DAY SIX

2. CAUSATION including the four passengers trapped inside it. It would appear that as the bus
overturned, gasoline began to leak and escape from the gasoline tank on the side
of the chassis, spreading over and permeating the body of the bus and the ground
General rule: if the negligence of the defendant is the proximate cause of the under and around it, and that the lighted torch brought by one of the men who
injury/ damage to property, then plaintiff may claim damages. answered the call for help set it on fire.

Exception: If the negligence of the plaintiff is the proximate cause of the injury or That same day, the charred bodies of the four deemed passengers inside the bus
damage, the plaintiff is wholly responsible for the same and he cannot recover were removed and duly identified that of Juan Bataclan. By reason of his death, his
damages. widow, Salud Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five minor children,
brought the present suit to recover from Mariano Medina compensatory, moral,
and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. After
2.1 Definition of Proximate Cause trial, the Court of First Instance of Cavite awarded P1,000 to the plaintiffs plus P600
as attorney's fee, plus P100, the value of the merchandise being carried by Bataclan
to Pasay City for sale and which was lost in the fire. The plaintiffs and the
VDA DE BATACLAN VS MEDINA defendants appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the latter endorsed
the appeal to us because of the value involved in the claim in the complaint.
On September 13, 1952 bus no. 30 of the Medina Transportation, operated by its
Issue:
owner defendant Mariano Medina under a certificate of public convenience, left
the town of Amadeo, Cavite, on its way to Pasay City, driven by its regular Whether or not the proximate cause of the death of Bataclan et al was their
chauffeur, ConradoSaylon. There were about eighteen passengers, including the burning by reason of the torches which ignited the gasoline.
driver and conductor. Among the passengers were Juan Bataclan, seated beside
and to the right of the driver, Felipe Lara, sated to the right of Bataclan, another Held: No.
passenger apparently from the Visayan Islands whom the witnesses just called
Visaya, apparently not knowing his name, seated in the left side of the driver, and a In the present case under the circumstances obtaining in the same, we do not
woman named Natalia Villanueva, seated just behind the four last mentioned. At hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus, this for
about 2:00 o'clock that same morning, while the bus was running within the the reason that when the vehicle turned not only on its side but completely on its
jurisdiction of Imus, Cavite, one of the front tires burst and the vehicle began to zig- back,the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected;
zag until it fell into a canal or ditch on the right side of the road and turned turtle. that the coming of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help,
Some of the passengers managed to leave the bus the best way they could, others made not only by the passengers, but most probably, by the driver and the
had to be helped or pulled out, while the three passengers seated beside the conductor themselves, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning),
driver, named Bataclan, Lara and the Visayan and the woman behind them named the rescuers had to carry a light with them, and coming as they did from a rural
Natalia Villanueva, could not get out of the overturned bus. Some of the area where lanterns and flashlights were not available; and what was more natural
passengers, after they had clambered up to the road, heard groans and moans than that said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle to extend the aid
from inside the bus, particularly, shouts for help from Bataclan and Lara, who said and effect the rescue requested from them. In other words, the coming of the men
they could not get out of the bus. There is nothing in the evidence to show whether with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of
or not the passengers already free from the wreck, including the driver and the the bus, the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
conductor, made any attempt to pull out or extricate and rescue the four more, the burning of the bus can also in part be attributed to the negligence of the
passengers trapped inside the vehicle, but calls or shouts for help were made to carrier, through is driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the driver and
the houses in the neighborhood. After half an hour, came about ten men, one of the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They, or at least, the driver
them carrying a lighted torch made of bamboo with a wick on one end, evidently should and must have known that in the position in which the overturned bus was,
fueled with petroleum. These men presumably approach the overturned bus, and gasoline could and must have leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
almost immediately, a fierce fire started, burning and all but consuming the bus, and around the bus, this aside from the fact that gasoline when spilled, specially
DAY SIX

over a large area, can be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet neither The dump truck belonged to co-petitioner Phoenix, and was parked there by the
the driver nor the conductor would appear to have cautioned or taken steps to company’ driver, co-petitioner Carbonel. It was parked on the right hand side of the
warn the rescuers not to bring the lighted torch too near the bus. Said negligence lane that Dionisio was driving on, but it was parked facing the oncoming traffic. It
on the part of the agents of the carrier come under the codal provisions above-
was parked askew so it was sticking out onto the street, partly blocking the way of
reproduced, particularly, Articles 1733, 1759 and 1763.
oncoming traffic. There were no lights nor were
Proximate cause- that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result there any “early warning” reflector devices set anywhere near the truck, front or
would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is rear. Phoenix permitted Carbonel to take home the truck, which was scheduled to
that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other be used the nextmorning.4.
events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for Dionisio, upon seeing the truck, tried to avoid a collision by swerving to the left, but
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have it was toolate. His car smashed into the truck. Dionisio suffered physical injuries,
reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
including permanent facial scars, “a nervous breakdown” and loss of two gold
some person might probably result therefrom.
bridge dentures.

