petitioners. With his help, all three petitioners
finally appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2005. Atty. Sindingan handled the cross-examination of
another prosecution witness, Salvacion, as well as the presentation of evidence for the defense.

After both parties had rested their case, they were required to submit their respective memoranda in
thirty (30) days. Atty. Sindingan submitted the Memorandum for the petitioners while no memorandum
was ever filed by the prosecution. Thereafter, the case was deemed submitted for decision.

The RTC's Ruling

The RTC accorded more weight to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses over the
declarations of the defense, thus, the dispositive portion of its judgment reads:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the Court finds accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibañez and
Daniel "Bobot" Ibanez GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide and hereby
sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor, as minimum, up to EIGHT (8) YEARS of prision mayor, as maximum, as well as to suffer the
accessory penalties provided for by law.

Also, accused Ronald Ibañez, Emilio Ibanez and Daniel "Bobot" Ibañez are ordered to pay to private
complainant or victim Rodolfo Lebria the sum of P2,174.80 representing his actual medical expenses.

With costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision but this was denied in an Order25
dated October 11, 2007. Undaunted, the petitioners elevated their case to the CA. They faulted the trial
court for totally disregarding their claim that Rodolfo was the aggressor and for not recognizing that

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Bobot was merely acting in self-defense when Rodolfo was stabbed. The petitioners also asserted that
they were deprived of their constitutional right to counsel.

The CA's Ruling

The CA agreed with the trial court's judgment of conviction but modified the penalty imposed. The
appellate court sentenced the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. The CA also
found it proper to award P15,000,00 as temperate damages and P30,000.00 as moral damages to
Rodolfo. The petitioners sought a reconsideration of the CA's decision. Still, their motion was denied in
the Resolution26 of December 28, 2009.

The Issue

Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising the lone issue of whether the petitioners
were deprived of their constitutionally guaranteed right to counsel.

The Court's Ruling

The Court sustains the conviction of the petitioners with modification.

No Deprivation of Right to Counsel

The right invoiced by the petitioners is premised upon Article III, Section 14 of the Constitution which
states that:

Section 14. (1) No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

(2) In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, x x x.

Guided by the constitutionally guaranteed right of an accused to counsel and pursuant to its rule-making
authority, the Court, in promulgating the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, adopted the following
provisions:

Rule 115, SEC. 1. Rights of accused at the trial. - In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
entitled to the following rights:

xxxx

(c) To be present and defend in person and by counsel at every stage of the proceedings, from
arraignment to promulgation of the judgment, x x x

xxxx

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Rule 116 of the same Rules makes it mandatory for the trial court to designate a counsel de oficio for
the accused in the absence of private representation. It provides:

SEC. 6. Duty of court to inform accused of his right to counsel. - Before arraignment, the court shall
inform the accused of his right to counsel and ask him if he desires to have one. Unless the accused is
allowed to defend himself in person or has employed counsel of his choice, the court must assign a
counsel de officio to defend him.

SEC. 7. Appointment of counsel de officio. - The court, considering the gravity of the offense and the
difficulty of the questions that may arise, shall appoint as counsel de officio such members of the bar in
good standing who, by reason of their experience and ability, can competently defend the accused. But
in localities where such members of the bar are not available, the court may appoint any person,
resident of the province and of good repute for probity and ability, to defend the accused.

The right to be assisted by counsel is an indispensable component of due process in criminal

prosecution.27 As such, right to counsel is one of the most sacrosanct rights available to the accused.28
A deprivation of the right to counsel strips the accused of an equality in arms resulting in the denial of a
level playing field.29 Simply put, an accused without counsel is essentially deprived of a fair hearing
which is tantamount to a grave denial of due process.30chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On the basis of this ratiocination and as a last ditch effort to be exculpated, the petitioners insisted that
they were denied of their right to counsel when their counsel de oficio failed to appear on the June 18,
2003 trial court hearing during which Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit gave their testimonies. As a consequence,
the petitioners argued that they were divested of the opportunity to cross-examine the said two
prosecution witnesses.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for its part, disputed the petitioners' claim that they were
deprived of their constitutional right to counsel. In their May 5, 2010 Comment31 on the instant
petition, the OSG pointed out that since the beginning of the proceedings in the trial court until the filing
of the present petition before this Court, three (3) counsel de oficio were appointed and represented
the petitioners32 and to which designation the latter did not raise any protest.33 The OSG opined that
the trial court judge made sure that the petitioners were adequately assisted by a counsel de oficio
when they failed to engage the services of a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, the OSG recommended
the dismissal of the petition.

The Court agrees with the position taken by the OSG.

There was no denial of right to counsel as evinced by the fact that the petitioners were not only assisted
by a counsel de oficio during arraignment and pre-trial but more so, their counsel de oficio actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court including the direct and cross-examination of the
witnesses.34 As aptly found by the CA, the petitioners were duly represented by a counsel de oficio all
throughout the proceedings except for one hearing when their court appointed lawyer was absent and
Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit presented their testimonies.35 As previously stated, it was during said hearing
when the trial court declared that the cross-examination of the said two prosecution witnesses was
deemed waived.

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Mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to cross-examine.36 The
case of Savory Luncheonette v. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, et al. thoroughly explained the
meaning and substance of right to cross-examine as an integral component of due process with a
colatilla that the same right may be expressly or impliedly waived, to quote:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it
criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is
a fundamental right which is part of due process. However, the right is a personal one which may be
waived expressly or impliedly, by conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination.
Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.37chanrobleslaw

Such is the scenario in the present case where the reason why Rodolfo and PO2 Sulit were not subjected
to cross-examination was not because the petitioners were not given opportunity to do so. Noticeably,
the petitioners' counsel de oficio omitted to mention that in the June 18, 2003 hearing, Ronald, one of
the accused, did not show up despite prior notice. Thus, the bail bond posted for his provisional liberty
was ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Ironically, Ronald comes to this Court asserting the
very right he seemingly waived and abandoned for not attending the scheduled hearing without
justifiable cause. Moreover, neither did the petitioners interpose any objection to the presentation of
testimony of the prosecution witnesses during the June 18, 2003 hearing nor did their counsel de oficio
subsequently seek a reconsideration of the June 18, 2003 Order.

Further, the trial court judge, when he issued the June 18, 2003 Order, was merely exercising a judicial
prerogative. No proof was presented by the defense showing that the exercise of such discretion was
either despotic or arbitrary.

Going by the records, there is no indication that any of the counsel de oficio had been negligent in
protecting the petitioners' interests. As a matter of fact, the counsel de oficio kept on attending the trial
court hearings in representation of the petitioners despite the latter's unjustified absences.

In sum, the Court is not persuaded that the absence of the counsel de oficio in one of the hearings of
this case amounts to a denial of right to counsel. Nor does such absence warrant the nullification of the
entire trial court proceedings and the eventual invalidation of its ruling. In People v. Manalo, the Court
held that the fact that a particular counsel de oficio did not or could not consistently appear in all the
hearings of the case, is effectively a denial of the right to counsel, especially so where, as in the instant
case, there is no showing that the several appointed counsel de oficio in any way neglected to perform
their duties to the appellant and to the trial court and that the defense had suffered in any substantial
sense therefrom.38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Guilt Proven Beyond Reasonable Doubt

At any rate, the factual findings of the RTC as affirmed by the CA, which are backed up by substantial
evidence on record, led this Court to no other conclusion than that the petitioners are guilty of
frustrated homicide.

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The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his
use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die
because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying circumstance for murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.39 There being no prior determination by
both the trial and appellate courts of any qualifying circumstance that would elevate the homicide to
murder, the Court will simply limit its discussion to the first two elements.

In ascertaining whether intent to kill exists, the Court considers the presence of the following factors: (1)
the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the
victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim;
and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the motives of the
accused.40chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Here, intent to kill Rodolfo was evident in the manner in which he was attacked, by the concerted
actions of the accused, the weapon used and the nature of wounds sustained by Rodolfo.

Both the RTC and CA correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy presupposes unity of
purpose and unity of action towards the realization of an unlawful objective among the accused.41 Its
existence can be inferred from the individual acts of the accused, which if taken as a whole are in fact
related, and indicative of a concurrence of sentiment.42 In this case, conspiracy was manifested in the
spontaneous and coordinated acts of the accused, where two of them delivered the initial attack on
Rodolfo by stoning, while another struck him with a shovel and the third held him so that the other two
can simultaneously stab Rodolfo. It was only when Rodolfo laid helpless on the ground and had lost
consciousness that the accused hurriedly left the scene. This chain of events leading to the commission
of the crime adequately established a conspiracy among them.

Plainly, the kind of weapon used for the attack, in this case, a knife and the vital parts of Rodolfo's body
at which he was undeniably stabbed demonstrated petitioners' intent to kill. The medico-legal certificate
revealed that Rodolfo sustained multiple stab wounds in the epigastrium, left upper quadrant of the
abdomen resulting to internal injuries in the transverse colon (serosal), mesentery and left kidney.43
Given these injuries, Rodolfo would have succumbed to death if not for the emergency surgical
intervention.

With respect to the petitioners' defenses of denial and alibi, the Court concurs with the lower courts'
rejection of these defenses. An assessment of the defenses of denial and alibi necessitates looking into
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies. Well-settled is the rule that in determining who
between the prosecution and defense witnesses are to be believed, the evaluation of the trial court is
accorded much respect for the simple reason that the trial court is in a better position to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses as they deliver their testimonies.44 As such, the findings of the trial court is
accorded finality unless it has overlooked substantial facts which if properly considered, could alter the
result of the case.45chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the instant case, the Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from this rule considering the credibility
of the prosecution witnesses.

The trial and appellate courts were right in not giving probative value to petitioners' denial. Denial is an
intrinsically weak defense that further crumbles when it comes face-to-face with the positive
identification and straightforward narration of the prosecution witnesses.46 Between an affirmative

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assertion which has a ring of truth to it and a general denial, the former generally prevails.47 The
prosecution witnesses recounted the details of the crime in a clear, detailed and consistent manner,
without any hint of hesitation or sign of untruthfulness, which they could not have done unless they
genuinely witnessed the incident. Besides, the prosecution witnesses could not have mistakenly
identified the petitioners as Rodolfo's perpetrators considering there is so much familiarity among them.
The records are also bereft of any indication that the prosecution witnesses were actuated by ill motives
when they testified against the petitioners. Thus, their testimonies are entitled to full faith and credit.

In contrast, the petitioners' testimonies are self-serving and contrary to human reason and experience.

The Court notes that the defense presented no witnesses, other than themselves, who had actually seen
the incident and could validate their story. Additionally, aside from the medical certificates of Ronald
and that of Bobot which was issued almost five (5) years since the incident occurred, the defense have
not submitted any credible proof that could efficiently rebut the prosecution's evidence.

Further, the Court finds it contrary to human reason and experience that Ronald, would just leave his
son Bobot, while the latter was being stabbed and struggling for the possession of the knife with
Rodolfo, to go to a police station for assistance. Logic dictates that a father would not abandon a son in
the presence of actual harm.

For the defense of alibi to prosper, the petitioners must not only prove by clear and convincing evidence
that he was at another place at the time of the commission of the offense but that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.48 Emilio himself admitted that he was just one
kilometer away from the crime scene when the incident happened during the unholy hour of 1:00 a.m.
of July 15, 2001. As such, Emilio failed to prove physical impossibility of his being at the crime scene on
the date and time in question. Just like denial, alibi is an inherently weak defense that cannot prevail
over the positive identification by the witnesses of the petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime.49 In
the present case, Emilio was positively identified by the prosecution witnesses as one of the assailants.
Moreover, alibi becomes less credible if offered by the accused himself and his immediate relatives as
they are expected to make declarations in his favor,50 as in this case, where Emilio, his father and
brother insisted that the former was somewhere else when the incident occurred. For these reasons,
Emilio's defense of alibi will not hold.

Anent Bobot's claim of self-defense, it is undeserving of any serious consideration or credence. Basic is
the rule that the person asserting self-defense must admit that he inflicted an injury on another person
in order to defend himself.51 Here, there is nothing on record that will show that Bobot categorically
admitted that he wounded Rodolfo.

Based on the foregoing, the Court upholds the trial and appellate courts' conviction of the petitioners
for frustrated homicide.

Penalty and Civil Liability

Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the imposable penalty for homicide is reclusion
temporal. Article 50 of the same Code states that the imposable penalty upon principals of a frustrated
crime shall be the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by law for the consummated felony.
Hence, frustrated homicide is punishable by prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances present in this case, the minimum penalty to be

119
meted on the petitioners should be anywhere within the range of six (6) months and one (1) day to six
(6) years of prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from the medium period of
prision mayor ranging from eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years. Thus, the imposition by the
CA of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.

As regards the civil liability of the petitioners, the Court sustains the award of moral and temperate
damages with modification as to the tatter's amount.

Pursuant to Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered when some pecuniary
loss has been suffered but the amount of which cannot be proven with certainty. In People v.
Villanueva52 and Serrano v. People,53 the Court ruled that in case the amount of actual damages, as
proven by receipts during trial is less than P25,000.00, the victim shall be entitled to P25,000.00
temperate damages, in lieu of actual damages of a lesser amount. In the instant case, only the amount
of P2,174.80 was supported by receipts. Following the prevailing jurisprudence, the Court finds it
necessary to increase the temperate damages from P15,000.00 to P25,000.00.

The award of moral damages is justified under Article 2219 of the Civil Code as Rodolfo sustained
physical injuries which were the proximate effect of the petitioners' criminal offense. As the amount is
left to the discretion of the court, moral damages should be reasonably proportional and approximate to
the degree of the injury caused and the gravity of the wrong done.54 In light of the attendant
circumstances in the case, the Court affirms that P30,000.00 is a fair and reasonable grant of moral
damages.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated September 25, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 31285
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioners RONALD IBAÑEZ, EMILIO IBAÑEZ and DANIEL "BOBOT"
IBAÑEZ are found guilty of frustrated homicide and sentenced to a prison term of six (6) years of prision
correctional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. They are
also ordered to pay RODOLFO LEBRIA Twenty Five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) as temperate damages
and Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as moral damages.

SO ORDERED

2. People v. Matyaong, G.R. No. 140206, June 21, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RODOLFO MATYAONG, accused-appellant.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
On 28 March 1996, accused appellant Rodolfo Matyaong was charged with the crime of parricide before
the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, for hitting his wife Rufina Matyaong with a
piece of wood, in an information which states –
That on or about the 27th day of December, 1995, at Brgy. Latud, Municipality of Rizal, Province of
Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with evident
premeditation, treachery and with intent to kill, while armed with a round wood (Bakawan), did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and club one RUFINA MATYAONG Y
PAZ, his lawfully wedded wife, hitting her in the different vital parts of her body and inflicting upon her

120
multiple contusion and hematuas [sic] in the body which were the direct and immediate cause of her
death shortly thereafter.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
Upon arraignment, accused-appellant denied culpability. 2 Thus, trial ensued, with the prosecution
presenting four witnesses, namely Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr., Wilfredo Tablazon, Roberta Paz, and Sgt.
Almirante Caburnay.
Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr., who was ten years old at the time his testimony was taken, is the eldest child of
accused-appellant and Rufina Matyaong. Rodolfo testified that on the evening of 27 December 1995, he
was at home cooking dinner for his family. His mother sat nearby reading a letter from his Auntie
Ventura, while at the same time nursing his youngest brother. The domestic calm was interrupted,
however, by the arrival of accused-appellant who, upon seeing Rufina reading a letter and being
illiterate, immediately suspected that it was about another man. Turning a deaf ear to his wife’s
explanation that the letter was actually about God, accused-appellant grabbed a piece of mangrove
wood, commonly known as bakawan, which was two feet in length and 1 ½ inches wide, and beat
Rufina. As a result, Rufina lost consciousness and fell to the floor. Accused-appellant revived Rufina by
pouring water on her, after which he threw the lighted wick lamp at her and then grabbed the bakawan.
Rufina fled her house and ran towards the forest.
Rodolfo also declared that prior to the attack, his mother was suffering from diarrhea and vomitting
spells, as were many other people in their locality. 3
Wilfredo Tablazon, barangay kagawad of Canipaan, declared that on the same evening, he was
supervising a benefit dance at a local school in a neighboring barangay when he was approached by
Soling Balahing asking for his help. Soling told him that Rufina Matyaong was hurt and hiding from her
husband in the grassy area near her [Soling] house. After some hesitation, Tablazon finally agreed to go
with Soling to the place where Rufina was hiding. Tablazon saw Rufina lying on the ground with three of
her children. She was in a very weak condition. Sobbing, Rufina pleaded with him to bring her to
Canipaan. Tablazon acceded to her request and Rufina was taken by Jun Makauling to Canipaan by
pumpboat. The following morning, she was brought to the barangay health center. Tablazon testified
that, while at the health center, Rufina vomitted once and suffered diarrhea. Also, he noticed that she
had large contusions on both her arms. Due to Rufina’s worsening condition, and at the instance of
Rufina and her mother, Tablazon decided to fetch accused-appellant to see his wife. When they arrived
at the health center, Tablazon heard accused-appellant say to his wife, "Hindi rin mangyari yan kung
hindi mo kasalanan." Accused-appellant remained at the health center, assisting his wife, until she
expired on 29 December 1995.4
Another witness for the prosecution was Roberta Paz – the mother of the victim. Roberta learned about
the assault on her daughter only the day after it occurred. On 28 December 1995, at 7 a.m., Delfin Tabo
went to Roberta’s house and informed her that Tablazon was looking for her. Roberta went with Delfin
to the house of Tablazon where she found her daughter, who told her that she was mauled by accused-
appellant. Roberta noticed that her daughter had bruises all over her body. They made a mock
hammock for Rufina to lie in and then, together with Tablazon and the barangay captain, brought her to
the barangay health center.5
At the Canipaan health center, Rufina was treated by Sgt. Almirante Caburnay. 6 Sgt. Caburnay belonged
to the Philippine Marines’ 6th Marine Batallion Landing Team, Western Command. From October 1995
to January 1996, he was assigned to Canipaan, Rizal, Palawan as a first aider. On 28 December 1995, Sgt.
Caburnay was at the marine detachment in Canipaan when Roberta Paz asked him for assistance for her
daughter. He proceeded to the health center where he saw Rufina. He noticed that she had bruises and
hematoma on her left arm and back. He was also informed that the patient was suffering from diarrhea.
In order to prevent dehydration, Sgt. Caburnay gave Rufina dextrose and, in addition, he administered
antibiotics. After assessing Rufina’s condition, he advised Roberta to bring her daughter to the health

121
center in the town proper of Rizal so that she could receive better medical attention. Unfortunately,
Rufina did not live long enough to receive further treatment in Rizal. On 29 December 1995, at five in
the morning, Rufina Matyaong breathed her last at the Canipaan health center. 7
In his defense, accused-appellant claimed that his wife died from dehydration caused by diarrhea and
vomitting, which started on 27 December 1995. He said that Rufina told him that she got sick after she
ate sarimburao (fish). Accused-appellant testified that, from December 28, until she died the following
day, he took care of his wife while she was at the health center in Canipaan. With him at the health
center were Roberta Paz, Vilma Apostol and barangay captain Belo Fernando. According to accused-
appellant, he cooked lugaw for his wife, and emptied ten chamber pots which she used whenever she
vomitted or defecated. Furthermore, accused-appellant declared that three of his children were also
retching and suffering from diarrhea, but that they all recovered. Finally, it was insisted by accused-
appellant that his son Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr. was induced by Roberta Paz to testify falsely against him. 8
To buttress accused-appellant’s testimony, the defense presented Vilma Apostol, a resident of Canipaan
and a barangay health worker. Vilma declared that on 27 December 1995, she was fetched from her
house by Roberta Paz to help care for Rufina at the health center. When she arrived thereat, she
observed that Rufina was already in serious condition – she could no longer speak or ingest any solids,
she was being given dextrose, and she was always vomitting and experiencing severe diarrhea. 9
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment,10 finding accused-appellant guilty of parricide, and
sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, as the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so
grave a wrong was appreciated in his favor. In addition, the court ordered accused-appellants to pay the
heirs of Rufina Matyaong P50,000.00 as civil indemnity. The trial court held that, although he may not
have intended to kill her, Rufina’s death was the direct and natural consequence of accused-appellant’s
felonious act of clubbing her, and therefore, pursuant to Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, he is liable
for the same.11
Hence, the present appeal.
Accused-appellant contends that the prosecution failed to establish that he had inflicted any injuries
upon his wife. No medical certificate or autopsy report was introduced in evidence that would prove
that Rufina had sustained any wounds or bruises due to the alleged beating by her husband. Even
assuming that accused-appellant had mauled his wife, the prosecution did not present any evidence
that such beating caused her death. It is the position of the defense that Rufina died due to her
vomitting and diarrhea, and not from the beatings. 12
In lieu of an appellee’s brief, the Solicitor General filed a "Manifestation and Motion" asking the Court to
acquit accused-appellant since his guilt was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. It is the Solicitor
General’s opinion that, although it was established that accused-appellant beat up Rufina, the
prosecution nevertheless failed to establish the nexus between the beatings and her death. 13
The elements of parricide are as follows: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused;
(3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other
ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. 14
In every criminal case, the evidence presented must be sufficient to prove the corpus delicti - that is, the
actual offense committed. In this case, the prosecution must first establish that the life of a human being
was taken, and second, that the death was occasioned by the accused’s criminal act or agency. 15 If the
evidence clearly discloses that a certain person is dead, and that his death resulted from the use of
violent and criminal means by another, then the corpus delicti is sufficiently proved.16
In the case at bar, it has been established that accused-appellant beat his wife with a piece of wood. This
conclusion is based upon the unrebutted testimony of Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr. – an eyewitness to the
assault. Having failed to prove that the witness was impelled by improper motives, the Court has no
reason to disbelieve the child’s testimony, which the trial court found to be credible. 17 It is also
undisputed that the victim died on 29 December 1995, or almost two days after the assault. However,

