Commonwealth Act No. 63.—An Act providing for the SEC. 2. How citizenship may be reacquired.

—Citizenship
ways in which Philippine citizenship may be lost or may be reacquired:
reacquired.
(1) By naturalization: Provided, That the applicant possess
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: none of the disqualifications prescribed in section two of
Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-seven;
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost.—A Filipino
citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the following (2) By repatriation of deserters of the Army, Navy or Air
ways and/or events: Corp: Provided, That a woman who lost her citizenship by
reason of her marriage to an alien may be repatriated in
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country; accordance with the provisions of this Act after the
termination of the marital status; and
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;
(3) By direct act of the National Assembly.
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the
constitution or laws of a foreign country upon attaining SEC. 3. Procedure incident to reacquisition of Philippine
twenty-one years of age or more; citizenship.—The procedure prescribed for naturalization
under Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-
(4) By accepting commission in the military, naval or air seven, as amended, shall apply to the reacquisition of
service of a foreign country; Philippine citizenship by naturalization provided for in the
next preceding section: Provided, That the qualifications
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of naturalization; and special qualifications prescribed in sections three and
four of said Act shall not be required: And provided,
(6) By having been declared, by competent authority, a further,
deserter of the Philippine army, navy or air corps in time of
war, unless subsequently a plenary pardon or amnesty (1) That the applicant be at least twenty-one years of age
has been granted; and and shall have resided in the Philippines at least six
months before he applies for naturalization;
(7) In the case of a woman, upon her marriage to a
foreigner if, by virtue of the law in force in her husband’s (2) That he shall have conducted himself in a proper and
country, she acquires his nationality. irreproachable manner during the entire period of his
residence in the Philippines, in his relations with the
constituted government as well as with the community in Section 1. Title of Act. – This Act shall be known and may
which he is living; and be cited as the "Revised Naturalization Law."

(3) That he subscribes to an oath declaring his intention to Section 2. Qualifications. – Subject to section four of this
renounce absolutely and perpetually all faith and Act, any person having the following qualifications may
allegiance to the foreign authority, state or sovereignty of become a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization:
which he was a citizen or subject.
First. He must be not less than twenty-one years of
SEC. 4. Repatriation shall be effected by merely taking age on the day of the hearing of the petition;
the necessary oath of allegiance to the Commonwealth of
the Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry. Second. He must have resided in the Philippines
for a continuous period of not less than ten years;
SEC. 5. The Secretary of Justice shall issue the
necessary regulations for the proper enforcement of this Third. He must be of good moral character and
Act. Naturalization blanks and other blanks required for believes in the principles underlying the Philippine
carrying out the provisions of this Act shall be prepared Constitution, and must have conducted himself in a
and furnished by the Solicitor General, subject to the proper and irreproachable manner during the entire
approval of the Secretary of Justice. period of his residence in the Philippines in his
relation with the constituted government as well as
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect upon its approval. with the community in which he is living.

Approved, October 21, 1936. Fourth. He must own real estate in the Philippines
worth not less than five thousand pesos, Philippine
COMMONWEALTH ACT No. 473 currency, or must have some known lucrative
trade, profession, or lawful occupation;
AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY NATURALIZATION, AND Fifth. He must be able to speak and write English
TO REPEAL ACTS NUMBERED TWENTY-NINE or Spanish and any one of the principal Philippine
HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SEVEN AND THIRTY-FOUR languages; and
HUNDRED AND FORTY-EIGHT.
Sixth. He must have enrolled his minor children of
Be it enacted by the National Assembly of the Philippines: school age, in any of the public schools or private
schools recognized by the Office of Private
 Education1 of the Philippines, where the Philippine who uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
history, government and civics are taught or organized governments;
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during b. Persons defending or teaching the necessity or
the entire period of the residence in the Philippines propriety of violence, personal assault, or
required of him prior to the hearing of his petition assassination for the success and predominance of
for naturalization as Philippine citizen. their ideas;
c. Polygamists or believers in the practice of
Section 3. Special qualifications. The ten years of polygamy;
continuous residence required under the second condition d. Persons convicted of crimes involving moral
of the last preceding section shall be understood as turpitude;
reduced to five years for any petitioner having any of the e. Persons suffering from mental alienation or
following qualifications: incurable contagious diseases;
f. Persons who, during the period of their residence in
1. Having honorably held office under the the Philippines, have not mingled socially with the
Government of the Philippines or under that of any Filipinos, or who have not evinced a sincere desire
of the provinces, cities, municipalities, or political to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and
subdivisions thereof; ideals of the Filipinos;
2. Having established a new industry or introduced a g. Citizens or subjects of nations with whom the
useful invention in the Philippines; United States 2and the Philippines are at war,
3. Being married to a Filipino woman; during the period of such war;
4. Having been engaged as a teacher in the h. Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than
Philippines in a public or recognized private school the United States 3whose laws do not grant
not established for the exclusive instruction of Filipinos the right to become naturalized citizens or
children of persons of a particular nationality or subjects thereof.
race, in any of the branches of education or
industry for a period of not less than two years; Section 5. Declaration of intention. – One year prior to the
5. Having been born in the Philippines. filing of his petition for admission to Philippine citizenship,
the applicant for Philippine citizenship shall file with the
Section 4. Who are disqualified. - The following cannot be Bureau of Justice4 a declaration under oath that it is bona
naturalized as Philippine citizens: fide his intention to become a citizen of the Philippines.
Such declaration shall set forth name, age, occupation,
a. Persons opposed to organized government or personal description, place of birth, last foreign residence
affiliated with any association or group of persons and allegiance, the date of arrival, the name of the vessel
or aircraft, if any, in which he came to the Philippines, and who has declared his intention to become a citizen of the
the place of residence in the Philippines at the time of Philippines, and dies before he is actually naturalized. 6
making the declaration. No declaration shall be valid until
lawful entry for permanent residence has been Section 7. Petition for citizenship. – Any person desiring
established and a certificate showing the date, place, and to acquire Philippine citizenship shall file with the
manner of his arrival has been issued. The declarant must competent court, a petition in triplicate, accompanied by
also state that he has enrolled his minor children, if any, in two photographs of the petitioner, setting forth his name
any of the public schools or private schools recognized by and surname; his present and former places of residence;
the Office of Private Education5 of the Philippines, where his occupation; the place and date of his birth; whether
Philippine history, government, and civics are taught or single or married and the father of children, the name,
prescribed as part of the school curriculum, during the age, birthplace and residence of the wife and of each of
entire period of the residence in the Philippines required of the children; the approximate date of his or her arrival in
him prior to the hearing of his petition for naturalization as the Philippines, the name of the port of debarkation, and,
Philippine citizen. Each declarant must furnish two if he remembers it, the name of the ship on which he
photographs of himself. came; a declaration that he has the qualifications required
by this Act, specifying the same, and that he is not
Section 6. Persons exempt from requirement to make a disqualified for naturalization under the provisions of this
declaration of intention. – Persons born in the Act; that he has complied with the requirements of section
Philippines and have received their primary and five of this Act; and that he will reside continuously in the
secondary education in public schools or those Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to
recognized by the Government and not limited to any the time of his admission to Philippine citizenship. The
race or nationality, and those who have resided petition must be signed by the applicant in his own
continuously in the Philippines for a period of thirty handwriting and be supported by the affidavit of at least
years or more before filing their application, may be two credible persons, stating that they are citizens of the
naturalized without having to make a declaration of Philippines and personally know the petitioner to be a
intention upon complying with the other requirements of resident of the Philippines for the period of time required
this Act. To such requirements shall be added that by this Act and a person of good repute and morally
which establishes that the applicant has given irreproachable, and that said petitioner has in their opinion
primary and secondary education to all his children in all the qualifications necessary to become a citizen of the
the public schools or in private schools recognized by Philippines and is not in any way disqualified under the
the Government and not limited to any race or provisions of this Act. The petition shall also set forth the
nationality. The same shall be understood applicable names and post-office addresses of such witnesses as
with respect to the widow and minor children of an alien the petitioner may desire to introduce at the hearing of the
case. The certificate of arrival, and the declaration of Section 10. Hearing of the petition.—No petition shall be
intention must be made part of the petition. heard within the thirty days preceding any election. The
hearing shall be public, and the Solicitor-General, either
Section 8. Competent court.—The Court of First Instance himself or through his delegate or the provincial fiscal
of the province in which the petitioner has resided at least concerned, shall appear on behalf of the
one year immediately preceding the filing of the petition Commonwealth11 of the Philippines at all the proceedings
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear the and at the hearing. If, after the hearing, the court believes,
petition. in view of the evidence taken, that the petitioner has all
the qualifications required by, and none of the
Section 9. Notification and appearance.—Immediately disqualifications specified in this Act and has complied
upon the filing of a petition, it shall be the duty of the clerk with all requisites herein established, it shall order the
of the court to publish the same at petitioner's expense, proper naturalization certificate to be issued and the
once a week for three consecutive weeks, in the Official registration of the said naturalization certificate in the
Gazette, and in one of the newspapers of general proper civil registry as required in section ten of Act
circulation in the province where the petitioner resides, Numbered Three thousand seven hundred and fifty-
and to have copies of said petition and a general notice of three.12
the hearing posted in a public and conspicuous place in
his office or in the building where said office is located, Section 11. Appeal.—The final sentence may, at the
setting forth in such notice the name, birthplace and instance of either of the parties, be appealed to the
residence of the petitioner, the date and place of his Supreme Court.13
arrival in the Philippines, the names of the witnesses
whom the petitioner proposes to introduce in support of Section 12. Issuance of the Certificate of Naturalization.
his petition, and the date of the hearing of the petition, —If, after the lapse of thirty days from and after the date
which hearing shall not be held within ninety days from the on which the parties were notified of the Court, no appeal
date of the last publication of the notice. The clerk shall, has been filed, or if, upon appeal, the decision of the court
as soon as possible, forward copies of the petition, the has been confirmed by the Supreme Court,14 and the said
sentence, the naturalization certificate, and other pertinent decision has become final, the clerk of the court which
data to the Department of the Interior, 7 the Bureau of heard the petition shall issue to the petitioner a
Justice,8 the Provincial Inspector9 of the Philippine naturalization certificate which shall, among other things,
Constabulary of the province and the justice of the state the following: The file number of the petition, the
peace10 of the municipality wherein the petitioner resides. number of the naturalization certificate, the signature of
the person naturalized affixed in the presence of the clerk
of the court, the personal circumstances of the person
naturalized, the dates on which his declaration of intention certificates each page of which shall have a duplicate
and petition were filed, the date of the decision granting which shall be duly attested by the clerk of the court and
the petition, and the name of the judge who rendered the delivered to the petitioner.
decision. A photograph of the petitioner with the dry seal
affixed thereto of the court which granted the petition, Section 14. Fees.—The clerk of the Court of First
must be affixed to the certificate. Instance shall charge as fees for recording a petition for
naturalization and for the proceedings in connection
Before the naturalization certificate is issued, the therewith, including the issuance of the certificate, the
petitioner shall, in open court, take the following oath: sum of thirty pesos.

"I, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , solemnly The Clerk of the Supreme Court17 shall collect for each
swear that I renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance appeal and for the services rendered by him in connection
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state or therewith, the sum of twenty-four pesos.
sovereignty, and particularly to the . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of which at this time I am a subject or citizen; that I will Section 15. Effect of the naturalization on wife and
support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and children.—Any woman who is now or may hereafter be
that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the herself be lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of
Commonwealth15 of the Philippines; [and I hereby declare the Philippines.
that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the
United States of America in the Philippines and will Minor children of persons naturalized under this law who
maintain true faith and allegiance thereto;16 and that I have been born in the Philippines shall be considered
impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without citizens thereof.
mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
A foreign-born minor child, if dwelling in the Philippines at
"So help me God." the time of the naturalization of the parent, shall
automatically become a Philippine citizen, and a foreign-
Section 13. Record books.—The clerk of the court shall born minor child, who is not in the Philippines at the time
keep two books; one in which the petition and declarations the parent is naturalized, shall be deemed a Philippine
of intention shall be recorded in chronological order, citizen only during his minority, unless he begins to reside
noting all proceedings thereof from the filing of the petition permanently in the Philippines when still a minor, in which
to the final issuance of the naturalization certificate; and case, he will continue to be a Philippine citizen even after
another, which shall be a record of naturalization becoming of age.
A child born outside of the Philippines after the Section 19. Penalties for violation of this Act.—Any
naturalization of his parent, shall be considered a person who shall fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change,
Philippine citizen, unless one year after reaching the age alter, or cause or aid any person to do the same, or who
of majority, he fails to register himself as a Philippine shall purposely aid and assist in falsely making, forging,
citizen at the falsifying, changing or altering a naturalization certificate
for the purpose of making use thereof, or in order that the
  same may be used by another person or persons, and
any person who shall purposely aid and assist another in
  obtaining a naturalization certificate in violation of the
provisions of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not
*************************** MISSING PAGE "#329" more than five thousand pesos or by imprisonment for not
*********************** more than five years, or both, and in the case that the
person convicted is a naturalized citizen his certificate of
  naturalization and the registration of the same in the
proper civil registry shall be ordered cancelled.
the fault of their parents either by neglecting
to support them or by transferring them to Section 20. Prescription.—No person shall be
another school or schools. A certified copy prosecuted, charged, or punished for an offense implying
of the decree canceling the naturalization a violation of the provisions of this Act, unless the
certificate shall be forwarded by the clerk of information or complaint is filed within five years from the
the Court to the Department of the Interior20 detection or discovery of the commission of said offense.
and the Bureau of Justice.21
Section 21. Regulation and blanks.—The Secretary of
(e) If it is shown that the naturalized citizen Justice shall issue the necessary regulations for the
has allowed himself to be used as a dummy proper enforcement of this Act. Naturalization certificate
in violation of the Constitutional or legal blanks and other blanks required for carrying out the
provision requiring Philippine citizenship as provisions of this Act shall be prepared and furnished by
a requisite for the exercise, use or the Solicitor-General, subject to the approval of the
enjoyment of a right, franchise or privilege. Secretary of Justice.

  Section 22. Repealing clause.—Act Numbered Twenty-

nine hundred and twenty-seven as amended by Act
Numbered Thirty-four hundred and forty-eight, entitled
"The Naturalization Law", is repealed: Provided, That or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
nothing in this Act shall be construed to affect any allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
prosecution, suit, action, or proceedings brought, or any citizenship.  
act, thing, or matter, civil or criminal, done or existing
before the taking effect of this Act, but as to all such Sec. 2.    This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
prosecutions, suits, actions, proceedings, acts, things, or
matters, the laws, or parts of laws repealed or amended
by this Act are continued in force and effect.
Approved: June 18, 1960
Section 23. Date when this Act shall take effect.—This
Act shall take effect on its approval. PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 725 June 5, 1975

Approved, June 17, 1939. PROVIDING FOR REPATRIATION OF FILIPINO

WOMEN WHO HAD LOST THEIR PHILIPPINE
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS AND OF
NATURAL BORN FILIPINOS
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 2630 - AN ACT PROVIDING FOR
REACQUISITION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY WHEREAS, there are many Filipino women who had lost
PERSONS WHO LOST SUCH CITIZENSHIP BY their Philippine Citizenship by marriage to aliens;
RENDERING SERVICE TO, OR ACCEPTING
COMMISSION IN, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WHEREAS, while the new constitution allows a Filipino
UNITED STATES woman who marries an alien to retain her Philippine
citizenship unless by her act or omission, she is deemed
under the law to have renounced her Philippine
citizenship, such provision of the new Constitution does
Section 1.    Any person who had lost his Philippine not apply to Filipino women who had married aliens before
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting said Constitution took effect;
commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or
after separation from the Armed Forces of the United WHEREAS, the existing law (C.A. Nos. 63, as amended)
States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire allows the repatriation of Filipino women who lost their
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to citizenship by reason of their marriage to aliens only after
the Republic of the Philippines and registering the same the death of their husbands or the termination of their
with the Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides marital status; and
WHEREAS, there are natural born Filipinos who have lost AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE REPATRIATION OF
their Philippine citizenship but now desire to re-acquire FILIPINO WOMEN WHO HAVE LOST THEIR
Philippine citizenship; PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP BY MARRIAGE TO ALIENS
AND OF NATURAL-BORN FILIPINOS.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers in me Section 1. Filipino women who have lost their Philippine
vested by the Constitution, do hereby decree and order citizenship by marriage to aliens and natural-born Filipinos
that: 1) Filipino women who lost their Philippine citizenship who have lost their Philippine citizenship, including their
by marriage to aliens; and (2) natural born Filipinos who minor children, on account of political or economic
have lost their Philippine citizenship may require necessity, may reacquire Philippine citizenship
Philippine citizenship through repatriation by applying with through repatriation in the manner provided in Section 4 of
the Special Committee on Naturalization created by Letter Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended: Provided, That
of Instruction No. 270, and, if their applications are the applicant
approved, taking the necessary oath of allegiance to the is not a:
Republic of the Philippines, after which they shall be
deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship. The
Commission on Immigration and Deportation shall     (1) Person opposed to organized government or
thereupon cancel their certificate of registration. affiliated with any association or group of persons who
uphold and teach doctrines opposing organized
The aforesaid Special Committee is hereby authorized to government;
promulgate rules and regulations and prescribe the     (2) Person defending or teaching the necessity or
appropriate forms and the required fees for the effective propriety of violence, personal assault, or associatEon for
implementation of this Decree. the predominance of their ideas;
    (3) Person convictad of crimes involving moral
turpitude; or
This Decree shall take effect immediately.
    (4) Person suffering from mental alienation or
incurablecontagious diseases.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5th day of June, in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-five.
Sec. 2. Repatriation shall be effected by taking the
Republic Act 8171 necessary oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registration in the proper civil registry and
Files:  in the Bureau or Immigration. The Bureau of Immigration
shall thereupon cancel the pertinent alien
Republic Act 8171
certificate of registration and issue the certificate of certain requirements dictated by national security and
identification as Filipino citizen to the repatriated citizen. interest.

Sec. 3. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or Section 3. Qualifications. - Subject to the provisions of
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby the succeeding section, any person desiring to avail of the
repealed or amended accordingly. benefits of this Act must meet the following qualifications:

(a) The applicant must be born in the Philippines and

Sec. 4. This Act shall take effect thirty (30) days after its residing therein since birth;
publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
(b) The applicant must not be less than eighteen (18)
Signed: October 23, 1995 years of age, at the time of filing of his/her petition;

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9139      June 08, 2001 (c) The applicant must be of good moral character and
believes in the underlying principles of the Constitution,
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ACQUISITION OF and must have conducted himself/herself in a proper and
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP FOR CERTAIN ALIENS BY irreproachable manner during his/her entire period of
ADMINISTRATIVE NATURALIZATION AND FOR residence in the Philippines in his relation with the duly
OTHER PURPOSES constituted government as well as with the community in
which he/she is living;
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress (d) The applicant must have received his/her primary and
assembled: secondary education in any public school or private
educational institution dully recognized by the Department
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as "The of Education, Culture and Sports, where Philippine history,
Administrative Naturalization Law of 2000." government and civics are taught and prescribed as part
of the school curriculum and where enrollment is not
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall control limited to any race or nationality: Provided, That should
and regulate the admission and integration of aliens into he/she have minor children of school age, he/she must
its territory and body politic including the grant of have enrolled them in similar schools;
citizenship to aliens. Towards this end, aliens born and
residing in the Philippines may be granted Philippine (e) The applicant must have a known trade, business,
citizenship by administrative proceedings subject to profession or lawful occupation, from which he/she
derives income sufficient for his/her support and if he/she (f) Those who, during the period of their residence in the
is married and/or has dependents, also that of his/her Philippines, have not mingled socially with Filipinos, or
family: Provided, however, That this shall not apply to who have not evinced a sincere desire to learn and
applicants who are college degree holders but are unable embrace the customs, traditions and ideals of the
to practice their profession because they are disqualified Filipinos;
to do so by reason of their citizenship;
(g) Citizens or subjects with whom the Philippines is at
(f) The applicant must be able to read, write and speak war, during the period of such war; and
Filipino or any of the dialects of the Philippines; and
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country whose laws do
(g) The applicant must have mingled with the Filipinos and not grant Filipinos the right to be naturalized citizens or
evinced a sincere desire to learn and embrace the subjects thereof.
customs, traditions and ideals of the Filipino people.
Section 5. Petition for Citizenship. - (1) Any person
Section 4. Disqualifications, - The following are not desiring to acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act
qualified to be naturalized as Filipino citizens under this shall file with the Special Committee on Naturalization
Act: created under Section 6 hereof, a petition of five (5)
copies legibly typed and signed, thumbmarked and
(a) Those opposed to organized government or affiliated verified by him/her, with the latter's passport-sized
with any association of group of persons who uphold and photograph attached to each copy of the petition, and
teach doctrines opposing all organized governments; setting forth the following:

(b) Those defending or teaching the necessity of or (a) The petitioner's name and surname, and any other
propriety of violence, personal assault or assassination for name he/she has used or by which he/she is known;
the success or predominance of their ideas;
(b) The petitioner's present and former places of
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy; residence;

(d) Those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude; (c) The petitioner's place and date of birth, the names and
citizenship of his/her parents and their residences;
(e) Those suffering from mental alienation or incurable
contagious diseases; (d) The petitioner's trade, business, profession or
occupation, and if married, also that of his/her spouse;
(e) Whether the petitioner is single or married or his/her (c) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of
marriage is annulled. If married, petitioner shall state the petitioner's marriage certified, if married, or the death
date and place of his/her marriage, and the name, date of certificate of his spouse, if widowed, or the court decree
birth, birthplace, citizenship and residence of his/her annulling his marriage, if such was the fact;
spouse; and if his marriage is annulled, the date of decree
of annulment of marriage and the court which granted the (d) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of birth
same; certificates, alien certificate of registration or native born
certificate of residence if any, of petitioner's minor
(f) If the petitioner has children, the name, date and children, wherever applicable;
birthplace and residences of his/her children ;
(e) Affidavit of financial capacity by the petitioner, and
(g) A declaration that the petitioner possesses all the sworn statements on the good moral character of the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this petitioner by at least two (2) Filipino citizens of good
Act; reputation in his/her place of residence stating that they
have personally known the petitioner for at least a period
(h) A declaration that the petitioner shall never be a public of ten (10) years and that said petitioner has in their own
charge; and opinion all the qualifications necessary to become a
citizen of the Philippines and is not in any way disqualified
(i) A declaration that it is the petitioner's true and honest under the provisions of this Act;
intention to acquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce
absolutely and forever any prince, potentate, State or (f) A medical certificate that petitioner is not a user of
sovereign, and particularly the country of which the prohibited drugs or otherwise a drug dependent and that
applicant is a citizen or subject. he/she is not afflicted with acquired immune deficiency
syndrome (AIDS);
(2) The application shall be accompanied by:
(g) School diploma and transcript of records of the
(a) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of petitioner in the schools he attended in the Philippines.
petitioner's birth certificate; Should the petitioner have minor children, a certification
that his children are enrolled in a school where Philippine
(b) Duplicate original or certified photocopies of history, government and civics are taught and are part of
petitioner's alien certificate of registration and native born the curriculum; and
certificate of residence;
(h) If gainfully employed, the income tax return for the past a newspaper of general circulation, and have copies of the
three (3) years. petition posted in any public or conspicuous area. The
Committee shall immediately furnish the Department of
Section 6. Special Committee on Naturalization. - There Foreign Affairs (DFA), the Bureau of Immigration (BI), the
shall be constituted a Special Committee on Naturalization civil registrar of the petitioner's place of residence and tile
herein referred to as the "Committee", with the Solicitor National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) copies of the
General as chairman, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, or petition and its supporting documents. These agencies
his representative, and the National Security Adviser, as shall have copies of the petition posted in any public or
members, with the power to approve, deny or reject conspicuous area in their buildings, offices and premises,
applications for naturalization as provided in this Act. and shall, within thirty (30) days from the receipt of the
petition, submit to the Committee a report stating whether
The Committee shall meet, as often as practicable, to or not petitioner has any derogatory record on file or any
consider applications for naturalization. For this purpose, such relevant and material information which might be
the chairman and members shall receive an honorarium of adverse to petitioner's application for citizenship.
Two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) and One thousand five
hundred pesos (P1,500.00), respectively, per meeting If the petition is found by the Committee to be wanting in
attended. substance and form, the petition shall be dismissed
without prejudice.
Section 7. Powers/Functions of the Special Committee
on Naturalization. - An alien who believes that he has all Section 8. Approval or Disapproval of the Petition. -
the qualifications, and none of the disqualifications, may Within sixty (60) days from receipt of the report of the
file an application for naturalization with the secretariat of agencies which were furnished a copy of the petition or
the Special Committee on Naturalization, and a the date of the last publication of the petition, whichever
processing fee of Forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00). comes in later, the Committee shall consider and review
Thereafter, the petition shall be stamped to indicate the all relevant and material information it has received
date of filing and a corresponding docket number. Within pertaining to the petition, and may, for the purpose call the
fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the petition, the petitioner for interview to ascertain his/her identity, the
Committee shall determine whether the petition is authenticity of the petition and its annexes, and to
complete in substance and in form. If such petition is determine the truthfulness of the statements and
complete, the Committee shall immediately publish declarations made in the petition and its annexes.
pertinent portions of the petition indicating the name,
qualifications and other personal circumstances of the
applicant, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in
If the Committee shall have received any information shall forward a copy of the petitioner's oath to the proper
adverse to the petition, the Committee shall allow the local civil registrar. Thereafter, the BI shall cancel the alien
petitioner to answer, explain or refute the information. certificates of registration of the applicant.

Thereafter, if the Committee believes, in view of the facts Section 11. Status of Alien Wife and Minor Children. -
before it, that the petitioner has all the qualifications and After the approval of the petition for administrative
none of the disqualifications required for Philippine naturalization in cancellation of applicant's alien certificate
citizenship under this Act, it shall approve the petition and of registration, applicant's alien lawful wife and minor
henceforth, notify the petitioner of the fact of such children may file a petition for cancellation of their alien
approval. Otherwise, the Committee shall disapprove the certificates of registration with the Committee subject to
same. the payment of the filing fee of Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and naturalization fee of Forty thousand
Section 9. Decree of Naturalization and Naturalization pesos (P40,000.00) payable as follows: Twenty thousand
Processing Fee. -Within thirty (30) days from the receipt pesos (P20,000.00) upon the approval of the petition and
of the notice of the approval of his/her petition, the Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) upon the taking of
applicant shall pay to the Committee a naturalization fee the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
of One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) payable
as follows: Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) upon the Section 12. Status of Alien Husband and Minor
approval of the petition and Fifty thousand pesos Children. - If the applicant is a married woman, the
(P50,000.00) upon the taking of the oath of allegiance to approval of her petition for administrative naturalization
the Republic of the Philippines, forthwith, a certificate of will not benefit her alien husband but her minor children
naturalization shall be issued. Within sixty (60) days from may file a petition for cancellation of their alien certificates
the issuance of the certificate, the petitioner shall take an of registration with the BI subject to the requirements of
oath of allegiance in the proper forum upon proof of existing laws.
payment of the required naturalization processing fee and
certificate of naturalization. Should the applicant fail to Section 13. Cancellation of the Certificate of
take the abovementioned oath of allegiance within said Naturalization. - The Special Committee may cancel
period of time, the approval of the petition shall be certificates of naturalization issued under this Act in the
deemed abandoned. following cases:

Section 10. Duty of the Bureau of Immigration. - Within (a) If it finds that the naturalized person or his duly
five (5) days after the applicant has taken his oath of authorized representative made any false statement or
allegiance as required in the preceding section, the BI misrepresentation or committed any violation of law, rules
and regulations in connection with the petition for order of nobility before the Special Committee or its duly
naturalization, or if he otherwise obtains Philippine authorized representative, and such renunciation shall be
citizenship fraudulently or illegally, the certificate of included in the records of his application for citizenship.
naturalization shall be cancelled;
Section 14. Penalties. - Any person who shall
(b) If the naturalized person or his wife, or any or his minor fraudulently make, falsify, forge, change, alter, or cause or
children who acquire Filipino citizenship by virtue of his aid any person to do the same, or who shall purposely aid
naturalization shall, within five (5) years next following the and assist in falsely making, forging, falsifying, changing
grant of Philippine citizenship, establish permanent or altering a naturalization certificate issued under this
residence in a foreign country, that individual's certificate proceeding for the purpose of making use thereof, or in
of naturalization or acquired citizenship shall be cancelled order that the same may be used by another person or
or revoked: Provided, That the fact of such person's persons, and any person who shall purposely aid and
remaining for more than one (1) year in his country of assist another in obtaining a naturalization certificate in
origin, or two (2) years in any foreign country, shall be violation of this Act, shall be punished by a fine of not
considered prima facie evidence of intent to permanently more than Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,OOO.OO)
reside therein; and by imprisonment for not more than five (5) years, and
in the case that the person convicted is a naturalized
(c) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with citizen, his certificate of naturalization shall, if not earlier
acquired citizenship allows himself or herself to be used cancelled by the Special Committee, be ordered
as a dummy in violation of any constitutional or legal cancelled.
provision requiring Philippine citizenship as a condition for
the exercise, use or enjoyment of a right, franchise or Section 15. Any person who failed to register his/her birth
privilege, the certificate of naturalization or acquired with the concerned city or municipal civil registrar may,
citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked; and within two (2) years from the effectivity of this Act, file a
petition for the acquisition of the Philippine
(d) If the naturalized person or his wife or child with citizenship: Provided, That the applicant possesses all the
acquired citizenship commits any act inimical to national qualifications and none of the disqualifications under this
security, the certificate of naturalization or acquired Act and subject to the requirements of existing laws.
citizenship shall be cancelled or revoked.
Section 16. Special Disposition of the Filing Fee. - An
In case the naturalized person holds any hereditary title, amount equivalent to twenty five percent (25%) of the
or belong to any order of nobility, he shall make an filing fee to be paid by the applicants pursuant to Section
express renunciation of his title or membership in this 7 hereof shall accrue to the University of the Philippines
Law Center and another twenty-five percent (25%) shall ACT. NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER
be allotted for the publication of the Journal of the House PURPOSES
of Representatives. Said amount shall be treated as
receipts automatically appropriated. Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:
Section 17. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The
Special Committee on Naturalization is hereby authorized Section 1. Short Title – this act shall be known as the
to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be "Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of
needed for the proper implementation of the provisions of 2003."
this Act.
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared
Section 18. Repealing Clause. -All provisions of existing the policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another
laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations contrary to or country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine
inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified citizenship under the conditions of this Act.
accordingly.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any
Section 19. Separability CIause. - If any part, section or provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-
provision of this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, born citizenship by reason of their naturalization as
the part, section or provision not affected thereby shall citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have
continue to be in force and effect. re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the
following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
Section 20. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least "I _____________________, solemny swear (or
two (2) newspapers of general circulation. affrim) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
Approved, obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I
Republic Act No. 9225             August 29, 2003 hereby declare that I recognize and accept the
supreme authority of the Philippines and will
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily
PERMANENT. without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH
Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the (3) Those appointed to any public office shall
effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country subscribe and swear to an oath of allegiance to the
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the Republic of the Philippines and its duly constituted
aforesaid oath. authorities prior to their assumption of
office: Provided, That they renounce their oath of
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child, allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine (4) Those intending to practice their profession in
citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed the Philippines shall apply with the proper authority
citizenship of the Philippines. for a license or permit to engage in such practice;
and
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and
Liabilities - Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine (5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to
citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political any public office in the Philippines cannot be
rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and exercised by, or extended to, those who:
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and
the following conditions: (a) are candidates for or are occupying any
public office in the country of which they are
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of naturalized citizens; and/or
surffrage must Meet the requirements under
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic (b) are in active service as commissioned or
Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The Overseas non-commissioned officers in the armed
Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing forces of the country which they are
laws; naturalized citizens.

(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or
shall meet the qualification for holding such public provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any
office as required by the Constitution and existing other section or provision not affected thereby shall
laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of remain valid and effective.
candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders,
before any public officer authorized to administer rules and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of
an oath; this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause – This Act shall take effect (1) that she is single when she is married to Congressman
after fifteen (15) days following its publication in Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she is a
the Official Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a
circulation. resident of Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her
husband, and at the same time, when she is also a
G.R. No. 207264               June 25, 2013 resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon City
as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, the House of Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is
vs. 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960; 3 (4) that she
SOCORRO B. TAN, Respondents. is not a permanent resident of another country when she
is a permanent resident or an immigrant 4 of the United
RESOLUTION States of America;5 and (5) that she is a Filipino citizen
when she is, in fact, an American citizen.6
PEREZ, J.:
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for publicly known to be the wife of Congressman Herminaldo
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas), there is no valid
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order dated 7 June and binding marriage between them. According to
2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes, assailing petitioner, although her marriage with Congressman
the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 Mandanas was solemnized in a religious rite, it did not
issued by public respondent Commission on Elections comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by the
(COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053. The assailed Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently,
Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of petitioner argues that as she is not duty-bound to live with
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative Congressman Mandanas, then his residence cannot be
of the lone district of Marinduque. attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate of
Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a that it was on 3 July 1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the
registered voter and resident of the Municipality of allegation that she is a permanent resident and/or a
Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the COMELEC an citizen of the United States of America is not supported by
Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the evidence.10
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground
that it contained material misrepresentations, specifically:
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the
2013, respondent filed a "Manifestation with Motion to COMELEC First Division ruled that she did not have the
Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and Amended List of oneyear residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI
Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible to run for
article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 the position of Representative for the lone district of
entitled "Seeking and Finding the Truth about Regina O. Marinduque.
Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification and Authenticity
of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion, Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First
which provides a database record of the Bureau of Division, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration 14 on
Immigration indicating that petitioner is an American 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a Certification citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply
of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally,
Sanchez, Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit petitioner surmised that the COMELEC First Division
of the Bureau of Immigration which indicates that relied on the fact of her marriage to an American citizen in
petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen.
abroad. Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only
resulted into dual citizenship, thus there is no need for her
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a to fulfill the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225. Still,
Resolution12 cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit: petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant September 2012. As to her alleged lack of the one-year
Petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Certificate of residency requirement prescribed by the Constitution, she
Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES is averred that, as she never became a naturalized citizen,
hereby CANCELLED. she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac,
Marinduque.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the
declarations that she made in her COC, petitioner is not a On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a
citizen of the Philippines because of her failure to comply Resolution15 denying petitioner’s Motion for
with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or Reconsideration for lack of merit.
the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003,
namely: (1) to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic of Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was
the Philippines; and (2) to make a personal and sworn proclaimed winner of the 13 May 2013 Elections.
renunciation of her American citizenship before any public
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a of the case without giving the petitioner the
Certificate of Finality16 declaring the 14 May 2013 opportunity to question and present controverting
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and executory, evidence, in violation of Petitioner’s right to due
considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have process of law.
elapsed from the date of promulgation with no order
issued by this Court restraining its execution. 17 33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office 18 before lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Feliciano R. Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet
Representatives. the residency requirement for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which
officially starts at noon of 30 June 2013. 34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on
Elections committed grave abuse of discretion
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225,
Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner raises it imposed additional qualifications to the
the following issues:19 qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without Article VI of the 1987 Constitution of the
jurisdiction over Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed Philippines.
winner and who has already taken her oath of
office for the position of Member of the House of The petition must fail.
Representatives for the lone congressional district
of Marinduque. At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of
respondent COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) appears to be
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this
cognizance of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly- Court, she is asserting that it is the HRET which has
discovered evidence" without the same having jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits that the issue on her
been testified on and offered and admitted in eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the House
evidence which became the basis for its Resolution of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of
competent jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s Representatives, as stated in Section 17, Article VI of the
recourse to this Court was made only in an attempt to 1987 Constitution:
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and
executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053. Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
consider each of the issues raised by petitioner. The need and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
to do so, and at once, was highlighted during the
discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not
was emphasized that the term of office of the Members of have jurisdiction over a candidate who is not a member of
the House of Representatives begins on the thirtieth day the House of Representatives, to wit:
of June next following their election.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
jurisdiction when she was duly proclaimed 20 because petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge
the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
qualifications" of the Members of the House of candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the
House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC this point has no jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis
retains jurisdiction for the following reasons: supplied.)

First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered
issue of petitioner’s qualifications, as well as over the a Member of the House of Representatives?
assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a petition is duly
filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v.
has filed such action. COMELEC23 and Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court
ruled that:
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the
candidate is considered a Member of the House of The Court has invariably held that once a winning
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over office.
election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the
begins. (Emphasis supplied.) pronouncement that once a proclamation has been made,
COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and, thus, its
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
Limkaichong v. COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction
to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, begins. However, it must be noted that in these cases, the
held that: doctrinal pronouncement was made in the context of a
proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of
The Court has invariably held that once a winning office, but who had also assumed office.
candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a Member of the House of For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC, 27 the
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over Court upheld the jurisdiction of the HRET against that of
election contests relating to his election, returns, and the COMELEC only after the candidate had been
qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker of
begins. (Emphasis supplied.) the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on
26 September 2007, or after the start of his term on 30
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC, 26 to June 2007, to wit:
wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office comment in which he brought to Our attention that on
by Gonzalez, jurisdiction over the matter of his September 26, 2007, even before the issuance of the
qualifications, as well as questions regarding the conduct status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been
of election and contested returns – were transferred to the proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of
HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the the House of Representatives of the First Congressional
same. (Emphasis supplied.) District of Lanao del Norte. On that very same day, he had
taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose de
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) a valid
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte,
already been transferred to the House of Representatives there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). (Emphasis supplied.) open session and, thus, it remains unclear whether the
required oath of office was indeed complied with.
Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the
questioned candidate had already assumed office, and More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this
hence, was already considered a Member of the House of controversy – that before the proclamation of petitioner on
Representatives, unlike in the present case. 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc had already finally
disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May
the House of Representatives because, primarily, she has 2013. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
not yet assumed office. To repeat what has earlier been COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioner’s
said, the term of office of a Member of the House of qualifications to run for the position of Member of the
Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day House of Representative. We will inexcusably disregard
of June next following their election." 28 Thus, until such this fact if we accept the argument of the petitioner that
time, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction. the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction when she was
proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed
petitioner attached a purported Oath Of Office taken petitioner cannot by such act be allowed to render
before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June 2013. nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En Banc which
However, this is not the oath of office which confers affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
membership to the House of Representatives.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House Division which was promulgated on 27 March 2013, and
of Representatives provides: the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc which
was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final and
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of
shall take their oath or affirmation either collectively or the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:
individually before the Speaker in open session.
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of pre-proclamation cases and petitions to deny due course
the oath it must be made (1) before the Speaker of the to or cancel certificates of candidacy, to declare nuisance
House of Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone or
suspend elections shall become final and executory after It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to
the lapse of five (5) days from their promulgation unless strictly adhere to the technical rules of procedure in the
restrained by the Supreme Court. presentation of evidence. Under Section 2 of Rule I, the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and
from becoming final and executory, petitioner should have inexpensive determination and disposition of every action
availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729 of the COMELEC and proceeding brought before the Commission." In view
Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny due
filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary
but she failed to do so. She would file the present last in nature, then the "newly discovered evidence" was
hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on 5 June 2013, properly admitted by respondent COMELEC.
respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of
Finality. Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the
case at bar as petitioner was given every opportunity to
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her argue her case before the COMELEC. From 10 October
Filipino citizenship, as well as her one-year residency in 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27 March 2013
Marinduque, suffice it to say that the COMELEC when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner
committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her had a period of five (5) months to adduce evidence.
ineligible for the position of Member of the House of Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity
Representatives. given her.

Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due
discretion when it took cognizance of "newly-discovered process only requires that the party be given the
evidence" without the same having been testified on and opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the case of
offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the Sahali v. COMELEC:31
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay
and the photocopy of the Certification from the Bureau of The petitioners should be reminded that due process does
Immigration. She likewise contends that there was a not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply an
violation of her right to due process of law because she opportunity or right to be heard. One may be heard, not
was not given the opportunity to question and present solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps many
controverting evidence. times more creditably and predictable than oral argument,
through pleadings. In administrative proceedings
Her contentions are incorrect. moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are
not strictly applied; administrative process cannot be fully present substantial evidence to prove otherwise. This, the
equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion
Indeed, deprivation of due process cannot be successfully inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her
invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and
on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis supplied) until she can establish that she had availed of the
privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office American citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn
on the ground of citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, renunciation of her American citizenship, she remains to
discoursed as follows: be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible to run
for and hold any elective public office in the
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship Philippines."32 (Emphasis supplied.)
and become eligible for public office, the law requires that
she must have accomplished the following acts: (1) take Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In
the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines moving for the cancellation of petitioner’s COC,
before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in respondent submitted records of the Bureau of
the USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US
of her American citizenship before any public officer passport, and that her status is that of a "balikbayan." At
authorized to administer an oath. this point, the burden of proof shifted to petitioner,
imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent born Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she
complied with the aforesaid requirements. Early on in the has reacquired such status in accordance with the
proceeding, respondent hammered on petitioner’s lack of provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the bare
proof regarding her American citizenship, contending that allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however,
it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, petitioner submitted no proof to support such contention.
specifically denied that she has become either a Neither did she submit any proof as to the inapplicability of
permanent resident or naturalized citizen of the USA. R.A. No. 9225 to her.

Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the
evidence thru a Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, COMELEC En Banc, petitioner admitted that she is a
however, establishing the fact that respondent is a holder holder of a US passport, but she averred that she is only a
of an American passport which she continues to use until dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of
June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his R.A. No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the
allegations. The burden now shifts to respondent to said motion is an Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34 Petitioner she took her oath of allegiance in connection with her
explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque,
her desire and zeal to serve the people and to comply with she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-
rules, even as a superfluity."35 We cannot, however, born Filipino citizen.
subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If petitioner executed
said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is an This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being
admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner presented for the first time before this Court, as it was
cannot claim that she executed it to address the never raised before the COMELEC. For another, said oath
observations by the COMELEC as the assailed of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec.
Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the 3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met
Affidavit was executed in September 2012. as prescribed by Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01,
otherwise known as the Rules Governing Philippine
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum
footnote to her oath of office as Provincial Administrator, Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and
to this effect: "This does not mean that Petitioner did not, Administrative Order No. 91, Series of 2004 issued by the
prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath of office as
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath
reacquisition of natural-born Filipino status, which she of allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
reserves to present in the proper proceeding. The
reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt
reference to what is already part of the records and was clearly cast on petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner,
evidence in the present case and to avoid injecting into however, failed to clear such doubt.
the records evidence on matters of fact that was not
previously passed upon by Respondent As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding
COMELEC."36 This statement raises a lot of questions – that petitioner has lost her natural-born status, we quote
Did petitioner execute an oath of allegiance for re- with approval the ruling of the COMELEC First Division
acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of
did she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the Marinduque:
COMELEC? And is this an admission that she has indeed
lost her natural-born Filipino status? "Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized
elsewhere effectively abandons his domicile of origin.
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
required by R.A. No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in
period of his residency shall be counted from the time he support of such findings should be applied with greater
made it his domicile of choice. force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of
the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC —
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that created and explicitly made independent by the
petitioner had already re-acquired her Filipino citizenship Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory
pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that she has administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers
regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no to ascertain the true results of the election by means
proof that petitioner had renounced her American available to it. For the attainment of that end, it is not
citizenship, it follows that she has not abandoned her strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1
domicile of choice in the USA.
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she discretion" which warrants this Court’s exercise of
has met the one-year residency requirement of the law certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined meaning. Guidance
and never abandoned her domicile of origin in Boac, is found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where the
Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Court held:
Administrator of the province from January 18, 2011 to
July 13, 2011. But such fact alone is not sufficient to prove x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave
her one-year residency. For, petitioner has never regained abuse of discretion is alleged and proved to exist. "Grave
her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a specific
American citizen. No amount of her stay in the said meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power
locality can substitute the fact that she has not abandoned due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the
her domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis supplied.) whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of power that
amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of
cancellation of the COC is summary in nature, the law. For an act to be struck down as having been done
COMELEC is given much discretion in the evaluation and with grave abuse of discretion, the abuse of discretion
admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)
determining of whether or not the COC should be
cancelled. We held in Mastura v. COMELEC: 38 Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately
and substantially show that grave abuse of discretion
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will exists.
not be disturbed by courts of justice except when there is
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JAIME S.
the COMELEC in enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. TY, Respondents.
9225, insofar as it adds to the qualifications of Members of
the House of Representatives other than those DECISION
enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We
find the same meritless. CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rules
candidates for the House of Representatives who have 641 and 652 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to
acquired foreign citizenship. It merely applied the annul and set aside the Resolution3 dated 31 July 2007 of
qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the the First Division of public respondent Commission on
1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a natural- Elections (COMELEC) and the Resolution4 dated 28
born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year September 2007 of COMELEC en banc, in SPA No. 07-
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the 568, for having been rendered with grave abuse of
case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No.
9225 to determine if she reacquired her status as a Both petitioner Manuel B. Japzon (Japzon) and private
natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied the respondent Jaime S. Ty (Ty) were candidates for the
constitutional provision and nothing more. Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur,
Eastern Samar, in the local elections held on 14 May
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is 2007.
DISMISSED, finding no grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Commission on Elections. The 14 May 2013 On 15 June 2007, Japzon instituted SPA No. 07-568 by
Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 filing before the COMELEC a Petition5 to disqualify and/or
March 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is cancel Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of
upheld. material misrepresentation. Japzon averred in his Petition
that Ty was a former natural-born Filipino, having been
SO ORDERED. born on 9 October 1943 in what was then Pambujan Sur,
Hernani Eastern Samar (now the Municipality of General
G.R. No. 180088               January 19, 2009 Macarthur, Easter Samar) to spouses Ang Chim Ty (a
Chinese) and Crisanta Aranas Sumiguin (a Filipino). Ty
MANUEL B. JAPZON, Petitioner, eventually migrated to the United States of America (USA)
vs. and became a citizen thereof. Ty had been residing in the
USA for the last 25 years. When Ty filed his Certificate of March 2007, he already performed the following acts: (1)
Candidacy on 28 March 2007, he falsely represented with the enactment of Republic Act No. 9225, granting
therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, Ty filed with the
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before Philippine Consulate General in Los Angeles, California,
14 May 2007, and was not a permanent resident or USA, an application for the reacquisition of his Philippine
immigrant of any foreign country. While Ty may have citizenship; (2) on 2 October 2005, Ty executed an Oath
applied for the reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship, of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines before
he never actually resided in Barangay 6, Poblacion, Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for a period of one General in Los Angeles, California, USA; (3) Ty applied
year immediately preceding the date of election as for a Philippine passport indicating in his application that
required under Section 39 of Republic Act No. 7160, his residence in the Philippines was at A. Mabini St.,
otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
In fact, even after filing his application for reacquisition of Samar. Ty’s application was approved and he was issued
his Philippine citizenship, Ty continued to make trips to on 26 October 2005 a Philippine passport; (4) on 8 March
the USA, the most recent of which was on 31 October 2006, Ty personally secured and signed his Community
2006 lasting until 20 January 2007. Moreover, although Ty Tax Certificate (CTC) from the Municipality of General
already took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Macarthur, in which he stated that his address was at
Philippines, he continued to comport himself as an Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
American citizen as proven by his travel records. He had Samar; (5) thereafter, on 17 July 2006, Ty was registered
also failed to renounce his foreign citizenship as required as a voter in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6, Poblacion,
by Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the General Macarthur, Eastern Samar; (6) Ty secured
Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003, or another CTC dated 4 January 2007 again stating therein
related laws. Hence, Japzon prayed for in his Petition that his address as Barangay 6, Poblacion, General
the COMELEC order the disqualification of Ty from Macarthur, Eastern Samar; and (7) finally, Ty executed on
running for public office and the cancellation of the latter’s 19 March 2007 a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign
Certificate of Candidacy. Citizenship. Given the aforementioned facts, Ty argued
that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship and
In his Answer6 to Japzon’s Petition in SPA No. 07-568, Ty renounced his American citizenship, and he had been a
admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern
the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized Samar, for more than one year prior to the 14 May 2007
American citizen. Ty claimed, however, that prior to filing elections. Therefore, Ty sought the dismissal of Japzon’s
his Certificate of Candidacy for the Office of Mayor of the Petition in SPA No. 07-568.
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28
Pending the submission by the parties of their respective Certificate of Candidacy that he was a resident of
Position Papers in SPA No. 07-568, the 14 May 2007 Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
elections were already held. Ty acquired the highest Samar, for at least one year before the elections on 14
number of votes and was declared Mayor of the May 2007. It reasoned that:
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers on 15 May 2007. 7 Although [Ty] has lost his domicile in [the] Philippines
when he was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1969, the
Following the submission of the Position Papers of both reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship and subsequent
parties, the COMELEC First Division rendered its acts thereof proved that he has been a resident of
Resolution8 dated 31 July 2007 in favor of Ty. Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar for at least one (1) year before the elections held
The COMELEC First Division found that Ty complied with on 14 May 2007 as he represented in his certificate of
the requirements of Sections 3 and 5 of Republic Act No. candidacy[.]
9225 and reacquired his Philippine citizenship, to wit:
As held in Coquilla vs. Comelec:
Philippine citizenship is an indispensable requirement for
holding an elective public office, and the purpose of the "The term ‘residence’ is to be understood not in its
citizenship qualification is none other than to ensure that common acceptation as referring to ‘dwelling’ or
no alien, i.e., no person owing allegiance to another ‘habitation,’ but rather to ‘domicile’ or legal residence, that
nation, shall govern our people and our country or a unit is, ‘the place where a party actually or constructively has
of territory thereof. Evidences revealed that [Ty] executed his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may
an Oath of Allegiance before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Consul be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
of the Philippine Consulate General, Los Angeles, and remain (animus manendi).’ A domicile of origin is
California, U.S.A. on October 2, 2005 and executed a acquired by every person at birth. It is usually the place
Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship on March 19, 2007 in where the child’s parents reside and continues until the
compliance with R.A. [No.] 9225. Moreover, neither is [Ty] same is abandoned by acquisition of new domicile
a candidate for or occupying public office nor is in active (domicile of choice).
service as commissioned or non-commissioned officer in
the armed forces in the country of which he was In the case at bar, petitioner lost his domicile of origin in
naturalized citizen.9 Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S.
Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000,
The COMELEC First Division also held that Ty did not when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, petitioner was
commit material misrepresentation in stating in his an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save
as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as With more reason then does naturalization in a foreign
a visitor or as a resident alien. country result in an abandonment of domicile in the
Philippines.
Indeed, residence in the United States is a requirement for
naturalization as a U.S. citizen. Title 8, §1427(a) of the Records showed that after taking an Oath of Allegiance
United States Code provides: before the Vice Consul of the Philippine Consulate
General on October 2, 2005, [Ty] applied and was issued
Requirements of naturalization: Residence a Philippine passport on October 26, 2005; and secured a
community tax certificate from the Municipality of General
(a) No person, except as otherwise provided in this Macarthur on March 8, 2006. Evidently, [Ty] was already a
subchapter, shall be naturalized unless such applicant, (1) resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
year immediately preceding the date of filing his Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year before the
application for naturalization has resided continuously, elections on May 14, 2007.10 (Emphasis ours.)
after being lawfully admitted for permanent residence,
within the United States for at least five years and during The dispositive portion of the 31 July 2007 Resolution of
the five years immediately preceding the date of filing his the COMELEC First Division, thus, reads:
petition has been physically present therein for periods
totaling at least half of that time, and who has resided WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
within the State or within the district of the Service in the DENIED for lack of merit.11
United States in which the applicant filed the application
for at least three months, (2) has resided continuously Japzon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing
within the United States from the date of the application Resolution of the COMELEC First Division. On 28
up to the time of admission to citizenship, and (3) during September 2007, the COMELEC en banc issued its
all period referred to in this subsection has been and still Resolution12 denying Japzon’s Motion for Reconsideration
is a person of good moral character, attached to the and affirming the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well First Division, on the basis of the following ratiocination:
disposed to the good order and happiness of the United
States. (Emphasis added) We have held that a Natural born Filipino who obtains
foreign citizenship, and subsequently spurns the same, is
In Caasi v. Court of Appeals, this Court ruled that by clear acts of repatriation a Filipino Citizen and hence
immigration to the United States by virtue of a ‘greencard,’ qualified to run as a candidate for any local post.
which entitles one to reside permanently in that country,
constitutes abandonment of domicile in the Philippines. xxxx
It must be noted that absent any showing of irregularity Failing to obtain a favorable resolution from the
that overturns the prevailing status of a citizen, the COMELEC, Japzon proceeded to file the instant Petition
presumption of regularity remains. Citizenship is an for Certiorari, relying on the following grounds:
important aspect of every individual’s constitutionally
granted rights and privileges. This is essential in A. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED
determining whether one has the right to exercise pre- GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
determined political rights such as the right to vote or the LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
right to be elected to office and as such rights spring from CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY
citizenship. DISREGARDED THE PARAMETERS SET BY LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A NEW
Owing to its primordial importance, it is thus presumed DOMICILE OF CHOICE AND RESIDENCE.14
that every person is a citizen of the country in which he
resides; that citizenship once granted is presumably B. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS COMMITTED
retained unless voluntarily relinquished; and that the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
burden rests upon who alleges a change in citizenship LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
and allegiance to establish the fact. CAPRICIOUSLY, WHIMSICALLY AND WANTONLY
REFUSED TO CANCEL [TY’S] CERTIFICATE OF
Our review of the Motion for Reconsideration shows that it CANDIDACY, AND CONSEQUENTLY DECLARE
does not raise any new or novel issues. The arguments [JAPZON] AS THE DULY ELECTED MAYOR OF GEN.
made therein have already been dissected and MACARTHUR, EASTERN SAMAR.15
expounded upon extensively by the first Division of the
Commission, and there appears to be no reason to depart Japzon argues that when Ty became a naturalized
from the wisdom of the earlier resolution. We thus affirm American citizen, he lost his domicile of origin. Ty did not
that [Ty] did not commit any material misrepresentation establish his residence in the Municipality of General
when he accomplished his Certificate of Candidacy. The Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, just because he
only ground for denial of a Certificate of Candidacy would reacquired his Philippine citizenship. The burden falls
be when there was material misrepresentation meant to upon Ty to prove that he established a new domicile of
mislead the electorate as to the qualifications of the choice in General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, a burden
candidate. There was none in this case, thus there is not which he failed to discharge. Ty did not become a resident
enough reason to deny due course to the Certificate of of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by merely
Candidacy of Respondent James S. Ty. 13 executing the Oath of Allegiance under Republic Act No.
9225.
Therefore, Japzon asserts that Ty did not meet the one- Eastern Samar, is indeed disqualified from running in the
year residency requirement for running as a mayoralty local elections, Japzon as the second placer in the same
candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The one- elections cannot take his place.
year residency requirement for those running for public
office cannot be waived or liberally applied in favor of dual The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), meanwhile, is
citizens. Consequently, Japzon believes he was the only of the position that Ty failed to meet the one-year
remaining candidate for the Office of Mayor of the residency requirement set by law to qualify him to run as a
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, and is mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections.
the only placer in the 14 May 2007 local elections. The OSG opines that Ty was unable to prove that he
intended to remain in the Philippines for good and
Japzon prays for the Court to annul and set aside the ultimately make it his new domicile. Nonetheless, the
Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28 September 2007 OSG still prays for the dismissal of the instant Petition
of the COMELEC First Division and en banc, respectively; considering that Japzon, gathering only the second
to issue a new resolution denying due course to or highest number of votes in the local elections, cannot be
canceling Ty’s Certificate of Candidacy; and to declare declared the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of
Japzon as the duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, even if Ty is found to
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. be disqualified from running for the said position. And
since it took a position adverse to that of the COMELEC,
As expected, Ty sought the dismissal of the present the OSG prays from this Court to allow the COMELEC to
Petition. According to Ty, the COMELEC already found file its own Comment on Japzon’s Petition. The Court,
sufficient evidence to prove that Ty was a resident of the however, no longer acted on this particular prayer of the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one COMELEC, and with the submission of the Memoranda
year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections. The Court by Japzon, Ty, and the OSG, it already submitted the
cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence case for decision.
without violating the well-entrenched rule that findings of
fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court. Ty The Court finds no merit in the Petition at bar.
disputes Japzon’s assertion that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in rendering the There is no dispute that Ty was a natural-born Filipino. He
assailed Resolutions, and avers that the said Resolutions was born and raised in the Municipality of General
were based on the evidence presented by the parties and Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. However, he left
consistent with prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. to work in the USA and eventually became an American
Even assuming that Ty, the winning candidate for the citizen. On 2 October 2005, Ty reacquired his Philippine
Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, citizenship by taking his Oath of Allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines before Noemi T. Diaz, Vice Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 reads:
Consul of the Philippine Consulate General in Los
Angeles, California, USA, in accordance with the SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. – Those
provisions of Republic Act No. 9225.16 At this point, Ty still who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this
held dual citizenship, i.e., American and Philippine. It was Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject
only on 19 March 2007 that Ty renounced his American to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under
citizenship before a notary public and, resultantly, became existing laws of the Philippines and the following
a pure Philippine citizen again. conditions:

It bears to point out that Republic Act No. 9225 governs xxxx
the manner in which a natural-born Filipino may reacquire
or retain17 his Philippine citizenship despite acquiring a (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines
foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office
liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of as required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at
said statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a
the matter of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign
advantage of its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 citizenship before any public officer authorized to
imposes no residency requirement for the reacquisition or administer an oath.
retention of Philippine citizenship; nor does it mention any
effect of such reacquisition or retention of Philippine Breaking down the afore-quoted provision, for a natural
citizenship on the current residence of the concerned born Filipino, who reacquired or retained his Philippine
natural-born Filipino. Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public
citizenship independently of residence. This is only logical office, he must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such
and consistent with the general intent of the law to allow public office as required by the Constitution and existing
for dual citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may laws; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of
hold, at the same time, both Philippine and foreign any and all foreign citizenships before any public officer
citizenships, he may establish residence either in the authorized to administer an oath.
Philippines or in the foreign country of which he is also a
citizen. That Ty complied with the second requirement is beyond
question. On 19 March 2007, he personally executed a
Residency in the Philippines only becomes relevant when Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship before a notary
the natural-born Filipino with dual citizenship decides to public. By the time he filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
run for public office. the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, on 28 March 2007, he had (c) Candidates for the position of mayor or vice mayor of
already effectively renounced his American citizenship, independent component cities, component cities, or
keeping solely his Philippine citizenship. municipalities must be at least twenty-one (21) years of
age on election day.
The other requirement of Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
9225 pertains to the qualifications required by the The challenge against Ty’s qualification to run as a
Constitution and existing laws. candidate for the Office of Mayor of the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, centers on his
Article X, Section 3 of the Constitution left it to Congress purported failure to meet the one-year residency
to enact a local government code which shall provide, requirement in the said municipality.
among other things, for the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and The term "residence" is to be understood not in its
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters common acceptation as referring to "dwelling" or
relating to the organization and operation of the local "habitation," but rather to "domicile" or legal residence,
units. that is, "the place where a party actually or constructively
has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he
Pursuant to the foregoing mandate, Congress enacted may be found at any given time, eventually intends to
Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Government Code of return and remain (animus manendi)."18
1991, Section 39 of which lays down the following
qualifications for local elective officials: A domicile of origin is acquired by every person at birth. It
is usually the place where the child’s parents reside and
SEC. 39. Qualifications. – (a) An elective local official continues until the same is abandoned by acquisition of
must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in new domicile (domicile of choice). In Coquilla,19 the Court
the barangay, municipality, city or province or, in the case already acknowledged that for an individual to acquire
of a member of the sangguniang panlalawigan, American citizenship, he must establish residence in the
sangguniang panlungsod, or sanggunian bayan, the USA. Since Ty himself admitted that he became a
district where he intends to be elected; a resident therein naturalized American citizen, then he must have
for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the day of necessarily abandoned the Municipality of General
the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, as his domicile of
other local language or dialect. origin; and transferred to the USA, as his domicile of
choice.
xxxx
As has already been previously discussed by this Court of Appeals, this Court set aside the appealed orders of the
herein, Ty’s reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship COMELEC and the Court of Appeals and annulled the
under Republic Act No. 9225 had no automatic impact or election of the respondent as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao,
effect on his residence/domicile. He could still retain his Pangasinan on the ground that respondent’s immigration
domicile in the USA, and he did not necessarily regain his to the United States in 1984 constituted an abandonment
domicile in the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. Being a
Samar, Philippines. Ty merely had the option to again green card holder, which was proof that he was a
establish his domicile in the Municipality of General permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, and
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines, said place in the absence of any waiver of his status as such before
becoming his new domicile of choice. The length of his he ran for election on January 18, 1988, respondent was
residence therein shall be determined from the time he held to be disqualified under §68 of the Omnibus Election
made it his domicile of choice, and it shall not retroact to Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881).
the time of his birth.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
How then could it be established that Ty indeed Representatives, respondent Jose Ong, Jr. was
established a new domicile in the Municipality of General proclaimed the duly elected representative of the 2nd
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines? District of Northern Samar. The House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) upheld his election against
In Papandayan, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,20 the claims that he was not a natural born Filipino citizen and a
Court provided a summation of the different principles and resident of Laoang, Northern Samar. In sustaining the
concepts in jurisprudence relating to the residency ruling of the HRET, this Court, citing Faypon v. Quirino,
qualification for elective local officials. Pertinent portions of applied the concept of animus revertendi or "intent to
the ratio in Papandayan are reproduced below: return," stating that his absence from his residence in
order to pursue studies or practice his profession as a
Our decisions have applied certain tests and concepts in certified public accountant in Manila or his registration as
resolving the issue of whether or not a candidate has a voter other than in the place where he was elected did
complied with the residency requirement for elective not constitute loss of residence. The fact that respondent
positions. The principle of animus revertendi has been made periodical journeys to his home province in Laoag
used to determine whether a candidate has an "intention revealed that he always had animus revertendi.
to return" to the place where he seeks to be elected.
Corollary to this is a determination whether there has In Abella v. Commission on Elections and Larrazabal v.
been an "abandonment" of his former residence which Commission on Elections, it was explained that the
signifies an intention to depart therefrom. In Caasi v. Court determination of a person’s legal residence or domicile
largely depends upon the intention that may be inferred petitioner Philip G. Romualdez established his residence
from his acts, activities, and utterances. In that case, during the early 1980’s in Barangay Malbog, Tolosa,
petitioner Adelina Larrazabal, who had obtained the Leyte. It was held that the sudden departure from the
highest number of votes in the local elections of February country of petitioner, because of the EDSA People’s
1, 1988 and who had thus been proclaimed as the duly Power Revolution of 1986, to go into self-exile in the
elected governor, was disqualified by the COMELEC for United States until favorable conditions had been
lack of residence and registration qualifications, not being established, was not voluntary so as to constitute an
a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte. The abandonment of residence. The Court explained that in
COMELEC ruled that the attempt of petitioner Larrazabal order to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must
to change her residence one year before the election by concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
registering at Kananga, Leyte to qualify her to run for the locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
position of governor of the province of Leyte was proof intention to abandon the old domicile. There must be
that she considered herself a resident of Ormoc City. This animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
Court affirmed the ruling of the COMELEC and held that purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
petitioner Larrazabal had established her residence in for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
Ormoc City, not in Kananga, Leyte, from 1975 up to the must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
time that she ran for the position of Provincial Governor of for the new domicile must be actual.
Leyte on February 1, 1988. There was no evidence to
show that she and her husband maintained separate Ultimately, the Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr. that
residences, i.e., she at Kananga, Leyte and her husband it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in
at Ormoc City. The fact that she occasionally visited determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the
Kananga, Leyte through the years did not signify an residency qualification requirement.
intention to continue her residence after leaving that
place. As espoused by Ty, the issue of whether he complied with
the one-year residency requirement for running for public
In Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, the Court held office is a question of fact. Its determination requires the
that "domicile" and "residence" are synonymous. The term Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
"residence," as used in the election law, imports not only probative value of the evidence presented by the parties
an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal before the COMELEC.
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent The COMELEC, taking into consideration the very same
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, pieces of evidence presently before this Court, found that
or for like reasons, one intends to return. In that case, Ty was a resident of the Municipality of General
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, one year prior to the 14 May reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
2007 local elections. It is axiomatic that factual findings of conclusion.23
administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which
have acquired expertise in their field are binding and The assailed Resolutions dated 31 July 2007 and 28
conclusive on the Court. An application for certiorari September 2007 of the COMELEC First Division and en
against actions of the COMELEC is confined to instances banc, respectively, were both supported by substantial
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon this
substantial denial of due process, considering that the Court.
COMELEC is presumed to be most competent in matters
falling within its domain.21 Ty’s intent to establish a new domicile of choice in the
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
The Court even went further to say that the rule that Philippines, became apparent when, immediately after
factual findings of administrative bodies will not be reacquiring his Philippine citizenship on 2 October 2005,
disturbed by courts of justice, except when there is he applied for a Philippine passport indicating in his
absolutely no evidence or no substantial evidence in application that his residence in the Philippines was at A.
support of such findings, should be applied with greater Mabini St., Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur,
force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of Eastern Samar. For the years 2006 and 2007, Ty
the Constitution intended to place the COMELEC— voluntarily submitted himself to the local tax jurisdiction of
created and explicitly made independent by the the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by
Constitution itself—on a level higher than statutory paying community tax and securing CTCs from the said
administrative organs. The factual finding of the municipality stating therein his address as A. Mabini St.,
COMELEC en banc is therefore binding on the Court. 22 Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern
Samar. Thereafter, Ty applied for and was registered as a
The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have voter on 17 July 2006 in Precinct 0013A, Barangay 6,
acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
their jurisdiction are accorded by this Court not only
respect but even finality if they are supported by In addition, Ty has also been bodily present in the
substantial evidence. Only substantial, not Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
preponderance, of evidence is necessary. Section 5, Rule Philippines, since his arrival on 4 May 2006, inarguably,
133 of the Rules of Court provides that in cases filed just a little over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local
before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may elections. Japzon maintains that Ty’s trips abroad during
be deemed established if it is supported by substantial said period, i.e., to Bangkok, Thailand (from 14 to 18 July
evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a 2006), and to the USA (from 31 October 2006 to 19
January 2007), indicate that Ty had no intention to Aquino v. COMELEC,25 the Court did not find anything
permanently reside in the Municipality of General wrong in an individual changing residences so he could
Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines. The COMELEC run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove
First Division and en banc, as well as this Court, however, with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of
view these trips differently. The fact that Ty did come back residence for election law purposes for the period required
to the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by law. As this Court already found in the present case, Ty
Philippines, after said trips, is a further manifestation of his has proven by substantial evidence that he had
animus manendi and animus revertendi. established residence/domicile in the Municipality of
General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, by 4 May 2006, a little
There is no basis for this Court to require Ty to stay in and over a year prior to the 14 May 2007 local elections, in
never leave at all the Municipality of General Macarthur, which he ran as a candidate for the Office of the Mayor
Eastern Samar, for the full one-year period prior to the 14 and in which he garnered the most number of votes.
May 2007 local elections so that he could be considered a
resident thereof. To the contrary, the Court has previously Finally, when the evidence of the alleged lack of residence
ruled that absence from residence to pursue studies or qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak
practice a profession or registration as a voter other than or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of
in the place where one is elected, does not constitute loss the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s
of residence.24 The Court also notes, that even with his right to the office, the will of the electorate should be
trips to other countries, Ty was actually present in the respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. 26 To
Philippines, for at least nine of the 12 months preceding successfully challenge Ty’s disqualification, Japzon must
the 14 May 2007 local elections. Even if length of actual clearly demonstrate that Ty’s ineligibility is so patently
stay in a place is not necessarily determinative of the fact antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that
of residence therein, it does strongly support and is only overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the
consistent with Ty’s avowed intent in the instant case to apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater
establish residence/domicile in the Municipality of General prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic
Macarthur, Eastern Samar. traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously
protect and promote. In this case, Japzon failed to
Japzon repeatedly brings to the attention of this Court that substantiate his claim that Ty is ineligible to be Mayor of
Ty arrived in the Municipality of General Macarthur, the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
Eastern Samar, on 4 May 2006 only to comply with the Philippines.
one-year residency requirement, so Ty could run as a
mayoralty candidate in the 14 May 2007 elections. In
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition FACTS
for Certiorari is DISMISSED.
Respondent Arnado is a natural born Filipino
SO ORDERED. citizen.3 However, as a consequence of his subsequent
naturalization as a citizen of the United States of America,
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO he lost his Filipino citizenship. Arnado applied for
Associate Justice repatriation under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 before the
Consulate General of the Philippines in San Franciso,
G.R. No. 195649               April 16, 2013 USA and took the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines on 10 July 2008.4 On the same day an
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING, Petitioner, Order of Approval of his Citizenship Retention and Re-
vs. acquisition was issued in his favor.5
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ROMMEL ARNADO y
CAGOCO, LINOG G. BALUA, Respondents. The aforementioned Oath of Allegiance states:

DECISION I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, solemnly swear that I will

support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
SERENO, CJ.: Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders
promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the
THE CASE Philippines and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will
This is a Petition for Certiorari ender Rule 64 in maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I
conjunction with Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to review impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 6
(COMELEC). The Resolution1 in SPA No. 10-1 09(DC) of
the COMELEC First Division dated 5 October 201 0 is On 3 April 2009 Arnado again took his Oath of Allegiance
being assailed for applying Section 44 of the Local to the Republic and executed an Affidavit of Renunciation
Government Code while the Resolution2 of the COMELEC of his foreign citizenship, which states:
En Banc dated 2 February 2011 is being questioned for
finding that respondent Rommel Arnado y Cagoco I, Rommel Cagoco Arnado, do solemnly swear that I
(respondent Arnado/Arnado) is solely a Filipino citizen absolutely and perpetually renounce all allegiance and
qualified to run for public office despite his continued use fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA of which I
of a U.S. passport. am a citizen, and I divest myself of full employment of all
civil and political rights and privileges of the United States Respondent Balua contended that Arnado is not a
of America. resident of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and that he is a
foreigner, attaching thereto a certification issued by the
I solemnly swear that all the foregoing statement is true Bureau of Immigration dated 23 April 2010 indicating the
and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 7 nationality of Arnado as "USA-American." 10To further
bolster his claim of Arnado’s US citizenship, Balua
On 30 November 2009, Arnado filed his Certificate of presented in his Memorandum a computer-generated
Candidacy for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte, travel record11 dated 03 December 2009 indicating that
which contains, among others, the following statements: Arnado has been using his US Passport No. 057782700
in entering and departing the Philippines. The said record
I am a natural born Filipino citizen / naturalized Filipino shows that Arnado left the country on 14 April 2009 and
citizen. returned on 25 June 2009, and again departed on 29 July
2009, arriving back in the Philippines on 24 November
I am not a permanent resident of, or immigrant to, a 2009.
foreign country.
Balua likewise presented a certification from the Bureau of
I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected to. Immigration dated 23 April 2010, certifying that the name
"Arnado, Rommel Cagoco" appears in the available
I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic Computer Database/Passenger manifest/IBM listing on
of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and file as of 21 April 2010, with the following pertinent travel
allegiance thereto. I will obey the laws, legal orders and records:
decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities.
DATE OF Arrival : 01/12/2010
I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily without
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. 8 NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN

On 28 April 2010, respondent Linog C. Balua (Balua), PASSPORT : 057782700

another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his certificate of candidacy for DATE OF Arrival : 03/23/2010
municipal mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in
connection with the 10 May 2010 local and national NATIONALITY : USA-AMERICAN
elections.9
PASSPORT : 05778270012
On 30 April 2010, the COMELEC (First Division) issued resident of his barangay and that Arnado went to
an Order13 requiring the respondent to personally file his the United States in 1985 to work and returned to
answer and memorandum within three (3) days from the Philippines in 2009;
receipt thereof.
4. Certification dated 31 May 2010 from the
After Arnado failed to answer the petition, Balua moved to Municipal Local Government Operations Office of
declare him in default and to present evidence ex-parte. Kauswagan stating that Dr. Maximo P. Arnado, Sr.
served as Mayor of Kauswagan, from January
Neither motion was acted upon, having been overtaken by 1964 to June 1974 and from 15 February 1979 to
the 2010 elections where Arnado garnered the highest 15 April 1986; and
number of votes and was subsequently proclaimed as the
winning candidate for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del 5. Voter Certification issued by the Election Officer
Norte. of Kauswagan certifying that Arnado has been a
registered voter of Kauswagan since 03 April 2009.
It was only after his proclamation that Arnado filed his
verified answer, submitting the following documents as THE RULING OF THE COMELEC FIRST DIVISION
evidence:14
Instead of treating the Petition as an action for the
1. Affidavit of Renunciation and Oath of Allegiance cancellation of a certificate of candidacy based on
to the Republic of the Philippines dated 03 April misrepresentation,15 the COMELEC First Division
2009; considered it as one for disqualification. Balua’s
contention that Arnado is a resident of the United States
2. Joint-Affidavit dated 31 May 2010 of Engr. Virgil was dismissed upon the finding that "Balua failed to
Seno, Virginia Branzuela, Leoncio Daligdig, and present any evidence to support his
Jessy Corpin, all neighbors of Arnado, attesting contention,"16 whereas the First Division still could "not
that Arnado is a long-time resident of Kauswagan conclude that Arnado failed to meet the one-year
and that he has been conspicuously and residency requirement under the Local Government
continuously residing in his family’s ancestral Code."17
house in Kauswagan;
In the matter of the issue of citizenship, however, the First
3. Certification from the Punong Barangay of Division disagreed with Arnado’s claim that he is a Filipino
Poblacion, Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte dated 03 citizen.18
June 2010 stating that Arnado is a bona fide
We find that although Arnado appears to have Nore is hereby ANNULLED. Let the order of succession
substantially complied with the requirements of R.A. No. under Section 44 of the Local Government Code of 1991
9225, Arnado’s act of consistently using his US passport take effect.20
after renouncing his US citizenship on 03 April 2009
effectively negated his Affidavit of Renunciation. The Motion for Reconsideration and
the Motion for Intervention
xxxx
Arnado sought reconsideration of the resolution before the
Arnado’s continued use of his US passport is a strong COMELEC En Banc on the ground that "the evidence is
indication that Arnado had no real intention to renounce insufficient to justify the Resolution and that the said
his US citizenship and that he only executed an Affidavit Resolution is contrary to law."21 He raised the following
of Renunciation to enable him to run for office. We cannot contentions:22
turn a blind eye to the glaring inconsistency between
Arnado’s unexplained use of a US passport six times and 1. The finding that he is not a Filipino citizen is not
his claim that he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship and supported by the evidence consisting of his Oath of
renounced his US citizenship. As noted by the Supreme Allegiance and the Affidavit of Renunciation, which
Court in the Yu case, "a passport is defined as an official show that he has substantially complied with the
document of identity and nationality issued to a person requirements of R.A. No. 9225;
intending to travel or sojourn in foreign countries." Surely,
one who truly divested himself of US citizenship would not 2. The use of his US passport subsequent to his
continue to avail of privileges reserved solely for US renunciation of his American citizenship is not
nationals.19 tantamount to a repudiation of his Filipino
citizenship, as he did not perform any act to swear
The dispositive portion of the Resolution rendered by the allegiance to a country other than the Philippines;
COMELEC
3. He used his US passport only because he was
First Division reads: not informed of the issuance of his Philippine
passport, and that he used his Philippine passport
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for after he obtained it;
disqualification and/or to cancel the certificate of
candidacy of Rommel C. Arnado is hereby GRANTED. 4. Balua’s petition to cancel the certificate of
Rommel C. Arnado’s proclamation as the winning candidacy of Arnado was filed out of time, and the
candidate for Municipal Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del First Division’s treatment of the petition as one for
 disqualification constitutes grave abuse of Maquiling, claiming that intervention is prohibited after a
discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction;23 decision has already been rendered, and that as a
second-placer, Maquiling undoubtedly lost the elections
5. He is undoubtedly the people’s choice as and thus does not stand to be prejudiced or benefitted by
indicated by his winning the elections; the final adjudication of the case.

6. His proclamation as the winning candidate RULING OF THE COMELEC EN BANC

ousted the COMELEC from jurisdiction over the
case; and In its Resolution of 02 February 2011, the COMELEC En
Banc held that under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646,
7. The proper remedy to question his citizenship is the Commission "shall continue with the trial and hearing
through a petition for quo warranto, which should of the action, inquiry or protest even after the proclamation
have been filed within ten days from his of the candidate whose qualifications for office is
proclamation. questioned."

Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling (Maquiling), another As to Maquiling’s intervention, the COMELEC En Banc
candidate for mayor of Kauswagan, and who garnered the also cited Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which allows
second highest number of votes in the 2010 elections, intervention in proceedings for disqualification even after
intervened in the case and filed before the COMELEC En elections if no final judgment has been rendered, but went
Banc a Motion for Reconsideration together with an on further to say that Maquiling, as the second placer,
Opposition to Arnado’s Amended Motion for would not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case as it
Reconsideration. Maquiling argued that while the First agrees with the dispositive portion of the Resolution of the
Division correctly disqualified Arnado, the order of First Division allowing the order of succession under
succession under Section 44 of the Local Government Section 44 of the Local Government Code to take effect.
Code is not applicable in this case. Consequently, he
claimed that the cancellation of Arnado’s candidacy and The COMELEC En Banc agreed with the treatment by the
the nullification of his proclamation, Maquiling, as the First Division of the petition as one for disqualification, and
legitimate candidate who obtained the highest number of ruled that the petition was filed well within the period
lawful votes, should be proclaimed as the winner. prescribed by law,24 having been filed on 28 April 2010,
which is not later than 11 May 2010, the date of
Maquiling simultaneously filed his Memorandum with his proclamation.
Motion for Intervention and his Motion for
Reconsideration. Arnado opposed all motions filed by
However, the COMELEC En Banc reversed and set aside apply for a US passport after his renunciation. Thus the
the ruling of the First Division and granted Arnado’s mentioned case is not on all fours with the case at bar.
Motion for Reconsideration, on the following premises:
xxxx
First:
The respondent presented a plausible explanation as to
By renouncing his US citizenship as imposed by R.A. No. the use of his US passport. Although he applied for a
9225, the respondent embraced his Philippine citizenship Philippine passport, the passport was only issued on June
as though he never became a citizen of another country. It 18, 2009. However, he was not notified of the issuance of
was at that time, April 3, 2009, that the respondent his Philippine passport so that he was actually able to get
became a pure Philippine Citizen again. it about three (3) months later. Yet as soon as he was in
possession of his Philippine passport, the respondent
xxxx already used the same in his subsequent travels abroad.
This fact is proven by the respondent’s submission of a
The use of a US passport … does not operate to revert certified true copy of his passport showing that he used
back his status as a dual citizen prior to his renunciation the same for his travels on the following dates: January
as there is no law saying such. More succinctly, the use of 31, 2010, April 16, 2010, May 20, 2010, January 12, 2010,
a US passport does not operate to "un-renounce" what he March 31, 2010 and June 4, 2010. This then shows that
has earlier on renounced. The First Division’s reliance in the use of the US passport was because to his
the case of In Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Willy Yu knowledge, his Philippine passport was not yet issued to
v. Defensor-Santiago, et al. is misplaced. The petitioner in him for his use. As probably pressing needs might be
the said case is a naturalized citizen who, after taking his undertaken, the respondent used whatever is within his
oath as a naturalized Filipino, applied for the renewal of control during that time.25
his Portuguese passport. Strict policy is maintained in the
conduct of citizens who are not natural born, who acquire In his Separate Concurring Opinion, COMELEC Chairman
their citizenship by choice, thus discarding their original Sixto Brillantes cited that the use of foreign passport is not
citizenship. The Philippine State expects strict conduct of one of the grounds provided for under Section 1 of
allegiance to those who choose to be its citizens. In the Commonwealth Act No. 63 through which Philippine
present case, respondent is not a naturalized citizen but a citizenship may be lost.
natural born citizen who chose greener pastures by
working abroad and then decided to repatriate to "The application of the more assimilative principle of
supposedly help in the progress of Kauswagan. He did not continuity of citizenship is more appropriate in this case.
Under said principle, once a person becomes a citizen,
either by birth or naturalization, it is assumed that he mayoralty post cure the latter’s failure to comply with the
desires to continue to be a citizen, and this assumption qualification requirements regarding his citizenship.
stands until he voluntarily denationalizes or expatriates
himself. Thus, in the instant case respondent after Since a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the
reacquiring his Philippine citizenship should be presumed eyes of the law, his having received the highest number of
to have remained a Filipino despite his use of his votes does not validate his election. It has been held that
American passport in the absence of clear, unequivocal where a petition for disqualification was filed before
and competent proof of expatriation. Accordingly, all election against a candidate but was adversely resolved
doubts should be resolved in favor of retention of against him after election, his having obtained the highest
citizenship."26 number of votes did not make his election valid. His ouster
from office does not violate the principle of vox populi
On the other hand, Commissioner Rene V. Sarmiento suprema est lex because the application of the
dissented, thus: constitutional and statutory provisions on disqualification
is not a matter of popularity. To apply it is to breath[e] life
Respondent evidently failed to prove that he truly and to the sovereign will of the people who expressed it when
wholeheartedly abandoned his allegiance to the United they ratified the Constitution and when they elected their
States. The latter’s continued use of his US passport and representatives who enacted the law. 27
enjoyment of all the privileges of a US citizen despite his
previous renunciation of the afore-mentioned citizenship THE PETITION BEFORE THE COURT
runs contrary to his declaration that he chose to retain
only his Philippine citizenship. Respondent’s submission Maquiling filed the instant petition questioning the
with the twin requirements was obviously only for the propriety of declaring Arnado qualified to run for public
purpose of complying with the requirements for running for office despite his continued use of a US passport, and
the mayoralty post in connection with the May 10, 2010 praying that Maquiling be proclaimed as the winner in the
Automated National and Local Elections. 2010 mayoralty race in Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte.

Qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, are Ascribing both grave abuse of discretion and reversible
continuing requirements; once any of them is lost during error on the part of the COMELEC En Banc for ruling that
his incumbency, title to the office itself is deemed forfeited. Arnado is a Filipino citizen despite his continued use of a
If a candidate is not a citizen at the time he ran for office US passport, Maquiling now seeks to reverse the finding
or if he lost his citizenship after his election to office, he is of the COMELEC En Banc that Arnado is qualified to run
disqualified to serve as such. Neither does the fact that for public office.
respondent obtained the plurality of votes for the
Corollary to his plea to reverse the ruling of the there has not yet been any
COMELEC En Banc or to affirm the First Division’s proclamation of the winner.
disqualification of Arnado, Maquiling also seeks the review
of the applicability of Section 44 of the Local Government Petitioner Casan Macode Maquiling intervened at the
Code, claiming that the COMELEC committed reversible stage when respondent Arnado filed a Motion for
error in ruling that "the succession of the vice mayor in Reconsideration of the First Division Resolution before the
case the respondent is disqualified is in order." COMELEC En Banc. As the candidate who garnered the
second highest number of votes, Maquiling contends that
There are three questions posed by the parties before this he has an interest in the disqualification case filed against
Court which will be addressed seriatim as the subsequent Arnado, considering that in the event the latter is
questions hinge on the result of the first. disqualified, the votes cast for him should be considered
stray and the second-placer should be proclaimed as the
The first question is whether or not intervention is allowed winner in the elections.
in a disqualification case.
It must be emphasized that while the original petition
The second question is whether or not the use of a foreign before the COMELEC is one for cancellation of the
passport after renouncing foreign citizenship amounts to certificate of candidacy and / or disqualification, the
undoing a renunciation earlier made. COMELEC First Division and the COMELEC En Banc
correctly treated the petition as one for disqualification.
A better framing of the question though should be whether
or not the use of a foreign passport after renouncing The effect of a disqualification case is enunciated in
foreign citizenship affects one’s qualifications to run for Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646:
public office.
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate
The third question is whether or not the rule on who has been declared by final judgment to be
succession in the Local Government Code is applicable to disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
this case. him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be
OUR RULING disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or
Intervention of a rival candidate in a Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
disqualification case is proper when action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such not be prejudiced by the outcome of the case, does not
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. deprive Maquiling of the right to elevate the matter before
this Court.
Mercado v. Manzano28
Arnado’s claim that the main case has attained finality as
clarified the right of intervention in a disqualification case. the original petitioner and respondents therein have not
In that case, the Court said: appealed the decision of the COMELEC En Banc, cannot
be sustained. The elevation of the case by the intervenor
That petitioner had a right to intervene at that stage of the prevents it from attaining finality. It is only after this Court
proceedings for the disqualification against private has ruled upon the issues raised in this instant petition
respondent is clear from Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, that the disqualification case originally filed by Balua
otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, against Arnado will attain finality.
which provides: Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and The use of foreign passport after renouncing one’s
the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment representation as to one’s nationality and citizenship;
before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by
and receives the winning number of votes in such repatriation but it recants the Oath of Renunciation
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the required to qualify one to run for an elective position.
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and,
upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may Section 5(2) of The Citizenship Retention and Re-
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the acquisition Act of 2003 provides:
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
guilt is strong. Under this provision, intervention may be Those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
allowed in proceedings for disqualification even after under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
election if there has yet been no final judgment be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities
rendered.29 under existing laws of the Philippines and the following
conditions:
Clearly then, Maquiling has the right to intervene in the
case. The fact that the COMELEC En Banc has already xxxx
ruled that Maquiling has not shown that the requisites for
the exemption to the second-placer rule set forth in (2)Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall
Sinsuat v. COMELEC30 are present and therefore would meet the qualification for holding such public office as
required by the Constitution and existing laws and, at the However, this legal presumption does not operate
time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a permanently and is open to attack when, after renouncing
personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign the foreign citizenship, the citizen performs positive acts
before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. showing his continued possession of a foreign
citizenship.33
x x x31
Arnado himself subjected the issue of his citizenship to
Rommel Arnado took all the necessary steps to qualify to attack when, after renouncing his foreign citizenship, he
run for a public office. He took the Oath of Allegiance and continued to use his US passport to travel in and out of
renounced his foreign citizenship. There is no question the country before filing his certificate of candidacy on 30
that after performing these twin requirements required November 2009. The pivotal question to determine is
under Section 5(2) of R.A. No. 9225 or the Citizenship whether he was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen at
Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, he became the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, thereby
eligible to run for public office. rendering him eligible to run for public office.

Indeed, Arnado took the Oath of Allegiance not just only Between 03 April 2009, the date he renounced his foreign
once but twice: first, on 10 July 2008 when he applied for citizenship, and 30 November 2009, the date he filed his
repatriation before the Consulate General of the COC, he used his US passport four times, actions that run
Philippines in San Francisco, USA, and again on 03 April counter to the affidavit of renunciation he had earlier
2009 simultaneous with the execution of his Affidavit of executed. By using his foreign passport, Arnado positively
Renunciation. By taking the Oath of Allegiance to the and voluntarily represented himself as an American, in
Republic, Arnado re-acquired his Philippine citizenship. At effect declaring before immigration authorities of both
the time, however, he likewise possessed American countries that he is an American citizen, with all attendant
citizenship. Arnado had therefore become a dual citizen. rights and privileges granted by the United States of
America.
After reacquiring his Philippine citizenship, Arnado
renounced his American citizenship by executing an The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath
Affidavit of Renunciation, thus completing the that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
requirements for eligibility to run for public office. violated the next day. It requires an absolute and
perpetual renunciation of the foreign citizenship and a full
By renouncing his foreign citizenship, he was deemed to divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the
be solely a Filipino citizen, regardless of the effect of such foreign country which granted the citizenship.
renunciation under the laws of the foreign country. 32
Mercado v. Manzano34 already hinted at this situation political rights and privileges of the United States of
when the Court declared: America."38

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will We agree with the COMELEC En Banc that such act of
fulfill his undertaking made under oath. Should he betray using a foreign passport does not divest Arnado of his
that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the Filipino citizenship, which he acquired by repatriation.
loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in However, by representing himself as an American citizen,
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, we Arnado voluntarily and effectively reverted to his earlier
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner status as a dual citizen. Such reversion was not
on the ground that, after taking his oath as a naturalized retroactive; it took place the instant Arnado represented
citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese himself as an American citizen by using his US passport.
passport and declared in commercial documents executed
abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing one’s
sanction can be taken against anyone who, in electing foreign citizenship is fatal to Arnado’s bid for public office,
Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, as it effectively imposed on him a disqualification to run for
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation an elective local position.
of his Philippine citizenship.
Arnado’s category of dual citizenship is that by which
While the act of using a foreign passport is not one of the foreign citizenship is acquired through a positive act of
acts enumerated in Commonwealth Act No. 63 applying for naturalization. This is distinct from those
constituting renunciation and loss of Philippine considered dual citizens by virtue of birth, who are not
citizenship,35 it is nevertheless an act which repudiates the required by law to take the oath of renunciation as the
very oath of renunciation required for a former Filipino mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already carries
citizen who is also a citizen of another country to be with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual
qualified to run for a local elective position. citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required
to take not only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of
When Arnado used his US passport on 14 April 2009, or the Philippines but also to personally renounce foreign
just eleven days after he renounced his American citizenship in order to qualify as a candidate for public
citizenship, he recanted his Oath of Renunciation 36 that he office.
"absolutely and perpetually renounce(s) all allegiance and
fidelity to the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA"37 and that By the time he filed his certificate of candidacy on 30
he "divest(s) himself of full employment of all civil and November 2009, Arnado was a dual citizen enjoying the
rights and privileges of Filipino and American citizenship.
He was qualified to vote, but by the express It was after complying with the requirements that he
disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local performed positive acts which effectively disqualified him
Government Code,40 he was not qualified to run for a local from running for an elective public office pursuant to
elective position. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991.

In effect, Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino The purpose of the Local Government Code in
citizen only for a period of eleven days, or from 3 April disqualifying dual citizens from running for any elective
2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date he first used his public office would be thwarted if we were to allow a
American passport after renouncing his American person who has earlier renounced his foreign citizenship,
citizenship. but who subsequently represents himself as a foreign
citizen, to hold any public office.
This Court has previously ruled that:
Arnado justifies the continued use of his US passport with
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements the explanation that he was not notified of the issuance of
and must be possessed not only at the time of his Philippine passport on 18 June 2009, as a result of
appointment or election or assumption of office but during which he was only able to obtain his Philippine passport
the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required three (3) months later.43
qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged. x x x.41 The COMELEC En Banc differentiated Arnado from Willy
Yu, the Portuguese national who sought naturalization as
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a a Filipino citizen and later applied for the renewal of his
continuing one. It must be possessed not just at the time Portuguese passport. That Arnado did not apply for a US
of the renunciation of the foreign citizenship but passport after his renunciation does not make his use of a
continuously. Any act which violates the oath of US passport less of an act that violated the Oath of
renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack. Renunciation he took. It was still a positive act of
representation as a US citizen before the immigration
We agree with the pronouncement of the COMELEC First officials of this country.
Division that "Arnado’s act of consistently using his US
passport effectively negated his "Affidavit of The COMELEC, in ruling favorably for Arnado, stated
Renunciation."42 This does not mean, that he failed to "Yet, as soon as he was in possession of his Philippine
comply with the twin requirements under R.A. No. 9225, passport, the respondent already used the same in his
for he in fact did. subsequent travels abroad."44 We cannot agree with the
COMELEC. Three months from June is September. If
indeed, Arnado used his Philippine passport as soon as Resolving the third issue necessitates revisiting Topacio v.
he was in possession of it, he would not have used his US Paredes45 which is the jurisprudential spring of the
passport on 24 November 2009. principle that a second-placer cannot be proclaimed as
the winner in an election contest. This doctrine must be
Besides, Arnado’s subsequent use of his Philippine re-examined and its soundness once again put to the test
passport does not correct the fact that after he renounced to address the ever-recurring issue that a second-placer
his foreign citizenship and prior to filing his certificate of who loses to an ineligible candidate cannot be proclaimed
candidacy, he used his US passport. In the same way that as the winner in the elections.
the use of his foreign passport does not undo his Oath of
Renunciation, his subsequent use of his Philippine The Facts of the case are as follows:
passport does not undo his earlier use of his US passport.
On June 4, 1912, a general election was held in the town
Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of of Imus, Province of Cavite, to fill the office of municipal
identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights president. The petitioner, Felipe Topacio, and the
accorded by the state to its citizens. It likewise demands respondent, Maximo Abad, were opposing candidates for
the concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag that office. Topacio received 430 votes, and Abad 281.
and country. While those who acquire dual citizenship by Abad contested the election upon the sole ground that
choice are afforded the right of suffrage, those who seek Topacio was ineligible in that he was reelected the second
election or appointment to public office are required to time to the office of the municipal president on June 4,
renounce their foreign citizenship to be deserving of the 1912, without the four years required by Act No. 2045
public trust. Holding public office demands full and having intervened.46
undivided allegiance to the Republic and to no other.
Abad thus questioned the eligibility of To p a c i o on the
We therefore hold that Arnado, by using his US passport basis of a statutory prohibition for seeking a second re-
after renouncing his American citizenship, has recanted election absent the four year interruption.
the same Oath of Renunciation he took. Section 40(d) of
the Local Government Code applies to his situation. He is The often-quoted phrase in Topacio v. Paredes is that "the
disqualified not only from holding the public office but wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible
even from becoming a candidate in the May 2010 candidate to any other candidate when the sole question
elections. is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the
legally cast ballots."47
We now resolve the next issue.
This phrase is not even the ratio decidendi; it is a mere was the real victor, the former must retire in favor of the
obiter dictum. The Court was comparing "the effect of a latter. In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
decision that a candidate is not entitled to the office contest, as the wreath of victory cannot be transferred
because of fraud or irregularities in the elections x x x with from an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when
that produced by declaring a person ineligible to hold such the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
an office." plurality of the legally cast ballots. In the one case the
question is as to who received a plurality of the legally
The complete sentence where the phrase is found is part cast ballots; in the other, the question is confined to the
of a comparison and contrast between the two situations, personal character and circumstances of a single
thus: individual.48 (Emphasis supplied)

Again, the effect of a decision that a candidate is not Note that the sentence where the phrase is found starts
entitled to the office because of fraud or irregularities in with "In the other case, there is not, strictly speaking, a
the elections is quite different from that produced by contest" in contrast to the earlier statement, "In the former,
declaring a person ineligible to hold such an office. In the we have a contest in the strict sense of the word, because
former case the court, after an examination of the ballots of the opposing parties are striving for supremacy."
may find that some other person than the candidate
declared to have received a plurality by the board of The Court in Topacio v. Paredes cannot be said to have
canvassers actually received the greater number of votes, held that "the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from
in which case the court issues its mandamus to the board an ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the
of canvassers to correct the returns accordingly; or it may sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving a
find that the manner of holding the election and the plurality of the legally cast ballots."
returns are so tainted with fraud or illegality that it cannot
be determined who received a plurality of the legally cast A proper reading of the case reveals that the ruling therein
ballots. In the latter case, no question as to the is that since the Court of First Instance is without
correctness of the returns or the manner of casting and jurisdiction to try a disqualification case based on the
counting the ballots is before the deciding power, and eligibility of the person who obtained the highest number
generally the only result can be that the election fails of votes in the election, its jurisdiction being confined "to
entirely. In the former, we have a contest in the strict determine which of the contestants has been duly elected"
sense of the word, because of the opposing parties are the judge exceeded his jurisdiction when he "declared that
striving for supremacy. If it be found that the successful no one had been legally elected president of the
candidate (according to the board of canvassers) obtained municipality of Imus at the general election held in that
a plurality in an illegal manner, and that another candidate town on 4 June 1912" where "the only question raised
was whether or not Topacio was eligible to be elected and What prevents the transfer of the wreath of victory from
to hold the office of municipal president." the ineligible candidate to another candidate?

The Court did not rule that Topacio was disqualified and When the issue being decided upon by the Court is the
that Abad as the second placer cannot be proclaimed in eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of the legally cast
his stead. The Court therein ruled: ballots and ineligibility is thereafter established, what
stops the Court from adjudging another eligible candidate
For the foregoing reasons, we are of the opinion and so who received the next highest number of votes as the
hold that the respondent judge exceeded his jurisdiction in winner and bestowing upon him that "wreath?"
declaring in those proceedings that no one was elected
municipal president of the municipality of Imus at the last An ineligible candidate who receives the highest number
general election; and that said order and all subsequent of votes is a wrongful winner. By express legal mandate,
proceedings based thereon are null and void and of no he could not even have been a candidate in the first place,
effect; and, although this decision is rendered on but by virtue of the lack of material time or any other
respondents' answer to the order to show cause, unless intervening circumstances, his ineligibility might not have
respondents raised some new and additional issues, let been passed upon prior to election date. Consequently,
judgment be entered accordingly in 5 days, without costs. he may have had the opportunity to hold himself out to the
So ordered.49 electorate as a legitimate and duly qualified candidate.
However, notwithstanding the outcome of the elections,
On closer scrutiny, the phrase relied upon by a host of his ineligibility as a candidate remains unchanged.
decisions does not even have a legal basis to stand on. It Ineligibility does not only pertain to his qualifications as a
was a mere pronouncement of the Court comparing one candidate but necessarily affects his right to hold public
process with another and explaining the effects thereof. office. The number of ballots cast in his favor cannot cure
As an independent statement, it is even illogical. the defect of failure to qualify with the substantive legal
requirements of eligibility to run for public office.
Let us examine the statement:
The popular vote does not cure the
"x x x the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligibility of a candidate.
ineligible candidate to any other candidate when the sole
question is the eligibility of the one receiving a plurality of The ballot cannot override the constitutional and statutory
the legally cast ballots." requirements for qualifications and disqualifications of
candidates. When the law requires certain qualifications to
be possessed or that certain disqualifications be not
possessed by persons desiring to serve as elective public This issue has also been jurisprudentially clarified in
officials, those qualifications must be met before one even Velasco v. COMELEC52 where the Court ruled that the
becomes a candidate. When a person who is not qualified ruling in Quizon and Saya-ang cannot be interpreted
is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of without qualifications lest "Election victory x x x becomes
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through a magic formula to bypass election eligibility
the ballot cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the requirements."53
candidate. To rule otherwise is to trample upon and rent
asunder the very law that sets forth the qualifications and We have ruled in the past that a candidate’s victory in the
disqualifications of candidates. We might as well write off election may be considered a sufficient basis to rule in
our election laws if the voice of the electorate is the sole favor of the candidate sought to be disqualified if the main
determinant of who should be proclaimed worthy to issue involves defects in the candidate’s certificate of
occupy elective positions in our republic. candidacy. We said that while provisions relating to
certificates of candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an
This has been, in fact, already laid down by the Court in established rule of interpretation as regards election laws,
Frivaldo v. COMELEC50 when we pronounced: that mandatory provisions requiring certain steps before
elections will be construed as directory after the elections,
x x x. The fact that he was elected by the people of to give effect to the will of the people. We so ruled in
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC:
salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to
the citizens of this country. The qualifications prescribed The present case perhaps presents the proper time and
for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate opportunity to fine-tune our above ruling. We say this with
alone. the realization that a blanket and unqualified reading and
application of this ruling can be fraught with dangerous
The will of the people as expressed through the ballot significance for the rule of law and the integrity of our
cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they elections. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate provide a way around the law that effectively negates
was qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strict election requirements aimed at providing the electorate
application when the deficiency is lack of citizenship. If a with the basic information to make an informed choice
person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, about a candidate’s eligibility and fitness for office.
he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring
and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other The first requirement that may fall when an unqualified
state.51 (Emphasis supplied) reading is made is Section 39 of the LGC which specifies
the basic qualifications of local government officials.
Equally susceptive of being rendered toothless is Section Maquiling is not a second-placer as
74 of the OEC that sets out what should be stated in a he obtained the highest number of
COC. Section 78 may likewise be emasculated as mere votes from among the qualified
delay in the resolution of the petition to cancel or deny due candidates.
course to a COC can render a Section 78 petition useless
if a candidate with false COC data wins. To state the With Arnado’s disqualification, Maquiling then becomes
obvious, candidates may risk falsifying their COC the winner in the election as he obtained the highest
qualifications if they know that an election victory will cure number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
any defect that their COCs may have. Election victory
then becomes a magic formula to bypass election We have ruled in the recent cases of Aratea v.
eligibility requirements. (Citations omitted) COMELEC54 and Jalosjos v. COMELEC55 that a void COC
cannot produce any legal effect.
What will stop an otherwise disqualified individual from
filing a seemingly valid COC, concealing any Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible candidate are
disqualification, and employing every strategy to delay any not considered at all in determining the winner of an
disqualification case filed against him so he can submit election.
himself to the electorate and win, if winning the election
will guarantee a disregard of constitutional and statutory Even when the votes for the ineligible candidate are
provisions on qualifications and disqualifications of disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
candidates? and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible
candidate do not constitute the sole and total expression
It is imperative to safeguard the expression of the of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible
sovereign voice through the ballot by ensuring that its and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must
exercise respects the rule of law. To allow the sovereign also be respected.
voice spoken through the ballot to trump constitutional and
statutory provisions on qualifications and disqualifications As in any contest, elections are governed by rules that
of candidates is not democracy or republicanism. It is determine the qualifications and disqualifications of those
electoral anarchy. When set rules are disregarded and who are allowed to participate as players. When there are
only the electorate’s voice spoken through the ballot is participants who turn out to be ineligible, their victory is
made to matter in the end, it precisely serves as an open voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who
invitation for electoral anarchy to set in.1âwphi1 does not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks
any of the qualifications set in the rules to be eligible as
candidates.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. not declared by final judgment before an election to be
COMELEC56 that when the voters are well aware within disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
the realm of notoriety of a candidate’s disqualification and number of votes in such election, the Court or
still cast their votes in favor said candidate, then the Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
eligible candidate obtaining the next higher number of action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidates who placed second to ineligible ones. candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

The electorate’s awareness of the candidate’s There was no chance for Arnado’s proclamation to be
disqualification is not a prerequisite for the disqualification suspended under this rule because Arnado failed to file
to attach to the candidate. The very existence of a his answer to the petition seeking his disqualification.
disqualifying circumstance makes the candidate ineligible. Arnado only filed his Answer on 15 June 2010, long after
Knowledge by the electorate of a candidate’s the elections and after he was already proclaimed as the
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified winner.
candidate who placed second to a disqualified one can be
proclaimed as the winner. The second-placer in the vote The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnado’s
count is actually the first-placer among the qualified candidacy involves his citizenship. It does not involve the
candidates. commission of election offenses as provided for in the first
sentence of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
That the disqualified candidate has already been effect of which is to disqualify the individual from
proclaimed and has assumed office is of no moment. The continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
subsequent disqualification based on a substantive elected, from holding the office.
ground that existed prior to the filing of the certificate of
candidacy voids not only the COC but also the The disqualifying circumstance affecting Arnado is his
proclamation. citizenship. As earlier discussed, Arnado was both a
Filipino and an American citizen when he filed his
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 provides: certificate of candidacy. He was a dual citizen disqualified
to run for public office based on Section 40(d) of the Local
Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate Government Code.
who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for Section 40 starts with the statement "The following
him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position." The prohibition serves as a bar against the duly elected Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte in the
individuals who fall under any of the enumeration from 10 May 2010 elections.
participating as candidates in the election.
This Decision is immediately executory.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a
candidate, his certificate of candidacy is thus rendered Let a copy of this Decision be served personally upon the
void from the beginning. It could not have produced any parties and the Commission on Elections.
other legal effect except that Arnado rendered it
impossible to effect his disqualification prior to the No pronouncement as to costs.
elections because he filed his answer to the petition when
the elections were conducted already and he was already SO ORDERED.
proclaimed the winner.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
To hold that such proclamation is valid is to negate the Chief Justice
prohibitory character of the disqualification which Arnado
possessed even prior to the filing of the certificate of WE CONCUR:
candidacy. The affirmation of Arnado's disqualification,
although made long after the elections, reaches back to G.R. No. 142840      May 7, 2001
the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Arnado is declared
to be not a candidate at all in the May 201 0 elections. ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner,
vs.
Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.
the qualified candidate who obtained the highest number
of votes. Therefore, the rule on succession under the CONCURRING OPINION
Local Government Code will not apply.
DISSENTING OPINION
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
GRANTED. The Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane KAPUNAN, J.:
dated 2 February 2011 is hereby ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. Respondent ROMMEL ARNADO y CAGOCO is The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue
disqualified from running for any local elective position. in this case, in view of the constitutional requirement that
CASAN MACODE MAQUILING is hereby DECLARED the
"no person shall be a Member of the House of (a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive
Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen." 1 and/or offensive pact of alliance with said foreign
country; or
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on (b) The said foreign country maintains armed
April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law forces on Philippine territory with the consent of the
then applicable was the 1935 Constitution.2 Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the
Filipino citizen concerned, at the time of rendering
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted said service, or acceptance of said commission,
in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto,
of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of states that he does so only in connection with his
allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he service to said foreign country; And provided,
lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act finally, That any Filipino citizen who is rendering
No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or of a foreign country under any of the circumstances
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b), shall not be
country." Said provision of law reads: Republic of the Philippines during the period of his
service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
SECTION 1. How citizenship may be lost. – A said country. Upon his discharge from the service
Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any of the of the said foreign country, he shall be
following ways and/or events: automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his
civil and politically entitled to the full enjoyment of
xxx his civil political rights as a Filipino citizen x x x.

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of
commission in, the armed of a foreign Philippine citizenship was erased by his naturalization as
country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his
or the acceptance of such commission in, the service in the U.S. Marine Corps.
armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of
an oath of allegiance incident thereto, with the On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his
consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall not Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic
divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either Act No. 2630.3 He ran for and was elected as the
of the following circumstances is present: Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in
the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing as a citizen of the Philippines despite the fact he
margin of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.
III, who was then running for reelection.1âwphi1.nêt
3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Philippine citizenship was invalid, the HRET
Cautelam with respondent House of Representatives committed serious errors and grave abuse of
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz discretion, amounting to excess of jurisdiction,
was not qualified to become a member of the House of when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that
Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as such reacquisition could not legally and
required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution. 4 constitutionally restore his natural-born status. 7

On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a
decision5 dismissing the petition for quo warranto and natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen,
declaring Cruz the duly elected Representative of the can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his
Second District of Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be
27, 2000.6 considered a natural-born Filipino since he lost h is
Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari United States in 1995, and had to reacquire the same by
assailing the HRET's decision on the following grounds: repatriation. He insists that Article citizens are those who
are from birth with out having to perform any act to
1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave acquire or perfect such citizenship.
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is Respondent on the other hand contends that he
a natural-born citizen of the Philippines despite the reacquired his status as natural-born citizen when he was
fact that he had ceased being such in view of the repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV,
loss and renunciation of such citizenship on his Section 2 refers to the innate, inherent and inborn
part. characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave The petition is without merit.
abuse of discretion, amounting to excess of
jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino Republic Act No. 530.11 To be naturalized, an applicant
citizens as follow: has to prove that he possesses all the qualifications 12 and
none of the disqualification13 provided by law to become a
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the Filipino citizen. The decision granting Philippine
time of the adoption of this Constitution; citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years
from its promulgation when the court is satisfied that
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of during the intervening period, the applicant has (1) not left
the Philippines; the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful
calling or profession; (3) has not been convicted of any
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or
mother, who elect Philippine citizenship upon (4) committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the
reaching the age of majority, and nation or contrary to any Government announced
policies.14
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with
law.8 Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may
however reacquire the same in the manner provided by
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, law. Commonwealth Act. No. (C.A. No. 63), enumerates
and (2) by naturalization. These ways of acquiring the three modes by which Philippine citizenship may be
citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2) by
natural-born citizen, and the naturalized citizen. A person repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.15
who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular
country, is a natural-born citizen thereof. 9 Naturalization is mode for both acquisition and
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a mode of
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is
"are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without governed by Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended.
having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for
Philippine citezenship."10 reacquiring Philippine citizenship is governed by
Commonwealth Act No. 63.16 Under this law, a former
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who Filipino citizen who wishes to reacquire Philippine
have become Filipino citizens through naturalization, citizenship must possess certain qualifications17 and none
generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise of the disqualification mentioned in Section 4 of C.A.
known as the Revised Naturalization Law, which repealed 473.18
the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship
various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to: when he rendered service in the Armed Forces of the
(1) desertion of the armed forces;19 services in the armed United States. However, he subsequently reacquired
forces of the allied forces in World War II; 20 (3) service in Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 2630, which
the Armed Forces of the United States at any other provides:
time,21 (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;22 and
(5) political economic necessity.23 Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine
citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting
As distinguished from the lengthy process of commission in, the Armed Forces of the United
naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of States, or after separation from the Armed Forces
an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and of the United States, acquired United States
registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the citizenship, may reacquire Philippine citizenship by
place where the person concerned resides or last resided. taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local
In Angat v. Republic,24 we held: Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last
resided in the Philippines. The said oath of
xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the person desiring to citizenship.
reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be
required to file a petition in court, and all that he Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the
had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the same in the Civil
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with
with the civil registry in the place of his residence or the aforecited provision, respondent Cruz is deemed to
where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics have recovered his original status as a natural-born
in the original.25 citizen, a status which he acquired at birth as the son of a
Filipino father.27 It bears stressing that the act of
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his
original nationality.26 This means that a naturalized Filipino original status before he lost his Philippine
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status citizenship.
as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former natural-born citizen since he had to perform an act to
status as a natural-born Filipino. regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained
by the HRET in its decision, the term "natural-born citizen" sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973 accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
Constitution as follows: deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only
naturalized Filipinos are considered not natural-born
Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are
of the Philippines from birth without having to citizens under the present Constitution that there are only
perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and
citizenship. (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did not have
Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain
as such: (1) a person must be a Filipino citizen birth and Philippine citizenship, necessarily is natural-born Filipino.
(2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a
perfect his Philippine citizenship. separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
categories of Filipino citizens which were not considered born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss
natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the
born before January 17, 1973,38 of Filipino mothers who, applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent
upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not proceeding in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is
considered natural-born obviously because they were not perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all
Filipino at birth and had to perform an act to acquire the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of
Philippine citizenship. Those born of Filipino mothers the House of Representatives.
before the effectively of the 1973 Constitution were
likewise not considered natural-born because they also A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the
had to perform an act to perfect their Philippines Constitution to be the "sole judge" of all contests relating
citizenship. to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members
of the House.29 The Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is
The present Constitution, however, now consider those merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave
born of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon jurisdiction" on the part of the latter. 30 In the absence
reaching the majority age as natural-born. After defining thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its
who re natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV adds a corrective power and annul the decision of the HRET nor
to substitute the Court's judgement for that of the latter for DECISION
the simple reason that it is not the office of a petition for
certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.31 There is no such showing of grave abuse of VELASCO, JR., J p:
discretion in this case.
Citizenship is a priceless possession. Former U.S.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. Chief Justice Earl Warren fittingly emphasized its
crowning value when he wrote that "it is man's basic right
SO ORDERED. for it is nothing less than to have rights." 1 When a person
loses citizenship, therefore, the State sees to it that its
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, and JJ., concur. reacquisition may only be granted if the former citizen fully
satisfies all conditions and complies with the applicable
Melo, Vitug, Mendoza, no part. law. Without doubt, repatriation is not to be granted simply
based on the vagaries of the former Filipino citizen.
Panganiban, concurring opinion.
The Case
Quisumbing, Buena, De Leon, Jr., on leave. The instant petition for review 2 under Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure contests the
Sandoval-Gutierrez, dissenting opinion. denial by the Court of Appeals (CA) of the Petition
for Habeas Corpus interposed by petitioner Joevanie
Pardo, Gonzaga-Reyes, concur on this and the concurring Arellano Tabasa from the Order of Summary Deportation
opinion of J. Panganiban issued by the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation
(BID) for his return to the United States.
Ynares-Santiago, certify majority opinion of J. Kapunan.
The Facts
[G.R. No. 125793. August 29, 2006.] The facts as culled by the CA from the records
show that petitioner Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, 3 when
JOEVANIE
petitioner was seven years old, 4 his father,
ARELLANO TABASA, petitioner, vs.
Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen 5 of the
HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
United States. By derivative naturalization (citizenship
BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION and
derived from that of another as from a person who holds
DEPORTATION and WILSON
SOLUREN, respondents.
citizenship by virtue of naturalization 6 ), petitioner also Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53
acquired American citizenship. issued by then Commissioner Miriam
Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation
Petitioner arrived in the Philippines on August 3,
(Exhibit 3). 8
1995, and was admitted as a "balikbayan" for one year.
Thereafter, petitioner was arrested and detained by agent The pertinent portion of the Herbert letter is as
Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to follows:
BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay,
The U.S. Department of State has
Aklan; subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention
revoked U.S. passport 053854189 issued
Center in Manila. 7
on June 10, 1994 in San Francisco,
Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor California under the name of Joevanie
Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Arellano Tabasa, born on February 21,
Division of the BID on May 28, 1996; and on the same 1959 in the Philippines. Mr. Tabasa's
day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter passport has been revoked because he is
3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a the subject of an outstanding federal
charge sheet which alleged: warrant of arrest issued on January 25,
1996 by the U.S. District Court for the
1. That on 3 August 1995,
Northern District of California, for
respondent (petitioner herein [Tabasa])
violation of Section 1073, "Unlawful Flight
arrived in the Philippines and was admitted
to Avoid Prosecution," of Title 18 of the
as a balikbayan;
United States Code. He is charged with
2. That in a letter dated 16 April one count of a felon in possession of a
1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul firearm, in violation of California Penal
General of [the] U.S. Embassy, informed Code, Section 12021(A)(1), and one
the Bureau that respondent's Passport No. count of sexual battery, in
053854189 issued on June 10, 1994 in violation of California Penal Code, Section
San Francisco, California, U.S.A., had 243.4 (D). 9
been revoked by the U.S.
The BID ordered petitioner's deportation to his
Department of State;
country of origin, the United States, on May 29, 1996, in
3. Hence, respondent the following summary deportation order:
[petitioner Tabasa] is now an
Records show that on 16 April 1996,
undocumented and undesirable alien and
Mr. Kevin F. Herbert, Consul
may be summarily deported pursuant to
 General of the U.S. Embassy in Manila, he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest
filed a request with the Bureau to for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities
apprehend and deport the abovenamed before a final order of deportation is made; that no
[sic] respondent [petitioner Tabasa] on the notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the
ground that a standing warrant for several U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a
federal charges has been issued against change of his immigration status as a non-quota
him, and that the respondent's Passport immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as
No. 053854189 has been revoked. AaSTIH provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born
By reason thereof, and on the
citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative
strength of Mission Order No. LIV-96-72,
naturalization when he was seven years old due to the
Intelligence operatives apprehended the
naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968.
respondent in Aklan on 23 May 1996.
At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was
In Schonemann vs. Commissioner
already 35 years old. 12
Santiago, et al., (G.R. No. 81461 [sic,
'81461' should be '86461'], 30 May 1989), On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent
the Supreme Court ruled that if a foreign Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3,
embassy cancels the passport of an alien, 1996 and show the cause of petitioner's detention, and
or does not reissue a valid passport to him, restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On
the alien loses the privilege to remain in June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA;
the country. Further, under Office and on June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10)
Memorandum Order No. 34 issued on 21 days within which to file their memoranda, after which the
August 1989, summary deportation case would be considered submitted for
proceedings lie where the passport of the decision. 13 Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration
alien has expired. granted the petitioner's temporary release on bail on a
PhP20,000.00 cash bond. 14
It is, thus, apparent that respondent
has lost his privilege to remain in the However, on June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a
country. 10 Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired
Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance
Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas
with Republic Act No. 8171 (RA 8171), and that because
Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary
he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or
Restraining Order 11 on May 29, 1996, which was
detained by the respondent Bureau. 15
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 40771. Tabasa alleged that
 The Ruling of the Court of Appeals The Issue
The CA, in its August 7, 1996 The only issue to be resolved is whether petitioner
Decision, 16 denied Tabasa's petition on the ground that has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA
he had not legally and successfully acquired — by 8171. If there is no valid repatriation, then he can be
repatriation — his Filipino citizenship as provided in RA summarily deported for his being an undocumented alien.
8171. The court said that although he became an
The Court's Ruling
American citizen by derivative naturalization when his
father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to The Court finds no merit in this petition.
show that he lost his Philippine citizenship "on
RA 8171, "An Act Providing for the
account of political or economic necessity," as explicitly
Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their
provided in Section 1, RA 8171 — the law governing the
Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens
repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
and of Natural-Born Filipinos," was enacted on October
citizenship. The affidavit does not state that political or
23, 1995. It provides for the repatriation of only two (2)
economic necessity was the compelling reason for
classes of persons, viz:
petitioner's parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in
1968. Moreover, the court a quo found that Filipino women who have lost
petitioner Tabasa did not dispute the truth of the April 16, their Philippine citizenship by marriage
1996 letter of the United States Consul General Kevin F. to aliens and natural-born Filipinos who
Herbert or the various warrants issued for his arrest by the have lost their Philippine citizenship,
United States court. The court a quo noted that after including their minor children, on
petitioner was ordered deported by the BID on May 29, account of political or economic necessity,
1996, he successively executed an may reacquire Philippine citizenship
Affidavit of Repatriation on June 6, 1996 and took an through repatriation in the manner
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on provided in Section
June 13, 1996 — more than ten months after his arrival in 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 63, as
the country on August 3, 1995. The amended: Provided, That the applicant is
appellate court considered petitioner's "repatriation" as a not a:
last ditch effort to avoid deportation and prosecution in the
(1) Person opposed to organized
United States. The appellate court concluded that his only
government or affiliated with any
reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid
association or group of persons who
criminal prosecution in the United States of America.
uphold and teach doctrines opposing
The court a quo, therefore, ruled against Tabasa, whose
organized government;
petition is now before us.
 (2) Person defending or teaching derivative naturalization when he was still a
the necessity or propriety of violence, minor. TDAcCa
personal assault, or association for the
Petitioner overlooks the fact that the
predominance of their ideas;
privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to
(3) Person convicted of crimes natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on
involving moral turpitude; or account of political or economic necessity, and to
the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This
(4) Person suffering from mental
means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine
alienation or incurable contagious
citizenship due to political or economic reasons later
diseases. 17 (Emphasis supplied.)
decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will
  also benefit his minor children according to the law. This
includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently
Does petitioner Tabasa qualify as a natural-born had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign
Filipino who had lost his Philippine citizenship by country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow
reason of political or economic necessity under RA 8171? him to recover his natural-born citizenship and
He does not. automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his
children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship: 18 the
Persons qualified for repatriation under RA 8171 children acquire the citizenship of their parent(s) who are
To reiterate, the only persons entitled to natural-born Filipinos. To claim the benefit of RA 8171,
repatriation under RA 8171 are the following: however, the children must be of minor age at the time the
petition for repatriation is filed by the parent. This is so
a. Filipino women who lost their Philippine because a child does not have the legal capacity for all
citizenship by marriage to aliens; acts of civil life much less the capacity to undertake a
and political act like the election of citizenship. On their own,
b. Natural-born Filipinos including their the minor children cannot apply for repatriation or
minor children who lost their naturalization separately from their parents.
Philippine citizenship on In the case at bar, there is no dispute that petitioner
account of political or economic was a Filipino at birth. In 1968, while he was still a minor,
necessity. his father was naturalized as an American citizen; and by
Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated derivative naturalization, petitioner acquired U.S.
under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born citizenship. Petitioner now wants us to believe that he is
Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by entitled to automatic repatriation as a child of natural-born
Filipinos who left the country due to political or economic Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was
necessity. This is absurd. Petitioner was no longer a minor designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant
at the time of his "repatriation" on June 13, 1996. The to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) dated
privilege under RA 8171 belongs to children who August 22, 1996, to wit:
are of minor age at the time of the filing of the petition
SECTION 1. Composition. — The
for repatriation.
composition of the Special Committee on
Neither can petitioner be a natural-born Filipino Naturalization, with the Solicitor General as
who left the country due to political or economic necessity. Chairman, the Undersecretary of Foreign
Clearly, he lost his Philippine citizenship by Affairs and the Director-General of the
operation of law and not due to political or economic National Intelligence Coordinating Agency,
exigencies. It was his father who could have been as members, shall remain as constituted.
motivated by economic or political reasons in deciding to
SECTION 2. Procedure. — Any
apply for naturalization. The decision was his parent's and
person desirous of repatriating or
not his. The privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is
reacquiring Filipino citizenship pursuant
extended directly to the natural-born Filipinos who could
to R.A. No. 8171 shall file a petition with
prove that they acquired citizenship of a foreign country
the Special Committee on Naturalization
due to political and economic reasons, and extended
which shall process the same. If their
indirectly to the minor children at the time of repatriation.
applications are approved[,] they shall take
In sum, petitioner is not qualified to avail the necessary oath of allegiance to the
himself of repatriation under RA 8171. However, he can Republic of the Philippines, after which
possibly reacquire Philippine citizenship by they shall be deemed to have reacquired
availing of the Citizenship Retention and Re- Philippine citizenship. The Commission on
acquisition Act of 2003 (Republic Act No. 9225) by simply Immigration and Deportation shall
taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the thereupon cancel their
Philippines. certificate of registration (emphasis
supplied).
Where to file a petition for repatriation pursuant
to RA 8171 SECTION 3. Implementing Rules.
Even if we concede that petitioner Tabasa can — The Special Committee is hereby
avail of the benefit of RA 8171, still he failed to follow the authorized to promulgate rules and
procedure for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. He regulations and prescribe the appropriate
has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special forms and the required fees for the
processing of petitions.
 SECTION 4. Effectivity. — This Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
Administrative Order shall take effect necessity as provided for in the law. Nowhere in his
immediately. affidavit of repatriation did he mention that his parents lost
their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
In the Amended Rules and Regulations
economic reasons. It is notable that under the Amended
Implementing RA 8171 issued by the SCN on August 5,
Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 8171, the SCN
1999, applicants for repatriation are required to submit
requires a petitioner for repatriation to set forth, among
documents in support of their petition such as their birth
others, "the reason/s why petitioner lost his/her Filipino
certificate and other evidence proving their claim to
citizenship, whether by marriage in case of Filipino
Filipino citizenship. 19 These requirements were imposed
woman, or whether by political or economic necessity in
to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the
case of [a] natural-born Filipino citizen who lost his/her
applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the
Filipino citizenship. In case of the latter, such political or
renunciation of Philippine citizenship.
economic necessity should be specified." 23
What petitioner simply did was that he took his
Petitioner Tabasa asserts, however, that
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then,
the CA erred in ruling that the applicant for repatriation
executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered,
must prove that he lost his Philippine citizenship on
together with the certificate of live birth, with the
account of political or economic necessity. He theorizes
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said
that the reference to 'political or economic reasons' is
office subsequently issued him a certificate of such
"merely descriptive, not restrictive, of the widely accepted
registration. 20 At that time, the SCN was already in place
reasons for naturalization in [a] foreign country." 24
and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995
Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Petitioner's argument has no leg to stand
Ramos. 21 Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to on. AcaEDC
process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued
A reading of Section 1 of RA 8171 shows the
only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory
manifest intent of the legislature to limit the
issuance according to the Court in Angat v.
benefit of repatriation only to natural-born Filipinos who
Republic. 22 Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a
lost their Philippine citizenship on account of political or
petition for repatriation before the SCN.
economic necessity, in addition to Filipino women who lost
Requirements for repatriation under RA 8171 their Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens. The
Even if petitioner — now of legal age — can still precursor of RA 8171, Presidential Decree No. 725 (P.D.
apply for repatriation under RA 8171, he nevertheless 725), 25 which was enacted on June 5, 1975
failed to prove that his parents relinquished their amending Commonwealth Act No. 63, also gives to the
same groups of former Filipinos the opportunity to
repatriate but without the limiting phrase, "on Of these four types of Filipinos, Mr.
account of political or economic necessity" in relation to Speaker, the first two have to leave the
natural-born Filipinos. By adding the said phrase to RA country not of choice, but rather
8171, the lawmakers clearly intended to limit the out of sacrifice to look for a better life, as
application of the law only to political or economic well as for a safer abode for themselves
migrants, aside from the Filipino women who lost their and their families. It is for these two
citizenship by marriage to aliens. This intention is more types of Filipinos that this measure is
evident in the following sponsorship speech of Rep. being proposed for approval by this
Andrea B. Domingo on House Bill No. 1248, the body. (Emphasis supplied.)
origin of RA 8171, to wit:
 