HELD
PHOENIX CONSTRUCTION VS IAC
CFI:
FACTS:
 An action for damages was commenced by Dionisio in the CFI, claiming
Petitioners: PHOENIX Construction Inc., and Armando U. CARBONEL Respondents: that the legal andproximate cause of his injuries was the negligent
The Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) and Leonardo DIONISIO manner in which Carbonel had parked thedump truck entrusted to him
by his employer Phoenix.
On November 15, 1975 (Martial Law period), about 1:30AM, respondent Dionisio, a  Phoenix and Carbonel countered that the proximate cause of Dionisio’s
injuries was his own
marketing man, was driving home from a dinner meeting where he had a shot or
 recklessness in driving fast at the time of the accident, while under the
two of liquor. He had just crossed the intersection of General Lacuna and General influence of liquor,without his headlights on, and without a curfew pass.
Santos Streets at Bangkal, Makati, not far from his home, and was proceeding  Phoenix also sought to establish that it had exercised due care in the
down General Lacuna Street, when his car headlights (in his allegation) suddenly selection and supervision of the dump truck driver.
failed. and while driving down the street, his headlights were turned off. When he  The CFI rendered judgment in favor of Dionisio and against Phoenix and
switched on his headlights to “bright”, he suddenly saw a Ford dump truck some 2 Carbonel.
½ meters away from his Volkswagen car. It was later found out that he did not a IAC:
curfew pass that night.
Upon appeal to the IAC, that court affirmed the CFI’s decision.

Hence, the present petition.

DAY SIX

ISSUE: WON Dionisio’s negligence was an intervening, efficient cause determinative However, the distinctions between “cause” and “condition have been “almost
of the accident and the injuries he sustained entirely discredited.”

DECISION: The Court quotes significantly from

NO. Although Dionisio was found to be negligent, his negligence was not an Prosser and Keeton
intervening,
. The following parts were quoted with emphasis:
efficient cause. The legal and proximate cause of the accident and of Dionisio’s
injuries was the “Cause and condition… So far as the fact of causation is concerned, in the sense of
necessary
negligence of Carbonel in the manner by which he parked the dump truck.
Petitioners are liable for damages, but these damages must be mitigated because antecedents which have played an important part in producing the result, it is quite
of Dionisio’s contributory negligence. Decision modified whereby Dionisio will impossible to distinguish between active forces and passive situations, particularly
shoulder 20% of awarded damages. since, as is invariably the case, the latter are the result of other active forces which
have gone before… Even the lapse of a considerable time during which the
“condition” remains static will not necessarily affect liability… “Cause”
and“condition”
HELD:[Resolution of factual issues]
still find occasional mention in the decisions; but the distinction is now almost
The Court held that on that night, Dionisio was driving without a curfew pass. Since entirely discredited. So far as it has any validity at all, it must refer to the type of
he was without a curfew pass, he was hurrying home, driving at a fast speed in case where the forces set in operation by the defendant have come to rest in a
order to avoid the police. Worse, he turned off his headlights as he was driving position of apparent safety, and some new force intervenes. But even in such
down that street in order to escape notice from the nearby police station. cases, it is not the distinction between “cause” and “condition” which is important,
However, the Court held that that the one or two shots of liquor he had did not but the nature of the risk and the ch aracter of the intervening cause.”
show that he was so heavily under the influence of liquor as to constitute an act of
reckless imprudence. Taken all together, however, the Court drew the conclusion
that Dionisio was negligent on the night of the accident.[Note: During the period of
Martial Law, no person was allowed to be outside his home during curfew hours, Dionisio’s negligence is not an efficient intervening cause Carbonel’s negligence is
unless he has a curfew pass.] far from being a “passive and static condition” –it was an indispensable and
efficient cause. The collision would not have happened had the truck not been
Cause vs. Condition; Almost no distinction between them parked askew and without any warning lights or reflector devices. The improper
parking of the dump truck created an unreasonable risk of injury for anyone driving
Petitioners urge that the Carbonel’s negligence was merelt a “passive and static down the street and for having so created this risk, Carbonel must be held
condition” and that Dionisio’s negligence was an “efficient intervening cause,” and responsible. Carbonel owed a duty to Dionisio and others similarly situated not
that consequently Dionisio’s negligence must be regarded as the legal and
proximate cause of the accident rather than the earlier negligence of Carbonel. to impose upon them the very risk that Carbonel had created. Dionisio’s negligence
was not of an independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain
DAY SIX

of causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the care” and that consequently Dionisio may recover damages though such damages
accident, nor to sever the are subject to mitigation by the court.

juris vinculum of liability.The Court quoted parts of Hence, on the award of most of the damages, an allocation of 20-80 ratio should be
followed, where20% shall be borne by Dionisio, while 80% shall be borne by
Prosser and Keeton petitioners.