122
we agree with the Solicitor General that the prosecution has not established the crucial link between the
assault and the death. In other words, it has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the
beatings inflicted by accused-appellant upon his wife were the proximate cause of her death.
It is significant that, in this particular case, no post mortem examination was conducted in order to
determine the precise cause of death. There was neither an ante mortem nor post mortem examination
of the victim’s body for purposes of ascertaining the nature and extent of any wounds that may have
been sustained as a result of the beating. The significance of evidence on the precise nature of the
injuries sustained by the deceased is that it often leads the careful examiner to uncover the real cause of
death. Therefore, the examination of a wound, from the legal point of view, should lead to the
determination as to when the wound was inflicted, what the degree of danger of the wound is, with its
dangers to life or function, whether the wound was given by the injured man himself, or by some one
else, and with what manner of instrument the wound was produced. 18 Wharton and Stille’s provides a
valuable discussion on the importance of ascertaining the degree of injury sustained by the victim –
In considering the extent of injury done, account must be taken of the injury to the function of the
various organs, and also the danger to life. A division into mortal and nonmortal wounds, if it could be
made, would be very desirable; but the unexpected complications and the various extraneous causes
which give gravity to the simplest cases, and, on the other hand, the favorable termination of some
injuries apparently the most dangerous, render any such classification impracticable. The general
classification into slight, severe, dangerous, and mortal wounds may be used, but the possibility of the
slight wound terminating with the loss of the person’s life, and the apparently mortal ending with only a
slight impairment of some function, must always be kept in mind. x x x
The danger to life of any wound is dependent upon a number of factors: the extent of the injury, the
form of the wound, the region of the body affected, the blood vessels, nerves, or organs involved, the
entrance of disease-producing bacteria or other organisms into the wound, the age and constitution of
the person injured, and the opportunities for administering proper surgical treatment. No one should be
willing, on theoretical grounds alone, to give an opinion as to the agency of the wound in producing
death. A careful post-mortem examination will usually show the violent cause of death, and it is the duty
of the physician whose opinion is desired, to make that examination most carefully, and to base his
opinion entirely upon the findings of this examination; not upon previous notions of the probable nature
and effects of the wound. Moreover, it is necessary not merely to make an examination of the regions
apparently involved in the injury, but also a thorough examination of the entire body; for,
notwithstanding the immediate cause of death may be evident, it is still advisable to be sure that there
was no cause of death in any other part. 19x x x
In the case at bar, not an iota of evidence on these points is extant in the records of this case. The
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, none of whom were competent to conduct a medico-legal
examination of the victim’s body, on the injuries sustained by Rufina are, to say the least, inconsistent -
Rodolfo Matyaong, Jr., the only eyewitness to the attack, was unable to state on what parts of his
mother’s body the blows fell; Wilfredo Tablazon said that Rufina had contusions on both her arms;
Roberta Paz declared that there were bruises all over her daughter’s body; and Sgt. Caburnay noted
bruises and hematoma on the victim’s left arm and back. These haphazard observations will certainly
not suffice for purposes of a criminal proceeding, wherein a man’s liberty, and maybe, even life, are at
stake.
In addition, the fact that the victim was suffering from severe diarrhea and vomitting, a condition
prevalent in the locality at the time, both prior to and after the assault, according to the testimony of
both prosecution and defense witnesses,20 and that she did not die immediately after the beating, but
almost two days later, makes evidence on the exact cause of her death even more imperative. It is very
possible that Rufina died due to food poisoning, of which vomitting and diarrhea are classic symptoms. 21
"Irritant foods and food poisoning, on account of organic and vegetable fermentation, may cause

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serious gastric, as well as intestinal, irritation; and there may ensue a still further conversion of these
altered food products into poisonous substances, by a well-known physico-chemical process, called
ptomains, leukomains, etc., and these may be absorbed into the circulation of the blood, and cause
peculiar symptoms of intoxication by the secondary poisonous products." 22 When two possible causes of
death are present, a doubt is created as to the actual cause, which can only be overcome by expert
testimony by a qualified physician who conducted a thorough examination of the victim. 23
In the case of U.S. v. Palalon,24 where accused struck the victim with the back of his hand, a few hours
after which the victim contracted a fever and died two and one-half days later, the Court acquitted the
accused of the charge of homicide on the ground that the cause of death had not been established,
despite the fact that a physician had conducted an examination of the deceased’s body and had linked
the blows sustained by the victim to his death. The Court held that –
There is no question as to the fact that the defendant struck the deceased a blow on the mouth. But it is
extremely doubtful that the blow either directly or indirectly caused the death. It is not denied that
fever was prevalent in the locality in July, 1925, and it is quite probable that the death of the deceased
was due entirely to natural causes. The theory of the prosecution is that the deceased, in falling down,
received fatal internal injuries, and bases its conclusions on the testimony of Dr. Jose V. Valero, who
stated in substance that he examined the body of the deceased on the day following the death and
found ecchymosis on the right shoulder and on the stomach and that, as a result of the former, there
was a congestion of the right lung, which was the principal cause of the death; that the blows causing
the ecchymosis must have been of such force as to have made its effect felt immediately; and that the
victim could not have continued working.1âwphi1.nêt
No proper autopsy of the body was made, and through the testimony of the boy’s father and that of the
witnesses for the defense, it has been proven conclusively that the deceased, contrary to the doctor’s
theory of the case, continued to work for more than a day after he received the blow. The ecchymosis
testified to by the doctor may have been nothing but suggillations or "death spots" formed after the
death; the fact that the marks were found both on the stomach and on the back of the deceased so
indicates. x x x
In the present case the examination of the body took place over twenty-four hours after the death and
appears to have been very incomplete; no incisions were made and the examining physician, a young
man of limited experience, admitted that his conclusions were partly based upon the statements of the
members of the family of the deceased. In these circumstances the conclusions cannot have been much
more than mere guesses. In this connection we may say that in cases of death under suspicious
circumstances it is the duty of the physician performing the post mortem examination to exercise the
utmost care and not draw unwarranted conclusions from external appearances susceptible of different
interpretations.
Meanwhile, in People v. Ilustre,25 the Court affirmed the judgment of conviction of defendant for
homicide based upon the opinion of three doctors who held that the death was caused by blows
inflicted upon the deceased’s right hypochondrium, which bruised the liver and produced an internal
hemorrhage. Further, the Court held that "[t]he fact that the deceased … suffered from incipient
pulmonary tuberculosis does not affect the defendant’s criminal liability, for even if it rendered the blow
more fatal, the efficient cause of the death remains the same."
In People v. Ulep,26 the Court held accused liable for the death of his wife based primarily upon the
autopsy report which described the cause of death as cardiac arrest and primary shock caused by strong
pressure applied on the upper front chest bone, since it was conclusively established that accused had
elbowed his wife on the chest. In light of the autopsy report, the Court was unconvinced by the
defense’s argument that death was caused by a chronic condition of the deceased, holding that –

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Even if the victim is suffering from an internal ailment, liver or heart disease, or tuberculosis, if the blow
delivered by the accused (a) is the efficient cause of death; or (b) accelerated his death; or (c) is the
proximate cause of death; then there is criminal liability. 27
All these cases lead to the inescapable conclusion that in order to hold a person liable for the death of
another, the evidence must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that accused’s criminal act was the
proximate cause of such death. Such proof is especially crucial when there are several possible causes of
death. In the case at bar, even assuming that the victim was afflicted with food poisoning, accused-
appellant may still be held liable for her death if the prosecution had presented proof that accused-
appellant’s act of beating his wife was the efficient or proximate cause of death, or had accelerated her
death, which it did not.
No man is convicted on a probability. The accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown
beyond a reasonable doubt. This means that the prosecution has the burden of establishing, beyond
reasonable doubt, each and every element constituting the crime charged. This is premised upon the
accused’s constitutionally guaranteed right to be presumed innocent. 28
There being no evidence on the injuries sustained by Rufina Matyaong and the cause of her death,
accused-appellant is entitled to an acquittal for the Court entertains a reasonable doubt that his actions
have in fact caused the death of his wife.
Although it is perhaps possible to convict accused-appellant under paragraph 3 of Article 266, 29 which
does not require proof of injury, still, the penalty for the same being only arresto menor, and it
appearing that accused-appellant has been detained in prison for a period greatly in excess of that
penalty, we find it unnecessary to provide for further punishment.
WHEREFORE, accused-appellant is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of parricide.
SO ORDERED

3. People v. Flora, G.R. No. 125909, June 23, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HERMOGENES FLORA AND EDWIN FLORA, accused-appellants.
QUISUMBING, J.
Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the decision 1 dated November 7, 1995, of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 26, Santa Cruz, Laguna, in Criminal Case Nos. SC-4810, 4811 and 4812, finding them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of double murder and attempted murder, and sentencing them
to reclusion perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 for indemnity, P14,000.00 for burial expenses and
P619,800.00 for loss of earning capacity in Crim. Case SC-4810 for the death of Emerita Roma; reclusion
perpetua, payment of P50,000.00 as indemnity, P14,000.00 for burial expenses and P470,232.00 for loss
of earning capacity for the death of Ireneo Gallarte in Crim. Case SC-4811; and imprisonment from 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 10 years of prision mayor and payment
of P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas for injuries sustained in Crim. Case SC-4812.
On February 26, 1993, Prosecution Attorney Joselito D.R. Obejas filed three separate informations
charging appellants as follows:
Criminal Case No. 4810
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay
Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Edwin Flora @
Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38 handgun,
with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one EMERITA ROMA y DELOS

125
REYES, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on her chest which caused her immediate
death, to the damage and prejudice of her surviving heirs.
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation are present. 2
Criminal Case No. 4811.
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay
Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused HERMOGENES FLORA @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Erwin
[Edwin] Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber
.38 handgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one IRENEO
GALLARTE y VALERA, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his chest which caused his
immediate death, to the damage and prejudice of his surviving heirs.1âwphi1.nêt
That in the commission of the crime, the aggravating circumstances of treachery and evident
premeditation are present. 3
Criminal Case No. 4812
That on or about January 10, 1993, at around 1:30 o'clock in the morning thereof, in Sitio Silab, Barangay
Longos, municipality of Kalayaan, province of Laguna, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Hermogenes Flora @ Bodoy, conspiring and confederating with accused Erwin [Edwin]
Flora @ Boboy, and mutually helping one another, while conveniently armed then with a caliber .38
handgun, with intent to kill, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said firearm one FLOR ESPINAS y
ROMA, hitting the latter on her shoulder, and inflicting upon her injuries which, ordinarily, would have
caused her death, thus, accused performed all the acts of execution which could have produced the
crime of Murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless did not produce it by reason of a cause
independent of their will, that is, by the timely and able medical attendance given the said Flor Espinas y
Roma, which prevented her death, to her damage and prejudice. 4
During arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty. Trial thereafter ensued. Resolving jointly
Criminal Cases Nos. SC-4810, SC-4811 and SC-4812, the trial court convicted both appellants for the
murder of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and the attempted murder of Flor Espinas. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, this Court finds as follows:
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4810, for the death of Emerita Roma, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder qualified by
treachery and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory
penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death
indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial; and (c) P619,800 for lost ( sic) of earning
capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4811, for the death of Ireneo Gallarte, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery and with the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and sentences each of them
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify
the heirs of the victim the sums of (a) P50,000.00 as death indemnity; (b) P14,000.00 as expenses for
wake and burial; and (c) P470,232.00 for lost (sic) of earning capacity, without any subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.
In CRIMINAL CASE NO. SC-4812, for the injuries sustained by Flor Espinas, the Court finds both accused
Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted Murder
and sentences each of them to suffer an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from two (2) years,

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four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor,
as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED. 5
The facts of the case, borne out by the records, are as follows:
Days before the incident, appellant Hermogenes Flora alias "Bodoy," had a violent altercation with a
certain Oscar Villanueva. Oscar's uncle, Ireneo Gallarte, pacified the two.
On the evening of January 9, 1993, a dance party was held to celebrate the birthday of Jeng-jeng
Malubago in Sitio Silab, Barangay Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna. Appellant Hermogenes Flora, allegedly a
suitor of Jeng-jeng Malubago, attended the party with his brother and co-appellant Edwin Flora, alias
"Boboy". Also in attendance were Rosalie Roma, then a high school student; her mother, Emerita Roma,
and her aunt, Flor Espinas. Ireneo Gallarte, a neighbor of the Romas, was there too.
The dancing went on past midnight but at about 1:30, violence erupted. On signal by Edwin Flora,
Hermogenes Flora fired his .38 caliber revolver twice. The first shot grazed the right shoulder of Flor
Espinas, then hit Emerita Roma, below her shoulder. The second shot hit Ireneo Gallarte who slumped
onto the floor. Rosalie, was shocked and could only utter, "si Bodoy, si Bodoy", referring to Hermogenes
Flora. Edwin Flora approached her and, poking a knife at her neck, threatened to kill her before he and
his brother, Hermogenes, fled the scene.
The victims of the gunfire were transported to the Rural Health Unit in Longos, Kalayaan, Laguna, where
Emerita and Ireneo died. 6
Early that same morning of January 10, 1993, the police arrested Edwin Flora at his rented house in
Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna. Hermogenes Flora, after learning of the arrest of his brother,
proceeded first to the house of his aunt, Erlinda Pangan, in Pangil, Laguna but later that day, he fled to
his hometown in Pipian, San Fernando, Camarines Sur.
The autopsy conducted by the medico-legal officer, Dr. Ricardo R. Yambot, Jr., revealed the following
fatal wounds sustained by the deceased:
EMERITA ROMA
a) Gunshot of entrance at the posterior chest wall near the angle of the axillary region measuring 1 cm.
in diameter with clean cut inverted edges involving deep muscles, and subcutaneous tissues and travel
through both lobes of the lungs, including the great blood vessels.
About 400 cc of clotted blood was extracted from the cadaver. The bullet caliver 38 was extracted from
the lungs.
The cause of her death was attributed to "Hypovolemic" shock secondary to massive blood loss
secondary to gunshot wound of the posterior chest wall.7
IRENEO GALLARTE
Gunshot wound of entrance at the left arm, measuring 1 cm. in diameter with clean cut inverted edges
involving the deep muscles, subcutaneous tissues traveling through the anterior chest wall hitting both
lobes of the lungs and each great blood vessels obtaining the bullet fragments.
About 500 cc. of clotted blood was obtained from the cadaver.
His cause of death was attributed to "Hypovelemic" shock secondary to massive blood loss secondary to
gunshot wound of the left arm. 8
Flor Espinas submitted herself to a medical examination by Dr. Dennis Coronado. Her medical certificate
9 disclosed that she sustained a gunshot wound, point of entry, 2 x 1 cm. right supra scapular area mid
scapular line (+) contusion collar; and another gunshot wound with point of exit 1 x 1 cm. right deltoid
area.
Three criminal charges were filed against the Flora brothers, Hermogenes and Edwin, before Branch 26
of the Regional Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. During the trial, the prosecution presented two
eyewitnesses, namely, (1) Rosalie Roma, daughter of one of the victims, Emerita Roma, and (2) Flor

127
Espinas, the injured victim. Rosalie narrated the treacherous and injurious attack by Hermogenes Flora
against the victims. Flor detailed how she was shot by him.
Felipe Roma, the husband of Emerita, testified that his wife was forty-nine (49) years old at the time of
her death and was a paper mache maker, earning an average of one thousand (P1,000.00) pesos a week.
He claimed that his family incurred fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos as expenses for her wake and
burial.
Ireneo Gallarte's widow, Matiniana, testified that her husband was fifty-two (52) years old, a carpenter
and a substitute farmer earning one hundred (P100.00) to two hundred (P200.00) pesos a day. Her
family spent fourteen thousand (P14,000.00) pesos for his wake and burial.
The defense presented appellants Hermogenes and Edwin Flora, and Imelda Madera, the common-law
wife of Edwin. Appellants interposed alibi as their defense, summarized as follows:
Version of Edwin Flora:
Edwin Flora, 28 years old, testified that accused Hermogenes Flora is his brother. On January 10, 1993,
around 1:30 in the morning, he was at Barangay Bagumbayan, Paete, Laguna in the house of Johnny
Balticanto, sleeping with his wife. Policemen came at said house looking for his brother Hermogenes.
Replying to them that his brother was not living there, policemen took him instead to the Municipal
building of Paete and thereafter transferred and detained him to (sic) the Municipal building of
Kalayaan.
He recalled that on January 9, 1993, after coming from the cockpit at about 3:00 p.m. he and his accused
brother passed by the house of Julito Malubago. His brother Hermogenes was courting the daughter of
Julito Malubago. At about 6:00 p.m. he went home but his brother stayed behind since there would be a
dance party that night. 10
Version of Hermogenes Flora:
Hermogenes Flora, 21 years old, testified that he did not kill Ireneo Gallarte and Emerita Roma and shot
Flor Espina on January 10, 1993 at about 1:30 in the morning of Silab, Longos Kalayaan Laguna.
On said date, he was very much aslept (sic) in the house of his sister Shirley at Sitio Bagumbayan,
Longos, Kalayaan. From the time he slept at about 8:00 in the evening to the time he woke up at 6:00 in
the morning, he had not gone out of her sister's house. He knew the victims even before the incident
and he had no severe relation with them.
x x x           x x x          x x x
He also testified that in the morning of January 10, 1993, Imelda Madera came to their house and told
him that his brother Edwin was picked-up by the policemen the night before. Taken aback, his sister told
him to stay in the house while she would go to the municipal hall to see their brother Edwin. Thereafter,
his aunt and sister agreed that he should go to Bicol to inform their parents of what happened to Edwin.
11
Madera corroborated the testimony of her husband. 12
As earlier stated, the trial court convicted accused-appellants of the crime of double murder and
attempted murder. Appellants now raise this sole assigned error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE TWO ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO MORALLY ASCERTAIN THEIR IDENTITIES AND GUILT FOR THE CRIMES CHARGED.
At the outset, it may be noted that the trial court found both appellants have been positively identified.
However, they challenge the court's finding that they failed to prove their alibi because they did not
establish that it was physically impossible for them to be present at the crime scene. According to the
trial court, by Hermogenes' own admission, the house of his sister Shirley, where appellants were
allegedly sleeping, was only one (1) kilometer away from Sitio Silab, where the offenses allegedly took
place. The sole issue here, in our view, concerns only the plausibility of the appellants' alibi and the
credibility of the witnesses who identified them as the perpetrators of the crimes charged.

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For the defense of alibi to prosper, it is imperative that the accused establish two elements: (1) he was
not at the locus delicti at the time the offense was committed, and (2) it was physically impossible for
him to be at the scene at the time of its commission. 13 The defense of alibi and the usual corroboration
thereof are disfavored in law since both could be very easily contrived. 14 In the present case,
appellants' alibi is patently self-serving. Although Edwin's testimony was corroborated by his common-
law wife, it is ineffectual against the positive testimonies of eyewitnesses and surviving victims who
contradicted his alibi. Moreover, an alibi becomes less plausible as a defense when it is invoked and
sought to be crafted mainly by the accused himself and his immediate relative or relatives. 15
Appellants' defense of alibi should have been corroborated by a disinterested but credible witness. 16
Said uncorroborated alibi crumbles in the face of positive identification made by eyewitnesses. 17
In their bid for acquittal, appellants contend that they were not categorically and clearly identified by
the witnesses of the prosecution. They claim that the testimonies of the said witnesses were not entitled
to credence. They assail the credibility of two eyewitnesses, namely Rosalie Roma and Flor Espinas,
because of the alleged inconsistencies in their testimonies. For instance, according to appellants, Rosalie
Roma testified she was in the dance hall when the gunshots were heard, and that she was dancing in the
middle of the dance hall when Hermogenes shot Emerita Roma, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas,
Q Where were you when Hermogenes Roma shot these Ireneo Gallarte, Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas?
A I was dancing, sir. (Emphasis ours.)
Q And how far were you from Hermogenes Flora when he shot these persons while you were dancing?
A Two armslength from me only, sir. 18
However, to a similar question, later in her testimony, she replied,
Q And where were these Emerita Roma, Your mother, Ireneo Gallarte and Flor Espinas when
Hermogenes Flora shot at them?
A They were beside each other.
Q And how far were you from these 3 persons?
A Because they were standing beside the fence and I was only seated near them, sir. 19 (Emphasis ours.)
On this issue, we do not find any inconsistency that impairs her credibility or renders her entire
testimony worthless. Nothing here erodes the effectiveness of the prosecution evidence. What counts is
the witnesses' admitted proximity to the appellants. Was she close enough to see clearly what the
assailant was doing? If so, is there room for doubt concerning the accuracy of her identification of
appellant as one of the malefactors?
Appellants argue that since the attention of witness Flor Espinas was focused on the dance floor, it was
improbable for her to have seen the assailant commit the crimes. On cross-examination, said witness
testified that while it was true she was watching the people on the dance floor, nonetheless, she also
looked around (gumagala) and occasionally looked behind her and she saw both appellants who were
known to her. 20 Contrary to appellants' contention that Flor did not have a sufficient view to identify
the assailants, the trial court concluded that Flor was in a position to say who were in the party and to
observe what was going on. On this point, we concur with the trial court.
Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve respect, for
it had the opportunity to observe first-hand the deportment of witnesses during trial. 21 Furthermore,
minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility of witnesses, as they may even tend to strengthen
rather than weaken their credibility. 22 Inconsistencies in the testimony of prosecution witnesses with
respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect either the substance of their declaration,
their veracity, or the weight of their testimony. 23 Such minor flaws may even enhance the worth of a
testimony, for they guard against memorized falsities.1avvphi1
Appellants assert that Flor Espinas and Rosalie Roma were biased because they are relatives of the
victim Emerita Roma. However, unless there is a showing of improper motive on the part of the
witnesses for testifying against the accused, the fact that they are related to the victim does not render

129
their clear and positive testimony less worthy of credit. On the contrary, their natural interest in
securing the conviction of the guilty would deter them from implicating other persons other than the
culprits, for otherwise, the latter would thereby gain immunity. 24
Here, appellants did not present any proof of improper motive on the part of the eyewitnesses in
pointing to the Flora brothers as the perpetrators of the crime. There is no history of animosity between
them. Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas were merely innocent bystanders when hit by gunfire. Where
eyewitnesses had no grudge against the accused, their testimony is credible. 25 In the absence of
ulterior motive, mere relationship of witnesses to the victim does not discredit their testimony. 26
Coming now to the criminal responsibility of appellants. In the present case, when Hermogenes Flora
first fired his gun at Ireneo, but missed, and hit Emerita Roma and Flor Espinas instead, he became liable
for Emerita's death and Flor's injuries. Hermogenes cannot escape culpability on the basis of aberratio
ictus principle. Criminal liability is incurred by any person committing a felony, although the wrongful act
be different from that which he intended. 27
We find that the death of Emerita and of Ireneo were attended by treachery. In order for treachery to
exist, two conditions must concur namely: (1) the employment of means, methods or manner of
execution which would ensure the offender's safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of
the offended party; and (2) such means, method or manner of execution was deliberately or consciously
chosen by the offender. 28 When Hermogenes Flora suddenly shot Emerita and Ireneo, both were
helpless to defend themselves. Their deaths were murders, not simply homicides since the acts were
qualified by treachery. Thus, we are compelled to conclude that appellant Hermogenes Flora is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of double murder for the deaths of Emerita Roma and Ireneo Gallarte, and
guilty of attempted murder of Flor Espinas.1âwphi1.nêt
Is the other appellant, Edwin Flora, equally guilty as his brother, Hermogenes? For the murder of Ireneo
Gallarte, was there conspiracy between appellants? For conspiracy to exist, it is not required that there
be an agreement for an appreciable period prior to the occurrence. It is sufficient that at the time of the
commission of the offense, the accused and co-accused had the same purpose and were united in
execution. 29 Even if an accused did not fire a single shot but his conduct indicated cooperation with his
co-accused, as when his armed presence unquestionably gave encouragement and a sense of security to
the latter, his liability is that of a co-conspirator. 30 To hold an accused guilty as a co-conspirator by
reason of conspiracy, it must be shown that he had performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance
of the conspiracy. 31 Edwin's participation as the co-conspirator of Hermogenes was correctly
appreciated by the trial court, viz.:
Edwin Flora demonstrated not mere passive presence at the scene of the crime. He stayed beside his
brother Hermogenes, right behind the victims while the dance party drifted late into the night till the
early hours of the morning the following day. All the while, he and his brother gazed ominously at Ireneo
Gallarte, like hawks waiting for their prey. And then Edwin's flick of that lighted cigarette to the ground
signaled Hermogenes to commence shooting at the hapless victims. If ever Edwin appeared acquiescent
during the carnage, it was because no similar weapon was available for him. And he fled from the crime
scene together with his brother but not after violently neutralizing any obstacle on their way. While
getting away, Edwin grabbed Rosalie Roma and poked a knife at her neck when the latter hysterically
shouted "si Bodoy, Si Bodoy," in allusion to Hermogenes Flora, whom she saw as the gunwielder. All
told, Edwin, by his conduct, demonstrated unity of purpose and design with his brother Hermogenes in
committing the crimes charged. He is thus liable as co-conspirator. 32
However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury
of Flor Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done
outside the contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la
Cerna, 21 SCRA 569, 570 (1967), we held:

130
. . . And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here,
only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael
but was fleeing away when shot.
To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo
Gallarte. He has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor for the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by
his co-accused Hermogenes Flora.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
(1) Appellants Hermogenes Flora and Edwin Flora are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
MURDER of Ireneo Gallarte and sentenced to each suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
jointly and severally the heirs of Ireneo Gallarte in the sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity;
P14,000.00 compensatory damages for the wake and burial; and P470,232.00 representing loss of
income without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
(2) Hermogenes Flora is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the MURDER of Emerita Roma and
the ATTEMPTED MURDER of Flor Espinas. For the MURDER of EMERITA ROMA, Hermogenes Flora is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of Emerita Roma in the
sum of P50,000.00 as death indemnity, P14,000.00 as expenses for wake and burial, and P619,800.00 for
loss of earning capacity, without any subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. For the ATTEMPTED
MURDER of Flor Espinas, Hermogenes Flora is sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment from two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay P15,000.00 to Flor Espinas as indemnity for her injuries.
(3) Appellant Edwin Flora is ACQUITTED of the murder of Emerita Roma and the attempted murder of
Flor Espinas.
Costs against appellants.
SO ORDERED.