Ms. Domingo: . . .
xxx xxx xxx
From my experience as the
. . . [I]f the body would recall, I
Commissioner of the
mentioned in my short sponsorship speech
Bureau of Immigration and Deportation, I
the four types of Filipinos who leave their
observed that there are only four
country. And the two types — the
types of Filipinos who leave the country.
economic and political refugees — are the
The first is what we call the ones being addressed by this proposed
"economic refugees" who go abroad to law, and they are not really Filipino women
work because there is no work to be found who lost their citizenship through marriage.
in the country. Then we have the We had a lot of problems with these
"political refugees" who leave the people who left the country
country for fear of their lives because they because of political persecution or
are not in consonance with the prevailing because of pressing economic reasons,
policy of government. The third type is and after feeling that they should come
those who have committed crimes and back to the country and get back their
would like to escape from the citizenship and participate as they should
punishment of said crimes. Lastly, we have in the affairs of the country, they find that it
those Filipinos who feel that they are not is extremely difficult to get their citizenship
Filipinos, thereby seeking other citizenship back because they are treated no different
elsewhere. from any other class of alien. 26
 From these two sources, namely, P.D. 725 and the their Philippine citizenship for political or economic
sponsorship speech on House Bill No. 1248, it is exigencies. He failed to undertake this crucial step, and
incontrovertible that the intent of our legislators in crafting thus, the sought relief is unsuccessful.
Section 1 of RA 8171, as it is precisely worded out, is to
Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a
exclude those Filipinos who have abandoned their country
privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by
for reasons other than political or economic necessity.
the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which
Petitioner contends it is not necessary to prove his provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the
political or economic reasons since the act of renouncing manner provided by law. The State has the power to
allegiance to one's native country constitutes a "necessary prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and
and unavoidable shifting of his political allegiance," and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to
his father's loss of Philippine citizenship through determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the
naturalization "cannot therefore be said to be for any requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the
reason other than political or economic necessity." 27 State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can
reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like
This argument has no merit.
petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements,
While it is true that renunciation of allegiance to the State is justified in rejecting the petition for
one's native country is necessarily a political act, it does repatriation.
not follow that the act is inevitably politically or
Petitioner: an undocumented alien subject to
economically motivated as alleged by petitioner. To
summary deportation
reiterate, there are other reasons why Filipinos relinquish
their Philippine citizenship. The sponsorship Petitioner claims that because of his repatriation,
speech of former Congresswoman Andrea B. Domingo he has reacquired his Philippine citizenship; therefore, he
illustrates that aside from economic and political refugees, is not an undocumented alien subject to deportation.
there are Filipinos who leave the country because they This theory is incorrect.
have committed crimes and would like to escape from
punishment, and those who really feel that they are not As previously explained, petitioner is not entitled to
Filipinos and that they deserve a better nationality, and repatriation under RA 8171 for he has not shown that his
therefore seek citizenship elsewhere. case falls within the coverage of the law.
Thus, assuming petitioner Tabasa is qualified Office Memorandum No. 34 dated August 21,
under RA 8171, it is incumbent upon him to prove to the 1989 of the BID is enlightening on summary deportation:
satisfaction of the SCN that the reason for his
2. The Board of Special Inquiry and
loss of citizenship was the decision of his parents to forfeit
the Hearing Board IV shall observe
 summary deportation proceedings in cases even if he [the alien] has no valid passport
where the charge against the alien is or Philippine visa. "Boat people" seeking
overstaying, or the expiration or residence elsewhere are examples.
cancellation by his government of his However, the grant of the
passport. In cases involving overstaying privilege of staying in the Philippines is
aliens, BSI and the Hearing Board IV shall discretionary on the part of the proper
merely require the presentation of the authorities. There is no showing of any
alien's valid passport and shall decide the grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness, or
case on the basis thereof. whimsicality in the questioned summary
judgment. . . . 29
3. If a foreign embassy cancels the
passport of the alien, or does not reissue a Petitioner Tabasa, whose passport was cancelled
valid passport to him, the alien loses the after his admission into the country, became an
privilege to remain in the country, under undocumented alien who can be summarily deported. His
the Immigration Act, Sections 10 and 15 subsequent "repatriation" cannot bar such deportation
(Schonemann v. Santiago, et al., G.R. No. especially considering that he has no legal and valid
81461 [sic, should be '86461'], 30 May reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. TAacCE
1989). The automatic loss of the privilege
WHEREFORE, this petition for review is
obviates deportation proceedings. In such
DISMISSED, and the August 7, 1996
instance, the Board of Commissioners may
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. No costs
issue summary judgment of deportation
to the petitioner.
which shall be immediately executory. 28
SO ORDERED.
In addition, in the case of Schonemann v.
Defensor Santiago, et al., this Court held: Quisumbing, Carpio, Carpio Morales and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
It is elementary that if an alien
wants to stay in the Philippines, he must ||| (Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125793, [August
possess the necessary documents. 29, 2006], 531 PHIL 407-428)
One of these documents is a valid
passport. There are, of course, exceptions [G.R. No. 162759. August 4, 2006.]
where in the exercise of its sovereign
prerogatives the Philippines may grant LOIDA NICOLAS-LEWIS, GREGORIO B.
refugee status, refuse to extradite an alien, MACABENTA, ALEJANDRO A.
or otherwise allow him or her to stay here ESCLAMADO, ARMANDO B. HEREDIA,
 REUBEN S. SEGURITAN, ERIC Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per
LACHICA FURBEYRE, TERESITA A. a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs
CRUZ, JOSEFINA OPENA DISTERHOFT, dated September 23, 2003 2 , they have yet no right to
MERCEDES V. OPENA, CORNELIO R. vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year
NATIVIDAD, EVELYN D. residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The
NATIVIDAD, petitioners, vs. COMMISSIO same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts
N ON ELECTIONS, respondent. abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voter's
registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would
contextually affect merely certain individuals who would
DECISION likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-
Lewis in the light of the ruling
GARCIA, J p: in Macalintal vs. COMELEC 3 on the residency
requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:
In this petition for certiorari and mandamus,
petitioners, referring to themselves as "duals" or dual Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the
citizens, pray that they and others who retained or presumption of constitutionality . . ., it is
reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act the Commission's position that those who
(R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re- have availed of the law cannot exercise the
Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of right of suffrage given under the OAVL for
the mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee the reason that the OAVL was not enacted
Voting Act of 2003 1 (R.A. 9189) and that for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be merely re-acquired their citizenship on 18
ordered to allow them to vote and register as absentee September 2003 at the earliest, and as law
voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189. and jurisprudence now stand, they are
considered regular voters who have to
The facts: meet the requirements of residency,
among others under Section 1, Article 5 of
Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition
the Constitution. 4
of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to
such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in
before the May 2004 national and local elections, the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal
petitioners sought registration and certification as to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
"overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., 5 filed on April 1, In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look
2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. DHACES at the governing provisions on the right of suffrage is,
therefore, indicated.
A little over a week before the May 10,
2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of
a Comment, 6 therein praying for the denial of the petition. the Constitution, respectively reading as follows:
As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register
SECTION 1. Suffrage may be
let alone vote in said elections.
exercised by all citizens of the Philippines
On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor not otherwise disqualified by law, who are
General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), at least eighteen years of age, and who
therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, shall have resided in the Philippines for at
including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of least one year and in the place wherein
suffrage, may do so", observing, however, that the they propose to vote for at least six months
conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition immediately preceding the election. . . . .
moot and academic. 7
SEC 2. The Congress shall
The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG provide . . . a system for absentee voting
pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and by qualified Filipinos abroad.
academic, but insofar only as petitioners' participation in
In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes
such political exercise is concerned. The broader and
residency requirement as a general eligibility factor for the
transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the
right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may
and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however,
vote, implying that a non-resident may, as an exception to
remains unresolved.
the residency prescription in the preceding section, be
Observing the petitioners' and the COMELEC's allowed to vote.
respective formulations of the issues, the same may be
In response to its above mandate, Congress
reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and
enacted R.A. 9189 — the OAVL 8 — identifying in its
others who might have meanwhile retained and/or
Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following
reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A.
section who cannot, as follows:
9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
Section 4. Coverage. — All citizens
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and
of the Philippines abroad, who are not
thereby accords merit to the petition.
otherwise disqualified by law, at least
eighteen (18) years of age on the day applied for citizenship in another country.
of elections, may vote for president, vice- Failure to return shall be the cause for the
president, senators and party-list removal of the name of the immigrant or
representatives. permanent resident from the National
Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her
Section 5. Disqualifications. — The
permanent disqualification to vote in
following shall be disqualified from voting
absentia.
under this Act:
(e) Any citizen of the Philippines
(a) Those who have lost their
abroad previously declared insane or
Filipino citizenship in accordance with
incompetent by competent authority . . . .
Philippine laws;
(Words in bracket added.)
(b) Those who have expressly
Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail
renounced their Philippine citizenship and
themselves of the absentee voting mechanism. However,
who have pledged allegiance to a foreign
Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino
country;
immigrants and permanent residents in another country
(c) Those who have . . . [been] opens an exception and qualifies the disqualification rule.
convicted in a final judgment by a court or Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional
tribunal of an offense punishable by challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it
imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, —
including those who have . . . been found
. . . violates Section 1, Article V of
guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article
the 1987 Constitution which requires that
137 of the Revised Penal Code, . . . .;
the voter must be a resident in the
(d) An immigrant or a permanent Philippines for at least one year and in the
resident who is recognized as such in the place where he proposes to vote for at
host country, unless he/she executes, least six months immediately preceding an
upon registration, an affidavit prepared for election. [The challenger]
the purpose by the Commission declaring cites . . . Caasi vs. Court of Appeals 9 to
that he/she shall resume actual physical support his claim [where] the Court held
permanent residence in the Philippines not that a "green card" holder immigrant to the
later than three (3) years from approval of [US] is deemed to have abandoned his
his/her registration under this Act. Such domicile and residence in the Philippines.
affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
 [The challenger] further argues that affidavit to show that he/she has not
Section 1, Article V of abandoned his domicile in pursuance of
the Constitution does not allow provisional the constitutional intent expressed in
registration or a promise by a voter to Sections 1 and 2 of Article V that
perform a condition to be qualified to vote "all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise
in a political exercise; that the legislature disqualified by law" must be entitled to
should not be allowed to circumvent the exercise the right of suffrage and, that
requirement of the Constitution on the right Congress must establish a system for
of suffrage by providing a condition absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual,
thereon which in effect amends or alters physical residence in the Philippines is
the aforesaid residence requirement to required, there is no sense for the framers
qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims of the Constitution to mandate Congress to
that the right of suffrage should not be establish a system for absentee
granted to anyone who, on the date of the voting. aEHIDT
election, does not possess the
Contrary to the claim of [the
qualifications provided for by Section 1,
challenger], the execution of the affidavit
Article V of the Constitution. 10 (Words in
itself is not the enabling or enfranchising
bracket added.)
act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is
As may be recalled, the Court upheld the not only proof of the intention of the
constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 mainly on the immigrant or permanent resident to go
strength of the following premises: back and resume residency in the
Philippines, but more significantly, it serves
As finally approved into law, Section
as an explicit expression that he had not in
5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
fact abandoned his domicile of origin.
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent
Thus, it is not correct to say that the
resident who is "recognized as such in the
execution of the affidavit under Section
host country" because immigration or
5(d) violates the Constitution that
permanent residence in another country
proscribes "provisional registration or a
implies renunciation of one's residence in
promise by a voter to perform a condition
his country of origin. However, same
to be qualified to vote in a political
Section allows an immigrant and
exercise." 11
permanent resident abroad to register as
voter for as long as he/she executes an  
 Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
test of constitutionality, Congress enacted R.A. 9225 the Philippines.
relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. — It and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-
is hereby declared the policy of the State acquire Philippine citizenship under this
that all Philippine citizens who become Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
citizens of another country shall be and be subject to all attendant liabilities
deemed not to have lost their Philippine and responsibilities under existing laws of
citizenship under the conditions of this Act. the Philippines and the following
conditions:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine
Citizenship. — Any provision of law to the (1) Those intending to
contrary notwithstanding, natural-born exercise their right of suffrage must
citizens of the Philippines who have lost meet the requirements under
their Philippine citizenship by reason of Section 1, Article V of
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign the Constitution, Republic Act No.
country are hereby deemed to have re- 9189, otherwise known as "The
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking Overseas Absentee Voting Act of
the following oath of allegiance to the 2003" and other existing laws;
Republic:
(2) Those seeking elective
xxx xxx xxx public office in the Philippines shall
meet the qualifications for holding
Natural-born citizens of the
such public office as required by
Philippines who, after the effectivity of this
the Constitution and existing laws
Act, become citizens of a foreign country
and, at the time of the filing of the
shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
certificate of candidacy, make a
taking the aforesaid oath.
personal and sworn renunciation of
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. — any and all foreign citizenship . . .;
The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
3) . . . ;
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire (4) . . . ;
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
 (5) That right to vote or be non-resident absentee voting
elected or appointed to any public rights, 12 COMELEC argues:
office in the Philippines cannot be
4. 'DUALS' MUST FIRST ESTABLISH
exercised by, or extended to, those
THEIR DOMICILE/RESIDENCE IN
who:
THE PHILIPPINES
(a) are candidates for or are
4.01. The inclusion of such
occupying any public office in
additional and specific
the country of which they are
requirements in RA 9225 is
naturalized citizens; and/or
logical. The 'duals,' upon
(b) are in active service as renouncement of their
commissioned or non- Filipino citizenship and
commissioned officers in the acquisition of foreign
armed forces of the country citizenship, have practically
which they are naturalized and legally abandoned their
citizens. domicile and severed their
legal ties to the homeland as
After what appears to be a successful application
a consequence. Having
for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9189,
subsequently acquired a
petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy . . . political
second citizenship (i.e.,
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to
Filipino) then, 'duals' must,
Section 5 thereof. caHCSD
for purposes of voting, first of
Opposing the petitioners' bid, however, all, decisively and definitely
respondent COMELEC invites attention to the same establish their domicile
Section 5 (1) providing that "duals" can enjoy their right to through positive acts; 13
vote, as an adjunct to political rights, only if they meet the
The Court disagrees.
requirements of Section 1, Article V of
the Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual
Capitalizing on what at first blush is the clashing citizenship law — R.A. 9225 — requiring "duals" to
provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, actually establish residence and physically stay in the
which, to repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for Philippines first before they can exercise their right to
a certain period, and R.A. 9189 which grants a Filipino vote. On the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit
acknowledgment that "duals" are most likely non-
residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of Philippines may be allowed to vote even
suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under R.A. though they do not satisfy the residency
9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, requirement in Section 1, Article V of
in essence, to enfranchise as much as possible all the Constitution.
overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
That Section 2 of Article V of
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary
the Constitution is an exception to the
conditions, are qualified to vote. Thus, wrote the Court
residency requirement found in Section 1
in Macalintal:
of the same Article was in fact the subject
It is clear from these discussions of of debate when Senate Bill No. 2104,
the . . . Constitutional Commission that [it] which became R.A. No. 9189, was
intended to enfranchise as much as deliberated upon on the Senate floor, thus:
possible all Filipino citizens abroad who
Senator Arroyo. Mr.
have not abandoned their domicile of
President, this bill should be looked
origin. The Commission even intended to
into in relation to the constitutional
extend to young Filipinos who reach voting
provisions. I think the sponsor and I
age abroad whose parents' domicile of
would agree that the Constitution is
origin is in the Philippines, and consider
supreme in any statute that we may
them qualified as voters for the first
enact.
time. DICSaH
Let me read Section 1,
It is in pursuance of that intention
Article V, of the Constitution . . . .
that the Commission provided for Section
2 [Article V] immediately after the xxx xxx xxx
residency requirement of Section 1. By the
Now, Mr. President,
doctrine of necessary implication in
the Constitution says, "who shall
statutory construction, . . ., the strategic
have resided in the Philippines."
location of Section 2 indicates that the
They are permanent immigrants.
Constitutional Commission provided for an
They have changed residence so
exception to the actual residency
they are barred under
requirement of Section 1 with respect to
the Constitution. This is why I asked
qualified Filipinos abroad. The
whether this committee amendment
same Commission has in effect declared
which in fact does not alter the
that qualified Filipinos who are not in the
original text of the bill will have any offshore voting to our offshore
effect on this? kababayan, Mr. President.
Senator Angara. Good Senator Arroyo. Mr.
question, Mr. President. And this President, when
has been asked in various fora. This the Constitution says, in Section 2
is in compliance with of Article V, it reads: "The Congress
the Constitution. One, the shall provide a system for securing
interpretation here of "residence" is the secrecy and sanctity of the
synonymous with "domicile." ballot as well as a system for
absentee voting by qualified
As the gentleman and I
Filipinos abroad."
know, Mr. President, "domicile" is
the intent to return to one's The key to this whole
home. And the fact that a Filipino exercise, Mr. President, is
may have been physically absent "qualified." In other words,
from the Philippines and may be anything that we may do or say
physically a resident of the in granting our compatriots
United States, for example, but abroad must be anchored on the
has a clear intent to return to the proposition that they are
Philippines, will make him qualified. Absent the
qualified as a resident of the qualification, they cannot vote.
Philippines under this law. And "residents" (sic) is a
qualification.
This is consistent, Mr.
President, with the constitutional xxx xxx xxx
mandate that we — that Congress Look at what
— must provide a franchise to the Constitution says — "In the
overseas Filipinos. place wherein they propose to vote
If we read for at least six months immediately
the Constitution and the suffrage preceding the election." acHDTA
principle literally as demanding Mr. President, all of us here
physical presence, then there is have run (sic) for office.
no way we can provide for
 I live in Makati. My neighbor The second reason, Mr.
is Pateros . . . . We are separated President, is that under our
only by a creek. But one who votes jurisprudence . . . — "residency" has
in Makati cannot vote in Pateros been interpreted as synonymous
unless he resides in Pateros for six with "domicile."
months. That is how restrictive
But the third more practical
our Constitution is. . . . .
reason, . . . is, if we follow the
As I have said, if a voter in interpretation of the gentleman,
Makati would want to vote in then it is legally and
Pateros, yes, he may do so. But he constitutionally impossible to
must do so, make the transfer six give a franchise to vote to
months before the election, overseas Filipinos who do not
otherwise, he is not qualified to physically live in the country,
vote. which is quite ridiculous because
that is exactly the whole point of
xxx xxx xxx
this exercise — to enfranchise
Senator Angara. It is a good them and empower them to
point to raise, Mr. President. But it is vote. 14 (Emphasis and words in
a point already well-debated even in bracket added; citations omitted)
the constitutional commission of
1986. And the reason Section 2 of Lest it be overlooked, no less than
Article V was placed immediately the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship Retention
after the six-month/one-year and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of
residency requirement is to overseas absentee voting. According to the poll body:
demonstrate unmistakably that  
Section 2 which authorizes
absentee voting is an exception 1.05 With the passage of RA
to the six-month/one-year 9225 the scope of overseas absentee
residency requirement. That is the voting has been consequently expanded
first principle, Mr. President, that so as to include Filipinos who are also
one must remember. citizens of other countries, subject,
however, to the strict prerequisites
 indicated in the pertinent provisions of RA It is very likely that a considerable number of
9225; 15 those unmarried children below eighteen (18) years of
age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the
Considering the unison intent of
next generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail
the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion of the
themselves the right to enjoy full civil and political
scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the
rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no
irresistible conclusion is that "duals" may now exercise the
rhyme nor reason why the petitioners and other present
right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme and
day "duals," provided they meet the requirements under
as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A.
adverted to in the following wise:
9189, be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas
"Absentee Voting" refers to the absentee voter. Congress could not have plausibly
process by which qualified citizens of the intended such absurd situation. cEaTHD
Philippines abroad exercise their right to
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
vote;
Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who
"Overseas Absentee Voter" refers to retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic
a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-
to register and vote under this Act, not Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote
otherwise disqualified by law, who is under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No.
abroad on the day of elections; 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
While perhaps not determinative of the issue SO ORDERED.
tendered herein, we note that the expanded thrust of R.A.
Panganiban, C.J., Puno, Quisumbing, Ynares-
9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next
Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the
Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga,
inclusion of the provision on derivative citizenship in R.A.
Chico-Nazario and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
9225 which reads:
||| (Nicolas-Lewis v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. —
162759, [August 4, 2006], 529 PHIL 642-659)
The unmarried child, whether legitimate,
illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen
(18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of
this Act shall be deemed citizens of the CIRILO R. VALLES, petitioner, vs.
Philippines. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
 ROSALIND YBASCO candidacy, where she declared that she is a Filipino
LOPEZ, respondents. citizen and that she will support and defend the Philippine
Constitution and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto, sufficed to renounce her foreign citizenship,
Ifurung & Marquinez for petitioner. effectively removing any disqualification as a dual citizen.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
SYLLABUS
SYNOPSIS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP;
This is a petition for certiorari assailing the RENUNCIATION MUST BE EXPRESS; APPLYING FOR
Resolutions of the COMELEC, dismissing the petition for AN ALIEN CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION AND
disqualification filed by petitioner against private HOLDING A FOREIGN PASSPORT, NOT A CASE OF;
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, in the May 1998 CASE AT BAR. — In order that citizenship may be lost by
elections for governor of Davao Oriental. EHTCAa renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Petitioner's contention that the application of private
Petitioner maintained that private respondent is an respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
Australian citizen, not qualified to run for elective office, Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put
because: she is a holder of an Australian passport; and to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC and in the
she expressly renounced her Filipino citizenship when she more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
declared under oath in her application for alien certificate COMELEC. In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the
of registration and immigrant certificate of residence that mere fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a
she was a citizen or subject of Australia. certificate stating that he is an American did not mean that
In dismissing the petition, the Supreme Court held he is no longer a Filipino, and that an application for an
that the mere fact that private respondent was a holder of alien certificate of registration was not tantamount to
an Australian passport and had an alien certificate of renunciation of his Philippine citizenship. And, in Mercado
registration are not acts constituting an effective vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it was held that the fact that
renunciation of Filipino citizenship. Renunciation must be respondent Manzano was registered as an American
express, to effectively result in the loss of Filipino citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and
citizenship. At most, private respondent had dual was holding an American passport on April 22, 1997, only
citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino, as a year before he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-
well. Dual citizenship as a disqualification refers to citizens mayor of Makati, were just assertions of his American
with dual allegiance. Her filing of a certificate of nationality before the termination of his American
citizenship. Thus, the mere fact that private respondent citizenship, it is enough that they elect Philippine
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian citizenship upon the filing of their certificate of candidacy,
passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not to terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.
acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship The filing of a certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce
and do not militate against her claim of Filipino citizenship. foreign citizenship, effectively removing any
For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of disqualification as a dual citizen. This is so because in the
citizenship, the same must be express. EDATSI certificate of candidacy, one declares that he/she is a
Filipino citizen and that he/she will support and defend
2. ID.; ID.; DUAL CITIZENSHIP; AS A
the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true
DISQUALIFICATION FROM RUNNING FOR PUBLIC
faith and allegiance thereto. Such declaration, which is
OFFICE REFERS TO CITIZENS WITH DUAL
under oath, operates as an effective renunciation of
ALLEGIANCE; CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner maintains
foreign citizenship. Therefore, when the herein private
that even on the assumption that the private respondent
respondent filed her certificate of candidacy in 1992, such
had dual citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for
fact alone terminated her Australian citizenship. Then, too,
governor of Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic
it is significant to note that on January 15, 1992, private
Act 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code
respondent executed a Declaration of Renunciation of
of 1991, . . . In the aforecited case of Mercado vs.
Australian Citizenship, duly registered in the Department
Manzano, the Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used
of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia on May 12,
in the Local Government Code and reconciled the same
1992. And, as a result, on February 11, 1992, the
with Article IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
Australian passport of private respondent was cancelled,
allegiance. Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
as certified to by Second Secretary Richard F. Munro of
citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
the Embassy of Australia in Manila. As aptly appreciated
involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts were enough to
countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
settle the issue of the alleged dual citizenship of Rosalind
explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must
Ybasco Lopez.
refer to citizens with dual allegiance. . . Thus, the fact that
the private respondent had dual citizenship did not 4. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE;
automatically disqualify her from running for a public JUDGMENT; PRINCIPLE THEREOF GENERALLY DOES
office. NOT APPLY IN CASES OF CITIZENSHIP; EXCEPTION;
CASE AT BAR. — Petitioner is correct insofar as the
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RENUNCIATION OF FOREIGN
general rule is concerned, i.e. the principle of res
CITIZENSHIP EFFECTIVELY REMOVES ANY
judicata generally does not apply in cases hinging on the
DISQUALIFICATION AS A DUAL CITIZEN; CASE AT
issue of citizenship. However, in the case of Burca vs.
BAR. — It was ruled that for candidates with dual
Republic, an exception to this general rule was
recognized. The Court ruled in that case that in order that disqualification filed by the herein petitioner, Cirilo R.
the doctrine of res judicata may be applied in cases of Valles, against private respondent Rosalind Ybasco
citizenship, the following must be present: 1) a person's Lopez, in the May 1998 elections for governor of Davao
citizenship be raised as a material issue in a controversy Oriental.
where said person is a party; 2) the Solicitor General or
Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was born on May 16, 1934
his authorized representative took active part in the
in Napier Terrace, Broome, Western Australia, to the
resolution thereof; and 3) the finding on citizenship is
spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a Filipino citizen and native of
affirmed by this Court. Although the general rule was set
Daet, Camarines Norte, and Theresa Marquez, an
forth in the case of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not
Australian. In 1949, at the age of fifteen, she left Australia
foreclose the weight of prior rulings on citizenship. It
and came to settle in the Philippines.
elucidated that reliance may somehow be placed on these
antecedent official findings, though not really binding, to On June 27, 1952, she was married to Leopoldo
make the effort easier or simpler. Indeed, there appears Lopez, a Filipino citizen, at the Malate Catholic Church in
sufficient basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Manila. Since then, she has continuously participated in
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-066 and EPC 92- the electoral process not only as a voter but as a
54 which resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the candidate, as well. She served as Provincial Board
herein private respondent. The evidence adduced by Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao
petitioner is substantially the same evidence presented in Oriental. In 1992, she ran for and was elected governor of
these two prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new Davao Oriental. Her election was contested by her
evidence or supervening event to warrant a reversal of opponent, Gil Taojo, Jr., in a petition for quo warranto,
such prior resolutions. TCaEAD docketed as EPC No. 92-54, alleging as ground therefor
her alleged Australian citizenship. However, finding no
sufficient proof that respondent had renounced her
DECISION Philippine citizenship, the Commission on Elections en
banc dismissed the petition, ratiocinating thus:
"A cursory reading of the records of
PURISIMA, J p: this case vis-a-vis the impugned resolution
shows that respondent was able to
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, produce documentary proofs of the Filipino
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 64 of the 1997 Rules of Civil citizenship of her late father . . . and
Procedure, assailing Resolutions dated July 17, 1998 and consequently, prove her own citizenship
January 15, 1999, respectively, of the Commission on and filiation by virtue of the Principle of Jus
Elections in SPA No. 98-336, dismissing the petition for
 Sanguinis, the perorations of the petitioner On July 17, 1998, the COMELEC's First Division
to the contrary notwithstanding. ETIDaH came out with a Resolution dismissing the petition, and
disposing as follows:
On the other hand, except for the
three (3) alleged important documents . . . "Assuming arguendo that res
no other evidence substantial in nature judicata does not apply and We are to
surfaced to confirm the allegations of dispose the instant case on the merits
petitioner that respondent is an Australian trying it de novo, the above table definitely
citizen and not a Filipino. Express shows that petitioner herein has presented
renunciation of citizenship as a mode of no new evidence to disturb the Resolution
losing citizenship under Commonwealth of this Commission in SPA No. 95-066.
Act No. 63 is an equivocal and deliberate The present petition merely restates the
act with full awareness of its significance same matters and incidents already
and consequence. The evidence adduced passed upon by this Commission not just
by petitioner are inadequate, nay meager, in 1995 Resolution but likewise in the
to prove that respondent contemplated Resolution of EPC No. 92-54. Not having
renunciation of her Filipino citizenship". 1 put forth any new evidence and matter
substantial in nature, persuasive in
In the 1995 local elections, respondent Rosalind
character or sufficiently provocative to
Ybasco Lopez ran for re-election as governor of Davao
compel reversal of such Resolutions, the
Oriental. Her opponent, Francisco Rabat, filed a petition
dismissal of the present petition follows as
for disqualification, docketed as SPA No. 95-066 before
a matter of course.
the COMELEC, First Division, contesting her Filipino
citizenship but the said petition was likewise dismissed by xxx xxx xxx
the COMELEC, reiterating substantially its decision in
"WHEREFORE, premises
EPC 92-54.
considered and there being no new
The citizenship of private respondent was once matters and issues tendered, We find no
again raised as an issue when she ran for re-election as convincing reason or impressive
governor of Davao Oriental in the May 11, 1998 elections. explanation to disturb and reverse the
Her candidacy was questioned by the herein petitioner, Resolutions promulgated by this
Cirilo Valles, in SPA No. 98-336. Commission in EPC 92-54 and SPA 95-
066. This Commission RESOLVES as it
hereby RESOLVES to DISMISS the
present petition.
 SO ORDERED." 2 national and was issued Alien
Certificate of Registration No.
Petitioner interposed a motion for reconsideration
404695 dated September 19,
of the aforesaid Resolution but to no avail. The same was
1988; SCEDaT
denied by the COMELEC in its en banc Resolution of
January 15, 1999. b) On even date, she applied for the
issuance of an Immigrant Certificate
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this
of Residence (ICR); and
Court via the present petition; questioning the citizenship
of private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. c) She was issued Australian Passport No.
H700888 on March 3, 1988.
The Commission on Elections ruled that private
respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is a Filipino citizen Petitioner theorizes that under the aforestated facts
and therefore, qualified to run for a public office because and circumstances, the private respondent had renounced
(1) her father, Telesforo Ybasco, is a Filipino citizen, and her Filipino citizenship. He contends that in her application
by virtue of the principle of jus sanguinis she was a for alien certificate of registration and immigrant certificate
Filipino citizen under the 1987 Philippine Constitution; (2) of residence, private respondent expressly declared under
she was married to a Filipino, thereby making her also a oath that she was a citizen or subject of Australia; and
Filipino citizen ipso jure under Section 4 said declaration forfeited her Philippine citizenship, and
of Commonwealth Act 473; (3) and that, she renounced operated to disqualify her to run for elective office.
her Australian citizenship on January 15, 1992 before the
As regards the COMELEC's finding that private
Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of Australia
respondent had renounced her Australian citizenship on
and her Australian passport was accordingly cancelled as
January 15, 1992 before the Department of Immigration
certified to by the Australian Embassy in Manila; and (4)
and Ethnic Affairs of Australia and had her Australian
furthermore, there are the COMELEC Resolutions in EPC
passport cancelled on February 11, 1992, as certified to
No. 92-54 and SPA Case No. 95-066, declaring her a
by the Australian Embassy here in Manila, petitioner
Filipino citizen duly qualified to run for the elective position
argues that the said acts did not automatically restore the
of Davao Oriental governor.
status of private respondent as a Filipino citizen.
Petitioner, on the other hand, maintains that the According to petitioner, for the private respondent to
private respondent is an Australian citizen, placing reacquire Philippine citizenship she must comply with the
reliance on the admitted facts that: mandatory requirements for repatriation under Republic
Act 8171; and the election of private respondent to public
a) In 1988, private respondent registered
office did not mean the restoration of her Filipino
herself with the Bureau of
citizenship since the private respondent was not legally
Immigration as an Australian
repatriated. Coupled with her alleged renunciation of that time, what served as the Constitution of the
Australian citizenship, private respondent has effectively Philippines were the principal organic acts by which the
become a stateless person and as such, is disqualified to United States governed the country. These were the
run for a public office in the Philippines; petitioner Philippine Bill of July 1, 1902 and the Philippine Autonomy
concluded. Act of August 29, 1916, also known as the Jones Law.
Petitioner theorizes further that the Commission on Among others, these laws defined who were
Elections erred in applying the principle of res judicata to deemed to be citizens of the Philippine islands. The
the case under consideration; citing the ruling in Moy Ya Philippine Bill of 1902 defined Philippine citizens as:
Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 3 that:
SEC. 4. . . . all inhabitants of the
". . . Everytime the citizenship of a Philippine Islands continuing to reside
person is material or indispensable in a therein who were Spanish subjects on the
judicial or administrative case, whatever eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred
the corresponding court or administrative and ninety-nine, and then resided in the
authority decides therein as to such Philippine Islands, and their children born
citizenship is generally not considered subsequent thereto; shall be deemed and
as res adjudicata, hence it has to be held to be citizens of the Philippine
threshed out again and again as the Islands and as such entitled to the
occasion may demand. . . . " protection of the United States, except
such as shall have elected to preserve
The petition is unmeritorious.
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to the accordance with the provisions of the
principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child follows the treaty of peace between the United States
nationality or citizenship of the parents regardless of the and Spain signed at Paris December tenth,
place of his/her birth, as opposed to the doctrine of jus eighteen hundred and ninety-eight. (italics
soli which determines nationality or citizenship on the supplied) HSIADc
basis of place of birth.
The Jones Law, on the other hand, provides:
Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was
SEC. 2. That all inhabitants of the Philippine
born on May 16, 1934 in Napier Terrace, Broome,
Islands who were Spanish subjects on the eleventh day of
Western Australia, to the spouses, Telesforo Ybasco, a
April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
Filipino citizen and native of Daet, Camarines Norte, and
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
Theresa Marquez, an Australian. Historically, this was a
thereto, shall be deemed and held to be citizens of the
year before the 1935 Constitution took into effect and at
Philippine Islands, except such as shall have elected to (1) Those who are citizens of the
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in Philippine Islands at the time of the
accordance with the provisions of the treaty of peace adoption of this Constitution.
between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris
(2) Those born in the Philippine Islands of
December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, and
foreign parents who, before the
except such others as have since become citizens of
adoption of this Constitution had
some other country: Provided, That the Philippine
been elected to public office in the
Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby authorized to
Philippine Islands.
provide by law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship
by those natives of the Philippine Islands who cannot (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the
come within the foregoing provisions, the natives of the Philippines.
insular possessions of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
of the United States, or who could become citizens of the the Philippines and, upon reaching
United States under the laws of the United States if the age of majority, elect Philippine
residing therein. (italics supplied) citizenship.

Under both organic acts, all inhabitants of the Philippines (5) Those who are naturalized in
who were Spanish subjects on April 11, 1899 and resided accordance with law.
therein including their children are deemed to be So also, the principle of jus sanguinis, which confers
Philippine citizens. Private respondent's father, Telesforo citizenship by virtue of blood relationship, was
Ybasco, was born on January 5, 1879 in Daet, Camarines subsequently retained under
Norte, a fact duly evidenced by a certified true copy of an the 1973 4 and 1987 5 Constitutions. Thus, the herein
entry in the Registry of Births. Thus, under the Philippine private respondent, Rosalind Ybasco Lopez, is a Filipino
Bill of 1902 and the Jones Law, Telesforo Ybasco was citizen, having been born to a Filipino father. The fact of
deemed to be a Philippine citizen. By virtue of the same her being born in Australia is not tantamount to her losing
laws, which were the laws in force at the time of her birth, her Philippine citizenship. If Australia follows the principle
Telesforo's daughter, herein private respondent Rosalind of jus soli, then at most, private respondent can also claim
Ybasco Lopez, is likewise a citizen of the Philippines. Australian citizenship resulting to her possession of dual
The signing into law of the 1935 Philippine citizenship.
Constitution has established the principle of jus Petitioner also contends that even on the
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine assumption that the private respondent is a Filipino
citizenship, to wit: citizen, she has nonetheless renounced her Philippine
citizenship. To buttress this contention, petitioner cited In order that citizenship may be lost by
private respondent's application for an Alien Certificate of renunciation, such renunciation must be express.
Registration (ACR) and Immigrant Certificate of Petitioner's contention that the application of private
Residence (ICR), on September 19, 1988, and the respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her
issuance to her of an Australian passport on March 3, Australian passport, is bereft of merit. This issue was put
1988. to rest in the case of Aznar vs. COMELEC 6 and in the
more recent case of Mercado vs. Manzano and
Under Commonwealth Act No. 63, a Filipino citizen
COMELEC. 7
may lose his citizenship:
In the case of Aznar, the Court ruled that the mere
(1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
fact that respondent Osmena was a holder of a certificate
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship; stating that he is an American did not mean that he is no
longer a Filipino, and that an application for an alien
(3) By subscribing to an oath of allegiance certificate of registration was not tantamount to
to support the constitution or laws of renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
a foreign county upon attaining
twenty-one years of age or more; And, in Mercado vs. Manzano and COMELEC, it
was held that the fact that respondent Manzano was
(4) By accepting commission in the registered as an American citizen in the Bureau of
military, naval or air service of a Immigration and Deportation and was holding an
foreign country; American passport on April 22, 1997, only a year before
(5) By cancellation of the certificate of he filed a certificate of candidacy for vice-mayor of Makati,
naturalization; SEHTIc were just assertions of his American nationality before the
termination of his American citizenship.
(6) By having been declared by competent
authority, a deserter of the Thus, the mere fact that private respondent
Philippine armed forces in time of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez was a holder of an Australian
war, unless subsequently, a plenary passport and had an alien certificate of registration are not
pardon or amnesty has been acts constituting an effective renunciation of citizenship
granted; and and do not militate against her claim of Filipino
citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss
(7) In case of a woman, upon her of citizenship, the same must be express. 8 As held by
marriage, to a foreigner if, by virtue this court in the aforecited case of Aznar, an application
of the laws in force in her husband's for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to
country, she acquires his nationality. an express renunciation or repudiation of one's
citizenship. The application of the herein private In the aforecited case of Mercado vs. Manzano, the
respondent for an alien certificate of registration, and her Court clarified "dual citizenship" as used in the Local
holding of an Australian passport, as in the case Government Code and reconciled the same with Article
of Mercado vs. Manzano, were mere acts of assertion of IV, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution on dual
her Australian citizenship before she effectively renounced allegiance. 9 Recognizing situations in which a Filipino
the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent had dual citizen may, without performing any act, and as an
citizenship — she was an Australian and a Filipino, as involuntary consequence of the conflicting laws of different
well. ISHCcT countries, be also a citizen of another state, the Court
explained that dual citizenship as a disqualification must
Moreover, under Commonwealth Act 63, the fact
refer to citizens with dual allegiance. The Court succinctly
that a child of Filipino parent/s was born in another
pronounced:
country has not been included as a ground for losing
one's Philippine citizenship. Since private respondent did ". . . the phrase 'dual citizenship'
not lose or renounce her Philippine citizenship, petitioner's in R.A. No. 7160, ... 40 (d) and in R.A. No.
claim that respondent must go through the process of 7854, . . . 20 must be understood as
repatriation does not hold water. referring to 'dual allegiance'. Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do not
Petitioner also maintains that even on the
fall under this disqualification."
assumption that the private respondent had dual
citizenship, still, she is disqualified to run for governor of Thus, the fact that the private respondent had dual
Davao Oriental; citing Section 40 of Republic Act citizenship did not automatically disqualify her from
7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of running for a public office. Furthermore, it was ruled that
1991, which states: for candidates with dual citizenship, it is enough that they
elect Philippine citizenship upon the filing of their
"SEC. 40. Disqualifications. — The
certificate of candidacy, to terminate their status as
following persons are disqualified from
persons with dual citizenship. 10 The filing of a certificate
running for any elective local position:
of candidacy sufficed to renounce foreign citizenship,
xxx xxx xxx effectively removing any disqualification as a dual
citizen. 11 This is so because in the certificate of
(d) Those with dual citizenship; candidacy, one declares that he/she is a Filipino citizen
xxx xxx xxx and that he/she will support and defend the Constitution of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
Again, petitioner's contention is untenable. thereto. Such declaration, which is under oath, operates
as an effective renunciation of foreign citizenship.
Therefore, when the herein private respondent filed her judicata may be applied in cases of citizenship, the
certificate of candidacy in 1992, such fact alone following must be present:
terminated her Australian citizenship.
1) a person's citizenship be raised as a
Then, too, it is significant to note that on January material issue in a controversy
15, 1992, private respondent executed a Declaration of where said person is a party;
Renunciation of Australian Citizenship, duly registered in
2) the Solicitor General or his authorized
the Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs of
representative took active part in the
Australia on May 12, 1992. And, as a result, on February
resolution thereof; and
11, 1992, the Australian passport of private respondent
was cancelled, as certified to by Second Secretary 3) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by
Richard F. Munro of the Embassy of Australia in Manila. this Court.
As aptly appreciated by the COMELEC, the aforesaid acts
were enough to settle the issue of the alleged dual Although the general rule was set forth in the case
citizenship of Rosalind Ybasco Lopez. Since her of Moy Ya Lim Yao, the case did not foreclose the weight
renunciation was effective, petitioner's claim that private of prior rulings on citizenship. It elucidated that reliance
respondent must go through the whole process of may somehow be placed on these antecedent official
repatriation holds no water. findings, though not really binding, to make the effort
easier or simpler. 14 Indeed, there appears sufficient
Petitioner maintains further that when citizenship is basis to rely on the prior rulings of the Commission on
raised as an issue in judicial or administrative Elections in SPA. No. 95-066 and EPC 92-54 which
proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is resolved the issue of citizenship in favor of the herein
generally not considered res judicata in any subsequent private respondent. The evidence adduced by petitioner is
proceeding challenging the same; citing the case of Moy substantially the same evidence presented in these two
Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration. 12 He prior cases. Petitioner failed to show any new evidence or
insists that the same issue of citizenship may be threshed supervening event to warrant a reversal of such prior
out anew. resolutions. However, the procedural issue
notwithstanding, considered on the merits, the petition
Petitioner is correct insofar as the general rule is
cannot prosper.
concerned, i.e. the principle of res judicata generally does
not apply in cases hinging on the issue of citizenship. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
However, in the case of Burca vs. Republic, 13 an and the COMELEC Resolutions, dated July 17, 1998 and
exception to this general rule was recognized. The Court January 15, 1999, respectively, in SPA No. 98-336
ruled in that case that in order that the doctrine of res AFFIRMED. ATHCac
 Private respondent Rosalind Ybasco Lopez is ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN
hereby adjudged qualified to run for governor of Davao AS FERNANDO POE JR., respondents.
Oriental. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DECISION
||| (Valles v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 137000,
[August 9, 2000], 392 PHIL 327-342)
VITUG, J p:

[G.R. No. 161434. March 3, 2004.] Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those