. With emphasis were the following: “Foresseable Intervening Causes. If the Last Clear Chance cannot apply
intervening cause is one which is ordinary human experience is reasonably to be
anticipated, or one which the defendant has reason to anticipate under the Petitioners ask the application of the “last clear chance” doctrine. It cannot apply.
particular circumstances, the defendant may be negligent, among other reasons,
because of failure to guard The last clear chance doctrine of the common law was imported into our
jurisdiction by
against it; or the defendant may be negligent only for that reason… There is an
intervening cause combining with the defendant’s conduct to produce result, and… Picart vs. Smith
the defendant’s negligence consists in failure to protect the plaintiff against that
but is a matter for debate whether, or to what extent, it has found its way into the
very risk.
Civil Code of the Philippines. Its historical function was to mitigate the harshness of
“Obviously the defendant cannot be relieved from liability by the fact that the risk another common law doctrine or rule – contributory negligence. The common law
or a substantial and important part of the risk, to which the defendant has notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant recovery to a plaintiff who had
subjected the plaintiff has indeed come to pass. Foreseeable intervening forces are also been negligent provided that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid
within th e scope of the original risk, and hence of the defendant’s negligence. the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to see what role, if any,
the common law last clear chance doctrine has to play in a jurisdiction where the
“Thus it has been held… that one who leaves an obstruction on the road or a common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute bar to recovery by
railroad track should foresee that a vehicle or a train will run into it. the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines.
“The risk created by the defendant may include the intervention of the foreseeable
negligence of others. Xxx The standard of reasonable conduct may require the
defendant to protect the plaintiff against ‘that occasional negligence which is one
of the ordinary incidents of human life, and therefore to be anticipated… One who The Court believes that there is no general concept of “last clear chance” that may
parks an automobile on the highway without lights at night is not relieved of be extracted from its common law matrix and utilized as a general rule in
responsibility when another negligently drives into it…” negligence cases in a civil law jurisdiction. Under Article 2179, the task of a court, in
technical terms, is to determine whose negligence the plaintiff’s or the defendant’s
– was the legal or proximate cause of the injury. That task is not simply or even
primarily an exercise in chronology or physics. Chronology of plaintiff’s and
Dionisio had contributory negligence defendant’s negligent acts or omissions is only one of the relevant factors that may
be taken into account.
The court held that Dionisio’s negligence was “only contributory,” that the
“immediate and proximate cause” of the injury remained Carbonel’s “lack of due
DAY SIX

Of more fundamental importance are the nature of the negligent act or omission of
each party and the character and gravity of the risks created by such act or Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office found them to have died from  "asphyxia" -
omission for the rest of the community. diminution of oxygen supply in the body and intake of toxic gas

Phoenix is presumed negligent for failing to supervise its employees properly and
November 26, 1975: Bascon signed the purchase order 
adequately

Carbonel’s proven negligence creates a presumption of negligence on the part of RTC: Dismissed the case
his employer Phoenix
CA: Reversed - law intended to protect the plight of the poor and the needy, the
in supervising its employees properly and adequately. Phoenix was not able to ignorant and the indigent
overcome this presumption of negligence. It failed to show any effort on the part of
Phoenix to supervise the manner in which the dump truck if parked when away ISSUE: W/N Davao city is negligent and its negligence is the proximate cause
from company premises. It is an affirmative showing of culpa in vigilando on the therefore can be liable for damages
part of Phoenix. Decision modified as to the allocation of award of damages.

HELD: NO. CA affirmed.

BELARMINO VS EEC
Test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case:
o Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that
FERNANDO VS CA reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would
have used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence
FACTS: November 7, 1975: Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public
Market filed a requisition request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's
Standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet pater
Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao wherein Bascon won.
familias of the Roman law.

November 22, 1975: bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito
Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead Conduct is said to be negligent when a prudent man in the position of the
inside the septic tank.  tortfeasor would have foreseen that an effect harmful to another was sufficiently
probable warrant his foregoing the conduct or guarding against its consequences
o The bodies were removed by a fireman.
o The question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent
o The body of Joselito Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia
man in a given situation must of course be always determined in the light
and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. 
of human experience and in view of the facts involved in the particular
case
The City Engineer's office investigated the case and learned they entered the septic o Reasonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the
tank without clearance from it nor with the knowledge and consent of the market suggestion born of this provision, is always necessary before negligence
master.  can be held to exist
o Since the septic tank was found to be almost empty, they were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying.
Distinction must be made between the accident and the injury
DAY SIX

o Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its

determining factors, he can not recover.
o Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he contributes only to
his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a
suitable equivalent for his own imprudence

Toilets and septic tanks are not nuisances per se as defined in Article 694 of the
New Civil Code which would necessitate warning signs for the protection of the
public
o While the construction of these public facilities demands utmost
compliance with safety and sanitary requirements, the putting up of
warning signs is not one of those requirements

Accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen unless
 The Altis, driving at 5-10kph, was trying to cross Katipunan Ave. from R.
one removes its covers
Matanda from the left (going to Blue Ridge), and has already crossed the

Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one which center lane of Katipunan, when the Ford Expedition (heading North) hit
has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly the rear right door of the Altis, sending it turning 180 degrees towards the
be aware of the attendant risks. The victims are no exception; more so with Mr. direction it came from.
Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary  Estela suffered injuries. COL Realty demanded payment for repairs of the
measures for their safety was the proximate cause of the accident. Altis and costs of the medical service to Estela. Ramos refused.
 COL Realty filed suit against Ramos in the MeTC QC for damages under
Proximate and immediate cause of the death of the victims was due to their own
negligence. Consequently, the petitioners cannot demand damages from the public quasi-delict.
respondent.  Ramos denied liability, arguing that the Altis was in the wrong
for crossing Katipunan despite the concrete barriers installed
RAMOS VS C.O.L REALTY thereon to prevent cars from crossing it. Ramos further argued
he wasn’t in the car when the accident happened, and has
Facts:
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of
 Collision incident, parties are: Toyota Altis sedan owned by COL Realty,
Rodel.
driven by Larin, with passenger Estela; and Ford Expedition, owned by
 MeTC dismissed the case. RTC affirmed the dismissal.
Ramos, driven by Rodel.
 CA modified holding that while the Altis negligent for crossing
 Collision occurred along Katipunan and R. Matanda St., see image:
Katipunan despite the concrete barriers, relying on the
certification of MMDA that such act is prohibited due to the
DAY SIX

