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1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 193

VOL. 193, JANUARY 21, 1991 147


Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

*
G.R. No. 94759. January 21, 1991.

TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPERS, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF


APPEALS, HON. NARCISO T. ATIENZA as Presiding Judge,
Bulacan, RTC, and HON. VICENTE CRUZ, Acting Mayor and the
MUNICIPALITY OF STA. MARIA, BULACAN, respondents.

Injunction; The matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is


addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court.—The wellknown rule is
that the matter of issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is addressed to
the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and its action shall not be
disturbed on appeal unless it is demonstrated that it acted without
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its
discretion. By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief
may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.

PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of


Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.


     Diosdado P. Peralta for petitioner.

GANCAYCO, J.:

The authority of the local executive to protect the community from


pollution is the center of this controversy.
The antecedent facts are related in the appealed decision of the
Court of Appeals as follows:

“Petitioner, a domestic private corporation engaged in the manufacture and


export of charcoal briquette, received a letter dated February 16, 1989 from
private respondent acting mayor Pablo N. Cruz, ordering the full cessation
of the operation of the petitioner’s plant located at Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, until further order. The letter likewise requested Plant Manager Mr.
Armando Manese to bring with him to the office of the mayor on February
20, 1989 the following: a) Building permit; b) Mayor’s permit; c) Region
III-Pollution of Environment and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit;
and of other

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_______________

* FIRST DIVISION.

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148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

document.
At the requested conference on February 20, 1989, petitioner, through its
representative, undertook to comply with respondent’s request for the
production of the required documents. In compliance with said undertaking,
petitioner commenced to secure “Region III-Department of Environmental
and Natural Resources Anti-Pollution Permit,” although among the permits
previously secured prior to the operation of petitioner’s plant was a
“Temporary Permit to Operate Air Pollution Installation” issued by the then
National Pollution Control Commission (now Environmental Management
Bureau) and is now at a stage where the Environmental Management
Bureau is trying to determine the correct kind of anti-pollution devise to be
installed as part of petitioner’s request for the renewal of its permit.
Petitioner’s attention having been called to its lack of mayor’s permit, it
sent its representatives to the office of the mayor to secure the same but
were not entertained.
On April 6, 1989, without previous and reasonable notice upon
petitioner, respondent acting mayor ordered the Municipality’s station
commander to padlock the premises of petitioner’s plant, thus effectively
causing the stoppage of its operation.
Left with no recourse, petitioner instituted an action for certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus with preliminary injunction against private
respondent with the court a quo which is presided by the respondent judge.
In its prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction,
it alleged therein that the closure order was issued in grave abuse of
discretion.
During the hearing of the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction on April 14, 1989, herein parties adduced their
respective evidences. The respondent judge, on April 19, 1989, found that
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction, hence, it ordered as follows:

“In view of the foregoing, upon petitioner’s posting of a bond in the amount of
P50,000.00 to answer for such damages that respondents may sustain should
petitioner eventually be found not entitled to the injunctive relief hereby issued, let a
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION issue ordering the respondent Hon.
Pablo N. Cruz, and other person acting in his behalf and stead to immediately revoke
his closure order dated April 6, 1989, and allow petitioner to resume its normal
business operations until after the instant case shall have been adjudicated on the
merits without prejudice to the inherent power of the court to alter, modify or even
revoke this order at any given time.

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149

VOL. 193, JANUARY 21, 1991 149


Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

“SO ORDERED.”

The writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued on April 28,


1989, upon petitioner’s posting a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Private respondent filed his motion for reconsideration dated May 3,
1989. Said motion for reconsideration was heard on May 30, 1989.
Petitioner’s counsel failed to appear and the hearing proceeded with the
Provincial Prosecutor presenting his evidence. The following documents
were submitted:

a) Exhibit “A”, Investigation report on the Technology Developers


Inc., prepared by one Marivic Guina, and her conclusion and
recommendation read:

“Due to the manufacturing process and nature of raw materials used, the fumes
coming from the factory may contain particulate matters which are hazardous to the
health of the people. As such, the company should cease operating until such a time
that the proper air pollution device is installed and operational.”

b) Exhibits “B”, “B-1”, “B-2”, three (3) sheets of coupon bond


containing signatures of residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan;
c) Exhibit “B-3”, a letter addressed to Hon. Roberto Pagdanganan,
Governor of the Province of Bulacan, dated November 22, 1988,
complaining about the smoke coming out of the chimney of the
company while in operation.

Reassessing all the evidence adduced, the lower court, on June 14, 1989,
issued an order (a) setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, which
granted a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction, and (b) dissolving the
writ consequently issued.
A motion for reconsideration dated July 6, 1989 was filed by petitioner.
Said motion drew an opposition dated July 19, 1989 from private
respondent.
Resolving the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, the respondent
judge issued an order dated August 9, 1989, denying said motion for
1
reconsideration.