4. People v. Balderas, G.R. No. 106582, July 31, 1997

G.R. No. 106582 July 31, 1997
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUPERTO BALDERAS y CABUSOG, accused-appellant.

MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision dated July 10, 1992 of the Regional Trial Court at Dumaguete City
(Branch 30), finding accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas y Cabusog guilty of the murder and sentencing
accused-appellant to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of the victim Gilbert
Cadiente in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay costs. 1
It appears that in the evening of March 16, 1991 (not March 17, 1991 as some of the witnesses had
mistakenly testified), William Devila met accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas and the latter's
companions, Mckinly Diada and Samuel Casido, as the latter were on their way home from work in Sitio
Matambok, Barangay Mandalupang in the Municipality of Manjuyod, Negros Oriental. The three, who
are sugar cane plantation workers, were carrying their "lading" or cane knives. 2 William Devilla invited
the three to go with him to the Mayflower dance at Sitio Matambok and enjoy themselves "a little." The
three agreed. They arrived at the dance hall at 8:00 in the evening and proceeded to a store beside the
place where the dance was to be held and there had a drinking session. They consumed one flat bottle
of Añejo Rhum compliments of accused-appellant.

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What happened afterwards is subject of divergent accounts by the prosecution and the defense. The
prosecution's version is as follows:
Per the testimony of Vicente Calidguid, 3 at around midnight, there was an altercation between Samuel
Casido and Rudy Cadiente. The two were grappling for the hunting knife held by Casido. Calidguid saw
Gilbert Cadiente approaching, presumably to help his brother Rudy, but Gilbert was struck from behind
with a cane knife by accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas. Gilbert was hit on the back of the head.
Seriously wounded, he ran towards the house of his brother Rudy which was 12 meters away. Calidguid
said he was three to four meters away from the protagonists and that he was unaware of any previous
quarrel between the deceased and the accused.
For his part, Rudy Cadiente, a barangay tanod, testified 4 that at around midnight of March 16, 1991, he
saw Samuel Casido pull out a hunting knife in the middle of the dance floor. As he tried to disarm Casido,
William Devila intervened and told him to leave Casido alone and he (Devila) would take care of Casido.
As Rudy released Casido's hand, however, the latter boxed him. They then wrestled for possession of the
hunting knife. As the two fought each other, the Petromax lamp nearby went off, rendering the place
partly dark. Knowing that Casido had companions who were armed, Rudy Cadiente ran away and went
home. He identified Casido's companions as accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas, Mckinly Diada, and
William Devila. Upon reaching his house, Rudy saw his brother downstairs wounded. He had injuries on
the nape, right foot, and in the middle of the chest. He took Gilbert to the Bais Emergency Hospital, but
Gilbert was dead on arrival. In his cross-examination, Rudy Cadiente said that he did not see his brother
attacked.5
Dr. Norberto J. Baldado, Jr., resident physician of the Bais General Hospital, issued a medical certificate 6
which listed the wounds suffered by Gilbert as follows:
1) Stab wound, 1 cm , penetrating 6th ICS along left parasternal line;
2) Incised wound, 3 cm., right foot distal third anterior;
3) Lacerated wound, 5 cm., occiput.
Dr. Baldado, Jr. testified7 that Injury No. 18 located just below
the nipple on the left side of the breast bone was "penetrating" and "most probably . . . fatal" as it "most
probably" injured the blood vessels of the heart. Injury No. 2, 9 located on the right foot, was considered
by Dr. Baldado, Jr. not fatal unless complications set in. Injury No. 3 10 at the back part of the head was
also considered by Dr. Baldado, Jr. not fatal because it only lacerated the soft tissue of the head and did
not fracture the skull. According to Dr. Baldado, Jr., damage to the brain as a result of this injury was
"possible but quite remote."
Accused-appellant's defense is basically alibi. He testified 11 that in the evening of March 16, 1991, while
he, Samuel Casido, and Mckinly Diada were on their way to Cagihayan, Lamugong, Manjuyod, after
coming from work in Alangilan, they met William Devila who invited them to go to the dance in Sitio
Matambok. They decided to go with Devila, bringing with them their cane knives, which they used for
work, wrapped in the sleeves of their jackets. Accused-appellant and his companions arrived at the
dance at around 8:00 pm. They proceeded to a small store where they had some drinks and stayed
there until 10:00 p.m. Accused-appellant then went home with Mckinly Diada. Samuel Casido had gone
with his uncle Vicente Calidguid, while William Devila had joined his gang. Accused-appellant's residence
is four kilometers away from Sitio Matamok. Upon arriving at his house, accused-appellant went to
sleep. Diada proceeded to his house farther down the road. The following morning, accused-appellant
was told by Julio Palagtiw that he and Diada were wanted for the killing of Gilbert Cadiente. For this
reason, he and Diada went to the Office of the Chief of Police of Manjuyod to verify the information, but
no sooner had they arrived than they were taken into custody. Samuel Casido, who had earlier been
arrested, pointed to them as his companions. Accused-appellant and Diada stayed in jail from March 19
to 24 until they were released on the 25th upon the intercession of Alberto and Rudy Cadiente and
Devila. Accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by Mckinly Diada 12 and William Devila.13

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Devila's testimony added further details regarding the fight between Samuel Casido and Rudy Cadiente.
He testified that after failing to stop the fight, he left the protagonists, but, as he stepped back, he
bumped the lamp post and as a result the light was extinguished He moved over to a place 30 meters
away where there was a light and saw the fight break up as Samuel Casido ran away and Rudy Cadiente
went home, although before going Rudy hurled a stone at Casido. 14 Rudy Cadiente's house could be
seen from where the witness was. The people in the house were agog as they found Gilbert Cadiente
crawling on the ground wounded.15
In his cross-examination, Devilla was shown the affidavit he executed dated March 20, 1991. He denied
having made the answer to Question No. 3, in which he pointed to Samuel Casido as having stabbed
Gilbert Cadiente. He said that he had merely been made to make the answer by Rudy Cadiente. 16
The defense also called as witness SPO1 Jaime Tolete, who had filed the original criminal complaint
against accused-appellant. Tolete testified concerning entries in the police blotter of the PNP Police
Station of Manjuyod. The entries read:17
A (Witness reads) "Brgy. Capt. Jesus Cadalso Balasabas of Brgy. Mandalupang, reported to this unit at
about 1701H March 1991 while holding a benefit dance on the above-mentioned barangay and after the
dance ended they found outside the dancing hall that one Gilbert Cadiente, 17 years old, single and a
resident of Sitio Matambok, Manjuyod was lying on the ground between life and death and thereby his
elder brother, Rudy Cadiente saw him and found out that said victim has stab wound at the center of his
breast and allegedly stabbed by unknown person/persons and said victim was rushed to the hospital for
treatment but already died while on the way to the hospital. Sgd. Dominador Acabal."
In reference to Entry 0582 brother of victim, Rudy Cadiente, a Brgy. Ronda came to this office and told
the investigator that he allegedly saw the assailants of his younger brother wherein he further stated
that these persons were seen at the dancing area of said brgy. and were making trouble thereat. The ff.
were (1) Samuel Casido (2) Perto Balderas (3) Misoy (surname unknown) Sgd. SPO3 Errol Pineda.
Upon follow-up by elements of this unit, Samuel Casido was picked up at this residence and stated that
he was at the scene with the ff. persons that were his companions, namely: William Devila, Perto
Balderas and Mckinly Diada, all residents of Sit. Cagihayan, Brgy. Lamogong, this municipality. He further
stated that this William Devila struck first the petromax that gave light to the dancing area. Samuel
Casido is detained in jail for further investigation.
Another entry: "In reference to Entry 0582, page 090 re murder case that on or about 0345H 18 March
1991 one Restituto Palagtiw, a Brgy. Ronda of Brgy. Lamogong, this municipality, brought to this station
2 persons in the name of Mckinly Diada and Ruperto Balderas, all of Sit. Cagihayan, Brgy. Lamogong this
municipality. Subject persons were the subject of said murder case and were detained for further
investigation.
Another entry: "In reference to Entry 0582, 0584 and 0585 dtd. 17 March 1991 re hacking and stabbing
to death of one Gilbert Cadiente, suspect was apprehended by element of this unit one William Devila y
Picante and detained for further investigation.
Reference to Entry 0582, 0584, 0585, 0588 and 0592 dtd. 17 & 18 March 1991 re murder case at
Mandalupang this municipality, turned over to this unit a plastic bag with cane knife, clothing and 2
plastic plates owned by Samuel Casido by Brgy. Ronda Cadiente, Sgd. Dominador Acabal. That is all.
On July 29, 1992, the trial court rendered judgment finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of
Gilbert Cadiente in the amount of P50,000.00 and to pay costs.
In its decision, the RTC disregarded Exhs. 1-4 of the defense, which were the affidavits taken during the
preliminary investigation. Exh. 1 was William Devila's affidavit in the dialect dated May 22, 1991,
retracting his affidavit dated March 20, 1991 (Exh. 1-a) Exh. 2 was Alberto Cadiente's affidavit, while Exh.
3 was that of Rudy Cadiente. Xerox copies of certain pages of the police blotter (Exhs. 4 and 4-a) were
likewise excluded.18 The court explained that —

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Exhibit "1" is inadmissible as evidence as it is not accompanied by a translation in an official language as
required by Section 33, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. Exhibits "1-a," "2" and "3" which are
alleged affidavits are not only unidentified by the affiants, but have not been testified to as authentic by
the person who certified therein that they are true copies. Exhibit "4" is not certified as a faithful
reproduction of the original entries which it purports to represent. It is, therefore, worthless as
secondary evidence.
Exhibits "1" to "4," therefore, cannot be considered in favor of Accused by reason of the foregoing
infirmities.
With the exception of Devila's affidavit, the affidavits pointed to Samuel Casido as the person who
assaulted Gilbert Cadiente during the dance. In its decision, the RTC stated:
While the evidence has amply shown the treacherous participation of Accused Ruperto Balderas in
inflicting injuries on Gilbert Cadiente, justice has not been fully served by the absence of a
determination of the author or authors of the other injuries sustained by said victim as found by the
medical officer. During the trial the prosecution has passed sub-silencio the matter of the "stab wound"
in particular which the medical officer described as "most probably fatal" among the three injuries. It
must have been the active cause of the death of Gilbert Cadiente, yet no one has been called upon to
answer for it. This is a sad commentary on the criminal justice system in this jurisdiction. Accused
Ruperto Balderas should not suffer alone for the killing of Gilbert Cadiente, for all that he may have
done to said victim. A little extra effort, one that is sincere, well-meaning and diligent, is all that is
needed approximate the administration of justice to the people of the State who have been offended by
the criminal killing of one of them.
It is, therefore, suggested that another inquiry by the Police and by the office of the Provincial
Prosecutor be undertaken for the purpose of identifying the person or persons responsible for the
infliction of the "stab wound" and the "incised wound" which contributed to the death of Gilbert
Cadiente so that he or they may be made to answer for the same.
Accused-appellant appealed, assigning the following errors as having been committed by the trial court:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE
CRIME OF MURDER.
II. GRANTING WITHOUT ADMITTING THAT THE ACCUSED HACKED THE VICTIM ONCE AT THE BACK OF
HIS HEAD ACCORDING TO THE LONE TESTIMONY OF VICENTE CALIDGUID, THE SAME WAS NOT A FATAL
WOUND AS TESTIFIED BY THE DOCTOR.
Accused-appellant lays store by the fact that, during preliminary investigation, witnesses including the
victim's brother Rudy Cadiente, pointed to Samuel Casido as the one who attacked the victim with a
cane knife and an icepick. He argues that even granting that he indeed hacked the victim, he could not
be held liable for murder as the wound he inflicted was not fatal.
First. As in all criminal prosecutions, the conviction must be based on the strength of the prosecution's
evidence and not on the weakness or absence of evidence of the defense. 19 In this case, the only
prosecution eyewitness, Vicente Calidguid, testified that accused-appellant struck the victim Gilbert
Cadiente with a cane knife once, hitting him on the nape. The wound inflicted, which the doctor
identified as Wound No. 3, was accordingly to him not a fatal one.
The Solicitor General argues that infliction of this wound is sufficient to convict accused-appellant of
murder, because it "could have caused brain injury as admitted by the attending physician [and]
contributed as cause of the death of the victim." 20
This possibility, however, is a remote one as the following testimony of Dr. Norberto Baldado, Jr.
explains:21
Q Let us proceed to Finding No. 3 doctor, please elaborate.
A Lacerated wound, 5 cm. occiput, it is somewhere here (witness indicating in the sketch).
Q Please indicate that in your head.

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A (Witness touching the back part of his head).
Q What instrument could have caused this type of wound, doctor?
A A sharp-bladed instrument.
Q Are you familiar with the bolo used in cutting sugar cane?
A Yes.
Q Is it possible that type of instrument could have caused this kind of injury?
A It is possible because it is a bladed instrument.
Q And do you consider this as a fatal wound, doctor?
A No, it is not fatal.
Q Did you try to find out doctor, if there was any fracture of the skull as a result of the injury?
A Yes, and I found that there was no fracture underlying the injury.
Q Did you try to find our doctor, other fractures that might have resulted in this kind of injury, your third
finding?
A Well, it is a head injury although how subtle, the victim might sustain a cerebral or brain injury such as
hemorrhage or hematoma formation.
Q In this particular case doctor, did you try to find out whether probably that type of injury precipitated
the death of the victim?
A It is possible although it may be remote because this type of injury has not caused a skull fracture as
such.
Q Is it almost necessary that in this type of injury especially located on the head, is it almost necessary
that there should be a fracture of the skull that brain injury will not . . . ?
A It is not necessary that the fracture should sustain a brain injury. However in this case, the instrument
used was a bladed instrument and it seems improbable that the head was hit so hard by the instrument
the skull was not fractured, it was only the soft tissue there that was lacerated, the soft tissue sustained
by the victim.
Q But as you said there was a possibility that as a result of this injury and considering its nature, brain
damage could result?
A More so with the blunt injury.
Q And by that answer doctor, you mean that it is possible?
A It is possible but quite remote.
The Court cannot convict accused-appellant of murder on this "remote" possibility that Injury No. 3
could have caused accused-appellant's death. Indeed, the prosecution's evidence in this regard,
consisting of Dr. Baldado, Jr.'s testimony, fails to establish that the act of the accused-appellant
produced the injury constituting the penal offense for which he stands convicted, i.e.,
murder.22
Dr. Baldado, Jr. found it was Injury No. 1, the stab wound located on the left side of the victim's chest,
which was "penetrating" and "most probably . . . fatal because right beneath that area [are] the blood
vessels of the heart and there are many blood vessels there and most probably it was injured by that
stab wound."23
Since there is no eyewitness account regarding the infliction of the fatal wound, it becomes necessary to
consider if there is circumstantial evidence to make accused responsible for the same. The
circumstances that might possibly tie accused-appellant to this wound are the following: (1) the fact that
accused-appellant attacked Gilbert Cadiente and wounded him on the back of his head; (2) the fact that
the fatal wound on the chest was caused by a "pointed instrument," 24 and (3) the fact that accused-
appellant's "lading" or cane knife was a "pointed instrument."
These circumstances must be appraised in light of the requirements of the Rules of Court for sufficiency
of circumstantial evidence, i.e., (1) there is more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to

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produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 25 The circumstances must form an unbroken chain
which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the defendant, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person.26
First of all the fact that accused-appellant wounded Gilbert Cadiente does not necessarily mean that he
also inflicted all the wounds which the victim was found to have suffered. Indeed Vicente Calidguid's
testimony was that accused-appellant hit Gilbert only once after which both he and his victim ran away.
Calidguid's testimony was as follows:27
FISCAL HERMOSA
Q: How many times did Ruperto Balderas hack Gilbert Cadiente?
A: Once.
Q: What happened to Gilbert Cadiente upon being hit by the hack of Ruperto Balderas?
A: He went to the house of his brother Rudy Cadiente.
Q: What about Ruperto Balderas, what did he do after hacking Gilbert Cadiente?
A: They ran away.
Q: You said "they", whom are you referring as "they"?
A: He (witness pointing to the accused).
x x x           x x x          x x x
ATTY. GARCIA:
Q: And Gilbert Cadiente upon being hit by the blow of the cane knife at his head went towards the
house of his elder brother, am I right?
A: Yes.
Q: And where was the accused then a that time when this Gilbert Cadiente went to the house of his
elder brother?
A: He ran.
Q: Towards where?
A: He went home.
Q: How about the cane knife, where was it?
A: He brought it along with him.
It is quite possible that after hitting the victim once, accused-appellant ran after the victim and wounded
him again. But this is a conjecture and a surmise which cannot stand for proof, much less be the basis of
a conviction. Another person could have inflicted the fatal stab. In fact the trial court suspected there
was at least another person responsible for Gilbert Cadiente's killing and it said so in its decision quoted
above.
We next go to the matter of the weapon used to inflict the wound in question, a "sharp-pointed
instrument" which penetrated to the heart of the victim. There were a number of persons present at the
dance who also had cane knives, among whom were accused-appellant's companions, Samuel Casido
and Mckinly Diada.
Moreover, the medical certificate describes the fatal wound as "1 cm. long." It is doubtful whether a
cane knife which has a maximum width of five inches, although possessing a sharp pointed end, can
leave a surface wound of that minuscule length if it had to penetrate to the heart, thereby damaging the
blood vessels thereof. A more probable weapon would be an icepick.
In sum, the circumstantial evidence in this case does not point with certainty to accused-appellant as
responsible for the fatal wound suffered by Gilbert Cadiente. In this, as in all criminal cases, speculation
and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish guilt of an accused beyond
reasonable doubt.28 Suspicion, no matter how strong, can not sway judgment. 29 Here, the means and
the opportunity to inflict the fatal wound were not accused-appellant's alone to the exclusion of all
others.

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Second. The trial court nonetheless found accused-appellant guilty of the murder of Gilbert Cadiente
because of his "treacherous participation in inflicting injuries on Gilbert Cadiente." This would be correct
if there was a conspiracy. But, as noted by the Solicitor General, the information did not allege
conspiracy and the number of the author/authors of the other injuries as in fact, it charged accused-
appellant of having inflicted all the wounds." 30
At any rate, conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 31 In this case not only was there no
evidence of prior agreement. There was also no showing of concerted action taken to kill Gilbert
Cadiente.
Third. Although there were many present at the dance who could possibly have witnessed the killing of
Gilbert Cadiente, the prosecution was able to present only one eyewitness, Vicente Calidguid, and that
was only with respect to Injury No. 3, a non-fatal wound. The police seized a cane knife and certain
clothing in relation to the incident, 32 but for one reason or another they did not produce them during
trial. On the other hand, the doctor who executed a medical certificate could only talk of probabilities as
to the cause of the victim's death for lack of an autopsy. 33 This gap in the prosecution's evidence moved
the trial court to call for zeal and diligence in investigative work by the law enforcement officials
concerned.
Fourth. Can accused-appellant totally escape criminal liability in this case?
The answer is in the negative. Accused-appellant's main defense is alibi. For alibi to prosper, he must
prove not only that he was not present at the scene of the crime but also that it was physically
impossible or him to have been present there at the time the offense was committed. 34 This accused-
appellant failed to do.
By his own account, he left the dance at around 10:00 in the evening to go to his home four kilometers
away.35 Walking with Mckinly Diada, he arrived home at past 11:00 o'clock. 36 (Per Diada's testimony,
he looked at his watch and determined accused-appellant's arrival to be at about 11 p.m. 37) Thus it was
possible, assuming that accused-appellant had indeed gone home, for him to return to the dance and be
present when Rudy Cadiente and Samuel Casido had an altercation at past midnight.
Moreover, there are contradictions in accused-appellant's alibi. He testified that when he left the dance
at around 10:00 with Mckinly Diada, Samuel Casido was no longer there, having earlier gone with his
uncle, Vicente Calidguid.38 But William Devila, who was called to corroborate accused-appellant's alibi,
belied the latter's claim by stating that Casido left with Vicente Calidguid two minutes after accused-
appellant and Mckinly Diada had left.39 It was therefore possible that accused-appellant stayed in the
place until the time when the fight between Rudy Cadiente and Samuel Casido took place. Hence the
testimony of Calidguid that accused-appellant actually struck Gilbert Cadiente with his cane knife.
There is also variance between accused-appellant's testimony and Mckinly Diada's account of the state
of accused-appellant's household when accused-appellant arrived home. Accused-appellant claimed
that when he arrive home, "everybody was asleep already," 40 but Mckinly Diada said accused-
appellant's wife and children "were still awake because his youngest child is an abnormal child which
caused so much inconvenience because he is a premature." 41
Nor can accused-appellant profit from the affidavits of William Devila dated March 20, 1991 (Exh. 1-a),
Alberto Cadiente (Exh. 2), and Rudy Cadiente (Exh. 3), which allegedly point to Casido as the assailant.
Devila retracted his affidavit. For its part, the trial court, as already stated, excluded the affidavits from
evidence for the reason that they had not been identified by the affiants.
Indeed, because Alberto Cadiente was not presented to testify, his affidavit could only constitute
hearsay evidence. On the other hand, Rudy Cadiente was not confronted with his affidavit in which he
allegedly stated that Samuel Casido was his brother's assailant which would cast doubt on his testimony
in court that he did not see who his brother's assailant was. Thus Calidguid's eyewitness account that
accused-appellant assaulted Gilbert Cadiente from behind stands unrebutted. 42

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Fifth. We go now to the determination of accused-appellant's criminal liability. We agree with the
Solicitor General that the weapon used and the location of the wound which is at the back of the head, a
vital part of the body, unmistakably show an intent to kill. However for some reason other than his own
desistance, accused-appellant was not able to perform all the acts of execution necessary to
consummate the killing, since the wound he had inflicted was not fatal. Accused-appellant ran away
after delivering the blow to the back of the head of the victim. As all acts of execution necessary to
produce the felony were not done, the crime for which he can be held liable is only that of attempted
murder.43
Accused-appellant's attack was sudden and done without any provocation. Because it was made from
behind, the victim was unable to defend himself. This circumstance constitutes treachery 44 which
qualifies the crime to attempted murder.
Under Art. 51 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty to be imposed upon the principal of an attempted
crime shall be lower by two degrees than that prescribed for the consummated felony. Prior to its
amendment by R.A. No. 7659, Art. 248 provided that the crime of murder shall be punished by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In accordance with Art. 61(3), the penalty two degrees lower
would be prision correctional maximum to prision mayor medium. Since there is no modifying
circumstance, the medium period of the penalty, which is prision mayor minimum, should be imposed
as the maximum penalty. Under Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is entitled to a
minimum penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correctional in its medium period as
the penalty next lower than the penalty for attempted murder.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED, finding accused-appellant Ruperto Balderas y
Cabusog guilty of attempted murder only and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
maximum, with the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay costs.
SO ORDERED.