ongoing road construction in the area and that the Altis still sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
crossed Katipunan through the broken cracks in the barricade, it without which the result would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the
held that the Ford Expedition was contributorily negligent for proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either
driving the car at a high speed (given that the Altis rotated 180 immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and
degrees upon being hit) through a busy intersection despite the continuous chain of events, each having a close causal connection with its
ongoing road construction. immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting the injury
 Hence the appeal. as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such
circumstances that the person responsible for the first event should, as an ordinary
prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of
ISSUE:
his act or default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.
Whether or not the Ford Expedition’s speed in driving along Katipunan despite the
ongoing construction makes it liable
If Aquilino heeded the MMDA prohibition against crossing Katipunan Avenue from
Rajah Matanda, the accident would not have happened. This specific untoward
RULING:
event is exactly what the MMDA prohibition was intended for. Thus, a prudent and
NO. The Altis’s violation in crossing Katipunan despite the barrier is the proximate
intelligent person who resides within the vicinity where the accident occurred,
cause of the collision.
Aquilino had reasonable ground to expect that the accident would be a natural
and probable result if he crossed Katipunan Avenue since such crossing is
If the master is injured by the negligence of a third person and by the concurring considered dangerous on account of the busy nature of the thoroughfare and the
contributory negligence of his own servant or agent, the latters negligence is ongoing construction of the Katipunan-Boni Avenue underpass. It was manifest
imputed to his superior and will defeat the superiors action against the third error for the Court of Appeals to have overlooked the principle embodied in Article
person, assuming of course that the contributory negligence was the proximate 2179 of the Civil Code, that when the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate
cause of the injury of which complaint is made. and proximate cause of his injury, he cannot recover damages.

Applying the foregoing principles of law to the instant case, Aquilinos act of Thus it is unnecessary to delve into the issue of Rodel’s contributory negligence,
crossing Katipunan Avenue via Rajah Matanda constitutes negligence because it since it cannot overcome or defeat Aquilino’s recklessness which is the immediate
was prohibited by law. Moreover, it was the proximate cause of the accident, and and proximate cause of the accident. Rodels contributory negligence has relevance
thus precludes any recovery for any damages suffered by respondent from the only in the event that Ramos (the Expedition owner) seeks to recover from
accident. respondent whatever damages or injuries he may have suffered as a result; it will
have the effect of mitigating the award of damages in his favor. In other words, an
Proximate cause is defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous assertion of contributory negligence in this case would benefit only the petitioner;
DAY SIX

it could not eliminate respondents liability for Aquilinos negligence which is the kilometers per hour. If the train were really running at 30 kilometers per hour when
proximate result of the accident. it was approaching the intersection, it would probably not have travelled 190
meters more from the place of the accident.

All of these factors, taken collectively, engendered the concrete and yes, correct
PHIL NATIONAL RAILWAYS VS VIZCARRA conclusion that the train engineer was negligent who, moreover, despite the last
opportunity within his hands vis-a-visthe weather condition including the presence
FACTS: The case arose from a collision of a passenger express train of defendant of people near the intersection, could have obviated the impending collision had he
Philippine National Railways, (PNR) coming from San Fernando, La Union and slackened his speed and applied the brakes. These considerations were addressed
bound for Manila and a passenger bus of Baliwag Transit, Inc. which was on its way to the trial judge was in a better position to assign weight on factual questions.
to Hagonoy, Bulacan, from Manila, but upon reaching the railroad crossing at Having resolved the question of negligence between the train engineer and the bus
Barrio Balungao, Calumpit, Bulacan at about 1:30 in the afternoon of August 10, driver after collating the mass of evidence, the conclusion reached thereafter thus
1974, got stalled and was hit by defendant's express train causing damages to commands great respect especially so in this case where respondent court gave its
plaintiff's bus and its passengers, eighteen (18) of whom died and fifty-three (53) nod of approval to the findings of the court of origin.
others suffered physical injuries.

