John F. Kennedy - Why England Slept (0, 1961) PDF
John F. Kennedy - Why England Slept (0, 1961) PDF
John F. Kennedy - Why England Slept (0, 1961) PDF
m a tu re
u n d e rs ta n d in g a n d fa ir -m in d e d n e s s .. .tim e ly
and p e n e tra tin g c o n c lu s io n s ..."
N ew Y o rk T im es, 1940
$ 3.50
“Imagine that as a young man in college you
wrote a book of judgment on the behavior of
a contemporary empire, its leaders, and its
people...
“Imagine that 20 years later when you are
still young, you become President of the
United States at a time when America faces
grim possibilities of destruction and surren
der ...
“Imagine, then, that you re-read the book
you wrote in college and find that you would
not be embarrassed by having it exposed
again; this surely would be an extraordinary
experience. Perhaps nothing like it ever hap
pened before in the lives of all the leaders of
men.
“This has been the experience of John F.
Kennedy, 3 5 th President of the United
States___”-Heriry R. Luce
Written when John F. Kennedy was a senior
at Harvard and published in 1940 , Why
England Slept is a brilliant appraisal of the
tragic events of the thirties that led to
World War II: it is an electrifying account
of England's unpreparedness for war and a
sober and serious study of the shortcomings
of democracy when confronted by the men
ace of totalitarianism.
Many of John Kennedy’s most impression
able years were spent in London where he
(continued on back (lap)
W HY E NG L A N D SLEPT
WHY
ENGLAND
SLEPT
JOHN F. KENNEDY
NEW YORK
WILFRED FUNK, INC.
© Copyright, 1961, by W ilfred F u n k, In c .
Library of Congress Catalog Card N u m ber 40-14799
Printed in the United States of America
+
T a b le o f C on ten ts
PART TWO
Period of Rearmament Policy
PAGE
Chapter VI. The Launching of the Rear
mament Program, 1936 115
PART THREE
Conclusion
Appendix 233
Bibliography 247
In tro d u ctio n
2
19 3
Feb. 2 Disarmament Conference
Mar. 13-
April 10 Hindenburg reelected
July 3 German Elections (Nazis won 230
seats)
July 9 Reparation Agreement signed at Lau
sanne
Nov. 7 General Von Schleicher succeeds
Herr Von Papen as Chancellor
Nov. 8 Election of Franklin D. Roosevelt as
President of the United States
F o r t h e c o n v e n ie n c e o f t h e r e a d e r , a c a le n d a r c o n t a in in g t h e m o s t
im p o r t a n t e v e n ts of th e year has been p la c e d a t th e b e g in n in g of
c e r ta in c h a p te r s .
T h o u g h n o t ev ery e v e n t is d is c u s s e d , t h e c a le n d a r w ill a id in e s ta b
lis h in g t h e te m p o o f t h e tim e .
II
4
IV
I
1
PART TWO
1
1
i
Period of Rearmament Policy 117
That the Government was still not definitely con
vinced of the inevitability of armaments is shown by
the statement that it would continue to discourage
competition in armaments. It gave the recent Naval
Agreement with Germany of June, 1935, and the ne
gotiations then going on with the United States
regarding naval limitations as instances. It admit
ted that a general raising of armament levels all
around was no guarantee of peace. But, “In deter
mining our own defense program, it is impossible to
disregard the extent of the preparations of others.”
It warned, however, that the provisions of the Pa
per could and would be modified if the situation
changed. This last statement indicates that the Gov
ernment had by no means accepted the idea that a
war with Germany was inevitable. This is an ex
tremely important point and was to become more
important during the next three years.
The British realized that they must make some
efforts to build up their armaments. Yet to them war
was such an unsatisfactory solution of the problems
then confronting Europe that they could not make
themselves believe that it was a serious and danger
ous threat. In their eyes, the important problems in
Europe were questions of trade and tariffs. They felt
that the gravest errors that had been made at Ver
sailles were economic rather than political. Even the
118 W hy England Slept
question of colonies, they believed, could be worked
out satisfactorily. To none of these problems would
a war be a solution—it would only make them far
worse.
They did not see the Nazi movement as a revolu
tionary movement, heading for European domina
tion. Hitler's propaganda and speeches were so effec
tive that they numbed any reaction that the British
felt from the reintroduction of conscription or the
invasion of the Rhineland. This had a vital effect on
England's defensive effort. To prepare for a war to
day requires a nation’s united effort. England’s was
bound to be only half-hearted, as she was not con
vinced that war was inevitable. She was not to get
that united effort until Munich had shocked the
people into an awareness of their vulnerability, and
the invasion of Prague in March convinced them
once and for all that a “deal” could not be made
with Germany. Meanwhile, it is important to note,
in studying the program for 1936, that the hope of
an equitable solution with Germany was still very
strong.
The actual estimates submitted called for a total
expenditure of £“158,211,000, although by the end
of the year this figure amounted to £188,163,000.
This is nearly double the figure of 1931 when we
began the analysis—the expenditure has risen from
Period of Rearmament Policy 119
$449,900,000 to $846,900,000. It is also an increase
of $250,000,000 over the previous year.
The Naval estimates totaled £69,930,000; this fig
ure was to be supplemented in May by another £10,-
000,000. This was an increase of £20,000,000 over
the previous year, due to the scare given the Navy
by Mussolini, when the Fleet in the Mediterranean
found that many of their guns had ammunition for
only one or two rounds.
I have pointed out that democracies require jolts
to awaken them. England got her jolt in regard to
the Navy in 1936. Thus, when the present war broke
out, the British Navy was the one branch of the
Services that could be said to be in excellent condi
tion. During 1936, 1937, and 1938 England engaged
in one of the most active building periods in her
career, and it has served her in good stead in the
present war.
The estimates for the Army were up about £6,-
000,000 to £49,281,000, but the White Paper indi
cated the general attitude towards this branch,
when it said that as the Army had “been reduced
twenty-one battalions since 1914 . . . it was proposed
to raise four battalions to mitigate the present diffi
culties of policing duties ”
As in 1935, the Air estimates witnessed the most
substantial increase. They were nearly doubled,
120 W hy England Slept
reaching the figure of £39,000,000 plus another £3,-
000,000 allotted to the Fleet Air Armaments. The
building program was once more “revised to keep
abreast of changing circumstances/* The number of
planes planned for Home Defense (England) was
now raised from the 1500, proposed in 1935, to 1750
and 144 planes were added to the Imperial Defense
(the Empire).
In addition to the rise in the estimates, there were
certain other innovations that marked the beginning
of the present period. An Air Raid Precaution office
was set up, and it was announced officially on March
13, that Sir Thomas Inskip had been appointed Min
ister for the Co-ordination of Defense. His job, while
he had little actual authority, was to co-ordinate all
the requirements of the different services and to act
as liaison between them and industry.