5. People v. Abulon, G.R. No. 174473, Aug. 17, 2007

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA, Appellant.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
For automatic review is the decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 28 April 2006, affirming with
modification the decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, 3 dated 27
December 2000, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of qualified rape and one
(1) count of acts of lasciviousness.
In three (3) separate Informations4 for Criminal Cases No. SC-7422, SC-7423 and SC-7424 all dated 16
June 1999, appellant was indicted before the RTC for three (3) counts of qualified rape against his minor
daughter AAA.5 The accusatory portions in all the Informations are identical, except as regards the date
of commission of the crime. The Information in Criminal Case No. SC-7422 reads:
At the instance of the private complainant [AAA] with the conformity of her mother [BBB] 6 in a sworn
complaint filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Lumban-Kalayaan (Laguna), the undersigned
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Laguna hereby accuses ALVIN ABULON Y SALVANIA, of the crime of
"RAPE," committed as follows:
"That on or about March 14, 1999, in the Municipality of Kalayaan, Province of Laguna, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd designs, with grave abuse of
confidence or obvious ungratefulness, and with force and intimidation, did then and there wilfully [ sic],

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unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of his legitimate minor daughter, [AAA], who at the
[sic] time was thirteen (13) years of age, against her will and consent and to her damage and prejudice."
CONTRARY TO LAW.
After appellant pleaded not guilty, trial ensued with AAA herself, as the first prosecution witness,
testifying to the following facts:
AAA is the oldest of five (5) legitimate children born to appellant and BBB. On 14, 15, and 16 March
1999, appellant raped AAA. The first rape incident occurred at around 1:30 in the morning of 14 March
1999. AAA was home, fast asleep next to her brother and sister when she suddenly woke up to the noise
created by her father who arrived drunk, but who likewise soon thereafter returned to the wedding
festivities he was attending. Abiding by their father’s instructions, AAA and her siblings went back to
sleep.7
AAA was next awakened by the weight of her father lying naked on top of her. Appellant had removed
her underwear while she slept. He poked a knife on AAA’s waist and threatened to kill her and her
siblings if she reported the incident to anyone. She begged him to stop but he proceeded to kiss her
mouth, vagina, and breast, and to have carnal knowledge of her. 8 Although they witnessed the ongoing
ordeal, AAA’s siblings could do nothing but cry as appellant likewise poked the knife on them. 9 The
following morning, AAA found a whitish substance and blood stains on her panty. 10
On 15 March 1999, at around 10:30 in the evening, AAA and her siblings were awakened as appellant
came home drunk. He told them to eat first as they had not taken their supper yet. After dining
together, appellant left and AAA, her brother, and her sister went back to sleep. 11 As in the previous
evening, appellant roused AAA in mid-sleep. This time, she woke up with her father holding her hand,
covering her mouth and lying on top of her. He undressed AAA, then mounted her. Repeatedly, he
inserted his penis into her vagina, and AAA felt pain in her private parts. Appellant also kissed and
fondled AAA on different parts of her body. 12
Again, AAA’s siblings could only cry as they saw appellant rape their sister. AAA’s sister, however, took a
pen and wrote her a note which read: "Ate, let us tell what father was doing to the police officer." After
appellant had raped AAA, the latter’s sister asked their father why he had done such to AAA. In
response, appellant spanked AAA’s sister and threatened to kill all of them should they report the
incidents to the police. 13 The sisters nonetheless related to their relatives AAA’s misfortune, but the
relatives did not take heed as they regarded appellant to be a kind man. 14
The third rape episode happened at around 3:30 in the morning of 16 March 1999. Although appellant
did not insert his penis into AAA’s vagina on this occasion, he took off her lower undergarments and
kissed her vagina.15 On cross-examination, AAA asserted that her father inserted his tongue into the hole
of her vagina and she felt pain because of this. 16
To corroborate AAA’s testimony, the prosecution presented BBB and AAA’s 6-year old brother CCC. 17
BBB testified that she was a stay-in housemaid working in Las Piñas on the dates that her daughter was
raped by appellant. On 26 March 1999, she went home and stayed with her family. However, it was only
on 4 May 1999 that BBB learned of the rape, when CCC told her that appellant had raped AAA three (3)
times and that he had seen his father on top of his sister during those occasions. BBB then verified the
matter with AAA herself, and the latter affirmed the incidents. BBB thus took AAA with her to the
barangay and police authorities to report the incidents, and later to the provincial hospital for medical
examination.18
CCC testified that on three (3) separate occasions, he saw his father lying naked on top of AAA, who was
likewise naked.19
The prosecution also presented SPO1 Bayani G. Montesur (SPO1 Montesur) and Dr. Gloria Cabael (Dr.
Cabael). SPO1 Montesur identified the Police Blotter of 4 May 1999 which recorded the complaints of
rape against appellant and the report of the latter’s arrest. 20 Dr. Cabael, on the other hand, testified that

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she examined AAA on 4 May 1999 upon the request of Police Officer Gallarosa. She identified the Rape
Case Report she prepared thereafter. 21
Appellant testified as the sole witness on his behalf, proffering denial and alibi as his defenses.
According to appellant, he was hired by his aunt, Raquel Masangkay, to deliver hogs and that at 1:30 in
the morning of 14 March 1999, he was in Calamba, Laguna pursuant to such employment. He averred
that he went home at 7:00 in the morning of the following day and thus could not have raped his
daughter as alleged.22 Likewise denying the second rape charge, appellant testified that on 15 March
1999, he attended a wedding ceremony in Sityo Kalayaan, San Antonio, Kalayaan, Laguna. He went
home drunk at 6:00 that evening and promptly went to sleep. 23 Similarly, at 3:00 in the morning of 16
March 1999, appellant claimed to have been asleep with his children and could not have thus
committed the rape as charged.24
Finding that the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of appellant of the crime of
qualified rape in Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 and the crime of acts of lasciviousness in
Criminal Case No. SC-7424, the RTC rendered a Consolidated Judgment against appellant and sentenced
him accordingly, thus:
WHEREFORE:
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7422, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise
known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of
DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums:
₱ 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7423, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of CONSUMMATED QUALIFIED RAPE as defined and
penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7639, otherwise
known as the DEATH PENALTY LAW, and hereby sentences him to suffer the SUPREME PENALTY of
DEATH and to indemnify the offended party [AAA] the following sums:
₱ 75,000.00 - as civil indemnity
50,000.00 - as moral damages; and
50,000.00 - as exemplary damages.
Under Criminal Case No. SC-7424, this Court finds the accused ALVIN ABULON y SALVANIA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as PRINCIPAL of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS as defined and penalized
under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for SIX (6) MONTHS of ARRESTO MAYOR as MINIMUM to SIX (6) YEARS of PRISION
CORRECCIONAL as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered to pay the costs of the instant three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.25
With the death penalty imposed on appellant, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review.
However, pursuant to this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,26 the case was transferred to the Court of
Appeals. On 28 April 2006, the appellate court rendered its decision affirming appellant’s conviction, but
with modification as to damages awarded to the victim. The dispositive portion of the decision states:

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WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna, Branch 28, in Criminal Case
Nos. SC-7422 and SC-7423 finding appellant Alvin S. Abulon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of qualified rape, and in Criminal Case No. SC-7424, finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness, are hereby AFFIRMED.
The civil aspect of the case is MODIFIED to read: In Criminal Case Nos. SC-7422-7423, the award of
exemplary damages in the amount of [₱]50,000.00 is reduced to [₱]25,000.00. In Criminal Case No. SC-
7424, appellant is ordered to pay the victim the amount of [₱]30,000.00 as moral damages. We affirm in
all other respects.
Pursuant to A.M. 00-5-03-SC (Amendments to the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure to Govern Death
Penalty Cases), which took effect on October 15, 2004, this case is elevated and certified to the Supreme
Court for its automatic review.
SO ORDERED.27
In his Brief,28 appellant assails his conviction and imputes grave error to the trial court for giving weight
and credence to the testimony of AAA. In particular, he makes capital of AAA’s delay in reporting the
incidents to her mother. He likewise impugns the trial court’s alleged bias in propounding inappropriate
leading questions to private complainant AAA. Finally, he maintains that the Informations against him
are defective as they failed to allege the key element of force and/or intimidation. 29
We affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals with modifications.
The duty to ascertain the competence and credibility of a witness rests primarily with the trial court, 30
because it has the unique position of observing the witness’s deportment on the stand while testifying.
Absent any compelling reason to justify the reversal of the evaluations and conclusions of the trial court,
the reviewing court is generally bound by the former’s findings. 31
In rape cases particularly, the conviction or acquittal of the accused most often depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainant’s testimony. By the very nature of this crime, it is generally
unwitnessed and usually the victim is left to testify for herself. 32 Her testimony is most vital and must be
received with the utmost caution.33 When a rape victim’s testimony, however, is straightforward and
marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it deserves full faith and confidence and cannot
be discarded. Once found credible, her lone testimony is sufficient to sustain a conviction. 34
The court a quo found the testimony of AAA in its entirety to be credible, made in a candid,
spontaneous, and straightforward manner and never shaken even under rigid cross-examination. 35 We
agree that AAA’s narration of her harrowing experience is worthy of credence, thus:
Criminal Case No. SC-7422
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Tell us what happened at around 1:30 in the morning of March 11, [sic] 1999 to you?
A : My brother and sister and I were already asleep when my father who was drank [ sic] came home. We
told him to just sleep. My father told us that he would still return to the wedding celebration (kasalan).
xxxx
Q : What happened next when you continued sleeping?
A : I was awakened when I felt my father already on top of me, sir.
Q : Tell us exactly what was [sic] your position then at that time you woke up?
A : I was still lying straight down, sir.
Q : How about your father in relation to you, where was he at the time you woke up?
A : He was on top (nakadagan) of me, sir.
Court:
Q : Was he naked?
A : Already naked, Your Honor.
Q : How about you, do [sic] you have your clothes on?
A : I have [sic] my lady sando on, Your Honor.

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Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Are [sic] you still wearing your panty when you were awakened?
A : No more, sir.
xxxx
Q : What did your father do aside from placing his body on top of you?
A : He poked a knife on [sic] me, sir.
Court:
Q : Did he say something?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : What did he say?
A : He said that if he [sic] report her [sic] to anybody he would kill us, Your Honor.
xxxx
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : What else did he do aside from telling you "huag kang magsusumbong"?
A : He also poked the knife on [sic] my brother and sister, sir.
Q : They were already awakened at that time?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What else did he do aside from poking a knife on [sic] you and your brother and sister?
A : No more, sir.
Court:
Q : While your father according to you is [sic] on top of you, what did he do if any?
A : "Kinayog na po niya ako."
Q : What do you mean by telling [sic] "kinayog na po niya ako"?
A : He was moving, Your Honor.
Q : While your father was moving, what else was happening at that time?
A : I felt pain, Your Honor.
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : From where did you feel that pain?
A : From my private part, sir.
xxxx
Q : Do you know if you know why you felt the pain on the lower portion of your body?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Please tell us if you know?
A : Something whitish coming out from it, sir.
Court:
Q : From where did it come from [sic]? That whitish substance?
A : From my father’s private part, Your Honor.
Q : Why, what happened to the private part of your father?
A : I do not know, Your Honor.
Q : When you felt pain, what was your father doing then?
A : He repeated what he told [sic] previously not to tell to [sic] anybody.
Q : At that time, did you see the private part of your father?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : When you felt pain. Do you know what is [sic] happening to the private part of your father?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : What was happening?
A : His private part stiffened or hardened (tumirik), Your Honor.
Q : Where was it placed if any?

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A : Into my private part, Your Honor.
Q : Did the private part of you father actually penetrate your vagina?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : What did you feel at the time the penis of your father entered your vagina?
A : It was painful, Your Honor.
Q : At that time was your father making any movement?
A : Yes, Your Honor.
Q : Will you describe the movement made by your father?
A : (Witness demonstrating an upward and downward stroke by placing her right palm over her left
hand)
Trial Prosecutor:
Q : Did he kiss you?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : In what part of your body?
A : On my mouth, sir.
Q : Aside from your mouth, what other part or parts of your body did he kiss?
A : On my private part, sir.
Q : When did he kiss you private part, before inserting his penis or after?
A : After he inserted his penis, sir.
Q : What other part of your body did he kiss?
A : On my breast, sir.36
xxxx
Criminal Case No. SC-7423
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q : Now, you said that the second incident happened [on] March 15, 1999, am I correct?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And where and what time said [sic] second incident happened?
A : 10:30 in the evening, sir, also in our house, sir.
xxxx
Q : And what were you doing when your father returned at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening?
A : We were all asleep, sir.
Q : And how did you come to know that he returned at around 11:00 P.M.?
A : My father suddenly held my hand, sir.
Q : And because of that, you were awakened?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : And what happened when you were awakened because your father held your hand?
A : He covered my mouth, sir.
Q : And after covering your mouth, what else did he do?
A : He removed the lower portion of my clothes. "Hinubuan po niya ako."
xxxx
Q : After removing your lady sando, what else did he do?
A : He laid himself on top of me, sir.
xxxx
Q : Now, what did he do to you when he was already on top of you?
A : He was "kinakayog niya po ako."
Q : Aside from "kinakayog," what else did he do?
A : He kissed my breast, sir.
Q : Aside from that, what else?

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A : He likewise touched my private part, sir.
Q : When he was on top of you, do you know where was [sic] his penis at that time?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Where?
A : Into my vagina, sir.
Q : How did you come to know that the penis of your father was inside your vagina?
A : I felt pain in my private part, sir.
Q : And do you know why you felt pain in your private part?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : Why?
A : His private part …. (Thereafter witness is crying while uttering words: "I am afraid I might be killed by
my father.") He held his penis into my vagina. Thereafter, inserted it repeatedly into mine, sir.
Q : And you were able to actually feel his penis inside your vagina?
A : Yes, sir. 37
xxxx
Criminal Case No. SC-7424
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q : Now, you said also that you were raped on March 16, 1999, am I correct?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What time?
A : It was 3:30 o’clock in the morning, sir.
xxxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q Now, how did it happen, that third incident?
A I was able to run downstairs but when I was about to open the door, he was able to hold my dress, sir.
Q : Was your father drunk at that time?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : How did you come to know?
A : His eyes were red and he was laughing at me while telling me: "It is your end." (Witness crying while
answering the question.)
Q : Now, what happened when your father was able to hold your dress?
A : He carried me upstairs, sir.
Q : Was he able to carry you upstairs?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What did he do, if any, when you were upstairs?
A : He removed my panty and shortpants, sir.
Q : After removing your shorts and panty, what else did he do?
A : No more but he kissed my vagina.
Q : Which part of your vagina did he kiss?
A : That part of my vagina with hold [sic].
Court:
Q : What about your upper garments at that time?
A : He did not remove it, Your Honor.
Q : What else did he do, aside from that?
A : Nothing more, just that.
Q : After kissing your vagina, what else happened, if any?
A : He again poked the knife on us, Your Honor.
Q : At that time, was your father naked or not?

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A : Still with his clothes on, Your Honor.
xxxx
Q : For clarification, what else, if any, did your father do after your father kissed your vagina?
A : Nothing more, merely that act, Your Honor.
Q : You mean your father did not insert his penis to [sic] your vagina anymore?
A : No more, Your Honor.
xxxx
TP. Arcigal, Jr.:
Q : Now, what did he use in kissing your clitoris?
A : His tongue, sir.
Q : How did you come to know that it was his tongue that he used?
A : It is because I saw him put out his tongue, sir. 38
Verily, it is inconceivable and contrary to human experience for a daughter, who is attached to her
father by the natural bond of love and affection, to accuse him of rape, unless he is the one who raped
and defoliated her.39 As we have pronounced in People v. Canoy:40
It is unthinkable for a daughter to accuse her own father, to submit herself for examination of her most
intimate parts, put her life to public scrutiny and expose herself, along with her family, to shame, pity or
even ridicule not just for a simple offense but for a crime so serious that could mean the death sentence
to the very person to whom she owes her life, had she really not have been aggrieved. Nor do we
believe that the victim would fabricate a story of rape simply because she wanted to exact revenge
against her father, appellant herein, for allegedly scolding and maltreating her. 41
In stark contrast with AAA’s convincing recital of facts, supported as it was by the testimonies of BBB
and CCC, are appellant’s uncorroborated and shaky defenses of denial and alibi. Nothing is more settled
in criminal law jurisprudence than that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony and identification of the complainant. 42 Alibi is an inherently weak defense, which is viewed
with suspicion because it can easily be fabricated. 43 Denial is an intrinsically weak defense which must be
buttressed with strong evidence of non-culpability to merit credibility. 44
The records disclose that not a shred of evidence was adduced by appellant to corroborate his alibi. Alibi
must be supported by credible corroboration from disinterested witnesses, otherwise, it is fatal to the
accused.45 Further, for alibi to prosper, it must be demonstrated that it was physically impossible for
appellant to be present at the place where the crime was committed at the time of its commission. 46 By
his own testimony, appellant clearly failed to show that it was physically impossible for him to have
been present at the scene of the crime when the rapes were alleged to have occurred. Except for the
first incident, appellant was within the vicinity of his home and in fact alleged that he was supposedly
even sleeping therein on the occasion of the second and third incidents.1avvphi1
Appellant’s contention that AAA’s accusations are clouded by her failure to report the alleged
occurrences of rape is unmeritorious. To begin with, AAA categorically testified that she told her father’s
niece about the incidents. However, the latter doubted her, believing instead that appellant was not
that kind of man. AAA’s subsequent attempt to report the incidents to the barangay turned out to be
futile as well as she was only able to speak with the barangay driver, who happened to be appellant’s
brother-in-law. She was likewise disbelieved by the latter. Her disclosure of the rapes to a certain Menoy
did not yield any positive result either. Fearing for the lives of her grandparents, AAA decided not to tell
them about the incidents.47
A child of thirteen years cannot be expected to know how to go about reporting the crime to the
authorities.48 Indeed, We see how AAA must have felt absolutely hopeless since the people around her
were relatives of her father and her attempts to solicit help from them were in vain. Thus, AAA’s silence
in not reporting the incidents to her mother and filing the appropriate case against appellant for over a
month is sufficiently explained. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only if the delay was

145
unreasonable and unexplained. 49 It is not beyond ken that the child, living under threat from appellant
and having been turned away by trusted relatives, even accused by them of lying, would simply opt to
just suffer in silence thereafter. In People v. Gutierrez, 50 we held:
Complainant’s failure to immediately report the rape does not diminish her credibility. The silence of a
victim of rape or her failure to disclose her misfortune to the authorities without loss of material time
does not prove that her charge is baseless and fabricated. It is not uncommon for young girls to conceal
for some time the assault on their virtues because of the rapist’s threat on their lives, more so when the
offender is someone whom she knew and who was living with her. 51
Appellant brands the trial judge as partial against him for propounding leading questions to AAA.
According to him, were it not for the lower court’s and the prosecution’s biased leading questions, AAA
would not have proven the elements of the crimes charged. 52
Appellant’s argument is not well-taken. It is the judge’s prerogative to ask clarificatory queries to ferret
out the truth.53 It cannot be taken against him if the questions he propounds reveal certain truths which,
in turn, tend to destroy the theory of one party. 54 After all, the judge is the arbiter and ought to be
satisfied himself as to the respective merits and claims of both parties in accord with the stringent
demands of due process.55 Also, being the arbiter, he may properly intervene in the presentation of
evidence to expedite proceedings and prevent unnecessary waste of time. 56
Besides, jurisprudence explains that allegations of bias on the part of the trial court should be received
with caution, especially when the queries by the judge did not prejudice the accused. The propriety of
the judge’s questions is determined by their quality and not necessarily by their quantity and, in any
event, by the test of whether the defendant was prejudiced by such questioning or not. 57 In the instant
case, the Court finds that on the whole, the questions propounded by the judge a quo were but
clarificatory in nature and that, concomitantly, appellant failed to satisfactorily establish that he was
prejudiced by such queries.
The matter of the purportedly defective Informations was properly addressed by the Court of Appeals,
pointing out that a close scrutiny of the Informations would reveal that the words "force and/or
intimidation" are specifically alleged therein. 58 Even if these were not so, well-established is the rule that
force or intimidation need not be proven in incestuous cases. The overpowering moral influence of a
father over his daughter takes the place of violence and offer of resistance ordinarily required in rape
cases where the accused is unrelated to the victim. 59
Now, we turn to the determination of the crime for which appellant under the third charge is liable and
the corresponding penalty therefor. In the Brief for the People, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
argues that all three (3) charges of rape, including the rape committed on 16 March 1999 subject of
Criminal Case No. SC-7424, were proved beyond reasonable doubt. The court a quo held that it was
clear from the evidence that appellant merely kissed the vagina of AAA and made no attempt of
penetration, meaning penile penetration, and for that reason found him guilty of acts of lasciviousness
only.60 Yet, in affirming the trial court, the Court of Appeals did not find any categorical testimony on
AAA’s part that appellant had inserted his tongue in her vagina, stressing instead that the mere
probability of such insertion cannot take the place of proof required to establish the guilt of appellant
beyond reasonable doubt for rape.61
The automatic appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case for review, 62 as in this case. Thus, this Court
is mandated to re-examine the vital facts established a quo and to properly apply the law thereto. The
two courts below were both mistaken, as we note that AAA unqualifiedly testified on cross-examination
to appellant’s insertion of his tongue into her vagina, viz:
Court:
Q : On the third time you are [sic] allegedly raped, you said it happened at 3:30 in the morning of March
16, 1999.
A : Yes, sir.