whom the state believes are deserving of the privilege. It
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
FELIX B. DESIDERIO, acquisition," 1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone —
JR., petitioners, vs. either by those who enjoy it or by those who dispute it.
The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all
RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. of which raise a single question of profound importance to
FERNANDO POE, JR.) and VICTORINO the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to
X. FORNIER, respondents. challenge the qualifications of a presidential candidate to
hold the highest office of the land. Our people are waiting
[G.R. No. 161634. March 3, 2004.] for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is
Fernando Poe, Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one
of the main contenders for the presidency, a natural-born
ZOILO ANTONIO Filipino or is he not?
VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN
KELLEY POE, a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, The moment of introspection takes us face to face
JR., respondent. with Spanish and American colonial roots and reminds us
of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions,
the fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence
[G.R. No. 161824. March 3, 2004.] that could be no less than distinctly Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
VICTORINO X.
FORNIER, petitioner, vs. HON. COMMISS On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan
ION ON ELECTIONS and RONALD Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (hereinafter
"FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of In the hearing before the Third Division of
President of the Republic of the Philippines under the the COMELEC on 19 January 2004, petitioner, in support
Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits — 1)
forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of a copy of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified
candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born photocopy of an affidavit executed in Spanish by Paulita
citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for
Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 bigamy and concubinage against the father of respondent,
August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Allan F. Poe, after discovering his bigamous relationship
with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824,
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth
entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
of Allan F. Poe, 5) a certification issued by the Director of
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
the Records Management and Archives Office, attesting
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
to the fact that there was no record in the National
Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a
Archives that a Lorenzo Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or
petition docketed SPA No. 04-003 before
entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a certification
the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to disqualify
from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of
National Archives to the effect that no available
candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material
information could be found in the files of the National
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
claiming to be a natural- born Filipino citizen when in truth,
according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two
mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his documentary pieces of evidence, the more significant
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son ones being — a) a certification issued by Estrella M.
of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, petitioner Domingo of the Archives Division of the National Archives
asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he that there appeared to be no available information
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births
the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. for San Carlos, Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by
Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the
respondent on two assertions — first, Allan F. Poe National Archives that no available information about the
contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be
before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of
Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of respondent. Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan, in the name of
Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Jurisdiction of the Court
Pou, f) a copy of the certificate of death of Lorenzo Pou, In G.R. No. 161824
g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of
issued by the City Civil Registrar of San Carlos City, FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny due course or to
Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said cancel FPJ's certificate of candidacy for alleged
office during the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were misrepresentation of a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a
totally destroyed during World War II. natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC, petitioner
Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed Code —
SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three days later,
or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for "Section 78.Petition to deny due
reconsideration. The motion was denied on 06 February course or to cancel a certificate of
2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to
petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before deny due course or to cancel a certificate
this Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of candidacy may be filed by any person
of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, exclusively on the ground that any material
docketed G.R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a representation contained therein as
temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction required under Section 74 hereof is false"
or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or —
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
in consonance with the general powers
The other petitions, later consolidated with G.R. of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the Omnibus
No. 161824, would include G.R. No. 161434, entitled Election Code —
"Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. "Section 52.Powers and functions
The Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe of the Commission on Elections. In
(a.k.a. 'Fernando Poe, Jr.'), and Victorino X. Fornier," and addition to the powers and functions
the other, docketed G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo conferred upon it by the Constitution,
Antonio G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. the Commission shall have exclusive
Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the jurisdiction of charge of the enforcement and
the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, administration of all laws relative to the
Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the conduct of elections for the purpose of
Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to ensuring free, orderly and
resolve the basic issue on the case. honest elections" —
 and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
Code which would authorize "any interested party" to jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
file a verified petition to deny or cancel the certificate of the Government."
candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be
cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule taken cognizance of, by this Court. A contrary view could
64 2 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental right
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who
the 1987 Constitution also reads — could or should be elected to occupy the highest
"Each Commission shall decide by government post in the land.
a majority vote of all its Members any case  
or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision In G.R. No. 161434 and G.R. No. 161634
or resolution. A case or matter is deemed Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and
submitted for decision or resolution upon Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article
the filing of the last pleading, brief, or VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in
memorandum, required by the rules of assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took
the Commission or by cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise Court to instead take on the petitions they directly
provided by this Constitution or by law, any instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited
decision, order, or ruling of reads:
each Commission may be brought to the
Supreme Court on certiorari by the "The Supreme Court, sitting en
aggrieved party within thirty days from banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
receipt of a copy thereof." relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the President or Vice-
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the President, and may promulgate its rules for
same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in the purpose."
one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law which power "includes the duty of the The provision is an innovation of the 1987
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge
to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has
constrained this Court to declare, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
in Lopez vs. Roxas, 4 as "not (being) justiciable" President of the Philippines.
controversies or disputes involving
"Rule 13.How Initiated. — An
contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
election contest is initiated by the filing of
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse
an election protest or a petition for quo
prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic
warranto against the President or Vice-
Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent
President. An election protest shall not
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide
include a petition for quo warranto. A
Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect
petition for quo warranto shall not include
and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and
an election protest.
Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic
Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate "Rule 14.Election Protest. — Only
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the the registered candidate for President or
tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption of the for Vice-President of the Philippines who
parliamentary form of government under the 1973 received the second or third highest
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act number of votes may contest the election
No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now be of the President or the Vice-President, as
deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph the case may be, by filing a verified petition
7, of the 1987 Constitution. with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal within thirty (30) days after
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in
the proclamation of the winner."
reference to a post-election scenario. Election contests
consist of either an election protest or a quo The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns
have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology the Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or
in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the "Rules of the Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally
Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
this premise — office. 5 In such context, the election contest can only
contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
"Rule 12.Jurisdiction. — The
registered candidate who would have received either the
Tribunal shall be the sole judge of
second or third highest number of votes could file an
all contests relating to the election, returns,
election protest. This rule again presupposes a post- fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the
election scenario. general interest of society.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the The concept of citizenship had undergone changes
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was
the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
brought before it, questioning the qualifications of a the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights
candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency before to property, personal liberty and justice. 9 Its meaning
the elections are held. expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in
Accordingly, G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria
the exercise of political power. 10 The 20th century saw
Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs. Commission on Elections,
the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
et al.," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic
Velez vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe,
well-being and social security. 11 The idea of citizenship
Jr." would have to be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
has gained expression in the modern welfare state as it so
The Citizenship Issue developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage
of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first
global village, might well be the internationalization of
give a brief historical background on the concept of
citizenship. 12
citizenship.
The Local Setting — from Spanish Time to the Present
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship
was that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 There was no such term as "Philippine citizens"
B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared during the Spanish regime but "subjects of Spain" or
in the administration of justice and in the holding of an "Spanish subjects." 13 In church records, the natives were
office. 6 Aristotle saw its significance if only to determine called 'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of
the constituency of the "State," which he described as the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became
being composed of such persons who would be adequate highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer
in number to achieve a self-sufficient existence. 7 The number made it difficult to point to one comprehensive
concept grew to include one who would both govern and law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however,
be governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for
judgment and loyalty could be expected. Citizenship was those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees. 14
seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to
hand, and with concomitant obligations, on the other. 8 In
the Novisima Recopilacion, promulgated in Spain on 16
its ideal setting, a citizen was active in public life and
July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the The year 1898 was another turning point in
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views Philippine history. Already in the state of decline as a
among experts; 15 however, three royal decrees were superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony
undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the in the East to an upcoming world power, the United
Philippines — the Order de la Regencia of 14 August States. An accepted principle of international law dictated
1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868 specifically that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
defining the political status of children born in the abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no
Philippine Islands, 17 and finally, the Ley Extranjera de effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually intact.
Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13
December 1898 between Spain and the United
July 1870. 18
States. 21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never and political status of the native inhabitants of the
extended to the Philippine Islands because of the express territories ceded to the United States would be determined
mandate of its Article 89, according to which the by its Congress —
provisions of the Ultramar among which this country was
"Spanish subjects, natives of the
included, would be governed by special laws. 19
Peninsula, residing in the territory over
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective which Spain by the present treaty
in this jurisdiction on 18 December 1889, which came out relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may
with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish remain in such territory or may remove
citizens. — therefrom, retaining in either event all their
rights of property, including the right to sell
"(a)Persons born in Spanish territory,
or dispose of such property or of its
"(b)Children of a Spanish father or mother, proceeds; and they shall also have the
even if they were born outside of right to carry on their industry, commerce,
Spain, and professions, being subject in respect
thereof to such laws as are applicable to
"(c)Foreigners who have obtained foreigners. In case they remain in the
naturalization papers, territory they may preserve their allegiance
"(d)Those who, without such papers, may to the Crown of Spain by making, before a
have become domiciled inhabitants court of record, within a year from the date
of any town of the Monarchy." 20 of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to
 preserve such allegiance; in default of Islands and as such entitled to the
which declaration they shall be held to protection of the United States, except
have renounced it and to have adopted the such as shall have elected to preserve
nationality of the territory in which they their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in
reside. accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States
Thus —
and Spain, signed at Paris, December
"The civil rights and political status tenth eighteen hundred and ninety
of the native inhabitants of the territories eight." 23
hereby ceded to the United States shall be
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines"
determined by the Congress." 22
was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending a Spanish subject on the 11th day of April 1899. The
legislation by the United States Congress on the term "inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born
subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained
become American citizens, they, however, also ceased Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899. 24
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus Controversy arose on to the status of children born
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
Philippines entitled to the protection of the United during which period no citizenship law was extant in the
States. LibLex Philippines. Weight was given to the view, articulated in
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle
also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of of territoriality, operative in the United States and England,
1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago within
of the United States on the Philippines — that period. 25 More about this later.
". . . that all inhabitants of the In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United
Philippine Islands continuing to reside States made the following amendment to the Philippine
therein, who were Spanish subjects on the Bill of 1902 —
11th day of April, 1891, and then resided
"Provided, That the Philippine
in said Islands, and their children born
Legislature is hereby authorized to provide
subsequent thereto, shall be deemed and
by law for the acquisition of Philippine
held to be citizens of the Philippine
 citizenship by those natives of the have since become citizens of some other
Philippine Islands who do not come within country; Provided, That the Philippine
the foregoing provisions, the natives of Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
other insular possession of the United authorized to provide for the acquisition of
States, and such other persons residing in Philippine citizenship by those natives of
the Philippine Islands who would become the Philippine Islands who do not come
citizens of the United States, under the within the foregoing provisions, the natives
laws of the United States, if residing of the insular possessions of the United
therein." 26 States, and such other persons residing in
the Philippine Islands who are citizens of
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the
the United States, or who could become
concept of "Philippine citizens" had for the first time
citizens of the United States under the
crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William
laws of the United States, if residing
H. Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the
therein."
Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of
Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as the Jones the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the
Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of
Bill of 1902, as so amended by the Act of Congress in Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the
1912 — Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a
"That all inhabitants of the citizen of some other country.
Philippine Islands who were Spanish While there was, at one brief time, divergent
subjects on the eleventh day of April, views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of acquiring
eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any
then resided in said Islands, and their such link with common law, by adopting, once and for
children born subsequently thereto, shall all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being the basis
be deemed and held to be citizens of the of Filipino citizenship —
Philippine Islands, except such as shall
have elected to preserve their allegiance to "Section 1, Article III, 1935
the Crown of Spain in accordance with the Constitution. The following are citizens of
provisions of the treaty of peace between the Philippines —
the United States and Spain, signed at
Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred
and ninety-eight and except such others as
 "(1)Those who are citizens of the "Section 1, Article III, 1973
Philippine Islands at the time of the Constitution — The following are citizens
adoption of this Constitution of the Philippines:
"(2)Those born in the Philippines "(1)Those who are citizens of the
Islands of foreign parents who, before the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
adoption of this Constitution, had been this Constitution.
elected to public office in the Philippine
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers
Islands.
are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3)Those whose fathers or mothers
"(3)Those who elect Philippine
are citizens of the Philippines.
citizenship pursuant to the provisions of
"(4)Those whose mothers are the Constitution of nineteen hundred and
citizens of the Philippines and upon thirty-five.
reaching the age of majority, elect
"(4)Those who are naturalized in
Philippine citizenship.
accordance with law."
"(5)Those who are naturalized in
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also
accordance with law."
further provided that —
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, "A female citizen of the Philippines
taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, who marries an alien retains her Philippine
which provided that women would automatically lose their citizenship, unless by her act or omission
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign she is deemed, under the law to have
husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that renounced her citizenship."
effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their
Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and required The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, Constitution.
the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions
Section 1, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now
of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
provides:
concerns —
 "The following are citizens of the The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared
Philippines: to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935
Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring
"(1)Those who are citizens of the
citizenship — naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus
Philippines at the time of the adoption of
sanguinis 28 — had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli
this Constitution.
and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a
"(2)Those whose fathers or mothers "natural-born" citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli,
are citizens of the Philippines. per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last
long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
"(3)Those born before January reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of
17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Labor 30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the would now become the primary basis of citizenship by
age of majority; and birth.
"(4)Those who are naturalized in Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner
accordance with law." would tend to indicate that the earliest established direct
The Case Of FPJ ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo
Pou, married to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe.
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987
While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had not been
Constitution expresses:
presented in evidence, his death certificate, however,
"No person may be elected identified him to be a Filipino, a resident of San Carlos,
President unless he is a natural-born Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his
citizen of the Philippines, a registered death on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of
voter, able to read and write, at least forty the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe, showed that he was
years of age on the day of the election, born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou,
and a resident of the Philippines for at and a mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced
least ten years immediately preceding by petitioner was an "uncertified" copy of a supposed
such election." certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and
Paulita Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley reflected the date of
include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or certificate, Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years
perfect their Philippine citizenship." 27 old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen, and Bessie Kelley to
be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American
citizen. The birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A"
was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F. Poe, a Filipino, for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for respondent. The marriage
twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted
American citizen, twenty-one years old and married. as Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of
Lorenzo Pou was submitted by respondent as his Exhibit
Considering the reservations made by the
"5." While the last two documents were submitted in
parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth
evidence for respondent, the admissibility thereof,
certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his
particularly in reference to the facts which they purported
parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with
to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date
some degree of certainty from the documents would be
of marriage of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death
that —
certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo Pou on 11
1.The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all
and Bessie Kelley; admitted by petitioner, who had utilized those material
statements in his argument. All three documents were
2.FPJ was born to them on 20 August certified true copies of the originals.
1939;
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that —
3.Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were
married to each other on 16 "Original document must be
September, 1940; produced; exceptions. — When the subject
of inquiry is the contents of a document, no
4.The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo evidence shall be admissible other than
Poe; and the original document itself, except in the
5.At the time of his death on 11 September following cases:
1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years xxx xxx xxx
old.
"(d)When the original is a public
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to record in the custody of a public office or is
establish the fact that FPJ is a natural-born Filipino recorded in a public office."
citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and
Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death Being public documents, the death certificate of
certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe
in the custody of a public officer. The documents have and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ,
been submitted in evidence by both contending parties constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section
during the proceedings before the COMELEC. 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
 "Entries in official records. Entries in Records Management and Archives Office would have
official records made in the performance of had complete records of all residents of the Philippines
his duty by a public officer of the from 1898 to 1902.
Philippines, or by a person in the
Proof of Paternity and Filiation Under Civil Law.
performance of a duty specially enjoined
by law, are prima facie evidence of the Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing
facts therein stated." filiation (relationship or civil status of the child to the father
[or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the
The trustworthiness of public documents and the father to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently
value given to the entries made therein could be being an illegitimate son according to petitioner, the
grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually
affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force
disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the in the Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day
publicity of record which makes more likely the prior prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the
exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31 Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
that he died on 11 September 1954, at the age of 84 acknowledgment was possible only if done during the
years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be lifetime of the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment
assumed that Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
1870 when the Philippines was still a colony of Spain. document. 32 Complementary to the new code was Act
Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the No. 3753 or the Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5
Philippines during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 thereof, that —
considering that there was no existing record about such
fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. "In case of an illegitimate child, the
Petitioner, however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
Pou was at any other place during the same period. In his to jointly by the parents of the infant or only
death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated by the mother if the father refuses. In the
to be San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any latter case, it shall not be permissible to
evidence to the contrary, it should be sound to conclude, state or reveal in the document the name
or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a of the father who refuses to acknowledge
person at the time of his death was also his residence the child, or to give therein any information
before death. It would be extremely doubtful if the by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented
to prove voluntary acknowledgment of filiation or by both parties, nowhere in the document was the
paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement apparently executed, or at least shown to have been
rendered the same useless as being an authoritative executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only other proof
document of of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public
recognition. 33 In Mendoza vs. Mella, 34 the Court document." In Pareja vs. Pareja, 35 this Court defined
ruled — what could constitute such a document as proof of
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, voluntary acknowledgment:
after the registry law was enacted, the "Under the Spanish Civil Code there
question here really is whether or not his are two classes of public documents,
birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is merely those executed by private individuals
a certified copy of the registry record, may which must be authenticated by notaries,
be relied upon as sufficient proof of his and those issued by competent public
having been voluntarily recognized. No officials by reason of their office. The
such reliance, in our judgment, may be public document pointed out in Article 131
placed upon it. While it contains the names as one of the means by which recognition
of both parents, there is no showing that may be made belongs to the first class."
they signed the original, let alone swore to
its contents as required in Section 5 of Act Let us leave it at that for the moment.
No. 3753. For all that might have The 1950 Civil Code categorized the
happened, it was not even they or either of acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
them who furnished the data to be entered voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was
in the civil register. Petitioners say that in required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a
any event the birth certificate is in the will, a statement before a court of record or in any
nature of a public document wherein authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in
voluntary recognition of a natural child may favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate
also be made, according to the same child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Article 131. True enough, but in such a Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
case, there must be a clear statement in generally in cases when the child had in his favor any
the document that the parent recognizes evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim
the child as his or her own." legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child,
and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an
action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be "Art. 173.The action to claim
brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent. legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during
transmitted to the heirs should the child die
the oral argument, "authentic writing," so as to be an
during minority or in a state of insanity. In
authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition,
these cases, the heirs shall have a period
simply as being a genuine or indubitable writing of the
of five years within which to institute the
father. The term would include a public instrument (one
action.
duly acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official) or a private writing admitted by the  
father to be his.
"The action already commenced by
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; the child shall survive notwithstanding the
Article 172, Article 173, and Article 175 provide: death of either or both the parties.
"Art. 172.The filiation of legitimate "xxx xxx xxx
children is established by any of the
"Art. 175.Illegitimate children may
following:
establish their illegitimate filiation in the
"(1)The record of birth appearing in same way and on the same evidence as
the civil register or a final judgment; or legitimate children.
"(2)An admission of legitimate "The action must be brought within
filiation in a public document or a private the same period specified in Article 173,
handwritten instrument and signed by the except when the action is based on the
parent concerned. second paragraph of Article 172, in which
case the action may be brought during the
"In the absence of the foregoing
lifetime of the alleged parent."
evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively
applied; Article 256 of the code reads:
"(1)The open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate "Art. 256.This Code shall have
child; or retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired
"(2)Any other means allowed by the
rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
Rules of Court and special laws.
other laws."
 Thus, in Vda. De SyQuia vs. Court of Appeals, 36 the determine and regulate the relations of
Court has ruled: assistance, authority and obedience
"We hold that whether Jose was a among member of a family, and those
voluntarily recognized natural child should which exist among members of a society
be decided under Article 278 of the Civil for the protection of private interests." 37
Code of the Philippines. Article 2260 of In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster, 38 the Court has
that Code provides that 'the voluntary held:
recognition of a natural child shall take
place according to this Code, even if the "In accordance with Article 9 of
child was born before the effectivity of this the Civil Code of Spain, . . . the laws
body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Hence, Article 278 may be given status, condition and legal capacity of
retroactive effect." persons, govern Spaniards although they
reside in a foreign country; that, in
It should be apparent that the growing trend to consequence, 'all questions of a civil
liberalize the acknowledgment of recognition of illegitimate nature, such as those dealing with the
children is an attempt to break away from the traditional validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond,
idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate the domicile of the husband and wife, their
relationships within the family in favor of the greater support, as between them, the separation
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are of their properties, the rules governing
intended to merely govern the private and personal affairs property, marital authority, division of
of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the conjugal property, the classification of their
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would property, legal causes for divorce, the
also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship extent of the latter, the authority to decree
to the State. While, indeed, provisions on "citizenship" it, and, in general, the civil effects of
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be marriage and divorce upon the persons
taken in the context or private relations, the domain of civil and properties of the spouses, are
law; particularly — questions that are governed exclusively by
"Civil Law is that branch of law the national law of the husband and wife."
which has for its double purpose the The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to
organization of the family and the Civil Law is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil
regulation of property. It has thus [been] Code, stating that —
defined as the mass of precepts which
 "Laws relating to family rights and remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly
duties, or to the status, condition and legal impede or impinge on the domain of political law.
capacity of persons are binding
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of
upon citizens of the Philippines, even
determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed
though living abroad" —
independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family
reiteration of the Constitutional Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
significant in civil relationships found in different parts to personal and family relations. The ordinary
of the Civil Code, 39 such as on successional rights rules on evidence could well and should govern. For
and family relations. 40 In adoption, for instance, an instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily
adopted child would be considered the child of his precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or
adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as Family Code provisions.
their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court
only to define his rights under civil law 41 and not his
provides —
political status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against "Act or Declaration about pedigree.
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to The act or declaration of a person
the Spanish family and property laws, which, while deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to
defining proprietary and successional rights of members the pedigree of another person related to
of the family, provided distinctions in the rights of him by birth or marriage, may be received
legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set- in evidence where it occurred before the
up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles controversy, and the relationship between
and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines and the the two persons is shown by evidence
concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by other than such act or declaration. The
foreign blood was paramount. word 'pedigree' includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death,
These distinctions between legitimacy and the dates when and the places where
illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and these facts occurred, and the names of the
the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish relatives. It embraces also facts of family
Civil Code became the primary source of our own Civil history intimately connected with
Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should pedigree."
 For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that "4.Ronald Allan Poe 'FPJ' was
(a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, born on August 20, 1939 at St.
(b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the Luke's Hospital, Magdalena Street,
declarant must be a relative of the person whose Manila.
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made
"xxx xxx xxx
before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the
relationship between the declarant and the person "7.Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister
whose pedigree is in question must be shown by Bessie, met and became engaged
evidence other than such act or declaration. while they were students at the
University of the Philippines in 1936.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby
I was also introduced to Fernando
Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted
Poe Sr., by my sister that same
as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to
year.
prove the facts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own
paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e., living together with "8.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister
Bessie Kelly and his children (including respondent FPJ) Bessie had their first child in 1938.
in one house, and as one family —
"9.Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie
"I, Ruby Kelly Mangahas, of legal and their first three children,
age and sound mind, presently residing in Elizabeth, Ronald, Allan and
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being Fernando II, and myself lived
sworn in accordance with law do hereby together with our mother at our
declare that: family's house on Dakota St. (now
Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the
"1.I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelly
liberation of Manila in 1945, except
Poe.
for some months between 1943-
"2.Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of 1944.
Fernando Poe, Sr.
"10.Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister,
"3.Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by Bessie, were blessed with four (4)
the name of Ronald Allan Poe, more more children after Ronald Allan
popularly known in the Philippines Poe.
as 'Fernando Poe, Jr., or FPJ'.
"xxx xxx xxx
 "18.I am executing this Declaration to analysis is based on the fact that the DNA
attest to the fact that my nephew, of a child/person has two (2) copies, one
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born copy from the mother and the other from
Filipino, and that he is the legitimate the father. The DNA from the mother, the
child of Fernando Poe, Sr. alleged father and the child are analyzed
to establish parentage. Of course, being a
"Done in City of Stockton,
novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January
test as evidence is still open to challenge.
2004.
Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
Ruby Kelly courts should not hesitate to rule on the
Mangahas admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was
said, that courts should apply the results of
Declarant science when completely obtained in aid of
DNA Testing situations presented, since to reject said
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be result is to deny progress."
unlikely to satisfactory establish or would be difficult to  
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any Petitioner's Argument For Jurisprudential
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted Conclusiveness
to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe
In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals, 42 this Court has were a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing — citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child. According to petitioner, prior to his
"Parentage will still be resolved
marriage to Bessie Kelly, Allan F. Poe, on July 5, 1936,
using conventional methods unless we
contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making
adopt the modern and scientific ways
his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelly bigamous and
available. Fortunately, we have now the
respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The veracity of the
facility and expertise in using DNA test for
supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe
identification and parentage testing. The
and Paulita Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the
University of the Philippines Natural
documentary evidence introduced by no less than
Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI)
respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of
DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the
respondent and a marriage certificate of his parents
capability to conduct DNA typing using
showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to Filipino
short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
father and an American mother who were married to each stepson did not have blood of the
other a year later, or on 16 September 1940. Birth to naturalized stepfather.
unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate child.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon.
Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so
This case was not about the illegitimate
followed the citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelly, an
son of a Filipino father. It was about a
American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
legitimate son of a father who had become
Court in Morano vs. Vivo, 43 citing Chiongbian vs. de
Filipino by election to public office before
Leon 44 and Serra vs. Republic. 45
the 1935 Constitution pursuant to Article
On the above score, the disqualification made IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution.
by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is most No one was illegitimate here.
convincing; he states —
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The
"We must analyze these cases and case was not about the illegitimate son of a
ask what the lis mota was in each of them. Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate
If the procurement of the Court on jus child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
sanguinis was on the lis mota, the mother. The issue was whether one who
pronouncement would be a decision was already a Filipino because of his
constituting doctrine under the rule of stare mother who still needed to be naturalized.
decisis. But if the pronouncement was There is nothing there about invidious jus
irrelevant to the lis mota, the sanguinis.
pronouncement would not be a decision
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan. 46 This is
but a mere obiter dictum which did not
more complicated case. The case was
establish doctrine. I therefore invite the
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who
Court to look closely into these cases.
was the son of Leoncio Chan. Quintin
"First, Morano vs. Vivio. The case Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was
was not about an illegitimate child of a the illegitimate son of a Chinese father and
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued
Filipino, a stepson who was the child of a that he got his citizenship from Leoncio, his
Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The father. But the Supreme Court said that
issue was whether the stepson followed there was no valid proof that Leoncio was
the naturalization of the stepfather. in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Nothing about jus sanguinis there. The Court therefore concluded that Leoncio
was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not
Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. children and illegitimate children
Quintin therefore was not only not a rests on real differences. . . . But real
natural-born Filipino but was not even a differences alone do not justify invidious
Filipino. distinction. Real differences may justify
distinction for one purpose but not for
"The Court should have stopped
another purpose.
there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiterthat even if ". . . What is the relevance of
Leoncio, Quintin's father, were Filipino, legitimacy to elective public service? What
Quintin would not be Filipino because possible state interest can there be for
Quintin was illegitimate. This statement disqualifying an illegitimate child from
about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact becoming a public officer. It was not the
assumption, was absolutely necessary for fault of the child that his parents had illicit
the case. . . . It was obiter dictum, pure and liaison. Why deprive the child of the
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum fullness of political rights for no fault of his
in Morano vs. Vivo. own? To disqualify an illegitimate child
from holding an important public office is to
"xxx xxx xxx
punish him for the indiscretion of his
"Aside from the fact that such a parents. There is neither justice nor
pronouncement would have no textual rationality in that. And if there is neither
foundation in the Constitution, it would also justice nor rationality in the distinction, then
violate the equal protection clause of the distinction transgresses the equal
the Constitution not once but twice. First, it protection clause and must be reprobated."
would make an illegitimate distinction
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente
between a legitimate child and an
Mendoza (a former member of this Court), Professor
illegitimate child, and second, it would
Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom,
make an illegitimate distinction between
have expressed similar views. The thesis of petitioner,
the illegitimate child of a Filipino father and
unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta, should
the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
indeed fail.
"The doctrine on constitutionality
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child
allowable distinctions was established long
as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the
ago by People vs. Cayat. 47 I would grant
benefit of the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
that the distinction between legitimate
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the
assumption that the mother had custody, would exercise the latter's capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
parental authority and had the duty to support her presidential and vice-presidential election contest under
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice the Constitution. Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the
or discriminate against him. Court can directly be invoked only after, not before,
the elections are held.
The fact of the matter — perhaps the most
significant consideration — is that the 1935 Constitution, (3)In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether
the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and grave abuse of discretion has been committed by
year of birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen,
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of
citizens of the Philippines are "those whose fathers are respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a
citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from
there are clearly none provided. taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father.
Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou
In Sum —
could only be drawn from the presumption that having
(1)The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been
review, possesses jurisdiction over the petition in G.R. No. born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
161824, filed under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824 place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
abuse of discretion in dismissing, for lack of merit, the residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would
petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has prayed for the have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the
disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the Philippine bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
position of President in the 10th May 2004 Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
national elections on the contention that FPJ has son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935
committed material representation in his certificate of Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has
candidacy by representing himself to be a natural-born seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
citizen of the Philippines. fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
(2)The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction
and prematurity, the petitions in G.R. No. 161434 and No. (4)But while the totality of the evidence may not
161634 both having been directly elevated to this Court in establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still SO ORDERED.
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he
||| (Tecson v. Commission on Elections, G.R. Nos.
cannot be held guilty of having made a material
misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in 161434, 161634 & 161824, [March 3, 2004], 468 PHIL
violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of 421-755)
the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to
substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding
the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their [G.R. No. 183133. July 26, 2010.]
position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there
has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled BALGAMELO CABILING MA,
in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, 48 must not only FELIX CABILING MA, JR., and
be material, but also deliberate and willful. VALERIANO CABILING MA, petitioners, 
  vs. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO
F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE
WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B.
— CARONOÑGAN, ASSOCIATE
1.G.R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette COMMISSIONER JOSE DL.
C. Tecson and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE
Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald COMMISSIONER TEODORO B.
Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE
X. Fornier, Respondents," and G.R. No. 161634, entitled COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z.
"Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner, versus Ronald Allan LITTAUA, in their capacities as
Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for Chairman and Members of the Board of
want of jurisdiction. Commissioners (Bureau of
Immigration), and MAT G.
2.G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, CATRAL, respondents.
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as Fernando Poe,
Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the
DECISION
part of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing
the petition in SPA No. 04-003.
No Costs. ASCTac PEREZ, J p:
 Should children born under the 1935 They were all raised in the Philippines and have
Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they
who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine spent their whole lives, studied and received their
citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the primary and secondary education in the country; they
government upon reaching the age of majority, but do not speak nor understand the Chinese language,
who failed to immediately file the documents of have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any
election with the nearest civil registry, be considered relative of their father; they have not even traveled
foreign nationals subject to deportation as abroad; and they have already raised their respective
undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien families in the Philippines. 4 aIAEcD
certificates of registration? During their age of minority, they secured from
Positioned upon the facts of this case, the the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of
question is translated into the inquiry whether or not Registration (ACRs). 5
the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-
as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance
lived and spent as Filipinos. with Section 1 (4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution,
The resolution of these questions would which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are
significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age
petitioners. of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of
the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr.
The Facts
executed his affidavit of election of Philippine
Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then
Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao,
Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January
(Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio
and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del
Kong) Ma, 1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Norte. 7 In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance
Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina. 2 before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of
Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in
Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis his Affidavit of 7 March 2005. 8
of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, Having taken their oath of allegiance as
1951, and 1957, respectively. 3 Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have
the necessary documents registered in the civil registry
as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. The Complaint
625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of
to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit 14 of a
Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix
on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are
they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral,
Felix, Jr. did so. 9 On the other hand, there is no however, did not participate in the proceedings, and
showing that Valeriano complied with the registration the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint
requirement. against them was politically motivated because they
Individual certifications 10 all dated 3 January strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the
2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, 2004 National and Local Elections. 15
Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of
of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation
Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records of Sections 37 (a) (7) 16 and 45
on previous registrations are no longer available (e) 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise
because of the mandatory general registration every known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as
ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their amended. The Charge Sheet 18 docketed as BSI-D.C.
right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in
incumbent Barangay part:
Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City. 11
That Respondents . . ., all Chinese
Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli nationals, failed and continuously failed to
were born also in Surigao City in 1953 12 and present any valid document to show their
1959, 13 respectively. The Office of the City Civil respective status in the Philippines. They
Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the likewise failed to produce documents to
documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine show their election of Philippines (sic)
citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its citizenship, hence, undocumented and
Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other overstaying foreign nationals in the
supporting documents appear to show that Lechi Ann country.
initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently
elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of That respondents, being aliens,
majority. Likewise, no document exists that will provide misrepresent themselves as Philippine
information on the citizenship of Nicolas and citizens in order to evade the requirements
Isidro. ECSaAc of the immigration laws.
Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of 3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No.
Immigration 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March
1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be
After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were
forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of
afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the
Justice for final determination and review. 23
Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of
Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, As regards the documentation of aliens in the
rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the
that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Bureau of Immigration 24 requires that ACR, E-series,
Act No. 613, Sections 37 (a) (7) and 45 (e) in relation be issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial
to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD- registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in
01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively. 19 accordance with the Alien Registration Act of
1950. 25 According to public respondents, any foreign
The Board ruled that since they elected
national found in possession of an ACR other than the
Philippine citizenship after the enactment
E-series shall be considered improperly documented
of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved
aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance
on 7 June 1941, they were governed by the following
with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the Alien
rules and regulations:
Registration Act of 1950, as amended. 26
1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625,
Supposedly for failure to comply with the
providing that the election of Philippine citizenship
procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine
embodied in a statement sworn before any officer
citizenship via election proceedings, public
authorized to administer oaths and the oath of
respondents concluded that Felix, Jr., Balgamelo,
allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil
Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented
registry; 20 and Commission of Immigration and
and/or improperly documented aliens. 27
Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration
[BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954, 21 detailing the Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not
procedural requirements in the registration of the submit any document to support their claim that they
election of Philippine citizenship. caSEAH are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any
evidence to show that they are properly documented
2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August
aliens. For these reasons, public respondents likewise
1956 22 of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for
deemed them undocumented and/or improperly
the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration
documented aliens. 28
with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine
citizenship; The dispositive portion 29 of the Judgment of 2
February 2005 reads:
1. Subject to the submission of appropriate 613, Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis
clearances, summary supplied.)
deportation of Felix (Yao Kong)
In its Resolution 30 of 8 April 2005, public
Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma,
respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2
Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma,
February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli is an
Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro
immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section
Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese],
13 (g). 31 However, they denied the Motion for
under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)
Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest
(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation to BI
of his children. 32
M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-
01-035 dated 6 and 22 August Ruling of the Court of Appeals
2001, respectively; On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and
2. Issuance of a warrant of Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
deportation against Felix (Yao of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court
Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, 89532. They sought the nullification of the issuances of
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated
Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 2 February 2005, ordering the summary deportation of
613, Section 37(a);  the petitioners, issuance of a warrant of deportation
against them, inclusion of their names in the
3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners
Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, from the Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8
Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, April 2005, denying the petitioners' Motion for
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Reconsideration.
Ma and Isidro Ma in the
Immigration Blacklist; On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals
and DAEICc dismissed the petition 33 after finding that the
petitioners "failed to comply with the exacting
4. Exclusion from the Philippines of standards of the law providing for the procedure and
Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines
Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, either as aliens or as its nationals." 34
Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli
Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No.
 On 29 May 2008, it issued a Section 1. The following are citizens
Resolution 35 denying the petitioners' Motion for of the Philippines:
Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007.
(1) . . .;
To reiterate, a person's continued
and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, xxx xxx xxx
his being a registered voter or an elected (4) Those whose mothers are
public official cannot vest in him Philippine citizens of the Philippines and, upon
citizenship as the law specifically lays reaching the age of majority, elect
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship. 37
Philippine citizenship by election. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was
citizenship is certainly not a tedious and enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine
painstaking process. All that is required of citizenship, to wit:
the elector is to execute an affidavit of Section 1. The option to elect
election of Philippine citizenship and, Philippine citizenship in accordance with
thereafter, file the same with the nearest subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of
civil registry. The constitutional mandate the Constitution shall be expressed in a
concerning citizenship must be adhered to statement to be signed and sworn to by the
strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be party concerned before any officer
treated like a commodity that can be authorized to administer oaths, and shall
claimed when needed and suppressed be filed with the nearest civil registry. The
when convenient. One who is privileged to said party shall accompany the aforesaid
elect Philippine citizenship has only an statement with the oath of allegiance to
inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, the Constitution and the Government of
he should avail of the right with fervor, the Philippines.
enthusiasm and promptitude. 36 HCaDIS
The statutory formalities of electing Philippine
Our Ruling citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath;
The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and
the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of
the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon the statement of election and of the oath with the
reaching the age of majority. The mandate states: nearest civil registry.
 In Re: Application for Admission to the we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 38 we determined Justice, 43 that the three (3) year period is
the meaning of the period of election described by not an inflexible rule. We said:
phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." Our
It is true that this clause has
references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
been construed to mean a
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case
reasonable time after reaching the
of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice. 39 We pronounced:
age of majority, and that the
. . . [T]he 1935 Secretary of Justice has ruled that
Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not three (3) years is the reasonable
prescribe a time period within which the time to elect Philippine citizenship
election of Philippine citizenship should be under the constitutional provision
made. The 1935 Charter only provides that adverted to above, which period
the election should be made "upon may be extended under certain
reaching the age of majority." The age of circumstances, as when the person
majority then commenced upon reaching concerned has always considered
twenty-one (21) years. 40 In the opinions himself a Filipino. STHAID
of the Secretary of Justice on cases
involving the validity of election of However, we cautioned
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option
resolved by basing the time period on the to elect Philippine citizenship is not
decisions of this Court prior to the indefinite.
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In Regardless of the foregoing,
these decisions, the proper period for petitioner was born on February 16,
electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, 1923. He became of age on
based on the pronouncements of the February 16, 1944. His election of
Department of State of the United States citizenship was made on May 15,
Government to the effect that the election 1951, when he was over twenty-
should be made within a reasonable time eight (28) years of age, or over
after attaining the age of majority. 41 The seven (7) years after he had
phrase "reasonable time" has been reached the age of majority. It is
interpreted to mean that the elections clear that said election has not been
should be made within three (3) years from made "upon reaching the age of
reaching the age of majority. 42 However, majority. 44
 We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. In Mallare, Esteban's exercise of the right of
Ramos, 45 a case in which we adopted the findings of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a
the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. 50 The
whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot
Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of support herein petitioners' cause, pointing out that,
three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a
that "the belated submission to the local civil registry of Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to
the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance . . . was confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino
defective because the affidavit of election was citizen, 51 and that Esteban was born in 1929 52 prior
executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the
several years before their filing with the proper office enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. 53 CDHacE
was not satisfactorily explained." 46 In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than
In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life
because they belatedly complied with all the here in the Philippines. 54 Again, such circumstance,
requirements. The acts of election and their while similar to that of herein petitioners', was not
registration with the nearest civil registry were all done appreciated because it was ruled that any election of
beyond the reasonable period of three years upon Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have
reaching the age of majority. resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had
already elected Philippine citizenship for him 55 as,
The instant case presents a different factual
apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of
setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second
naturalization was issued to his father. 56
requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was
only the registration of the documents of election with In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his
the civil registry that was belatedly done. application for admission to the Philippine Bar
because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a
We rule that under the facts peculiar to the
statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of
petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has
allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the
not been lost and they should be allowed to complete
Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of
the statutory requirements for such election.
election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry
Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he
Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re: reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason
Florencio Mallare, 47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the for the late election of Philippine citizenship. 57
House of Representatives, 48 and Re: Application for
Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching. 49
 In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners' meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly,
argument of good faith and "informal election" consistently, and continuously been done. The actual
unacceptable and held:  exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a
century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the
Their reliance in the ruling contained
Philippine public which is equivalent to formal
in Re: Application for Admission to the
registration of the election of Philippine citizenship.
Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which
was decided on 1 October 1999], is For what purpose is registration?
obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that In Pascua v. Court of Appeals, 59 we
the Supreme Court, in said case, did not elucidated the principles of civil law on registration:
adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re:
Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the To register is to record or annotate.
Supreme Court was emphatic in American and Spanish authorities are
pronouncing that "the special unanimous on the meaning of the term "to
circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his register" as "to enter in a register; to record
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in
Philippines and his being a certified public a list." 60 In general, registration refers to
accountant, a registered voter and a any entry made in the books of the
former elected public official, cannot vest in registry, including both registration in its
him Philippine citizenship as the law ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation,
specifically lays down the requirements for annotation, and even the marginal notes.
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry
election. 58 made in the registry which records
solemnly and permanently the right of
We are not prepared to state that the mere ownership and other real rights. 61 Simply
exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, stated, registration is made for the purpose
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, of notification. 62 CTSHDI
and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine
citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. Actual knowledge may even have the effect of
What we now say is that where, as in petitioners' case, registration as to the person who has knowledge
the election of citizenship has in fact been done and thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to
documented within the constitutional and statutory all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed,
timeframe, the registration of the documents of contract, or instrument to others." 63 As pertinent is
election beyond the frame should be allowed if in the the holding that registration "neither adds to its validity
nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one
between the parties." 64 It lays emphasis on the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the
validity of an unregistered document. registration of the act of election, although a valid
requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that
Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted.
will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is
In a contract of partnership, we said that the only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has
purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; been claimed.
that failure to register the contract does not affect the
Indeed, we even allow the late registration of
liability of the partnership and of the partners to third
the fact of birth and of marriage. 69 Thus, has it been
persons; and that neither does such failure affect the
admitted through existing rules that the late registration
partnership's juridical personality. 65 An unregistered
of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of
contract of partnership is valid as among the partners,
birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared
so long as it has the essential requisites, because the
void solely because of the failure to have the marriage
main purpose of registration is to give notice to third
certificate registered with the designated government
parties, and it can be assumed that the members
agency. HIAcCD
themselves knew of the contents of their
contract. 66 The non-registration of a deed of donation Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of
does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious
requirement for the validity of the contract as between undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the
the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely
to bind third persons. 67 and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was
unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino
Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that
and the complete disavowal of any other nationality.
registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an
analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, Petitioners have passed decades of their lives
we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status
mode of acquiring ownership. having been formed by their past, petitioners can no
longer have any national identity except that which
Registration does not confer
they chose upon reaching the age of reason.
ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring
dominion, but only a means of confirming Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the
the fact of its existence with notice to the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR
world at large. 68 presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on
account of the new requirement to present an E-series
Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence
ACR, they are deemed not properly
of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the
documented. 70 On the contrary, petitioners should
not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it Better than the relaxation of the requirement,
would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-
and its constructive registration through their acts born citizens upon election of Philippine citizenship.
made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage, Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides:
election as public official, and continued and Section 2. Natural-born citizens are
uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The those who are citizens of the Philippines
failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent from birth without having to perform any
with petitioners' election of Philippine citizenship. act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship. Those who elect Philippine
citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been citizenship in accordance with
indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof 74 shall
liberalized the requirement on time of election, and be deemed natural-born
recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship. citizens. (Emphasis supplied.)
The favor that is given to such children is The constitutional bias is reflected in the
likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission.
provision on Philippine citizenship.
MR. CONCEPCION. . . . .
Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that
children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship xxx xxx xxx
upon reaching their age of majority, 71 upon the . . . As regards those born of Filipino
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely
become Filipinos 72 and need not elect Philippine gave them the option to choose Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The citizenship upon reaching the age of
1973 provision reads: majority, even, apparently, if the father
Section 1. The following are citizens were an alien or unknown. Upon the other
of the Philippines: hand, under the 1973 Constitution,
children of mixed marriages involving an
(1) . . . . alien father and a Filipino mother are
(2) Those whose fathers and Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the
mothers are citizens of the counterpart provision in the 1935
Philippines. 73 HATICc Constitution by dispensing with the need to
make a declaration of intention upon
reaching the age of majority. I understand
that the committee would further liberalize citizenship is just a reality imposed on us
this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The because we have no control of the laws on
Committee seemingly proposes to further citizenship of other countries. We
liberalize the policy of the 1935 recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But
Constitution by making those who became whether or not she is considered a citizen
citizens of the Philippines through a of another country is something completely
declaration of intention to choose their beyond our control. But certainly it is within
mother's citizenship upon reaching the the jurisdiction of the Philippine
majority age by declaring that such government to require that [at] a certain
children are natural-born citizens of the point, a child be made to choose. But I do
Philippines. 75 not think we should penalize the child
before he is even able to choose. I would,
xxx xxx xxx
therefore, support the retention of the
. . . Why does the draft resolution adopt the modification made in 1973 of the male
provision of the 1973 Constitution and not chauvinistic rule of the 1935
that of the 1935? 76 Constitution. 77 SacTAC 
xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx
FR. BERNAS. . . . Precisely, the reason MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child
behind the modification of the 1935 rule on who became a Filipino citizen by election,
citizenship was a recognition of the fact which the Committee is now planning to
that it reflected a certain male chauvinism, consider a natural-born citizen, he will be
and it was for the purpose of remedying so the moment he opts for Philippine
that this proposed provision was put in. citizenship. Did the Committee take into
The idea was that we should not penalize account the fact that at the time of birth, all
the mother of a child simply because she he had was just an inchoate right to
fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by
question on what citizenship the child subsequently choosing Philippine
would prefer arises. We really have no way citizenship, it would appear that his choice
of guessing the preference of the infant. retroacted to the date of his birth so much
But if we recognize the right of the child to so that under the Gentleman's proposed
choose, then let him choose when he amendment, he would be a natural-born
reaches the age of majority. I think dual citizen? 78
 FR. BERNAS. But the difference between form and substance. The failure to register the election
him and the natural-born who lost his in the civil registry should not defeat the election and
status is that the natural-born who lost his resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a
status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
individual in the situation contemplated in complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the administrative penalties, if any. The documents they
chance to choose. 79 submitted supporting their allegations that they have
already registered with the civil registry, although
xxx xxx xxx
belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes
[on the period within which to elect by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of
Philippine citizenship] Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the
administrative orders and other issuances of the
MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice
very, very important because his election shall be complied with within a reasonable
of Philippine citizenship makes him not time. CTEDSI
only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born
Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August
Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the
Court . . . . 80 Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89532 affirming
the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the
We are guided by this evolvement from election Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of
of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-
majority under the 1935 Philippine 09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to
Constitution to dispensing with the election petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma,
requirement under the 1973 Philippine Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given
Constitution to express classification of these children ninety (90) days from notice within which
as natural-born citizens under the 1987 to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of
Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February
of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that
documents of election should not result in the all requirements, including the payment of their
obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship. financial obligations to the state, if any, have been
Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine administrative fines; REVIEW the documents
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in
 submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in This Petition for Review on Certiorari 2 assails the
accordance with the decision of this Court. May 23, 2008 Decision 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA G.R. CV No. 00523, which affirmed the January 31,
SO ORDERED.
2005 Decision 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
Corona, C.J., Velasco, Jr., 29, Zamboanga del Sur that granted the Petition for
Nachura * and Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur. Naturalization 5 of
||| (Ma v. Fernandez, Jr., G.R. No. 183133, [July 26, respondent Azucena Saavedra Batuigas (Azucena).
2010], 639 PHIL 577-601) Factual Antecedents
[G.R. No. 183110. October 7, 2013.] On December 2, 2002, Azucena filed a Petition for
Naturalization before the RTC of Zamboanga del Sur. The
case was docketed as Naturalization Case No. 03-001
REPUBLIC OF THE
and raffled to Branch 29 of said court.
PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. AZUCENA 
SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS, respondent. Azucena alleged in her Petition that she believes in
the principles underlying the Philippine Constitution; that
she has conducted herself in a proper and irreproachable
DECISION manner during the period of her stay in the Philippines, as
well as in her relations with the constituted Government
and with the community in which she is living; that she has
mingled socially with the Filipinos and has evinced a
DEL CASTILLO, J p:
sincere desire to learn and embrace their customs,
"It is universally accepted that a State, in extending traditions, and ideals; that she has all the qualifications
the privilege of citizenship to an alien wife of one of its required under Section 2 and none of the disqualifications
citizens could have had no other objective than to enumerated in Section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 473
maintain a unity of allegiance among the members of the (CA 473); 6 that she is not opposed to organized
family." 1 government nor is affiliated with any association or group
of persons that uphold and teach doctrines opposing all
organized governments; that she is not defending or
teaching the necessity or propriety of violence, personal
assault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of men's ideas; that she is neither a
polygamist nor believes in polygamy; that the nation of
which she is a subject is not at war with the Philippines;
that she intends in good faith to become a citizen of the 1972-1976; and, in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur,
Philippines and to renounce absolutely and forever all thereafter, up to the filing of her Petition.
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate,
Azucena can speak English, Tagalog, Visayan, and
state or sovereignty, and particularly to China; and that
Chavacano. Her primary, secondary, and tertiary
she will reside continuously in the Philippines from the
education were taken in Philippine schools, i.e.,
time of the filing of her Petition up to the time of her
Margosatubig Central Elementary School in
naturalization. ATcaEH
1955, 14 Margosatubig Academy in 1959, 15 and the
After all the jurisdictional requirements mandated Ateneo de Zamboanga in 1963, 16 graduating with a
by Section 9 7 of CA 473 had been complied with, the degree in Bachelor of Science in Education. She then
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Motion to practiced her teaching profession at the Pax High School
Dismiss 8 on the ground that Azucena failed to allege that for five years, in the Marian Academy in Ipil for two years,
she is engaged in a lawful occupation or in some known and in Talisayan High School in Misamis Oriental for
lucrative trade. Finding the grounds relied upon by the another two years. 17 SIaHTD
OSG to be evidentiary in nature, the RTC denied said
In 1968, at the age of 26, Azucena married
Motion. 9 Thereafter, the hearing for the reception
Santiago Batuigas 18 (Santiago), a natural-born Filipino
of Azucena's evidence was then set on May 18, 2004. 10
citizen. 19 They have five children, namely Cynthia,
Neither the OSG nor the Office of the Provincial Brenda, Aileen, Dennis Emmanuel, and Edsel
Prosecutor appeared on the day of the hearing. James. 20 All of them studied in Philippine public and
Hence, Azucena's counsel moved that the evidence be private schools and are all professionals, three of whom
presented ex-parte, which the RTC granted. Accordingly, are now working abroad. 21
the RTC designated its Clerk of Court as Commissioner to
After her stint in Talisayan High
receive Azucena's evidence. 11 During the November 5,
School, Azucena and her husband, as conjugal partners,
2004 ex-parte hearing, no representative from the OSG
engaged in the retail business of and later on in
appeared despite due notice. 12
milling/distributing rice, corn, and copra. As proof of their
Born in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur on income, Azucena submitted their joint annual tax returns
September 28, 1941 to Chinese parents, 13 Azucena has and balance sheets from 2000-2002 22 and from 2004-
never departed the Philippines since birth. She has 2005. 23 The business name and the business permits
resided in Malangas, Zamboanga del Sur from 1941- issued to the spouses' store, 'Azucena's General
1942; in Margosatubig, Zamboanga del Sur from 1942- Merchandising,' are registered in Santiago's name, 24 and
1968; in Bogo City for nine months; in Ipil, Zamboanga del he is also the National Food Authority licensee for their
Sur from 1969-1972; in Talisayan, Misamis Oriental from rice and corn business. 25 During their marital union, the
Batuigas spouses bought parcels of land in Barrio WHEREFORE, premises
Lombog, Margosatubig. 26 considered, the petition is hereby granted.
To prove that she has no criminal SO ORDERED. 29 AIHDcC
record, Azucena submitted clearances issued by the
In its Omnibus Motion, 30 the OSG argued that
Philippine National Police of Zamboanga del Sur
the ex-parte presentation of evidence before the Branch
Provincial Office and by the National Bureau of
Clerk of Court violates Section 10 of CA 473, 31 as the
Investigation. 27 She also presented her Health
law mandates public hearing in naturalization cases.
Examination Record 28 declaring her as physically and
mentally fit. Rejecting this argument in its March 21, 2005
Order, 32 the RTC held that the public has been fully
To further support Azucena's Petition, Santiago and
apprised of the naturalization proceedings and was free to
witnesses Eufemio Miniao and Irineo Alfaro testified.
intervene. The OSG and its delegate, the Provincial
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court Prosecutor, are the only officers authorized by law to
On January 31, 2005, the RTC found appear on behalf of the State, which represents the public.
that Azucena has amply supported the allegations in her Thus, when the OSG was furnished with a copy of the
Petition. Among these are her lack of a derogatory record, notice of hearing for the reception of evidence ex-parte,
her support for an organized government, that she is in there was already a sufficient compliance with the
perfect health, that she has mingled with Filipinos since requirement of a public hearing. aTcIAS
birth and can speak their language, that she has never
had any transgressions and has been a law abiding
citizen, that she has complied with her obligations to the
government involving her business operations, and that
the business and real properties she and Santiago own
provide sufficient income for her and her family. Thus, the
RTC ruled:
. . . In sum, the petitioner has all the
qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to be admitted as citizen
of the Philippines in accordance with the
provisions of the Naturalization Law.
 The OSG then appealed the RTC judgment to the should not be treated like male applicants for
CA, 33 contending that Azucena failed to comply with the naturalization who are required to have their own
income requirement under CA 473. The OSG maintained "lucrative trade."
that Azucena is not allowed under the Retail Trade
Azucena denied that the hearing for her Petition
Law (Republic Act No. 1180) to engage directly or
was not made public, as the hearing before the Clerk of
indirectly in the retail trade. Hence, she cannot possibly
Court was conducted in the court's session hall. Besides,
meet the income requirement. And even if she is allowed,
the OSG cannot claim that it was denied its day in court
her business is not a "lucrative trade" within the
as notices have always been sent to it. Hence, its failure
contemplation of the law or that which has an appreciable
to attend is not the fault of the RTC.
margin of income over expenses in order to provide for
adequate support in the event of unemployment, sickness, Ruling of the Court of Appeals
or disability to work. The OSG likewise
In dismissing the OSG's appeal, 35 the CA found
disputed Azucena's claim that she owns real property
that Azucena's financial condition permits her and her
because aliens are precluded from owning lands in the
family to live with reasonable comfort in accordance with
country.
the prevailing standard of living and consistent with the
The OSG further asserted that the ex- demands of human dignity. It said: caADSE
parte proceeding before the commissioner is not a "public
Considering the present high cost of
hearing" as ex-parte hearings are usually done in
living, which cost of living tends to increase
chambers, without the public in attendance. It claimed that
rather than decrease, and the low
the State was denied its day in court because the RTC,
purchasing power of the Philippine
during the May 18, 2004 initial hearing, immediately
currency, petitioner-appellee, together with
allowed the proceeding to be conducted ex-parte without
her Filipino husband, nonetheless, was
even giving the State ample opportunity to be present.
able to send all her children to college,
Azucena countered that although she is a teacher pursue a lucrative business and maintain a
by profession, she had to quit to help in the retail business decent existence. The Supreme Court, in
of her husband, and they were able to send all their recent decisions, adopted a higher
children to school. 34 It is highly unlikely that she will standard in determining whether a
become a public charge as she and her spouse have petitioner for Philippine citizenship has a
enough savings and could even be given sufficient lucrative trade or profession that would
support by their children. She contended that the definition qualify him/her for admission to Philippine
of "lucrative trade/income" should not be strictly applied to citizenship and to which petitioner has
her. Being the wife and following Filipino tradition, she successfully convinced this Court of her
 ability to provide for herself and avoid naturalization at the time of their marriage nor do they
becoming a public charge or a financial have to submit themselves to judicial naturalization.
burden to her community. . . . 36 Copying from similar laws in the United States which has
since been amended, the Philippine legislature retained
As for the other issue the OSG raised, the CA held
Section 15 of CA 473, which then reflects its intent to
that the RTC had complied with the mandate of the law
confer Filipino citizenship to the alien wife thru derivative
requiring notice to the OSG and the Provincial Prosecutor
naturalization. 37 ECaHSI
of its scheduled hearing for the Petition.
Thus, the Court categorically declared in Moy Ya
Thus, the instant Petition wherein the OSG
Lim Yao  v. Commissioner of Immigration: 38
recapitulates the same arguments it raised before the
CA, i.e., the alleged failure of Azucena to meet the income Accordingly, We now hold, all previous
and public hearing requirements of CA 473. decisions of this Court indicating
otherwise notwithstanding, that under
Our Ruling
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473,
The Petition lacks merit. an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native born or naturalized, becomes ipso
Under existing laws, an alien may acquire
facto a Filipina provided she is not
Philippine citizenship through either judicial naturalization
disqualified to be a citizen of the
under CA 473 or administrative naturalization
Philippines under Section 4 of the same
under Republic Act No. 9139 (the "Administrative
law. Likewise, an alien woman married to
Naturalization Law of 2000"). A third option, called
an alien who is subsequently naturalized
derivative naturalization, which is available to alien women
here follows the Philippine citizenship of
married to Filipino husbands is found under Section 15
her husband the moment he takes his
of CA 473, which provides that:
oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she
"[a]ny woman who is now or may does not suffer from any of the
hereafter be married to a citizen of the disqualifications under said Section 4. 39
Philippines and who might herself be
As stated in Moy Ya Lim Yao, the procedure for an
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a
alien wife to formalize the conferment of Filipino
citizen of the Philippines."
citizenship is as follows:
Under this provision, foreign women who are
Regarding the steps that should be taken
married to Philippine citizens may be deemed ipso
by an alien woman married to a Filipino
facto Philippine citizens and it is neither necessary for
citizen in order to acquire Philippine
them to prove that they possess other qualifications for
 citizenship, the procedure followed in the Having been denied of the process in the
Bureau of Immigration is as follows: The CID, Azucena was constrained to file a Petition for judicial
alien woman must file a petition for the naturalization based on CA 473. While this would have
cancellation of her alien certificate of been unnecessary if the process at the CID was granted
registration alleging, among other things, in her favor, there is nothing that prevents her from
that she is married to a Filipino citizen seeking acquisition of Philippine citizenship through
and that she is not disqualified from regular naturalization proceedings available to all qualified
acquiring her husband's citizenship foreign nationals. The choice of what option to take in
pursuant to Section 4 of Commonwealth order to acquire Philippine citizenship rests with the
Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing applicant. In this case, Azucena has chosen to file a
of said petition, which should be Petition for judicial naturalization under CA 473. The fact
accompanied or supported by the joint that her application for derivative naturalization under
affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino Section 15 of CA 473 was denied should not prevent her
husband to the effect that the petitioner from seeking judicial naturalization under the same law. It
does not belong to any of the groups is to be remembered that her application at the CID was
disqualified by the cited section from denied not because she was found to be disqualified, but
becoming naturalized Filipino citizen . . ., because her husband's citizenship was not proven. Even
the Bureau of Immigration conducts an if the denial was based on other grounds, it is proper, in a
investigation and thereafter promulgates judicial naturalization proceeding, for the courts to
its order or decision granting or denying determine whether there are in fact grounds to deny her of
the petition. 40 Philippine citizenship based on regular judicial
naturalization proceedings.
Records however show that in February
1980, Azucena applied before the then Commission on As the records before this Court show, Santiago's
Immigration and Deportation (CID) for the cancellation of Filipino citizenship has been adequately proven. Under
her Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. judicial proceeding, Santiago submitted his birth certificate
030705 41 by reason of her marriage to a Filipino citizen. indicating therein that he and his parents are Filipinos. He
The CID granted her application. However, the Ministry of also submitted voter's registration, land titles, and
Justice set aside the ruling of the CID as it found no business registrations/licenses, all of which are public
sufficient evidence that Azucena's husband is a Filipino records. He has always comported himself as a Filipino
citizen 42 as only their marriage certificate was presented citizen, an operative fact that should have
to establish his citizenship. TcHCDE enabled Azucena to avail of Section 15 of CA 473. On the
submitted evidence, nothing would show
that Azucena suffers from any of the disqualifications this issue further delay the grant of Philippine citizenship
under Section 4 of the same Act. to a woman who was born and lived all her life, in the
Philippines, and devoted all her life to the care of her
However, the case before us is a Petition for
Filipino family. She has more than demonstrated, under
judicial naturalization and is not based on Section 15
judicial scrutiny, her being a qualified Philippine citizen.
of CA 473 which was denied by the then Ministry of
On the second issue, we also affirm the findings of the CA
Justice. The lower court which heard the petition and
that since the government who has an interest in, and the
received evidence of her qualifications and absence of
only one who can contest, the citizenship of a person, was
disqualifications to acquire Philippine citizenship, has
duly notified through the OSG and the Provincial
granted the Petition, which was affirmed by the CA. We
Prosecutor's office, the proceedings have complied with
will not disturb the findings of the lower court which had
the public hearing requirement under CA 473.
the opportunity to hear and scrutinize the evidence
presented during the hearings on the Petition, as well as No. 4, Section 2 of CA 473 provides as qualification
determine, based on Azucena's testimony and deportment to become a Philippine citizen:
during the hearings, that she indeed possesses all the
4. He must own real estate in the
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
Philippines worth not less than five
acquisition of Philippine citizenship. TcHDIA
thousand pesos, Philippine
The OSG has filed this instant Petition on the currency, or must have known
ground that Azucena does not have the qualification lucrative trade, profession, or
required in no. 4 of Section 2 of CA 473 as she does not lawful occupation.
have any lucrative income, and that the proceeding in the
Azucena is a teacher by profession and has
lower court was not in the nature of a public hearing. The
actually exercised her profession before she had to quit
OSG had the opportunity to contest the qualifications
her teaching job to assume her family duties and take on
of Azucena during the initial hearing scheduled on May
her role as joint provider, together with her husband, in
18, 2004. However, the OSG or the Office of the
order to support her family. Together, husband and wife
Provincial Prosecutor failed to appear in said hearing,
were able to raise all their five children, provided them
prompting the lower court to order ex parte presentation of
with education, and have all become professionals and
evidence before the Clerk of Court on November 5, 2004.
responsible citizens of this country. Certainly, this is proof
The OSG was also notified of the ex parte proceeding, but
enough of both husband and wife's lucrative
despite notice, again failed to appear. The OSG had
trade. Azucena herself is a professional and can resume
raised this same issue at the CA and was denied for the
teaching at any time. Her profession never leaves her,
reasons stated in its Decision. We find no reason to
and this is more than sufficient guarantee that she will not
disturb the findings of the CA on this issue. Neither should
be a charge to the only country she has known since alternative prayer therefor in a naturalization
birth. SaETCI proceeding." 45
Moreover, the Court acknowledged that the main This case however is not a Petition for judicial
objective of extending the citizenship privilege to an alien declaration of Philippine citizenship but rather a Petition
wife is to maintain a unity of allegiance among family for judicial naturalization under CA 473. In the first, the
members, thus: petitioner believes he is a Filipino citizen and asks a court
to declare or confirm his status as a Philippine citizen. In
It is, therefore, not congruent with
the second, the petitioner acknowledges he is an alien,
our cherished traditions of family unity and
and seeks judicial approval to acquire the privilege of
identity that a husband should be a citizen
becoming a Philippine citizen based on requirements
and the wife an alien, and that the national
required under CA 473. Azucena has clearly proven,
treatment of one should be different from
under strict judicial scrutiny, that she is qualified for the
that of the other. Thus, it cannot be that the
grant of that privilege, and this Court will not stand in the
husband's interests in property and
way of making her a part of a truly Filipino family.
business activities reserved by law to
citizens should not form part of the WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May
conjugal partnership and be denied to the 23, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
wife, nor that she herself cannot, through No. 00523 which affirmed the January 31, 2005 Decision
her own efforts but for the benefit of the of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 29, Zamboanga del
partnership, acquire such interests. Only in Sur that granted the Petition for Naturalization, is
rare instances should the identity of hereby AFFIRMED. Subject to compliance with the period
husband and wife be refused recognition, and the requirements under Republic Act No. 530 which
and we submit that in respect of our supplements the Revised Naturalization Law, let a
citizenship laws, it should only be in the Certificate of Naturalization be issued
instances where the wife suffers from the to AZUCENA SAAVEDRA BATUIGAS after taking an
disqualifications stated in Section 4 of oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
the Revised Naturalization Law. 43 Thereafter, her Alien Certificate of Registration should be
cancelled.
We are not unmindful of precedents to the effect
that there is no proceeding authorized by the law or by SO ORDERED. CcAIDa
the Rules of Court,for the judicial declaration of the
||| (Republic v. Batuigas, G.R. No. 183110, [October 7,
citizenship of an individual. 44 "Such judicial declaration of
citizenship cannot even be decreed pursuant to an 2013], 719 PHIL 20-36)
 March 8, 2016 COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015
Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-002
G.R. No. 221697 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, jurisdiction.
vs.
COMELEC AND ESTRELLA C. The Facts
ELAMPARO Respondents.
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner)
x-----------------------x was found abandoned as a newborn infant in the Parish
Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
G.R. No. 221698-700 (Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and
custody over petitioner was passed on by Edgardo to his
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three
LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and
vs. registered petitioner as a foundling with the Office of the
COMELEC, FRANCISCO S. TATAD, ANTONIO P. Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
CONTRERAS AND AMADO D. VALDEZ Respondents. Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was
given the name "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras
DECISION Militar." 1

PEREZ, J.: When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses
Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition
Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of San Juan City. On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
writ of preliminary injunction assailing the following: (1) 1 changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to
December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on "Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe." Although necessary
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's
2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed
15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the adoption,2 the petitioner's adoptive mother discovered only
sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San Jose
handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her
OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating husband who was then based in the U.S., the couple flew
petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive back to the U.S. two days after the wedding ceremony or
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an on 29 July 1991. 11
affidavit attesting to the lawyer's omission which she
submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest
issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16 April 1992. 12 Her two
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.4 daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika
(Anika) were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
petitioner registered as a voter with the local COMELEC
Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized
received her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for American citizen. 14 She obtained U.S. Passport No.
Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 5 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15

On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the
Philippine Passport No. F9272876 by the Department of Philippines together with Hanna to support her father's
Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993 and candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was
19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and during this time that she gave birth to her youngest
respectively secured Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S. with her two
and DD156616.7 daughters on 8 July 2004. 16

Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004,
Development Studies at the University of the petitioner rushed back to the Philippines upon learning of
Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
and left for the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner
Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston College in stayed in the country until 3 February 2005 to take care of
Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
Bachelor of Arts degree in Political Studies. 9 the settlement of his estate.18

On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her
Daniel V. Llamanzares (Llamanzares), a citizen of both father was a severe blow to her entire family. In her
earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to
petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
permanently in the Philippines sometime in the first remaining household belongings.29 She travelled back to
quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
resettlement including notification of their children's
schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed
for the next semester;20 coordination with property movers the U.S. Postal Service of the family's change and
for the relocation of their household goods, furniture and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family
cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with home was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be husband resigned from his job in the U.S. in April 2006,
followed in bringing their pet dog into the country. 22 As arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working
early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the for a major Philippine company in July 2006.33
U.S.23
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 square meter lot in Corinthian Hills, Quezon City where
May 200524 and without delay, secured a Tax they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the
Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal couple and their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer
Revenue. Her three (3) children immediately Certificate of Title covering said property was issued in the
followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
U.S. to complete pending projects as well as to arrange on 1June 2006.
the sale of their family home there.26
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to Republic Act
mother's place until she and her husband purchased a (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of with the Bureau of Immigration (BI) a sworn petition to
2005.27 The corresponding Condominium Certificates of reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her on 10 July 2006.37 As can be gathered from its 18 July
husband on 20 February 2006.28 Meanwhile, her children 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions
of school age began attending Philippine private schools. and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her
Philippine citizenship while her children are considered as
citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in resided outside of the U.S., specifically in the Philippines,
the names of her three (3) children. 39 from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May
2005 to present.51
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa
Lucia, San Juan City on 31 August 2006.40 She also On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to
secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing petitioner a "Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the United
the No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 States" effective 21 October 2010.52
March 2014 and she was issued Philippine Passport No.
EC0588861 by the DFA.42 On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the
COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6
appointed petitioner as Chairperson of the Movie and years and 6 months" to the question "Period of residence
Television Review and Classification Board in the Philippines before May 13, 2013." 53 Petitioner
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed
an "Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United Senator on 16 May 2013. 54
States of America and Renunciation of American
Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine
October 2010,44 in satisfaction of the legal requisites Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 55
stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following day,
21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the
the BI46 and took her oath of office as Chairperson of the Presidency for the May 2016 Elections. 56 In her COC, the
MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using her petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
American passport.48 that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9
May 2016 would be ten (10) years and eleven (11)
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice months counted from 24 May 2005.57 The petitioner
Consul of the U.S. Embassy in Manila an attached to her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation
"Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and sworn to before a
United States."49 On that day, she accomplished a sworn notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein she
stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming
Chairperson on 21 October 2010 with the intent, among elections triggered the filing of several COMELEC cases
others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the against her which were the subject of these consolidated
same questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697 and six ( 6) months as of May 2013 Elections. Elamparo
likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No.
Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a petition to deny due course 9225, she still fell short of the ten-year residency
or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15- requirement of the Constitution as her residence could
001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second only be counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she
Division.59 She is convinced that the COMELEC has reacquired Philippine citizenship under the said Act. Also
jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire
contention is that petitioner committed material lost Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that
misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that she is she failed to reestablish her domicile in the Philippines. 67
a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of
the Philippines for at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she
months up to the day before the 9 May 2016 Elections. 61 countered that:

On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that (1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over
petitioner cannot be considered as a natural-born Filipino Elamparo's petition as it was actually a petition
on account of the fact that she was a for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace
foundling.62 Elamparo claimed that international law does Poe wins in the Presidential elections, and that the
not confer natural-born status and Filipino citizenship on Department of Justice (DOJ) has primary
foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
not qualified to apply for reacquisition of Filipino
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a natural- (2) the petition failed to state a cause of action
born Filipino citizen to begin with.64 Even because it did not contain allegations which, if
assuming arguendo that petitioner was a natural-born hypothetically admitted, would make false the
Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she statement in her COC that she is a natural-born
became a naturalized American citizen.65 According to Filipino citizen nor was there any allegation that
Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must be continuous there was a willful or deliberate intent to
from birth.66 misrepresent on her part;

On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed (3) she did not make any material
out that petitioner was bound by the sworn declaration she misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated citizenship and residency qualifications for:
that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention give way to evidence on her true date of
deliberations show that foundlings were reacquisition of domicile;
considered citizens;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to
b. foundlings are presumed under usurp the sovereign right of the Filipino
international law to have been born of people to decide a purely political question,
citizens of the place where they are found; that is, should she serve as the country's
next leader.68
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda,
9225; the petition was deemed submitted for resolution.

d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division
American citizenship prior to the filing of her promulgated a Resolution finding that petitioner's COC,
COC for President in the May 9, 2016 filed for the purpose of running for the President of the
Elections and that the same is in full force Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National
and effect and has not been withdrawn or and Local Elections, contained material representations
recanted; which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution
reads:
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving
that she did not possess natural-born status; WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations,
the instant Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED.
she reestablished her domicile in the Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy for President of
Philippines as early as May 24, 2005; the Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016
National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary
g. she could reestablish residence even Grace Natividad Sonora Poe Llamanzares is
before she reacquired natural-born hereby CANCELLED.69
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015
h. statement regarding the period of Resolution was filed by petitioner which the
residence in her 2012 COC for Senator was COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015
an honest mistake, not binding and should Resolution by denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698- Philippines.77 He also stressed that there is no standard
700 state practice that automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.78
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed
by Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that
(Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against petitioner cannot avail of the option to reacquire Philippine
petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to
and raffled to its First Division. former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she
was a foundling.79
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad
15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the concluded that she did not comply with the ten (10) year
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner
Presidency.72 acquired her domicile in Quezon City only from the time
she renounced her American citizenship which was
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad
principle of jus sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, questioned petitioner's lack of intention to abandon her
particularly foundlings, cannot be considered natural-born U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband
Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative stayed thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
of natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory
construction that what is not included is excluded. He In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the
averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly COC of petitioner, docketed as SPA No. 15-139 (DC),
included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225
Constitution is indicative of the framers' intent to exclude did not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born
them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove citizen.83 He advanced the view that former natural-born
that she is a natural-born citizen.75 citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires
only their Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international original status as natural-born citizens.84
conventions or treaties to support her claim that
foundlings have a nationality.76 According to Tatad, He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her
international conventions and treaties are not self- COC for Senator that she had only been a resident of the
executory and that local legislations are necessary in Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months
order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the prior to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her.
Valdez rejected petitioner's claim that she could have petitioner which are not among the recognized grounds for
validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior the disqualification of a candidate to an elective office. 90
to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his
position was that petitioner did not meet the ten (10) year Second, the petitions filed against her are basically
residency requirement for President. petitions for quo warranto as they focus on establishing
her ineligibility for the Presidency.91 A petition for quo
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
petitioner, Contreras' petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15- Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) and not the
007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue. He COMELEC.92
claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should
be cancelled on the ground that she did not possess the Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born
ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy Filipino citizen is on the respondents.93 Otherwise stated,
and that she made false entry in her COC when she she has a presumption in her favor that she is a natural-
stated that she is a legal resident of the Philippines for ten born citizen of this country.
(10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May
2016.86 Contreras contended that the reckoning period for Fourth, customary international law dictates that
computing petitioner's residency in the Philippines should foundlings are entitled to a nationality and are presumed
be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to to be citizens of the country where they are
reacquire Philippine citizenship was approved by the found.94 Consequently, the petitioner is considered as a
BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical presence in the natural-born citizen of the Philippines. 95
country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of
reacquisition of her Philippine domicile since she was then Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has
living here as an American citizen and as such, she was every right to be repatriated under R.A. No. 9225 or the
governed by the Philippine immigration laws.88 right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments: presumption of regularity, to wit: the issuance of the 18
July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for citizen, her appointment as MTRCB Chair and the
failure to state a cause of action. His petition did not issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her
enumerated under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus position that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely relied on the Philippines.98
alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
2005, she started reestablishing her domicile of choice in Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
the Philippines as demonstrated by her children's to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of
resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a Candidacy of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA
condominium unit in San Juan City and the construction of POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
their family home in Corinthian Hills. 99 President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection
with the 9 May 2016 Synchronized Local and National
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish Elections.
her domicile of choice in the Philippines even before she
renounced her American citizenship as long as the three Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a
determinants for a change of domicile are complied reversal of the COMELEC First Division's Resolution. On
with.100 She reasoned out that there was no requirement 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
the acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC,
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the petitioner instituted the present petitions for certiorari with
residency portion of her COC for Senator was a mistake urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
made in good faith.102 restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction. On 28 December 2015, temporary
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC First Division ruled that petitioner is not a COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the
natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten assailed COMELEC Resolutions until further orders from
(10) year residency requirement, and that she committed the Court. The Court also ordered the consolidation of the
material misrepresentation in her COC when she declared two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12
therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for January 2016. Thereafter, oral arguments were held in
a period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of these cases.
the day of the elections on 9 May 2016. The COMELEC
First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad
elective position of President of the Republic of the S. Poe-Llamanzares and to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
Philippines. The dispositive portion of said Resolution
reads:
 1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the
through its Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity
(DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. of the ground should hedge in the discretion of the
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares. COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered case, such issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the
through its First Division, in the consolidated cases proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same
SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe- of the candidate.
Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic,
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, particularly its provisions in Article IX, C, Section 2:
respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, the following powers and functions:
respondent.
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the regulations relative to the conduct of an
Commission En Banc, upholding the 1 December election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
2015 Resolution of the Second Division. and recall.

4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the (2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
Commission En Banc, upholding the 11 December over all contests relating to the elections,
2015 Resolution of the First Division. returns, and qualifications of all elective
regional, provincial, and city officials, and
The procedure and the conclusions from which the appellate jurisdiction over all contests
questioned Resolutions emanated are tainted with grave involving elective municipal officials decided
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or
petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in involving elective barangay officials decided
the 9 May 2016 National Elections. by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.

The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the
COC of petitioner should be denied due course or Commission on election contests involving
elective municipal and barangay offices shall Financial contributions from foreign
be final, executory, and not appealable. governments and their agencies to political
parties, organizations, coalitions, or
(3) Decide, except those involving the right candidates related to elections constitute
to vote, all questions affecting elections, interference in national affairs, and, when
including determination of the number and accepted, shall be an additional ground for
location of polling places, appointment of the cancellation of their registration with the
election officials and inspectors, and Commission, in addition to other penalties
registration of voters. that may be prescribed by law.

(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the (6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its
President, law enforcement agencies and own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
instrumentalities of the Government, or exclusion of voters; investigate and,
including the Armed Forces of the where appropriate, prosecute cases of
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of violations of election laws, including acts or
ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and omissions constituting election frauds,
credible elections. offenses, and malpractices.

(5) Register, after sufficient publication, (7) Recommend to the Congress effective
political parties, organizations, or coalitions measures to minimize election spending,
which, in addition to other requirements, including limitation of places where
must present their platform or program of propaganda materials shall be posted, and
government; and accredit citizens' arms of to prevent and penalize all forms of election
the Commission on Elections. Religious frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance
denominations and sects shall not be candidacies.
registered. Those which seek to achieve
their goals through violence or unlawful (8) Recommend to the President the
means, or refuse to uphold and adhere to removal of any officer or employee it has
this Constitution, or which are supported by deputized, or the imposition of any other
any foreign government shall likewise be disciplinary action, for violation or disregard
refused registration. of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or
decision.
 (9) Submit to the President and the The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of
Congress a comprehensive report on the the qualifications of the President, the Vice-President,
conduct of each election, plebiscite, Senators and the Members of the House of
initiative, referendum, or recall. Representatives was made clear by the Constitution.
There is no such provision for candidates for these
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the positions.
exactitude of the provisions of Article VI, Section 17 of the
same basic law stating that: Can the COMELEC be such judge?

The Senate and the House of Representatives The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-
shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall Marcos v. Commission on Elections,104 which was
be the sole judge of all contests relating to the affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
election, returns, and qualifications of their COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall
be composed of nine Members, three of whom Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding
shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be
chosen on the basis of proportional representation Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate
from the political parties and the parties or who does not possess all the qualifications
organizations registered under the party-list system of a candidate as provided for by the
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Constitution or by existing law or who
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. commits any act declared by law to be
grounds for disqualification may be
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
provides that:
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice- action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC,
President, and may promulgate its rules for the in the exercise of its rule-making power under Art. IX, A,
purpose. §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that
the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds
power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which and the consequences of the respective proceedings, the
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack
on age, residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates,
§2(3)] however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule". Justice
Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of
grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in authorized proceeding for determining before election the
their grounds but also in their consequences are qualifications of a candidate.
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is
as already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an
Local Government Code and are for the purpose of individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over
continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either question which should be determined lest he wins
from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the because of the very acts for which his disqualification is
other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be
public office and the purpose of the proceedings for voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been
office. voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed
or his proclamation will be set aside.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the
qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates'
not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond
this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2 demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No.
of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
of [the] disqualifications provided in §4. determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in
the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995. any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
This is contrary to the summary character proceedings may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate. 107
relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied
if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in
they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, which he is a party, is declared by final decision of a
leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to
after the election and only in the event they are elected. be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or
Only in cases involving charges of false representations the Constitution.
made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given
jurisdiction. A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a
Petition to Deny to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy or
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre- Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate,
proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of
preserve the prerogatives of the House of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding for
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals determining before election the qualifications of
as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, candidate. Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a
returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment
President and Vice President, as the case may be. 106 of a competent court that the candidate sought to be
disqualified "is guilty of or found by the Commission to be
To be sure, the authoritativeness of suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated Constitution."
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523, on 25 September 2012 of its Rule Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned,
25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other.
states that: Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not
vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification
possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding
for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits before an authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The
prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation
executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or with a Filipino parent."
tribunal.
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding Filipino citizen is DEMONSTRABLE.
that he or she is suffering from a disqualification "provided
by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate of At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in
of false representations regarding his or her qualifications, Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a
without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said,
qualified, such prior authority being the necessary there is more than sufficient evider1ce that petitioner has
measure by which the falsity of the representation can be Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
found. The only exception that can be conceded are self- Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity respondents to show that petitioner is not a Filipino
and judicial confessions. Such are, anyway, bases citizen. The private respondents should have shown that
equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of both of petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission
representation can be determined. that she is a foundling did not shift the burden to her
because such status did not exclude the possibility that
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case
a proceeding under Rule 23 that deals with, as in this where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that her
case, alleged false representations regarding the parents are Filipinos.
candidate's citizenship and residence, forced the
COMELEC to rule essentially that since foundlings 108 are The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are,
not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the as their identities are unknown, but whether such parents
1935 Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
COMELEC stated in oral arguments, when petitioner
admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must
borders on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the have such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief
COMELEC, after saying that it cannot rule that herein in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral
petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any
citizen when "it is certain that such relationship is reasonable degree to establish the probability of
indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has the improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the There is a disputable presumption that things have
Philippine Statistics Authority (PSA)111 that from 1965 to happened according to the ordinary course of nature and
1975, the total number of foreigners born in the the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence,
Philippines was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in
born in the country was 10,558,278. The statistical Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of
probability that any child born in the Philippines in that the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
decade is natural-born Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo Province for province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than
1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's
962,532 Filipinos and 4,734 foreigners in the parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section
1970, the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented were figures for the
child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the
female Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners virtually impossible, as the norm. In the words of the
or 99.68%. In the same year, there were 210,349 Filipino Solicitor General:
males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there
were 270,299 Filipino females versus 1, 190 female Second. It is contrary to common sense because
aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were 245,740 foreigners do not come to the Philippines so they can get
Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do
or 99.53%. COMELEC did not dispute these figures. not face a situation where the probability is such that
Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the every foundling would have a 50% chance of being a
oral arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need
1968, the majority of the population in Iloilo was Filipino. 112 to frame our questions properly. What are the chances
that the parents of anyone born in the Philippines would
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the
petitioner's parents are the fact that she was abandoned parents of anyone born in the Philippines would be
as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo Filipinos? 99.9%.
City.1âwphi1 She also has typical Filipino features: height,
flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped eyes According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010
and an oval face. to 2014, on a yearly average, there were 1,766,046
children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as
opposed to 1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign
parents. Thus, for that sample period, the ratio of non- foundlings might be the child of not just one, but two,
Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. foreigners is downright discriminatory, irrational, and
This means that the statistical probability that any child unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical
born in the Philippines would be a natural born Filipino is certainty - 99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines
99.93%. would be a natural born citizen, a decision denying
foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court
the Philippines is 15,986 while the total number of should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
period, the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the
means that the statistical probability that any child born in use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.83%. As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born
citizens. While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration is
We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
crunch the numbers for us, but I am confident that the which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because
statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines of silence and ambiguity in the enumeration with respect
would be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
whether or not the parents are known. If at all, the framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal
likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent Revenue,114 this Court held that:
might even be higher than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their
children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do not The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping
imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the with the fundamental principle of constitutional
Philippines thinking those infants would have better construction that the intent of the framers of the
economic opportunities or believing that this country is a organic law and of the people adopting it should be
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I given effect. The primary task in constitutional
certainly doubt whether a foreign couple has ever construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure
considered their child excess baggage that is best left the realization of the purpose of the framers and of
behind. the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It
may also be safely assumed that the people in
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
render them stateless just because there may be a explanation offered by the framers.115
theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor Sr. Rafols:
General, the deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional There is a need, because we are relating the conditions
Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to that are [required] to be Filipino.
be covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is
recorded: Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after no [more] need for amendment.
subsection 2, the following is inserted: "The natural
children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not Sr. Rafols:
recognized by the father. The amendment should read thus:
"Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino
xxxx mother recognized by one, or the children of unknown
parentage."
President:
[We] would like to request a clarification from the Sr. Briones:
proponent of the amendment. The gentleman refers to The amendment [should] mean children born in the
natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children? Philippines of unknown parentage.

Sr. Rafols: Sr. Rafols:

To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person]
natural children of unknown parentage, natural or does not recognize the child, is not unknown.
illegitimate children of unknown parents.
President:
Sr. Montinola: Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown
parents." Current codes consider them Filipino, that is, I Sr. Rafols:
refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown I do not accept the amendment because the amendment
parentage born in Spanish territory are considered would exclude the children of a Filipina with a foreigner
Spaniards, because the presumption is that a child of who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may be unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and
applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown father [whom the latter] does not recognize, should also
parentage born in the Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, be considered as Filipinos.
and there is no need ...
President: Constitution to apply to them, should be governed
The question in order is the amendment to the by statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed
amendment from the Gentleman from Cebu, Mr. Briones. that the rules of international law were already clear
to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
Sr. Busion: citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave followed the nationality of the place where they
this matter in the hands of the Legislature? were found, thereby making unnecessary the
inclusion in the Constitution of the proposed
Sr. Roxas: amendment.
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases
are few and far in between, that the constitution need [not] This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor
refer to them. By international law the principle that General during the 16 February 2016 Oral Arguments:
children or people born in a country of unknown parents
are citizens in this nation is recognized, and it is not We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But
necessary to include a provision on the subject note that what was declined was the proposal for a textual
exhaustively.116 and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And so,
the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was that it was the view of Montinola and Roxas which
not because there was any objection to the notion that prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare
persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only foundlings as Filipinos.
because their number was not enough to merit specific
mention. Such was the account,117 cited by petitioner, of Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas'
delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who views were legally correct. Framers of a constitution can
said: constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing
During the debates on this provision, Delegate rules. This is basic. What matters here is that Montinola
Rafols presented an amendment to include as and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a convention that there is no more need to expressly
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the declare foundlings as Filipinos because they are already
Philippines, and also foundlings; but this impliedly so recognized.
amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained
to warrant the inclusion of a provision in the in terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x"
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to
(3) of the 1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried defend the "right of children to assistance, including
over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other
Chief Justice Fernando: the constitution is not silently conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly,
silent, it is silently vocal. 118 these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate
against foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the
framers "worked to create a just and humane society," Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that
that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
unfair to impute upon them a discriminatory intent against adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather,
foundlings." He exhorts that, given the grave implications the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be
of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born adopted. The most basic of such laws is Article 15 of the
Filipinos, the Court must search the records of the 1935, Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family
1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an express intention to rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons
deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on are binding on citizens of the Philippines even though
those who wish to use the constitution to discriminate living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
against foundlings to show that the constitution really adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a
intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v. Republic,119 a child left by an
across the board marginalization." unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
This Court said:
We find no such intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings. On the contrary, all In this connection, it should be noted that this is a
three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal proceedings in rem, which no court may entertain unless
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the
justice. Of special consideration are several provisions in case and over the parties, but also over the res, which is
the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides the personal status of Baby Rose as well as that of
that the "State values the dignity of every human person petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the
and guarantees full respect for human rights," Article XIII, theory that jurisdiction over the status of a natural person
Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest is determined by the latter's nationality. Pursuant to this
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose,
enhance the right of all the people to human dignity, she being a citizen of the Philippines, but not over the
status of the petitioners, who are and a Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied) is an act to perfect it.

Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no
"An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter- dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Foundling Certificate issued in her favor.122 The Decree of
Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved
Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled "An Act petitioner's adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald
Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes" (otherwise wife, Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence
known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this effectively affirming petitioner's status as a foundling. 123
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all
expressly refer to "Filipino children" and include foundlings Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.
as among Filipino children who may be adopted. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
It has been argued that the process to determine that the transformation or incorporation. The transformation
child is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling method requires that an international law be transformed
certificate under these laws and the issuance of said into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally
citizenship which make the foundling a naturalized Filipino accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the
at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
"Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to obligations. Generally accepted principles of international
acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first law include international custom as evidence of a general
place, "having to perform an act" means that the act must practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
be personally done by the citizen. In this instance, the recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary
determination of foundling status is done not by the child rules are accepted as binding as a result from the
but by the authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the combination of two elements: the established,
process is the determination of the whereabouts of the widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the and a psychological element known as the opinionjuris
process is certainly not analogous to naturalization sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the in the latter element is a belief that the practice in question
election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by Article 7
civilized nations" are principles "established by a process
of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on principles which 1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and
are "basic to legal systems generally,"127 such as "general shall have the right from birth to a name, the right to
principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
and justice," and the "general principle against know and be cared for by his or her parents.
discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International rights in accordance with their national law and their
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial obligations under the relevant international instruments in
Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination in this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be
Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning stateless.
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation."128 These are the same core principles which In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 24
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
Rights.129 nationality:"

Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has Article 24

been interpreted by this Court as part of the generally
accepted principles of international law and binding on the 1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to
State.130 Article 15 thereof states: race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social
origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality. protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the
part of his family, society and the State.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his
nationality nor denied the right to change his 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth
nationality. and shall have a name.

The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
the Rights of the Child (UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC
imposes the following obligations on our country: The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is
to obligate the Philippines to grant nationality from birth
and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State
nationality must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
accomplished by the application of our present considered to have been born within the territory of
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as parents possessing the nationality of that State.
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague
Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction
The principles found in two conventions, while yet of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a signatory to the Universal
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is ofwhich131 effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague
presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," Convention. Article 2 of the 1961 "United Nations
to wit: Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely
"gives effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v.
Article 14 Tagitis,  133 this Court noted that the Philippines had not
signed or ratified the "International Convention for the
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance."
the nationality of the country of birth. If the child's Yet, we ruled that the proscription against enforced
parentage is established, its nationality shall be disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless
determined by the rules applicable in cases where the binding as a "generally accepted principle of international
parentage is known. law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable for declaring the
ban as a generally accepted principle of international law
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to although the convention had been ratified by only sixteen
have been born on the territory of the State in which it was states and had not even come into force and which
found. (Underlining supplied) needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states.
Additionally, as petitioner points out, the Court was
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed content with the practice of international and regional state
born of citizens of the country where he is found, organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State
contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Practice in the United States.
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness:
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was
Article 2 not determinative is Mijares v. Ranada,  134 where
only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to" 135 the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016 Oral Arguments
1966 "Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or
Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters" 87.83%), foundlings are recognized as citizens. These
when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also circumstances, including the practice of jus
pointed out that that nine member countries of the sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted
European Common Market had acceded to the principle of international law to presume foundlings as
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws having been born of nationals of the country in which the
and jurisprudence on recognition of foreign judgments. In foundling is found.
all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
recognition of foreign judgments was widespread practice. Philippines to this generally accepted principle of
international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into 8042 and this Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer
account the fact that "generally accepted principles of to "Filipino children." In all of them, foundlings are among
international law" are based not only on international the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to
by civilized nations," as the phrase is understood in Article foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, This shows that even the executive department, acting
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine
fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and citizens.
which are "basic to legal systems generally,"136 support
the notion that the right against enforced disappearances Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague
and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly Convention and the 1961 Convention on Statelessness is
considered as "generally accepted principles of rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
international law" under the incorporation clause. sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of
natural-born citizenship of foundlings stems from the
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries presumption that their parents are nationals of the
in Asia, North and South America, and Europe have Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA
passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen. show, that presumption is at more than 99% and is a
Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus virtual certainty.
sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only thirty-three (33) are
parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty- In sum, all of the international law conventions and
six (26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
We cannot be restrictive as to their application if we are a Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former
country which calls itself civilized and a member of the status as a natural-born Filipino.
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in
his opening statement is relevant: R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been
described as such in several cases. They
.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we
Honorable Court that those treaties and conventions were described it as an "abbreviated repatriation process that
drafted because the world community is concerned that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also included
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa
would be tragically ironic if this Honorable Court ended up v. Court of Appeals,143 where we said that "[t]he
using the international instruments which seek to protect repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on
to accord them second-class citizenship.138 Audit144 is categorical that "if petitioner reacquires his
Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation will ... recover his natural-born citizenship."
in July 2006 under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not
result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. The The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the
COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must definition of natural citizens as implying "that natural-born
perform an act, what is reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted
citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship." and continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously
passed in line with Congress' sole prerogative to
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired.
jurisprudence on the matter of repatriation statutes in Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular. may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress'
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. determination.
HRET,  140 repatriation was explained as follows:
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the status must be continuous was already rejected
original nationality. This means that a naturalized Filipino in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth"
who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status was clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at
the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an "should be prospective in application for the reason that
act to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the
v. HRET, this Court pointed out that there are only two Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine's error, it
for repatriated citizens: should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens thereupon should be respected."148
under the present Constitution that there are only two
classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral
those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A arguments that petitioner committed a falsehood when
citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, ie., did not have to she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for
undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her
citizenship, necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to presume that
Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended
separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine that the data required were the names of her biological
citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor parents which are precisely unknown.
is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-
born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss This position disregards one important fact - petitioner
of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the was legally adopted. One of the effects of adoption is "to
applicable law for the reacquisition thereof. As respondent sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is of the adoptee."149 Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was
perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he possessed all also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to
the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and
the House of Representatives.146 which certificate "shall not bear any notation that it is an
amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases
is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit in the files of the court, the Department [of Social Welfare
a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot and Development], or any other agency or institution
be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept
and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr.,147 where we decreed strictly confidential."151 The law therefore allows petitioner
to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the
as that was what would be stated in her birth certificate U.S.
anyway. And given the policy of strict confidentiality of
adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost
that she was an adoptee. her original domicile, which is the Philippines. There are
three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to
petitioner, which it cannot make in the same case for remain there; and 3. an intention to abandon the old
cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile,
is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
by COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion. change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one
On Residence and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In
other words, there must basically be animus
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
issue of whether or not petitioner committed false material purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be
representation when she stated in her COC that she has for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen
Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months. for the new domicile must be actual.153

Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that
(10) years and eleven (11) months on the day before she and her family abandoned their U.S. domicile and
the 2016 elections, is true. relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence
include petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to the Philippines
ten (10) years' residence in the Philippines before the day every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences
of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be starting in March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight
held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident company to arrange for the shipment of their household
of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-
answer to the requested information of "Period of mail with the Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines; school
2016," she put in "10 years 11 months" which according to records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine
her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning schools starting June 2005 and for succeeding years; tax
identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005; titles petitioner could have started residence in the Philippines
for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No.
and their corresponding tax declarations issued in April 9225 was approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC
2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005 from the Salvation relied on Coquilla v. COMELEC,155 Japzon v.
Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC.  157 During the
petitioner's family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal oral arguments, the private respondents also
Service confirming request for change of address; final added Reyes v. COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that
statement from the First American Title Insurance these cases decree that the stay of an alien former
Company showing sale of their U.S. home on 27 April Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a
2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to permanent resident visa or reacquires Philippine
the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp
been a Philippine resident since May 2005; affidavit from being insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American
Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner on (without any resident visa) until her reacquisition of
24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May
affiant until the condominium was purchased); and 2005 to 7 July 2006 cannot be counted.
Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the
spouses jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four
2005 and that he stayed behind in the U.S. only to finish cases are very different from her situation. In Coquilla v.
some work and to sell the family home). COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a
community tax certificate secured by the candidate and
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts his declaration that he would be running in the
were even listed by the COMELEC, particularly in its elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a
Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases. candidate who wanted to count residence prior to his
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the Court
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the
petitioner's domicile had been timely changed as of 24 issue there was whether the candidate's acts after
May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero
Commissioner Arthur Lim conceded the presence of the v. COMELEC,  161 the candidate admitted that his place of
first two requisites, namely, physical presence work was abroad and that he only visited during his
and animus manendi, but maintained there was frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the
no animus non-revertendi.154 The COMELEC disregarded candidate was found to be an American citizen who had
the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on not even reacquired Philippine citizenship under R.A. No.
the basis of the position that the earliest date that 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was
disqualified on the citizenship issue. On residence, the otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan
only proof she offered was a seven-month stint as Program," shows that there is no overriding intent to
provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave
this Court, said that "such fact alone is not sufficient to after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who
prove her one-year residency." has been naturalized abroad and "comes or returns to the
Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on "providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
residence in the four cases cited by the respondents, the training to enable the balikbayan to become economically
Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa country"164 in line with the government's "reintegration
or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In contrast, program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary
the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken transients.
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to
permanently abandon her U.S. residence (selling the Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of
house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it
quotes from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute
Office of the abandonment of their address in the U.S., terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the
house) and permanently relocate to the Philippines and community before he attends to the necessary formal and
actually re-established her residence here on 24 May legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what
2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine petitioner did - she reestablished life here by enrolling her
schools, buying property here, constructing a residence children and buying property while awaiting the return of
here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly
husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her thereafter.
eventual application to reacquire Philippine citizenship
and her family's actual continuous stay in the Philippines No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's
over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on evidence of change in domicile is extensive and
24 May 2005 it was for good. overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against There is no judicial precedent that comes close to the
petitioner that she had entered the Philippines visa-free as facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication
a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended, in Coquilla v. COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by
the respondents that the Court intended to have its rulings Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query
there apply to a situation where the facts are different. in 2012 (period of residence before 13 May 2013) as
Surely, the issue of residence has been decided inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the
particularly on the facts-of-the case basis. COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC
itself introduced in the 2015 COC which is now "period of
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
evidence of residence of petitioner, the COMELEC ruled 2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if
that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and it did not acknowledge that the first version was vague.
eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was
false because she put six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date
"period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 earlier than the sale of her U.S. house and the return of
COC for Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
started being a Philippine resident only in November returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would
2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed include her passport and the school records of her
as true the statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC children.
as false.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she the 2012 COC as a binding and conclusive admission
misunderstood the date required in the 2013 COC as the against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against
period of residence as of the day she submitted that COC her, yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is
in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April- precedent after all where a candidate's mistake as to
May 2006 which was the period when the U.S. house was period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
sold and her husband returned to the Philippines. In that evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the
regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that candidate mistakenly put seven (7) months as her period
residence could be counted from 25 May 2005. of residence where the required period was a minimum of
one year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification
requirement." The COMELEC ought to have looked at the
evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the
truth that she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005.
Had the COMELEC done its duty, it would have seen that
the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated circumstances that surrounded the statement were
the pertinent period of residency. already matters of public record and were not hidden.

The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also
evidence that petitioner actually and physically returned brought up in the SET petition for quo warranto. Her
here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015,
because COMELEC took the position that domicile could admitted that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when
be established only from petitioner's repatriation under she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as she
R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take misunderstood the question and could have truthfully
away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from indicated a longer period. Her answer in the SET case
the U.S. and was here to stay permanently, on 24 May was a matter of public record. Therefore, when petitioner
2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015,
(10) years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in she could not be said to have been attempting to hide her
good faith. erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for Senator which
was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was
attempting to hide anything. As already stated, a petition The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show
for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET or even hint at an intention to hide the 2012 statement and
as early as August 2015. The event from which the have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
COMELEC pegged the commencement of residence, moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement
petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No. 9225, that:
was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her
senatorial candidacy. Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public
office does not necessarily constitute material
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying
and six (6) months in the 2012 COC, petitioner recounted due course to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further,
that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015 as already discussed, the candidate's misrepresentation
by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility
Petitioner appears to have answered the issue and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a
immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which
disputed petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
therefore when Rep. Tiangco discussed it in the media, made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to
the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the one's qualifications to run for public office. 168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of before us that at the time the declaration for Senator was
infallibilism, virtually ignored a good number of evidenced made, petitioner did not have as yet any intention to vie
dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was
Philippines and animus non revertedi to the United States never made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that
of America. The veracity of the events of coming and she would run for President in 2016. Presidential
staying home was as much as dismissed as candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of
inconsequential, the focus having been fixed at the a senatorial candidacy. There are facts of residence other
petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" than that which was mentioned in the COC for Senator.
which the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and Such other facts of residence have never been proven to
therefore an admission that her residence in the be false, and these, to repeat include:
Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006";
such that "based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to [Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005.
meet the residency requirement for President." This (petitioner's] husband however stayed in the USA to finish
conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing pending projects and arrange the sale of their family
jurisprudence that it is the fact of residence, not the home.
statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her
requirement of residency for election as President. It mother in San Juan City. [Petitioner] enrolled Brian in
ignores the easily researched matter that cases on Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
questions of residency have been decided favorably for Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was
the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far less in enrolled in Learning Connection in San Juan in 2007,
number, weight and substance than that presented by when she was already old enough to go to school.
petitioner.169 It ignores, above all else, what we consider
as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound by In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband
her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson Place Condominium in
was not even considered by the SET as an issue against San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until
her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a was completed.
resident for a period of six (6) years and six (6) months
counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother
had as reference the residency requirements for election discovered that her former lawyer who handled
as Senator which was satisfied by her declared years of [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the
residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new name and stating deadly diseased with grave abuse of discretion from root
that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. to fruits.
Sonora."
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in Resolutions, to wit:
order to supervise the disposal of some of the family's
remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner] 1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006. COMELEC Second Division, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC),
entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating
United States Postal Service of the family's abandonment that:
of their address in the US.
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006. Republic of the Philippines in the May 9, 2016 National
and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.
work in the US. He returned to the Philippines on 4 May
2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July 2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the
2006. COMELEC First Division, in the consolidated cases SPA
No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner,
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
vacant lot in Corinthian Hills, where they eventually built respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P.
their family home.170 Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC)
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
satisfy its intention to let the case fall under the exclusive Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating
ground of false representation, to consider no other date that:
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the
residence of petitioner for her candidacy as President of petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY
the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for
COMELEC in Division and En Banc are, one and all, the elective position of President of the Republic of the
Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016 [G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
Synchronized Local and National Elections.
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
Banc, upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the SION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S.
Second Division stating that: TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission
RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the
Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. DISSENTING OPINION
The Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of the
Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En
Banc, upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the I begin this Dissenting Opinion by outrightly
First Division. expressing my view that the opinion of Honorable
Justice Jose P. Perez on the issue of natural-born
are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY citizenship which was joined by six (6) other Justices
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES including the Honorable Chief Justice Ma. Lourdes
is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for P.A. Sereno, if not overturned, will wreak havoc on our
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May constitutional system of government.
2016. By their opinion, the seven (7) Justices would
amend the 1935 Constitution which was in effect when
SO ORDERED. petitioner was born, to add "foundlings found in the
Philippines whose parents are unknown" in the
[G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.] enumeration of natural-born citizen, as follows:
ARTICLE IV
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE- CITIZENSHIP
LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS (1935 Constitution)
SION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA
C. ELAMPARO, respondents. Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines
 (1) Those who are citizens of the 1, 2015 and December 23, 2015 Resolutions in SPA
Philippine Islands at the time of the Nos. 15-001 (DC); and, the December 11, 2015 and
adoption of this Constitution. December 23, 2015 Resolutions in 15-002 (DC), 15-
007 (DC), and 15-139 (DC) should be granted.
(2) Those born in the Philippine
Islands of foreign parents who, before It is my humble submission that petitioner
the adoption of this Constitution, had Senator Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares
been elected to public office in the (Poe for brevity) failed to show that the COMELEC En
Philippine Islands. banc gravely abused its discretion in affirming its
Second Division's December 1, 2015 and its First
(3) Those whose fathers are
Division's December 11, 2015 Resolutions, both
citizens of the Philippines [and
denying due course to and/or cancelling her Certificate
foundlings found in the Philippines
of Candidacy (COC) for the position of President of the
whose parents are unknown].
Republic of the Philippines, particularly with respect to
(4) Those whose mothers are the finding that she made therein material
citizens of the Philippines and upon representations that were false relating to her natural-
reaching the age of majority, elect born citizenship and ten-year period of residence in the
Philippine citizenship. Philippines that warrant the cancellation of her COC.
(5) Those who are naturalized in In gist, the bases for my dissent in the
accordance with the law. (Emphases disposition of the cases, which will be discussed in
supplied.) seriatim, are as follows — contrary to the findings in
This amendment of the Constitution by the the Ponencia:
judicial opinion put forth by the seven (7) Justices is On  the Procedural/Technical Issues
based mainly on extralegal grounds and a misreading
I. The review power of this Court relative to the
of existing laws, which will have unimaginable grave
present petitions filed under Rule 64 vis-à-
and far-reaching dire consequences in our
vis Rule 65 both of the Rules of Court, as
constitutional and legal system and national interest
amended, is limited to the jurisdictional
which this Dissenting Opinion will explain below.
issue of whether or not the COMELEC acted
For the above reason and other reasons, I without or in excess of its jurisdiction, or
dissent to the Ponencia of Mr. Justice Jose P. Perez with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
that the four consolidated petitions seeking the lack or excess of jurisdiction;
annulment and setting aside of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) December
II. Petitioner Poe failed to satisfactorily show that with its constitutional mandate to
the COMELEC was so grossly unreasonable promulgate rules of procedure to expedite
in its appreciation and evaluation of the the dispositions of election cases;
pieces of evidence submitted by the parties VII. The COMELEC has the power to determine
as to transgress the limits of its jurisdiction; petitioner Poe's citizenship notwithstanding
III. All the four petitions filed, inclusive of the Tatad the decision of the Senate Electoral Tribunal
Petition, subject of the assailed resolutions which is still pending appeal and which
of the COMELEC, adduced ultimate facts deals with different issues; and
establishing the cause of action for a On  the Substantive/Focal Issues
petition based on Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code (OEC); I. Sections 1 and 2, Article IV of the 1987
Constitution clearly and categorically define
IV. The COMELEC correctly considered the who are natural-born citizens: they are
allegations contained in the Tatad Petition citizens from birth with blood relationship to
as one filed under Section 78 of the OEC; a Filipino father or mother, following
V. The COMELEC did not encroach upon the the "jus sanguinis" principle;
jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral II. Salient Rules of Interpretation and/or
Tribunal when it took cognizance of the Construction of the Constitution dictate that
petitions to deny due course to or cancel the the clear and unambiguous letter of the
COC of petitioner Poe; the distinction Constitution must be obeyed;
between jurisdictions of the two tribunals
has already been settled III. Statutes, Treaties and International Covenants
in Tecson v. COMELEC, the jurisdiction of or Instruments must conform to the
the PET can only be invoked after the provisions of the Constitution;
election and proclamation of a President or IV. Pursuant to the Constitution, natural-born
Vice President and the question of citizenship is an indispensable requirement
qualifications of candidates for President or for eligibility to constitutionally identified
Vice-President properly belongs to elective positions like the Presidency;
the COMELEC;
V. Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as
VI. Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of the "Citizenship Retention and Re-
Procedure is a valid exercise of the rule- acquisition Act of 2003," makes natural-born
making powers of the COMELEC, which is citizenship an indispensable requirement for
not inconsistent and can be harmonized
 the retention and/or re-acquisition of of the 1987 Constitution; and even
Philippine citizenship; in other words, the assuming arguendo that she has re-acquired
right to avail of dual citizenship is only natural-born citizenship under Republic Act
available to natural-born citizens who have No. 9225, petitioner Poe has failed to
earlier lost their Philippine citizenship by establish her change of domicile from the
reason of acquisition of foreign United States, her domicile of choice to the
citizenship; TIADCc Philippines through clear and unmistakable
evidence.
VI. Petitioner Poe obtained dual citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 by misrepresenting to The Procedural Issues
the Bureau of Immigration that she is the Petitioner Poe seeks the annulment of the
biological child of a Filipino father and December 1, 2015 Resolution of
Filipino mother such that the Bureau was the COMELEC Second Division and December 23,
misled into believing that "[petitioner Poe] 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En banc, in SPA
was a former citizen of the Republic of the Nos. 15-001 (DC); and the December 11, 2015
Philippines being born to Filipino parents," Resolution of the COMELEC First Division and
which is a false factual averment not an December 23, 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
erroneous legal conclusion; and (ii) the said banc, in SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-
order was not signed by the Commissioner 139 (DC) via the instant consolidated petitions
of the BI as required by Department of for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of
Justice (DOJ) Regulation; the Rules of Court. 1 This mode of review is
VII. As a consequence of petitioner Poe's above- based on the limited ground of whether
stated misrepresentations, the July 18, 2006 the COMELEC acted without or in excess of
Order of the Bureau of Immigration granting jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
petitioner Poe's application for dual amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
citizenship or the re-acquisition of Philippine Court held in Jalover v. Osmeña 2 that:
citizenship was clearly invalid and her taking "Grave abuse of discretion" defies
of an oath of allegiance to the Republic did exact definition; generally, it refers to
not result in her re-acquisition of Philippine "capricious or whimsical exercise of
citizenship; and judgment as is equivalent to lack of
VIII. Not having validly reacquired natural-born jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must
citizenship, she is not eligible to run for the be patent and gross as to amount to an
Presidency pursuant to Section 2, Article VII evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, Court is not only obliged, but has the
or to act at all in contemplation of law, as constitutional duty to intervene. When
where the power is exercised in an grave abuse of discretion is present,
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason resulting errors arising from the grave
of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of abuse mutate from error of judgment to
discretion is not enough; it must be one of jurisdiction. (Citations omitted.)
grave. We have held, too, that the use The COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of
of wrong or irrelevant considerations in the evidence adduced by petitioner Poe is said to be
deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
decision-maker's action with grave abuse
of discretion. Petitioner Poe failed to hurdle the bar set by this
Court
Closely related with the limited in Mitra v. Commission on Elections 3 and Sabili v. 
focus of the present petition is the Commission on Elections, 4 which is to prove that
condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the the COMELEC was so grossly unreasonable in its
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of appreciation and evaluation of evidence as to amount
the COMELEC, supported by substantial to an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner Poe's insistence
evidence, shall be final and non- that the COMELEC utterly disregarded her
reviewable. Substantial evidence is that "overwhelming and unrefuted evidence" is baseless.
degree of evidence that a reasonable As stated in Mitra, substantial evidence is not a simple
mind might accept to support a question of number. The emphasis must be on what
conclusion. In light of our limited authority the pieces of evidence are able to substantiate and
to review findings of fact, we do what they cannot. I find that
not ordinarily review in a certiorari case the COMELEC's assessment of the evidence is logical
the COMELEC's appreciation and and well-founded. The conclusions it reached are
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by adequately supported by evidence and are well in
the COMELEC in this regard generally accord with the applicable laws and settled
involves an error of judgment, not of jurisprudence on the matter.
jurisdiction.
The petitions filed by respondents Elamparo,
In exceptional cases, however, Contreras, and Valdez sufficiently alleged the ultimate
when the COMELEC's action on the facts constituting the cause(s) of action for a petition
appreciation and evaluation of evidence under Section 78 of the OEC, that
oversteps the limits of its discretion to the petitioner Poe falsely represented in her COC that she
point of being grossly unreasonable, the
is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she complied Ordinary usage would
with the ten-year residency requirement. Also, they characterize a "contest" in reference to
averred that such false representations were made a post-election scenario. Election
with intent to deceive the electorate. contests consist of either an election
protest or a quo warranto which,
With respect to the petition of private
although two distinct remedies, would
respondent Tatad, the COMELEC properly
have one objective in view, i.e., to
relied on the allegation of said petition instead of its
dislodge the winning candidate from
caption as a petition for disqualification under Rule 25
office. . . . .
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. Clearly, private
respondent Tatad squarely put in issue the truthfulness xxx xxx xxx
of the declarations of petitioner Poe in her COC. The rules [Rules of the
Specifically, he alleged that petitioner Poe lacked Presidential Electoral Tribunal]
natural-born citizenship and failed to meet the ten-year categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
residency requirement, which are grounds for the the tribunal over contests relating to the
cancellation of her COC under Section 78. election, returns and qualifications of
As to the jurisdiction of the COMELEC vis-à- the "President" or "Vice-President," of
vis that of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal's (PET), I the Philippines, and not of "candidates"
strongly disagree in the conclusion that for President or Vice-President. A quo
the COMELEC, in ruling on the four Section 78- warranto proceeding is generally defined
petitions, usurped the jurisdiction of the PET. as being an action against a person who
Petitioner Poe espouses that due to the absence of a usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
false material misrepresentation in her COC, or exercises a public office. In such
the COMELEC should have dismissed the petitions context, the election contest can only
outright for being premature as they are in the nature contemplate a post-election scenario. In
of petitions for quo warranto, which is within the sole Rule 14, only a registered candidate who
and exclusive jurisdiction of the PET. This is plain would have received either the second or
error. The jurisdiction of the PET over election contests third highest number of votes could file
attaches only after the President or the Vice-President an election protest. This rule again
concerned had been elected and presupposes a post-election scenario.
proclaimed. Tecson v. Commission on Elections 5 cle It is fair to conclude that the
arly laid out that: jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
 1987 Constitution, would not include continuity of the service for the full term
cases directly brought before it, for which he was elected.
questioning the qualifications of a Unless otherwise provided by law,
candidate for the presidency or vice- the regular election for President and
presidency before the elections are Vice-President shall be held on the
held. (Emphases supplied, citation second Monday of May.
omitted.)
The returns of every election for
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution President and Vice-President, duly
sustains this above-quoted ruling. The grant of certified by the board of canvassers of
jurisdiction to the PET follows the provisions on the each province or city, shall be
preparations of the returns and certificates of canvass transmitted to the Congress, directed to
for every election for President and Vice-President and the President of the Senate. Upon receipt
the proclamation of the person who obtained the of the certificates of canvass, the
highest number of votes. AIDSTE President of the Senate shall, not later
SECTION 4. The President and than thirty days after the day of the
the Vice-President shall be elected by election, open all the certificates in the
direct vote of the people for a term of six presence of the Senate and the House of
years which shall begin at noon on the Representatives in joint public session,
thirtieth day of June next following the and the Congress, upon determination of
day of the election and shall end at noon the authenticity and due execution
of the same date six years thereafter. thereof in the manner provided by law,
The President shall not be eligible for any canvass the votes.
reelection. No person who has
The person having the highest
succeeded as President and has served
number of votes shall be proclaimed
as such for more than four years shall be
elected, but in case two or more shall
qualified for election to the same office at
have an equal and highest number of
any time.
votes, one of them shall forthwith be
No Vice-President shall serve for chosen by the vote of a majority of all the
more than two successive terms. Members of both Houses of the
Voluntary renunciation of the office for Congress, voting separately.
any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the
 The Congress shall promulgate its relating to the election, returns, and
rules for the canvassing of the qualifications" of the President and Vice-
certificates. President, Senators, and,
Representatives. In a litany of cases,
The Supreme Court, sitting en
this Court has long recognized that
banc, shall be the sole judge of all
these electoral tribunals exercise
contests relating to the election,
jurisdiction over election contests
returns, and qualifications of the
only after a candidate has already
President or Vice-President, and may
been proclaimed winner in an
promulgate its rules for the purpose.
election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of
(Emphasis, supplied.)
the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
In his separate opinion in Tecson, retired Chief provide that, for President or Vice-
Justice Reynato S. Puno was uncompromising about President, election protest or quo
the jurisdiction of the PET, to wit: warranto may be filed after the
The word "contest" in the proclamation of the winner. 7 (Emphasis
provision means that the jurisdiction of supplied, citations omitted.)
this Court can only be invoked after the Section 2 (2), Article IX of the 1987 Constitution
election and proclamation of a which expressly vests upon the COMELEC exclusive
President or Vice President. There can original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction over
be no "contest" before a winner is election "contests" involving local officials is consistent
proclaimed. 6 (Emphasis supplied.) with this doctrine. Election "contests" has a definite
And likewise in a separate opinion in the same case, meaning under the Constitution, which involve the
retired Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez emphasized that qualification of proclaimed winning candidates in an
— election.