The White Paper then announced the setting up
of the now famous “shadow factory scheme.” This
idea was an attempt to meet the German productive
capacity of planes, taking into consideration the dif
ferences between the two countries* industrial set-up.
Briefly, the theory behind the shadow factories was
that each factory should make certain airplane parts,
which would be assembled at a certain plant. This,
of course, was entirely different from the German
and American organization in which the entire plane
Period of Rearmament Policy 121
was produced at the same factory. The advantage of
the British scheme lies in the fact that each of the
other existing factories could manufacture the parts
they were most suited to handle. The Government
would give subsidies to certain big companies, like
Austin Motors. They would then put in the neces
sary tools, and start in with “ educational” orders.
At the same time they could continue their usual
business. Meanwhile, labor would be constantly
shifted in the new department, so that all the em
ployees would become skilled in airplane produc
tion. Then if and when the emergency came, the
company could quickly change its whole production
capacity into producing planes.
Because of England’s industrial set-up, this scheme
was peculiarly adapted to her requirements. The dis
advantages of the scheme, however, are obvious. In
the first place, it meant that it would be several years
before they could get the whole system running
smoothly. The continual shifts of labor would neces
sitate “ educational” orders for a considerable period.
Secondly, there was the danger that a swift air raid
might put one or two key factories out of produc
tion. This might well tie up the entire system.
Thirdly, there was bound to be a tremendous
amount of inefficiency in assembling the planes. All
the factories were new at their job. It was difficult at
122 W hy England Slept
the time to know how long it would take the facto
ries to do their particular tasks, and it was difficult
to co-ordinate the shipping to the central point. The
result was that at different times the British found
themselves with hundreds of propellers and no en
gines, hundreds of engines and no fuselages, and
so on.
For the first two or three years, the inefficiency of
such a system was bound to be extensive. There is
no doubt that the German and American way of do
ing the entire job in one plant is more efficient. Eng
land's great engine manufacturer, Lord Nuffield, felt
this so strongly that he refused to take part in the
general scheme. Nevertheless, it was felt that this
was so much cheaper, and that it would interfere so
much less with the country’s normal industrial life,
that it received general support throughout the
country. I have discussed this problem in some de
tail as it explains much of the subsequent ineffi
ciency and delay in Britain’s air progress.
After announcing this new industrial plan, the
White Paper cited the need for skilled labor in this
new type of production. It added that every precau
tion would be taken to ensure that profits would be
limited. The whole organization of the new defense
preparations indicate that the Government was be-
Period of Rearmament Policy 123
coming really serious about this problem. What was
the reaction to it in Parliament?
The Labour Party continued to oppose rearma
ment. It was now in a position somewhat similar to
that of the Conservative Party in 1934 and 1935.
Then the public had been opposed to rearmament.
Now the public was changing; armaments were re
garded as necessities. In opposing them, Labour was
standing against the tide of popular opinion. But its
stand was predicated on the theory that “security
cannot be achieved by competitive rearmament.” It
voted against the defense measures, as I have said
before, because they were part of the Government's
foreign policy. Their opposition was not, they care
fully pointed out, because they felt Britain should
continue to neglect her armaments. The truth was
that Labour was becoming doubtful of its own posi
tion. A good portion of Labour’s voting strength
came from the Trades Unions, and the Trades Un
ions were not greatly opposed to armaments, which,
they thought, would mean increased employment.
This put the Parliamentary wing of the Labour Party
in a difficult political position.
The Liberal Party, led by Sir Archibald Sinclair,
the present Air Minister under Churchill, also op
posed the Government. But this was not because
124 W hy England Slept
they were against the idea of the Government’s build
ing up the defense forces, but rather because they
opposed the particular way in which the Govern
ment was doing it. Sinclair stated, “Denunciation of
any expenditure upon the modernization and equip
ment of the British land, naval, or air forces could
only be justified in principle from the point of non
resisting pacifism.”
Winston Churchill, in his attack on the Paper,
took his usual position. He attacked it bitterly, warn
ing of German rearmament, and the tremendous fig
ures that the Germans were spending.
The reoccupation of the Rhineland several days
after the Paper was submitted, of course, made most
of the country support it. Sir Samuel Hoare’s state
ment that German rearmament had become “the
central factor in the European problem and the cen
tral problem of our defensive program,” expressed
the opinion of nearly all groups.
The exact extent of this German rearmament was
a matter of great dispute in England at this time.
What exactly were the Germans paying for their re
armaments? No budget figures had been released dur
ing the last year, so it was difficult to draw any definite
conclusions. In addition, there was the great prob
lem of having to figure amounts in Reichsmarks,
which then had to be translated into pounds. As
Period of Rearmament Policy 125
there were several values for the mark, the figures
had little significance as far as “buying” power went.
In April, Winston Churchill gave the amounts
spent for German rearmament since 1933 as £2,000,-
000,000. This seems to have been an extreme figure.
A series of articles in T he Banker in 1937 placed the
expenditures up to 1936 at around 18,000,000,000
Reichsmarks. At the par rate of twenty Reichsmarks
to the pound the figure would be £900,000,000. At
the then current fixed rate of exchange of twelve
Reichsmarks to a pound, the figure would be £1,-
500,000,000. A compromise between the two figures
would place Germany’s armament expenditure
around £1,200,000,000, which is slightly more than
half of Churchill’s figure.
The Economist, in an article of August 1936, fig
ured the German expenditure at about 24,000,000,-
000 Reichsmarks. This translated into pounds would
be either £1,200,000,000 or £2,000,000,000, accord
ing to whether you accepted the current or the par
rate for the mark. A compromise would bring it to
£1,600,000,000. A fourth source, an article in The
Spectator, figures the amount spent as “ 15,000,000,-
000 marks or £1,200,000,000.” The Foreign Policy
Association reports that the figures in Germany
range from 4,000,000,000 to 12,000,000,000 Reichs
marks, up to April 1936.
126 W hy England Slept
I have cited these different authorities chiefly be
cause they illustrate how difficult it was to judge
Germany’s armed effort. I have pointed out before
that it was possible for the British Government to
make a mistake in its estimates of Germany’s poten
tial output, and these various opinions are cited to
show that there was no real and accurate knowledge
of how much rearmament was going on in Germany.
Not only was it impossible to get a consensus in
regard to the amount of money Germany was spend
ing, but there was no agreement, in any group in
Parliament, on the number of planes Germany then
possessed. According to an article in The Spectator,
which would represent more neutral opinion, it was
thought that in April 1935, when they announced
their Air Force, Germany had 1000 first-line planes
and 300 reserves—a total of 1300. In 1936 they had a
total, roughly, of 2000. In April 1935 England had
about 600 first-line planes and a total of 1434 planes.