146
Q : And you said yesterday that he did not insert his pennies [sic] to [sic] your vagina on March 16?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : What he did is he kissed your vagina?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : For how long did he kiss your vagina?
A : Two minutes, sir.
Q : What did he actually do when he kissed your vagina?
A : He kissed my vagina, thereafter he laughed and laughed.
Q : You mean to tell the court when he kissed your vagina he used his lips?
A : His lips and tongue, sir.
Q : What did he do?
A : He put out his tongue thereafter he "inano" the hole of my vagina.
Court:
Q : What did your father do with his tongue?
A : He placed it in the hole of my vagina.
Q : Did you feel pain?
A : Yes, sir.
Q : By just kissing your vagina you felt pain?
A : Yes, Your Honor.63
Notwithstanding the explicit testimony of AAA on the matter, this Court cannot find appellant guilty of
rape as proved, but of acts of lasciviousness only. In reaching this conclusion, we take a route different
from the ones respectively taken by the courts below.
With the enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as the Anti-Rape Law of
1997,64 the concept of rape was revolutionized with the new recognition that the crime should include
sexual violence on the woman’s sex-related orifices other than her organ, and be expanded as well to
cover gender-free rape.65 The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime
against persons and the introduction of rape by "sexual assault" 66 as differentiated from the traditional
"rape through carnal knowledge" or "rape through sexual intercourse."
Section 2 of the law provides:
Sec. 2. Rape as a Crime Against Persons. – The crime of rape shall hereafter be classified as a Crime
Against Persons under Title Eight of Act No. 9815, as amended, otherwise known as the Revised Penal
Code. Accordingly, there shall be incorporated into Title Eight of the same Code a new chapter to be
known as Chapter Three on Rape, to read as follows:
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. – Rape Is Committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
(a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
(b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise is unconscious;
(c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
(d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit
an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Paragraph 1 under Section 2 of R.A. No. 8353, which is now Paragraph 1 of the new Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code, covers rape through sexual intercourse while paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual
assault. Rape through sexual intercourse is also denominated as "organ rape" or "penile rape." On the
other hand, rape by sexual assault is otherwise called "instrument or object rape," 67 also "gender-free
rape,"68 or the narrower "homosexual rape."69

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In People v. Silvano,70 the Court recognized that the father’s insertion of his tongue and finger into his
daughter’s vaginal orifice would have subjected him to liability for "instrument or object rape" had the
new law been in effect already at the time he committed the acts. Similarly, in People v. Miranda,71 the
Court observed that appellant’s insertion of his fingers into the complainant’s organ would have
constituted rape by sexual assault had it been committed when the new law was already in effect.
The differences between the two modes of committing rape are the following:
(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a man or a
woman;
(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended party may
be a man or a woman;
(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second is
committed by inserting the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and
(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.
In view of the material differences between the two modes of rape, the first mode is not necessarily
included in the second, and vice-versa. Thus, since the charge in the Information in Criminal Case No. SC-
7424 is rape through carnal knowledge, appellant cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault
although it was proven, without violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him.
However, following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120, Rules
of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness. Said
provisions read:
Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. – When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.
Sec. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. – An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those
constituting the latter.
Indeed, acts of lasciviousness or abusos dishonestos are necessarily included in rape.72
In light of the passage of R.A. No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in
the Philippines,"73 the penalty of death can no longer be imposed. Accordingly, the penalty meted out to
appellant for rape through sexual intercourse in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423 is reduced in
each case from death to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.74 We affirm the conviction of
appellant in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 for acts of lascivousness but modify the penalty imposed by the
Court of Appeals instead to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (6) months of arresto
mayor as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum as neither
mitigating nor aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the crime.
With respect to the civil liability of appellant, we modify the award in Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and
SC-7423 in light of prevailing jurisprudence. Therefore, appellant is ordered to indemnify AAA, for each
count of qualified rape, in the amount of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages,
and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. 75 The award of damages in Criminal Case No. SC-7424 is
affirmed.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 01926 is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATIONS. In Criminal Cases No. SC-7422 and SC-7423, appellant is found guilty beyond

148
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole and to pay the victim, AAA, in the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages plus costs. In Criminal
Case No. SC-7424, appellant is found guilty of the crime of acts of lasciviousness and sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay AAA moral damages in the
amount of ₱30,000.00 plus costs.
SO ORDERED.

6. People v. Enrique Ceballos, G.R. No. 169642, Sept. 14, 2007

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
vs.
ENRIQUE CEBALLOS JR. y CABRALES, Appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Enrique Ceballos Jr. y Cabrales1 (appellant) was charged with six counts of rape, five on complaint of his
minor daughter AAA, and one on complaint of another minor daughter BBB. The Informations were filed
on November 23, 1998 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. C-55119, C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-
55123 and C-57126 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan.
The accusatory portion of each of the informations follows:
Criminal Case No. C-55119
That [in] December, 1997 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one
[AAA], 14 years old2 , against the latter’s will and without her consent, the rape was committed with
grave abuse of authority.3 (Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55120
That [in] January, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one
[AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave
abuse of authority.4 (Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55121
That [in] February, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one
[AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave
abuse of authority.5 (Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55122
That [in] March, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, with lewd design, by means of force and intimidation, did then and there
wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with his daughter one [AAA], 14
years old, against the latter’s will and without her consent, the rape was committed with grave abuse of
authority.6 (Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-55123
That on or about 5th day of November, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design, and by means of force and

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intimidation, did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse
with his daughter one [AAA], 14 years old, against the latter’s will and without her consent, the rape was
committed with grave abuse of authority. 7 (Underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-57126
That on or about during the period from December 25, 1995 until July 16, 1998 in Caloocan City, Metro-
Manila [sic] and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then
the father of [BBB], a minor of 17 years old,8 with lewd design, and by means of force and intimidation,
did then and there wil[l]fully, [u]nlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with one [BBB]
against the latter’s will and without her consent. 9 (Underscoring in the original)
AAA’s birth certificate shows that she was born on October 13, 1984 10 while BBB’s shows that she was
born on October 16, 1981. 11 At the times material to the first five cases, CCC, appellant’s wife with whom
he has six children, was working abroad in Qatar. 12
Culled from the evidence for the prosecution are the following respective versions in the cases:
Criminal Case No. C-55119:
One nighttime in December 1997, AAA and four of her siblings were sleeping at the second floor of their
house in Caloocan City when their father-herein appellant touched AAA’s breast and vagina, catching
her by surprise. Appellant thereafter removed her short pants and underwear and tried to insert his
penis inside her vagina but failed, drawing him to, while AAA was in a lying position, instead insert his
finger inside her vagina and mash her breasts. She boxed appellant but she was subdued by him. And
she cried, but appellant covered her mouth, rendering it difficult for her to breathe. Appellant thereafter
dozed off to sleep.13
AAA did not report the incident as appellant had threatened that he would kill the members of the
family if she did. She had no opportunity to narrate the incident to her older sisters because every time
she was conversing with them, appellant would send her away. And while she had the opportunity to
report to her classmates and teacher, she did not do so, apprehensive that they might tease her. 14
Criminal Case No. C-55120:
Also at nighttime sometime in January 1998, while AAA was sleeping with her five siblings at the upper
floor of their house, she was awakened as appellant forcibly undressed her and again succeeded in
inserting his penis inside her vagina. She tried to resist appellant’s moves by boxing his chest, but to no
avail. And while she cried, appellant again covered her mouth. 15
Again, AAA did not narrate the incident to any of her siblings with whom she often quarrelled in the
discharge of household chores.16
Criminal Case No. C-55121:
On the night of February 14, 1998, while AAA was sleeping with her siblings, she was again awakened as
appellant touched her vagina. He removed her underwear, inserted a finger and then inserted his penis
inside her vagina. She resisted by boxing him but appellant held her hands and told her to give in;
otherwise, he would harm her. She was frightened, but she did not cry anymore because she did not
want appellant to cover her mouth again to render her unable to breathe. 17
She did not also report the incident because appellant had warned her against doing so. 18
Criminal Case No. C-55122:
On March 26, 1998, three days before her graduation from grade school, AAA was awakened as
appellant took off her clothes and directed her to, as she did, lie down on her side. With appellant at her
back, he inserted his penis inside her vagina. She could not offer any resistance, however, on account of
her position.19 While she initially cried, the fear that appellant would again cover her mouth prompted
her to stop. After appellant ejaculated, he went to sleep. 20
Every time appellant had sexual intercourse with AAA, he would be kind to her the following morning;
otherwise, she expected appellant to beat her buttocks with a fiber glass object, 21 the same object which
he was using to hit her brother’s head. 22

150
Asked by the defense counsel during cross-examination, on observing her to be "aggressive" in
answering the questions he was propounding, whether that was "how [she] [had been] talking within
the household," AAA replied in the negative, but explaining that her "aggressive" manner was reflective
of her anger at her father for the "ginawang kahayupan" to her and her sister BBB − "Ginahasa niya po
kaming dalawa."23
Criminal Case No. C-55123:
On November 5, 1998, between two and three o’clock in the morning, appellant removed AAA’s short
pants and had sexual intercourse with her. She offered no resistance as she was afraid that he would
beat her again. Besides, it would just be an exercise in futility. Appellant thereafter went to sleep, while
AAA put on her short pants and went downstairs to clean the house. 24
On November 19, 1998, AAA narrated to her classmates in high school what she had been through. On
November 21, 1998, SPO4 Bayani Feria of the Northern Police District (NDP) who had in the meantime
been informed of AAA’s plight, accompanied AAA to the NDP Headquarters where she executed a sworn
statement25 charging appellant, who was soon after arrested, with rape.
At the Philippine General Hospital (PGH) where AAA was subjected to medico-legal examination, AAA
informed the resident doctor on duty at the Emergency Room that she was raped several times by
appellant.26
Dr. Bernadette Madrid of the PGH Child Protection Unit, who conducted on AAA general physical and
genital examination with the use of a colposcope, an apparatus that enlarges the view of one’s genitalia
by 15 times and takes pictures of it, 27 found a deep cleft between 3 o’clock and 4 o’clock positions in
AAA’s hymen28 and a healed laceration at her fossa navicularis or "part of the genitalia beside or before
the hymen."29 In the Provisional Medical Certificate 30 which she issued, Dr. Madrid gave her impression
as follows:
IMPRESSION
Patient with a statement made at the Caloocan Police Station on Nov. 21, 1998. Physical findings are
highly suspicious of sexual abuse.31 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Criminal Case No. C-57126:
On December 25, 1995, after BBB arrived home from the church together with her aunt, BBB learned
that her mother CCC had left the conjugal house and went to her parents’ house, after a quarrel with
appellant, bringing along her (BBB’s) siblings. 32 At about two o’clock in the morning of even date, BBB
was awakened to find appellant on top of her. Appellant succeeded in inserting his penis inside her
vagina, following which he went to sleep. 33
BBB did not inform her mother CCC about the incident before she left for Qatar in May 1996 as she was
threatened by appellant that he would kill them, and he would create a scandal in the neighborhood. 34
After the rape on December 25, 1995, BBB’s travails continued as appellant raped her on the average of
ten times every month and every birthday of his on July 15 except his birthday in 1998, she having
allowed her boyfriend to sleep in their house. The following day, July 16, however, appellant raped her. 35
When BBB eventually learned that appellant had also raped her younger sister AAA who even
witnessed36 appellant having sexual intercourse with her (BBB) to thus prompt her to instruct AAA not to
tell anybody what she had witnessed, she broke her silence. 37
While BBB was brought to a doctor for medical examination, she was no longer examined as she was at
that time already cohabiting with her boyfriend. 38
By the account of CCC, mother of AAA and BBB, she left for Qatar on May 17, 1996 and returned to the
Philippines in November 1998; and while her husband was in jail, he sent her and her children letters 39
through his mother DDD asking for forgiveness. 40
For the defense, appellant testified as did his mother DDD and sister EEE.
Appellant declared that it was impossible for him to commit the acts complained of as the family of his
sister EEE was also living with them41 and there were many other people in the house.

151
With respect to the alleged rape of BBB on December 25, 1995, appellant declared that he could not
have committed it as he followed his wife and children who earlier left that day for Pangulo, Malabon. 42
Appellant also denied having asked his wife and children for forgiveness bearing on the acts complained
of. If he had asked for forgiveness, it had to do with his being strict with them and it was in fact on that
account that AAA filed the charges against him. 43 As for BBB, he could not think of any reason why she
filed a case against him.44
Appellant’s mother DDD found it impossible too for appellant to rape his daughters because of the
presence of people in the house. 45 She surmised that CCC could have instigated her daughters to file the
charges against him in view of his objection to her (CCC’s) going abroad.
DDD claimed that AAA and BBB in fact usually went out of the house to avoid being scolded by
appellant, adding that she herself usually got mad at the two since they could no longer help in the
discharge of household chores.46
Appellant’s sister EEE affirmed that her family used to live with appellant and family during which she
usually saw AAA and BBB being scolded by appellant. She claimed that before CCC left for Qatar, she
witnessed a quarrel between CCC and appellant because of the hardheadedness of their children. She
tried to convince both AAA and BBB to withdraw the charges against appellant but the two were
adamant, apprehensive that the withdrawal would infuriate their mother CCC and some of their
relatives.47
By Decision48 of October 14, 2002, the RTC of Caloocan City, Branch 128, found the testimonies of AAA
and BBB "straightforward, categorical and convincing" and accordingly convicted appellant of rape in all
the charges except that in Criminal Case No. C-55119 where it convicted appellant only of acts of
lasciviousness. The decretal portion of the trial court’s decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, this Court hereby finds accused Enrique Ceballos GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt for Acts of Lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. C-55119, hereby sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years of prision
correc[c]ional and for Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126, the Court
finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, for five (5) counts of consummated rape, hereby
sentences Enrique Ceballos to five (5) death by lethal injection. He is further adjudged to indemnify
[AAA] in the amount of [₱]50,000.00 as moral damages and [₱]50,000 as exemplary damages for
count[s] of four (4) consummated rape. Further, Enrique Ceballos is adjudged to indemnify [BBB]
[₱]50,000.00 as moral damage[s] and [₱]50,000.00 as exemplary damage[s][.]
The City Jail Warden of Caloocan City is hereby ordered to bring the accused to the National Penitentiary
in Muntinlupa City, to serve his sentence.
Let the entire record of th[ese] case[s] be forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review as
mandated by law.49 (Italics supplied)
The records of the cases were forwarded to this Court for automatic review where they were docketed
as G.R. Nos. 155493-155498. Per this Court’s ruling in People v. Mateo,50 however, the cases were
referred to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition. 51
By the assailed Decision52 of July 20, 2005, the appellate court affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court. It modified the duration of the penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. C-55119, for acts of
lasciviousness, the amount of moral damages awarded in each rape case which it increased to ₱75,000
from ₱50,000, and the amount of exemplary damages in each rape case which it reduced to ₱25,000
from ₱50,000. Additionally, the appellate court awarded the amount of ₱75,000 in each rape case as
civil indemnity.
In modifying the penalty for acts of lasciviousness, the appellate court explained:
The penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstance alleged and proven in this case, the penalty prescribed shall be imposed in its medium
period, i.e., from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate

152
Sentence Law, said penalty shall constitute the maximum term, while the minimum shall be within the
range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense, i.e.,
arresto mayor or 1 month and 1 day to 6 months. Appellant should, therefore, be sentenced to suffer
the penalty of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional,
as maximum.53 (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
Thus the appellate court disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch 128, convicting
accused-appellant Enrique Ceballos of acts of lasciviousness in Criminal Case No. C-55119 and of five (5)
counts of rape in Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126 is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION in that in Criminal Case No. C-55119 for acts of lasciviousness, appellant is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate prison term of 6 months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum. In addition to the moral damages awarded by
the trial court which is increased to [₱]75,000.00 and exemplary damages which is hereby reduced to
[₱]25,000.00, civil indemnity in the amount of [₱]75,000.00 is awarded to the victims, in each of the five
(5) counts of rape.54 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
The cases are now before this Court for final review and have been given one docket number.
By Resolution of November 8, 2005,55 this Court required the parties to simultaneously submit
Supplemental Briefs if they so desired. Both parties filed their respective Manifestations 56 that they were
no longer filing supplemental briefs.
In rape cases, the credibility of the victim is almost always the single most important issue. 57 If the
testimony of the victim passes the test of credibility, which means it is credible, natural, convincing, and
consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on
that basis.58
In its Decision, the trial court observed:
. . . Though inherently shy, [AAA and BBB] displayed an air of confidence and sincerity in their narration.
Their testimony was straightforward, categorical and convincing. Showing no signs of remorse, they
braved the embarrassment and stigma of a public trial, came forward and courageously revealed the
dastardly acts of their own father. At some points during the taking of their testimony, when they were
narrating the rape committed on their person by their own father, both cried. This emotional condition
displayed by the sisters is evidence of the veracity of their claim. The Court sees no reason at all to
doubt their narration of what happened during the instances they were defiled by the accused, and no
reason at all why these two young sisters would impute so grave a crime as rape against their own
father, if the same were not true.
Indeed, it would be the height of depravity for the two sisters who have no experience of sexual
perversity to concoct a scenario that would lead their father on the death row and in the process, drag
themselves and the rest of the their family to a lifetime of ridicule and shame. 59 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
The observations of the trial court, which are substantiated by the records of the cases, deserve the
respect of appellate courts. Apropos is the following observation of this Court in People v. Briones:60
. . . [A] daughter would not accuse her own father of a serious offense like rape, had she really not been
aggrieved. Her testimony against him is entitled to greater weight, since reverence and respect for
elders is too deeply ingrained in Filipino children and is even recognized by law. . . . That she would
accuse her own father of this heinous crime had she not been aggrieved would be absurd. 61
(Underscoring supplied)
Appellant’s argument that the acts complained of could not have been committed due to the presence
of other people fails. As repeatedly held by this Court, lust is no respecter to time and place. The nearby
presence of the relatives of the victim, 62 the cramped condition of the room, the presence of other

153
people therein, or the high risk of being caught, have been held as not sufficient and effective to deter
the commission of rape.63
As for appellant’s allegation that AAA and BBB falsely charged him as he was strict and had had quarrels
with his wife CCC, the same was correctly brushed aside by the appellate court as "puerile and . . . too
flimsy to merit even scant consideration." Indeed, People v. Bidoc64 teaches:
. . . [P]arental punishment or disciplinary chastisement is not enough for a daughter in a Filipino family
to falsely accuse her father of rape. She would not subject herself to an examination of her private parts,
undergo the trauma and humiliation of public trial, and embarrass herself with the need to narrate in
detail how she was raped if she was not in fact raped. It takes depravity for a young girl to concoct a tale
of defloration, which would put her own father on death row, drag herself and the rest of her family to a
lifetime of shame, and make them the object of gossip among their classmates and friends .65
(Underscoring supplied)1âwphi1
One of appellant’s letters, Exhibit "L," dated July 13, 1999, sent to CCC and children, which reads in part:
. . . Nalulungkot ako sa mga pangyayari sa ating buhay. Sana matanggap niyo na ito sa sarili ninyo at
mapatawad na ninyo ako sa aking kasalanang nagawa. Siguro naman alam naman niyo na hindi naman
ako likas na masama. Kung nagawa ko man iyong mga bagay na iyon dala na rin ng naging kahinaan
ko. Lahat naman tayo ay nagkakamali at ang nangyari sa akin ay kinamuhian ko rin ang aking sarili
sapagkat hindi ko alam matagal akong nabilanggo sa bisig ng diyablo na siyang tunay na may kagagawan
sa pagwasak sa buhay natin. Alam niyo lahat ng kasalanan ng nagagawa ng tao ay simbuyo ng damdamin
na inutos ng diyablo na di natin napaglalabanan sapagkat wala sa puso natin si Cristo. Alam mo siguro na
nangarap din ako sa buhay natin. Lahat ay ginawa ko para sa inyo naging mabuti rin akong ama. Inaamin
ko na ako’y nalulong sa bawal na gamut at ito rin ang naging dahilan kaya ako nakagawa ng di ko
gusto. Patawarin niyo ako kung di ko kayang aminin sa korte ang kasalanan ko . . . 66 (Emphasis
supplied)
in fact strongly reflects his admission of guilt to thus negate his professed innocence.
The offenses of rape subject of Criminal Case Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122 and C-55123 having been
committed in 1998, appellant should have been charged under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal
Code.67 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 68 ("Anti-Rape Law of 1997") introduced Articles 266-A, 266-B, 266-C
and 266-D on Rape, and effective October 22, 1997, rape was reclassified as a crime against persons.
Since, as the Office of the Solicitor General observes, "the acts constituting the crime of rape and its
qualifying circumstances as averred in the information in each of said cases, which were all filed under
the then Article 33569 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, are substantially the
same as those required to be stated under Articles 266-A, paragraph 1, and 266-B 70 of the said Code,"
appellant’s right to be informed of the charges against him was not violated. 71
Appellant’s conviction in Criminal Case No. C-55119, for acts of lasciviousness, 72 is in order. While under
R.A. No. 8353, which was, as reflected above, already in effect when the criminal act was committed in
December 1997, the act of inserting a finger into another’s genital is penalized as rape by sexual assault
under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, the Information charged appellant with
rape still under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, appellant cannot be convicted of rape by means of sexual assault even if it was established that he
inserted his finger into the vagina of AAA. To do so would violate his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature of the charge against him. It bears noting, however, that the crime of acts of lasciviousness
is necessarily included in the crime of rape. 73
The appellate court, however, erred in finding that no aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven
in the case for acts of lasciviousness. Relationship, which was alleged in the information and admitted by
appellant,74 is under Article 1575 of the Revised Penal Code (alternative circumstances) aggravating in
acts of lasciviousness.76

154
Under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for acts of lasciviousness is prision correccional.
Appreciating relationship as an aggravating circumstance and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
appellant should suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to
six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.77 Further, the amount of ₱30,000 as moral damages
may be awarded to the victim.78
The award of exemplary damages in acts of lasciviousness is also justified under Article 2230 of the Civil
Code,79 there being an aggravating circumstance. This Court finds the amount of ₱2,000 reasonable for
the purpose.80
Going back to the charges for rape in Criminal Cases Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-
57126 in which appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt is affirmed, in view of the enactment of R.A.
No. 9346, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," the death penalty can
no longer be imposed. Appellant must thus be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole.81
WHEREFORE, the assailed July 20, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION.
In Criminal Case Nos. C-55120, C-55121, C-55122, C-55123 and C-57126, in lieu of the death penalty,
appellant, ENRIQUE CEBALLOS, JR. y CABRALES, is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua,
without eligibility for parole, and to pay the victim AAA in each of the first four cases and the victim BBB
in the last case ₱75,000 as moral damages, ₱25,000 as exemplary damages, and another ₱75,000 as civil
indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. C-55119, appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months of arresto
mayor as minimum, to Six (6) Years of prision correccional as maximum, and to pay the victim AAA
₱30,000 as moral damages and ₱2,000 as exemplary damages.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

7. People v. Dela Torre, G.R. Nos. 121213, 121216-23, Jan. 13, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,
vs.
BUTCHOY DE LA TORRE and FE DE LA TORRE, appellants.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The present cases are remarkably different, if not altogether unique, in two aspects. Appealed are nine
(9) rape convictions of the same accused for ravishing the same hapless young girl. And found guilty are
a husband and wife tandem.
Appellant-spouses Butchoy and Fe de la Torre were charged in nine (9) separate Amended Complaints
with rape committed during the months of September, October and December 1992 in Barangay
Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan. The victim, Baby Jane Dagot, was then only sixteen (16) years old.
The first Amended Complaint dated February 23, 1994 charged the appellants with rape as follows:
That on or about the 2nd week of September, 1992, at Barangay Tumarbong, in the Municipality of
Roxas, Province of Palawan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused
Butchoy de la Torre, in conspiracy and confederating with his wife, Fe de la Torre, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge
with one BABY JANE DAGOT, a girl of 16 years of age against her will and consent, to her damage and
prejudice.
That Fe de la Torre is hereby accused as a co-principal for indispensable cooperation in the commission
of the crime by threatening Baby Jane Dagot with a bladed weapon if ever said minor refused to submit
to perform a sexual act with Butchoy de la Torre.