The Supreme Court, as a On the other hand, Section 2, Article IX (C) of

Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the the 1987 Constitution providing that
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the COMELEC shall have the power to:
House of Representatives Electoral (1) Enforce and administer all laws and
Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, regulations relative to
each specifically and exclusively clothed the conduct of an election,
with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
respectively as "sole judge of all contests and recall. (Emphasis supplied.)
is sufficient basis to entrust to the COMELEC all According to the Ponencia,
issues relative to the qualifications of all "candidates" the COMELEC cannot, in a Section 78-petition, look
to run in National or Local Elections. Implementing the into the qualification of the candidate (for
aforementioned provision is Batas Pambansa Representative, Senator, Vice-President and
Bilang 881, or the "Omnibus Election Code of the President) simply because per its perusal of the 1987
Philippines" (OEC), which provides for the cancellation Constitution, the latter failed to categorically state that
of a candidate's Certificate of Candidacy on grounds the COMELEC was granted the power to look into the
stated in Section 78 thereof. A contrary construction of qualifications of candidates for President, Vice-
the Constitution will result in emasculating the President, Senator and Representatives. It is insisted
Constitutional mandate of the COMELEC to ensure that the specific provisions of the same giving the PET,
fair, honest and credible elections. The overbroad SET and HRET jurisdiction over the "election, returns,
interpretation of the power of the PET under the and qualifications" of the President, Vice-President,
Constitution will prohibit the COMELEC from even Senator and Representatives are sure fire evidence
disqualifying nuisance candidates for President. that the COMELEC does not have the authority to look
into the qualification of said candidates prior to a
Hence, it is beyond cavil that it is
determination in a prior proceeding by an authority with
the COMELEC, not the PET, which has jurisdiction
proper jurisdiction to look in to the same. Simply put,
over the petitions for the cancellation of the COC of
the Ponencia would have the fact of a Presidential,
petitioner Poe who is still a candidate at this time.
Vice-Presidential, Senatorial or Congressional
With the foregoing, I cannot but register candidate's qualification established in a prior
my strong dissent to the opinion in the Ponencia that proceeding that may be by statute, executive order, or
"[t]he exclusivity of the ground (that judgment by a competent court or tribunal, before
petitioner Poe made in the certificate a false material her/his COC can be cancelled or denied due
representation) should hedge in the discretion of course on grounds of false material representations as
the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the to her/his qualifications.
issues of the qualifications of the candidate for the
The Ponencia's analysis is utterly incorrect. As
position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet undecided
shown above, such analysis disregards existing
or undetermined by the proper authority.
jurisprudence stating that these electoral tribunals
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the same cancellation
exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a
case, decide the qualification of lack thereof of the
candidate has already been proclaimed winner in an
candidate." This opinion is contrary to the ruling
election.
penned by Justice Perez himself
in Reyes v. COMELEC. 8 If the Ponencia's analysis is allowed to become
the leading jurisprudence on the matter, the Court is as
good as amending the OEC by deleting the Section 78 possession of the one-year residency
thereof — there can no longer be a petition for denial requirement under the law.
of due course to or cancellation of COC because Lest it be misunderstood, the
the COMELEC has now been disallowed to look into denial of due course to or the
the whether or not a candidate has made a false claim cancellation of the CoC is not
as to her/his material qualifications for the elective based on the lack of qualifications
office that she/he aspires for. That a Section 78- but on a finding that the candidate made
petition would naturally look into the candidate's a material representation that is false,
qualification is expected of the nature of such petition. which may relate to the qualifications
As elucidated in Fermin v. COMELEC, 9 to wit: required of the public office he/she is
After studying the said petition in running for. It is noted that the candidate
detail, the Court finds that the same is in states in his/her CoC that he/she is
the nature of a petition to deny due eligible for the office he/she seeks.
course to or cancel a CoC under Section Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to
78 of the OEC. The petition contains the be read in relation to the
essential allegations of a "Section 78" constitutional and statutory
petition, namely: (1) the candidate made provisions on qualifications or
a representation in his certificate; (2) the eligibility for public office. If the
representation pertains to a material candidate subsequently states a
matter which would affect the substantive material representation in the CoC
rights of the candidate (the right to run for that is false, the COMELEC, following
the election for which he filed his the law, is empowered to deny due
certificate); and (3) the candidate made course to or cancel such
the false representation with the intention certificate. Indeed, the Court has
to deceive the electorate as to his already likened a proceeding under
qualification for public office or Section 78 to a quo
deliberately attempted to mislead, warranto proceeding under Section
misinform, or hide a fact which would 253 of the OEC since they both deal
otherwise render him ineligible. It with the eligibility or qualification of a
likewise appropriately raises a candidate, with the distinction mainly
question on a candidate's eligibility in the fact that a "Section 78" petition
for public office, in this case, his is filed before proclamation, while a
petition for quo warranto is filed after
 proclamation of the winning Contrary to petitioner's claim,
candidate. however, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction for the following reasons:
At this point, we must stress that a
"Section 78" petition ought not to be First, the HRET does not acquire
interchanged or confused with a "Section jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's
68" petition. They are different qualifications, as well as over the
remedies, based on different grounds, assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless
and resulting in different eventualities. a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
Private respondent's insistence, Petitioner has not averred that she has
therefore, that the petition it filed before filed such action.
the COMELEC in SPA No. 07-372 is in Second, the jurisdiction of the
the nature of a disqualification case HRET begins only after the candidate is
under Section 68, as it is in fact considered a Member of the House of
captioned a "Petition for Disqualification," Representatives, as stated in Section 17,
does not persuade the Court. AaCTcI Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
But the Ponencia misconstrues the above clear  
import of Fermin. It uses the latter case as its authority
to push its erroneous view that the COMELEC has no Section 17. The Senate
jurisdiction or power to look into the eligibility of and the House of
candidates in the absence of a specific law to that Representatives shall each
effect. have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole
Further, with all due respect to the Ponente, I
judge of all contests
submit that his position that it is only the
relating to the election,
PET/SET/HRET that has jurisdiction over the
returns, and qualifications
qualifications of candidates for President, Vice-
of their
President, Senator, or Representative runs counter to
respective Members . . . .
this Court's pronouncement in its Resolution in G.R.
No. 20724, Reyes v. Commission on Elections and As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,
Joseph Socorro B. Tan, 10 of which he was also the HRET does not have jurisdiction over
the Ponente, that — a candidate who is not a member of the
House of Representatives, to wit:
 As to the House of her ineligible for the position of
Representatives Electoral Member of the House of
Tribunal's supposed Representatives.
assumption of jurisdiction With the indulgence of my colleagues, to
over the issue of emphasize the incongruity of the position taken by the
petitioner's qualifications majority in this case led by the Ponente, allow me to
after the May 8, quote verbatim the relevant facts and findings of the
1995 elections, suffice it to Court in Reyes as written by the Ponente of this
say that HRET's jurisdiction case, to wit:
as the sole judge of all
contests relating to Let us look into the events that led
the elections, returns and to this petition: In moving for the
qualifications of members cancellation of petitioner's COC,
of Congress begins only respondent submitted records of the
after a candidate has Bureau of Immigration showing that
become a member of the petitioner is a holder of a US passport,
House of and that her status is that of a
Representatives. "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of
Petitioner not being a proof shifted to petitioner, imposing upon
member of the House of her the duty to prove that she is a
Representatives, it is natural-born Filipino citizen and has not
obvious that the HRET at lost the same, or that she has re-
this point has no acquired such status in accordance with
jurisdiction over the the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside
question. (Emphasis from the bare allegation that she is a
supplied.) natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such
And, interestingly, it was held that — contention. Neither did she submit any
As to the issue of whether proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No.
petitioner failed to prove her Filipino 9225 to her.
citizenship, as well as her one-year xxx xxx xxx
residency in Marinduque, suffice it to
say that the COMELEC committed no These circumstances, taken
grave abuse of discretion in finding together, show that a doubt was clearly
 cast on petitioner's citizenship. Petitioner, provided that the evidence for the
however, failed to clear such doubt. grounds for denial to or cancel certificate
of candidacy is strong. For this purpose,
xxx xxx xxx
at least three (3) days prior to any
All in all, considering that the election, the Clerk of
petition for denial and cancellation of the Commission shall prepare a list of
the COC is summary in nature, pending cases and furnish all
the COMELEC is given much Commissioners copies of the said list.
discretion in the evaluation and
A Decision or Resolution is
admission of evidence pursuant to its
deemed final and executory if, in case of
principal objective of determining of
a Division ruling, no motion for
whether or not the COC should be
reconsideration is filed within the
cancelled . . . .
reglementary period, or in cases of
Here, this Court finds that rulings of the Commission En Banc, no
petitioner failed to adequately and restraining order is issued by the
substantially show that grave abuse of Supreme Court within five (5) days
discretion exists. from receipt of the decision or
With the above, I am at a loss how the Court, resolution. (Emphasis supplied.)
through the majority, could rule the way it did in this does not violate Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987
case when not so long ago it took the opposite position Constitution, which states that —
and dismissed the petition of Reyes.
SEC. 7. Each Commission shall
Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of decide by a majority vote of all its
Procedure, as amended, which reads: Members any case or matter brought
SEC. 8. Effect if Petition before it within sixty days from the date
Unresolved. — If a Petition to Deny Due of its submission for decision or
Course to or Cancel a Certificate of resolution. A case or matter is deemed
Candidacy is unresolved by final submitted for decision or resolution upon
judgment on the day of elections, the the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
petitioner may file a motion with the memorandum required by the rules of
Division or Commission En Banc, as may the Commission or by
be applicable, to suspend the the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
proclamation of the candidate concerned, provided by this Constitution or by
 law, any decision, order, or ruling of motions for reconsideration of decisions
each Commission may be brought to the shall be decided by the Commission en
Supreme Court on certiorari by the banc.
aggrieved party within thirty days from The Substantive Issues
receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis
supplied.) The issue is whether or not the COMELEC En
banc acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting
Section 8, Rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules is a valid to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it cancelled the
exercise of the rule-making powers of COC for Presidency of Petitioner Poe on the
the COMELEC notwithstanding Section 7, Article IX of substantive grounds of lack of citizenship and
the 1987 Constitution. The condition "[u]nless residency qualifications.
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law" that
is mentioned in the latter provision gives I hold that it did not.
the COMELEC the flexibility to fix a shorter period for Ground for Petition for
the finality of its decision and its immediate execution Cancellation of COC under Section
in consonance with the necessity to speedily dispose 78 of the OEC
of election cases, but without prejudice to the
continuation of the review proceedings before this Section 78 of the OEC provides that —
Court. Certainly, this is not inconsistent SECTION 78. Petition to deny due
with Commission's constitutional mandate to course to or cancel a certificate of
promulgate its own rules of procedure to expedite the candidacy. — A verified petition seeking
dispositions of election cases, viz.: to deny due course or to cancel a
ARTICLE IX certificate of candidacy may be filed by
CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION the person exclusively on the
C. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS ground that any material
representation contained therein as
SEC. 3. required under Section 74 hereof is
The Commission on Elections may sit en false. The petition may be filed at any
banc or in two divisions, and shall time not later than twenty-five days from
promulgate its rules of procedure in order the time of the filing of the certificate of
to expedite disposition of election cases, candidacy and shall be decided, after
including pre-proclamation controversies. due notice and hearing, not later than
All such election cases shall be heard fifteen days before the election.
and decided in division, provided that (Emphasis supplied.) EcTCAD
 In relation thereto, Section 74 also of the OEC name by which he has been baptized, or
requires: if has not been baptized in any church or
religion, the name registered in the office
SECTION 74. Contents of
of the local civil registrar or any other
certificate of candidacy. — The certificate
name allowed under the provisions of
of candidacy shall state that the person
existing law or, in the case of a Muslim,
filing it is announcing his candidacy for
his Hadji name after performing the
the office stated therein and that he is
prescribed religious
eligible for said office; if for Member of
pilgrimage: Provided, That when there
the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
are two or more candidates for an office
including its component cities, highly
with the same name and surname, each
urbanized city or district or sector which
candidate, upon being made aware of
he seeks to represent; the political party
such fact, shall state his paternal and
to which he belongs; civil status; his date
maternal surname, except the incumbent
of birth; residence; his post office
who may continue to use the name and
address for all election purposes; his
surname stated in his certificate of
profession or occupation; that he will
candidacy when he was elected. He may
support and defend the Constitution of
also include one nickname or stage
the Philippines and will maintain true faith
name by which he is generally or
and allegiance thereto; that he will obey
popularly known in the locality.
the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted The person filing a certificate of
authorities; that he is not a permanent candidacy shall also affix his latest
resident or immigrant to a foreign photograph, passport size; a statement in
country; that the obligation imposed by duplicate containing his bio-data and
his oath is assumed voluntarily, without program of government not exceeding
mental reservation or purpose of one hundred words, if he so desires.
evasion; and that the facts stated in the In her 2016 COC for President, much like in her
certificate of candidacy are true to the 2013 COC for Senator, petitioner Poe made the
best of his knowledge. following verified representations, viz.:
Unless a candidate has officially 7. PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
changed his name through a court PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY
approved proceeding, a certificate shall BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:
use in a certificate of candidacy the
 10 No. of Years 11 No. of Months Petitioner Poe being a foundling, does not come
within the purview of this constitutionally ordained
8. I AM A NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO
principle.
CITIZEN.
xxx xxx xxx During the effectivity of the Spanish Civil Code
in the Philippines on December 8, 1889, the doctrines
9. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I of jus soli and jus sanguinis were adopted as the
SEEK TO BE ELECTED TO. 11 principles of attribution of nationality at birth. 12
Materiality of the Representation Upon approval of the Tydings-McDuffie Act
With respect to the issue of materiality of the (Public Act No. 127), a Constitutional Convention was
representation, as above discussed, Mitra has settled organized in 1934. The Constitution proposed for
that "critical material facts are those that refer to a adoption by the said Convention was ratified by the
candidate's qualifications for elective office, such as Philippine electorate in 1935 after its approval by the
his or her citizenship and residence"; thus, the President of the United States. 13
materiality of the representations on citizenship, It was in the 1935 Constitution that the
residence and/or eligibility is no longer in issue. Philippines adopted the doctrine of jus sanguinis,
  literally translated to right by blood, or the acquisition
of citizenship by birth to parents who are citizens of the
Falsity of the Representation Philippines. The doctrine of jus sanguinis considers
But the truthfulness of the material blood relationship to one's parents as a sounder
representation remains an issue to be resolved. guarantee of loyalty to the country than the doctrine
of jus soli, or the attainment of a citizenship by the
Citizenship Requirement place of one's birth. 14 The case
In the present case, I submit that of Tecson v. Commission on Elections traced the
petitioner Poe's representation that she is a natural- history, significance, and evolution of the doctrine
born Filipino citizen, hence, eligible to run for and hold of jus sanguinis in our jurisdiction as follows:
the position of President, is false. My position is While there was, at one brief time,
anchored on the following reasons: divergent views on whether or not jus
Under the Constitution, natural- soli was a mode of acquiring citizenship,
born Filipino citizenship is based on the 1935 Constitution brought to an end
blood relationship to a Filipino to any such link with common law, by
father or mother following the "jus adopting, once and for all, jus
sanguinis" principle
sanguinis or blood relationship as being Subsection (4), Article III, of the
the basis of Filipino citizenship — 1935 Constitution, taken together with
existing civil law provisions at the time,
"Section 1, Article III,
which provided that women would
1935 Constitution. The
automatically lose their Filipino
following are citizens of the
citizenship and acquire that of their
Philippines —
foreign husbands, resulted in
(1) Those who are discriminatory situations that effectively
citizens of the Philippine incapacitated the women from
Islands at the time of the transmitting their Filipino citizenship to
adoption of this their legitimate children and required
Constitution. illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to
(2) Those born in the still elect Filipino citizenship upon
Philippine Islands of foreign reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
parents who, before the correct this anomaly, as well as fully
adoption of this cognizant of the newly found status of
Constitution, had been Filipino women as equals to men, the
elected to public office in framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted
the Philippine Islands. the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such
(3) Those whose concerns —
fathers [or mothers] are
citizens of the Philippines. "Section 1, Article III,
1973 Constitution — The
(4) Those whose following are citizens of the
mothers are citizens of the Philippines:
Philippines and upon
reaching the age of (1) Those who are
majority, elect Philippine citizens of the Philippines at
citizenship. the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
(5) Those who are
naturalized in accordance (2) Those whose
with law." fathers or mothers are
citizens of the Philippines.
 (3) Those who elect The following are
Philippine citizenship citizens of the Philippines:
pursuant to the provisions (1) Those who are
of the Constitution of citizens of the Philippines at
nineteen hundred and the time of the adoption of
thirty-five. this Constitution.
(4) Those who are (2) Those whose
naturalized in accordance fathers or mothers are
with law." citizens of the Philippines.
For good measure, Section 2 of the (3) Those born
same article also further provided that — before January 17, 1973 of
"A female citizen of Filipino mothers, who elect
the Philippines who marries Philippine citizenship upon
an alien retains her reaching the age of
Philippine citizenship, majority; and
unless by her act or (4) Those who are
omission she is deemed, naturalized in accordance
under the law to have with law."
renounced her
citizenship." HSAcaE The Case of FPJ
The 1987 Constitution generally Section 2, Article VII, of the
adopted the provisions of the 1973 1987 Constitution
Constitution, except for subsection (3) expresses:
thereof that aimed to correct the irregular No person may be
situation generated by the elected President unless he
questionable proviso in the 1935 is a natural-born citizen of
Constitution. the Philippines, a registered
"Section 1, Article IV, voter, able to read and
1987 Constitution now write, at least forty years of
provides: age on the day of the
election, and a resident of
 the Philippines for at least Thus, contrary to the insistence of
ten years immediately petitioner Poe that there is nothing in our Constitutions
preceding such election. that enjoin our adherence to the principle of "jus
sanguinis" or "by right of blood," said principle is, in
The term "natural-born citizens," is
reality, well-entrenched in our constitutional system.
defined to include 'those who are citizens
One needs only to read the 1935, 1973 and 1987
of the Philippines from birth without
Constitutions and the jurisprudence detailing the
having to perform any act to acquire or
history of the well deliberated adoption of the jus
perfect their Philippine citizenship.'
sanguinis principle as the basis for natural-born
The date, month and year of birth Filipino citizenship, to understand that its significance
of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 cannot be lightly ignored, misconstrued, and trivialized.
during the regime of the 1935
Natural-born Citizenship by Legal
Constitution. Through its history, four
Fiction or Presumption of Law is
modes of acquiring citizenship —
Contrary to the Constitution under
naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and
Salient Rules of Interpretation of
jus sanguinis — had been in vogue. Only
the Constitution
two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could
qualify a person to being a "natural-born" In this case, petitioner Poe's original birth
citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, certificate stated that she was a foundling, or a child of
per Roa vs. Collector of unknown father or mother, found in Jaro,
Customs (1912), did not last long. With Iloilo, on September 3, 1968. The Constitution in effect
the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and then was the 1935 Constitution. To reiterate, it
the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. enumerated the "citizens of the Philippines" in Section
Secretary of Labor (1947), jus 1, Article IV, which included the following:
sanguinis or blood relationship would (3) Those whose fathers are citizens of
now become the primary basis of the Philippines.
citizenship by birth. 15 (Emphasis
supplied.) (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of
the Philippines and, upon
The changes in the provisions on citizenship reaching the age of majority,
was done to harmonize the Article on Citizenship with elect Philippine citizenship.
the State policy of ensuring the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men under Section 14, Petitioner Poe would want this Court to look
Article II of the 1987 Constitution. beyond the above-quoted enumeration and apply the
disputable or rebuttable presumption brought about by Petitioner Poe claims that "foundlings" were
the principles of international law and/or customary intended by the delegates of the 1934
international law. However, the above-quoted Constitutional Commission to be considered natural-
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Article IV are clear, born citizens. Specifically, she maintains that during
unequivocal and leave no room for any exception. the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols
proposed an amendment to include foundlings as
Rule of Verba Legis
among those who are to be considered natural-born
Basic in statutory construction is the principle citizens; that the only reason that there was no specific
that when words and phrases of a statute are clear reference to foundlings in the 1935 Philippine
and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined Constitution was because a delegate mentioned that
from the language employed and the statute must be foundlings were too few to warrant inclusion in a
taken to mean exactly what it says. This plain-meaning provision of the Constitution and their citizenship is
or verba legis rule, expressed in the Latin maxim dealt with by international law.
"verba legis non est recedendum," dictates that "from
The above inference or conclusion drawn from
the words of a statute there should be no
the debates adverted to is not accurate.
departure." 16
Firstly, the deliberations did not evince the
Undeniably, petitioner Poe does not come
collective intent of the members of the 1934
within the scope of Filipino citizens covered by
Constitutional Convention to include "foundlings" in the
paragraphs (3) and (4). From a literal meaning of the
list of Filipino citizens in the Article on Citizenship.
said provisions, she cannot be considered a natural-
Moreover, there was no mention at all of granting them
born citizen. Paragraphs 3 and 4, Section 1, Article IV
natural-born citizenship.
of the 1935 Constitution, the organic law in effect
during the birth of petitioner Poe, were clear and  
unambiguous, it did not provide for any exception to
A review of the transcript of the deliberations of
the application of the principle of "jus sanguinis" or
the 1934 Constitutional Convention actually proved
blood relationship between parents and child, such
prejudicial to petitioner Poe's cause. The suggestion of
that natural-born citizenship cannot be presumed by
Delegate Rafols to include in the list of Filipino citizens
law nor even be legislated by Congress where no
children of unknown parentage was voted down by
blood ties exist.
the delegates when the amendment and/or suggestion
Function of Extrinsic Aid Such as was put to a vote. In other words, the majority thereof
the Deliberations of the 1934 voted not to approve Delegate Rafol's amendment.
Constitutional Convention
 Secondly. Petitioner Poe's use of the terms of the Constitution when the
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention to meaning is clear. Debates in the
expand or amend the provision of the Constitution is constitutional convention "are of value as
unwarranted. showing the views of the individual
members, and as indicating the reasons
The Constitution is the basis of government. It is
for their votes, but they give us no light
established by the people, in their original sovereign
as to the views of the large majority
capacity, to promote their own happiness, and
who did not talk, much less of the
permanently to secure their rights, property,
mass of our fellow citizens whose
independence, and common welfare. When the people
votes at the polls gave that instrument
associate, and enter into a compact, for the purpose of
the force of fundamental law. We think
establishing government, that compact, whatever may
it safer to construe the constitution from
be its provisions, or in whatever language it may be
what appears upon its face." The
written, is the Constitution of the state, revocable only
proper interpretation therefore depends
by people, or in the manner they prescribe. It is by this
more on how it was understood by the
instrument that government is instituted, its
people adopting it than in the framer's
departments created, and the powers to be exercised
understanding thereof. (Emphases
by it conferred. 17
supplied, citations omitted.) HESIcT
Thus, in the construction of the Constitution, the
And as eloquently observed by Charles P.
Court is guided by the principle that it (constitution) is
Curtis, Jr. —
the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and
it is supreme, imperious, absolute, and unalterable The intention of the framers of
except by the authority from which it emanates. 18 the Constitution, even assuming we
could discover what it was, when it is
In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
not adequately expressed in the
Secretary, 19 this Court enunciated that —
Constitution, that is to say, what they
While it is permissible in this meant when they did not say it, surely
jurisdiction to consult the debates and that has no binding force upon us. If
proceedings of the constitutional we look behind or beyond what they set
convention in order to arrive at the down in the document, prying into what
reason and purpose of the resulting else they wrote and what they said,
Constitution, resort thereto may be had anything we may find is only advisory.
only when other guides fail as said They may sit in at our councils. There is
proceedings are powerless to vary the
 no reason why we should wisdom is that the Constitution does
eavesdrop on theirs. 20 not derive its force from the
convention which framed it, but from
Synthesized from the aforequoted, it is apparent
the people who ratified it, the intent to
that debates and proceedings of constitutional
be arrived at is that of the people. 22
conventions lack binding force. Hence —
In the present case, given that the language of
If at all, they only have persuasive
the third and fourth paragraphs of the
value as they may throw a useful light
article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine
upon the purpose sought to be
Constitution clearly follow only the doctrine of jus
accomplished or upon the meaning
sanguinis, it is, therefore, neither necessary nor
attached to the words employed, or they
permissible to resort to extrinsic aids, like the records
may not. And the courts are at liberty to
of the constitutional convention. A foundling, whose
avail themselves of any light derivable
parentage and/or place of birth is obviously unknown,
from such sources, but are not bound to
does not come within the letter or scope of the said
adopt it as the sole ground of their
paragraphs of the Constitution. Considering the silence
decision. 21
of the Constitution on foundlings, the people who
Moreover, while the opinions of the members of approved the Constitution in the plebiscite had
the constitutional convention on the absolutely no idea about the debate on the citizenship
article on citizenship of the 1935 Philippine of foundlings and therefore, they could not be bound
Constitution may have a persuasive value, it is, to by it.
repeat, not expressive of the people's intent. To
Rule that Specific Provisions of
recap:
Law Prevails Over General
The proceedings of the Convention are Provisions
less conclusive on the proper
The specific provision of Article IV of the
construction of the fundamental law than
Constitution prevails over the general provisions of
are legislative proceedings of the proper
Section 21, Article III of the Constitution. General
construction of a statute, for in the latter
international law principles cannot overturn specifically
case it is the intent of the legislature the
ordained principles in the Constitution.
courts seek, while in the former, courts
seek to arrive at the intent of the people Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
through the discussions and provides:
deliberations of their
representatives. The conventional
 SECTION 2. The Philippines A special and specific provision
renounces war as an instrument of prevails over a general provision
national policy, adopts the generally irrespective of their relative positions in
accepted principles of international the statute. Generalia specialibus non
law as part of the law of the land and derogant. Where there is in the same
adheres to the policy of peace, equality, statute a particular enactment and also a
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity general one which in its most
with all nations. (Emphasis supplied.) comprehensive sense would include
what is embraced in the former, the
Generally accepted principles of international
particular enactment must be operative,
law "may refer to rules of customary law, to general
and the general enactment must be
principles of law . . ., or to logical propositions resulting
taken to affect only such cases within its
from judicial reasoning on the basis of existing
general language as are not within the
international law and municipal analogies." 23 And it
provisions of the particular enactment.
has been observed that, certainly, it is this judicial
reasoning that has been the anchor of Philippine Hence, the general provision of Section 2,
jurisprudence on the determination of generally Article II of the Constitution on "Declaration of
accepted principles of international law and Principles and State Policies" cannot supersede,
consequent application of the incorporation clause. 24 amend or supplement the clear provisions of Article
IV on "Citizenship."
Petitioner Poe would like to apply to her
situation several international law conventions that International Law Instruments/
supposedly point to her entitlement to a natural-born Conventions are not self-executing
Filipino citizenship, notwithstanding her lack of Petitioner Poe cannot find succor in the
biological ties to a Filipino father or mother. In effect, provisions of the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
she wants to carve an exception to the "jus Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
sanguinis" principle through that generally accepted Laws and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
principles of international law which, under the theory Statelessness, in claiming natural-born Filipino
of incorporation, is considered by the Constitution as citizenship primarily for the following reasons: firstly,
part of the law of the land. 25 the Philippines has not ratified said International
Basic is the principle in statutory construction Conventions; secondly, they espouse a presumption
that specific provisions must prevail over general ones, by fiction of law which is disputable and not
to wit: based on the physical fact of biological ties to a Filipino
parent; thirdly, said conventions are not self-executing
as the Contracting State is granted the discretion to embodied through an enactment of Congress before it
determine by enacting a domestic or national law the forms part of the domestic or municipal law, viz.:
conditions and manner by which citizenship is to be (a) The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
granted; and fourthly, the citizenship, if acquired by Questions Relating to the Conflict of
virtue of such conventions will be akin to a citizenship Nationality Laws, which provides:
falling under Section 1 (4), Article IV of the 1987
Constitution, recognizing citizenship by naturalization Article 14.
in accordance with law or by a special act of Congress. A child whose parents are
The cited international conventions are as both unknown shall have
follows: the nationality of the
country of birth. If the
(a) 1930 Hague Convention on Certain child's parentage is
Questions Relating to the Conflict of established, its nationality
Nationality Laws; shall be determined by the
(b) 1961 Convention on the Reduction of rules applicable in cases
Statelessness; where the parentage is
known.
(c) 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child;  
(d) 1966 International Covenant on Civil and A foundling is, until the
Political Rights; and contrary is
(e) 1947 UN Declaration on Human Rights. proved, presumed to have
been born on the territory
Notice must be made of the fact that the of the State in which it
treaties, conventions, covenants, or declarations was found.
invoked by petitioner Poe are not self-executing, i.e.,
the international instruments invoked must comply with Article 15.
the "transformation method" whereby "an Where the nationality of a
international law [must first] be transformed into a State is not acquired
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such automatically by reason of
as local legislation." 26 birth on its territory, a child
Each of the aforementioned recognizes the born on the territory of that
need for its respective provisions to be transformed or State of parents having no
 nationality, or of unknown subparagraph (b) of this
nationality, may obtain the paragraph may also provide
nationality of the said for the grant of its
State. The law of that nationality by operation of
State shall determine the law at such age and
conditions governing the subject to such conditions
acquisition of its as may be prescribed by
nationality in such cases. the national law.
(b) The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of xxx xxx xxx
Statelessness, provides: Article 2
Article 1 A foundling found in the
1. A Contracting State territory of a Contracting
shall grant its nationality State shall, in the absence
to a person born in its of proof to the contrary, be
territory who would considered to have been
otherwise be stateless. born within that territory
Such nationality shall be of parents possessing
granted: the nationality of that
State.
(a) At birth, by operation of law, or
Conspicuously, the Philippines has neither
(b) Upon an application being
acceded nor ratified any of the above
lodged with the appropriate
conventions. caITAC
authority, by or on behalf of
the person concerned, in the The other international instruments to which the
manner prescribed by the Philippines has acceded, require initially conversion to
national law. Subject to the domestic law via the transformation method of
provisions of paragraph 2 of implementing international instruments. They are:
this article, no such (a) The 1989 UN Convention on the Rights of
application may be rejected. the Child, ratified by the
A Contracting State which provides Philippines on August 21, 1990,
for the grant of its nationality providing that:
in accordance with
 Article 7 or social origin, property or
birth, the right to such
1. The child shall be
measures of protection as
registered immediately after
are required by his status
birth and shall have the
as a minor, on the part of
right from birth to a
his family, society and the
name, the right to acquire
State.
a nationality and as far as
possible, the right to know 2. Every child shall be
and be cared for by his or registered immediately after
her parents. birth and shall have a
name.
2. States Parties shall
ensure 3. Every child has the
the implementation of right to acquire a
these rights in nationality.
accordance with their (c) The 1947 Universal Declaration on Human
national law and their Rights.
obligations under the
relevant international Article 15
instruments in this field, in (1) Everyone has the right
particular where the child to a nationality.
would otherwise be
stateless. (2) No one shall be
arbitrarily deprived of his
(b) The 1966 International Covenant on Civil nationality nor denied the
and Political Rights, which the right to change his
Philippines ratified on October 23, 1986 nationality.
providing that:
The foregoing international conventions or
Article 24 instruments, requiring implementing national laws to
1. Every child shall have, comply with their terms, adhere to the concept of
without any discrimination statehood and sovereignty of the State, which are
as to race, colour, sex, inviolable principles observed in the community of
language, religion, national independent States. The primary objective of said
conventions or instruments is to avoid statelessness administrative rule violates any norm
without impairing State sovereignty. Hence, the of the Constitution, that issuance is
Contracting State has the discretion to determine the null and void and has no effect. The
conditions and manner by which the nationality or Constitution is the basic law to which
citizenship of a stateless person, like a foundling, may all laws must conform; no act shall be
be acquired. Neither do they impose a particular type valid if it conflicts with the
of citizenship or nationality. The child of unknown Constitution." In Sabio v. Gordon, the
parentage may acquire the status of a mere "national." Court held that, "the Constitution is the
Nowhere in the identified international rules or highest law of the land. It is the 'basic
principles is there an obligation to accord the stateless and paramount law to which all other
child a citizenship that is of a "natural-born" character. laws must conform." In Atty.
Moreover, even if it so provided, it cannot be enforced Macalintal v. Commission on Elections,
in our jurisdiction because it would go against the the Court held that, "The Constitution is
provisions of the Constitution. the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must
Statutes and Treaties or
conform and in accordance with which all
International Agreements or
private rights must be determined and all
Conventions are accorded the Same
public authority administered. Laws that
Status in Relation to the
do not conform to the Constitution
Constitution
shall be stricken down for being
In case of conflict between the Constitution and unconstitutional." In Manila Prince
a statute, the former always prevails because the Hotel v. Government Service Insurance
Constitution is the basic law to which all other laws, System, the Court held that:
whether domestic or international, must conform to.
Under the doctrine of
The duty of the Court under Section 4 (2), Article VIII is
constitutional supremacy, if
to uphold the Constitution and to declare void all laws,
a law or contract violates
and by express provisions of said Section treaties or
any norm of the
international agreements that do not conform to
constitution that law or
it. 27 In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court further
contract whether
instructed that:
promulgated by the
In Social Justice Society v. legislative or by the
Dangerous Drugs Board, the Court held executive branch or
that, "It is basic that if a law or an entered into by private
 persons for private The Solicitor General argues for
purposes is null and void Petitioner Poe citing the ratio of children born in the
and without any force Philippines of Filipino parents to children born in the
and effect. Thus, since Philippines of foreign parents during specific periods.
the Constitution is the He claims that based on statistics, the statistical
fundamental, paramount probability that any child born in the
and supreme law of the Philippines would be a natural-born Filipino is either
nation, it is deemed 99.93% or 99.83%, respectively, during the period
written in every between 2010 to 2014 and 1965 to 1975. This
statute and argument, to say the least, is fallacious.
contract. 28 (Emphases Firstly, we are determining blood ties between a
supplied; citations omitted.) child and her/his parents. Statistics have never been
Citizenship by "Naturalization" used to prove paternity or filiation. With more
under International Law reason, it should not be used to determine natural-born
citizenship, as a qualification to hold public office,
Citizenship is not automatically conferred under
which is of paramount importance to national interest.
the international conventions cited but will entail an
The issue here is the biological ties between a specific
affirmative action of the State, by a national law or
or named foundling and her parents, which must be
legislative enactment, so that the nature of citizenship,
supported by credible and competent evidence. We
if ever acquired pursuant thereto, is citizenship by
are not dealing with the entire population of our
naturalization. There must be a law by which
country that will justify a generalized approach that
citizenship can be acquired by a foundling. By no
fails to take into account that the circumstances under
means will this citizenship can be considered that of a
which a foundling is found may vary in each case.
natural-born under the principle of jus sanguinis, which
is based on the physical existence of blood ties to a Secondly, the place of birth of the foundling
Filipino father or Filipino mother. It will be akin to is unknown but the argument is based on the wrong
citizenship by naturalization if conferred by fiction premise that a foundling was born in the place where
created by an international convention, which is of he/she was found. The age of the foundling may
legal status equal to a statute or law enacted by indicate if its place of birth is the place where he or she
Congress. is found. If the foundling is a newly born baby, the
assumption may have solid basis. But this may not
Probabilities/Possibilities Based on
Statistics always be the case. It does not appear from the
documents on record that petitioner Poe was a
newborn baby when she was found. There is no
 evidence as to her place of birth. The Solicitor General will somehow prevent opening the floodgates to the
cannot, therefore, use his statistics of the number of danger foreseen by Justice del Castillo that non-
children born to Filipino parents and to alien parents in Filipinos may misuse a favorable ruling on foundlings
the Philippines since the places of birth of foundlings to the detriment of national interest and security.
are unknown. Stated otherwise, the fact of being a foundling must
first be officially established before a foundling can
Natural-born citizenship, as a qualification for
claim the rights of a Filipino citizen. This being the
public office, must be an established fact in view of
case, a foundling does not meet the above-quoted
the jus sanguinis principle enshrined in the
definition of a natural-born citizen who is such "from
Constitution, which should not be subjected to
birth". ICHDca
uncertainty nor be based in statistical probabilities. A
disputable presumption can be overcome anytime by To illustrate, Republic Act Nos. 8552 and 9523,
evidence to the contrary during the tenure of an provide, respectively:
elective official. Resort to this interpretation has a great Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8552:
potential to prejudice the electorate who may vote a
candidate in danger of being disqualified in the future SECTION 5. Location of Unknown
and to cause instability in public service. Parent(s). — It shall be the duty of the
Department or the child-placing or child-
A Foundling does not Meet the caring agency which has custody of the
Definition of a Natural-born child to exert all efforts to locate his/her
Filipino Citizen under Section 2, unknown biological parent(s). If such
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution efforts fail, the child shall be registered
Other than those whose fathers or mothers are as a foundling and subsequently be
Filipinos, Section 2, Article IV of the Constitution the subject of legal proceedings where
further defines "natural-born citizens" to cover "those he/she shall be declared abandoned.
who are citizens of the Philippines from birth Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9523:
without having to perform an act to acquire or
perfect their Philippine citizenship." SECTION 2. Definition of Terms.
— As used in this Act, the following
  terms shall mean:
A foundling is one who must first go through a xxx xxx xxx
legal process to obtain an official or formal declaration
proclaiming him/her to be a foundling in order to be (3) Abandoned Child refers to a child
granted certain rights reserved to Filipino citizens. This who has no proper parental care or
guardianship, or whose parent(s) have child legally available for adoption within
deserted him/her for a period of at least seven (7) working days from receipt of
three (3) continuous months, which the recommendation.
includes a foundling. Said certification, by itself, shall
xxx xxx xxx be the sole basis for the immediate
issuance by the local civil registrar of
SECTION 4. Procedure for the
a foundling certificate. Within seven (7)
Filing of the Petition. — The petition shall
working days, the local civil registrar shall
be filed in the regional office of the
transmit the foundling certificate to the
DSWD where the child was found or
National Statistics Office (NSO).
abandoned.
SECTION 8. The certification that
The Regional Director shall
a child is legally available for adoption
examine the petition and its supporting
shall be issued by the DSWD in lieu of a
documents, if sufficient in form and
judicial order, thus, making the entire
substance and shall authorize the
process administrative in nature.
posting of the notice of the petition in
conspicuous places for five (5) The certification, shall be, for all intents
consecutive days in the locality where and purposes, the primary evidence that
the child was found. the child is legally available in domestic
adoption proceeding, as provided in
The Regional Director shall
Republic Act No. 8552 and in an inter-
act on the same and shall render a
country adoption proceeding, as provided
recommendation not later than five (5)
in Republic Act No. 8043.
working days after the completion of its
posting. He/she shall transmit a copy of The above laws, though pertaining to adoption
his/her recommendation and records to of a Filipino child, clearly demonstrate that
the Office of the Secretary within forty- a foundling first undergoes a legal process to be
eight (48) hours from the date of the considered as one before he/she is accorded rights to
recommendation. be adopted available only to Filipino citizens. When the
foundling is a minor, it is the State under the concept
SECTION 5. Declaration of
of "parens patriae" which acts for or on behalf of the
Availability for Adoption. — Upon finding
minor, but when the latter reaches majority age,
merit in the petition, the Secretary
she/he must, by herself/himself, take the necessary
shall issue a certification declaring the
step to be officially recognized as a foundling. Prior to
this, the error of out-rightly invoking the "disputable evidence of natural-born citizenship. This is pure and
presumption" of alleged "natural-born citizenship" is simple judicial legislation. Foundlings are not even
evident as there can be no presumption of citizenship mentioned at all in R.A. No. 9225.
before there is an official determination of the fact that Pursuing this logic further, will one who wish to
a child or person is a foundling. It is only after this take the Bar Examinations or to be appointed to the
factual premise is established that the inference or Judiciary need to submit only a Foundling Certificate to
presumption can arise. 29 the Supreme Court and the Judicial Bar and Council to
That being so, a foundling will not come within prove his/her qualification as a natural-born citizen?
the definition of a natural-born citizen who by birth The same question can be raised in other situations
right, being the biological child of a Filipino father or where natural-born citizenship is required, not only by
mother, does not need to perform any act to acquire or law, but most especially by the Constitution. Do the
perfect his/her citizenship. seven (7) Justices intend that the question be
answered in the affirmative? If so, my humble
It should also be emphasized that our adoption
submission is that, apart from violating the
laws do not confer "natural-born citizenship" to
Constitution, it will be a reckless position to take as a
foundlings who are allowed to be adopted. To read
Foundling Certificate should not automatically confer
that qualification into the adoption laws would amount
natural-born citizenship as it can easily be obtained by
to judicial legislation. The said laws of limited
impostors who pretend to have found a child of
application which allows the adoption of a foundling,
unknown parents.
cannot also be used as a basis to justify the natural-
born citizenship of a foundling who has reached The July 18, 2006 Order of the
majority age like petitioner Poe who applied to Bureau of Immigration approving
reacquire her citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The petitioner Poe's application for dual
opinion of the seven (7) Justices if pursued, there will citizenship was not valid.
be no need for a foundling to misrepresent himself or First, petitioner Poe's claim to a dual citizenship
herself as a biological child of her adoptive parents like by virtue of R.A. No. 9225 is invalid for the simple
what petitioner Poe did, and instead, a foundling can reason that the said law limits its application to natural-
be truthful and just submit a Foundling Certificate to be born Filipino citizens only. In other words, the right to
entitled to the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Since from avail of dual citizenship is only available to natural-
their point of view a foundling need not perform any act born citizens who have earlier lost their Philippine
to be considered a natural-born citizen, said foundling citizenship by reason of acquisition of foreign
need not prove the veracity of the Foundling citizenship. Second, petitioner Poe obtained dual
Certificate. This will include a Foundling Certificate in citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 by
the Bureau of Immigration (BI) prepared list of
misrepresenting to the BI that she is the biological reason of their naturalization as citizens
child of a Filipino father and Filipino mother such that of a foreign country.
the Bureau was misled in to believing that Hence, given my preceding discussion on the
"[petitioner Poe] was a former citizen of the Republic citizenship of petitioner Poe, I submit that she could
of the Philippines being born to Filipino parents. Third, not have validly repatriated herself under the
the said order was not signed by the Commissioner of provisions of Republic Act No. 9225 for purposes of
the BI as required by implementing regulations. And "reacquiring" natural-born Filipino citizenship.
her re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship being clearly
invalid, petitioner Poe's acceptance and assumption to Another point that I wish to emphasize is the
public office requiring natural-born citizenship as fact that in her Petition for Retention and/or Re-
condition sine qua non is likewise invalid. acquisition of Philippine Citizenship filed before the
BI on July 10, 2006, petitioner Poe knowingly
Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship committed a false representation when she declared
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003) 30 governs under oath that she was "a former natural-born
the reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship Philippine citizen, born on Sept. 3, 1968 at Iloilo
by a natural-born Filipino who acquired citizenship in a City to Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, a Filipino citizen and
foreign country. Under Section 3 thereof, natural-born Jesusa Sonora Poe, a Filipino citizen[.]" [Emphasis
citizens of the Philippines who have lost their supplied.]
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization
as citizens of a foreign country are deemed to have re- In so answering the blank form of the petition,
acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the oath of petitioner Poe plainly represented that she is
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines the biological child of the spouses Ronald Allan
specifically stated therein. 31 The foregoing point is Kelly Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe; thereby effectively
reiterated under the Bureau of Immigration's concealing the fact that she was a foundling who was
Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002 (Revised subsequently adopted by the said spouses.
Rules Governing Philippine Citizenship under Republic This false representation paved the way for the
Act No. 9225 and Administrative Order No. 91, Series issuance by the BI of the Order dated July 18, 2006
of 2004), particularly Section 1 thereof, it is that granted Poe's petition, which declared that she
categorically provided that — "was a former citizen of the Republic of the Philippines,
Section 1. Coverage. — These being born to Filipino parents and is presumed to be a
rules shall apply to natural-born natural-born Philippine citizen[.]"
citizens of the Philippines as defined by  
Philippine law and jurisprudence, who
have lost their Philippine citizenship by
 Another point worthy of note is the fact that the indicating that the said signature/autograph was made
said Order was not signed by the Commissioner of the in lieu of the named person's own signature/autograph.
BI as required under the aforementioned Whose signature/autograph it was, and under whose
Memorandum Circular No. AFF. 05-002, to wit: authority it was made, are not evident from the
document.
Section 10. Compliance and
approval procedures. — All petitions On the basis of the above undisputed facts, I
must strictly comply with the preceding submit that the July 18, 2006 Order of the BI granting
requirements prior to filing at the Office of petitioner Poe's application for the reacquisition of her
the Commissioner or at nearest supposedly lost natural-born citizenship was not only
Philippine Foreign Post, as the case may improvidently issued, but more importantly, it was null
be . . . . and void. The nullity stemmed from her concealment
or misrepresentation of a material fact, not an error of
If the petition is found to be
law, regarding the identity of her biological
sufficient in form and in substance, the
parents. The unlawful product of this concealment
evaluating officer shall submit the
was carried over in her pursuit of high government
findings and recommendation to the
positions requiring natural-born citizenship as a
Commissioner of Immigration or Consul
qualification. Therefore, the same could not be the
General, as the case may
source of her reacquisition of all the attendant civil and
be . . . . TCAScE
political rights, including the rights and responsibilities
[T]he Commissioner of Immigration, . . under existing laws of the Philippines, granted to
., or the Consul natural-born Filipino citizens.
General, . . ., shall issue, within five (5)
Petitioner Poe's re-acquisition of Philippine
days from receipt thereof, an Order of
citizenship was not validly approved as it was
Approval indicating that the petition
based on an erroneous finding of fact based on the
complies with the provisions of R.A. 9225
false representation by petitioner Poe as to her
and its IRR, and the corresponding IC, as
parentage.
the case may be. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Residency Requirement
A perusal of the said order will show that an
indecipherable signature or autograph is written above The assailed COMELEC resolutions uniformly
the type written name of then Commissioner Alipio F. held that petitioner Poe falsely claimed in her COC that
Fernandez, Jr. (Fernandez). The said writing was not she had been a resident of the Philippines for ten
made by Commissioner Fernandez as the word "for" years and eleven months up to the day before the May
was similarly written beside the name of the latter 9, 2016 elections. Assuming petitioner Poe may be
validly repatriated under Republic Act No. 9225, For election purposes, the term residence is to
the COMELEC ruled that it was only when she be understood not in its common acceptation as
reacquired her Filipino citizenship on July 18, 2006 referring to dwelling or habitation. 33 In contemplation
that she could have re-established her domicile in the of election laws, residence is synonymous with
Philippines. domicile. Domicile is the place where a person actually
or constructively has his permanent home, where he,
Before this Court, petitioner Poe primarily
no matter where he may be found at any given time,
argues that the COMELEC "acted whimsically and
eventually intends to return and remain. It consists not
capriciously, ignored settled jurisprudence and
only in the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
disregarded the evidence on record in ruling that she
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
made a false material representation in her COC for
indicative of such intention. 34
President when she stated therein that her 'period of
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May In Domino v. Commission on Elections, 35 the
09, 2016' would be '10' years and '11' Court stressed that domicile denotes a fixed
months." 32 Petitioner Poe contends that she re- permanent residence to which, whenever absent for
established her domicile of choice in the Philippines as business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one
early as May 24, 2005, even before she reacquired her intends to return. It is a question of intention and
Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225. circumstances. In the consideration of circumstances,
three rules must be borne in mind, namely: (1) that a
Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
man must have a residence or domicile somewhere;
provides for the qualifications for the position of
(2) when once established it remains until a new one is
President, to wit:
acquired; and (3) a man can have but one residence or
ARTICLE VII domicile at a time.
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Domicile is classified into: (1) domicile of origin,
SECTION 2. No person may be elected which is acquired by every person at birth; (2) domicile
President unless he is a natural-born of choice, which is acquired upon abandonment of the
citizen of the Philippines, a registered domicile of origin; and (3) domicile by operation of law,
voter, able to read and write, at least which the law attributes to a person independently of
forty years of age on the day of the his residence or intention. 36 To acquire a new
election, and a resident of the domicile of choice, the following requirements must
Philippines for at least ten years concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new
immediately preceding such election. locality; (2) an intention to remain there; and (3) an
(Emphasis supplied.) intention to abandon the old domicile. There must
be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile imposes no residency requirement for
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the the reacquisition or retention of
change of residence must be voluntary; and the Philippine citizenship; nor does it
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile mention any effect of such
must be actual. 37 reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship on the current residence of
In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 38 the
the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Court held in no uncertain terms that naturalization in a
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats
foreign country results in the abandonment of domicile
citizenship independently of
in the Philippines.
residence. This is only logical and
Thereafter, consistent with the general intent of the
in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 39 the Court law to allow for dual citizenship. Since a
construed the requirement of residence under election natural-born Filipino may hold, at the
laws vis-a-vis the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225. same time, both Philippine and foreign
The respondent in said case, Jaime S. Ty, was a citizenships, he may establish residence
natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen. either in the Philippines or in the foreign
He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship under country of which he is also a citizen.
Republic Act No. 9225 and ran for Mayor of the
Residency in the Philippines only
Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar.
becomes relevant when the natural-born
Manuel B. Japzon, a rival candidate, questioned Ty's
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to
residency in said place. The Court ruled that —
run for public office.
It bears to point out that Republic
Section 5(2) of Republic Act No.
Act No. 9225 governs the manner in
9225 reads:
which a natural-born Filipino may
reacquire or retain his Philippine SEC. 5. Civil and
citizenship despite acquiring a foreign Political Rights and
citizenship, and provides for his rights Liabilities. — Those who
and liabilities under such circumstances. retain or reacquire
A close scrutiny of said statute would Philippine citizenship under
reveal that it does not at all touch on the this Act shall enjoy full civil
matter of residence of the natural-born and political rights and be
Filipino taking advantage of its subject to all attendant
provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 liabilities and
 responsibilities under xxx xxx xxx
existing laws of the As has already been previously
Philippines and the discussed by this Court herein, Ty's
following conditions: reacquisition of his Philippine citizenship
xxx xxx xxx under Republic Act No. 9225 had no
automatic impact or effect on his
(2) Those seeking
residence/domicile. He could still retain
elective public office in the
his domicile in the USA, and he did not
Philippines shall meet the
necessarily regain his domicile in the
qualifications for holding
Municipality of General Macarthur,
such public office as
Eastern Samar, Philippines. Ty merely
required by the Constitution
had the option to again establish his
and existing laws and, at
domicile in the Municipality of General
the time of the filing of the
Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
certificate of candidacy,
Philippines, said place becoming his
make a personal and sworn
new domicile of choice. The length of
renunciation of any and all
his residence therein shall be
foreign citizenship before
determined from the time he made it
any public officer
his domicile of choice, and it shall not
authorized to administer an
retroact to the time of his
oath.
birth. 40 (Citations omitted; emphasis
Breaking down the aforequoted supplied.) cTDaEH
provision, for a natural-born Filipino, who
Applying the foregoing disquisition to the instant
reacquired or retained his Philippine
cases, it is beyond question that petitioner Poe lost her
citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225,
domicile in the Philippines when she became a
to run for public office, he must: (1) meet
naturalized American citizen on October 18, 2001.
the qualifications for holding such
From then on, she established her new domicile of
public office as required by the
choice in the U.S. Thereafter, on July 7, 2006,
Constitution and existing laws; and
petitioner Poe took her oath of allegiance to the
(2) make a personal and sworn
Republic of the Philippines under Republic Act No.
renunciation of any and all foreign
citizenships before any public officer 9225. Again, on the assumption that petitioner Poe can
validly avail herself of the provisions of said law, she
authorized to administer an oath.
was deemed to have reacquired her Philippine
 citizenship under the latter date. 6768 (An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program), 43 as
Subsequently, on October 20, 2010, amended by Republic Act No. 9174, 44 the said
petitioner Poe executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of program was instituted "to attract and encourage
Allegiance to the United States of America and overseas Filipinos to come and visit their
Renunciation of American Citizenship (Affidavit of motherland." 45
Renunciation). Under Section 3 of the above-mentioned law,
  petitioner Poe was merely entitled to a visa-free entry
to the Philippines for a period of one (1) year. 46 Thus,
Following Japzon, petitioner Poe's reacquisition
her stay then in the Philippines was certainly not for an
of her Philippine citizenship did not automatically make
indefinite period of time. 47 This only proves that
her regain her residence in the Philippines. She merely
petitioner Poe's stay was not impressed with animus
had the option to again establish her domicile here.
manendi, i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile
The length of petitioner Poe's residence herein shall
of choice for an indefinite period of time.
be determined from the time she made the Philippines
her domicile of choice. Whether In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections, 48 We
petitioner Poe complied with the ten-year residency disregarded the period of a candidate's physical
requirement for running for the position of the presence in the Philippines at the time when he was
President of the Philippines is essentially a question of still a non-resident alien. In this case, Teodulo M.
fact that indeed requires the review and evaluation of Coquilla lost his domicile of origin in Oras, Eastern
the probative value of the evidence presented by the Samar when he joined the U.S. Navy in 1965 and he
parties before the COMELEC. was subsequently naturalized as a U.S.
citizen. On October 15, 1998, he came to the
On this note, I concur with the ruling in Justice
Philippines and took out a resident certificate.
Del Castillo's Dissenting Opinion that the
Afterwards, he still made several trips to the U.S.
evidence 41 submitted by petitioner Poe was
Coquilla later applied for repatriation and took his oath
insufficient to establish her claim that when she arrived
as a citizen of the Philippines on November 10, 2000.
in the Philippines on May 24, 2005, her physical
Coquilla thereafter filed his COC for the mayorship of
presence was imbued with animus manendi. At that
Oras, Eastern Samar. A rival candidate sought the
point in time, petitioner Poe's status was merely that of
cancellation of Coquilla's COC as the latter had been a
a non-resident alien.
resident of Oras for only six months after he took his
Notably, when petitioner arrived in the oath as a Filipino citizen.
Philippines on May 24, 2005, the same was through a
The Court ruled that Coquilla indeed lacked the
visa-free entry under
requisite period of residency. While he entered the
the Balikbayan Program. 42 Under Republic Act No.
Philippines in 1998 and took out a residence The Court, thus, found that Coquilla can only be
certificate, he did so as a visa-free balikbayan visitor held to have waived his status as an alien and as a
whose stay as such was valid for only one year. He non-resident only on November 10, 2000 upon taking
then entered the country at least four more times using his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. The Court
the same visa-free balikbayan entry. From 1965 until arrived at the same ruling in the earlier case
his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November of Ujano v. Republic 51 and Caasi v. Court of
10, 2000, Coquilla's status was held to be that of "an Appeals. 52
alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save In the cases at bar, petitioner Poe similarly
as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay failed to prove that she waived her status as a non-
as a visitor or as a resident alien." The Court also resident alien when she entered the
explained that: Philippines on May 24, 2005 as a visa-
The status of being an alien and a non- free balikbayan visitor. Her status only changed when
resident can be waived either separately, she ostensibly took her oath of allegiance to the
when one acquires the status of a Republic under Republic Act No. 9225 on July 7, 2006.
resident alien before acquiring Philippine Under Section 5 of Republic Act No.
citizenship, or at the same time when 9225, 53 the entitlement to the full civil and political
one acquires Philippine citizenship. As rights concomitant with the reacquired citizenship shall
an alien, an individual may obtain an commence only when the requirements in the said law
immigrant visa under §13 49 of the have been completed and the Philippine citizenship
Philippine Immigration Act of 1948 and has been acquired. It is only then that that Filipinos
an Immigrant Certificate of Residence who have reacquired their citizenship can be said to
(ICR) and thus waive his status as a non- gain the right to exercise their right of suffrage or to
resident. On the other hand, he may seek elective public office, subject to the compliance
acquire Philippine citizenship by with the requirements laid down in the Constitution and
naturalization under C.A. No. 473, as existing laws.
amended, or, if he is a former Philippine
national, he may reacquire Philippine Thus, it is the taking of the oath of allegiance to
citizenship by repatriation or by an act of the Republic on July 7, 2006 presumably conferred
Congress, in which case he waives not upon petitioner Poe not only Philippine citizenship but
only his status as an alien but also his also the right to stay in the Philippines for an unlimited
status as a non-resident period of time. It was only then that she can claim
alien. 50 (Citations omitted.) subject to proof, that her physical presence in the
Philippines was coupled with animus manendi. Any
temporary stay in the Philippines prior to the aforesaid This is because she continued to represent herself as
date cannot fall under the concept of residence for an American citizen who was free to return to the said
purposes of elections. The animus manendi must be country whenever she wished. Moreover, although
proven by clear and unmistakable evidence since a petitioner Poe supposedly reacquired her Philippine
dual citizen can still freely enjoy permanent resident citizenship on July 7, 2006, she was issued a
status in her/his domicile of choice if said status is not Philippine passport only three years
given up or officially waived. thereafter on October 13, 2009. Thus, I concur with the
finding of the Ponencia that petitioner Poe's affidavit of
Anent the pieces of evidence 54 that
renunciation of U.S. citizenship was the only clear and
petitioner Poe submitted to prove her animus non
positive proof of her abandonment of her U.S.
revertendi to her domicile in the U.S., I agree with the
domicile.
dissent of Justice Del Castillo that little weight can
likewise be properly ascribed to the same, given that Given the above findings, the petitioner's
they referred to acts or events that took place after evidence fails to substantiate her claim that she had
May 24, 2005. As such, they were also insufficient to established her domicile of choice in the Philippines
establish petitioner's claim that she changed her starting on May 24, 2005.
domicile as of May 24, 2005. Petitioner Poe's evidence By stating in her COC that she had complied
was insufficient to prove animus non revertendi prior to with the required ten-year residency when she actually
her renunciation of her U.S. citizenship on October 20, did not, petitioner made a false material representation
2010. Before the renunciation, it cannot be said that that justified the COMELEC's cancellation of her COC.
there was a clear and unmistakable intent on the part
of petitioner Poe to abandon her U.S. domicile. To be The majority opinion, however, reached a
clear, one cannot have two domiciles at any given dissimilar conclusion and ruled that Coquilla, Japzon,
time. It was thus incumbent upon the petitioner Poe to Caballero and Reyes are inapplicable to the case at
prove by positive acts that her physical presence in the bar. The majority posited that, unlike in the aforesaid
Philippines was coupled with the intent to relinquish cases where the evidence presented on residency was
her domicile in the U.S. sparse, petitioner Poe's evidence is overwhelming and
unprecedented. The majority furthermore asserted that
As pointed out by Justice Del Castillo, the there is no indication in the said cases that the Court
continued use of her American passport in her travels intended to have its ruling therein apply to a situation
to the U.S., as well as her ownership and maintenance where the facts are different.
of two residential houses in the said country until the
present time, only served to weaken her stance that I strongly beg to differ.
she actually and deliberately abandoned her domicile
in the U.S. when she came here on May 24, 2005.
 But of course, the factual milieu of these cases necessary formal and legal requirements of
is different from those of Coquilla, Japzon, repatriation.
Caballero and Reyes. No two cases are exactly the
On this point, the majority apparently lost sight
same. However, there are no substantial differences
of the fact that the training program envisioned in
that would prevent the application here of the
Republic Act No. 6768, as amended, that is to be
principles enunciated in the said decided cases.
pursued in line with the government's reintegration
Moreover, absolutely nowhere in the said cases did
program does not apply to petitioner Poe. It applies to
the Court expressly say that the rulings therein only
another set of balikbayans who are Filipino overseas
apply pro hac vice (meaning, "for this one particular
workers. Section 6 of the law expressly states that:
occasion"). 55 On the contrary, the doctrines laid down
in said cases are cited in a catena of election cases, SEC. 6. Training Programs. —
which similarly involve the residency requirement for The Department of Labor and
elective positions. Simply put, the jurisprudential Employment (DOLE) through
doctrines and guidelines set out in said cases, along the OWWA, in coordination with the
with other cases dealing with the same subject matter, Technology and Livelihood Resource
serve as the standards by which the pieces of Center (TLRC), Technical Education and
evidence of a party in a specific case are to be Skills Development Authority (TESDA),
measured. Even petitioner Poe herself adverts to our livelihood corporation and other
ruling in Japzon, Coquilla and Caballero, albeit in a concerned government agencies, shall
manner that tends to suit her cause. 56 cSaATC provide the necessary entrepreneurial
training and livelihood skills programs
In relation to the application of Coquilla to these
and marketing assistance to
cases relative to petitioner Poe's utilisation of the visa-
a balikbayan, including his or her
free balikbayan entry, the majority opines that under
immediate family members, who shall
Republic Act No. 6768, as amended, balikbayans are
avail of the kabuhayan program in
not ordinary transients in view of the law's aim of
accordance with the existing
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary
rules on the government's
training enable the balikbayan to become economically
reintegration program.
self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country" in line with the government's "reintegration In the case of non-
program." The majority, thus, concluded that the visa- OFW balikbayan, the Department of
free period is obviously granted to allow Tourism shall make the necessary
a balikbayan to re-establish his life and reintegrate arrangement with the TLRC and other
himself into the community before he attends to the
 training institutions for possible livelihood that she already established her domicile in the
training. (Emphasis supplied.) Philippines from May 24, 2005. The majority points out
that when petitioner Poe made the declaration in her
Indeed, the Overseas Workers Welfare
2013 COC that she has been a resident for a period of
Administration (OWWA) is a government agency that
six (6) years and six (6) months counted up to the May
is primarily tasked to protect the interest and promote
13, 2013 elections, she naturally had as reference the
the welfare of Overseas Filipino Workers
residency requirements for election as Senator, which
(OFWs). 57 Among the benefits and services it
was satisfied by her declared years of residence. The
renders is a Reintegration Program, which defines
majority even belabors the obvious fact that the length
reintegration as "a way of preparing for the return of
of residence required of a presidential candidate is
OFWs into the Philippine society." 58 Not being an
different from that of a senatorial candidate.
OFW, petitioner Poe is not the balikbayan that is
envisioned to be the recipient of the above To this I likewise take exception.
reintegration program. It bears pointing out that the COMELEC did not
If she indeed wanted to reestablish her life here, turn a blind eye and deliberately refused to look at the
petitioner Poe should have applied for a Returning evidence of petitioner Poe. A reading of the
Former Filipino Visa, instead availing herself of a visa- assailed COMELEC resolutions reveals that the pieces
free balikbayan entry. This visa may be applied for by of evidence of the petitioner were indeed considered,
a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who has been piece by piece, but the same were adjudged
naturalized in a foreign country, and is returning to the insufficient to prove the purpose for which they were
Philippines for permanent residence, including his/her offered. To repeat, the emphasis must be on the
spouse and minor children. By this visa, she would be weight of the pieces of evidence, not the number
allowed, inter alia, to stay in the Philippines indefinitely, thereof. The COMELEC, perforce, arrived at an
establish a business, and allowed to work without unfavorable conclusion. In other words,
securing an alien employment permit. This would have petitioner Poe's evidence had actually been weighed
definitely established her intent to remain in the and measured by the COMELEC, but same was found
Philippines permanently. Unfortunately for wanting.
petitioner Poe, she did not apply for this visa. Moreover, I do not find significant the distinction
The majority opinion also ascribes grave abuse made on the residency requirement for a presidential
of discretion on the part of the COMELEC for giving candidate and that of a senatorial candidate for
more weight to the 2013 COC of petitioner Poe instead purposes of these cases. The truth of a candidate's
of looking into the many pieces of evidence she statement on the fact of her residency must
presented in order to see if she was telling the truth be consistent and unwavering. Changes in a
candidate's assertion of the period of residency in the declaration of a material qualification in the CoC
Philippines shall not inspire belief or will not be be false." The Court therein further acknowledged that
credible. "an express finding that the person committed any
deliberate misrepresentation is of little consequence
Deceit
in the determination of whether one's CoC should be
As to the view that the material representation deemed cancelled or not"; 61 and concluded that
that is false should be "made with an intention to "[w]hat remains material is that the petition
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for essentially seeks to deny due course to and/or
public office," 59 I cannot but deviate therefrom. cancel the CoC  on  the basis of one's ineligibility
Again, Section 78 of the OEC, provides that — and that the same be granted without any
qualification." 62
SECTION 78. Petition to deny due
course to or cancel a certificate of The above standard is in keeping with the tenor
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking of Section 78 of the OEC. The said law used the
to deny due course or to cancel a phrase material representation qualified by the
certificate of candidacy may be filed by term false; and not misrepresentation per se. This
any person exclusively on the ground distinction, I believe, is quite significant.
that any material A deeper analysis and research on the import
representation contained therein as and meaning of the language of Section 78, led to the
required under Section 74 hereof is conclusion that as opposed to the use of the term
false. The petition may be filed at any "misrepresentation" which, colloquially is understood
time not later than twenty-five days from to mean a statement made to deceive or
the time of the filing of the certificate of mislead, 63 the qualifying term "false" referring to the
candidacy and shall be decided, after phrase "material representation" is said to have "two
due notice and hearing, not later than distinct and well-recognized meanings. It signifies
fifteen days before the election. (1) intentionally or knowingly, or negligently untrue,
(Emphases supplied.) and (2) untrue by mistake, accident, or honestly after
In Tagolino v. House of Representatives the exercise of reasonable care." 64 Thus, the word
Electoral Tribunal, 60 the Court had the occasion to "false" does not necessarily imply an intention to
enlighten that "the deliberateness of the deceive. What is important is that an untrue material
misrepresentation, much less one's intent to representation is made.
defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 Relating to the disqualification under Section 78
petition as it is enough that the person's of the OEC, the requirement of the said law (that a
cancellation of a candidate's COC be exclusively woman and all other circumstances
grounded on the presence of any material found by the Honorable Second Division
representation contained therein that is required to be present in this case, would leave
under Section 74 of the same is false) should only little doubt as to the intention of
pivot on the candidate's declaration of a material [petitioner Poe] when she made the false
qualification that is false, and not on the deliberate representations in the Certificates . . .
intent to defraud. With this, good faith on the part of that is, to mislead [the] people into
the candidate would be inconsequential. thinking that she was then a Filipino.
In these present cases, there is no need to go The Commission is especially
into the matter of questioning petitioner Poe's intent in bothered by [petitioner Poe's]
making a material representation that is false. It is representation in the Petition for
enough that she signified that she is eligible to run for Retention and/or Reacquisition of
the Presidency notwithstanding the fact that she Philippine Citizenship that she was
appeared to know the legal impediment to her claim of BORN TO her adoptive parents. To
natural-born Filipino citizenship, as borne out by her recall, it was this Petition, granted by the
concealment of her true personal circumstances, and BID, that led to [petitioner Poe] supposed
that she is likewise aware of the fact that she has not acquisition of Filipino citizenship in July
fulfilled the ten-year residency requirement as shown 2006 under RA 9225 — a law which
by her inconsistent and ambivalent stand as to the limits its application only to natural-born
start of her domicile in the Philippines. Apparently, she Filipinos who lost their citizenships. The
is cognizant of the fact that she is actually ineligible for design to mislead in order to satisfy the
the position. requirements of the law is evident,
reminiscent of the intent to mislead in the
However, that while an intent to deceive in
2016 COC, put in issue in the present
petitioner Poe's actions is not an indispensable
case. cHDAIS
element under a Section 78 Petition,
the COMELEC's affirmative finding on the existence of All told, the foregoing
deceit is not without basis. The COMELEC observed, misrepresentations may be for different
and I quote: purposes, but all seems to have been
deliberately done. It is, therefore, hard to
The simplicity and clarity of the
think, given the aforementioned pattern
terms used in our Constitution and
laws on citizenship, the fact that of behavior, that the representation in
[petitioner Poe's] 2016 COC for President
[petitioner Poe] is a highly educated
that she was a natural-born citizen was
 not a deliberate attempt to mislead, Petitioner Poe explains, however, that she
misinform, or hide a fact that would made the above statement as an "honest
otherwise render her ineligible for the misunderstanding" of what was being asked of
office that she seeks to be elected to. 65 her. 66 She contends that she did not fully
comprehend that the phrase "Period of Residence in
On the matter of her residency requirement,
the Philippines before May 13, 2013" in her 2013 COC
petitioner Poe concedes that she indicated in her 2013
actually referred to the period of residence on the day
COC that her "period of residence in the Philippines
right before the May 13, 2013 elections. She allegedly
before May 13, 2013" was "6 years and 6 months."
construed it to mean her "period of residence in the
Consequently, her residence in the Philippines could
Philippines as of the submission of COCs in October
have only begun on November 2006, such that by May
2012 (which is technically also a period 'before May
9, 2016, her aggregate period of residence in the
13, 2013')." 67 Thus, she counted backwards from
Philippines was approximately only 9 years and 6
October 2012, instead from May 13, 2013, and in so
months, which is short of the period of residence
doing she brought herself back to "March-April 2006,"
required for presidential candidates.
which was the period when her house in the U.S. was
sold and when her husband resigned from his job in
the U.S. 68 She argues that that was the period she
indicated, albeit it was a mistake again on her part as it
should have been May 24, 2005.
Petitioner Poe's ambivalent or varying accounts
do not inspire beliefs of the truthfulness of her latest
allegation of the period of her residence in the
Philippines.
It is indeed incredible of someone of her stature
to gravely misinterpret the phrase "Period of
Residence in the Philippines before the May 13, 2013"
in the 2012 COC. At any rate, having been informed as
early as June 2015 of this supposedly honest mistake,
it is quite perplexing that the same was not
immediately rectified. As it were, the above-mentioned
explanations that were belatedly given even muddled
the issue further. Petitioner Poe can hardly blame
the COMELEC for casting a suspicious and skeptic then, [petitioner Poe could have already
eye on her contentions regarding her residency. been aware that she cannot maintain her
declaration in the 2013 COC as it would
Petitioner Poe's claim of good faith, thus,
be insufficient to meet the 10-year
stands on very shaky grounds. As found by
residency requirement for President.
the COMELEC En banc:
Indeed, the Commission finds it
. . . worthy of note are certain
hard to believe that a woman as
arguments raised such as
educated as [petitioner Poe], who was
[petitioner Poe's] claim that she never hid
then already a high-ranking public official
from the public her supposed mistake in
with, no doubt, a competent staff and a
the 2013 COC, as evinced by the
band of legal advisers, and who is not
following: 1.) she publicly acknowledged
herself entirely unacquainted with
the same in an interview in June 2015,
Philippine politics being the daughter of a
after the issue of compliance with the
former high-profile presidential aspirant,
residency requirement for President was
would not know how to correctly fill-up
raised by Navotas City Representative
a pro-forma COC in 2013. We are not
and then United Nationalist Alliance
convinced that the subject entry
Secretary General Tobias Tiangco; and
therein was an honest mistake.
2.) that as early as September 1, 2015, in
her Verified Answer filed before the Conclusion
Senate Electoral Tribunal (hereinafter The foregoing discussion points to the failure of
"SET") in SET Case No. 001-15, she petitioner Poe to prove her cases. Therefore, I submit
already made it of record that as of May that the two assailed COMELEC En banc Resolutions
13, 2013, she had been residing in the dated December 23, 2015, separately affirming the
Philippines "for more than six (6) years December 1, 2015 Resolution of the Second Division
and six (6) months." and the December 11, 2015 Resolution of the First
While the two statements were Division are not tainted with grave abuse of discretion
indeed made before respondent filed her amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
2016 COC, it was nonetheless delivered Petitioner Poe implores this Court not to allow
at a time when, at the very least, the the supposed disenfranchisement of the sovereign
possibility of [petitioner Poe] running for people by depriving them of "of something rightfully
President of the country in 2016, was theirs: the consideration of petitioner as a viable and
already a matter of public knowledge. By valid choice for President in the next elections." 69
 But the Constitution itself is the true
embodiment of the supreme will of the people. It was
the people's decision to require in the Constitution,
which they approved in a plebiscite, that their EN BANC
President be a natural-born Filipino citizen. The people
did not choose to disenfranchise themselves but rather [G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
to disqualify those persons, who did not descend by
blood from Filipino parents, from running in an election MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
for the Presidency. LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
The will of the electorate will never cure the vice SION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA
of ineligibility. As so eloquently reminded by then C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz
in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections: 70
[G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
The qualifications prescribed for elective
office cannot be erased by the electorate
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
alone. The will of the people as
LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
expressed through the ballot cannot cure
SION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S.
the vice of ineligibility, especially if they
TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
mistakenly believed, as in this case, that
AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
the candidate was qualified. Obviously,
this rule requires strict application when
the deficiency is lack of citizenship.
DISSENTING OPINION
WHEREFORE, I vote to (i) DISMISS the four
petitions for certiorari filed by petitioner Mary Grace
Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares; and (ii) LIFT the
temporary restraining order issued by this BRION, J.:
Court on December 28, 2015.
I write this DISSENTING OPINION to express
  my disagreements with the ponencia of my esteemed
||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R. colleague, Mr. Justice JOSE P. PEREZ, who wrote the
Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March majority opinion of this Court.
8, 2016])
 The ponencia is based on the exclusive ground In this manner, I can show how mistaken and
that the COMELEC committed "grave abuse of misplaced the majority's ruling had been, and how it
discretion" in "denying due course to and/or dishonored our Constitution through its slanted reading
cancelling her Certificate of Candidacy for the that allows one who does not qualify to serve as
President for the May 9, 2016 elections for false President, to be a candidate for this office.
material representation as to her citizenship and Shorn of the glamor and puffery that paid
residency." advertising and media can provide, this case is about
I write as well to offer help to the general public an expatriate — a popular one — who now wants to
so that they may be enlightened on the issues already run for the presidency after her return to the country.
darkened by political and self-interested claims and Her situation is not new as our jurisprudence is replete
counterclaims, all aired by the media, paid and unpaid, with rulings on similar situations. As early as 1995, a
that only resulted in confusing what would otherwise great jurist — Justice Isagani Cruz 1 — (now
be fairly simple and clearcut issues. deceased but whose reputation for the energetic
defense of and respect and love for the Constitution
I respond most especially to the appeal of our
still lives on) gave his "take" on this situation in his
President Benigno C. Aquino for this Court to rule with
article Return of the Renegade. He wrote:
clarity for the sake of the voting public. Even a Dissent
can contribute to this endeavour. Thus, I write with ". . . Several years ago a
utmost frankness so that every one may know what permanent resident of the United
really transpired within the Court's veiled chambers. States came back to the Philippines
and was elected to a local office. A
For a systematic and orderly approach in
protest was lodged against him on the
presenting my Dissent, I shall:
ground of lack of residence. The
• first summarize the ponencia and the votes of evidence submitted was his green
the ruling majority (Part A); card, and it was irrefutable. The
• then proceed to my more specific objections to Supreme Court ruled that his
the ponencia's egregious claims; (Part permanent and exclusive residence
B) and was in the United States and not in the
municipality where he had run and
• quote the portions of my original Separate won. His election was annulled.
Concurring Opinion that specifically
dispute the majority's ruling (Part C). Where a former Filipino citizen
repents his naturalization and decides
to resume his old nationality, he must
 manifest a becoming contrition. He situation. Still, it would be best to remember the
cannot simply abandon his adopted renegade, lest we forget this hidden facet of this case
country and come back to this as we hear many impassioned pleas for justice and
country as if he were bestowing a gift fairness, among them for foundlings, within and
of himself upon the nation. It is not as outside the Court. What should be before us should
easy as that. He is not a donor but a be one whole story with all the pieces woven
supplicant. together, both for and against the parties' respective
sides. Part of this story should be the general public
In a sense, he is an apostate. He
whose interests should be foremost in our minds. In
has renounced Philippine citizenship
considering them, we should consider most of all the
by a knowing and affirmative act.
Constitution that that they approved in the
When he pledged allegiance to the
exercise of their sovereign power.
adopted country, he also flatly
disavowed all allegiance to the PART A
Philippines. He cannot erase that SUMMARY OF
infidelity by simply establishing his THE PONENCIA'S VOTES & POSITIONS
residence here and claiming the
status he has lost. Of the nine (9) members of the Court supporting
the ponencia, four (4) — among them, Justices
The remorseful Filipino turned Benjamin Caguioa, Francis Jardeleza, and Mario
alien by his own choice cannot say Victor M.V.F. Leonen, as well as Chief Justice Maria
that he sought naturalization in Lourdes P.A. Sereno herself — submitted their
another country only for reasons of respective opinions to explain their own votes as
convenience. That pretext is itself a reasons for supporting the ponencia's conclusions.
badge of bad faith and insincerity.
It reflects on his moral character and  
suggests that he is not an honest While they offered their respective views
person. By his own admission, he (particularly on Poe's claimed natural-born citizen
deceived his adopted country when status, ten-year residency, and
he pretended under oath to embrace the COMELEC's conclusion of false representations),
its way of life." [emphases and they fully concurred (by not qualifying their respective
underscoring supplied] concurrences) with the ponencia's basic reason in
Of course, this is only one side of the story and cannot concluding that grave abuse of discretion attended
represent the total truth of the returning citizen the COMELEC's challenged rulings. CAIHTE
 On the other hand, the other four (4) members candidate for the position, if, as in this
who voted with the majority fully concurred without case, such issue is yet undecided or
qualification with the ponencia, thus fully joined it. undetermined by the proper authority.
The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
In granting Poe's certiorari petitions,
same cancellation case, decide the
the ponencia ruled that —
qualification or lack thereof of the
". . . [t]he procedure  and the candidate.
conclusions from which the questioned
xxx xxx xxx
Resolutions emanated are tainted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to . . . as presently required, to
lack of jurisdiction. [Poe] is a QUALIFIED disqualify a candidate there must be a
CANDIDATE for President in the May 9, declaration by a final judgment of a
2016 National Elections." 2 [emphasis competent court that the candidate
and underscoring supplied] sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
found by the Commission to be suffering
Under the terms of this grant,
from any disqualification provided by law
the ponencia confirmed its position that
or the Constitution." 3
the COMELEC ruling was attended by grave abuse of
discretion and this was the sole basis for the Court . . . The facts of qualification must
decision that COMELEC ruling should be nullified and beforehand be established in a prior
set aside. proceeding before an authority properly
vested with jurisdiction. The prior
The ponencia gave the following explanations,
determination of qualification may be by
which I quote for specific reference (as I do not wish to
statute, by executive order or by
be accused of maliciously misreading the ponencia):
judgment of a competent court or
"The issue before the COMELEC is tribunal." 4
whether or not the COC of [Poe] should
If a candidate cannot be
be denied due course or cancelled
disqualified without prior finding that he
'on the exclusive ground' that she made
or she is suffering from a disqualification
in the certificate a false material
'provided by law or the Constitution,'
representation. The exclusivity of the
neither can the [CoC] be cancelled or
ground should hedge in the discretion of
denied due course on grounds of false
the COMELEC and restrain it from going
material representations regarding his or
into the issue of the qualifications of the
her qualifications, such prior authority
 being the necessary measure by which the falsity of representation could
falsity of representation can be found. have been determined; and
The only exception that can be made (4) the COMELEC's determinatio
conceded are self-evident facts of ns on Poe's citizenship and residency
unquestioned or unquestionable veracity are acts of grave abuse of discretion
and judicial confessions . . . [which] are because:
equivalent to prior decisions against
which the falsity of representation can be (a) Poe's natural-
determined". 5 born citizenship is
founded on the intent of
To summarize all these in a more straight- the framers of the 1935
forward format, the ponencia concluded that Constitution,
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in domestically recognized
cancelling Poe's CoC because: presumptions, generally
(1) the COMELEC did not have accepted principles of
the authority to international law, and
rule on Poe's citizenship and executive and legislative
residency qualifications as these actions; and
qualifications have not yet been (b) Poe's residency
determined by the proper authority; claims were backed up
(2) since there is no such prior not only by
determination as jurisprudence, but more
to Poe's qualifications, there is no importantly by
basis for a finding overwhelming evidence.
that Poe's representations are false; Justice Caguioa additionally offered the view
(3) while a candidate's CoC may that the requirement of "deliberate intent to deceive"
be cancelled without prior cannot be disposed of by a simple finding that there
disqualification finding from the was false representation of a material fact. Rather,
proper authority, the issues there must also be a showing of the candidate's intent
involving Poe's citizenship and to deceive animated the false material
residency do not involve self-evident representation. 6
facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity from which
 J. Caguioa also pointed out that law provides for presumptions regarding
the COMELEC shifted the burden to Poe to prove that paternity. 10 Poe's admission that she is a foundling
she had the qualifications to run for President instead did not shift the burden of proof to her because her
of requiring the private respondents (as the original status did not exclude the possibility that her parents
petitioners in the petitions before the COMELEC) to are Filipinos. 11
prove the three (3) elements required in a Section 78 The factual issue is not who the parents
proceeding. It failed to appreciate that the evidence of of Poe are, as their identities are unknown, but
both parties rested, at the least, at equipoise, and whether such parents were Filipinos. 12 The
should have been resolved in favor of Poe. following circumstantial evidence show that Poe was a
A.1. The ponencia on Poe's citizenship natural-born Filipino: (1) statistical probability that any
child born in the Philippines at the time of Poe's birth is
First, on Poe's citizenship, i.e., that Poe was
natural-born Filipino; (2) the place
not a natural-born Philippine citizen,
of Poe's abandonment; and (3) Poe's Filipino physical
the ponencia essentially ruled that although she is
features. 13
a foundling, her blood relationship with a Filipino
citizen is demonstrable. 7 Third, the framers of the 1935 Constitution and
the people who adopted this Constitution intended
J. Leonen agreed with this point and
foundlings to be covered by the list of Filipino
added 8 that all foundlings in the Philippines are
citizens. 14 While the 1935 Constitution's enumeration
natural-born being presumptively born to either a
is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive
Filipino biological father or mother, unless substantial
language that would definitely exclude foundlings. 15
proof to the contrary is shown. There is no requirement
that the father or mother should be identified. There Thus viewed, the ponencia believes that Poe is
can be proof of a reasonable belief that evidence a natural-born citizen of the Philippines by
presented in a relevant proceeding substantially shows circumstantial evidence, by presumption, and by
that either the father or the mother is a Filipino citizen. implication from the silent terms of the
Constitution.
For his part, J. Caguioa submitted that if indeed
a mistake had been made regarding her real status, The ponencia also clarified that
this could be considered a mistake on a difficult the Rafols amendment pointed out by Poe was not
question of law that could be the basis of good carried in the 1935 Constitution not because there was
faith. 9 DETACa any objection to their inclusion, but because the
number of foundlings at the time was not enough to
Second, more than sufficient evidence exists
merit specific mention. 16
showing that Poe had Filipino parents since Philippine
 More than these reasons, the inclusion of born status when she reacquired citizenship pursuant
foundlings in the list of Philippine citizens is also to Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
consistent with the guarantee of equal protection of the Reacquisition Act of 2003, hereinafter RA 9225) and
laws and the social justice provisions in the when she was appointed as the Chairperson of the
Constitution. 17 Movie and Television Review and Classification
Board (MTRCB). 20 Her natural-born status was
J. Jardeleza particularly agreed with these
recognized, too, by the people when she was elected
reasons and added that in placing foundlings at a
Senator and by the Senate Electoral
disadvantaged evidentiary position at the start of the
Tribunal (SET) when it affirmed her qualifications to
hearing and imposing upon them a higher quantum of
run for Senator. 21
evidence, the COMELEC effectively created two
classes of children: (1) those with known biological The Chief Justice added, on this point, that the
parents; and (2) those whose biological parents are SET decision is another document that shows that she
unknown. This classification is objectionable on equal was not lying when she considered herself a natural-
protection grounds because it is not warranted by the born Filipino. At the very least, it is a prima
text of the Constitution. In doing so, facie evidence finding of natural-born citizenship
the COMELEC effectively subjected her to a higher that Poe can rely on. The SET ruling negated the
standard of proof, that of absolute certainty. 18 element of deliberate attempt to mislead. 22
Fourth, the domestic laws on adoption and the Fifth, the issuance of a foundling certificate is
Rule on Adoption support the principle that foundlings not an act to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship
are Filipinos as these include foundlings among the that makes a foundling a naturalized Filipino at best.
Filipino children who may be adopted. 19 "Having to perform an act" means that the act must be
personally done by the citizen. In the case of
In support of this position, J. Leonen additionally
foundlings, the determination of his/her foundling
pointed out that the legislature has provided statutes
status is not done by himself, but by the authorities. 23
essentially based on a premise that foundlings are
Philippine citizens at birth, citing the Juvenile Justice Sixth, foundlings are Philippine citizens under
and Welfare Act of 2006; and that the Philippines also international law, i.e., the Universal
ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR), United Nations
and the 1966 International Convention on Civil and Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC), and
Political Rights, which are legally effective and binding the International Convention on Civil and Political
by transformation. Rights (ICCPR), all obligate the Philippines to grant
J. Leonen further argued that the executive them nationality from birth and to ensure that no child
department had, in fact, also assumed Poe's natural- is stateless. This grant of nationality must be at the
time of birth which cannot be accomplished by the did not result in her becoming a naturalized Filipino,
application of our present Naturalization Laws. 24 but restored her status as a natural-born Philippine
citizen. Repatriation is not an act to "acquire or perfect
The principle — that the foundlings are
one's citizenship" nor does the Constitution require the
presumed to have the nationality of the country of
natural-born status to be continuous from birth. 28
birth, under the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws A.2. The ponencia  on  Poe's  residency
and the 1961 United Nations Convention on the The ponencia ruled that the COMELEC gravely
Reduction of Statelessness — is a generally accepted erred on the residency issue when it blindly applied
principle of international law. "Generally accepted the ruling in Coquilla, Japzon,
principles of international law" are based not and Caballero reckoning the period of residence of
only on international custom, but also on "general former natural-born Philippine citizens only from the
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 25 date of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, and
The requirement of opinio juris sive relied solely in her statement in her 2012 CoC as to
necessitates in establishing the presumption of the the period of her residence in the Philippines.
founding State's nationality in favor of foundlings under The COMELEC reached these conclusions by
the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961 disregarding the import of the various pieces of
Convention on Statelessness as generally accepted evidence Poe presented establishing her animus
principle of international law was, in fact, established manendi and animus non-revertendi. 29
by the various executive and legislative acts
recognizing foundlings as Philippine citizens, i.e., by
the executive through the Department of Foreign
Affairs in authorizing the issuance of passports to
foundlings, and by the Legislature, via the Domestic
Adoption Act. Adopting these legal principles in the
1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and
reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. 26
Lastly, the COMELEC disregarded settled
jurisprudence that repatriation results in the
reacquisition of natural-born Philippine
citizenship. 27 Poe's repatriation under RA No. 9225
 Poe, in fact, had shown more than sufficient period allows a balikbayan to re-establish his or her life
evidence that she established her Philippine and to reintegrate himself or herself into the
residence even before repatriation. The cases community before attending to the formal and legal
of Coquilla, Japzon, Caballero, and Reyes are not requirements of repatriation. There is no overriding
applicable to Poe's case because in these cases, the intent under the balikbayan program to
candidate whose residency qualification was treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave
questioned presented "sparse after one year. 34
evidence" 30 on residence which gave the Court no Third, Poe committed an honest mistake in
choice but to hold that residence could only be her 2012 CoC declaration on her residence
counted from the acquisition of a permanent resident period. 35 Following jurisprudence, it is the fact of
visa or from reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. residence and not the statement in a CoC which is
Under this reasoning, Poe showed overwhelming decisive in determining whether the residency
evidence that she decided to permanently relocate to requirement has been satisfied. The COMELEC, in
the Philippines on May 24, 2005, or before fact, acknowledged that the query on the period of
repatriation. 31 residence in the CoC form for the May
J. Leonen, on this point, added that 2013 elections was vague; thus, it changed the
the COMELEC's dogmatic reliance on formal phrasing of this query in the current CoC form for the
preconceived indicators has been repeatedly decried May 9, 2016 elections. It was grave abuse of discretion
by the Court as grave abuse of discretion. Worse, for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as binding
the COMELEC relied on the wrong formal indicators of and conclusive admission against Poe.
residence. 32 Fourth, assuming that Poe's residency
As the ponencia did, J. Leonen stressed that statement in her 2015 CoC is erroneous, Poe had no
the COMELEC disregarded Poe's evidence of re- deliberate intent to mislead or to hide a fact as
establishment of Philippine residence prior to July shown by her immediate disclosure in public of her
2006 when it merely invoked Poe's status as one who mistake in the stated period of residence in her 2012
had not reacquired Philippine citizenship. To him, CoC for Senator. 36
the COMELEC relied on a manifestly faulty premise to PART B
justify the position that all of Poe's evidence before
July 2006 deserved no consideration. 33 aDSIHc SPECIFIC REFUTATION OF
THE PONENCIA'S OUTSTANDING ERRORS
Second, Poe may re-establish her residence
notwithstanding that she carried a balikbayan visa My original Separate Concurring Opinion (to the
in entering the Philippines. The one year visa-free original ponencia of Justice Mariano del Castillo) deals
with most, if not all, of the positions that the majority Tribunal (SET), the House of Representatives
has taken. My Separate Concurring Opinion is quoted Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Presidential
almost in full below (with some edits for completeness) Electoral Tribunal (PET) respectively. 37
as my detailed refutation of the ponencia. Second, Fermin v. Comelec, 38 citing the
Nevertheless, I have incorporated Part B in this Separate Opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza
Opinion to address the ponencia's more egregious in Romualdez-Marcos v. Comelec, 39 noted that "the
claims that, unless refuted, would drastically change lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of
the constitutional and jurisprudential landscape in this candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere
country, in order only to justify the candidacy of one rule." 40 This view was adopted in the revision of
popular candidate. As I repeated often enough in my the COMELEC Rules of Procedure in 2012, as
Separate Concurring Opinion, the Court operates reflected in the changes made in the 2012 Rules from
outside of its depth and could possibly succeed in the 1993 Rules of Procedure, 41 as follows:
drowning this nation if it adds to, detracts from, 1993 Rules of Procedure:
negates, enlarges or modifies the terms of the
Constitution as approved by the sovereign people of Section 1. Grounds for
the Philippines. Disqualification. — Any candidate who
does not possess all the qualifications of
B.1. The Ponencia on the Comelec's lack of a candidate as provided for by the
jurisdiction Constitution or by existing law or who
The ponencia presented two arguments in commits any act declared by law to be
concluding that the COMELEC lacked the jurisdiction grounds for disqualification may be
to determine Poe's eligibility to become President in disqualified from continuing as a
the course of a section 78 proceeding against her: candidate.
First, Article IX-C of the 1987 2012 Rules of Procedure:
Constitution on the COMELEC's jurisdiction had no Rule 25, Section 1. Grounds. —
specific provision regarding the qualification of the Any candidate who, in an action or
President, Vice President, Senators and Members of protest in which he is a party, is declared
the House of Representatives, while Article VI, Section by final decision of a competent court,
17 and Article VII, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution guilty of, or found by the Commission to
specifically included contest involving the qualifications be suffering from any disqualification
of Senators and Members of the House of provided by law or the Constitution.
Representatives, and of the President and Vice-
President, to the jurisdiction of the Senate Electoral
 A Petition to Disqualify a includes the determination of whether
Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition a candidate has made a false material
to Deny or to Cancel a Certificate of representation in his CoC, and the
Candidacy or Petition to Declare a determination of whether the eligibility
Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate, or a he represented in his CoC is true.
combination thereof, shall be summarily
b) In Tecson  v.  COMELEC  44 the Court has
dismissed.
recognized
The ponencia read Fermin and the 2012 Rules the COMELEC's jurisdiction in a
of Procedure to mean that there is no authorized Section 78 proceeding over a
proceeding to determine the qualifications of a presidential candidate.
candidate before the candidate is elected. To
c) Fermin's quotation of Justice Mendoza's
disqualify a candidate, there must be a declaration by
Separate Opinion in Romualdez-
a final judgment of a competent court that the
Marcos should be taken in context,
candidate sought to be disqualified "is guilty of or
as Fermin itself clarified:
found by the Commission to be suffering from any
disqualification provided by law or the Constitution." 42 Lest it be misunderstood, the
denial of due course to or the
Thus, the ponencia held that a certificate of
cancellation of the CoC is not
candidacy "cannot be cancelled or denied due
based on the lack of qualifications
course on grounds of false representations regarding
but on a finding that the candidate
his or her qualifications without a prior authoritative
made a material representation that is
finding that he or she is not qualified, such prior
false, which may relate to the
authority being the necessary measure by which the
qualifications required of the public office
falsity of the representation can be found. The only
he/she is running for. It is noted that the
exception that can be conceded are self-evident facts
candidate states in his/her CoC that
of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial
he/she is eligible for the office he/she
confessions." 43
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC,
The arguments in my original Separate therefore, is to be read in relation to
Concurring Opinion regarding the constitutional and statutory
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to rule on Section 78 provisions on qualifications or
cases address the ponencia's arguments, as follows: eligibility for public office. If the
a) The COMELEC's quasi-judicial power in candidate subsequently states a material
resolving a Section 78 proceeding representation in the CoC that is false,
 the COMELEC, following the law, is The Court even affirmed
empowered to deny due course to or the COMELEC's capability to liberally construe its own
cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court rules of procedure in response to Ongsiako-Reyes'
has already likened a proceeding under allegation that the COMELEC gravely abused its
Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding discretion in admitting newly-discovered evidence that
under Section 253 of the OEC since they had not been testified on, offered and admitted in
both deal with the eligibility or evidence. The Court held:
qualification of a candidate, with the All in all, considering that the
distinction mainly in the fact that a petition for denial and cancellation of
"Section 78" petition is filed before the CoC is summary in nature,
proclamation, while a petition for quo the  COMELEC  is given much
warranto is filed after proclamation of the discretion in the evaluation and
wining candidate. 45 [underscoring admission of evidence pursuant to its
supplied] principal objective of determining of
Aside from these a rguments, I point out that: whether or not the CoC should be
cancelled. We held
d) The ponente's conclusion contradicts his
in Mastura v. COMELEC:
own recent affirmation of
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to The rule that factual findings of
determine the eligibility of a candidate administrative bodies will not be
through a Section 78 proceeding disturbed by courts of justice except
in Ongsiako when there is absolutely no evidence
Reyes  v.  COMELEC  (G.R. No. 207264, or no substantial evidence in support
June 25, 2013) and of such findings should be applied
in  Cerafica  v.  COMELEC  (G.R. No. with greater force when it concerns
205136, December 2, 2014).  ETHIDa the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place
In Ongsiako-Reyes v. COMELEC, the Court,
the COMELEC — created and
speaking through J. Perez, affirmed
explicitly made independent by the
the COMELEC's cancellation of Ongsiako-Reyes' CoC
Constitution itself — on a level higher
and affirmed its determination that Ongsiako-Reyes is
than statutory administrative organs.
neither a Philippine citizen nor a resident of
Marinduque. The COMELEC has broad powers to
ascertain the true results of the
election by means available to it. For
 the attainment of that end, it is not The ponencia disregarded the following cases
strictly bound by the rules of where it recognized the COMELEC's jurisdiction to
evidence. 46 [emphasis, italics and determine eligibility as part of determining false
underscoring supplied] material representation in a candidate's CoC. Cases
involving Section 78 since the year 2012 (the year
In Cerafica, the Court, again speaking
the COMELEC amended its Rules of Procedure) are
through J. Perez, held that the COMELEC gravely
shown in the table below:
abused its discretion in holding that Kimberly Cerafica
(a candidate for councilor) did not file a valid CoC andCase Ponente, Division Ruling
subsequently cannot be substituted by Olivia Cerafica.    
Kimberly's CoC is considered valid unless the contentsComelec, Carpio, J. En banc The Court affirmed the Comelec's
therein (including her eligibility) is impugnedG.R.
through a
No. 195229   determination that Lonzanida has
Section 78 proceeding. As Kimberly's CoC had not
October 9, 2012   served for three terms already and
undergone a Section 78 proceeding, then her CoC   therefore misrepresented his eligibility
remained valid and she could be properly substituted
  to run for office; this, according to the
by Olivia. In so doing, the Court quoted and reaffirmed
its previous ruling in Luna  v.  COMELEC:  47   Court, is a ground for cancelling
  Lonzanida's CoC under Section 78.
"If Hans Roger made a material    
misrepresentation as to his date of birth Sereno, CJ, En The Court reversed the Comelec's
or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
Comelec, G.R. No. banc determination of the Arnado's
eligibility may only be impugned through
195649, April 16,
a verified petition to deny due course to   qualification to run for office because of
or cancel such certificate of candidacy   a recanted oath of allegiance, and thus
under Section 78 of the Election   cancelled his CoC and proclaimed
Code." 48 [italics supplied]   Maquiling as the winner. The Court, in
  reviewing the Comelec's determination,
e) The ponencia's conclusion would wreak
havoc on existing jurisprudence   did not dispute its capacity to determine
recognizing   Arnado's qualifications.
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to    
OngsiakoinReyes v.
determine a candidate's eligibility Perez, J., En Banc The Court affirmed the Comelec's
Comelec,
the course of deciding a Section 78G.R. No.   evaluation and determination that
proceeding before it. 207264, June 25,   Ongsiako-Reyes is not a Philippine
  citizen and a resident of the Philippines.
   It even upheld the Comelec's cognizance    
  of "newly-discovered evidence" and held  If Hans Roger made a material
  that the Comelec can liberally construe   misrepresentation as to his date of birth
  its own rules of procedure for the speedy   or age in his certificate of candidacy, his
  disposition of cases before it.   eligibility may only be impugned
      through a verified petition to deny due
ca v. Perez, J. The Court held that the Comelec   course to or cancel such certificate of
ec, G.R. No. En Banc Decision gravely abused its discretion in holding   candidacy under Section 78 of the
6   that Kimberly did not file a valid CoC   Election Code.
mber 2, 2014   and subsequently cannot be substituted  In this case, there was no petition to
  by Olivia; in so doing, the Court quoted   deny due course to or cancel the
  and reaffirmed its previous ruling in   certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger.
  Luna v. Comelec, thus:   The COMELEC only declared that
      Hans Roger did not file a valid
  "If Hans Roger made a material   certificate of candidacy and, thus, was
  misrepresentation as to his date of birth  not a valid candidate in the petition to
  or age in his certificate of candidacy, his  deny due course to or cancel Luna's
  eligibility may only be impugned   certificate of candidacy. In effect, the
  through a verified petition to deny due   COMELEC, without the proper
  course to or cancel such certificate of   proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger's
  candidacy under Section 78 of the   certificate of candidacy and declared the
  Election Code."   substitution by Luna invalid.
     