France had 1500 first-line planes and a total of 2286.
By 1936 England had in all about 1650 planes and
France remained at about the same figure as in 1935.
According to these figures, therefore, England and
France were still markedly superior in numbers to
Germany—about 4000 to 2000.
There were two great weaknesses, however, in
these figures. The first was that France, for the next
Period of Rearmament Policy 127
months, was to be under the Socialist Government
of Leon Blum. She was to introduce a complete pro
gram of social legislation; she was to give birth to
the idea of the sit-down strike; and she was to see her
entire production system torn and thrown off gear.
This, combined with France’s industrial and general
financial set-up, resulted in France’s Air Force re
maining at around the same figures. Plane produc
tion fell to almost nothing in the next two years.
As the years 1935, 1936, and 1937 saw a great de
velopment in plane structure and plane speeds,
France’s old models became outmoded and could no
longer be considered first-line. The result was that in
September, 1938, the French Air Force could be con
sidered at best a dubious asset. France recognized this
in 1939 and an expansion program, calling for 2600
first-line planes, was approved before the war, to be
completed by April, 1940. It was due to her small out
put that France made a great effort to supplement her
production by buying in the United States. The
importance of all this in our discussion lies in the
fact that much of England’s program was planned
with the expectation that the French Air Force could
be counted on to supplement figures. When French
production failed to materialize, English figures were
thrown out of scale.
On the whole, in summing up the reactions to the
128 W hy England Slept
White Paper in March, and observing the general
opinion expressed in articles, it may be said that
those who still opposed rearmament were chiefly
members of small organized minority groups. The
country as a whole had been definitely converted to
the need of rearmament. This conversion, which had
begun in the Government in the fall of 1934, had
not reached any great strength either in the people
or the Government until the fall of 1935 and the
winter of 1936.
A shattering of the ideal that was the League and
the dawning realization of Germany’s great produc
tive capacity had now made the country ready for
rearmament. But it was still a democracy, which was
leisurely and confidently turning to rearmament,
not a frightened and desperate nation. It was not a
nation with a single purpose, with all its energies
headed in one direction; this was not to come until
after Munich. The fear for its national self-preserva
tion had not become strong enough to cause groups
to give up their personal interests for the greater na
tional purpose. In other words, every group wanted
rearmament, but no group felt that there was any
necessity for sacrificing its privileged position.
The “City,” or business group, was still unwilling
to see great expenditures made on armaments. Both
in England and in America there has always been a
Period of Rearmament Policy 129
strong feeling against armaments as pump-priming,
or as genuine stimuli to business. Several years ago
when it appeared that a big armaments bill was to
be presented to Congress, the United States Cham
ber of Commerce issued a resolution condemning
armament expenditure as a method of increasing
prosperity. It warned that expenditure of this sort
should be purely on the grounds of military neces
sity. In December 1938, the Congress of American
Industry passed a similar resolution. It said that any
prosperity created by this type of expenditure was
artificial and was only a temporary stimulant. Busi
ness in England felt this way, too, and therefore was
opposed to any great armament program, as they
realized that they would have to foot most of the bill.
But it was not only among the business groups that
we find this unwillingness to make great sacrifices.
In the White Paper, it had been suggested that
industry and labor should get together in conversa
tions, to try to work out the new program with a
minimum of sacrifices on both sides. On its part, the
Government had promised to abstain from applying
any compulsion on either party. In an April speech,
Churchill called attention to the fact that, although
one month had passed, labor and industry had not
as yet met together. In fact, although the employers
had written to the Amalgamated Engineers Union,
130 W hy England Slept
one of England’s great trade unions, they had re
ceived no response for over five weeks. The reason
for this was pointed out in a letter from the Secretary
of the Union, to T he Times on May 12. In it he set
down what labor’s general views were towards this
question of co-operation. The Secretary’s letter indi
cates the feelings that motivated the Trade Unions
during this and the subsequent period. He pointed
out the “false promises” that had been made to labor
during the World War and stated that there were a
number of unemployed among the skilled workers
who should be given jobs before there was any dilu
tion. “We remind Sir Thomas Inskip [the Minister
for the Co-ordination of Defense] that what they
were asking us to do was to open our industry to
allow unskilled men to do skilled men’s work.”
In order to understand how horrified a Trade
Union man was at the thought of opening “our in
dustry to allow unskilled men to do skilled men’s
work,” it is necessary to realize the position labor
held in England. Labor is organized on far more
rigid lines than it is in the United States. Although
we have skilled and unskilled labor, our production
is essentially mass production. English production is
far more individualized. The average English prod
uct is the product of skilled workmen, men who have
Period of Rearmament Policy 131
been doing their jobs all their lives and who love it
as a craft. Before they were permitted to take their
places in the union, they were obliged to serve a
long period as an apprentice, a carry-over from the
Middle Ages. That has given English workmen a
pride in the standard of their work and of the work
of their entire union, which they guard jealously.
This fits in with the specialized nature of British
production.
In the difference between a Rolls-Royce and a
Ford, we can see the contrast between the two types
of production. A Rolls-Royce engine is probably the
finest motor built and it is essentially a hand-made
product. The Ford motor, on the other hand, is the
result of mass-production methods, highly developed.
Where Rolls are turned out in single units, Ford can
turn out his car by the thousands. This difference in
the industrial organization has had a tremendous
effect on later British plane production. English
planes, like the Spitfire, have been acknowledged to
be far superior to the German in workmanship and
general construction. But, like Ford, the Germans
have placed their emphasis on mass production.
Their planes, though individually inferior, are
turned out in such masses, that they have more than
made up for the individual superiority of the Brit
132 W hy England Slept
ish. In modern warfare, where die average life of a
plane is figured at less than three months, the skill
of the workmanship makes little difference.
For this reason, it would seem that the mass-pro
duction method is the better. Although the British
have tried to convert their organization to that type,
it has been a difficult struggle, and it has taken them
a long time. Labor's attitude has been one of the
great obstacles. Their unions were organized for the
technical individualized production methods, and
they hated to see their skilled labor diluted by men
who were unskilled. In the first World War, they had
agreed to it of necessity. They made great sacrifices;
but when the war was over, they found that much of
their old system was broken down. The new, un
skilled labor that had been taken in could not be
forced out. This resulted in a lowering of their stand
ards, and they were anxious that this should not hap
pen again. They were, therefore, wary of any plan
that even faintly indicated more dilution. Conse
quently, the opposition of the Secretary is under
standable.
Until British labor was convinced that the actual
existence of the nation was threatened, they refused
to co-operate. And as the Government itself did not
feel in 1936 that the danger was imminent enough to
require the use of force, nothing much was done.