155
CONTRARY TO LAW.1
The other Amended Complaints are similarly worded except for changes in the dates of commission of
the offenses. The second to the seventh complaints charged the appellants with rape perpetuated in the
remaining weeks of the month of September as well as the whole month of October. 2 The last amended
complaint charged the appellants with rape in the second week of December 1992. 3
The nine criminal cases were consolidated and joint trial conducted before the Regional Trial Court of
Palawan and Puerto Princesa City, Branch 47. On March 2, 1995 Judge Eustaquio Z. Gacott, Jr. found the
appellants guilty of all nine (9) counts of rape charged in the nine Amended Complaints and sentenced
them to reclusion perpetua for each count. They were also ordered to indemnify the complainant the
sum of P5,000.00 as actual damages and P90,000.000 as moral and exemplary damages, and to pay the
costs.
Appellant Fe de la Torre employed Baby Jane Dagot as housemaid in July 1992 in Langogan, Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan. After a week’s stay in Langogan, Fe brought Baby Jane to New Buncag, Puerto
Princesa City. In September 1992, they transferred to Tumarbong, Roxas, Palawan. It was in Tumarbong
where Baby Jane first met Fe’s husband, appellant Butchoy dela Torre. 4
As recounted by Baby Jane, the initial rape incident occurred in the first week of September 1992. She
could not remember the exact date but in that fateful night, as in previous nights, Baby Jane and the
appellant-spouses were asleep on the floor of the same bedroom. At around 12:00 o’clock midnight,
appellant Fe de la Torre woke Baby Jane and her husband Butchoy. Baby Jane was surprised to see that
Fe was holding a lighted kerosene lamp and a scythe. 5 Fe ordered her husband to transfer and lie beside
Baby Jane. As appellant Butchoy did not comply, Fe herself transferred so that Baby Jane was between
her and Butchoy. Fe put down the scythe and the lamp and proceeded to take Butchoy’s clothes off and
then Baby Jane’s. Butchoy offered no resistance but Baby Jane objected and cried to no avail. Fe then
ordered Butchoy to have sex with Baby Jane. Baby Jane, fearful of the spouses and the dawning
realization of what would happen to her, could not ward off his advances. Butchoy placed himself on top
of Baby Jane, inserted his penis into her vagina and did a push and pull motion. 6 Baby Jane felt pain. All
the while, Fe was standing beside them, holding the lamp and the scythe. 7 After the sexual intercourse,
Butchoy kissed her on the neck and fondled her breasts. 8 Baby Jane found it revolting but could not do
much to refuse him, as she was afraid of Fe. When Butchoy was finished, he threw her clothes to her
and got dressed. Baby Jane immediately put on her clothes. She wanted to leave the room but Fe
prevented her from doing so. 9 They all went back to sleep. Baby Jane could not sleep. The following
morning, Baby Jane saw that there was blood on her panty. 10
The rape was repeated once a week from the second week of September 1992 on to the fourth week of
October 1992. Baby Jane had her menarche in the month of November 1992 and was spared from the
appellants’ abuse that month.11 However she was again raped in the second week of December. This
was to be the last. Baby Jane testified that the subsequent rape incidents were carried out in the same
manner as the first.12 She felt pain during the first and second rapes, but did not feel pain anymore in
the succeeding rape incidents.13
In December 1992, Fe brought Baby Jane with her to Langogan. 14 When Fe went out to check on her
rattan business, Baby Jane was left alone in the house. Baby Jane took the chance to slip out of the
house and go to her godmother Lucita Talamisan, who was then the barangay captain of Langogan. She
narrated her ordeal to her godmother. 15 While Baby Jane was at the barangay captain’s home, Fe
arrived and told Baby Jane not to report the matter. Fe threatened to twist the facts about the rape,
that she caught Baby Jane and her husband in the act and would file a complaint against them. 16
Baby Jane thereafter proceeded to her parents’ home and related to them her abuse in the hands of the
appellant-spouses. Her father brought her to the police station in San Rafael, Puerto Princesa. They were
advised to have her medically examined. She underwent the medical examination on February 1993 at

156
the Provincial Health Office of Palawan conducted by Dr. Joselito Vicente, Municipal Health Officer. 17 The
Medico-Legal Certificate revealed the following:
External findings:
(-) signs of physical injuries
Pelvic examination:
External findings = minimal distribution of pubic hair
Healed hymenal lacerations = 2:00 o’clock
4:00 o’clock
10:00 o’clock
Vaginal vault admits one finger with ease 18
The prosecution presented Dr. Marideth de Leon, Assistant Provincial Health Officer, to testify on the
findings of Dr. Joselito Vicente. Dr. de Leon concluded from the healed lacerations that when Baby Jane
was examined, there had been sexual intercourse possibly two or three weeks before the examination.
Clearly there was previous insertion into the vaginal canal, but she could not determine from the
medical findings when the first intercourse occurred. 19
The appellant-spouses denied the allegations of rape. In their version of the events, from September to
October 1992, neither they nor Baby Jane were in Tumarbong but were in Puerto Princesa instead. They
stayed in Tumarbong for less than a month. 20 Butchoy asserts that they stayed there for only a week. 21
Fe explains that they had to leave for Puerto Princesa since her daughter-in-law gave birth in October
1992. When they went to Puerto Princesa, they took Baby Jane with them. 22 In Tumarbong, Baby Jane
and the appellants slept in separate rooms divided by a sawali wall. The appellants profess that they had
no quarrel with Baby Jane herself,23 but surmise that the imputations of rape against them may have
been instigated by Baby Jane’s father, Rafael Dagot.
Rafael Dagot was employed by appellant Fe dela Torre as a capataz in her rattan business. She allegedly
caught him stealing some of the rattan and selling them to others without her consent. Fe claims that
Rafael asked for forgiveness and offered to have Baby Jane work for them as their maid. She forgave
him, allowed him to continue to work for her and also employed Baby Jane as her maid. Rafael also
allegedly owes them a total of P11,500.00 in cash which he borrowed on May 1991. However when Fe
tried to collect from Rafael through the barangay captain, Rafael allegedly transferred to another place
and she no longer saw him. 24 The appellants imply that Rafael filed the complaints for rape against them
to escape payment of his debt.25
The appellants also insist that Baby Jane was already married to one Eddie Tabi when they took her as
their maid. This explains why, according to them, Baby Jane was no longer a virgin. 26
In this appeal, the appellants impute error to the trial court in believing Baby Jane’s account of the
supposed rape, and in not according them their right to be presumed innocent. 27 The appellants proceed
from the theory that the alleged rape as narrated by the complainant is fantastic and unbelievable. In
Baby Jane’s narration, it was Fe who ordered Butchoy to have sexual intercourse with Baby Jane. The
appellant-spouses argue that it is unnatural for a wife like Fe to intensely desire that her husband have
sex with their maid. There is no evidence of anything wrong or unusual about the appellants’ marriage
or their sexual habits that would support the complainant’s story. Even assuming that the sexual
encounters had actually taken place, the appellants insist that the prosecution failed to prove that they
did so against Baby Jane’s will. Evidence for the prosecution fails to explain how all nine rapes could
have occurred over a period of several months unless Baby Jane gave her full cooperation. The
appellants insist that the trial court merely relied on the weakness of the evidence for the defense to
convict them and hence deprived them of their right to the presumption of innocence.
From the outset it should be noted that while the appellants assail the credibility of the complainant’s
testimony, they actually do not point to specific inconsistencies or contradictions in her testimony. True,

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the trial court relied solely on the testimony of the complainant regarding the rape incidents, but the
determinative question before the trial court was whether the complainant’s testimony is credible.
The test to determine the value of the testimony of a witness is whether such is in conformity with
knowledge and consistent with the experience of mankind. Further, the credibility of witnesses can also
be assessed on the basis of the substance of their testimony and the surrounding circumstances. 28
The appellants point to the unusual manner of commission of the crime, involving as it did not only the
sexual assault by the man but also the participation of his wife, to discredit the complainant’s testimony.
Under the Revised Penal Code,29 however, an accused may be considered a principal by direct
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. This is true in a charge of rape against a
woman, provided of course a man is charged together with her. Thus, in two cases this Court convicted
the woman as a principal by direct participation since it was proven that she held down the complainant
in order to help her co-accused spouse consummate the offense.
In People v. Villamala,30 the Court found the husband and wife guilty for raping their neighbor and
"kumare" in this factual setting, viz: the wife visited the victim at her home on the pretext of inquiring as
to the whereabouts of her husband. Once inside, she whistled for her husband and he immediately
appeared at the doorstep. The wife then suddenly pinned her "kumare" to the floor. The husband
forcefully removed the victim’s skirt and panties, removed his shorts, placed himself on top of the victim
and consummated the rape. In the more recent People v. Saba,31 the accused married couple victimized
a fourteen (14) year-old epileptic who stayed at their home for treatment by the wife who was a
reputed healer. On the pretext of conducting a healing session, the wife ordered the victim to lie down
on the floor then pinned the victim’s hands to the floor and covered her mouth while her husband
removed his pants and briefs and the victim’s panties and raped the young girl. These two cases show
not only the possibility but the reality of rape committed by a woman together with a man.
A close look at the cited cases reveals a common thread that not only links them but also explains why
the offenses were committed in the fashion they were. This consists of the close relationship between
the parties and the attendant conducive environment. The victim and the felons were familiar with each
other and there was a certain bond of trust between them. The same kindred relationship and suitable
setting are extant in the present case. Indeed, the proximity of the victim to the accused spouses was
established by the particular circumstances of their relationship. The backdrop presented the offenders
with a tempting opportunity to satisfy their twisted desires upon a conveniently placed victim.
The appellants argue that the prosecution failed to present any evidence of aberrant sexual behavior on
their part that would justify the trial court’s conclusion that the rape occurred as described by the
complainant. This argument must fail since the sexual habits of the appellant-spouses do not constitute
an essential element of the offense of rape. The prosecution only has to prove that there was carnal
knowledge of the complainant and that it was done against her will. The trial court’s evaluation of the
evidence resulted in the appellants’ conviction and a close scrutiny of its judgment leads us to affirm it.
The greatest weight is accorded to the findings and conclusions reached by the lower court regarding
the credibility of witnesses and their testimony, owing to the court’s unique position to see, hear and
observe the witnesses testify. Unless it is shown that the court overlooked or misunderstood some facts
or circumstances of weight and substance which would affect the outcome of the case, or that its
findings of fact and conclusions on the credibility of witnesses are not supported by the evidence on
record, its determination is left undisturbed. 32 In the present case, we see no need to overturn this well-
settled principle.
Herein appellants do not refer to any inconsistency in the complainant’s testimony that would discredit
her or would lead this Court to doubt her version of the story. Baby Jane’s testimony was
straightforward and simple, positively identifying the appellants as her abusers and clearly narrating the
circumstances of her defloration.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:

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Q While you were residing with Butchoy de la Torre and Fe de la Torre in Tumarbong, Roxas, was there
any incident that transpired sometime in September 1992?
A Something happened, Sir.
COURT:
Q When was this?
A It happened in September, Your Honor, but I cannot remember the exact date.
Q What year?
A 1992, Your Honor.
Q Can you remember what week? First, second or what?
A I cannot remember, your Honor.
COURT:
Go ahead.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Now, this incident that happened to you, what is this?
A That was when Fe de la Torre told her husband to use me but I resisted. But she removed our clothes.
COURT:
Q You mean Fe de la Torre.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Whose clothes?
A Both of us, Your Honor.
Q You and who?
A Butchoy de la Torre, Your Honor.
Q What do you mean by "to use me"?
A To have sexual intercourse ("ing bubuli") with me, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Where did this happen?
A At Tumarbong, Sir.
Q Where in Tumarbong?
A In the house of Fe de la Torre, Sir.
Q What happened next after that?
A Butchoy de la Torre already used me, Sir.
COURT:
Q Be more specific. What is that "use me"?
A After that Butchoy de la Torre had sexual intercourse with me while Fe de la Torre was also present.
Q And Fe de la Torre was doing what?
A Fe de la Torre was holding a big kerosene lamp and also a scythe.
Q Is that a weapon?
A Yes, Your Honor, a "karit" or "sangget" in Cuyuno dialect, Your Honor.
Q You mean Fe de la Torre was there while Butchoy was having sexual intercourse with you holding a
scythe and a lamp?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Go ahead.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Was this Fe de la Torre saying something while the incident was going on?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was she saying?
A That I can leave the house only if I marry Butchoy de la Torre, Sir.

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COURT:
Q Now, you said Fe de la Torre removed your clothes and also that of Butchoy. While she was doing that
did you not object?
A I objected, Your Honor. I resisted. I even cried, but she forced me.
Q But Fe de la Torre is smaller than you, did you not fight her?
A How could I fight her when she was holding that scythe, Your Honor.
Q Can you describe that scythe?
A It is sharp and we are using it in the house, Your Honor.
Q But Butchoy de la Torre was not threatening you?
A No, Sir.
Q Why did you allow Butchoy de la Torre to have sex with you without you resisting?
A Fe de la Torre ordered him, Your Honor.
Q Butchoy de la Torre?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q You heard that?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How? What were the words uttered by Fe de la Torre in ordering her husband?
A We were sleeping in the same room, Your Honor, on the floor and I heard Fe de la Torre ordering her
husband to transfer to my side but Butchoy objected. So, Fe de la Torre was the one who transferred to
the other side of her husband and Butchoy was already between us.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q After that what happened next?
A After that Fe de la Torre took off our clothes.
Q Was it not Butchoy de la Torre who took off your clothes?
A It was Fe de la Torre who took off Butchoy de la Torre’s clothes, Sir.
COURT:
Q What time of the night was this?
A It was about 12:00 midnight.
xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q After your clothes were taken off, what happened next, Madam Witness?
A Butchoy de la Torre placed himself on top of me.
COURT:
Q While on top of you, what was happening?
A While he was on top of me, Butchoy de la Torre was doing the push and pull motion, Your Honor,
("aga ayud-ayud") while Fe was holding a scythe and a lamp.
Q Was Fe de la Torre lying down or standing while this was going on?
A She was standing holding a lamp, Your Honor.
Q Only a lamp?
A Also the scythe.
Q This push and pull motion, what was that?
A While he was having sex with me he was doing that motion, Sir.
Q Was his penis inside your vagina when he was doing that push and pull motion?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q Did you enjoy it?
A No, Your Honor. In fact I don’t want it.
Q What did you feel?
A It was painful, Your Honor.

160
Q Why was it painful?
A Because of his penetration, Your Honor. He inserted his penis inside my vagina.
Q Was that the first time you experienced sex?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q There was no blood?
A Only my panty was filled with blood, Your Honor.
Q But you said your clothes were taken off?
A After the rape I put on my panty and the next morning I saw my panty with blood.
Q That was the first time he had sexual intercourse with you?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q That was about the first week of September 1992?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q The husband did not complain to the wife why she was doing it?
A He did not complain, Your Honor.
Q But you could feel the penis of Butchoy de la Torre harden as it entered your vagina?
A Yes, Your Honor, it was painful.
Q So, it was not only Fe de la Torre who wanted Butchoy to have sex with you, Butchoy also wanted to
do it?
A But he was also told by Fe de la Torre to have sex with me, Your Honor.
Q But Butchoy did not complain that he did not want to have sex with you?
A He did not complain, Your Honor.
xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q This push and pull motion that Butchoy de la Torre did, how long did it take?
A For sometime, Sir.
COURT:
Q How many minutes?
A I cannot tell, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Did Butchoy de la Torre kiss you?
A Yes, Sir, on my neck.
Q Not on your face or lips?
A No, Sir.
COURT:
Q So Butchoy liked you also?
A I did not notice that, Your Honor, but he was ordered by his wife to do it.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Was there any touching of your breasts or squeezing some parts of your body while he was having sex
with you?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q Your breasts, for example?
A My nipple was fondled, Your Honor, by him.
Q That was before his penis was inserted in your vagina or after?
A After, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO;
Q Do you like what Fe de la Torre and Butchoy de la Torre did to you?
A No, Sir.

161
COURT:
Q Did you not feel, while Butchoy de la Torre’s penis was inside you and doing the push and pull if he
finished his act?
A I did not feel, Your Honor.
Q He only suddenly stopped?
A Yes, Your Honor.33
Baby Jane never wavered in her testimony even under intense cross-examination by the defense. She
forthrightly answered the questions and re-affirmed her attestations during the direct. The cross-
examination only served to clarify certain details in the commission of the offense and reinforced the
truth of her narration.
ATTY. PADON:
Q Madam Witness, you were awakened by Fe de la Torre before the intercourse?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you were already awaken (sic), you saw her holding a lamp and a scythe?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And you said, Madam Witness, that Fe de la Torre told her husband to rape you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What was the exact words uttered by Fe de la Torre?
A "Magpaluyo kaw sa kilid." (You move to the other side.)
COURT:
Q But the Court thought she was holding a lamp and a scythe, so she was not lying anymore?
A She was seated between us, Your Honor.
Q About the sexual intercourse, what was the command of Fe de la Torre to Butchoy de la Torre?
A And then Fe de la Torre told him to undress or remove his clothes, but Butchoy did not obey her. So,
this Fe de la Torre put down the scythe and the lamp which she was holding and she was the one who
removed the clothes of Butchoy and my clothes.
Q And immediately upon removal of the clothes of Butchoy, you saw the penis of Butchoy already?
A No, Your Honor.
Q You did not see him naked?
A I saw him naked but I did not focus my eyes to his penis.
Q Who was undressed first, Butchoy de la Torre or you?
A It was Butchoy, your Honor.
Q You did not resist when you were being undressed?
A I asked her why but she did not reply.
Q But you could feel that the private organ of Butchoy de la Torre entered your body, is that right?
A Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. PADON:
Q What was the position of Butchoy de la Torre when Fe de la Torre removed his clothes?
A He was standing and after Fe de la Torre removed his clothes, he sat down already.
Q How about you what was your position when Fe de la Torre removed your clothes?
A I was still lying down and then she pulled me to stand up and then she removed my clothes.
Q When you were already standing, you just allowed Fe de la Torre to remove your clothes?
A I cannot resist because I was afraid, Sir. Even her husband was also afraid. 34
The trial court noted that Baby Jane was only sixteen years old when the incidents occurred, and had
barely finished the second grade of elementary schooling. She was young, unlettered, and
unsophisticated. Given her background she was innocent in the ways of the world and incapable of
fabricating the charges of rape against the appellants, and making up such a shocking tale of sexual
perversity.

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Additionally, the defense has not imputed to her any ill motive to indict the appellants with trumped up
charges. The appellants have categorically manifested that they had no quarrel with Baby Jane and
effectively erased any evil intention that may be attributed to her. Their claim is that the charges were
instigated by Baby Jane’s father, Rafael Dagot. This is absurd. It is unnatural for a parent to use her
offspring as an engine of malice, especially if it will subject her to embarrassment, and even stigma, as in
this case.35 In like manner, a father would not subject his daughter to the indignities of a rape trial just to
evade payment of a debt.
The appellants even tried to show that Baby Jane was a girl of loose morals, by having Rafael Dagot’s
neighbor, Gloria Mijares, testify that Baby Jane was already married to one Eddie Tabi and that Baby
Jane had lived with said Eddie Tabi for more than a year before working for the appellants as a maid. But
the witness testified to no such thing, saying only that allegedly Eddie Tabi had proposed marriage to
Baby Jane but she refused him.36 The testimony could not even be given much credit for being hearsay.
Baby Jane’s behavior during and after the rape incidents reinforce the trial court’s findings of rape. She
objected to Fe’s acts of removing her clothes, but her resistance was restricted by her fear of the
appellants. The scythe that Fe held in her hands and threats of bodily harm should she refuse effectively
intimidated her into submitting to Butchoy’s onslaught. Afterwards, she could tell no one of the ordeal
she had gone through as she was constantly under Fe’s watchful eye. In addition, she did not know any
of their neighbors nor their neighborhood well enough to report the incident. When the opportunity to
escape presented itself, she took it. She reported the matter to the authorities and this led to the filing
of the Amended Complaints against the appellants. Her actions testify to the truth of her allegations of
rape for a young girl would not make up a story of sexual exploitation and undergo the humiliation of a
medical examination of her private parts and a court trial that would dissect each and every aspect of
the sexual abuse committed against her if it were not true. 37
But then, on the basis of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the appellants may be convicted
only of the rape committed in the first week of September 1992. The evidence for the prosecution
proves only the first charge of rape. Baby Jane’s testimony on the commission of the eight other charges
does not satisfy the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt to justify the appellants’ conviction. We
quote the transcript of the trial:
COURT:
Q You have just described your first sexual intercourse which happened on September 1992, was it done
to you again the next week?
A It happened once every week, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q How about on the second week of September 1992, did this happen to you again?
A Yes, Sir, it happened again.
COURT:
Q When?
A On the second week of September, Your Honor.
Q 1992 also?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It happened the same way as the first with the wife holding a lamp and a scythe?
A Yes, Sir.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q How about the third week, did it happen again?
A Yes, Your Honor, the same thing happened again.
Q How about on the fourth week of September 1992, did it happen again?
A The same, Sir.
COURT:

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Q It also happened on the fourth week?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q The same procedure? The same threats?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
POSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q This incident that transpired in the first week of September 1992, did it happen again on the first week
of October 1992?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about in the second week of October 1992, did it happen again?
A Yes, Sir.
COURT:
Q The same thing happened where Fe de la Torre was holding a scythe and a lamp?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q And what happened the first time, happened again several times?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q So, in the month of October 1992, how many times had this Butchoy de la Torre have sex with you?
A Once every week, Your Honor.
Q So how many times?
A Four times, Your Honor.
Q So first, second, third and fourth week?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxx
COURT:
Q During the first intercourse and the second, did you feel pain?
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How about on the third time?
A It was not painful anymore.
Q And subsequently, no more?
A No more, Your Honor.
Q Why no more pain?
A I don’t know but I did not feel pain anymore.
Q Is it because you already approved of the intercourse?
A No, Your Honor.
Q But you did not resist or struggle?
A I was between a woman and a man, Your Honor, I could not struggle.
Q But you did not resist or struggle?
A I struggled but in vain, Your Honor.
Q Because you were afraid?
A I was afraid, Your Honor.
Q But Fe de la Torre did not injure you, why were you afraid?
A She was threatening me with that scythe that she would strike me with that scythe.
Q So because you were afraid of physical harm you allowed yourself to be used by Butchoy de la Torre?
A Yes, Your Honor, because despite my struggle Fe de la Torre was there, armed.
xxx
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Now, did this incident also happen in the second week of December?
A Yes, Sir.