Plaintiff alleging that the proximate cause of the collision was the negligence and
imprudence of defendant PNR and its locomotive engineer, HonorioCirbado, in
DRA LEILA DELA LLANA VS BIONG
operating its passenger train in a busy intersection without any bars, semaphores,
signal lights, flagman or switchman to warn the public of approaching train that FACTS: On March 30, 2000, Juan delaLlana was driving and his sister, Dra.
would pass through the crossing, filed the instant action for Damages against delaLlana, was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
defendants. The defendants, in their Answer traversed the material allegation of backseat. Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the
the Complaint and as affirmative defense alleged that the collision was caused by signal lightturned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck rammed
the negligence, imprudence and lack of foresight of plaintiff's bus driver, Romeo
the car’s rear end,violently pushing the car forward.Dra. DelaLlana suffered minor
Hughes.
wounds. The traffic investigation report dated March 30, 2000 identified the truck driver as
Joel Primero who is an employee of respondent Rebecca Biong. In the first week of May
ISSUES:
2000, Dra.delaLlana began to feel mild to moderate pain on the left side of hernneck and
shoulder. The pain became more intense as dayspassed by. Her injury became more severe.
Who between the driver Romeo Hughes of the Baliuag Transit Incorporated and
HonorioCabardo, train Engineer of the Philippine National Railways was negligent On June 9, 2000, she to suffer from
in the operation of their respective vehicles, or whether or both were negligent? a whiplash injury, an injury caused by the compression of the nerve running to her l
Could either of the companies Baliuag Transit Incorporated and the Philippine eft arm and is required to undergo serious medication to alleviate her condition.
National Railways be held accountable for the collision because of negligence? Thus she demanded from Biong compensation for her injuries, but Rebecca refused to pay. This
made her sued Biong for damages before the Regional Trial Court.
HELD:
The RTC ruled in favor of Dra. delaLlana but was reversed by the CA.
It was established that the weather condition was characterized with intermittent
rain which should have prompted the train engineer to exercise extra precaution.
Also, the train reached Calumpit, Bulacan ahead of scheduled arrival thereat,
indicating that the train was travelling more than the normal speed of 30 ISSUE:  Whether Joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of Dra. dela Llana’s
DAY SIX

 whiplash injury  Once negligence, the damages and the proximate causation are established, this
Court can then proceed with the application and the interpretation of the fifth
  paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.31

HELD: Under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, in relation with the fifth paragraph of Article
2180, "an action predicated on an employee’s act or omission may be instituted
Dra. delaLlana failed to establish her case by preponderance of evidence
against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed
by his employee."32
Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides that "[w]hoever by act or omission causes
damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
The rationale for these graduated levels of analyses is that it is essentially the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates the vinculum juris in
relation between the parties, is a quasi-delict." Under this provision, the elements
extra-contractual obligations. 33
necessary to establish a quasi-delict case are:
In civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it.
(1) damages to the plaintiff;
He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by preponderance of
(2) negligence, by act or omission, of the defendant or by some person for whose
evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. 34
acts the defendant must respond, was guilty; and
The reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are
(3) the connection of cause and effect between such negligence and the damages. 28
not equivalent to proof.
These elements show that the source of obligation in a quasi-delict case is the
In short, mere allegations are not evidence.35
breach or omission of mutual duties that civilized society imposes upon its
members, or which arise from non-contractual relations of certain members of In the present case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s
society to others.29 negligence and Dra.delaLlana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. delaLlana. She must
establish by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and
Based on these requisites, Dra. delaLlana must first establish by preponderance of
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her
evidence the three elements of quasi-delict before we determine Rebecca’s liability
whiplash injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred. 36
as Joel’s employer.
Notably, Dra.delaLlana anchors her claim mainly on three pieces of evidence:
She should show the chain of causation between Joel’s reckless driving and her
whiplash injury. (1) the pictures of her damaged car,

Only after she has laid this foundation can the presumption - that Rebecca did not (2) the medical certificate dated November 20, 2000, and
exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision
of Joel - arise.30 (3) her testimonial evidence. However, none of these pieces of evidence show the
causal relation between the vehicular accident and the whiplash injury. In other
words,
DAY SIX

Dra. delaLlana, during trial, did not adduce the factum probans or the evidentiary line of the Alcala Electric Plant (AEP) were blown down and fell on the electric wire.
facts by which the factum probandum or the ultimate fact can be established, as The live electric wire was cut, one end of which was left hanging on the electric
fully discussed below post and the other fell to the ground. The following morning, barrio captain Bueno
of San Pedro saw CiprianoBaldomero, a laborer of the AEP, asked him to fix it, but
ndeed, a perusal of the pieces of evidence presented by the parties before the trial the latter told the barrio captain that he could not do it but that he was going to
court shows that Dra. DelaLlana did not present any testimonial or documentary look for the lineman to fix it. Sometime thereafter, a small boy of 3 years and 8
evidence that directly shows the causal relation between the vehicular accident months old by the name of Manuel P. Saynes, whose house is just on the opposite
and Dra. DelaLlana’s injury. Her claim that Joel’s negligence causes her whiplash side of the road, went to the place where the broken line wire was and got in
injury was not established because of the deficiency of the presented evidence contact with it. The boy was electrocuted and he subsequently died. It was only
during trial. We point out in this respect that courts cannot take judicial notice that after the electrocution that the broken wire was fixed.
vehicular ccidents cause whiplash injuries. This proportion is not public knowledge,
or is capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges Petitioner claims that he could not be liable under the concept of quasi-delict or
because of their judicial functions. 46 We have no expertise in the field of medicine. tort as owner and manager of the Alcala Electric Plant because the proximate cause
Justices and judges are only tasked to apply and interpret the law on the basis of of the boy's death electrocution could not be due to any negligence on his part, but
the parties’ pieces of evidence and their corresponding legal arguments. rather to a fortuitous event-the storm that caused the banana plants to fall and cut
the electric line-pointing out the absence of negligence on the part of his employee
In sum, Dra.delaLlana miserably failed to establish her cause by preponderance of CiprianoBaldomero who tried to have the line repaired and the presence of
evidence. While we commiserate with her, our solemn duty to independently and negligence of the parents of the child in allowing him to leave his house during that
impartially assess the merits of the case binds us to rule against Dra. delaLlana’s time.
favor. Her claim, unsupported by prepondernace of evidence, is merely a bare
assertion and has no leg to stand on. Issues: (1) WON the proximate cause of the boy's death is due to a fortuitous
event- storm; (2) WON boy’s parents’ negligence exempts petitioner from liability.

