Digest
Digest
Digest
SPOUSES
ABRAHAM AND REMEDIOS DE VERA, RESPONDENTS.
Facts:
Jerson Servandil (Servandil) filed a complaint4 for illegal dismissal against A. De
Vera Corporation (Corporation). LA ruled in favor of the complainant. The
corporation filed an appeal before the NLRC, which was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction because of the failure to post the appeal bond. MR was denies. The CA
likewise denied the petition for certiorari filed before it. When the case was
elevated to the Supreme Court, the petition was denied on April 23, 2007 for
failure to show any reversible error in the CA Decision
Consequently, a Writ of Execution12 dated May 22, 2007 was issued commanding
the sheriff to proceed against the movable and immovable properties of the
corporation and respondent Abraham De Vera.
When the Writ of Execution was returned unsatisfied, Servandil moved for the
issuance of an alias writ of execution which was granted. Pursuant to this writ, a
parcel of land (property) registered in the name of respondents was levied upon
and sold to petitioners Jaime Bilan Montealegre and Chamon'te, Inc. (petitioners)
at a public auction.
It was during this time that respondents realized that only the corporation was
impleaded as party-respondent in Servandil's complaint for illegal dismissal. Thus,
respondents filed a verified counter-manifestation with omnibus motion 18 stating
that the property sold at auction does not belong to the judgment debtor, the
corporation, but to respondents, who were not impleaded as party-respondents in
the case for illegal dismissal. They likewise claimed that the property was conjugal
and there was no showing that an advantage or benefit accrued to their conjugal
partnership.
Issue: whether the CA correctly declared null the writs of execution issued by the
LA and the subsequent orders and resolutions of the LA and NLRC implementing
said writs of execution against respondents' property.
Ruling: Yes
As a general rule, a writ of execution must strictly conform to every particular of
the judgment to be executed. It should not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks
to enforce, nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed,
otherwise, if it is in excess of or beyond the original judgment or award, the
execution is void.38 Furthermore, the power of the courts in executing judgments
extends only to properties unquestionably belonging to the judgment debtor and
liability may even be incurred by the sheriff for levying properties not belonging to
the judgment debtor.
The Order and the Alias Writ of Execution issued by the LA are null and void for
lack of jurisdiction and for altering the tenor of the NLRC decision dated October
24, 2000 which directed Mandaue Dinghow alone to pay the private respondents'
separation pay. The private respondents did not assail this ruling. Thus, the same
became final and executory. Even granting that the NLRC committed a mistake in
failing to indicate in the dispositive portion that Uytengsu was solidarity liable
with Mandaue Dinghow, the correction — which is substantial — can no longer be
allowed in this case because the judgment has already become final and
executory.41
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
Here, it is undisputed that the final and executory November 27, 2003 LA
Decision42 adjudged the corporation guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered it to pay
Servandil separation pay and backwages. It did not mention respondents' liability.
Nevertheless, the Writ of Execution dated May 22, 2007 and the Alias Writ of
Execution dated February 11, 2008 were directed against the movable and
immovable properties of both the corporation and respondent Abraham. Clearly,
the writs of execution here exceeded the terms of the final and executory judgment
of the LA.
Consequently, the CA correctly set aside the levy and sale of the subject property
pursuant to said writs and the August 25, 2011 Order, which directed the issuance
of a Final Deed of Sale in favor of petitioners, for being the offshoot of a void
execution, as well as the NLRC Resolutions dated March 29, 2012 and May 28,
2012, which affirmed the August 25, 2011 Order.43
Petitioners also want us to disregard the corporation's separate personality and hold
respondent Abraham De Vera liable. Petitioners allege that the corporation has
already ceased to operate and there is no other way by which the LA judgment
could have been satisfied other than through the levy and sale of the property
belonging to respondent Abraham De Vera. Consequently, they claim that the levy
and sale of the property pursuant to the writs of execution and orders of the LA are
likewise valid
Here, the two requisites are wanting. Servandil's complaint failed to allege or
impute bad faith or malice on the part of respondent Abraham De Vera. There was
likewise nothing in the November 27, 2003 LA Decision that would establish that
respondent Abraham De Vera acted in bad faith when Servandil was dismissed
from the service. There was likewise no invocation of bad faith on the part of
respondent Abraham De Vera to evade any judgment against the corporation.