164
COURT:
Q How about in November?
A There was none, Your Honor.
Q So you were free that November?
A Yes, Your Honor.
PROSECUTOR GUAYCO:
Q Now, in these nine incidents, did you really like what was done to you by the accused?
A No, Sir.38
Each and every charge of rape is a separate and distinct crime; hence, each of the eight other rape
charges should be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution is required to establish, by the
necessary quantum of proof, the elements of rape for each charge. 39 Baby Jane’s testimony on the first
rape charge was explicit, detailing the participation of each appellant in the offense and clearly
illustrating all the elements of the offense of rape. However her simple assertion that the subsequent
rapes occurred in exactly the same manner as in previous incidents is clearly inadequate and grossly
insufficient to establish to a degree of moral certainty the guilt of the appellants insofar as the eight rape
charges are concerned. Her testimony was too general as it failed to focus on material details as to how
each of the subsequent acts was committed. Even her testimony on cross-examination did not add
anything to support her accusations of subsequent rape. Thus, only the rape alleged to have been
committed on September 1992 was proven beyond reasonable doubt and the appellants may be
penalized only for this offense.
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The use by the appellants of a bladed
weapon, alleged in the Amended Complaint and sufficiently proven in this case, qualifies the rape. 40 In
the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the penalty that the appellants shall suffer is
the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua.41
In accordance with jurisprudential law, the complainant in a rape case is entitled to civil indemnity,
which is actually in the nature of actual or compensatory damages, in the amount of P50,000.00, as well
as moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00. Civil indemnity42 and moral damages43 are automatically
granted once the fact of rape has been established. Exemplary damages are awarded under Article 2230
of the Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance, whether ordinary or qualifying. Since the
commission of the rape was attended by the qualifying circumstance of use of a deadly weapon,
exemplary damages of P25,000.00 should also be given to the complainant. 44
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Palawan and Puerto Princesa City is MODIFIED.
In Criminal Case No. 11199, the appellants are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of rape qualified
with the use of a deadly weapon and are accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to indemnify the offended party the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos ( P50,000.00) as
civil indemnity, Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000,00) as moral damages and Twenty-five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000.00) as exemplary damages. With respect to Criminal Cases No. 11313 to No. 11320, the
appellants are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
SO ORDERED.

8. People v. Gavina, G.R. No. 118076, Nov. 20, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CESAR GAVINA y NAVARRO, accused-appellant.
 
REGALADO, J.:

165
Accused-appellant Cesar Gavina y Navarro argues in this appeal that, for lack of the requisite element of
animus lucrandi, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, of Dagupan City should have found him guilty in
Criminal Case No. D-11417 of only the lesser offense of homicide and not the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide. The evidence for the prosecution, however, indubitably established the
contrary. The trial court stamped its imprimatur thereon and rendered a condemnatory verdict. We
affirm.
On February 20, 1993, accused-appellant was charged with the felony of robbery with homicide, the
accusatory part of the corresponding information reading —
That on or about the 19th day of February, 1993, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, CESAR GAVINA y Navarro, being then
armed with a knife, with intent to gain and by means of violence against person, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, rob one CIPRIANO TANDINGAN of his cash in the amount of
P70,800.00, by stabbing him on vital part parts (sic) of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing
the death of the latter due to "Cardio respiratory arrest, Massive Intrathoracic and Mediastinal
Hemorrhage, Multiple stab wound" as per Autopsy Report issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Asst. City
Health Officer, this city, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased, CIPRIANO
TANDINGAN, in the amount of not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) Philippine currency,
and other consequential damages.1
At his arraignment on June 22, 1993, appellant with the assistance of counsel de oficio, registered his
negative plea to the indictment. 2 Trial thereafter ensued and eventually, on September 27, 1994, the
lower court rendered its adverse decision 3 finding the accused guilty as charged. The penalty of life
imprisonment was imposed upon appellant who was at the same time ordered to indemnify the heirs of
Cipriano Tandingan in the amount of P100,000.00, to restitute to Ruben Go, the victim's employer, the
amount of P89,200.00, and to pay the costs of the suit. 4
Prosecution eyewitness SPO1 Esteban Martinez narrated on the witness stand that on February 19,
1993, he was on duty and was posted along the junction of A. B. Fernandez Avenue and Nable Street in
Dagupan City. At a little past noon of that day, he noticed from across the street where he was standing
that two men were grappling for possession of a black bag. Sensing trouble, he forthwith ran to where
the two men were thus preoccupied and, as he was on his way, one of the men, whom he later
identified as the appellant, pulled out a knife and stabbed the other three times. 5
As Martinez neared the duo, appellant who was by then in possession of the black bag, scampered away
upon seeing the onrushing police officer and, in his haste, he dropped both the black bag and the knife.
Appellant then boarded a passing jeepney and it was in said jeepney that SPO1 Martinet, still in hot
pursuit, was able to pounce on and arrest him. Recovered at the crime scene were the black bag, which
turned out to contain more than P70,000.00 in cash, and the knife which appellant had used in stabbing
his victim, Cipriano Tandingan.6
Another prosecution eyewitness, Angel Sarmiento, testified and corroborated the account of SPO1
Martinez that appellant tried to escape by boarding the public utility jeepney which he was then driving
along A. B. Fernandez Avenue on the day and time in question. 7 The employer of the victim, one Ruben
Go, likewise appeared in court and recalled that on that particular day he instructed the victim, who was
then employed as a cashier in Go's grocery store, to encash a check in the amount of P160,000.00 at the
Dagupan City branch of Solidbank.8
Cipriano Tandingan apparently was able to encash the same just before he was waylaid by appellant.
Tandingan's sister, Eleanor Tandingan Penullar, confirmed that her brother was indeed an employee of
Ruben Go at the time of his demise. She also testified as to her brother's income at that time, as well as
the expenses they incurred for his funeral wake and burial which amounted to approximately
P52,500.00.9 Dr. Conrad Cornel, a medico-legal and assistant city health officer in Dagupan City,

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informed the trial court that the victim suffered multiple stab wounds on the chest, all of which proved
to be fatal.10
While appellant admitted having killed the victim, he advanced an altogether different version of the
incident. He claimed that on February 19, 1993, he left for and arrived at around noontime in Dagupan
City. He was then in front of Covelandia, a commercial establishment located along A. B. Fernandez
Avenue, when he chanced upon the victim and it was with the latter that he decided to have his P500.00
bill changed into smaller denominations. The victim have agreed to do so and appellant, after receiving
the bills, then hurriedly left as someone was waiting for him. At this point, he noticed that he had been
shortchanged in the amount P10.00 and, for that reason, he had to go back. 11
Appellant met Tandingan along the way and he confronted the latter. To appellant's surprise, the victim
retorted with fist blows which thus prompted him to kick Tandingan in retaliation. The victim then
reached for a knife, but appellant beat him to the draw by pulling out his own knife which he used in
stabbing the victim to death. He then immediately bearded a jeepney and it was there that he was
accosted by SPO1 Martinez. Appellant vehemently denied having taken the clutch bag of the victim
which contained cash and contended that he never intended to rob Tandingan whom he had met for the
first time that day.12
There appears to be no reversible error in the factual findings of the trial court that appellant indeed
committed the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. The witnesses for the prosecution had
credible stories to narrate to the court a quo, particularly SPO1 Martinez whose testimony is entitled to
much weight considering the fact that he is a police officer. In contrast, appellant's defense consisting of
bare denials, especially when viewed alongside the positive and forthright testimony of SPO1 Martinez,
suffers from inherent vulnerability and generates total disbelief.
In the offense of robbery with homicide, a crime primarily classified as one against property and not
against persons, the prosecution has to firmly establish the following elements: (a) the taking of
personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b) the property thus taken
belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (d) on the
occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, the crime of homicide, which is therein used in a generic
sense, was committed.13
In the case under review, there is no dispute that appellant employed undue violence and, on the
occasion thereof, killed Cipriano Tandingan while wresting the clutch bag from the possession of the
victim. SPO1 Martinez clearly established that appellant and the victim were struggling with each other
for possession of the bag. In the course of the altercation, appellant pulled out a knife which he then
used in repeatedly stabbing his quarry. It was decidedly through such homicidal violence that appellant
was able to get hold of the clutch bag, but had to shortly thereafter let go thereof together with the
knife when SPO1 Martinez closed in on him.
From the foregoing testimony of said police officer, no other conclusion can be deduced than that
appellant was initially seen by him in the act of unlawfully taking away the bag of Tandingan and that he
in fact succeeded in forcibly taking possession of the same. In short, the element of taking or asportation
was completed when appellant violently got hold of the bag however momentarily. In robbery, the
element of asportation — which requires the unlawful taking of personal property from the possession
of its owner, without this privity and consent and without animus revertendi — is present once the
property is in fact taken from the owner, even for just an instant. The subsequent disposition of the
property taken, or the failure to dispose of the same, is of no moment in so far as the characterization of
the offense as robbery is concerned.14
With regard to appellant's contention that animus lucrandi was not established by the prosecution, the
same is completely devoid of merit. Animus lucrandi or intent to gain, as the Solicitor General correctly
submits, is an internal act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender. As this Court
pithily put it in the early case of People vs. Sia Teb Ban,15 "one's intention may be gathered from one's

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deeds." Appellant's act of obtaining possession of the victim's clutch bag through violence speaks for
itself. And, the fact that the clutch bag of the victim was later found to contain a considerable amount of
money only confirms that appellant had intended to rob Tandingan all along.
As to the ownership of the money recovered from the crime scene, there is ample proof showing that
the same belonged to the victim's employer, Ruben Go. There seems to be an apparent variance,
therefore, between the allegation in the indictment and the proof regarding the same. Based on the
testimony of Ruben Go, however, the victim had been lawfully authorized to have in his possession the
money which he obtained by encashing a check with Solidbank upon the express instructions of Ruben
Go.
At all events, in robbery by the taking of property through intimidation or violence, it is not necessary
that the person unlawfully divested of the personal property be the owner thereof. Article 293 of the
Revised Penal Code employs the phrase "belonging to another" and this has been interpreted to merely
require that the property taken does not belong to the offender. Actual possession of the property by
the person dispossessed thereof suffices. In fact, it has even been held that robbery may be committed
against a bailee or a person who himself has stolen it. 16 So long as there is apoderamiento of personal
property from another against the latter's will through violence or intimidation, with animo de lucro,
robbery is the offense imputable to the offender. And, if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason
of the robbery, the offense is converted into the composite crime of robbery with homicide.
There are, however, obvious errors in the disposition made by the court below concerning the penalty
imposed and the order for restitution of the amount of P89,200.00 to Ruben Go, which thus calls for
modification of its judgment. Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code specifically imposes the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death in robbery with homicide. Reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment are not
synonymous but are distinct in nature, in duration, and in accessory penalties. 17 As regards the order of
restitution, there is clearly no ground to order the same since it was lucidly demonstrated at the trial
that the cash money, which was immediately recovered at the scene of the crime, actually amounted to
only P70,800.00 and not P160,000.00.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of the court a quo is MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Cesar Gavina y Navarro
is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and the order for the restitution to
Ruben Go of the further amount of P89,200.00 is deleted for lack of basis. In all other respects, the
judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

9. People v. Pulusan, G.R. No. 110037, May 21, 1998

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EDUARDO PULUSAN y ANICETA, ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO, ROLANDO TAYAG and JOHN
DOE Alias Ramon/Efren, accused. EDUARDO PULUSAN y ANICETA And ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y
MACALINO, accused-appellants.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Four men held a robbery of a passenger jeepney along the Bulacan-Pampanga highway, divesting all
passengers of their valuables. Four of the jeepney's passengers were killed by the robbers and the only
female passenger raped repeatedly. Three victims, however, lived to tell the story — the jeepney driver,
a fifty-year old man and the ravaged girl.
The Solicitor General summarized the prosecution evidence as follows:
On January 20, 1986 at about 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Constancio Gomez was then plying his route
from Balagtas, Bulacan along the MacArthur Highway going towards Malolos, Bulacan on board a
passenger jeepney with six (6) passengers (pp. 5-6, TSN, June 10, 1986). They included Marilyn Martinez,

168
a seventeen (17) year old student and Cresenciano Pagtalunan (p. 2, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN,
June 10 1986). The four (4) other male passengers were later identified to be Rodolfo Cruz, Magno
Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan (pp. The 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 5-14, TSN,
Aug. 5, 1987; pp. 3-4, TSN, Jan. 27, 1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8, 1987; Exhibits
"Z", "AA", "BB", "CC").
Upon reaching Bgy. Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, a group of four (4) male passengers boarded the jeepney
(pp. 5 - 6, TSN, June 10, 1986). Two of them sat at the rearmost portion of the jeepney fronting each
other; the third man sat behind the driver's seat while the fourth man sat in the middle of the other
passengers (pp. 6-7, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-4, TSN, July 22, 1986; pp. 3-5, TSN, March 10, 1987).
Suddenly the man who was later identified to be appellant Eduardo Pulusan, who sat behind the driver,
poked a knife at Constancio Gomez and announced: "Hold-up ito, huwag kayong kikilos'' (pp. 5-6, TSN,
June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, 9, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 4-6, TSN, March 18, 1987). Thereafter, appellant
Pulusan's three (3) companions followed suit, poked their knife and "sumpak" (homemade shotgun) at
the passengers and divested them of their valuables (p. 6, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 3-5, TSN, July 22,
1986; pp. 5-9, March 10, 1987). Gomez was divested of his P100.00 cash money, a lighter valued at
P50.00 and a fancy ring of unknown value (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10, 1986). Cresenciano Pagtalunan, one of
the passengers was similarly divested of P110.00 in cash and a diver's watch worth P1,000.00 (TSN, pp.
3-4, July 22, 1986). Marilyn Martinez, another passenger was divested of a wristwatch worth P350.00
together with her books, notebooks and handbag (pp. 5-7, TSN, March 10, 1987). Rodolfo Cruz was
likewise divested of a watch valued at P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500.00 and P750.00 in cash (pp.
3-8, TSN, Jan. 27, 1987). Magno Surio's watch worth P400.00, camera with flash bulb and batteries
inside and cash of more than P2,000.00 were also taken during the incident (pp. 3-7, 9-10, TSN, Feb. 17,
1987; Exhs. "A", "B", "C" to "C-3"). Thereafter, appellant Pulusan took over the wheels from driver
Gomez and drove towards Pampanga. He later stopped at Quezon Road, Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon,
Pampanga (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10, 1987). He parked the jeepney in a "talahiban" where there were no
people around except for the occupants of the passenger jeepney (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 7-8,
TSN, March 10, 1987). Afterwards, appellant Rolando Rodriguez (Rodriguez) dragged Marilyn Martinez
to the "talahiban" a few meters away from the parked jeepney where his three (3) companions,
including appellant Pulusan, were left guarding Gomez and his other passengers (pp. 7-8, TSN, June 10,
1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 1-13, TSN, March 18, 1987). Once at the "talahiban,"
appellant Rodriguez, then armed with a kitchen knife, through force and intimidation, succeeded in
having carnal knowledge of Marilyn Martinez who was then still a virgin (Exhibit "W"; pp. 10-13, TSN,
March 10, 1987). Subsequently, appellant Pulusan followed appellant Rodriguez and Marilyn Martinez at
the "talahiban" and likewise sexually abused her (pp. 14-15, TSN, March 10, 1987; Exh. "W"). Later,
appellant's two other companions similarly took turns in having carnal knowledge of Marilyn Martinez at
the "talahiban" (pp. 15-16, TSN, March 10, 1987). After the fourth man had succeeded in having carnal
knowledge of her, he held Marilyn Martinez's wrist and they both proceeded towards the jeepney (pp.
16-17, TSN, March 10, 1987).
Meanwhile, at the place where the jeepney was parked, Gomez and one of his passengers who were
then inside the vehicle were called outside by one of appellants' companions and asked Gomez ''pare,
gusto mo bang mamatay?" (p. 10, TSN, June 10, 1986). Gomez pleaded with them that he be spared
because his wife recently gave birth and he was the only breadwinner for his family ( ibid). Thereafter, he
was boxed at the right jaw and told to board the jeepney while said man, together with appellants
Pulusan and Rodriguez, clubbed and stabbed the passenger who was called with him (pp. 10-11, TSN,
June 10, 1986). Subsequently, the four called three other passengers inside the jeepney one by one.
When the three (3) passengers were about to alight at the "estribo," they were clubbed and stabbed by
appellants and their companions (pp. 10-111, TSN, June 10, 1986). One of the three (3) passengers
managed to run towards the "talahiban" but his captors pursued and eventually killed him (pp. 10-11,

169
TSN, June 10, 1986). Subsequently, Cresenciano Pagtaluan was hit with a pipe and clubbed by appellants
and their companions but one of them uttered "Pare, huwag na yan, matanda na yan, hindi na papalag"
(pp. 12-13, TSN, ibid.' p. 7, TSN, July 22, 1986). Thereafter, Gomez was ordered to start the jeepney
while a shotgun was aimed at his temple and threatened not to report the incident (ibid.) Eventually,
their captors boarded Marilyn Martinez in the jeepney and threatened her not to report the incident
and sent them home. Appellants and his companions then dispersed to different directions (pp. 12-13,
TSN, June 10, 1986).
Accordingly, Gomez and his two surviving passengers Marilyn Martinez and Cresenciano Pagtalunan, left
their four (4) co-passengers who had been killed by their captors and proceeded to the Municipal
Building of Apalit, Pampanga to report the incident to the Apalit police (p. 14, TSN, June 20, 1986; pp. 8-
9, TSN, July 22, 1986; p. 19, TSN, March 10, 1987). Accompanied by the Apalit police, Gomez, Marilyn
Martinez and Crescenciano Pagtalunan reported the incident to the San Simon police who questioned
them on the incident (pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 26, 1986). Eventually, Marilyn
Martinez was transferred to another vehicle which brought her to a clinic (p. 14, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp.
2-3, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986, p. 19, TSN, March 10, 1987). Gomez and Cresenciano Pagtalunan, were
immediately interviewed by Pat. Maniago, Investigator of the San Simon Police at San Simon, Pampanga
(pp. 2-3, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986). Later, Pagtalunan stayed at the municipal building of San Simon where he
remained for more than a day (p. 10, TSN, July 22, 1986). Thereafter, the joint team of the San Simon
and Apalit police, including Pat. Maniago. Pfc. Nicolas Yambao and Umali, was accompanied by Gomez
to the crime scene at Quezon Road, Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon where the bodies of his four (4) male
passengers were found and which were later brought to the Funeraria Punzalan for autopsy (p. 14, June
10, 1986; pp. 3-5, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Pat. Emerito Maniago prepared a sketch of the crime scene (Exh.
"S", p. 4, TSN. Dec. 2, 1986). Eventually, Pat. Maniago, Pfc. Nicolas Yambao and Lino Umali returned to
the station and interviewed Gomez and Pagtalunan about the description of the suspects and conducted
follow-up investigation of the case (pp. 3-4, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; Exh. "P", "P-1"; pp. 3-6, TSN, Dec. 16,
1986; pp. 2-9, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987). They also proceeded to Malolos, Bulacan to coordinate with the
Malolos INP for the identification of the victims' cadavers (pp. 3-4, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). Thereafter, Pat.
Maniago prepared an "Initial Investigation Report" addressed to Corporal Santiago Rodriguez, Station
Commander of the San Simon Police Station at San Simon, Pampanga concerning the "Robbery In Band,
Rape, Multiple Homicide and Illegal Possession of Firearms/Deadly Weapons" committed on or about
9:30 to 10:30 PM. of January 20, 1986 at Quezon Road, San Pablo Propio, San Simon, Pampanga (Exh.
"P", "P-1"; pp. 2-5, TSN, Dec. 16, 1986; pp. 2-16, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 2-3, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986).
On January 21, 1986, Cpl. Santiago Rodriguez was informed of the aforesaid incident (pp. 2-3, TSN, Nov.
18, 1986). He then instructed his men to continue investigation on the case considering that preliminary
investigation thereon had been made by Pat. Maniago (pp. 3-4, TSN, ibid.; pp. 3-6, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986).
On the same day, Marilyn Martinez, one of the surviving victims, was brought by her relatives to the
Central Luzon General Hospital in San Fernando, Pampanga where she underwent physical examination
by Dr. Evelyn Macabulos, a resident of the Hospital's Obstetrics and Gynecology Department (pp. 19-20,
TSN, March 10, 1987; pp. 6-15, TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "W", "W1"). Dr. Macabulos found that the
patient was "conscious, coherent, slightly uncooperative, distraught, untidy with soiled clothes and
underwear" and that her blood pressure was 130/80 while her pulse rate was 105 per minute (pp. 7-9.
TSN, May 27, 1987). She noted that "her eyes were swollen but without contusions; her heart was
slightly tachycardic, regular rate rhythm with no murmur (pp. 9-10, TSN, ibid). She also observed that
she had clear breath sounds; her breasts are conical, well-developed, symmetrical with light brown
nipple and areola, no contusions noted" (ibid.). She also noted that her trunk has linear hematoma at
the back which looked like finger marks while in her extremities, there were 2 x 1.5 cm. Round
hematoma at posterior aspect of her right upper arm and multiple hematomas at posterior upper pan of
the left thigh (pp. 9-10. TSN, ibid). Dr. Macabulos further observed that in her external genitalia there

170
was "scanty pubic hair, well coaptated but moderately swollen labia minora, labia mahora also
confested (sic)". She noted that the hymen had fresh lacerations at 12 o'clock, 6 o'clock, 5 and 7 o'clock;
scantily bleeding from the lacerations; there was a .3 x .3 cm. Hematoma ( sic) at 12 o'clock; the patient
cried and was hysterical in the examination of her genitalia and complained of pain when application
was inserted for smear; the patient's panty was stained with blood and when smear for spermatozoa
was done, none was found (pp. 10-11. TSN, May 27, 1987; Exh. "W") Later that day, Marilyn was
confined at the Rosary Hospital in Bulacan for 2 1/2 days so that she can recover her strength (p. 11,
TSN, March 25, 1987).
Meanwhile, the widows of the passengers who were killed during the January 20, 1986 incident at Bgy.
San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, including Susana Bautista Vda. de Surio, Lucila Cruz and Corazon
Dionisio, were informed that their respective husbands were among the four (4) passengers of a jeepney
who were killed in San Simon, Pampanga and were invited to go to the funeral parlor in Pampanga to
make the necessary identification of the cadavers (pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8, 1987; pp. 3-4, TSN, January 27,
1987; pp. 3-5, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987). Lucila Cruz confirmed her husband's death when she went to San
Simon, Pampanga on January 23, 1986 at 2:00 o'clock pm. (pp. 3-4, TSN, January 23, 1987; Exh. "Z", pp.
8-9, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987). The death of her husband Constancio Dionisio was confirmed by his widow
Corazon when she went to the funeral parlor in San Simon on January 25, 1986 (pp. 3-5, TSN, April 8,
1987). The death of Magno Surio was also confirmed by his widow Susana Bautista Surio when she went
to the funeral parlor in San Simon accompanied by a policeman from Malolos (pp. 3-5, TSN, Feb. 17,
1987; Exh. "AA"; pp. 10-11, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Dr. Maria Teresa F. Santos, Rural Health Physician of San Simon, Pampanga, who conducted autopsy of
the four (4) cadavers recovered at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, issued Certificates of Death of
Rodolfo C. Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan (pp. 3-4, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987;
Exhs. "Z", "AA", "BB" and "CC"). The cause of death of Rodolfo C. Cruz was "Cardio-respiratory arrest,
shock hemorrhage, multiple stab wounds" (Exh. "ZZ", pp. 8-9, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987). The cause of death of
Magno dela Cruz y Surio is the same as that of Rodolfo C. Cruz (Exh. "AA"; pp. 10-11, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
The stated cause of death of Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan was also the same as those
indicated in the certificates of death of the other victims (Exhs. "BB", "CC"; pp. 12-14, TSN, Aug. 5, 1987).
Meanwhile, in the early morning of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez received a tip from a civilian
informer that the description of one of the four (4) suspects given by Marilyn Martinez tallied with that
of appellant Eduardo Pulusan who previously had a record in their file (pp. 6-8, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp.
4-6, TSN, Sept. 7, 1987).
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, Cpl. Rodriguez, Pat. Maniago and several policemen of San Simon,
Pampanga, together with the Pampanga P.C. Command, including Sgt. Mario Dulin, proceeded to the
residence of appellant Pulusan at Bgy. San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga (pp. 10-11, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986).
When their group reached San Pablo, San Simon, Pampanga, they found Honwario Pulusan, appellant
Eduardo Pulusan's brother there (pp. 10-11, Nov. 25, 1986; p. 6, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). After interviewing
him, the team learned from Honwario that appellant Pulusan was with Rolando Rodriguez, Rolando
Tayag and one Efren alias Ramon at Bgy. Moras dela Paz, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga, where Rolando
Rodriguez resided (pp. 2-5, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, Jan. 6, 1987; pp. 5-7, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986).
Immediately thereafter, the joint San Simon police and Pampanga PC team coordinated with the Station
Commander of Sto. Tomas and proceeded to Moras dela Paz together with Honwario Pulusan (pp. 3-5,
TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Upon reaching Bgy. Moras dela Paz, the team parked their vehicle a few meters
away from the residence of appellant Rolando Rodriguez (pp. 5-6, TSN. Oct. 7, 1987). As the members of
the joint PC and police team approached the residence of appellant Rodriguez about 20 or 30 meters
therefrom, they noticed four (4) persons, including appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan, jumping and
scampering away from the house (pp. 7-8, TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 7-8, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986). Honwario
Pulusan pointed to the police team appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan and also said "Kuya, sumuko na