v. Comelec, Carpio, J. En Banc Since Hans Roger withdrew his
No. 165983   certificate of candidacy and the f) Rules 23 of the 2012 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure does not limit
4, 2007   COMELEC found that Luna complied
the COMELEC's jurisdiction in
as reference   with all the procedural requirements for determining the eligibility of a
ffirmation   a valid substitution, Luna can validly candidate in the course of ruling on a
africa)   substitute for Hans Roger. Section 78 proceeding.
   
  xxx
The second paragraph in Rule 23 delineates grounds for a separate remedy, shall be
the distinction between a Section 78 summarily dismissed;
cancellation proceeding and a Section Thus, Rule 23 recognizes material
68 disqualification proceeding; to misrepresentation in the CoC as the sole ground for
avoid the muddling or mixing of the Section 78 without amending the definition of false
grounds for each remedy, material representation that jurisprudence has
the COMELEC opted to provide that provided as early as 1999 in Salcedo
petitions that combine or substitute II v. COMELEC: 49
one remedy for the other shall be
dismissed summarily. The only difference between the
two proceedings is that, under section
Naturally, the text of this second paragraph 78, the qualifications for elective office
also appears in Rule 25, which are misrepresented in the certificate of
provides for the grounds for a petition candidacy and the proceedings must be
for disqualification. initiated before the elections, whereas a
Rule 23 provides: petition for quo warranto under section
253 may be brought on the basis of two
Section 1. Ground for Denial or
grounds — (1) ineligibility or (2) disloyalty
Cancellation of Certificate of
to the Republic of the Philippines, and
Candidacy. —
must be initiated within ten days after the
A verified Petition to Deny Due Course to proclamation of the election results.
or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy for Under section 253, a candidate is
any elective office may be filed by any ineligible if he is disqualified to be elected
registered voter or a duly registered to office,[21] and he is disqualified if he
political party, organization, or coalition of lacks any of the qualifications for elective
political parties on the exclusive ground office.
that any material representation
xxx xxx xxx
contained therein as required by law is
false.  
A Petition to Deny Due Course to or Therefore, it may be concluded
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy invoking that the material misrepresentation
grounds other than those stated above or contemplated by section 78 of the Code
grounds for disqualification, or combining refer to qualifications for elective office.
 This conclusion is strengthened by the that even this Court itself cannot
fact that the consequences imposed rule  on  Poe's  citizenship and residence
upon a candidate guilty of having made a eligibilities in the course of reviewing a Section
false representation in his certificate of 78  COMELEC  ruling; any declaration regarding
candidacy are grave to prevent the these issues would be obiter dictum.
candidate from running or, if elected, In practical terms, the Court's ruling only
from serving, or to prosecute him for assured Poe the chance to run; conceivably, if she
violation of the election laws.[23] It could wins, the Court, through the Presidential Electoral
not have been the intention of the law to Tribunal, will then rule that the people have spoken
deprive a person of such a basic and and that they cannot be denied their voice after
substantive political right to be voted for the elections. Based on the present circumstances,
a public office upon just any innocuous this is a scenario that cannot be entirely ruled out.
mistake:
To reiterate, the ponencia declared that
xxx xxx xxx the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to determine, even
Aside from the requirement of preliminarily, the eligibility of candidates prior to an
materiality, a false representation under election under a Section 78 proceeding, except for
section 78 must consist of a deliberate disqualifications already or previously acted upon by
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a the proper authorities or where the facts are self-
fact which would otherwise render a evident or of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity
candidate ineligible.[25] In other words, it from which the falsity of representation could readily
must be made with an intention to be determined.
deceive the electorate as to ones Since the COMELEC lacks jurisdiction to rule
qualifications for public office. . . . and cannot even preliminarily determine questions of
B.1.a. Effect of the ponencia's eligibility, then the issues involving
misinterpretation of the COMELEC's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
Section 78 proceedings to the Court's ruling on Poe's eligibilities cannot effectively be
certiorari jurisdiction over the present resolved except through a ruling that, given the lack of
case authority, it was grave abuse of discretion
for COMELEC to rule as it did. And given the same
If we were to follow the ponencia's
lack of authority, the reversal of the cancellation of her
limitation on the COMELEC's function to
CoC must follow as a consequence. Thus, her CoC
determine Poe's eligibility to become President in a
effectively remains valid. cSEDTC
Section 78 proceeding, the logical result would be
 The consequence of ruling that During the debates on this
the COMELEC is without jurisdiction to determine provision, Delegate Rafols presented
eligibility as part of a Section 78 proceeding is that any an amendment to include as Filipino
other subsequent discussions by this Court citizens the illegitimate children with a
upholding Poe's eligibilities would be obiter dicta, or foreign father of a mother who was a
pronouncements that are not essential to the citizen of the Philippines, and also
resolution of a case. With the COMELEC stripped of foundlings; but this amendment was
the jurisdiction to determine, even defeated primarily because the
preliminarily, Poe's citizenship and residence, then its Convention believed that the cases,
determinations are null and void, leading to the further being too few to warrant the inclusion
conclusion that this Court no longer has any issue left of a provision in the Constitution to
to review and to decide upon as neither would it be apply to them, should be governed by
necessary to determine Poe's eligibilities. statutory legislation. Moreover, it was
believed that the rules of international
In other words, any pronouncements outside
law were already clear to the effect
the COMELEC's limited jurisdiction in Section 78
that illegitimate children followed the
would only be expressions of the COMELEC's opinion
citizenship of the mother, and that
and would have no effect in the determination of the
foundlings followed the nationality of
merits of the Section 78 case before it. Findings of
the place where they were found,
ineligibility outside of the limits do not need to be
thereby making unnecessary the
resolved or even be touched by this Court. Thus, in the
inclusion in the Constitution of the
present case, Poe can simply be a candidate for the
proposed amendment. 50
presidency, with her eligibilities open to post-election
questions, if still necessary at that point. Aruego's account of the deliberations
reinforces my position for the following reasons:
B.1.b. Aruego's account of the
deliberations, First, Aruego said that "this amendment was
as cited in the ponencia defeated primarily because the Convention believed
that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion
Ironically, the ponencia's citation of Jose M.
of a provision in the Constitution to apply to
Aruego's recounting of the deliberations even
them, should be governed by statutory legislation."
reinforces my position that the framers never intended
to include foundlings within the terms of the 1935 In saying this, Aruego also recounted that
Constitution's parentage provisions. Aruego allegedly many, if not most, of the majority of those who voted
said: against the inclusion of foundlings in the 1935
Constitution believed that the matter of their citizenship must yield to the higher categorization accorded to
should be governed by statutory legislation because foundlings who do not enjoy similar roots.
the cases of foundlings are too few to be included in Another drastic change appears to be coming
the Constitution. for no clear and convincing legal reason in the present
Thus, the principle of international case: Section 78 would now be emasculated despite
law on foundlings is merely supportive of the primary established rulings by this very Court on what
reason that the matter should be governed by statute, the COMELEC can undertake within its Section 78
or is a secondary reason to the majority's decision not jurisdiction.
to include foundlings in Article IV, Section 1 of the A close reading of Ongsiako-
1935 Constitution. Reyes v. COMELEC, also penned by J. Perez as
Notably, both the text of the deliberations of the above noted, will show that the issues
1934 Constitutional Convention and the account of its the COMELEC decided there were practically the
member Jose Aruego do not disclose that the intent same issues in this cited case. Yet, the Court's
behind the non-inclusion of foundlings in Article IV, majority in the present case holds that
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution was because they the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to rule on the
are deemed already included. issues of a candidate's citizenship and residence
requirements in the course of a Section 78
What deliberations show is that a member of
proceeding, despite its previous affirmation of the
the Convention thought that it would be better for a
same COMELEC power in Ongsiako-Reyes also in a
statute to govern the citizenship of foundlings, which
Section 78 proceeding. Have established precedents
Aruego, in his subsequent retelling of what happened
been sacrificed to achieve desired results?
in the deliberations, described as the primary belief of
the majority. At the very least, there was no clear But the worst impact yet on the Constitution is
agreement that foundlings were intended to be part of the discovery that this Court can play around even
Article IV, Section 1. with the express wordings of the Constitution.
While this may already be known to those in the legal
The ponencia's ruling thus does not only
profession, the reality becomes glaring and may be a
disregard the distinction of citizenship
new discovery for the general public because of the
based on the father or the mother under the 1935
recent EDCA case; the present case and ruling may
Constitution; it also misreads what the records
very well be considered another instance of judicial
signify and thereby unfairly treats the children of
tinkering with the express terms of the Constitution.
Filipino mothers under the 1935 Constitution who,
although able to trace their Filipino parentage, B.1.c. Burden of Proof.
 A contested issue that surfaced early on in 2016 elections, when she had not. The original
these cases is the question: who carries the burden of petitioners had to prove what they claimed to be false
proving that the petitioner is a natural-born Philippine representations.
citizen?  
Lest we be distracted by the substance of this
Thus viewed, the main issue in the case below
question, let me clarify at the outset that the cases
was the false material representation, which
before us are petitions for certiorari under Rule 64 (in
essentially rested on the premises of citizenship and
relation to Rule 65) of the Rules of Court. In these
residence — is Poe a natural-born citizen as she
types of petitions, the petitioner challenges the
claimed and had she observed the requisite qualifying
rulings/s made by the respondent pursuant to Article
period of residence?
VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution. Thus, it is the
petitioner who carries the burden of showing that the The original petitioners undertook the
respondent, the COMELEC in this case, committed task on the citizenship issue by alleging that Poe is a
grave abuse of discretion. foundling; as such, her parents are unknown, so that
she is not a Philippine citizen under the terms of the
Of course, in making the challenged ruling,
1935 Constitution.
the COMELEC had a wider view and had to consider
the parties' respective situations at the outset. The Poe responded by admitting that indeed she is
present private respondents were the petitioners who a foundling, but claimed that the burden is on the
sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC and who thereby original petitioners to prove that she is in fact a
procedurally carried the burden of proving the claim foreigner through proof that her parents are
that Poe falsely represented her citizenship and foreigners. SDAaTC
residency qualifications in her CoC. Since Poe indeed could not factually show that
I would refer to this as the procedural aspect of either of her parents is a Philippine citizen,
the burden of proof issue. The original petitioners the COMELEC concluded that the original petitioners
before the COMELEC (the respondents in the present are correct in their position that they have discharged
petitions) — from the perspective of procedure — their original burden to prove that Poe is not a natural-
carried the burden under its Section 78 cancellation of born citizen of the Philippines. To arrive at its
CoC petition, to prove that Poe made false material conclusion, the COMELEC considered and
representations; she claimed in her CoC that she is a relied on the terms of the 1935 Constitution.
natural-born Filipino citizen when she is not; she also With this original burden discharged, the burden
claimed that she has resided in the Philippines for ten of evidence then shifted to Poe to prove that despite
years immediately preceding the May 9, her admission that she is a foundling, she is in fact a
natural-born Filipino, either by evidence (not From the substantive perspective, too, a
necessarily or solely DNA in character) and by legal sovereign State has the right to determine who its
arguments supporting the view that a foundling found citizens are. 51 By conferring citizenship on a person,
in the Philippines is a natural-born citizen. the State obligates itself to grant and protect the
person's rights. In this light and as discussed more
The same process was repeated with respect to
fully below, the list of Filipino citizens under the
the residency issue, after which, the COMELEC ruled
Constitution must be read
that Poe committed false representations as, indeed,
as exclusive and exhaustive.
she is not a natural-born Philippine citizen and had not
resided in the country, both as required by the Thus, this Court has held that any doubt
Constitution. regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of the
State. 52 In other words, citizenship cannot be
These were the processes and developments at
presumed; the person who claims Filipino
the COMELEC level, based on which the present
citizenship must prove that he or she is in fact a
Court majority now say that the COMELEC committed
Filipino. 53 It is only upon proper proof that a claimant
grave abuse of discretion for not observing the
can be entitled to the rights granted by the State. 54
rules on the burden of proof on the citizenship and the
residency issues. This was the Court's ruling in Paa v.
Chan 55 where this Court categorically ruled that it is
Separately from the strictly procedural aspects
incumbent upon the person who claims Philippine
of the cancellation of CoC proceedings, it must be
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of the court that
considered that the petitioner, by filing a CoC, actively
he is really a Filipino. This should be true particularly
represents that she possesses all the
after proof that the claimant has not proven (and even
qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
admits the lack of proven) Filipino parentage. No
the office she is running for.
presumption can be indulged in favor of the
When this representation is questioned, claimant of Philippine citizenship, and any doubt
particularly through proof of being a foundling as in the regarding citizenship must be resolved in favor of
present case, the burden should rest on the present the State.
petitioner to prove that she is a natural-born Philippine
The Court further explained that the exercise by
citizen, a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
a person of the rights and/or privileges that are granted
years immediately prior to the election, able to read
to Philippine citizens is not conclusive proof that he or
and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the
she is a Philippine citizen. A person, otherwise
election, and a registered voter. This is the opportunity
disqualified by reason of citizenship, may exercise and
that the COMELEC gave Poe to the fullest, and I see
no question of grave abuse of discretion on this basis.
enjoy the right or privilege of a Philippine citizen by fully disclosed to me, the actual deliberation and voting
representing himself to be one. 56 took place on March 8, 2016 (when I was on leave for
medical reasons).
Based on these considerations, the Court
majority's ruling on burden of proof at Thus, while my Separate Concurring Opinion
the COMELEC level appears to be misplaced. On both was circulated, made available on time to all the
counts, procedural and substantive (based on settled Justices and accounted for in the Court's count of
jurisprudence), the COMELEC closely hewed to the votes, I did not have the full opportunity to orally
legal requirements. Thus, the Court majority's expound on them. In this light, this Dissenting Opinion
positions on where and how the COMELEC committed is my opportunity to cover the views I have not orally
grave abuse of discretion are truly puzzling. With no aired.
grave abuse at the COMELEC level, the present I.
petitioner's own burden of proof in the
present certiorari proceedings before this Court must The Relevant Facts and their Legal Significance.
necessarily fail. I.A. The Petitions for Cancellation of CoC
PART C and the COMELEC ruling
MY ORIGINAL "SEPARATE CONCURRING Four (4) petitions were filed with
OPINION" the COMELEC to cancel Poe's CoC for the Presidency
TO THE PONENCIA OF under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
JUSTICE MARIANO DEL CASTILLO Code (OEC).
I am submitting this original Separate The first petition before the COMELEC was the
Concurring Opinion to refute in detail petition for cancellation filed by Estrella C. Elamparo,
the ponencia's main points that I disagree with. For which was docketed as G.R. No. 221697.
convenience, the original numbering system of the The other three (3) petitions were similarly for
original has been retained and I have introduced edits the cancellation of Poe's CoC filed by separate parties
and supplied the footnotes that were missing when this — by Francisco S. Tatad, Amado D. Valdez,
Opinion was circulated on Monday, March 7, 2016. and Antonio P. Contreras — and are before this
The deadline for submission of Opinions Court under G.R. Nos. 221298-700.
was on March 8, 2016. The deliberation and the vote The petitions before this Court — all of them for
were originally scheduled for Wednesday, March 9, the nullification of the COMELEC en banc rulings
2016 to allow the individual Justices to read through all through a writ of certiorari — were consolidated for
the submitted Opinions. Unfortunately, for reasons not
hearing and handling because they all dealt with the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
cancellation of Poe's CoC. of jurisdiction when it made this ruling.
These petitions essentially raised two Thus, the issue before this Court is not per
grounds as basis for the cancellation prayed for: se about the COMELEC's legal authority to rule on the
cancellation of Poe's CoC, but about the manner
First, she falsely represented her citizenship in
the COMELEC exercised its jurisdiction, its allegedly
her CoC because she is not a natural-born Filipino
abusive acts that caused it to exceed its
citizen; and
jurisdiction. acEHCD
Second, she falsely represented the period of
I say this under the view that
her residency prior to the May 9,
the COMELEC's primary authority in this case is to
2016 elections as she has not resided in the
pass upon the candidates' certificates of
Philippines for at least ten (10) years before the day of
candidacy and to order their cancellation if
the election.
warranted, for false representation on material
These issues were raised based on the points. But the COMELEC can, in the exercise of this
constitutional command that: authority, preliminarily (and as a necessarily
SECTION 2. No person may be included power) pass on the correctness of
elected President unless he is a natural- the claims made on the material points of
born citizen of the Philippines, a citizenship, residency, and other qualifications. I
registered voter, able to read and write, explain this point more extensively below.
at least forty years of age on the day of I.B. The Citizenship Table
the election, and a resident of the
The citizenship issues relate to Poe's status as
Philippines for at least ten
a citizen of the Philippines and to the character of this
years immediately preceding such
citizenship: whether or not she is a Philippine
election. [Article VII, 1987
citizen; if so, whether or not she is a natural-born
Constitution, emphasis and underscoring
citizen as the Constitution requires.
supplied]
The issues started because of the undisputed
The COMELEC en banc — in the appeal
evidence that Poe is a foundling, which raised the
that Poe filed from the COMELEC Divisions' decisions
question:
— ruled that Poe's CoC should be cancelled for the
false representations she made regarding her (a) what is the status of a foundling under
citizenship and residency. In the petitions before the 1935 Constitution given that this is
us, Poe claims that the COMELEC en banc acted with
 the governing law when Poe was Classification Board [MTRCB], her candidacy and
found in September of 1968. election to the Senate, and her present candidacy for
the presidency).
Poe was likewise naturalized as an American
citizen and thereafter applied for the reacquisition of Had Poe early on identified herself as a
Filipino citizenship under RA No. 9225. This foundling (i.e., one who cannot claim descent from a
circumstance gave rise to the questions: Filipino parent), then the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) would have at least inquired further
(a) was she qualified to apply under RA No.
because this undisclosed aspect of her personal
9225 given that the law specifically
circumstances touches on her former natural-born
applies only to former natural-born
citizenship status — the basic irreplaceable
citizens;
requirement for the application of RA No. 9225.
(b) even granting arguendo that she can be
Notably, the BID approval led the career
considered natural-born, did she —
of Poe to her appointment to the MTRCB and her
under RA 9225 — reacquire her
subsequent election to the Senate. Both positions
natural-born status or is she now a
require the natural-born citizenship status that the BID
naturalized citizen in light of the
previously recognized in approving Poe's RA No. 9225
constitutional definition of who is a
application.
natural-born citizen?
For easy and convenient reference and
 
understanding of the essential facts and issues,
The COMELEC, after considering the evidence separate tables of the major incidents in the life of Poe,
and the surrounding circumstances, noted relevant to the issues raised and based on the duly
that Poe's citizenship claim was based on the material footnoted parties' evidence, are hereby presented.
representation that she is a natural-born citizen of the
Table I
Philippines when in fact, she is not; thus her
representation on a material point was false. On this CITIZENSHIP TABLE
basis, the COMELEC resolved to cancel Poe's CoC Particulars (with legal
based on her citizenship statements. Date      
significance)
The false material representation started    
in Poe's application for re-acquisition of citizenship SeptemberThe date Poe was found; her parentage as
under RA No. 9225 which became the foundation for 3, 1968 well as the exact date
the exercise of critical citizenship rights (such as the and actual place of birth are
   
appointment to the Movie and Television Review and unknown. 
          61     
Poe claims that she was born on this date    
 
when Edgardo Militar SeptemberEmiliano reported Poe as a foundling with the
found her at the Jaro Iloilo 6, 1968 Office of the Civil
   
Cathedral. 57  Registrar (OCR) in Jaro, Iloilo for
 
        registration. 62 
Legal significance: Our Constitution        
    •
requires a President Legal significance: official record
to be a natural-born     •
      that Poe is a foundling.
citizen. Poe admitted that she is a No legal question has been raised
foundling (i.e., one born of unknown      
      about this document.
parents) 58 and later    
claimed that she is a natural-born November The OCR issued the foundling certificate
     
citizen. 59  27, 1968 under the name "Mary
        Grace Natividad Contreras
She made her representation on the    
    • Militar." 63 
basis of a claimed        
presumption of Filipino citizenship The original Certificate of Live Birth
          •
(apparently stemming dated November 27,
from the circumstances under which 1968 contains the notation "foundling"
           
she was found [on and now appears
September 3, 1968 in Jaro, to have erasures, to reflect apparently
           
Iloilo]), 60 and on the basis of the subsequent
international law which allegedly gave adoption of Poe by Ronald
           
her natural-born Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora
      citizenship status.         Poe.    
           
Poe never formally claimed that she When Poe was five years old, Ronald
    • 1973
is presumed a Allan Poe and Jesusa
Filipino citizen under Philippine Sonora Poe filed a petition
       
adoption laws, although for Poe's adoption. 64 
adoption was mentioned in May 13, The court approved the
     
passing in her Memorandum. 1974 Spouses Poe's petition for adoption.
 Poe's name was changed to "Mary Grace Rules on the Civil
 
Sonora Poe. 65  Registry law, and P.D. 603 (The Child
     
        and Youth Welfare
Legal Significance: She officially Code) which specifically allows the
    •      
assumed the status  of a confidential treatment
legitimate child by adoption of the       of the adoption.    
     
Spouses Poe, but the    
adoption did not affect her citizenship December The Comelec issued a voter's identification
     
status; under P.D. 13, 1986 card to Poe for
603 (The Child and Youth Welfare Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro
       
Code), the adopted Manila. 69 
child does not follow the citizenship of        
     
the adopting Legal Significance: The records of the
      parents. 66          •
case do not
        disclose the documents Poe used to
     
Significantly, no question arose support her voter
In 2006   •
regarding Poe's legal registration, but she must have
     
capacity to be adopted as the law surely claimed to be a
     
likewise does not bar Filipino citizen; otherwise, the voter's
     
      the adoption of an alien. 67    ID would not have
              been issued. 70     
Jesusa    
    • Sonora Poe registered Poe's birth April 4, Poe obtained her Philippine Passport No.
and secured a 1988 F927287 71 from the
birth certificate from the National   Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   
     
Statistics Office on May    
4, 2006. The certificate did not reflect She renewed her passport on April 5, 1993
       
that she was a (Passport No.
foundling who had been adopted by L881511) and on May 19, 1998 (Passport No.
       
the spouses Poe. 68 DD155616). 72 
The changes were in accordance with        
     
Adm. Order No. 1, Legal Significance: She could have
      Series of 1993, the Implementing     •
been granted a
 passport only if she had applied as, October Poe became a naturalized United States
     
and claimed that she 18, 2001 (U.S.) citizen. 78 
is, a Filipino citizen. 73 Filipino        
     
citizenship is expressly Legal significance: Poe lost
stated on the faces of the     •
      whatever claim she had to
passports. 74  Philippine citizenship through
     
        "express renunciation" of
The exercise of the rights of a Filipino this citizenship. 79 U.S. citizenship
    •      
citizen does not confirmed her
ripen to nor can it be the basis for abandonment of the Philippine
           
claim of Filipino citizenship whose rights
      citizenship. 75      she had been exercising, as well as
     
    her Philippine
July 29, Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel       residence. 80     
1991 Llamanzares (an        
American citizen of Filipino extraction) in the Note that in her oath to the U.S.,
      •
Philippines on she "absolutely and
  July 27, 1991. 76      entirely renounce[d] and abjure[d]
     
        all allegiance and
Legal Significance: Her U.S. fidelity . . . to any state . . . of whom
    •      
residency status did not or which I have
affect the Philippine citizenship status heretofore been a subject or
           
reflected in her citizen." (This was the
passport and voter's ID, but affected infidelity that the Return of the
           
her Philippine Renegade quotation,
residency status as soon as she       above, referred to.)  
     
applied for and was        
granted U.S. residency status. She turned her back on the
          •
Specifically, she abandoned Philippines under these terms.
the Philippine domicile that she had    
     
from the time December Poe obtained U.S. Passport No. 017037793,
      she was found. 77    19, 2001 expiring on
      December 18, 2011. 81     
        Passport
Legal Significance: Part of her right US
    •   July 5, 2006 Balikbayan
as a U.S. citizen. Passport
           
October Legal Significance: During this
Various travels of Poe to the Philippines     •
18, 2001 period, Poe — an
before she applied for American citizen — was a visitor
to      
July 18, Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225. She who had abjured all
2006 used her U.S. allegiance and fidelity  to
     
Passport and entered the Philippines through the  Philippines; she was not a
  Filipino citizen or a legal resident of
Philippine      
  Balikbayan visas. 82      the country.
           
Passpor July 7, She took her oath of allegiance to the
  Dates of Arrival Visa 2006 Philippines. 83 
t
               
US Legal Significance: The start of the
  December 27, 2001 Balikbayan     •
Passport process of reacquiring
US Filipino citizenship by an alien under
  January 13, 2002 Balikbayan      
Passport RA No. 9225. The
US process assumes that the
  November 9, 2003 Balikbayan      
Passport applicant was a NATURAL-
US BORN Philippine citizenship before
  April 8, 2004 Balikbayan      
Passport she lost this
US       citizenship.    
  December 13, 2004 Balikbayan
Passport    
US July 10, Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and
  May 24, 2005 Balikbayan
Passport 2006 Deportation (BID)
US applications for: (a) reacquisition of Philippine
  September 14 2005 Balikbayan  
Passport citizenship under
US Republic Act (RA) No. 9225; and (b) derivative
  January 7, 2006 Balikbayan  
Passport citizenship for
  March 11, 2006 Balikbayan US   her three minor children. 84   
        in her MTRCB appointment, her
     
Legal Significance: RA No. 9225 is election to the Senate
    • and her present candidacy for
available only to      
former natural-born Filipino President. The
      COMELEC's ruling on Poe's CoC for
citizens. 85 Thus, the      
validity of her RA No. 9225 President is now
      the subject of the present
reacquired Philippine        
citizenship depended on the validity petitions.
     
of her natural-born        
      citizenship claim.   Despite the privilege under the
    •
        adoption laws and rules
She falsely represented under 86 to keep the fact of adoption
    •      
oath in her RA No. 9225 confidential, she still had
application that she was a former the duty to disclose her foundling
           
natural-born citizen of status under RA No.
the Philippines and was the 9225 because this is material
           
daughter of Ronald and information that the law
Susan Poe, thereby also concealing mandatorily requires to be made
           
that she had been a under oath as a
foundling who was adopted by the condition for the application of the
           
Spouses  Poe, not their law. 87 
natural-born child. As an adopted    
      July 18, The BID approved Poe's application for
child, she could not
have been a natural-born citizen who 2006 Philippine citizenship
      and the applications for derivative citizenship
followed the  
citizenship of the Spouses Poe under for her three
     
the rule of jus   children. 88     
      sanguinis.            
        Legal Significance: The approval
    •
This false material representation of Poe's RA No. 9225
    • application, on its face, entitled her to
became the basis for      
her subsequent claim to be a natural- claim dual
     
born citizen, notably       citizenship status — Philippine and
 American. 89  August 31, Poe registered again as voter in Barangay
        2006 Santa Lucia, San Juan
To quote the BID Order   City. 92      
    •
approving Poe's application —        
"the petitioner was a former natural- Legal Significance: Under RA No.
          •
born citizen of the 9225, a dual citizen
Philippines, having been born  to can vote but cannot be voted upon to
           
Filipino parents . . . ." elective position
This Order immeasurably unless a renunciation of the other
           
facilitated Poe's subsequent citizenship is made. 93 
      claim to natural-born status.      
        October Poe obtained Philippine Passport No.
The present case is not the medium 13, 2009 XX473199. 94 
    •
to question validity of        
the BID approval, but still lays open Legal Significance: The passport was
          •
the question of issued after the
whether Poe committed false approval of Poe's RA No. 9225
           
material representations in citizenship and was
the application process — a question therefore on the strength of the
           
of fact that the approval made.
COMELEC ruled upon, 90 i.e., that    
     
she falsely July 18, Poe travelled abroad using her U.S.
represented that she had been a 2006- passport; the BID stamped
     
natural-born citizen. October the entry "RC" and/or "IC No. 06-10918" for
    13, 2009 her travels to and
July 31, The BID issued to Poe her Identification from the Philippines on these
2006 Certificate No. 06    
dates: 95 
10918 91 pursuant to RA No. 9225 in relation        
 
with (The date Passpor
Administrative Order No. 91, series of 2004 Dates of Arrival Visa
  of the  t
and Memorandum BID's
  Circular No. AFF-2-005.     approval,          
    to
the date of US       Filipino citizen. 97   
July 21, 2007 RC
the Passport    
issuance US October Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and
March 28, 2008 RC
of Poe's Passport 20, 2010 citizenship to comply
Philippine US   with RA No. 9225's requirements. 98  
May 8, 2008 RC
passport. Passport        
US Legal Significance: Her renunciation
  October 2, 2008 RC     •
Passport of U.S. citizenship
US complied with the requirements of RA
  October 5, 2008 RC      
Passport No. 9225 and
US would have made her a "pure" Filipino
  April 20, 2009 RC      
Passport citizen if she had
US validly reacquired Philippine
  May 21, 2009 RC      
Passport citizenship under this law.
US       99     
  July 31, 2009 RC
Passport
       
       
A seldom noticed aspect of this
Legal Significance: The BID     •
    • renunciation is that Poe
allowed Poe to enter and only renounced her U.S. citizenship
leave the country as "RC." Atty.      
      because it was
Poblador mentioned that required by her appointment and
"RC" means "resident citizen" to claim      
      subsequent assumption
the marking as
      to office at the MTRCB. 100   
evidence of continuing
           
residency.
October Poe took her Oath of Office for the position of
     
21, 2010 MTRCB
October 6, Poe was appointed Chair of the
    Chairperson. 101     
2010 MTRCB. 96 
           
Legal significance: Poe could have October Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities
    • 26, 2010 of the Office of the
been appointed as
MTRCB Chairperson only if she had MTRCB
           
been a natural-born Chairperson. 102 
        Nationality. 108 
Legal significance: Poe could have        
    •
been appointed as Legal significance: Confirmatory
    •
MTRCB Chairperson only if she had renunciation, before
     
been a natural-born U.S. authorities, of her previous
     
      Filipino citizen. 103    renunciation under RA
    No. 9225. Up until these series of
     
U.S. government actions on the renunciation acts, Poe was a dual
        citizen.    
of U.S.
citizenship        
     
that Poe made. Legally, this was the  conclusive
    •
    evidence  that she had
The U.S. immigration noted in Poe's passport abandoned her U.S. domicile; as a
       
that she traveler carrying a
  repatriated herself on this date. 104    purely Philippine passport, she could
     
        no longer travel at
July 12, Poe executed the Oath/Affirmation of will to and from the U.S., nor reside in
         
2011 Renunciation of that country.
U.S. Nationality at the U.S. Embassy    
      October 2, Poe filed her CoC for Senator for the May 13,
in Manila. 105 
        2012 2013 Elections;
December She also executed a Statement of she stated that she is a natural-born Filipino
     
9, 2011 Voluntary citizen. 109 
Relinquishment of U.S.        
      Legal Significance: This is another
Citizenship. 106      •
        case involving the
February The U.S. Vice Consul signed a material representation of being a
         
3, 2012 Certificate of natural-born
Loss of Nationality of the Filipino, having been born to Ronald
             
U.S. 107  Allan  Poe  and
The U.S. Department of State       Jesusa Sonora  Poe.  
             
approved the Certificate
      of Loss of U.S.       • She was elected Senator without
 any question about    
her citizenship being October Poe filed her CoC 111 for PRESIDENT for
       
raised. 15, 2015 the May 9,
    2016 Elections; she signed the statement
 
November The Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) (voting 5 under oath that
18, 2015 to 4) issued she is a NATURAL-BORN FILIPINO
   
its Decision 110 dismissing the Quo Warranto CITIZEN.
 
petition of        
Rizalito David which was based on the claim Legal Significance: This is the
      •
that Poe is not citizenship issue in the
a natural-born citizen of the present case which posed to
         
Philippines. the Comelec 2 sub
              issues:    
Legal Significance — The SET ruling        
    •
does not bind First. Is Poe a natural-born Filipino
nor bar the COMELEC from      
      citizen after
ruling on the considering her foundling status, her
cancellation of CoC petitions because      
      acquisition of U.S.
these tribunals citizenship and the consequent loss
are different, the cause of actions      
      of her claimed
before them are natural-born Philippine citizenship,
different, and the parties are likewise      
      and her alleged
different. reacquisition under RA No.
               
9225?
Significantly, the dissents at the SET        
    •
were wholly Second. Since she claimed she was
based on legal considerations      
      a natural-born
— on the Constitution, citizen, did she commit false material
on international law, and Philippine      
      representations
statutes. The in her CoC and in the official
SET majority ruling relied      
      documents supporting
more on political her claim? If she did, should this false
      considerations.          
material
 representation lead to the More importantly, could her election
          •
cancellation of her CoC? or appointment
        to public office have worked to
     
Given the succession of falsities automatically grant
      or restore her Philippine
that Poe made on her        
natural-born status, may citizenship?
     
the COMELEC be faulted        
      with GAD for ruling as it did?   While the fact of adoption is
    •
        confidential information
Ironically, she claims in the present in the Amended Certificate of Live
    •      
CoC cancellation Birth (but must
case that the grant by the Philippines appear in the Registry of Birth), the
           
of her right to grant of
vote, her passport, and her confidentiality is not an absolute
           
appointment to the shield against the
MTRCB should be considered disclosure of being a foundling nor a
           
evidence of defense against
government recognitions of her false representation. While in RA No.
           
natural-born 9225, the
Philippine citizen status. 112 She natural-born requirement is a
           
thus wants her very statutory one that
own misdeeds to be the evidence arguably stands at the same level
           
of her natural- and footing as the
      born status.     confidential privilege on the
     
        law on adoption, in the
The previous false claims open the present case, the natural-born
    •      
question: could requirement is a
they count as evidence of natural- constitutional one that stands on a
           
born status if they very much
have all been rooted on documents higher plane than the
           
that were based on confidentiality privilege. In
      misrepresentations?   the latter case, national interest is
     
already plainly
       
 involved in electing the highest official rights, i.e., for election purposes, based on her
     
of the land. compliance with the requisites for change of residence.
        Still assuming that she complied with the RA 9225
Note, too, that requisites, the consolidated petitions still pose the
    • following questions to the COMELEC and to this Court:
in Frivaldo  v.  COMELEC,  113  the
Court ruled that the election of a (a) whether she became a resident of the
     
former Filipino to Philippines for election purposes; and
office does not automatically restore
      (b) if so, when did she become a resident.
Philippine
citizenship, the possession of which The COMELEC, after considering the evidence
     
is an and the surrounding circumstances, ruled that she
indispensable requirement for holding engaged in false material representations in claiming
     
public office. her residency status in her CoC for the
"The will of the people as expressed Presidency; she tailor-fitted her claim to the
     
through the requirements of the position by deviating from the
ballot cannot cure the vice of claim she made when she ran for the Senate.
     
ineligibility, especially
if they mistakenly believed, as in this While she claimed that a mistake intervened in
      her Senate CoC, she failed to adduce evidence on the
case, that the
candidate was details and circumstances of the mistake, thus making
        her claim a self-serving one. Her claim, too, went
qualified." 114 
against established jurisprudence which holds that the
  counting of the period of residency for election
I.C. RESIDENCY TABLE purposes starts — at the earliest — from the approval
of the RA No. 9225 application.
The residency issues mainly stemmed from two
events — (1) the naturalization of Poe as a U.S. Table 2
citizen; and (2) her application for reacquisition of THE RESIDENCY TABLE
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225.
    Particulars (with legal significance)  
The first made her a domiciliary of the  
U.S., 115 while the second (assuming the claimed With Poe's parentage unknown, her residence from the time of
reacquisition to be valid) gave her the right to reside in
September 3, 1968 — her birth until she was found is likewise unknown.
the Philippines and to be considered a domiciliary of
the Philippines for the exercise of her political          
o, Iloilo   • Legal Significance: Poe's circumstances of birth have  • Legal Significance: She could have been registered as a
    been a big cipher from the very beginning.      voter only if she had represented that she was a Filipino
      citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least one
3, 1968 116  This is Poe's declared birthday, which is really the date Poe was     year and of Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila for at
found by Edgardo Militar at the Jaro Iloilo Cathedral. She was     least six months immediately preceding the elections. 121 
subsequently given to the care of Emiliano Militar and his wife,  
residents of Jaro, Iloilo.      Poe went to the U.S. to continue her tertiary studies at the
      Boston College in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts. 122 
  • Legal Significance: The spouses Militar became Poe's     
    facto guardians; hence, Poe technically became a resident
  • Legal Significance: Poe remained a Philippine resident
    of Jaro, Iloilo.         while studying in the U.S. Absence from Philippine
      domicile to pursue studies overseas does not constitute
Ronald Allan Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe filed a petition for     loss of domicile or residence.  
Poe's adoption. 117         
  Poe graduated from Boston College. 123   
4 The court approved the Spouses Poe's petition for adoption.      
Poe's name was changed to "Mary Grace Sonora Poe". 118    • Legal significance. Absence from the domicile of origin
          to pursue studies does not constitute loss of domicile or
  • Legal Significance: She officially assumed the status of  a   residence.    
    legitimate child after the Spouses Poe adopted her. She      
    then followed her adoptive parents' residence as her   • While a student in the U.S., Poe's permanent residence
    domicile of origin.       remained in the Philippines; there was intent to return to
          the Philippines or animus revertendi. 124 There is no
  • Under the Civil Code, the general effect of a decree of    evidence or proven intent to make Boston her fixed and
    adoption is to transfer to the adoptive parents parental    permanent home. 125   
    authority over the adopted child . . . they must have the
     
    same residence. 119      • Thus, Poe was a permanent Philippine resident for 23
      years (1968 to 1991).  
3, 1986 The COMELEC issued a voter's identification card to Poe for  
Precinct No. 196, Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. 120  Poe left for the U.S. after she married Daniel Llamanzares (an
      American citizen of Filipino extraction) in the Philippines on
 July 27, 1991. 126          she had from the time she was adopted by the spouses
          Poe. 132     
  • Legal Significance: Her initial US stay was presumably     
    preparatory to being a permanent resident of the U.S.   • To qualify for citizenship under U.S. naturalization laws,
    for purposes of the U.S. citizenship that she eventually    it is required that one must have been a permanent
    claimed.         resident for 3 (three) years or more if one is filing for
          naturalization as the spouse of a U.S. citizen. 133 
  • Significantly, Poe admits that she willingly chose to live
     
    with her husband in the U.S., and thus left on July 29,  • Her subsequent acts of living and remaining in the U.S.
    1991. Very clearly, Poe  intended to abandon her     for ten years until her naturalization in 2001 point to the
    Philippine residence for a new residence in the U.S.    conclusion that at some point during this time (after
    when she went with her husband to the U.S. 127      arrival in 1991), she was already a U.S. and could no
      longer be considered a Philippine resident.
Poe lived with her husband and children in the U.S. 128 They  
travelled frequently to the Philippines but only to visit family Poe resigned from her work in the U.S. and allegedly never
and friends.     sought re-employment. 134   
           
  • Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident from   the • Legal Significance: Resignation from work had no
    time she secured permanent U.S. visa status. The     immediate legal effect on residence and is thus immaterial
    permanent resident status confirmed her intent to     to Poe's claimed Philippine residency status. Poe
    establish family life, and thus, residence, in the U.S.     remained a U.S. resident and was in fact a U.S. citizen
      domiciled in that country.  
2001 Poe became a naturalized American Citizen 130       
        • Resignation from one's employment per se does not
  • Legal significance: U.S. citizenship erased all doubts that
    amount to abandonment of residence. 135 
    Poe had completely abandoned her Philippine residence.  
    131 It confirmed as well that she had been a permanent Poe travelled to the Philippines with her daughter, Hanna. Poe
    resident of the U.S. before her application for U.S. also wanted to give birth to Anika in the Philippines and to give
    citizenship.     moral support to her parents during her father's campaign for the
      presidency. 136     
  • The Philippine domicile she abandoned was the domicile      
   • Legal significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident.     would allow a change of domicile. Notably, Poe was
          in the Philippines during the year as a Visitor under a
  • Poe's travels (to and from the U.S. and the Philippines)     Balikbayan visa. 140   
    between April 2004 and February 2005 did not affect her      
    U.S. residency status.     • Mere change of residence in the exercise of the civil right
          to change residence is likewise different from a change of
  • The admitted purposes for these travels had nothing to   do   domicile for the exercise of the political right to be voted
    with any intent to re-establish Philippine residence.     into public office. For the exercise of this political right,
      the candidate must be a Philippine citizen.
Poe returned to the U.S. with her two daughters. 137       
        • U.S. residency — which started in 1991 and which was
  • Legal significance: This return trip further proves that     later confirmed by Poe's acquisition of U.S. citizenship —
    Poe remained a U.S. resident.       remained until specifically given up, for as long as the
      right to reside in the U.S. subsisted.
3, 2004 Poe was in the Philippines when Fernando Poe, Jr. was  
ary 3, hospitalized. She eventually took care of settling his affairs Note: Poe argues that her travels to and initial stay in the
after he died. 138      Philippines were preparatory acts in the goal to establish
      residence in the Philippines. Even assuming that they were
  • Legal significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident. preparatory acts, they are not material to the issue of when  Poe
      became a Philippine resident (as contemplated by the
  • The admitted purposes of her stay in the Philippines Constitution and or election laws). They are not also conclusive
    during this period had nothing to do with the re- on  when she abandoned her U.S. residence.
    establishment of her residence in the Philippines.  
  Poe and her husband informed their children's schools that the
r of Poe and her husband allegedly decided to return to the children would be transferring to Philippine schools in the next
Philippines for good. 139      semester. 141     
           
  • Legal Significance: Poe did not abandon her U.S.   • Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident. This
    residence. Their (Poe and her husband's) alleged intent     act establishes the intent to transfer schools, but does
    are internal subjective acts that are meaningless without    not, by itself, conclusively prove the intent to change
    external supporting action under the legal conditions that
    or to abandon her U.S. residence.  
           at will to the U.S. as a resident.  
  • Absence from her U.S. residence (and presence in the 
    Philippines) to pursue studies does not constitute lossPoe and her husband transacted with shipping agents for the
    of U.S. domicile and acquisition of a new domicile in transport of their personal belongings and other personal
    the Philippines.     property from the U.S. to the Philippines in view of their
  decision to resettle in the Philippines. 145   
5 Poe returned to the Philippines and allegedly decided to resettle      
here for good. 142 Note that Poe was still under a Balikbayan   • Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident
visa and was thus a visitor to the Philippines. 143      temporarily in the Philippines; her visa status did not
      point to residence that could be credited as legal
Poe argues that she re-established permanent Philippine     residence for election purposes. She might have been
residence at this point. Can a U.S. citizen, on a Balikbayan visit     physically present in the Philippines but what was the
to the Philippines, thereby establish residence for purposes of     nature of her stay in the Philippines? She was legally in
the exercise of political rights in the Philippines?     the country for purposes only of a temporary stay and
          had no legally established basis to stay beyond this. 146 
  • Legal Significance: The evidence speak for themselves.      
    Poe's Balikbayan visa does not point to or confirm any  • An important point to note is that she was not exercising
    intent to permanently settle in the Philippines. 144      any political right to reside in the Philippines at this
          point.    
  • Since she entered the Philippines under a Balikbayan visa    
    and was thus a temporary visitor to the country under   • Again, an obvious missing element was her clear intent to
    Section 13 of CA 613 (as amended by RA No. 4376),  her   abandon her U.S. domicile. Her claimed acts do not
    alleged intent was not supported by her contemporaneous    clearly show Poe's intent to abandon her U.S. domicile.
    act.      
      Poe and her husband inquired with the Philippine authorities on
  • Consider too from here on that from the perspective ofthe procedure to bring their pet dog from the U.S.A. to the
    change of domicile, although Poe's acts may collectively
Philippines. 147     
    show her intent to settle in the Philippines, they do not    
    conclusively the intent to abandon her U.S. domicile   • Legal Significance: Poe's inquiry did not affect her
    She was at this point still a U.S. citizen who had been a   residency at all; she remained a U.S. resident, and is
    permanent resident since 1991 and who could return     totally worthless as she did not even show by subsequent
     evidence that she actually brought the dog to the     significant for the residency issue before the Court.
    Philippines. This act, too, does not prove abandonment   of   She was then on a temporary visitor who was simply
    their U.S. residence.       physically present in the Philippines. A Taxpayer
      Identification No. could have been necessary for the
Poe enrolled her children in different schools in the     purposes indicated below as Poe was a forced heir of
Philippines. 148          Ronald Poe who recently died.  
           
  • Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's intent   to • "Any person, whether natural or juridical, required
    abandon their U.S. domicile; Poe's children entered the     under the authority of the Internal Revenue Code to
    Philippines for a temporary period under the Balikbayan     make, render or file a return, statement or other
    program. Note too, that the enrollment in schools is only     documents, shall be supplied with or assigned a
    for a period of one school year. At most, this shows that     Taxpayer Identification Number (TIN) to be
    Poe and her children were physically present in the     indicated in the return, statement or document to be
    Philippines at this time. Note that under certain     filed with the Bureau of Internal Revenue, for his
    conditions, aliens like Poe, can enroll their children in  the   proper identification for tax purposes." (Sec. 236 (i)
    Philippines. 149        of the Tax Code).  
           
  • Absence from her U.S. residence (and presence in the  • The absence of definitive abandonment of U.S.
    Philippines) to pursue studies does not conclusively point    residency status and lack of legal capacity to
    to the loss of U.S. domicile and acquisition of a new     establish Philippine residence for election purposes
    Philippine domicile. Note that Poe herself previously     can only point to the conclusion that Poe remained a
    studied in the U.S. without losing her Philippine     U.S. resident until July 18, 2006, 151 the date she
    residence.         acquired the right to reside in the Philippines.
   
5 Poe registered with and secured Tax Identification No. (TIN) The Register of Deeds (RD) of San Juan City issued to Poe
150 from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). and her husband CCT No. 11985-R covering Unit 7F of
      One Wilson Place, and CCT No. 11986-R covering the
  • Legal Significance: This act was undertaken as an alien parking slot for Unit 7F. 152   
    and does not prove Poe's intent to remain in the      
    Philippines or the intent to abandon U.S. domicile   • Legal Significance: This act does not prove Poe's
    (animus non-revertendi); hence, it is not legally     intent to abandon U.S. domicile (animus non-
     revertendi). It is, at best, evidence of an investment in    the legal capacity or right to establish domicile or
    Philippine real estate — a move that aliens can make.    residence in the country. The act does not conclusively
          signify abandonment of U.S. domicile.
  • Aliens or foreign nationals, whether former natural-  
    born Filipino citizens or not, can acquire Unit 7F of One Wilson Place and its parking slot were declared
    condominium units and shares in condominium for taxation purposes under Poe and her husband's names. 157 
    corporations up to 40% of the total and outstanding      
    capital stock of a Filipino owned or controlled   • Legal Significance: It does not establish permanent
    condominium Corporation, per RA No. 4726, as     residence in the Philippines. It is merely in compliance
    amended by RA No. 7899, (or An Act to Define     with an obligation that arises from ownership of real
    Condominium, Establish Requirements for Its     property in the Philippines — an obligation that even
    Creation, and Govern Its Incidents). 153      alien owners of real property must fulfill.
     
, 2006 Poe travelled to the U.S. to supervise the disposal of some of her Poe's U.S. family home was sold. 158   
2006 family's remaining household belongings. 154 She returned to the     
Philippines on March 11, 2006. 155      • Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident. The
          sale of their family home may indicate intent to transfer
  • Legal Significance: Poe remained a U.S. resident. This   is   residence (within or without the U.S.) but it does not
    an unequivocal act that does not prove Poe's intent to    automatically result in reacquiring domicile in the
    abandon her U.S. domicile (animus non-revertendi).     Philippines. Sale of the family home is a practical
      recourse for one who may be on extended absence; or
2006 Poe's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of     who may be relocating for employment purposes; or who
their change of their U.S. address. 156        is simply engaged in profit-taking.  
           
  • Legal Significance: Poe and her husband may have   • What is important for the exercise of political right at
    merely complied with the U.S. laws, for convenience and     issue is the legal capacity to establish residence in the
    for mail forwarding purposes while on extended but     Philippines. Notably, too, in terms of the legal status of
    temporary absence.       her Philippine stay, she was still under a Balikbayan
          Visitor's Visa at this time.  
  • This act, by itself, does not prove the establishment of 
    domicile in the Philippines. Poe did not have at that point
The RD for Quezon City issued to Poe and her husband TCT
No. 290260 covering a 509-square meter lot located at No. 106      
Rodeo Drive, Corinthian Hills, Barangay Ugong Norte,   • Legal Significance: Poe's oath of allegiance to the
Quezon City to be used as their new family home. 159      Philippines started the legal process under RA No. 9225
          but had no immediate legal effect on her change of
  • Legal Significance: Poe still remained a U.S. resident    domicile; she was still a U.S. resident at this point and
    for lack of legal capacity and the right to establish     would remain to be so even after her RA No. 9225 is
    residence in the Philippines. She was also still a U.S.     approved.    
    citizen who had not conclusively abandoned her U.S.      
    domicile.       • Dual citizens do not become Philippine domiciliaries
          upon the approval of their RA No. 9225 petitions; note
  • Even alien non-residents who were former Filipino     that former natural-born Filipino citizens who are U.S.
    citizens can be transferees of up to 5,000 sqm. of     residents can apply under RA No. 9225 even without need
    urban land or 3 has. of rural land for business or     of establishing actual Philippine residence. 164 All they
    other purposes under RA No. 7042, as amended by RA     have after approval is the civil and political right to
    No. 8179, 160 in relation with Article XII, Section 8 of  the   establish residence in the Philippines, but this they must
    Constitution, 161 without the need to reacquire Philippine
    do by complying with the rules on change of domicile.
    citizenship or to re-establish Philippine residence,  
    provided they were former natural-born Filipinos. Poe filed with the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID)
    Acquisition of Philippine real estate is not evidence of an
theapplication for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under
    citizenship of former Filipino citizens, much less of their
RA No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
    natural-born status.   Act of 2003"; she also filed for derivative citizenship on behalf
      of her three children, who were all below eighteen years of age
  • The original ponencia of Justice Mariano C. del Castillo at that time. 165     
    noted that after this sale, Poe and her husband still owned
     
    and retained two (2) other residential properties in the  • Legal Significance: RA No. 9225 is available only to
    U.S. 162 The retained properties negate whatever     former natural-born citizens. 166 Thus, the validity of
    evidentiary worth the sale of the "family home" provided,    Poe's RA No. 9225 reacquired Philippine citizenship
    Poe could still return to a residence the couple already    depends on the validity of her natural-born citizenship
    own.         claim.    
       
Poe took her oath of allegiance to the Philippines. 163    • Poe's application for reacquisition of Philippine
     citizenship (RA No. 9225) did not, by that act alone,     who could be a resident — physical as opposed to legal or
    conclusively prove abandonment of her U.S. domicile.  As   juridical resident — of both the U.S. and the Philippines.
    noted below, Poe, at that point, had the option to establish
    Note that  Poe  started as a U.S. domiciliary. This
    residence in both the Philippines and the U.S.     characterization stays until she could carry a change of
      domicile into effect. This change admits of evidence
6 The BID approved Poe's application for reacquisition of     showing compliance with the required elements, and
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225, and the applications     becomes conclusive only when dual citizenship is given
for derivative citizenship for her three children. 167      up in favor of one of the citizenships; upon this
          surrender, the right to reside in the other country is
  • Legal Significance: Subject to the reservation made     likewise given up.  
    above, the approval entitled her to recognition as a dual      
    citizen — Philippine and American. 168    • In the case of Poe, she secured her civil and political
          rights as a RA No. 9225 dual citizen on July 18, 2006.
  • Assuming Poe to be a former natural-born citizen,      This is the earliest date she could exercise her right to
    18, 2006 would be the earliest possible reckoning  point   reside in the Philippines for the exercise of her political
    for  Poe  to establish Philippine residency for purposes   of
  rights, particularly of her right to vote. But she enjoys the
    the exercise of political rights as it was only then that     right to be voted upon as a candidate upon the
    she was granted civil and political rights. To vote and   be  renunciation of her other citizenship. It was only then that
    voted for are both political rights.       she conclusively gave up the U.S. domiciliary tag that
          she started with. Of course, hanging above and
  • But note that actual residence is still necessary as an  RA   beclouding these issues is the natural-born citizenship
    No. 9225 Filipino citizen is a dual citizen who can reside    question — was she in the first place a former natural-
    either in the Philippines or in the other country of dual     born Filipino who could avail of RA No. 9225? 170 
    citizenship. 169 As already mentioned, the reacquisition   of
    Philippine citizenship only gives the RA No. 9225 dualThe BID issued Poe Identification Certificate No. 06-10918
    citizen an option to re-establish residence in the pursuant to RA No. 9225 in relation with Administrative Order
    Philippines and to exercise the limited right of suffrageNo.in 91, Series of 2004 and Memorandum Circular No. AFF-2
    national elections but not the right to run for public office.
005. 171 Her children were likewise issued their respective
      Identification Certificate Nos. 172   
  • At this exact point, the resolution of the issue of residence
     
    is still unclear as Poe was a dual Philippine-US citizen  • Legal Significance: These are the effects of the approval
     of Poe's application for Philippine citizenship under RA      
    No. 9225, and relate primarily to the citizenship, not toDecember 27, 2001 Balikbayan US Passport
    the residency issue. The right to reside in the Philippines
January 13, 2002 Balikbayan US Passport
    of course came when the RA No. 9225 application was November 9, 2003 Balikbayan US Passport
    approved. The exercise of this right is another matter.April 8, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
  December 13, 2004 Balikbayan US Passport
2006 Poe registered as voter in Brgy. Santa Lucia, San Juan City. 173 May 24, 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
      September 14 2005 Balikbayan US Passport
  • Legal Significance: Registration as a voter could serveJanuary
as 7, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
    proof of the start of Poe's stay in the Philippines after March
she 11, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
    acquired the legal capacity to do so through RA No. 9225, July 5, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
    but does not conclusively establish her intent to remain November
in 4, 2006 Balikbayan US Passport
    the Philippines or the intent to abandon her U.S.      
    citizenship and domicile.     • Legal Significance: These notations are evidence of the
          character of Poe's stay in the Philippines from May 24,
  • She could have been registered as a voter only if she  had   2005 up to the time her RA No. 9225 application was
    represented that she was a resident of the Philippines  for   approved.    
    at least one year and of Brgy. Santa Lucia, San Juan  City    
    for at least six months immediately preceding the   • During this period, Poe — an American citizen — was a
    elections. 174          visitor to the Philippines, not a Filipino citizen nor a legal
          resident of this country.  
  • In Japzon v. COMELEC, 175 the Court considered Ty's  
    registration as a voter as evidence of his intent to On these dates, 178 Poe travelled to and from the Philippines
    establish a new domicile of choice in General Macarthur, using her U.S. Passport, but the BID stamp on her U.S. Passport
    Eastern Samar.     changed from "BB" or "1YR" to "RC" and/or "IC No. 06-
  10918:" 179     
2001 to On these dates, Poe returned to the Philippines using her U.S.      
6 Passport under the Balikbayan program 176 per the entry "BB" orDates of Arrival Visa Passport
"1YR" and stamped dates in her U.S. Passport: 177       
      July 21, 2007 RC US Passport
Dates of Arrival Visa Passport
March 28, 2008 RC US Passport
 May 8, 2008 RC US Passport Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB). 181 
October 2, 2008 RC US Passport      
October 5, 2008 RC US Passport   • Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed as
April 20, 2009 RC US Passport     MTRCB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born
May 21, 2009 RC US Passport     Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Philippines for
July 31, 2009 RC US Passport     purposes of the exercise of political rights. 182 The
          natural-born citizenship status is a direct legal
  • Legal Significance — The continued use of Poe's U.S.     requirement. Residency, on the other hand, is a
    passport could be explained by Poe's lack of a Philippine    consequence of the need to make a renunciation of the
    passport. The delay of three years between the RA No.     other citizenship (pursuant to RA No. 9225), as
    9225 approval and the issuance of the passport on     renunciation would leave the appointee with no other
    October 13, 2009 raises questions about her intents, both    residence other than the Philippines.
    the intent to remain in the Philippines and the intent to 
    abandon her U.S. domicile. During this period at least,Poe renounced her U.S. allegiance and citizenship. 183 
    any claimed residence for the exercise of the right to be     
    voted upon as a candidate cannot and should not be   • Legal Significance: This is a requirement under RA No.
    recognized; her abandonment of her US domicile was    9225 and served to complete the necessary requirement
    incomplete and uncertain.       before she could assume appointive public office.
       
2009 Poe obtained Philippine Passport No. XX473199. 180    • The event should be very significant for a Presidential
          candidate who had been previously naturalized in a
  • Legal Significance: The issuance of a Philippine passport,
    foreign country, and who now claims residency status
    per se, has no legal effect on Poe's Philippine residency    for the period required by the Philippine Constitution.
    status. A Philippine citizen on dual citizenship status is
    This should serve as the conclusive proof that the
    entitled to a Philippine passport.       candidate has undertaken a change of domicile through
          proof of abandonment of her old domicile.
  • The BID allowed Poe to enter and leave the country as      
    "RC." Atty. Poblador mentioned that "RC" means   • The strictest rule of interpretation and appreciation
    resident citizen.         of evidence should be used given the previous loss of
      both Philippine citizenship and residency status. She is
010 Poe was appointed as the Chairperson of the Movie and     not the usual candidate as she is vying for the highest
     office in the land whose citizenship she previously  • Legal Significance: The residency statement in the CoC
    renounced.         for the Senate was a material representation that Poe
          now claims to be a mistake.  
  • Her renunciation of her foreign citizenship should be the
     
    lowest acceptable level of proof of Poe's intent to   • Ironically for Poe, the period she claimed in her Senate
    abandon her U.S. domicile (animus non-revertendi), as     CoC dovetailed with her Philippine residency computed
    pointed out by Justice Del Castillo during the third round
    from the time her RA No. 9225 application was
    of oral arguments.)       approved.    
           
  • Note that by her own admission, Poe  renounced her U.S.   • Poe  never introduced any evidence relating to her
    citizenship and thereby likewise abandoned her U.S.     claimed "mistake," thus leaving this claim a self-serving
    domiciliary status only to comply with the requirements   of   one that allows her this time to qualify for the residency
    RA No. 9225 and the MTRCB appointment extended to     requirement for the Office of the President of the
    her. 184          Philippines.    
   
2010 Poe took her Oath of Office for the position of MTRCB The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) issued to Poe,
Chairperson. 185      Diplomatic Passport No. DE0004530. 189   
       
2010 Poe assumed the duties and responsibilities of the Office of the   • No effect on Poe's residency status.
MTRCB Chairperson. 186       
      The DFA issued to Poe, Philippine Passport No.
  • Legal significance: Poe could have been appointed asEC0588861. 190     
    MTRCB Chairperson only if she had been a natural-born      
    Filipino citizen, and a resident of the Philippines   • No effect on Poe's residency status.
    purposes of exercising political rights. 187   
  Poe filed her CoC for the Presidency for the May 9, 2016
012 Poe filed her CoC for Senator for the May 13, 2013 Elections; Elections; she stated in Item No. 7 of her CoC that her "PERIOD
she stated in Item No. 7 of her CoC that her "PERIOD OF OF RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES UP TO THE DAY
RESIDENCE BEFORE MAY 13, 2013" was "6 years and 6 BEFORE MAY 09, 2016 is '10 YEARS, 11 MONTHS," 191
months." 188 This statement was made on October 2, 2012. which the petitions before us now claim to be a false material
      representation.    
      established standards of legal interpretation and
  • Legal significance: The residency claim, under the givenapplication, only our individual conscience guides us;
    as unelected officials, only history can judge us. Thus,
facts and in light of the Senate CoC statement, gives rise
    to the question: did  Poe  commit a false material for the sake of the country and for the maintenance of
    representation regarding her compliance with the the integrity of this Court, we must render our
ruling with the utmost circumspection.
    residency requirement?  
      As defined, the problem directly before the
  • Poe claims that she made a mistake in the Senate CoC Court is the determination of the presence or
    declaration, but the claim remained self-serving with absence of grave abuse of discretion in
    evidence to support it.   the COMELEC's cancellation of petitioner Poe's CoC
for its invalidity, based on the false material
     
representations the COMELEC found in her
  • An unavoidable observation is that  Poe's  belated claim statements of citizenship and residency qualifications
    of mistake in her Senate CoC now allows her to claim for the position of President of the Philippines. From
    the longer period of residency that her candidacy forthe theperspective of the Court, the present case calls for
    Presidency now requires.   the exercise of the Court's power of judicial review.
     