We have seen a somewhat similar situation in Amer
Period of Rearmament Policy 133
ica, in the attempts to exempt labor from the limits
of the Walsh-Healey Act, and to allow a forty-eight-
hour week in the Navy Yards. This has been strongly
opposed, as it was felt that it would mark the begin
ning of the conscription of labor in America. And
until we feel vitally menaced, any such condition
will continue to be strongly opposed. The unwilling
ness of labor in both countries to sacrifice what it has
taken them years to build up because of a somewhat
vague external menace, is the natural result of their
having had to be continually on guard during the
last years to protect what they had already gained.
However, the Secretary's letter concluded on a note
which showed that the Union was concerned with
more than standards of labor.
In describing the Union's interview with Sir
Thomas Inskip, the Secretary said, “We suggested
that there was one thing that might be done which
could be calculated to have the desired effect. We
had a door to open which was depriving 300,000
people of work. This door would be thrown wide
open if you decided to send instruments of warfare
to help the legally elected government of Spain in
their struggle against Germany, Italy and France.”
This was a reference to the embargo on arms put
on Spain by the British Government. The Trade
Unions were strongly supporting the loyalist cause
134 W hy England Slept
and so were opposed to the embargo. But this drag
ging of international politics into the domestic prob
lem of rearmament illustrates the complexity of the
forces with which a democracy must contend in put
ting through a national endeavor, and it is impor
tant in contrasting the progress of German and Brit
ish rearmament. In a totalitarian state, this issue
would never have arisen. This type of freedom is one
of the penalties of democracy, and the attitude of
placing group and political interests above the na
tional interests was by no means confined to labor—
it was typical of all groups.
Another clear illustration of the difficulties a de
mocracy must face in dealing with a problem as gi
gantic as the one England was now handling, is
shown in the debates over the Ministry of Supply.
These debates were to continue for three more years
and, in its stand on this problem we see a clear pic
ture of the Government’s attitude towards this whole
question of rearmament.
On May 21, in the Commons, Churchill rose and
demanded a Ministry of Supply to supplement the
Ministry of the Co-ordination of Defense. He said
that one minister could not co-ordinate the policies
of the three services on tactical lines and, in addi
tion, handle the whole problem of their relation
ships with industry. From Churchill’s description of
Period of Rearmament Policy 135
what the functions of a Ministry of Supply should
be, the Government felt that it would entail giving
the Minister dictatorial powers, and this the Govern
ment was unwilling to do. Sir Thomas Inskip re
plied to Churchill for the Government. He said that
the Government was unwilling to give any Ministry
these dictatorial powers. “That is where the Govern
ment and my right honourable friend part company.
.. . My right honourable friend would take the gigan
tic stride which would put a great part of our indus
trial system on a war basis. He has naturally been
impressed with the example of thoroughness afforded
by Germany. He has invited us to follow that exam
ple. His Majesty's Government up to now have taken
a different course."
In a speech on May 29, in Parliament, Inskip re
peated his statement and illustrated by examples
how a Ministry of Supply, unless it had dictatorial
powers, could accomplish “nothing that could not
be done under the present system.” The fundamen
tals of the issue were whether England should or
ganize industry and labor on a wartime basis or not.
The Government felt that their present system was
the more effective, voluntary co-operation rather
than industrial conscription. It was felt that the com
petition for labor and material was not between
branches of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, but rather
136 W hy England Slept
was between the Service requirements and those of
civil industry. In order to settle the question of pri
ority between these two, a complete system of con
trol would have to be set up. This might well have
meant a dislocation of trade budgets and the general
financial and credit structure of the country. And
after coming through the financial depression of
1929—1931, no one wanted to take that risk. It would
also have had a great effect on England’s export
trade. If her export production was held up, she
might well lose markets to competitors like the Japa
nese, and never be able to get them back.
More and more it was becoming apparent that
upon the export trade would fall a great share of the
burden if a war began. The only way England could
hope to match Germany’s rich, natural resources,
was through her imports. If her export trade was
cut down she would rapidly find herself obliged to
sell her investments in other countries to pay for
these vital raw materials. Then when her cash ran
out, she would be finished. If, however, she kept her
trade lanes open, she could continue to buy from
America and other countries if war began. Her in
vestments would still be intact and these, combined
with the receipts from her export trade, would en
able her to remain solvent, even though she would
have to expend huge amounts.
Period of Rearmament Policy 137
The Government, therefore, preferred to interfere
as little as possible with this vital trade. In order to
have an efficient Ministry of Supply of the type fa
vored by Churchill, it would need dictatorial powers
and might throw industry out of gear. Until the na
tion was at war, or knew it was heading for war, it
felt it would not be worth it. In addition, there was
another reason put forward by Lord Halifax in No
vember 1936, which gives us valuable insight into
the later policy of appeasement. He stated that peace
could be attained by economic adjustments, and
therefore it would be defeating their purpose if they
took steps to interfere with trade and make these
economic adjustments more difficult.
It was this belief of Britain's leaders, that the
reasons for the friction in Europe were reasons that
could be worked out, which prevented her from tak
ing steps that would have called for a complete
change in the national life. If England had known
for sure that she would be in a war in 1940, she
would have put in departments like the Ministry of
Supply. But to put them in for an indefinitely long
period would have had too great an effect on the
economic structure of the country to make it seem
worth while.
This was the great advantage Hitler had over Eng
land. He could build his war machine and plan to
138 W hy England Slept
have it ready to strike in a definite period of time.
In the meanwhile he cared little what happened to
the country’s internal economy. He doubled, tripled,
and quadrupled the internal debt but, due to the
totalitarian nature of his regime, he was able to keep
prices to a reasonable level.
Contrast this with England’s position. England
could not double, triple, and quadruple her debts or
she would have gone bankrupt. She would not have
been able to keep prices from skyrocketing unless
she put in Government control, which would have
marked the end of her as a capitalistic nation, and
the end of her democratic form of government. The
English were unwilling to risk this disaster back in
1936; in fact, it was not until May, 1940, that they
gave the Government dictatorial powers equal to
Hitler’s. Meanwhile, however, Germany could ex
pend sums of hundreds of millions of pounds a year
building up for D er Tag. Britain realized that she
could never match that effort year after year, and she
was therefore unwilling to spend enormous sums un
til she felt that war was indeed inevitable. And this
was not to come until March 1939, or indeed, with
great sections of the country, until the following
September.