Ruling: Decision affirmed.

2.2 Tests of Proximate Cause
(1) A careful examination of the records convinces the SC that a series of
negligence on the part of defendants' employees in the AEP resulted in the death
2.2.1 Cause in fact
of the victim by electrocution. First, by the very evidence of the defendant, there
2.2.2 Effectiveness of the cause (sine qua non) “but for” rule were big and tall banana plants at the place of the incident standing on an elevated
ground which were about 30 feet high and which were higher than the electric post
2.2.3 Substantial factor test supporting the electric line, and yet the employees of the defendant who, with
ordinary foresight, could have easily seen that even in case of moderate winds
2.2.4 Foreseeability Test the electric line would be endangered by banana plants being blown down, did
not even take the necessary precaution to eliminate that source of danger to the
UMALI VS BACANI electric line. Second, even after the employees of the Alcala Electric Plant were
already aware of the possible damage the storm of May14, 1972, could have
Facts: On May 14, 1972, a storm with strong rain hit the Municipality of Alcala caused their electric lines, thus becoming a possible threat to life and property,
Pangasinan. During the storm, the banana plants standing near the transmission
DAY SIX

they did not cut off from the plant the flow of electricity along the lines , an act
they could have easily done pending inspection of the wires to see if they had been
cut. Third, employee CiprianoBaldomero was negligent on the morning of the
FACTS: The plaintiff, one of a gang of eight negro laborers in the employment of
incident because even if he was already madeaware of the live cut wire, he did the defendant, was at work, transporting iron rails from a barge in the harbor to
not have the foresight to realize that the same posed a danger to life and the company's yard near the malecon in Manila. Plaintiff claims that but one hand
property, and that he should have taken the necessary precaution to prevent car was used in this work. The defendant has proved that there were two
anybody from approaching the live wire; instead Baldomero left the premises immediately following one another, upon which were piled lengthwise seven rails,
because what was foremost in his mind was the repair of the line, obviously each weighing 560 pounds, so that the ends of the rails lay upon two crosspieces or
forgetting that if left unattended to it could endanger life and property. sills secured to the cars, but without side pieces or guards to prevent them from
slipping off. According to the testimony of the plaintiff, the men were either in the
rear of the car or at its sides. According to that defendant, some of them were also
in front, hauling by a rope. At a certain spot at or near the water's edge the track
sagged, the tie broke, the car either canted or upset, the rails slid off and caught
(2) Art. 2179 CC provides that if the negligence of the plaintiff (parents of the victim
the plaintiff, breaking his leg, which was afterwards amputated at about the knee.
in this case) was only contributory, the immediate and proximate cause of the
injury being the defendants' (petitioners’) lack of due care, the plaintiff may ISSUE:
recover damages, but the courts shall mitigate the damages to be awarded. This Whether the company is liable
law may be availed of by the petitioner but does not exempt him from liability. Whether there is contributory negligence on the part of petitioner
Petitioner's liability for injury caused by his employees negligence is well defined in
par. 4, of Article 2180 of the Civil Code. RULING:
Yes. The negligence of the plaintiff, contributing to the accident, to what extent it
existed in fact and what legal effect is to be given it. In two particulars is he charged
The owner and manager of an establishment or enterprise are likewise responsible
with carelessness:
for damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the First. That having noticed the depression in the track he continued his work; and
latter are employed or on tile occasion of their functions. Second.That he walked on the ends of the ties at the side of the car instead of
along the boards, either before or behind it.
2.2.5 Natural and probable consequence test The Court ruled that His lack of caution in continuing at his work after noticing the
slight depression of the rail was not of so gross a nature as to constitute
2.2.6 Ordinary and natural or direct consequence test negligence, barring his recovery under the severe American rule. While the plaintiff
and his witnesses swear that not only were they not forbidden to proceed in this
way, but were expressly directed by the foreman to do so, both the officers of the
company and three of the workmen testify that there was a general prohibition
frequently made known to all the gang against walking by the side of the car, and
2.3 INTERVENING CAUSE the foreman swears that he repeated the prohibition before the starting of this
particular load. On this contradiction of proof we think that the preponderance is in
RAKES VS ATLANTIC GULF & PACIFIC CO. favor of the defendant's contention to the extent of the general order being made
known to the workmen. If so, the disobedience of the plaintiff in placing himself in
DAY SIX

opened the caps and found yellowish substance. They lighted a match and applied
it on the contents. The girl became frightened and ran away. The substance
exploded, causing a slight cut on Jessie’s neck, burns on Manuel, and loss of David’s
danger contributed in some degree to the injury as a proximate, although not as its eyesight. Plaintiff sued the company for damages.
primary cause. Issue: Whether the company could be faulted for the allowing the children to be
exposed to the harmful substances
Distinction must be between the accident and the injury, between the event itself,
without which there could have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not
entering into it, independent of it, but contributing under review was the Held:
displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. this produced the event
giving occasion for damages — that is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the Fulminating caps or detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges
iron rails. by dynamite are not articles in common use by the average citizen, and under all
the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think that
1. CIVIL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES. — In order to enforce the liability of an employer the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found
for injuries to his employee, it is not necessary that a criminal action be first
by the plaintiff on defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the
prosecuted against the employer or his representative primarily chargeable with
the accident. No criminal proceeding having been taken, the civil action may defendant company was either the owner of the caps in question or had the caps
proceed to judgment. under its possession and control.