171
kayo" (p. 8. TSN, Dec. 2, 1986). The joint police and PC team pursued them and eventually apprehended
appellants Rodriguez and Pulusan (pp. 7-8, TSN, September 9, 1987, pp. 4-6, TSN, Nov. 11, 1986).
Thereafter, Pat. Maniago Sgt. Dulin and the Barangay Captain, returned to the house of appellant
Rodriguez, conducted a search thereon in the presence of one Gloria Bautista, sister-in-law of Rolando
and eventually confiscated several items, to wit: "one (1) camera, nikon type with cover (Exh. "A"); one
(1) pair of men's shoes, colored brown (Exh. "E"); one pair Grosby men's shoes (while) (Exh "G"); one (1)
pair ladies shoes colored black (Melvin Trade Mark (Exh. "H"); one (1) knife 12 inches long (Exh "J"); one
(1) knife 10 inches long (Exh. "K"); one (1) sunglass (Unisex) (Exh "I"); one (1) ladies wrist watch (Urika)
(Exh. "M"); four (4) pcs of batteries (Exh. "C" to "C-3"); two (2) pieces of steel pipes which turned out to
be an improvised 12 gauge shotgun "paltik-sumpak" (Exh. "L", "L-1"); one (1) pants Haruta (Exh. "F");
one (1) jacket colored green (Exh. "D"); one (1) camera flasher (Exh. "B"); two (2) pieces (live) 12 gauge
shotgun ammos (Exh. "N"); and one (1) piece empty shell for 12 gauge shotgun" (Exh. "N") (pp. 8-10,
TSN, Dec. 2, 1986; pp. 8-9, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987; pp. 3-9, TSN, Dec. 9, 1986; pp. 6-10, TSN, Nov. 18, 1986).
Afterwards, Sgt. Dulin prepared an inventory of the recovered items (Exh. "R", "R-1", "R-2"; pp. 8-11,
Sept. 9, 1987). Subsequently, appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez, together with the recovered items,
were brought to the Station of the Pampanga P.C. Command at St. Nino, San Fernando Pampanga, for
further investigation (p. 15, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987). A "Progress Report" relative to the arrest of appellants
Pulusan and Rodriguez and the recovery of the items from their possession was also made by Cpl.
Rodriguez (Exh. "Q", "A-1").
In the afternoon of January 23, 1986, the joint police and PC team informed the three (3) surviving
victims Gomez, Pagtalunan and Martinez that the suspects had been arrested and invited them and the
wives of the victims who were killed, including Lucila Cruz, Susana Surio and Mrs. Cundangan, to go to
the PC Headquarters in the morning of January 24, 1986 (pp. 15-16, TSN, Sept. 9, 1987; pp. 10-11, TSN,
Nov. 11, 1986; pp. 23-24, TSN, Nov. 25, 1986; pp. 4-11, TSN, Nov. 11, 1986).
In the early morning of January 24, 1986, Gomez, Marilyn Martinez and Pagtalunan, together with the
wives of those who were killed, proceeded to the PC Headquarters in San Fernando, Pampanga (pp. 15-
16, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6, TSN, July 29, 1986). Three persons, including appellants Pulusan and
Rodriguez, were presented to Gomez, Martinez and Pagtalunan and they were asked if they knew them
(pp. 2-3, TSN. Oct. 14, 1986). Pagtalunan pinpointed only two of them, appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez
as the persons who held them up in Malolos on January 20, 1986 (ibid.; pp. 15-17, TSN, July 22, 1986)
Gomez and Martinez also positively identified appellants to be among the four (4) persons who
committed the robbery, killing and rape in the evening of January 20, 1986 (pp. 10-11, kTSN, Dec. 2,
1986; pp. 20-21, TSN, March 19, 1987 Exhs. "O". "O-1" to "O-3"). Pictures of the identification of
appellants Pulusan and Rodriguez by the three (3) surviving victims were taken by a commercial
photographer under the supervision of the police authorities (pp. 16-17, TSN, June 10, 1986; pp. 5-6,
TSN, July 29, 1986; pp. 10-11, TSN, July 22, 1986; Exhs. "O", "O-1", "O-2" and "O-3").
Susana Bautista Surio, widow of the victim Magno Surio, in her "Sworn Statement" identified the
camera, flash and batteries, among the items confiscated by the police at the house of appellant
Rodriguez, to be the property of her husband who used them in his work as commercial photographer
(pp. 4-11, TSN, Feb. 17, 1987; Exh. "U", "U-1"; Exhs. "A", "B", "C", to "C-3").
An information charging Pulusan and Rodriguez with the crime of highway robbery attended with
multiple homicide and multiple rape was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Malolos. 1 The
information was later amended to include Rolando Tayag and one John Doe alias Ramon or Efren. The
amended information reads:
That on or about the 20th day of January, 1986, along the MacArthur highway in the municipality of
Malolos, province of Bulacan Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused Eduardo Pulusan y Anicete and Rolando Rodriguez y Macalino, Rolando Tayag and one John
doe alias Ramon/Efren, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, armed with

172
an improvised firearm and bladed instruments, with intent of gain and by means of violence against
and intimidation persons (sic), did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob and
carry away with them the following articles from the driver and the passengers of a passenger
jeepney bound for the said municipality, to wit:
From Constancio Gomez, driver:
Cash P 100.00
Lighter (Zippo brand) 100.00
2 fancy rings 60.00
From Cresenciano Pagtalunan, passenger:
Cash P 110.00
Wrist watch 1,500.00
From Magno Surio, passenger:
Wrist watch, Seiko brand P 800.00
Camera, Nikon brand 8,000.00
From Armando Cundangan, passenger:
Wrist watch, Seiko brand P 700.00
Cash 80.00
From Rodolfo Cruz, passenger:
Cash P 700.00
Wrist watch, Seiko brand 700.00
From Constancio Dionisio, passenger:
Cash P 200.00
From Marilyn Martinez, passenger:
Wrist watch Urika brand P 350.00
To the damage and prejudice of the above-enumerated persons in the amounts above-mentioned;
and that by reason or on the occasion of the said highway robbery and in pursuance of their
conspiracy, the said Eduardo Pulusan y Aniceta, Rolando Rodriguez y Macalino and Rolando Tayag and
one John Doe alias Ramon/Efren, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd
designs and by means of force, violence and intimidation, have carnal knowledge of said Marilyn
Martinez one after the other, and with intent to kill, abuse of superior strength, cruelty, treachery and
evidence premeditation, further assault, attack strike and hack/stab with the weapons they were then
provided the said Magno Surio, Armando Cundagan, Rodolfo Cruz and Constancio Dionisio, inflicting
on the said persons serious physical injuries which directly caused their instantaneous death.
Contrary to law. 2
Rolando Tayag and John Does alias Ramon or Efren remain at large. Pulusan and Rodriguez pleaded
not guilty to the crime charged.
In his defense, Rodriguez testified that he was a nephew of co-accused Eduardo Pulusan. He denied
knowledge of the crime charged against him. He asserts that he had not committed any crime, and
that in fact, he was able to get an NBI clearance as a requirement for his work as a driver in Iraq. 3
As a kabo ng jueteng, he would collect bets three times a day, the last jueteng draw being at 9:30 in
the evening. He would thus be home only between 11:30 and twelve midnight, as on the night of
January 20, 1986. Rodriguez presented in court to corroborate his alibi fellow kabo Oscar Nocum, a
jueteng collector named Sara Lee, and a jueteng Marilou Garcia.
Oscar Nocum testified that Rodriguez was with him from about 9:30 in the evening of January 20,
1986, which was the time of the last jueteng draw, until midnight. 4
Sara Lee, who lived nine houses from Rodriguez, testified that on the night of January 20, 1986 she
saw Rodriguez at around eight o'clock to remit her collection. Rodriguez then came back to her house

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between 10:30 and eleven o'clock because she had invited him to her daughter's birthday celebration
and because they expected to hear from him the results of the jueteng draw. 5
Marilou Garcia, also a neighbor of Rodriguez who lived six houses away, testified that she placed a bet
with Rodriguez at his house at around eight o'clock to 8:45 in the evening of January 20, 1986,
afterwhich Rodriguez left. She next saw him later that evening at around 10:30 to eleven o'clock when
he passed by Garcia's house where a bingo game was in progress. 6
When arrested at his house in Moras, Sto. Tomas, Pampanga, Rodriguez was with his two children, his
uncle Eduardo Pulusan and jueteng collectors, one of which was Rolando Tayag, one of those charged
with Pulusan and Rodriguez in the amended information. Pulusan was in Rodriguez's house to invite
the latter to their town fiesta.7
Eduardo Pulusan testifying in his defense asserted that on January 20, 1986, he was repairing his
house in preparation for the coming fiesta. His helper then was a certain Tony. The following day, he
also stayed at home because he helped his father in their fishpond. He did not leave his house until
around 1:30 p.m. on January 23, 1986 when he went to the house of his nephew, Rolando Rodriguez,
to invite him to the fiesta. Pulusan presented in court his mother, Agapita, and Antonio Libid, the
carpenter who allegedly repaired his house, to corroborate his alibi. Both testified that Pulusan did
not leave the house on the night of January 20, 1986. 8
He professed innocence because he had never been implicated in a crime, not even vagrancy. He
denied the testimony of prosecution witness Sgt. Dulin that he once had a rape case against him. 9
On June 5, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 12 at Malolos, rendered a Decision in
Criminal Case No. 9217-M as follows:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established the guilt of the accused EDUARDO PULUSAN y
ANICETA and ROLANDO RODRIGUEZ y MACALINO beyond reasonable doubt, this Court finds them
guilty of the offense of Robbery with Homicide penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised
Penal Code, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer and undergo imprisonment for life or
RECLUSION PERPETUA, with costs against said accused.
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to indemnify the heirs
of the late Rodolfo Cruz, Magno Surio, Constancio Dionisio and Armando Cundangan the amount of
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00) for each dead victim as civil indemnification for their death.
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are also hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, as
indemnification to the rape victim Marilyn Martinez, the amount of SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P60.000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and severally, to pay moral
damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and
Armando Cundangan, the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby further ordered, jointly and severally, to pay moral
damages to the respective heirs of the deceased Magno Surio, Rodolfo Cruz, Constancio Dionisio and
Armando Cundangan, the amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) to each victim and to
rape victim Marilyn Martinez the amount of FORTY THOUSAND PESOS (P40.000.00).
Both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby furthermore ordered, jointly, and severally, to
reimburse the heirs of the dead victims for the funeral expenses incurred by them as follows.
TWENTY ONE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P21,830.00) for deceased Rodolfo Cruz;
TEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY PESOS (P10,170.00) for deceased Magno Surio;
ELEVEN THOUSAND PESOS (P11,000.00) for deceased Constancio Dionisio.
Finally, both accused Pulusan and Rodriguez are hereby ordered, jointly and severally, to return to the
victims or their heirs the items they have taken during the robbery or to reimburse the value thereof
as follows:
Constancio Gomez — a lighter worth P50.00 and cash of P100.00;

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Cresenciano Pagtalunan — a driver's watch Worth P1,000.00 and cash of P110.00;
Marilyn Martinez — a wrist watch worth P350.00;
Rodolfo Cruz — a watch worth P700.00, a wedding ring worth P500 and cash of P750.00.
As regards accused ROLANDO TAYAG and a John Doe alias "Ramon/Efren", let the record of this case
be committed to the Archives to await their arrest and for this purpose, let an alias warrant of arrest
be issued against accused Rolando Tayag.
SO ORDERED. 10
Pulusan contends before this Court that the trial court erred in giving credence to his identification by
prosecution witnesses as one of the perpetrators of the crime; in giving evidentiary weight to the
"incredible, unreliable and inconsistent if not conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses;" in
failing to give "exculpatory weight" to his alibi which was supported by witnesses, and in convicting
him even if his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. 11
Rodriguez asserts that the trial court erred in convicting him and imposing on him the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and giving credence to the evidence presented by the prosecution. 12
The arguments of Pulusan and Rodriguez are anchored mainly on the issue of credibility.
The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently
performed by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light
of the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is hereby placed in a more
competent position to discriminate between the true and the false. 13 Thus, the trial court's findings
on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal absent any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case. 14 There is no
showing in the instant case of an oversight, misunderstanding or misapplication of facts on the part of
the trial court that may warrant reversal of that court" findings and conclusions.
Pulusan avers that the prosecution witnesses' identification of him as one of the robbers was not
enough to hurdle the test of certainty. 15 Pulusan quotes the following portions of the testimony of
Constancio Gomez:16
Q Mr. Witness before the wheel of your jeep was taken from you and (you were) told to sit at the
back, you did not recognize the faces of those persons?
A No, sir.
Q Because you did not give a glance at their faces, correct?
A When something was poked at me, I have not yet recognized them. But when I was sitted (sic) at
the back, once in a while I glanced at them, sir.
Q Mr. Witness when one of the persons you mentioned who boarded your jeep at Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan poked a knife at your back and announced a hold-up, you became greatly afraid Mr. Witness,
correct?
A Of course, sir.
Q You were even terrified of being killed harmed by such happening, Mr. Witness?
A Yes, sir.
Q And you were very much afraid of these four men who announced the hold-up, correct?
A Yes, sir, of course, I am afraid.
x x x           x x x          x x x
Q In fact Mr. Witness when these persons announced the hold-up, specifically when one of them was
poking a knife at your back and you were terribly afraid of these four persons, you were afraid much
more to look at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir, I am not looking at their faces because something was poked at me.

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Q Now even if you were ordered to go inside the jeepney, together with the passengers and even
after one of the four men took the wheels of the jeep, you were still very afraid to look at them,
correct?
A Even if I am so afraid, sir, once in a while I glanced at them and tried to recognize them.
Q Is it not a fact Mr. Witness that when you were ordered to go inside the jeep to sit with your
passengers, they ordered the light of the jeep to be put off?
A When that was said, we were already far and all the valuables were already taken from us, sir.
Q The light were (sic) ordered put off when you were still driving the jeep, correct?
A They were the ones who put off the light, sir.
Q When you said that you take a look at their faces, it means to say that you take only a passing
glance at their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q When you were just taking a passing glance of the faces of those four men, you did not actually
describe (sic) their faces, is that correct?
A Some of them I can describe but the others I cannot, sir.
Q When you arrived at the place where the jeep stopped, is it not a fact that the place was dark?
A Darked (sic), sir.
Q While you were there, you were not able to recognize the faces of the four men, correct?
A No more because it was dark, sir. 17 (Emphasis supplied).
The quoted portion, rather than support Pulusan's contention, shows that Gomez, although gripped
by fear, was able to look at and see the malefactors. While it may be true that Gomez had only
occasional glances at the men, this does not mean that he could not have been able to recognize
them. The most natural reaction of victims of violence is to strive to see the appearance of the
perpetrators of the crime and observe the manner in which the crime was being committed. 18
We also consider the following testimony of Cresenciano Pagtalunan, thus:
Q When these four passengers boarded the jeepney, was the jeepney inside lighted or not?
A The jeep was lighted, sir.
Q Did you look at the faces of these four persons who boarded the jeepney?
A I came to know their faces when they passed by me and announced that it was a hold-up, I
happened to look at them, sir.
Q In fact you looked at their faces and you have only a glimpse of their faces, correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you have glimpses of these four persons who boarded at Malolos or only one of them?
A I saw their faces because there was still light inside the jeep, sir. 19
This testimony was corroborated by Marilyn Martinez who affirmed that when the four men boarded
the jeep, the light inside the jeep was still on. She was able to recognize the men because they
entered the jeep one by one. Moreover, Marilyn testified that even though the light inside the jeep
was off, because they travelled quite a long distance, lights from the vehicles following them provided
enough illumination.20 When they arrived at the isolated talahiban in Sto. Tomas, one of the robbers
switched on the headlights of the jeep. After the repeated rape of Marilyn, the light inside the jeep
was already
on.21 Furthermore, appellant Rodriguez, who was the first to rape Marilyn, dragged her to the
talahiban by passing in front of the jeep with its headlights on. She was looking at him, pleading for
mercy.22
This Court has time and again held that the relative weight and significance of evidence on visibility
depend largely on the attending circumstances and the discretion of the trial court. The Court has
considered as sufficient for identification illumination from a kerosene lamp 23 from a flashlight,24 in
the same way that the Court considered as enough lighting for identification purposes the "medium"

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light inside a jeepney which was passing through a dark place. 25 In the instant case, the factor of
visibility was in favor of the eyewitnesses. Such identification by all of the three prosecution
eyewitnesses, not only by one, could not have been coincidental or contrived.
In an attempt to discredit the eyewitnesses and their testimonies, Pulusan points out these
"conflicting testimonies:" (1) Gomez and Marilyn testified he poked a knife at Gomez while
Pagtalunan said that he was holding a sumpak; (2) Gomez testified that it was Pulusan who brought
Marilyn to the talahiban while according to Marilyn, it was Rodriguez who brought her first to that
place; (3) Gomez testified that they went to the PC headquarters the day following January 20, 1986
while Pagtalunan testified that they did so four days later; and (4) Gomez contradicted his testimony
on direct examination that the crime transpired on January 20, 1986 by his testimony on cross-
examination that the incident happened on February 20, 1986.
We find these alleged contradictions too trivial to affect the prosecution's case. Far from eroding the
effectiveness of the testimonies of these eyewitnesses, such trivial differences are in fact indicative of
veracity.26 Witnesses testifying on the same event do not have to be consistent in every detail
considering the inevitability of differences in their recollection, viewpoint or impression. Total recall
or perfect symmetry is not required as long as the witnesses concur on material points. 27
The prosecution, contrary to appellants' contention has also proven beyond reasonable doubt that
the four men. Pulusan and Rodriguez included, conspired in the commission of the crime. In
conspiracy, direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not necessary. It may be
deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts
of the accused themselves when such point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and
community of interest.28
Pulusan and Rodriguez boarded the jeep together with two companions at the same time in Barangay
Tikay. When Pulusan announced the hold-up, Rodriguez and their companions simultaneously
brandished knives and the sumpak and divested the passengers of their money and valuables. When
the jeepney reached an isolated place, the men took turns in raping Marilyn, inflicting physical harm
on four male passengers who all succumbed to repeated clubbing and stabbing. After the carnage, the
four malefactors walked towards the same northerly direction. Apparent then is the unity of purpose
and design in the execution of the unlawful act. 29 And where conspiracy is shown, the precise extent
of participation of each accused in the crime is secondary and the act of one may be imputed to all the
conspirators.30
Pulusan's and Rodriguez's respective alibis cannot prosper. Apart from the fact that they situated
themselves in places not too far from the crime scene, there was no proof that it was physically
impossible for them to have been at the locus criminis during its commission.31 Most of all, their
respective alibis collapse in the face of the positive identification of them as the perpetrators of the
crime.32
The crime of charged in the information was "highway robbery attended with multiple homicide with
multiple rape." Highway robbery or brigandage is defined in Sec (2) of Presidential Decree No. 532,
otherwise known as the "Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974," as:
(t)he seizure of any person for ransom, extortion or other unlawful purposes, or the taking away of
the property of another by means of violence against or intimidation of person or force upon things or
other unlawful means, committed by any person on any Philippine Highway.
As manifest in its preamble, the object of the decree is to deter and punish lawless elements who
commit acts of depredation upon persons and properties of innocent and defenseless inhabitants who
travel from one place to another thereby disturbing the peace and tranquillity of the nation and
stunting the economic and social progress of the people. A conviction for highway robbery requires
proof that the accused were organized for the purpose of committing robbery indiscriminately. There

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is no such proof in this case. Neither is there proof that the four men previously attempted to commit
similar robberies indiscriminately.33
The trial court thus correctly found Pulusan and Rodriguez guilty of the crime of robbery with
homicide aggravated by rape under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. In the interpretation of
an information, controlling is not the designation but the description of the offense charged. Under
the allegations in the information, Pulusan and Rodriguez are liable under the aforesaid article of the
penal code.34
We must state that regardless of the number of homicides committed on the occasion of a robbery,
the crime is still robbery with homicide. In this special complex crime, the number of persons killed is
immaterial and does not increase the penalty prescribed in Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code. 35
There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the said Code. 36 The same crime is
committed even if rape and physical injuries are also committed on the occasion of said crime.
Moreover, whenever the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is proven to have been
committed, all those who took part in the robbery are liable as principals therein although they did
not actually take part in the homicide. 37
Rape had not been proven to be the original intention of the appellants, the crime having been
committed simply because there was a female passenger in the jeep. Hence, rape can only be
considered as an aggravating circumstance and not a principal offense. 38
Under Art. 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death. Considering the attendance of rape as a generic aggravating circumstance, the
maximum penalty of death should be imposed. However, by reason of Section 19(1), Art. III of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which proscribes the imposition of the death penalty and considering
further that at the time the crime was committed, Republic Act No. 7659 entitled "An Act to Impose
the Death Penalty on Certain Heinous Crimes" reimposing the death penalty had not yet been
enacted, the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Because reclusion perpetua is a single indivisible
penalty for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, the same shall be imposed regardless
of the attending aggravating or mitigating circumstances.39
The Court gives credence to the findings of the trial court as to the items to be returned or the
equivalent amount to be reimbursed to the victims of robbery, as well as the actual damages claimed
and proven by the widows of the slain victims. However, the civil indemnity for the heirs of the
deceased victims should be increased to P50,000.00 in conformity with jurisprudence. 40
As to the moral damages awarded to Marilyn Martinez, the same should be increased pursuant to this
Court's ruling that the offended party in the crime of rape is entitled to moral damages in the amount
of at least P50,000.00; but in cases where multiple rapes are committed against one victim, as in this
case where the victim suffered four rapes by four men, the victim should be awarded no less than the
amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages.41
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 5, 1990 of the Regional Trial Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 12
convicting appellants Eduardo Pulusan and Rolando Rodriguez of the crime of robbery with homicide
is hereby AFFIRMED subject to the modifications that the heirs of the four (4) slain victims shall each
be entitled to an indemnity of P50,000.00 and the rape victim, Marilyn Martinez, shall be awarded
moral damages in the amount of P200,000.00. Appellants shall be liable jointly and severally for the
monetary awards.
SO ORDERED.

10. People v. Bustinera, G.R. No. 148233, June 8, 2004

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