The general problem of defense had now become
of great importance to the House. Concern began to
Period of Rearmament Policy 139
be felt generally with the progress being made. In
May supplementary estimates had been submitted,
totaling £19,752,700, of which the Air Force got
£1 1,700,000. The total for the year had now reached
£188,163,780. This figure did not, by any means,
satisfy Churchill. He claimed that £800,000,000 a
year was being spent in Germany, of which £300,-
000,000 was for up-keep, the rest for “extraordinary
expenditures and expansion.” He then stated that
England would be able to spend only £75,000,000
of her appropriation that year, due to the lack of fa
cilities for production. In Commons on November
12, he again demanded a Ministry of Supply, and
declared that, at the existing rate of expansion, the
R.A.F. would not reach the promised 124 squadrons
(1488 planes), in spite of Sir Samuel Hoare’s state
ment that “the position is satisfactory.” It was now
becoming evident to all that Britain had started with
her rearmament later than she should have. Church
ill’s speeches were causing some people to question
why, for example, they were ordering machine tools,
“which were the neck of the bottle,” now, instead of
a year before. Baldwin arose on November 12 to ex
plain this failure.
The speech Baldwin delivered was one of the
gravest political “boners” that any politician ever
made. His “appalling frankness” has resulted in his
140 W hy England Slept
being blamed for the entire condition of Britain’s
armaments. Although a master politician, he made
the most elementary mistakes in phrasing, and from
this time on he became the political scapegoat for
Britain’s failure to rearm. Much of what Baldwin
said was true, but the manner in which he worded
the truth made it appear that he had put his party’s
interest above the national interest, and that was
fatal.
W e started late and I want to say a word about the years the
locusts have eaten. I want to speak to the House with the
utmost frankness . . . I w ould remind the House that not
once but on many occasions in speeches and in various
places, when I have been advocating as far as I am able the
democratic principle, l have stated that a democracy is al
ways two years behind the dictator. I believe this to be true.
It has been true in this case. I put before the whole House
my own views with an appalling frankness. From 1933, I
and all my friends, were all very worried about what was
happening in Europe. You w ill remember at that time the
Disarmament Conference was sitting in Geneva. You w ill
remember at that time there was probably a stronger pacifist
feeling running through this country than at any time since
the W ar. I am speaking of 1934-1935. You w ill remember
the election at Fulham in the autumn of 1933, when a seat
which the N ational Governm ent held was lost by about
7,000 votes on no issue but the pacifist. You w ill remember,
perhaps, that the N ational Government candidate who made
a most guarded reference to the question of defense was
mobbed for it. T h a t was the feeling in the country in 1933.
Period of Rearmament Policy 141
M y position as the leader of agreat party was not alto
gether a comfortable one. I asked myself w hat chance was
there—when that feeling that was given expression to in F u l
ham was common throughout the country. W h at chance was
there w ithin the next two years of that feeling being so
changed that the country w ould give a mandate for rearma
ment? Supposing I had gone to the country and said that
Germany was rearm ing and that we must rearm, does any
body think that this pacific democracy w ould have rallied
to that cry at that moment?
1939
Mar. 15 Hitler marches into Prague
Sept. 1 Hitler marches into Poland
Sept. 3 England and France declare war on
Germany
VIII
Pre-Munich
How definite the new foreign policy had become
was brought out forcefully when, on February 20,
Eden resigned as Foreign Minister. The particular
reason he gave for his resignation was his refusal to
agree to continue the conversation that had been
going on since February 1937, between Britain and
Italy, until the Italian Government would “give
some evidence of their sincerity” by “withdrawing a
substantial number of volunteers” from Spain. How
ever, the real reason, as he explained in his account
to the House, was that he felt that “This was the
moment for the country to stand firm, not to plunge
into negotiations unprepared, with the full knowl
edge that the chief obstacle to their success has not
been resolved.”
Chamberlain said that this sentence described “the
difference in outlook” between the two. “I was con
fident that his Government [the Italian Ambassa-
165
x66 W hy England Slept
dor’s] would approach the negotiations in the same
spirit as we should do, namely in perfect good faith
and with a sincere desire to reach agreement.” In
other words: was peace to be achieved by means of
appeasement? or was it to be achieved by taking a
firm stand?
Both policies had their disadvantages. America was
much more sympathetic with Eden’s; Americans be
lieved it would bring an end to all these coups of the
dictators. There was considerable feeling, both in
England and America, that Hitler and Mussolini
were just bluffing. Show strength and they will back
down. This feeling was to provoke much of the criti
cism for the subsequent settlement at Munich. How
ever, opposed to this was the fact that at that time
England had not much strength to show anyone.
Exactly how much was to be revealed nine months
later at Munich. Many people in the British Govern
ment felt that, at that time, due to the need for con
tinued triumphs at home, either one of the two
dictators might prefer to “go down fighting.” When
one man can throw a country into a war, and the man
is as emotional as Hitler, it would be a terrific risk to
start any game of bluff. In addition, it was felt that
to take sides definitely meant war between Italy and
England “might become inevitable.” And there was
Period of Rearmament Policy 167
a strong hope in England that Italy would be won
away from the axis. W hether right or wrong, this
was the feeling among those who supported Cham
berlain.
The reactions of the different parties to Eden’s
resignation are illuminating. Labour moved a vote
of censure, indicating it supported Eden’s policy. Its
reason for supporting him was not that it was ready
“to stand up and fight,” but rather that it felt his
policy indicated a return to security through the
League. Churchill was more belligerent in his oppo
sition to Chamberlain’s policy. He supported a
strong, active League policy and felt this had been
abandoned in favor of bowing to the dictators.
The Dominions seemed to support Chamberlain's
position, according to the statements of South
Africa's Prime Minister, General Hertzog, and Aus
tralia’s Prime Minister, Mr. J. A. Lyons. Articles in
current periodicals such as the Queen s Quarterly
indicate that Canada also supported it strongly. The
French backed it in a statement made by the French
Foreign Minister. But there is no doubt that it split
the country, although the majority still favored
Chamberlain’s policy. The essence of this policy was
stated once more in a speech on February 19. The
Prime Minister said the Government’s policy was,
168 W hy England Slept
first, that England must seek to remove the causes of
war; and second, make the country so strong that
nobody would dare attack her.
Eden’s resignation has been gone into at length, as
it is here we find the essence of Chamberlain’s policy
and the policy opposed to it. One group thought that
the only way to deal with the dictators was to show
strength—the other felt that the way to get peace was
to remove the causes of war. Their importance to
this study lies in the fact that rearmament was such
an integral part of both policies.
On March 2, a White Paper on defense was sub
mitted. The tone of the Paper was entirely different
from that of previous years, as the Paper proceeded
upon the assumption, now almost universally ac
cepted, that the “steps taken by his Majesty’s Gov
ernment are unavoidable, and that they furnish a
steadying influence on the present state of interna
tional affairs.” It declared that, while difficulties had
been encountered, “the program has, on the whole,
been satisfactory.”