2. LIABILITY OF EMPLOYER TO WORKMEN. — The responsibility of an employer to It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps
his employee of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted in been left exposed at the point where they were found, or if their owner had
Philippine jurisprudence.
exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it is equally clear
that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and
3. FELLOW-SERVANT RULE. — Sua cuique culpa nocet. The doctrine known as the
"Fellow-servant rule," exonerating the employer where the injury was incurred convenience, entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon
through the negligence of a fellow-servant of the employee injured, is not adopted without the express permission of the defendant, and had he not picked up and
in Philippine jurisprudence. carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its premises, and
had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to
its contents.
TAYLOR VS MANILA ELCTRIC CO.
Children are actuated by similar childish instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity
FACTS: Plaintiff David Taylor was 15 years old at the time he received the injuries and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here will usually be found
that gave rise to this complaint. On September 30, 1905, plaintiff and Manuel whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
Claparols, about 12 years of age, went to the power plant owned by the defendant indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will
to visit one Murphy, an employee. Not being able to find Murphy on inquiry, the draw them to the neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron
boys for curiosity wandered around the premises and reached the place where the
which comes within the range of its magnetic influence. The owners of premises,
company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its furnaces. There they found
some 20-30 fulminating caps scattered on the ground. The caps are intended for therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which the
explosion of dynamites, and have in themselves explosive power. The boys picked public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner
up the caps and carried them home. Along the way they met Jessie Adrian, a 9-year knows or ought to know children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play,
old girl. The 3 went to Manuel’s house and performed a little experiment. They "must calculate upon this, and take precautions accordingly."
DAY SIX

reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without incurred but for the negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on
defendant's express invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act was the proximate and principal cause
from responsibility for injuries incurred there by plaintiff, without other fault on his of the accident which inflicted the injury
part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of
opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the
defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause
of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, TEAGUE VS FERNANDEZ
"attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match Doctrine: Violation of Rules and Statutes
to its contents was the proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant
injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore is not civilly FACTS: The Realistic Institute situated on the second floor of the Gil-Armi Building,
responsible for the injuries thus incurred. a two-storey, semi-concrete edifice located at the corner of Quezon Boulevard and
Soler Street, Quiapo, Manila  was owned and operated by Teague. The said second
As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout, "While it is the general rule in regard floor was unpartitioned, had a total area of about 400 square meters, and although
to an adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the it had only one stairway, of about 1.50 meters in width, it had eight windows, each
fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from fault, such is of which was provided with two fire-escape ladders and the presence of each of
not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of said fire-exits was indicated on the wall.
a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in
each case by the circumstances of the case." In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time October 24, 1955, around 4pm, a fire broke out in a store for surplus materials
of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and located about ten meters away from the institute (across the street). Upon seeing
physically than the average boy of his age. The evidence of record leaves no room the fire, some of the students in the Realistic Institute shouted ‘Fire! Fire!’ and
for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive thereafter, a panic ensued. Four instructresses and six assistant instructress of the
character of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments Institute were present and they, together with the registrar, tried to calm down the
made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. students, who numbered about 180 at the time. The panic, however, could not be
His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to subdued and the students, with the exception of the few who made use of fire-
explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought escapes kept on rushing and pushing their way through the stairs, thereby causing
about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show clearly that stampede therein. No part of the Gil-Armi Building caught fire. But, after the panic
he knew what he was about. was over, four students, including Lourdes Fernandez, a sister of plaintiffs-
appellants, were found dead and several others injured on account of the
We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and stampede. The deceased’s five brothers and sisters filed an action for damages
understanding to be sensible of the danger to which he exposed himself when he against Mercedes M. Teague as owner and operator of Realistic Institute. 
put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in the sense that his
age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity CFI found for the defendant and dismissed the case. This was however, reversed by
for the exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury the CA. The CA held that petitioner was negligent and that such negligence was the
which resulted from his own deliberate act; and that the injury incurred by him proximate cause of the death of Lourdes Fernandez. This finding of negligence is
must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own willful and based primarily on the fact that the provision of Section 491 Of the Revised
DAY SIX

Ordinances of the City of Manila had not been complied with in connection with the stairway was the proximate cause and that it was precisely what the ordinance
the construction and use of the Gil-Armi building. The alleged violation of the intended to prevent by requiring that there be two stairways instead of only one.
ordinance consisted in the fact that the second storey of the Gil-Armi building had Under the doctrine of the cases cited by the respondents, the principle of
only one stairway, 1.5 meters wide, instead of two of at least 1.2 meters each, proximate cause applies to such violation.
although at the time of the fire the owner of the building had a second stairway
under construction.
The decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