Hence a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary


injunction was filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals seeking to
annul and set aside (a) the order issued by the trial court on June 14,
1989, setting aside the order dated April 28, 1989, and (b) the order
of August 9, 1989, denying petitioner’s

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_______________

1 Pages 117 to 119, rollo.

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150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

motion for reconsideration of the order of June 14, 1989. In due


course the petition was denied for lack of merit by the appellate
2
court in a decision dated January 26, 1990. A motion for
reconsideration thereof filed by petitioner was denied on August 10,
1990.
Thus, the herein petition for review on certiorari filed with this
Court. Six errors are alleged to have been committed by the
appellate court which may be synthesized into the singular issue of
whether or not the appellate court committed a grave abuse of
discretion in rendering its question decision and resolution.
The petition is devoid of merit.
The well-known rule is that the matter of issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction is addressed to the sound judicial discretion
of the trial court and its action shall not be disturbed on appeal
unless it is demonstrated that it acted without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or otherwise, in grave abuse of its discretion.
By the same token the court that issued such a preliminary relief
may recall or dissolve the writ as the circumstances may warrant.
To the mind of the Court the following circumstances militate
against the maintenance of the writ of preliminary injunction sought
by petitioner:

1. No mayor’s permit had been secured. While it is true that


the matter of determining whether there is a pollution of the
environment that requires control if not prohibition of the
operation of a business is essentially addressed to the then
National Pollution Control Commission of the Ministry of
Human Settlements, now the Environmental Management
Bureau of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources, it must be recognized that the mayor of a town
has as much responsibility to protect its inhabitants from
pollution, and by virture of his police power, he may deny
the application for a permit to operate a business or
otherwise close the same unless appropriate measures are
taken to control and/or avoid injury to the health of the
residents of the community from the emissions in the
operation of the business.
2. The Acting Mayor, in a letter of February 16, 1989, called
the attention of petitioner to the pollution emitted by the

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fumes of its

_______________

2 Justice Regina G. Ordoñez-Benitez was the ponente, Justices Lorna S. Lombos-


de la Fuente and Hector C. Fule concurred.

151

VOL. 193, JANUARY 21, 1991 151


Technology Developers, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

plant whose offensive odor “not only pollute the air in the
locality but also affect the health of the residents in the area,” so
that petitioner was ordered to stop its operation until further
orders and it was required to bring the following:

(1) Building permit;


(2) Mayor’s permit; and
(3) Region III-Department of Environment
3
and Natural
Resources Anti-Pollution permit.

3. This action of the Acting Mayor was in response to the


complaint of the residents of Barangay Guyong, Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, 4 directed to the Provincial Governor through
channels. The alleged NBI finding that some of the
signatures in the four-page petition were written by one
5
person, appears to be true in some instances, (particularly
as among members of the same family), but on the whole
the many signatures appear to be written by different
persons. The certification of the barrio captain of said 6barrio
that he has not received any complaint on the matter must
be because the complaint was sent directly to the Governor
through the Acting Mayor.
4. The closure order of the Acting Mayor was issued only
after an investigation was made by Marivic Guina who in
her report of December 8, 1988 observed that the fumes
emitted by the plant of petitioner goes directly to the
surrounding houses 7
and that no proper air pollution device
has been installed.
5. Petitioner failed to produce a building permit from the
municipality of Sta. Maria, but instead presented a building
8
permit issued by an official of Makati on March 6, 1987.
6. While petitioner was able to present a temporary permit to
operate by the then National Pollution Control Commission
on December 15, 1987, the permit was good only up to
9
May 25, 1988. Petitioner had not exerted any effort to
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extend or validate its permit much less to install any device


to control the pollution and prevent any hazard to the health
of the residents of the community.

All these factors justify the dissolution of the writ of prelimi-

_______________

3 Annex A-2, petition.


4 Annex A-B, petition.
5 Annex A to motion for reconsideration, page 91, rollo.
6 Annex A-11, petition.
7 Annex A-9, petition.
8 Annex A-4, petition.
9 Annex A-12, petition.

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152 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Rocaberte vs. People

nary injunction by the trial court and the appellate court correctly
upheld the action of the lower court.
Petitioner takes note of the plea of petitioner focusing on its huge
investment in this dollar-earning industry. It must be stressed
however, that concomitant with the need to promote investment and
contribute to the growth of the economy is the equally essential
imperative of protecting the health, nay the very lives of the people,
from the deleterious effect of the pollution of the environment.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Narvasa (Chairman), Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea,


JJ., concur.

Petition denied.

Note.—The primary purpose of an injunction is to preserve the


status quo, that is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which
preceded the controversy. (Rivera vs. Florendo, 144 SCRA 643.)

——o0o——

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1/15/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 193

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