As far as the Navy went, the tonnage under con
struction had risen from 139,345 tons on January 1,
1935, to 547,014 on January 1, 1938. About sixty
new warships were expected to be put into service
during the year 1938. Among them were two new
capital ships and one aircraft carrier. The gross Navy
Period of Rearmament Policy 169
estimates were £123,707,000, an increase of £18,-
642,000 over the £105,065,000 total of the previous
year.
The gross Army estimates were up to £106,500,-
000, an increase of £24,326,000 over the £82,174,000
of the previous year, and the White Paper reported
that recruiting had been a record, “the strength of
all ranks being increased 17,690.” It also pointed out
that “the majority of the units of the two anti-aircraft
divisions have been provided with accommodations.”
This last sentence indicates one of the great rea
sons for the failure of the British to have suitable
anti-aircraft defenses during September 1938. It was
because this branch of the service was regarded as
being a special sendee tacked on to the Regular
Army. Consequently, any money that was given to
build up these units was felt to be money that legiti
mately should have gone to the Army proper for
improvements. The Army at this time was busy try
ing to transform itself into a mechanized force, in
order to keep abreast of recent modern develop
ments. It felt that Home Defense was not its primary
concern, and was, in fact, an unproductive drain on
its purse. It, therefore, paid little attention to build
ing up anti-aircraft units of defense. This task was
put into the hands of the Territorials, who were re
garded only as supplementary troops. This attitude
170 W hy England Slept
had a great effect later on in the condition of the
equipment and the number of guns. Because it was
such a vital part of Britain’s defenses, it should have
been made a separate section, with its own appro
priations from the start. Thus the Army heads also
must bear their share of the responsibility for Brit
ain's inadequate defenses.
The Air estimates were up to £93,500,000, an in
crease of £11,000,000 over the previous year’s gross
of £82,500,000. The White Paper reported that the
strength of the Air Force had been raised in 1937 to
123 squadrons (1476 planes), the present force now
comprised 58 bomber squadrons (696 planes), 15
squadrons (180 planes) of general reconnaissance
aircraft, and 10 army co-operative squadrons (120
planes), in addition to the fighter squadrons.
The White Paper concluded by warning that the
gross estimates for the five-year period would prob
ably be over £1,500,000, which had been mentioned
in 1937 as the sum that would have to be spent over
that period. The total gross estimate for all the Serv
ices this particular year was £342,564,000, an in
crease of £64,879,000 over 1937—1938.
In discussing the estimates, Chamberlain gave the
essence of the Government's policy towards rearma
ment, and indeed the whole British attitude towards
war. The British believed very strongly, at that time,
Period o£ Rearmament Policy 171
in Liddell-Hart’s theory of limited warfare. It was so
much more adapted to the country’s geographic and
economic position than any form of total war. It ex
plains in a great measure why the British did not,
until the very end, put much emphasis on building
mechanical equipment. They always believed that
the fleet would do their fighting for them. They
knew that, in number, England, with a population
of only one-half of Germany’s, and with limited nat
ural resources, could not hope to meet Hitler’s ef
forts in preparing for war. But they felt there was no
need to attempt this.
The Maginot Line was considered by everyone
unbreakable. Hadn’t the Allies pounded for a year
^ a t the Hindenburg Line in 1917 before they finally
cracked it at terrific cost in men and materials? And
wasn't the Maginot Line backed by the strong French
Army, supposedly ten times stronger? The result
would be a deadlock on the Western front, and mean
while the British Fleet would establish a close block
ade. England would then sit down and wait for an
internal revolution to break out in Germany. Eng
lishmen, with their emphasis on balanced budgets
and sound economy, had watched the German finan
cial hocus-pocus with amazement. Accustomed to the
automatic laws of capitalism, they yearly prophesied
inflation of the mark and the ruin of Germany’s
172 W hy England Slept
credit system. In addition, the repugnance that the
British felt for the totalitarian nature of the regime
made them think that no nation could possibly live
for very long under such a system.
These ideas made them confident that a few months
after the war began, especially if there was a dead
lock, and the dictator could not keep adding easy
triumphs, the people would rise and revolt. This
was supposed to be democracy’s great advantage: it
could stand up under the pressure of adversity; it
could always let off steam by changing its leaders
without changing its system of government. In a
dictatorship, a new regime could only be put in by a
revolution, and the same discontent that resulted in
peaceful changes in a democracy would blow up un
der the Nazi regime, because there were no safety
valves for its escape.
Thus the British theory of war was that they merely
had to build up their defenses to prevent a knock
out blow and then keep “business going as usual.”
Chamberlain expressed this view when he said in
Commons:
T h e cornerstone of our defense policy must be the security
of the U nited Kingdom. O ur main strength lies in the re
sources of man power, productive capacity, and endurance
of this country, and unless these can be maintained not only
in peace but in the early stages of the war, when they w ill
Period of Rearmament Policy 173
be the subject of continuous attack, our defeat w ill be cer
tain, whatever might be the fate in secondary spheres else
where.
One good thing, at any rate, has come out of the emergency
through which we have passed. It has thrown a vivid light
upon our preparations for defense, on their strength and on
their weakness. I should not think we were doing our duty
if we had not already ordered that a prom pt and thorough
inquiry should be made to cover the whole of our prepara
tions, m ilitary and civil, in order to see, in the light of what
198 W hy England Slept
has happened during these hectic days, what further steps
may be necessary to make good our deficiencies in the short
est possible time.
Conclusion
3
I
X
America's Lesson
N A T I O N A L D EFEN SE E X P E N D IT U R E S O F T H E W O R L D
Sources: T he Foreign Policy Association; other authorities as to
1938 and 1939. Figures show millions of dollars
Britain .................................... 426.1 455-5 480.6 595-6 846.9 1,263.1 1,693.3 1,817.1
F ra n c e ...................................... 509.2 678.8 582.7 623.8 834.4 909-2 7 3 i *5 1,800.2
Germany ................................ 253-5 299-5 381.5 2,600.0 3,600.0 4,000.0 4,400.0 4,500.1
Italy ........................................ 270.6 241.2 263.7 778.1 916.1 573-4 526.0 873-4
U.S.S.R...................................... 282.5 309-5 1,000.0 1,640.0 4,002.4 5,026.0 1,352-2 1,500.1
Far East (6 cou n tries)............. 469-7 538.3 573-6 593-3 606.7 1,431.4 2,056.9 —
Japan ...................................... 19 9 *1 253-1 271.9 296.2 3051 1,120.8 1 ,755-3 1,600.8
China ...................................... 9 3 -o 108.1 112.5 9 3 -i 95-3 95-3 95-3 -■
W orld total (60 countries) .. . 3.783-7 3,962.8 5,031.4 8,776.0 12,976.0 15,468.7 17,581.3 20,000.1
«
G R E A T B R I T A I N ’S W A R C H A R G E S E X P E N D IT U R E *
W ar Debt Services and Armaments
Estimates
19*3-14 1930-31 1931-32J1932-33 *9 3 3 -3 4 1934-35 1935-36 1936-37 i 937 - 3 8| 1938-39 ' 9 3 9 -4 0
(Amounts are in £'s millions)
A rm y ....................... 28.4 40.0 38-5 36.0 3 7 5 39-6 44-9 49-3 9 °- 7 e 125.0® 165.0®
Navy ....................... 48.7 52-3 5 *o 50.1 53-6 56.6 64.9 81.3 105.0 128.0c *49-5
Air Force ............... —
17.2 17.4 16.6 16.2 17.2 27.6 50-7 82.5 1345 208.0
Civil D efence......... — — — — — — — — 56-5 18.0
—
Appendix
Supplementary .. .