The petitioner relates the chain of events that resulted in the death of Lourdes
Fernandez as follows: (1) violation of ordinance; (2) fire at a neighboring place; (3) MCKEE VS IAC
shouts of “Fire!, Fire!”; (4) panic in the Institute; (5) stampede; and (6) injuries and
FACTS: A head-on-collision took place between an International cargo truck,
death. As thus projected the violation of the ordinance, it is argued, was only a
Loadstar owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
remote cause, if at all, and cannot be the basis of liability since there intervened a
Escort car driven by Jose Koh along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and
number of independent causes which produced the injury complained of.
San Fernando, Pampanga. The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
According to the petitioner “the events of fire, panic and stampede were
McKee and Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
independent causes with no causal connection at all with the violation of the
Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
ordinance.”
Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of minors
ISSUE: Whether a violation of a statute constitutes negligence George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the other hand, was
the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time of the collision, Kim was
HELD:   seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the front passenger's seat of the car
It is true that the petitioner’s non-compliance with the ordinance in question was while Araceli and her two (2) sons were seated at the car's back seat.
ahead of and prior to the other events in point of time, in the sense that it was
coetaneous with its occupancy of the building. But the violation was a continuing Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with two
one, since the ordinance was a measure of safety designed to prevent a specific hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was traveling southward
situation which would pose a danger to the occupants of the building. That from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and was bound for Manila. The Ford
situation was undue overcrowding in case it should become necessary to evacuate Escort, on the other hand, was on its way to Angeles City from San Fernando. When
the building, which, it could be reasonably foreseen, was bound to happen under the northbound car was about (10) meters away from the southern approach of
emergency conditions if there was only one stairway available. the bridge, two (2) boys suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into
the lane of the car. The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to
cross all the way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car,
“The general principle is that the violation of a statute or ordinance is not rendered swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on the
remote as the cause of an injury by the intervention of another agency if the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to return to his
occurrence of the accident, in the manner in which it happened, was the very thing lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. The collision occurred in
which the statute or ordinance was intended to prevent.” To consider the violation the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, on the said bridge.
of the ordinance as the proximate cause of the injury does not portray the situation
in its true perspective; it would be more accurate to say that the overcrowding at
DAY SIX

Civil Case No. 4477 and No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then very well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
Court of First Instance of Pampanga. While an Information charging Ruben Galang car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who suddenly
with the crime of "Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without time to consider
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of
negligence, if he fails to adopt what subsequently and upon reflection may appear
CFI rendered a decision against the accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal to have been a better method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is
case finding the accused Ruben Galang guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the brought about by his own negligence." 
crime Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical
Injuries and Damage to Property. Upon the other hand, the two (2) civil cases were Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the car, We
dismisse and awarded the private respondents moral damages, exemplary find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given situation to avoid
damages and attorney's fees.  hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear that he was not guilty of
negligence.
CA reversed and set aside and another one is rendered, ordering defendants-
appellees to pay plaintiffs-appellants damages. The decision is anchored principally In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be said that
on the respondent Court's findings that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. Proximate cause has been
reckless imprudence which caused the accident. The appellate court further said defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
that the law presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result
respondents), as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; would not have occurred. And more comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is
it was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other
defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of events, each
and supervising the said employee.  having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in
the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts was cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the respondent the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
Court, reconsidered and set aside its earlier decision and affirmed in toto the trial reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
court's judgment. A motion to reconsider this Resolution was denied by the some person might probably result therefrom. 
respondent Court. Hence, this petition.
Although it may be said that the act of Jose Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial
ISSUE: WON the findings of respondent court is supported by evience act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused the eventual
injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the
RULING:
negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The
entry of the car into the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision
The test of negligence and the facts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no
had the latter heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and
negligence could be imputed to Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent
give the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing down
man would have tried to avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away
and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper precautionary
from where they were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane.
measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver continued at full speed
Avoiding such immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly
towards the car. The truck driver's negligence becomes more apparent in view of
where the vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could
DAY SIX

the fact that the road is 7.50 meters wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and however, is only juris tantum, not  juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible defense is
the truck, 2.286 meters, in width. This would mean that both car and truck could that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
pass side by side with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the damage.
bridge has a level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck.
Any reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to avoid The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the selection and
the car instead of meeting it head-on. supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private respondents in Civil Cases
Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this defense. Neither did they attempt to
The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said that his prove it.
truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the bridge while the
maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30 kilometers per hour. Under The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November 1983 in
Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if at reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and
the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no sufficient legal and factual
credence to private respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by moorings.
the investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to whether
SC RULING: In the light of recent decisions of this Court,  the indemnity for death
the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The law presumes
must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless there is proof to the
contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, private respondents' claim is
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the
based on mere conjecture.
respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of 29 November
1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED, subject to the modification that
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent  negligence in failing to take
the indemnity for death is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the
the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision which was
death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh McKee.
the proximate cause of the resulting accident.

Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance finds
application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts which states that
the contributory negligence of the party injured will not defeat the claim for
damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care
and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the negligence of the injured
party. In such cases, the person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap
is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences thereof.  56

Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule, that it
was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to avoid the
collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision. As employers of
the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article 2180 of the Civil Code,
directly and primarily liable for the resulting damages. The presumption that they
are negligent flows from the negligence of their employee. That presumption,