F.stimates ............... —• —• — — ■1 —* — — — 20.0
Total Expenditures
on Armaments . 77.1 109.5 106.9 102.7 107.3 113.4 * 3 7 4 181.3 278.2 405-5 5 9 9 -°f
W ar Debt Services. 360.0 322.0a 308.5a 224.0b 224.0b 224.0b 224.0b 224.0b 230.0b 230.0b
W ar Pensions . . . . 5 i -7 49-4 46.8 45-2 4 3 -i 42.4 41.4 40.5 43.1 42.1
Totals ............... 521.2 478-3 458.0 376-5 380.5 403.8 446.7 542-7 678.6 871.1
W holesale Price Index c 1913—100% 1938—98.9%
Cost of Living Index* 1914—100% *938—156%
•T he amounts allocated for the new Sinking Fund in each of these years were approximately £30,000,000 less than the figure for 1930-31.
b The heavy reduction on the 1932—33 figures is accounted for by the omission of any provision for the Sinking Fund, and by the decrease
of some £50,000,000 in Debt Charges due to Conversion. c Economist. d Ministry of Labour. e Includes Ordnance.
* Sir John Simon, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in introducing his Budget on April 25th, 1939, pointed out that in a White Paper issued
in February it was stated that defence expenditure was then estimated at £580,000,000 and said that this figure "is no longer correct or valid 10
. . . We must now proceed on the assumption that something in the region of £630,000,000 will be required . . . It may well be more." O©
• Source: Peace Year Book, 1940.
236 W hy England Slept
the country could be increased to an extent which
had not hitherto been dreamt of. To do that he nec
essarily had to enlist the services of firms who were
entirely without previous experience of the work
they were called upon to do.
“Those three years of which I speak during which
the expansion of the Air Force has had to take place
coincided with one of those forward leaps which
periodically take place in applied science, and in this
particular case the features of this advance took
three forms. The development of the all-metal mon
oplane, the design of new engines of unprecedented
efficiency, and the invention of the variable pitch air
screw. The combination of those three new features
in aircraft construction not only completely altered
the design but it necessarily altered the strategy
which had to be employed in the use of these newly
developed machines.
“Lord Swinton’s work during those three years
has been largely one of building foundations, and
we are now beginning to see the fruits of his labours.
I have not the slightest doubt that upon the founda
tions which he has laid, my right hon. Friend the
Secretary of State for Air will be able to build a
firmly based structure of further additions and de
velopments. But there are three indispensable pieces
of preparatory work which have been done by Lord
A ppendix 237
Swinton, and for which we owe him gratitude. First
of all he has consistently stimulated experimentation
so that we might get the best types of machines that
could be devised, and I think it is satisfactory that
the orders that we have been placing recently are or
ders for machines which have the highest records for
performance and for maintenance when they are ac
tually in operation.
“The second task of my Noble Friend was to de
vise a scheme for the expansion and for the training
of personnel. . . . In accordance with the plan of the
Air Ministry, there are now 13 civil schools devoted
to preliminary training, there are 11 training schools
for Service flying, the capacity for the trade training
of men and boys in the Air Service has been in
creased seven-fold, and Lord Swinton also created
the Royal Air Force Volunteer Reserve, for which
there are now 22 centres in operation. I am not sure
whether hon. Members have already been told, but
there are now over 1,000 volunteer pilots who have
qualified to fly solo.
“Then may I say one word about the new war po
tential? That involved the building of new factories
and very large extensions of those which were al
ready engaged in aircraft construction. It also in
volved the creation of a shadow factory system, which,
for the time being, is being fully employed, while we
238 W hy England Slept
are building up the Force, but which it is intended
later on to keep in reserve for an emergency only,
placing with the shadow factories such orders as are
necessary to maintain the craftsmanship and the ex
perience of those who will run them. This shadow
factory system is giving us an enormous increase of
productive capacity in war and it covers not only the
manufacture of aircraft and engines, but there are
shadow factories also for the production of carburet
tors, bombs, and air screws. These factories are laid
out on the very latest model of factory equipment,
and they are, I am told, second to none in the world.”
Speech by Viscount Szuinton Regarding Diffi
culties Encountered by British in Building up
Air Arm
May 12, 1938
Viscount Swinton said: “The House is well aware
that there were serious initial delays in the output of
aircraft. The scale on which orders were placed—and
the industry had never had large-scale orders before;
it could not have them—was such that much time
was necessarily spent in constructing new shops and
in arranging for the supply of jigs and tools neces
sary for large-scale production. Expansion also co
incided with the development of an entirely new
A ppendix 239
technique in manufacture in which British industry
had had little, if any, opportunity of taking part—the
development of large all-metal skin-dressed types of
aircraft. Also, as the House is well aware, there was a
great shortage of skilled labour, a shortage all the
more serious because the great demands of the air
craft industry coincided with a great expansion of
ordinary civil industry, both alike making demands
on the same kind of labour; and the policy was being
pursued at that time, and reasonably pursued, of in
terfering as little as possible with the ordinary trade
of the country which was then entering upon its
expansion.
“But the Air Ministry, in making their plans,
looked forward, and were indeed bound to look for
ward, to the probable need of a larger programme
and of acceleration, whether the larger programme
or the existing programme held the field. They
therefore planned on a large scale. Factory exten
sions, new factories, shadow factories were created of
a size which would not only cope with orders which
were then given, but which, with little further ex
tension, would be on a scale and of a size to cope
with a much larger output. If that had not been
done it would not be possible today to place orders
and get going immediately a much larger programme
than that on which we have been at work. I empha
240 W hy England Slept
sise that because it was that preparation, that laying-
out of factories on an extensive scale, which alone
makes possible much that we are putting in hand at
the present time.
“And just as the Air Ministry planned the facto
ries on a larger scale than was required for the initial
programme, so they also planned to have the train
ing establishments within the Air Force larger. . . .
The Air Ministry also planned the orders which
would be necessary if the programme were extended.
The result of that preparatory work—preparatory
work which it obviously was the duty of the Air
Ministry to undertake—was that, when a decision
was taken that the expansion should go further, it
was possible to take immediately effective action.
“The objective of the Government in the decision
that has been taken is twofold. It is boti* to speed up
and to enlarge the programme . . . In aircraft the ac
celeration of the new expansion orders which have
been given should mean rn increase in output in
this financial year of well over 50 per cent., and dou
bling this year’s output during the next financial
year. That is a very great increase of production,
which is already substantial, and it is the considered
opinion of those in the industry that that production
can and will be obtained, on one condition, and that
is that the necessary labour is available.
A ppendix 241
“As a result of the preparation which went before,
and that practical method of giving effect to the
preparation, firms which can produce the aircraft re
quired by the programme—and it is the right kind of
aircraft which it is necessary to have and not just any
aircraft which you can order anywhere, as your Lord-
ships will fully appreciate—have received additional
orders which will fill them to the maximum of their
capacity in plant and labour for the next two years.
The great production must come from the factories
of a size and capacity to work on that scale. Large-
scale orders running into hundreds in a factory of a
single type must be placed with factories which have
both the experience and the works capacity to exe
cute them. Smaller works can perform and are per
forming most valuable services in sub-contracting,
and I know ok is the policy of the firms to sub-contract
wherever they possibly can, and can get good results,
in order to increase the output °f the works.
“We are also using sqjne of these smaller firms to
do repair work and that is proving successful. It ob
viates the expense and the delay of creating addi
tional repair facilities within the Air Force itself; it
keeps the main firms in a steady flow of production;
and it enables the smaller firms to undertake repair
work on damaged machines—one particular type go
ing to one particular factory—work which they are
242 W hy England Slept
doing very satisfactorily. It is a system which we
should wish to expand. I have shown, I think, that
there is no case of placing orders in driblets. The
policy has always been to give the largest orders
which are authorised by the programme.”
Speech by Neville Chamberlain Regarding
Proposal for Ministry of Supply
May 23, 1938
Dealing with the proposal to form a Ministry of
Supply, Mr. Chamberlain continued: “Whichever
form of ministry of supply we adopt it must inevi
tably mean a certain dislocation of the present ma
chine, and that must be followed, therefore, by a
check and a setback in the programme which is be
ing developed by the existing organisation. It seems
to me that that difficulty is only to be overridden if
there are some superior interests to be served. Either
the new ministry of supply will be so superior to the
present system that it will very quickly overtake the
arrears, and thereafter give us greatly increased out
put, or else it follows that the present system is de
ficient in co-ordination, and that the new scheme
would put an end to that deficiency and consequently
promote efficiency and progress, which are now be
ing hampered by overlapping.
A p pen dix 243
“There is ample machinery existing today and
working daily for preventing overlapping and for al
locating priority in all the things that matter. I won
der sometimes whether hon. Members realise how
far the system of co-ordination has been carried to
day in commodities which we require for warlike
purposes. The House has been told on other occa
sions of a body which is known as the Principal Sup
ply Officers’ Committee—a sub-committee of the
Committee of Imperial Defence. T hat is the body
which is responsible for this work. It contains repre
sentatives of all the Departments that are concerned
in war supplies—the three Service Departments, the
Treasury, the Board of Trade, the Ministry of
Labour, the Home Office, and also the Dominions
and India. It deals with all the commodities that are
required in war—ships, guns, aeroplanes, tanks, ex
plosives and propellants, motor vehicles, clothing,
raw materials, machine tools and so forth. I could
enlarge the list almost indefinitely. It is in continu
ous session.
“In the case of every one of these commodities—
and I have given only some—it assesses what would
be the probable demand for that commodity in war
time, based, of course, on certain hypotheses as to
the conditions of the war. It has inspected hundreds
of factories all through the country. It has now alio-
244 W hy England Slept
cated the capacity for each of these commodities, and
where the capacity does not fully exist it has taken,
or is taking, steps to supply the deficiency. It handles
all questions of priority as between one Department
and another, and that covers not only materials but
labour. It has the closest relations with industry be
cause it has on its representatives of industry, leading
men who are in close touch with it and who act, in
fact, as chairmen of some of its sub-committees. This
is an organisation which was founded as long ago as
1924. It has been gradually building up this system.
There was nothing like it before 1914, before the
Great War, and I am bound to say that I find great
difficulty in seeing how it will be possible to improve
upon it today for the particular purposes for which
it has been constituted.
“My own view—and I, at any rate, have not looked
at this matter from any departmental point of view;
I am not concerned with the prestige of one Depart
ment against another—is that, although in actual
war a ministry of supply would be essential—and, in
deed, we have all the plans ready for such a ministry
which could be put into operation at once in such
circumstances—I do not believe that a ministry of
supply in peacetime will be effective, as the Ministry
of Munitions was effective in the Great War, unless
A p pen dix 245
you give that ministry of supply the same powers as
the Ministry of Munitions had.
“I submit to hon. Members that you can do a
great deal today by persuasion, by voluntary effort,
and by co-operation with labour and with employ
ers; but if you want to produce the sort of effect you
had in the Great War, when the Government had
absolute control over the whole of industry through
out the country, you must give this ministry the
same sort of powers.
“What I am saying is that I do not think it is any
use setting up a ministry of supply with the same
limited powers that we have already. If you want to
go further than that you must have these further
powers over industry and over labour, and I doubt
very much whether we should be justified in asking
for such powers, or whether, if we did ask for them,
Parliament would give us them in time of peace.
The analogy of wartime is really misleading. We are
not at war.
“I have said repeatedly in many Debates on this
subject that our programme is flexible; it is a pro
gramme which is capable of expansion, or even of re
duction; and it is a programme, therefore, which
must vary from time to time in accordance with the
international situation. I do not mind saying—and I
246 W hy England Slept
pick out here something which I think I heard just
now—that to me the important thing is not the pro
gramme but its execution. W hat the Government
have set themselves to do is to get the maximum exe
cution possible, at least in the next two years. In
these days, when foreign conditions are continually
changing, it is difficult to look forward with any con
fidence to what the condition^ may be over a longer
period than two years, but our view is that it is our
duty to obtain the maximum production of aircraft,
and all the necessary accessories and equipment, that
this country can give us in the course of the next two
years. T hat is really the programme we have set be
fore ourselves for the present.”
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P A M P H L E T S A N D M A G A Z IN E S
NEWSPAPERS
New York Tim es 1936-1938
London Tim es 1931-1939
Manchester Guardian
(continued from front flapJ