The main issues in this case — the conformity
  • Should the COMELEC be now faulted for arriving at thisof the COMELEC's ruling with legal 192 and
    obvious conclusion?   constitutional standards 193 — are directly governed
  by the Constitution. Thus, the dispute before us is
a constitutional law case, not simply an election
II. nor a social justice case, and one that should be
Preliminary/Threshold Issues and Concerns dealt with according to the terms of the Constitution,
following the norms of the rule of law.
II.A.   Nature of the Present Petition
and the Court's Responses. To be sure, the applicable measuring
standards cannot simply be the individual Justices'
As the ultimate interpreter of the Constitution
notions of the fairness of the constitutional
and of our laws, this Court will have the final say in the
terms involved (which are matters of policy that the
case now before us. Our collective actions and
Court cannot touch), nor their pet social and human
decisions are not subject to review by any other
rights advocacies that are not justified by the clear
institution of government; we are the ultimate
terms of the Constitution.
Guardians with no other guardians to check, correct,
and chastise us. Beyond the dictates of the
 If these constitutional terms are clear, the only Judicial power includes the duty of
option for the Court is to apply them; if they lack clarity, the courts of justice to settle actual
the Court may interpret them using the established controversies involving rights which are
canons of constitutional interpretation but without legally demandable and enforceable, and
touching on matters of policy that an authority higher to determine whether or not there has
than the Court's — that of the sovereign Filipino people been a grave abuse of discretion
— has put in place. 194 SDHTEC amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
If indeed the Court deems the constitutional
instrumentality of the Government.
terms to be clear but tainted with unfairness, the
[underscoring supplied]
Court's remedy is to note the tainted terms and
observe that they should be raised with the people and In the seminal case of Angara v. Electoral
their representatives for constitutional amendment; the Tribunal 195 the Court mandated in no uncertain terms
Court cannot act on its own to remedy the unfairness that judicial review is "limited to the constitutional
as such step is a political one that the Court cannot question raised or the very lis mota presented," and
directly undertake. Definitely, the remedy is not to without passing upon "questions of wisdom, justice or
engage in interpretation in order to read into the expediency of legislation." With the scope of the
Constitution what is not written there. This is justiciable issue so delimited, the Court in resolving the
judicial legislation of the highest order that I do not constitutional issues likewise cannot add to, detract
want to be a party to. from, or negate what the Constitution commands;
it cannot simply follow its sense of justice
II.B.   The Parameters of the Court's Exercise of
based on how things out to be, nor lay down its own
Judicial Power in acting  on  the case.
policy, nor slant its ruling towards the individual
II.B.1. The Exercise of the Power of Judicial Justices' pet advocacies. The individual Justices
Review. themselves cannot simply raise issues that the parties
The Supreme Court in entertaining the present did not raise at the COMELEC level, nor explore
petitions acts pursuant to Article VIII, Section 1 of the constitutional issues for the first time at this stage of
1987 Constitution which provides that: the case.

SECTION 1. The judicial power Procedurally, the present case comes to this
shall be vested in one Supreme Court Court under Rule 64, in relation with Rule 65, of the
and in such lower courts as may be Rules of Court — a petition for certiorari that calls for
established by law. the judicial review of the COMELEC decision to ensure
that the COMELEC acts within its jurisdiction.
 The Court's review is limited by the grave abuse The standard is the separation of powers principle that
of discretion standard that the Constitution itself underlies the Constitution.
provides — to determine the propriety of Separation of powers is a fundamental principle
the COMELEC action based on the question of in our system of government 198 that divides the
whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion, in powers of government into the legislative, the
cancelling Poe's CoC. executive, and judicial. 199 The power to enact laws
"Grave abuse of discretion" as mentioned in the lies with the legislature; the power to execute is with
Constitution and as implemented by the Court under the executive; and, the power to interpret laws rests
Rule 65 and in its established rulings, carries a specific with the judiciary. 200 Each branch is supreme within
meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of its own sphere.
power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; Thus, the judiciary can only interpret and apply
or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise of the Constitution and the laws as they are written; it
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform cannot, under the guise of interpretation in the
a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in course of adjudication, add to, detract from or
contemplation of law. For an act to be struck down as negate what these laws provide except to the
having been done with grave abuse of discretion, the extent that they run counter to the
abuse of discretion must be patent and gross." 196 Constitution. With respect to the Constitution and as
Thus, for this Court to strike down and nullify already mentioned above, the judiciary cannot
the challenged COMELEC rulings, interpret the Constitution to read into it what is not
the COMELEC must be considered to have acted written there.
without jurisdiction because it did not simply err, The separation of powers can be very material
either in the appreciation of the facts or the laws in resolving the present case as
involved, but because it acted in a patent and gross petitioner Poe essentially relies on two positions in
manner, thereby acting outside the contemplation claiming natural-born Philippine citizenship as a
of the law. 197 foundling. The first of these positions is the claim that
II.C. The Separation of Powers Principle. foundlings fall within the listing of "citizens of the
Philippines" under the 1935 Constitution, under the
The same cited Angara ruling, in
view that this was the intent of the framers of the
expounding on what "judicial power" encompasses,
Constitution.
likewise fully provided a constitutional standard to
ensure that the judiciary and its exercise of the power As I reason out below, foundlings are simply not
of judicial review do not exceed defined parameters. included in the wordings of the Constitution and cannot
be read into its clear and express terms. Nor can any
intent to include foundlings be discerned. Thus, legislative task. The presumption is in favor of the
foundlings are not within the 1935 constitutional listing, classification's validity. 206
except to the extent that the application of its general If the classification, while not facially invidious,
terms would allow their coverage. nonetheless gives rise to recurring constitutional
II.D. The Equal Protection Clause. difficulties, or if a classification disadvantages a "quasi-
suspect class" 207 it will be treated under a
II.D.1.   In General.
heightened review called the intermediate scrutiny
The equal protection clause is a specific test. 208
constitutional guaranty of the equal application of the
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the
laws to all persons. The equality guaranteed does not
classification serve an important governmental end or
deny the State the power to recognize and act upon
objective and is substantially related to the
factual differences between individuals and classes. It
achievement of this objective. 209 The classification is
recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the
presumed unconstitutional and the burden of
right to classify. 201
justification for the classification rests entirely with the
The well-settled principle is that the equal government. 210
protection of the laws guaranty is not violated by a
Finally, the strict scrutiny test is used when
legislation based on reasonable classification. 202
suspect classifications or fundamental rights are
Thus, the problem in equal protection cases is involved. This test requires that the classification serve
primarily in the determination of the validity of the a compelling state interest and is necessary to achieve
classification made by law, 203 if resort to such interest. 211
classification is justified. For this reason, three (3)
 
different standards of scrutiny in testing the
constitutionality of classifications have been developed A suspect classification is one where
over time 204 — the rational basis test; distinctions are made based on the most invidious
the intermediate scrutiny test; and strict scrutiny test. bases for classification that violate the most basic
II.D.2.  The Applicable Tests. human rights, i.e., on the basis of race, national origin,
alien status, religious affiliation, and to a certain extent,
Under the rational basis test, courts will uphold sex and sexual orientation. 212
a classification if it bears a rational relationship to an
accepted or established governmental end. 205 This is The Court has found the strict scrutiny standard
a relatively relaxed standard reflecting the Court's useful in determining the constitutionality of laws that
awareness that classification is an unavoidable tend to target a class of things or persons. By this
standard, the legislative classification is presumed
unconstitutional and the burden rests on the The citizenship provisions of the Constitution
government to prove that the classification is authorize the State's exercise of its sovereign power to
necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and determine who its citizens are. These citizens
that it is the least restrictive means to protect such constitute one of the pillars in the State's exercise of its
interest. The strict scrutiny standard was eventually sovereignty. 214 Based on this exercise, the State
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the accordingly grants rights and imposes obligations to its
regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other citizens. This granted authority and its exercise
fundamental rights, as the earlier applications had assume primary and material importance, not only
been expanded to encompass the coverage of these because of the rights and obligations involved, but
other rights. 213 because the State's grants involve the exercise of its
sovereignty.
II.D.3.  The Application of the Equal
Protection Aside from the above discussions on the
Clause to a constitutional provision. application of the equal protection clause to the terms
of the Constitution itself, it must further be considered
The argument that the equal protection clause
in appreciating the equal protection clause in relation
should be applied to the constitutional
with foundlings that:
provisions on citizenship is patently misplaced. The
Constitution is supreme; as the highest law of the land, First, foundlings do not fall under any suspect
it serves as the gauge or standard for all laws and for class.
the exercise of all powers of government. The A "suspect class" is identified as a class
Supreme Court itself is a creation of, and cannot rise saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a
higher than, the Constitution. AScHCD history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to
Hence, this Court cannot invalidate a such a position of political powerlessness as to
constitutional provision; it can only command extraordinary protection from the
act on an unconstitutional governmental majoritarian political process. Examples of suspect
action trampling on the equal protection clause, such classifications are based on race or national origin,
as when a constitutional provision is interpreted in a alienage, or religion. 215
way that fosters the illegal classification that the Foundlings are not being treated
Constitution prohibits. This is the question now before differently on the basis of their race, national origin,
this Court. alienage, or religion. It is the lack of
II.D.4.   The Citizenship of a Foundling . information  on  the circumstances of their
birth because of their unknown parentage and
the jus sanguinis standard of the Constitution
itself, that exclude them from being considered as To pass an intermediate scrutiny, it must be
natural-born citizens. They are not purposely treated shown that the legislative purpose is important and the
unequally nor are they purposely rendered politically classification is substantially related to the legislative
powerless; they are in fact recognized under binding purpose; otherwise, the classification should be
treaties to have the right to be naturalized as Philippine invalidated.
citizens. All these take place because of The classification of foundlings vis-a-
distinctions that the Constitution itself made. vis Philippine citizens is undeniably important as
Second, there is likewise no denial of a already explained and the purpose of the classification
fundamental right that does not emanate from the is the State exercise of sovereignty: it has the inherent
Constitution. As explained elsewhere in this Opinion, it power to determine who are included and excluded as
is the Constitution itself that requires that the President its own nationals. On these considerations, I rule out
of the Philippines be a natural-born citizen and must the use of the intermediate scrutiny test.
have resided in the country for 10 years before the day Third, under the circumstances, the most direct
of the election. answer can be provided by the rational basis test in
Thus, naturalized citizens and those who do not considering the petitioner's charge that
fall under the definition of a natural-born citizen, again the COMELEC denied her equal protection by
as defined in the Constitution itself, have no actionable applying the constitutional
cause for complaint for unfair treatment based on the provisions on citizenship they way it did.
equal protection clause. This consideration rules out It is a well-settled principle that the equal
the application of the strict scrutiny test as protection guaranty of the laws is not violated by a
the COMELEC recognized distinctions the Constitution legislation (or governmental action)
itself made. based on reasonable classification. A classification, to
On the test of intermediate scrutiny, the test has be reasonable must: 1) rely on substantial distinctions;
been generally used for legislative classifications 2) be germane to the purpose of the law; 3) not be
based on gender or illegitimacy. Foundlings, limited to existing conditions only; and 4) apply equally
however, may arguably be subject to intermediate to all members of the same class. 216
scrutiny since their classification may give rise to To restate and refine the question posed to us
recurring constitutional difficulties, i.e., qualification in the context of the present petition: did
questions for other foundlings who are public officials the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion
or are seeking positions requiring Philippine when it did not include Poe in the natural-born
citizenship. classification?
 This question practically brings us back to the law and is not baseless; in fact, it is based on the clear
main issues these consolidated cases pose to us. terms of the cited treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory and on the principles of international law.
To start from square one, I start with the
Thus, again, the COMELEC committed no grave
admitted fact that Poe is a foundling, i.e., one whose
abuse of discretion in its ruling on this point.
parents are not known. With no known parents,
the COMELEC could not have abused the exercise of This same conclusion necessarily results in
its discretion when it concluded that Poe did not fall considering Poe's argument that she should be treated
under the express listing of citizens under the 1935 like other foundlings favorably affected by treaties
Constitution and, hence, cannot even be a binding on the Philippines. All foundlings found in the
citizen under the express terms of the Constitution. Philippines and covered by these treaties have the
right to acquire Philippine nationality; it is a question of
In the context of classification,
availing of the opportunity that is already there. Thus, I
the COMELEC effectively recognized that Poe, whose
can see no cause for complaint in this regard. In
parents are unknown, cannot be the same, and cannot
fact, Poe has not pointed to any foundling or to any
be similarly treated, as other persons born in the
specific treaty provision under which she would be
Philippines of Filipino parents as provided under Article
treated the way she wants to — as a natural-born
IV, Section 1, paragraphs 3 and 4 of the 1935
citizen. AcICHD
Constitution.
In these lights, the COMELEC's exercise in
The COMELEC did not also favorably
classification could not but be reasonable, based as it
entertain Poe's view that the 1935
were on the standards provided by the
Constitution impliedly recognized a foundling to be
Constitution. This classification was made to give
included in its listing. Based on the reasons on the
effect to the Constitution and to protect the
merits that are more lengthily discussed elsewhere in
integrity of our elections. It holds true, not only
this Opinion, the COMELEC — at the most — could
for Poe, but for all foundlings who may be in the
have erred in its conclusions, but its reasoned
same situation as she is in.
approach, even assuming it to be erroneous, cannot
amount to grave abuse of discretion as I have above II.E. Jurisdictional Issues
specifically defined. The petitioner questions
Lastly, the COMELEC did not recognize that the the COMELEC's decision to cancel her CoC on the
Philippines is bound under international law to ground that she falsely represented her Philippine
recognize Poe as a natural-born citizen; these treaties citizenship because it allegedly:
merely grant Poe the right to acquire a nationality.
This COMELEC conclusion is largely a conclusion of
 a. ignored the Senate Electoral At the core of these challenges lie two main
Tribunal's (SET) Decision dated inquiries, from which all other issues raised by the
November 17, 2015, as well as relevant petitioner spring:
law and jurisprudence First, what is the scope and
bestowing on foundlings the status of extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction
Philippine citizenship; in a Section 78 proceeding?
b. disregarded the primary jurisdiction of the Second, given the scope and
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Bureau extent of the COMELEC's jurisdiction
of Immigration and Deportation (BID) in in a Section 78 proceeding, did it
its application of RA No. 9225; and gravely abuse its discretion in its
c. prematurely raised eligibility challenges that interpretation and application of the
is properly the jurisdiction of the law and jurisprudence to the evidence
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). presented before it?
In particular, the petitioner Poe argues that To my mind, the COMELEC has ample
the COMELEC does not have the primary jurisdiction to interpret and apply the relevant laws and
jurisdiction to resolve attacks against her citizenship. applicable jurisprudence in the Section 78 proceeding
The DOJ, as the administrative agency with against the petitioner, and did not commit any grave
administrative control and supervision over the BID, abuse of discretion in doing so.
has the authority to revoke the latter's Order approving II.E.1. The  COMELEC's  authority to
her reacquisition of natural-born citizenship. Petitions act  on  petitions
for cancellation of CoCs are thus, by their nature, for cancellation of CoCs of
prohibited collateral attacks against the petitioner's presidential
claimed Philippine citizenship. candidates.
  As the constitutional authority tasked to ensure
Additionally, since the allegations in the clean, honest and orderly elections,
petitions for cancellation of CoC seek to the COMELEC exercises administrative, quasi-
establish Poe's ineligibilities to become President, the legislative, and quasi-judicial powers granted under
issue lies within the exclusive jurisdiction of the PET, Article IX of the 1987 Constitution.
and should be filed only after she has been proclaimed These constitutional powers are refined and
President. implemented by legislation, among others, through the
powers expressly provided in the Omnibus Election
Code (OEC). These statutory powers include nature. The decision to cancel a candidate's CoC,
the authority to cancel a certificate of candidacy based on grounds provided in Section 78, involves an
under Section 78 of the OEC, which provides: exercise of judgment or discretion that qualifies as a
quasi-judicial function by the COMELEC.
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to
or cancel a certificate of candidacy. — A Quasi-judicial power has been defined as:
verified petition seeking to deny due . . . the power of the administrative
course or to cancel a certificate of agency to adjudicate the rights of
candidacy may be filed by the person persons before it. It is the power to hear
exclusively on the ground that and determine questions of fact to which
any material representation contained the legislative policy is to apply and to
therein as required under Section 74 decide in accordance with the standards
hereof is false. The petition may be filed laid down by the law itself in enforcing
at any time not later than twenty-five and administering the same law. The
days from the time of the filing of the administrative body exercises its quasi-
certificate of candidacy and shall be judicial power when it performs in a
decided, after due notice and hearing, judicial manner an act which is
not later than fifteen days before the essentially of an executive or
election. [emphasis and underscoring administrative nature, where the power to
supplied] act in such manner is incidental to or
The petitioner injects her desired color to reasonably necessary for the
Section 78 with performance of the executive or
the argument that the COMELEC's jurisdiction in administrative duty entrusted to it. In
these proceedings is limited to determining deliberate carrying out their quasi-judicial functions
false representation in her CoC, and should not the administrative officers or bodies are
include the substantive aspect of her eligibility. On this required to investigate facts or ascertain
view, Poe asserts that she had not deliberately the existence of facts, hold hearings,
misrepresented her citizenship and residence. CAIHTE weigh evidence, and draw conclusions
from them as basis for their official action
II.E.2. The  COMELEC's  power under Section
and exercise of discretion in a judicial
78
nature. 218
is Quasi-Judicial in Character.
In Section 78 proceedings,
In Cipriano v. COMELEC, 217 this Court
the COMELEC determines whether the allegations in a
recognized that this authority is quasi-judicial in
petition to cancel a CoC are supported by sufficient (i) an inquiry into the standards for
evidence. In the process, the COMELEC allows both eligibility (which are found in the
the petitioner and the respondent-candidate the law and in jurisprudence);
opportunity to present their evidence and arguments (ii) the application of these standards to
before it. Based on these submissions, the candidate; and
the COMELEC then determines whether the
candidate's CoC should be cancelled. (iii) the representations he or she made
as well as the facts surrounding
To arrive at its decision in a cancellation case, these representations.
the COMELEC must determine whether the candidate
committed a material representation that is false — Only in this manner can the COMELEC determine if
the statutory basis for the cancellation — in his or her the candidate falsely represented his or her
CoC statements. While Section 78 itself does not qualification for the elective office he or she aspires
expressly define what representation is "material," for.
jurisprudence has defined "materiality" to be a false Aside from inquiring into the applicable laws
representation related to the candidate's eligibility to bearing on the issues raised, the COMELEC can
run for office. 219 The representation is "false" if it is interpret these laws within the bounds allowed by the
shown that the candidate manifested that he or she is principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation.
eligible for an elective office that he or she filed a CoC It can then apply these laws to the evidence presented
for, when in fact he or she is not. after they are previously weighed.
Thus, we have affirmed the cancellation of The capacity to interpret and apply the relevant
CoCs based on a candidate's false laws extends to situations where there exists no
representations on citizenship, residence, and lack of a jurisprudence squarely applicable to the facts
prior criminal record. These cases also refer to the established by evidence. The exercise of a function
need to establish a candidate's deliberate intent to that is essentially judicial in character includes not just
deceive and defraud the electorate that he or she is the application by way of stare decisis of judicial
eligible to run for office. precedent; it includes the application and interpretation
The linkage between the qualification the of the text of the law through established principles of
elective office carries and the representation the construction. To say otherwise would be to unduly
candidate made, directly shows that Section 78 cripple the COMELEC in the exercise of its quasi-
proceedings must necessarily involve: judicial functions every time a case before it finds no
specific precedent.
 II.E.2(a). Poe  and the Section 78 attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
Proceedings. fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. In other words, it
II.E.2(a)(i)Intent to Deceive
must be made with an intention to
as an Element.
deceive the electorate as to one's
In the present case, the private respondents qualifications for public office. The use of
sought the cancellation of Poe's CoC based on the a surname, when not intended to mislead
false representations she allegedly made regarding or deceive the public as to ones identity,
her Philippine citizenship, her natural-born status, and is not within the scope of the provision.
her period of residence. These are all material [italics supplied]
qualifications as they are required by the Constitution
Salcedo III cited Romualdez-
itself.
Marcos v. COMELEC, 221 which provided that:
To determine under Section 78 whether the
It is the fact of residence, not a
representations made were false, the COMELEC must
statement in a certificate of candidacy
necessarily determine the eligibility standards, the
which ought to be decisive in determining
application of these standards to Poe, and the
whether or not and individual has
claims she made i.e., whether she is indeed a
satisfied the constitution's residency
natural-born Philippine citizen who has resided in the
qualification requirement. The said
Philippines for at least ten years preceding the
statement becomes material only when
election, as she represented in her CoC, as well as the
there is or appears to be a deliberate
circumstances surrounding these representations.
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
In relation to Poe's defense, these
fact which would otherwise render a
circumstances relate to her claim that she did not
candidate ineligible. It would be plainly
deliberately falsely represent her citizenship and
ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately
residence, nor did she act with intent to deceive.
and knowingly make a statement in a
The element of "deliberate intent to certificate of candidacy which would lead
deceive" first appeared in Philippine jurisprudence to his or her disqualification. [italics
in Salcedo III v. COMELEC 220 under the following supplied]
ruling: DETACa
From Salcedo and with the exception
Aside from the requirement of of Tagolino v. HRET, 222 the "deliberate intent to
materiality, a false representation under deceive" element had been consistently included as a
section 78 must consist of a deliberate requirement for a Section 78 proceeding.
 The Court in Tagolino v. HRET 223 ruled: at the time, as Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, prior to its nullification
Corollary thereto, it must be noted
in Fermin v. Comelec, 225 had allowed the institution
that the deliberateness of the
of disqualification cases based on the lack of
misrepresentation, much less one's
residence.
intent to defraud, is of bare significance
in a Section 78 petition as it is enough The quoted portion in Romualdez-
that the person's declaration of a Marcos thus pertains to the challenge to
material qualification in the CoC be Romualdez-Marcos' residence in a disqualification
false. In this relation, jurisprudence holds proceeding, and not in a CoC cancellation
that an express finding that the person proceeding.
committed any deliberate The Court held that the statement in
misrepresentation is of little consequence Romualdez-Marcos's CoC does not necessarily
in the determination of whether one's disqualify her because it did not reflect the necessary
CoC should be deemed cancelled or not. residence period, as the actual period of residence
What remains material is that the petition shows her compliance with the legal
essentially seeks to deny due course to requirements. The statement "[t]he said statement
and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of becomes material only when there is or appears to be
one's ineligibility and that the same be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
granted without any qualification. fact which would otherwise render a candidate
[emphasis, italics, and underscoring ineligible" should thus be understood in the context
supplied] of a disqualification proceeding looking at the fact
This statement in Tagolino assumes validity of a candidate's residence, and not at a CoC
and merit when we consider that Romualdez- cancellation proceeding determining whether a
Marcos, the case that Salcedo III used as basis, is candidate falsely represented her eligibility.
not a Section 78 proceeding, but a disqualification Arguably, the element of "deliberate intent to
case. deceive," has been entrenched in our jurisprudence
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's Separate since it was first mentioned in Salcedo III. Given the
Opinion 224 in Romualdez-Marcos pointed out that the history of this requirement, and the lack of clear
allegations in the pleadings in Romualdez- reference of "deliberate intent to deceive" in Section
Marcos referred to Imelda Romualdez- 78, this deliberate intention could be anchored
Marcos' disqualification, and not to an allegation from the textual requirement in Section 78 that the
for the cancellation of her CoC. This was allowable representation made must have been false, such
that the representation was made with the and allegiance thereto; that he will obey
knowledge that it had not been true. the laws, legal orders, and decrees
promulgated by the duly constituted
Viewed from this perspective, the element of
authorities; that he is not a permanent
"deliberate intent to deceive" should be considered
resident or immigrant to a foreign
complied with upon proof of the candidate's
country; that the obligation imposed by
knowledge that the representation he or she made
his oath is assumed voluntarily, without
in the CoC was false.
mental reservation or purpose of
Note, at this point, that the CoC must contain evasion; and that the facts stated in the
the candidate's representation, under oath, that he or certificate of candidacy are true to the
she is eligible for the office aspired for, i.e., that he or best of his knowledge. [italics and
she possesses the necessary eligibilities at the time he underscoring supplied] aDSIHc
or she filed the CoC. This statement must have also
More specifically, COMELEC Resolution No.
been considered to be true by the candidate to the
9984 requires the following to be contained in the 2015
best of his or her knowledge.
CoC:
Section 74 of the OEC, which lists the
Section 4. Contents and Form of
information required to be provided in a CoC, states:
Certificate of Candidacy. — The COC
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of shall be under oath and shall state:
candidacy. — The certificate of
a. office aspired for;
candidacy shall state that the person
filing it is announcing his candidacy for xxx xxx xxx
the office stated therein and that he g. citizenship, whether natural-born or
is eligible for said office; if for Member of naturalized;
the Batasang Pambansa, the province,
including its component cities, highly xxx xxx xxx
urbanized city or district or sector which k. legal residence, giving the exact
he seeks to represent; the political party address and the number of years
to which he belongs; civil status; his date residing in the Philippines . . .;
of birth; residence; his post office xxx xxx xxx
address for all election purposes; his
profession or occupation; that he will n. that the aspirant is eligible for said
support and defend the Constitution of office;
the Philippines and will maintain true faith xxx xxx xxx
 t. that the facts stated in the certificate are II.E.2(a)(ii) Poe  had the
true and correct to the best of the "Intent to Deceive"
aspirant's knowledge; But even if we were to consider deliberate
xxx xxx xxx intent to deceive as a separate element that needs
The COC shall be sworn to before a to be established in a Section 78 proceeding, I find
Notary Public or any official authorized that the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its
to administer discretion in concluding that Poe deliberately
oath. COMELEC employees are not falsely represented her residence and citizenship
authorized to administer oath, even in qualifications.
their capacities as notary public. The COMELEC, in concluding that Poe had
[emphasis and underscoring supplied] known of her ineligibilities to run for President, noted
The oath, the representation of eligibility, and that she is a highly-educated woman with a competent
the representation that the statements in the CoC are legal team at the time she filled up her 2012 and 2015
true to the best of the candidate's knowledge CoCs. As a highly educated woman, she had the
all operate as a guarantee from a candidate that he necessary acumen to read and understand the
or she has knowingly provided information plain meaning of the law. I add that she is now after
regarding his or her eligibility. The information he or the highest post in the land where the understanding
she provided in the CoC should accordingly be of the plain meaning of the law is extremely
considered a deliberate representation  on  his or basic. ATICcS
her part, and any falsehood regarding such The COMELEC thus found it unconvincing
eligibility would thus be considered deliberate. that Poe would not have known how to fill up a pro-
In other words, once the status of a candidate's forma CoC, much less commit an "honest mistake" in
ineligibility has been determined, I do not find it filling it up. (Interestingly, Poe never introduced any
necessary to establish a candidate's deliberate intent evidence explaining her "mistake" on the residency
to deceive the electorate, as he or she had already issue, thus rendering it highly suspect.)
vouched for its veracity and is found to have A plain reading of Article IV, Section 1 of the
committed falsehood. The representations he or she 1935 Constitution could have sufficiently
has made in his or her CoC regarding the truth about appraised  Poe  regarding her citizenship. Article IV,
his or her eligibility comply with the requirement that he Section 1 does not provide for the situation where the
or she deliberately and knowingly falsely represented identities of both an individual's parents from whom
such information. citizenship may be traced are unknown. The ordinary
meaning of this non-inclusion necessarily means that
she cannot be a Philippine citizen under the 1935 her intent to mislead the electorate regarding her
Constitution's terms. eligibility.
The COMELEC also found that Poe's  Petition First, at the time Poe executed her 2012 CoC,
for Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship before she was already a high-ranking public official who
the BID deliberately misrepresented her status as could not feign ignorance regarding the requirement of
a former natural-born Philippine citizen, as it lists establishing legal domicile. She also presumably had a
her adoptive parents to be her parents without team of legal advisers at the time she executed this
qualifications. The COMELEC also noted CoC as she was then the Chair of the MTRCB. She
that Poe had been falsely representing her status also had experience in dealing with the qualifications
as a Philippine citizen in various public for the presidency, considering that she is the adoptive
documents. All these involve a succession of daughter of a former presidential candidate (who
falsities. himself had to go to the Supreme Court because of his
own qualifications).
With respect to the required period of
residency, Poe deliberately falsely represented that Second, Poe's 2012 CoC had been
she had been a resident of the Philippines for at least taken under oath and can thus be considered an
ten years prior to the May 9, admission against interest that cannot easily be
2016 elections. Poe's CoC when she ran for the brushed off or be set aside through the simplistic
Senate in the May 2013 national elections, however, claim of "honest mistake."
shows that she then admitted that she had been Third, the evidence Poe submitted to prove that
residing in the Philippines for only six years and she established her residence (or domicile) in the
six months. Had she continued counting the period of Philippines as she now claims, mostly refer to events
her residence based on the information she provided prior to her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship,
in her 2012 CoC, she would have been three months contrary to the established jurisprudence requiring
short of the required Philippine residence of ten Philippine citizenship in establishing legal domicile in
years. Instead of adopting the same the Philippines for election purposes.
representation, her 2015 CoC shows that she has
been residing in the Philippines from May 24, 2005, Fourth, that Poe allegedly had no life-changing
and has thus been residing in the Philippines for event on November 2006 (the starting point for
more than ten years. counting her residence in her 2012 CoC) does not
prove that she did not establish legal domicile in the
To the COMELEC, Poe's subsequent change in Philippines at that time.
counting the period of her residence, along with the
circumstances behind this change, strongly indicates
 Lastly, Poe announced the change in the Philippine citizenship with the BID. This amended
starting point of her residency period when she was certificate, where reference to being an adoptee has all
already publicly known to be considering a run for the been erased as allowed by law, was not used
presidency; thus, it appears likely that the change in Poe's RA No. 9225 BID application.
was made to comply with the residence period The timing of the application for this amended
requirement for the presidency. birth certificate strongly suggest that it was used
These COMELEC considerations, to my purposely as a reserve document in case questions
mind, do not indicate grave abuse of discretion. I are raised about Poe's birth; they became
note particularly that Poe's false representation unnecessary and were not used when the BID
regarding her Philippine citizenship did not merely accepted Poe's statement under oath that she was a
involve a single and isolated statement, but a series former natural-born citizen of the Philippine as required
of acts — a series of falsities — that started from her by RA No. 9225. TIADCc
RA No. 9225 application, as can be seen from the That government documents that
presented public documents recognizing her touched on Poe's birth origins had been tainted with
citizenship. irregularities and were issued before Poe ran for
I note in this regard that Poe's original certificate elective office strongly indicate that at the time she
of live birth (foundling certificate) does not indicate her executed her CoC, she knew that her claimed
Philippine citizenship, as she had no known parents Philippine citizenship is tainted with
from whom her citizenship could be traced. Despite discrepancies, and that she is not a Philippine
this, she had been issued various government citizen under Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
documents, such as a Voter's Identification Card and Constitution.
Philippine passport recognizing her Philippine II.E.2(a)(iii) Poe  and her
citizenship. The issuance of these subsequent Residency Claim
documents alone should be grounds for
heightened suspicions given that Poe's original On Poe's residence, I find it worthy to add that
birth certificate provided no information regarding the information in her 2012 CoC (for the
her Philippine citizenship, and could not have Senate) complies with the requirement that a person
been used as reference for this citizenship. must first be a Philippine citizen to establish legal
domicile in the Philippines. Based on Poe's 2012 COC,
Another basis for heightened suspicion is the her legal domicile in the Philippines began in
timing of Poe's amended birth certificate, which was November 2006, shortly after the BID issued the Order
issued on May 4, 2006 (applied for in November granting her reacquisition of Philippine
2005), shortly before she applied for reacquisition of citizenship on July 18, 2006.
 That her 2012 CoC complies with the ruling binding on the COMELEC, nor does it have any
in Japzon v. Comelec, 226 a 2009 case requiring effect on the COMELEC's authority to render its own
Philippine citizenship prior to establishing legal decision over the Section 78 proceedings filed against
domicile in the Philippines, indicates Poe's knowledge her.
of this requirement. It also indicates her present A first important point to consider in looking at
deliberate intent to deceive the electorate by changing the SET decision, is that until now it is still the subject
the starting point of her claimed residency in the of judicial review petition before this Court but does not
Philippines to May 24, 2005. This, she did despite serve as a prejudicial question that must be resolved
being in the Philippines at that time as an alien under before the COMELEC can rule on the separate and
a balikbayan visa. distinct petition before it. Rizalito Y. David, the
II.E.3.The  COMELEC's  interpretation of the petitioner who initiated the quo warranto proceeding,
law timely invoked the expanded jurisdiction of the Court in
despite the Senate Electoral G.R. No. 221538. While the decision's implementation
Tribunal's (SET) has not been prohibited by the Court, its legal
decision in the Quo Warranto case conclusions and reasoning are still under question.
against the Thus, the decision has not yet been affirmed by the
petitioner. Court and cannot be applied, by way of judicial
precedent, to the COMELEC's decision-making.
I cannot agree with the petitioner's position that
the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it Note in this regard that only rulings of the
did not consider the SET's decision dated November Supreme Court are considered as part of the laws of
17, 2005. the land and can serve as judicial
precedent. 227 Cases decided by the lower courts,
By way of background, the petitioner's
once they have attained finality, may only bar the
Philippine citizenship was earlier challenged in a quo
institution of another case for res adjudicata, i.e., by
warranto proceeding before the SET. A quo
prior judgment (claim preclusion) or the preclusion of
warranto proceeding involves a direct, not a
the re-litigation of the same issues (issue
preliminary challenge (unlike in a cancellation
preclusion). 228 For res judicata to take effect,
proceeding), to a public officer's qualification for
however, the petitioner should have raised it as part of
office. The SET, voting 5 to 4, dismissed the petition
her defense and properly established that the
and effectively held that she was fit to hold office as
elements for its application are present. The petitioner
Senator.
has done neither.
The SET's dismissal of the quo
warranto petition against Poe, however, is not
 Likewise note that a court's That these two bodies have separate, distinct,
ruling on citizenship, as a general rule, does not have and different jurisdictions mean that neither has the
the effect of res judicata, especially when the authority nor the ascendancy over the other, with
citizenship ruling is only antecedent to the each body supreme in its own sphere of authority.
determination of rights of a person in a Conversely, these bodies have no ascendancy to rule
controversy. 229 This point is further discussed upon issues outside their respective specific authority,
below. much less bind other bodies with matters outside their
respective jurisdictions. The decision of the SET, with
Second, the COMELEC can conduct its own
its specific jurisdiction to resolve contests involving the
inquiry regarding the petitioner's citizenship, separate
qualifications of Senators, does not have the authority
from and independently of the SET.
to bind the COMELEC, another constitutional body
The COMELEC, in order to determine the with a specific jurisdiction of its own.
petitioner's eligibility and decide on whether her CoC
Consider, too, that the actual ruling and
should be cancelled, can inquire into her citizenship.
reasoning behind the SET's decision are suspect and
Courts, including quasi-judicial agencies such as
ambiguous. All the members of the SET, except for
the COMELEC, may make pronouncements on the
Senator Nancy Binay (who voted with the minority),
status of Philippine citizenship as an incident in the
issued his or her own separate opinion to explain his
adjudication of the rights of the parties to a
or her vote: aside from the three members of the SET
controversy.
who dissented and issued their own separate opinions,
In making this determination (and separately the five members of the majority also wrote their own
from the reasons discussed above), the COMELEC is separate opinions explaining their votes. AIDSTE
not bound by the SET's decision since these
Notably, one member of the SET majority
constitutional bodies are separate and
opined that the SET's decision is a political one since
independent from one another, each with its own
the majority of SET membership comes from the
specific jurisdiction and different issues to
political legislative branch of government.
resolve. The COMELEC, as the independent
constitutional body tasked to implement election laws, While I do not subscribe to this view, the fact
has the authority to determine citizenship to determine that this was said by one of the members in the
whether the candidate committed false material majority could reasonably affect the COMELEC's (and
representation in her CoC. The SET, on the other even the public's) opinion on the SET's grounds for its
hand, is a constitutional body tasked to resolve all conclusion.
contests involving the eligibility of Senators to hold Another member of the SET majority in fact
office. pointedly said:
 The composition of the Senate candidacy as President or issues raised
Electoral Tribunal is predominantly in the public fora.
political, six Senators and three These opinions reasonably cast doubt on the
Justices of the Supreme Court. The applicability — whether as precedent or as persuasive
Philippine Constitution did not strictly legal points of view — to the present COMELEC case
demand a strictly legal viewpoint in which necessarily has to apply the law and
deciding disqualification cases jurisprudence in resolving a Section 78 proceeding.
against Senators. Had the intention
been different, the Constitution should  
have made the Supreme Court also sit Given the structure and specific jurisdictions of
as the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The the COMELEC and the SET, as well as the opinions of
fact that six Senators, elected by the some of the latter's members regarding the nature of
whole country, form part of the Senate their decision, the COMELEC could not have acted
Electoral Tribunal would suggest that the beyond its legitimate jurisdiction nor with grave abuse
judgment of the whole Filipino nation of discretion when it inquired into the petitioner's
must be taken into consideration. citizenship.
[emphases, italics, and underscoring
supplied] II.E.4. The  COMELEC's  authority under
Section 78
Still another member of the SET majority openly and the BID's Order under RA No.
explained that his vote stems from the belief that the 9225.
SET is "predominantly a political body" that must
take into consideration the will of the Filipino people, Neither do I agree that
while another expressly stated that her opinion should the COMELEC's decision amounted to a collateral
not be extended to the issues raised in the COMELEC: attack on the BID Order, nor that
the COMELEC usurped the DOJ's primary jurisdiction
Finally, it is important for the over the BID Order.
public to understand that the main
decision of the SET and my separate In the present case, the private respondents
opinion are limited to the issues raised sought the cancellation of the petitioner's CoC
before it. This does not cover other based on her false material representations regarding
issues raised in her Philippine citizenship, natural-born status, and
the Commission on Elections in period of residence. The BID, on the other hand,
connection with the Respondent's passed upon petitioner Poe's compliance with RA No.
9225 when she applied for the "reacquisition" of
Philippine citizenship. The BID approved the applicant can enjoy or exercise these political
application and thus certified Poe as a dual Philippine- rights are matters that are covered by other laws; the
U.S. citizen. full enjoyment of these rights also depends on other
institutions and agencies, not on the BID itself whose
Whether the COMELEC's Section 78 decision is
task under RA No. 9225 at that point is finished.
a collateral attack on the BID Order
depends on the COMELEC's purpose, authority to Thus, the BID Order approving
make the inquiry, and the effect of its decision on the petitioner Poe's reacquisition of her Philippine
BID Order. citizenship allowed her the political right to file a CoC,
but like other candidates, she may be the subject of
As I pointed out earlier, the COMELEC can
processes contesting her right to run for elective office
make pronouncements on the status of Philippine
based on the qualifications she represented in her
citizenship as an incident in the adjudication of the
CoC.
rights of the parties to a controversy that is within its
jurisdiction to rule on. 230 In the petitioner's case, her CoC has been
challenged under Section 78 of the OEC for her false
A significant point to understand on citizenship
material representation of her status as a natural-born
is that RA No. 9225 — the law authorizing the BID to
Philippine citizen and as a Philippine resident for at
facilitate the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and
least ten years before the May 9, 2016 elections. Thus,
pursuant to which Poe now claims Filipino citizenship
as Section 78 provides, the COMELEC conducted its
— does not ipso facto authorize a former natural-born
own investigation and reached its conclusions
Philippine citizen to run for elective office.
based on its investigation of the claimed false material
An RA No. 9225 proceeding simply makes a representations. As this is part of its authority under
finding on the applicant's compliance with the Section 78, the COMELEC cannot be faulted for lack
requirements of this law. Upon approval of the of authority to act; it possesses the required
application, the applicant's political and civil rights as a constitutional and statutory authority for its
Philippine citizen are restored, with actions. AaCTcI
the subsequent enjoyment of the restored civil and
More importantly in this case,
political rights "subject to all attendant liabilities
the COMELEC's action does not amount to a collateral
and responsibilities under existing laws of the
attack against the BID Order, as the consequences
Philippines . . . ."
of the BID Order allows the petitioner to enjoy
In other words, the BID handles the approval political rights but does not exempt her from the
process and the restoration of the applicant's civil liabilities and challenges that the exercise of these
and political rights, but how and whether the rights gave rise to.
 In more precise terms, the COMELEC did not supervision of this Court. It is an independent
directly hold the Order to be defective for purposes of constitutional body that enjoys both decisional AND
nullifying it; it simply declared — pursuant to its own institutional independence from the three branches
constitutional and statutory power — that of the government. Its decisions are not subject to
petitioner Poe cannot enjoy the political right to appeal but only to the certiorari jurisdiction of this
run for the Presidency because she falsely Court for the correction of grave abuses in the
represented her natural-born citizenship and
The Supreme Court COMELEC
residency status. These facts are material because
 
they are constitutional qualifications for the
Presidency. Republic Act No. 1793 (1957): Commonwealth Act No. 607 (1940), Sec. 2:
Sec. 1. There shall be an independent The Commission on Elections shall have
It is not without significance that
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to be exclusive charge of the enforcement and
the COMELEC's determination under Section 78 of the
composed of eleven members which administration of all laws relative to the
OEC of a candidate's Philippine citizenship status
despite having reacquired it through RA No.shall 9225behas the sole judge of all contests conduct of elections. It shall decide save those
been affirmed by the Court several times — relating to the election, returns, and
notably, involving the right to vote, all administrative
qualifications of the president-elect
in Japzon v. Comelec, 231 Condon v. Comelec, 232  questions affecting elections . . .
and Lopez v. Comelec. 233 and the vice-president-elect of the    
Philippines. . . . . 1935 Constitution (as amended in 1940), Art.
II.E.5. The
X, Sec. 2:
claimed  COMELEC  encroachment  on 
the The Commission on Elections shall have
powers of the Presidential Electoral exclusive charge of the enforcement and
Tribunal (PET). administration of all laws relative to the
conduct of elections and shall exercise all
The petitioner posits on this point that
other functions which may be conferred upon
the COMELEC, by ruling on her qualifications for the
Presidency, encroached on the power of the PET to it by law. It shall decide, save those involving
rule on election contests involving the Presidency. In the right to vote, all administrative questions
short, she claims that the COMELEC, without any legal affecting elections, including the determination
basis, prematurely determined the eligibility of a of the number and location of polling places,
presidential candidate. and the appointment of election inspectors and
To properly consider this position, it must be of other election officials. All law enforcement
appreciated that the COMELEC is not an ordinary agencies and instrumentalities of the
court or quasi-judicial body that falls within the judicial Government, when so required by the
 Commission, shall act foras the
its deputies
purpose.for the    
purpose of insuring free, orderly, and honest xxx
election. The decisions, orders, and rulings of    
the Commission shall be subject to review by (3) Decide, except those involving the right
the Supreme Court. . . .   to vote, all questions affecting elections,
Pambansa Blg. 884 (1985), Sec. 1: 1973 Constitution, Art. XII-C, Sec. 2:   including determination of the number and
shall be an independent   location of polling places, appointment of
The Commission on Elections shall have the
dential   election officials and inspectors, and
oral Tribunal, hereinafter referred following powers and functions:   registration of voters.
he Tribunal, to be composed of the      
members which shall be the sole 1. Enforce and administer all laws relative
1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 7: 1987 Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. 1:
of all contests relating to the   to the conduct of elections.  
on, returns and qualifications of      . . . Unless otherwise provided by this The Constitutional Commissions, which
esident and the Vice-President xxx
Constitution or by law, any decision, shall be independent, are the Civil Service
Philippines. . . .     order, or ruling of each Commission Commission, the Commission on Elections,
3. Decide, save those mayinvolving the right
be brought to Supreme Court on
to the and the Commission on Audit.
  vote, administrative questions affecting
by the aggrieved party within    
  elections, including the days
thirty determination of of a copy thereof.
from receipt Executive Order 292 (1987), Book V, Title I,
  the number and location of polling places, Subtitle C, Chapter 1, Sec. 2:
  the appointment of election officials and  
  inspectors, and the registration of votes. Powers and functions. — In addition to the
  powers and functions conferred upon it by
Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 4: 1987 Constitution, Art. IX-C, Sec. 2: the constitution, the Commission shall have
    exclusive charge of the enforcement and
xxx The Commission on Elections shall exercise administration of all laws relative to the
the following powers and functions: conduct of elections for the purpose of
upreme Court, sitting en banc,     insuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful,
be the sole judge of all contests (1) Enforce and administer all laws and and credible elections, and shall:
g to the election, returns, and   regulations relative to the conduct of an    
cations of the President or Vice-   election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, (20) Have exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-
dent, and may promulgate its rules   and recall.   proclamation controversies. It may motu
   proprio or upon written petition, and National Assembly; the office of the Vice-President in
  after due notice and hearing, order the turn ceased to exist. 236
  partial or total suspension of the The PET was only revived in 1985 through
  proclamation of any candidate-elect or Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 884 237 after the 1981
  annul partially or totally any proclamation,
amendments to the 1973 Constitution restored to the
  if one has been made, as the evidencepeople shall the power to directly elect the President and
  warrant. Notwithstanding the pendencyreinstalled
of the office of the Vice-President.
  any pre-proclamation controversy, the The PET under B.P. 884 exercised the same
  Commission may, motu proprio or uponjurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to
  filing of a verified petition and after duethe election, returns, and qualifications of the President
  notice and hearing, order the proclamation and the Vice-President, albeit it omitted the suffix "-
  of other winning candidates whose election elect." It was also an entirely distinct entity from the
  will not be affected by the outcome of the Supreme Court with membership composed of both
  controversy.  Supreme Court Justices and members of the Batasang
Pambansa. 238
II.E.5(a). History of the PET.
The PET's jurisdiction was restored under the
An examination of the 1935 Constitution shows 1987 Constitution with the Justices of the Supreme
that it did not provide for a mechanism for the Court as the only members. Presently, this Court,
resolution of election contests involving the office of sitting en banc, is the sole judge of all contests relating
the President or Vice-President. This void was only to the election, returns, and qualifications of the
filled in 1957 when Congress enacted RA No. President or Vice-President.
1793, 234 creating the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Until then, controversies or disputes involving election The grant of jurisdiction to the PET
contests, returns, and qualifications of the President- is exclusive but at the same time, limited. The
elect and Vice-President-elect were not justiciable. 235 constitutional phraseology limits the PET's jurisdiction
to election contests which can only contemplate a
RA No. 1793 gave the Supreme Court, acting post-election and post-proclamation
as the PET, the sole jurisdiction to decide all contests controversy 239 since no "contest" can exist before a
relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of winner is proclaimed. Understood in this sense, the
the President-elect and the Vice-President elect. jurisdiction of the members of the Court, sitting as
The PET became irrelevant under the 1973 PET, does not pertain to Presidential or Vice-
Constitution since the 1973 President was no longer Presidential candidates but to the President (elect) and
chosen by the electorate but by the members of the Vice-President (elect).
 II.E.5(b). The  COMELEC's  History. of power are deemed to include those of necessary or
fair implication, or incident to the powers expressly
The PET's history should be compared to the
conferred, or essential thereto. This power under
history of the grant of jurisdiction to
Section 78, therefore, necessarily includes the power
the COMELEC which was created in 1940, initially by
to make a determination of the truth or falsity of the
statute whose terms were later incorporated as an
representation made in the CoC.
amendment to the 1935 Constitution.
The COMELEC was given the power to decide, save The bottom line from this brief comparison is
those involving the right to vote, that the power granted to the PET is limited to election
all administrative questions contests while the powers of the COMELEC are broad
affecting elections. EcTCAD and extensive. Except for election contests involving
the President or Vice-President (and members of
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted,
Congress) 240 and controversies involving the right to
this COMELEC power was retained with the same
vote, the COMELEC has the jurisdiction to decide ALL
limitations.
questions affecting the elections. Logically, this
The 1987 Constitution deleted the adjective includes pre-proclamation controversies such as the
"administrative" in the description of determination of the qualifications of candidates for
the COMELEC's powers and expanded its jurisdiction purpose of resolving whether a candidate committed
to decide all questions affecting elections, except false material representation.
those involving the right to vote. Thus, unlike the
Thus, if this Court would deny
very limited jurisdiction of election contests granted to
the COMELEC the power to pass upon the
the Supreme Court/PET, the COMELEC's jurisdiction,
qualifications of a Presidential candidate — to stress,
with its catch-all provision, is all encompassing; it
not a President or a President-elect — on the
covers all questions/issues not specifically reserved for
ground that this power belongs to the PET composed
other tribunals.
of the members of this Court, we shall be self-servingly
The Administrative Code of 1987 further expanding the limited power granted to this Court by
explicitly granted the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction Article VII, Section 4, at the expense of limiting the
over all pre-proclamation controversies. powers explicitly granted to an independent
Section 78 of the OEC still further refines constitutional commission. The Court would thus
the COMELEC's power by expressly granting it the commit an unconstitutional
power to deny due course or to cancel a Certificate encroachment on the COMELEC's powers.
of Candidacy on the ground of false material II.E.5(c). Jurisprudence  on  COMELEC
representation. Ex necessitate legis. Express grants -PET Jurisdiction.
 In Tecson v. COMELEC, 241 the Court the COMELEC's jurisdiction to determine a
indirectly affirmed the COMELEC's jurisdiction over a presidential candidate's eligibility in a pre-election
presidential candidate's eligibility in a cancellation proceeding. It also clarified that while the PET also has
proceeding. The case involved two consolidated jurisdiction over the questions of eligibility, its
petitions assailing the eligibility of presidential jurisdiction begins only after a President has been
candidate Fernando Poe Jr. (FPJ): one petition, G.R. proclaimed.
No. 161824, invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction Thus, the two Tecson petitions, read in relation
under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court over with one another, stand for the proposition that the
a COMELEC decision in a CoC cancellation PET has jurisdiction over challenges to a proclaimed
proceeding, while the other, G.R. No. 161434, invoked President's eligibility, while the COMELEC has
the Court's jurisdiction as a Presidential Electoral jurisdiction over the eligibilities and disqualifications of
Tribunal. presidential candidates filed prior to the proclamation
The G.R. No. 161824 petition, in invoking the of a President.
Court's jurisdiction over the COMELEC's decision to This is the precise point of my discussions
uphold FPJ's candidacy, argued that above.
the COMELEC's decision was within its power to
render but its conclusion is subject to the Court's As against the Tecson ruling, the case
review under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Article of Fermin v. COMELEC 242 that
IX, Section 7 of the 1987 Constitution. petitioner Poe relies on, does not divest
the COMELEC of its authority to determine a
In contrast, the G.R. No. 161434 petition argued candidate's eligibility in the course of resolving Section
that that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction to decide a 78 petitions.
presidential candidate's eligibility, as this could only be
decided by the PET. It then invoked the Court's Fermin held that a candidate's ineligibility is not
jurisdiction as the PET to rule upon the challenge to a ground for a Section 68
FPJ's eligibility. proceeding involving disqualification cases, despite
a COMELEC rule including the lack of residence
The Court eventually dismissed both petitions, (which is an ineligibility) in the list of grounds for a
but for different reasons. The Court dismissed G.R. petition for disqualification. It then characterized the
No. 161824 for failure to show grave abuse of disputed petition as a petition for the cancellation of a
discretion on the part of the COMELEC. G.R. No. CoC and not a petition for disqualification, and held
161434 was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. that it had been filed out of time.
The difference in the reasons for the dismissal
of the two petitions in effect affirmed
 The Court's citation in Fermin of Justice cancel such certificate. Indeed, the Court
Vicente V. Mendoza's Separate Opinion has already likened a proceeding under
in Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC 243 thus refers Section 78 to a quo warranto proceeding
to the COMELEC's lack of authority to add to the under Section 253 of the OEC since they
grounds for a petition for disqualification as both deal with the eligibility or
provided in the law, even if these grounds involve qualification of a candidate, with the
an ineligibility to hold office. It cannot be distinction mainly in the fact that a
construed to divest the COMELEC of its authority "Section 78" petition is filed before
to determine the veracity of representations in a proclamation, while a petition for quo
candidate's CoC, which, to be considered material, warranto is filed after proclamation of the
must pertain to a candidate's eligibility to hold winning candidate. 244 [emphases and
elective office. Fermin itself clarified this point when it italics supplied]
said that: HSAcaE  
Lest it be misunderstood, the
III.
denial of due course to or the
cancellation of the CoC is not The Claim of Grave Abuse of Discretion
based on the lack of qualifications with respect to the CITIZENSHIP ISSUE
but on a finding that the candidate Aside from committing acts outside its
made a material representation that is jurisdiction, petitioner Poe claims that
false, which may relate to the the COMELEC also committed acts of grave abuse of
qualifications required of the public office discretion when it misapplied the law and related
he/she is running for. It is noted that the jurisprudence in holding that Article IV, Section 1 of the
candidate states in his/her CoC that 1935 Constitution does not grant her natural-born
he/she is eligible for the office he/she Philippine citizenship and in disregarding the country's
seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, obligations under treaties and the generally-accepted
therefore, is to be read in relation to principles of international law that require the
the constitutional and statutory Philippines to recognize the Philippine citizenship of
provisions on qualifications or foundlings in the country.
eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material Petitioner Poe also questions
representation in the CoC that is false, the COMELEC's evaluation of the evidence, and
the COMELEC, following the law, is alleges that it disregarded the evidence she presented
empowered to deny due course to or proving that she is a natural-born Philippine citizen.
 Poe lastly raises the COMELEC's violation of second level of constitutional construction should not
her right to equal protection, as it has the right to be also apply.
treated in the same manner as other foundlings Even if we apply ratio legis, the records of the
born after the Philippines' ratification of several 1934 Constitutional Convention do not reveal an
instruments favorable to the rights of the child. intention to consider foundlings to be citizens, much
III.A. The  COMELEC  did not gravely abuse its less natural-born ones. On the contrary the
discretion in Constitutional Convention rejected the inclusion
interpreting Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 of foundlings in the Constitution. If they were now
Constitution. to be deemed included, the result would be an
anomalous situation of monstrous proportions —
III.A.1. Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
foundlings, with unknown parents, would
Constitution
have greater rights than those whose mothers are
does not,  on  its face, include
citizens of the Philippines and who had to elect
foundlings in
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
listing the "citizens of the
majority.
Philippines."
In interpreting the Constitution from the
Jurisprudence has established three principles
perspective of what it expressly contains (verba legis),
of constitutional construction: first, verba legis non est
only the terms of the Constitution itself require to be
recedendum — from the words of the statute there
considered. Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935
should be no departure; second, when there is
Constitution on Citizenship provides:
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima — the words of the
Constitution should be interpreted based on the intent ARTICLE IV
of the framers; and third, ut magis valeat quam CITIZENSHIP
pereat — the Constitution must be interpreted as a
whole. 245 Section 1. The following are citizens of
the Philippines:
I hold the view that none of these modes
support the inclusion of foundlings among the Filipino (1) Those who are citizens of the
citizens listed in the 1935 Constitution. The 1935 Philippine Islands at the time
Constitution does not expressly list foundlings among of the adoption of this
Filipino citizens. 246 Using verba legis, the Constitution.
Constitution limits citizens of the Philippines to the (2) Those born in the Philippine
listing expressly in its text. Absent any ambiguity, the Islands of foreign parents
 who, before the adoption of mother. Either or both parents of a child must be
this Constitution, had been Philippine citizens at the time of the child's birth so
elected to public office in the that the child can claim Philippine citizenship under
Philippine Islands. these paragraphs. 248
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens This is the rule of jus sanguinis or citizenship
of the Philippines. by blood, i.e., as traced from one or both parents and
(4) Those whose mothers are as confirmed by the established rulings of this
citizens of the Philippines Court. 249 Significantly, none of the 1935
and, upon reaching the age constitutional provisions contemplate the situation
of majority, elect Philippine where both parents' identities (and consequently, their
citizenship. citizenships) are unknown, which is the case for
foundlings.
(5) Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law. As the list of Philippine citizens under Article IV,
Section 1 does not include foundlings, then they are
Section 2. Philippine citizenship may be not included among those constitutionally-granted or
lost or reacquired in the manner provided recognized to be Philippine citizens except to the
by law. extent that they fall under the coverage of paragraph
To reiterate, the list of persons who may be 5, i.e., if they choose to avail of the opportunity to be
considered Philippine citizens is an exclusive list. naturalized. Established rules of legal interpretation tell
According to the principle of expressio unius est us that nothing is to be added to what the text
exclusio alterius, items not provided in a list are states or reasonably implies; a matter that is not
presumed not to be included in it. 247 HESIcT covered is to be treated as not covered. 250
In this list, Paragraphs (1) and (2) need not The silence of Article IV, Section 1, of the 1935
obviously be considered as they refer to persons who Constitution, in particular of paragraphs (3) and (4)
were already born at the time of the adoption of the parentage provisions, on the citizenship of foundlings
1935 Constitution. Petitioner Poe was born only in in the Philippines, in fact speaks loudly and directly
1968. Paragraph (5), on the other hand and except about their legal situation. Such silence can only mean
under the terms mentioned below, does not also need that the 1935 Constitution did not address the
to be included for being immaterial to the facts and the situation of foundlings via paragraphs (3) and (4),
issues posed in the present case. but left the matter to other provisions that may be
applicable as discussed below.
Thus, we are left with paragraphs (3) and
(4) which respectively refer to a person's father and
 Specifically, foundlings can fully avail of The appropriate remedy for the petitioner and
Paragraph (5) of the above list, which speaks of those other foundlings, as already adverted to,
who are naturalized as citizens in accordance with law. is via naturalization, a process that the Constitution
Aside from the general itself already provides for. Naturalization can be by
law on naturalization, 251 Congress can pass a law specific law that the Congress can pass for foundlings,
specific to foundlings or ratify other treaties or on the strength of international law via the treaties
recognizing the right of foundlings to acquire Filipino that binds the Philippines to recognize the right of
citizenship. The foundling himself or herself, of course, foundlings to acquire a
must choose to avail of the opportunity under the law nationality. (Petitioner  Poe  obviously does not want
or the treaty. to make this admission as, thereby, she would not
qualify for the Presidency that she now aspires
To address the position that
for.) There, too, is the possible amendment of the
petitioner Poe raised in this case, the fact that the
Constitution so that the situation of foundlings can be
1935 Constitution did not provide for a situation where
directly addressed in the Constitution (of course, this
both parents are unknown (as also the case in the
may also be an unwanted suggestion as it is a
current 1987 Constitution) does not mean that the
course of action that is too late for the
provision on citizenship is ambiguous with respect to
2016  elections.)
foundlings; it simply means that the constitutional
provision on citizenship based on blood or parentage Notably, the government operating under the
has not been made available under the Constitution 1935 Constitution has recognized that foundlings who
but the provision must be read in its totality so that we wish to become full-fledged Philippine citizens must
must look to other applicable provision that are undergo naturalization under Commonwealth Act No.
available, which in this case is paragraph (5) as 473. DOJ Opinion No. 377 Series of 1940, in allowing
explained above. the issuance of Philippine passports to foundlings
found in the Philippines, said:
In negative terms, even if Poe's suggested
interpretation via the parentage provision did not However under the principles of
expressly apply and thus left a gap, the omission does International Law, a foundling has the
not mean that we can take liberties with the nationality of the place where he is found
Constitution through stretched interpretation, and or born (See chapter on the Conflict of
forcibly read the situation so as to place foundlings Law, footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in
within the terms of the Constitution's parentage an article in the Revue de Troit int. for
provisions. We cannot and should not do this as we 1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of
would thereby cross the forbidden path of judicial State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to
legislation. Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel.
 1899, 760; Moore, International Law The two DOJ opinions both say that a foundling
Digest, Vol. III, p. 281; Garcia's is considered a Philippine citizen for passport
Quizzer on Private International Law, p. purposes. That the second DOJ Opinion does not
270) which in this case, is the categorically require naturalization for a foundling to
Philippines. Consequently, Eddy become a Philippine citizen does not mean it amended
Howard may be regarded as a citizen the government's stance on the citizenship of
of the Philippines for passport foundlings, as these opinions were issued to grant
purposes only. If he desires to be a them a Philippine passport and facilitate their right
full-fledged Filipino, he may apply for to travel. International law is cited as reference
naturalization under the provisions of because they would be travelling abroad, and it is
Commonwealth Act No. 473 as possible that other countries they will travel to
amended by Commonwealth Act No. recognize that principle. But for purposes of
535. [emphasis, italics, and underscoring application in the Philippines, the domestic
supplied] law on citizenship prevails, that is, Article IV,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution. This is why DOJ
A subsequent DOJ Opinion, DOJ Opinion No.
Opinion No. 377, Series of 1940 clarified that if a
189, series of 1951, stated:
foundling wants to become a full-fledged Philippine
However under the principles of citizen, then he should apply for naturalization under
International Law, a foundling has the CA No. 473.
nationality of the place where he is found
In any case, DOJ Opinion No. 189, Series of
or born (See chapter on the Conflict of
1950 should not be interpreted in such a way as to
Law, footnote, p. 57 citing Bluntschli in
contravene the 1935 Constitution; and it most certainly
an article in the Revue de Troit int. for
cannot amend or alter Article IV, Section 1, of the
1870, p. 107; Mr. Hay, Secretary of
1935 Constitution.
State, to Mr. Leishman, Minister to
Switzerland, July 12, 1899, For. Rel. III.A.2. The Constitution did not intend to
1899, 760; Moore, International Law include
Digest, Vol. III, p. 281) which in this case, foundlings within its express terms
is the Philippines. Consequently, but did
Anthony Saton Hale may be regarded as not totally leave them without any
a citizen of the Philippines, and entitled remedy.
to a passport as such. caITAC Poe, in arguing this point, effectively imputes
  grave abuse of discretion on the COMELEC for not
recognizing that an ambiguity exists under paragraphs maxim expressio unius est exclusio
(3) and (4) of Section 1, of Article IV of the 1935 alterius, should not be invoked. 253
Constitution, and for not recognizing that the framers The petitioner appears to forget that, as
of the 1935 Constitution intended to include foundlings discussed above, the terms of the Constitution are
in the constitutional listing. clear — they simply did not provide for the
I see no ambiguity as explained above, but I situation of foundlings based  on  parentage — but
shall continue to dwell on this point under the present left the door open for the use of another measure, their
topic to the extent of petitioner Poe's argument that naturalization. There is thus that backdoor opening in
the exclusio unios principle is not an absolute rule and the Constitution to provide for foundlings using a way
that "unfairness" would result if foundlings are not other than parentage.
deemed included within the constitutional listing. The 1935 Constitution did not also have the
I shall discuss these points though in relation effect of fostering unfairness by not expressly including
with the petitioner's second point — the alleged intent foundlings as citizens via the parentage route as
of the framers of the 1935 Constitution to include foundlings could not rise any higher than children
foundlings within the terms of the 1935 Constitution. whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines. Like
The link between the first and the second points of them, they fell under the naturalized classification
discussion lies in the claim that ambiguity and fairness under the terms of the 1935 Constitution. That under
render the discussion of the framers' intent necessary. the terms of the subsequent Constitutions the
children of Filipino mothers were deemed natural-born
Poe bases her ambiguity and unfairness
citizens of the Philippines does not also unfairly treat
argument on the Court's ruling in People v.
foundlings as there is a reasonable distinction between
Manantan 252 which provided an exception to
their situations — the former have established Filipino
the exclusio unius est exclusio alterius principle under
parentage while the latter's parents are unknown.
the ruling that:
From these perspectives, the Constitution did
Where a statute appears on its
not leave out the situation of foundlings altogether so
face to limit the operation of its provisions
that there could be a gap that would call for
to particular persons or things by
interpretation. Apparently, the petitioner simply
enumerating them, but no reason exists
objects because she wants the case of foundlings
why other persons or things not so
to be addressed via the parentage route which is a
enumerated should not have been
matter of policy that is not for this Court to take. In
included, and manifest injustice will
the absence of a gap that would call for interpretation,
follow by not so including them, the
the use of interpretative principles is uncalled for.
 III.A.3. Neither did the framers of the 1935 To refer to the specifics of the deliberations, Mr.
Constitution intend to include Rafols, a Constitutional Convention member, proposed
foundlings the inclusion of foundlings among those who should be
within the parentage provisions of expressly listed as Philippine citizens. The proposal
this was framed as an amendment to the agreed
Constitution. provision that children born of Filipina mother and
foreign fathers shall be considered Philippine
The full transcript of the deliberations shows
citizens.
that the express inclusion of foundlings within the
terms of the 1935 Constitution was taken up during its As petitioner Poe pointed out, Mr. Roxas raised
deliberations. These records show that the proposal to the point (as an observation, not as an amendment to
include them was rejected. Other than this rejection, the proposal on the table) that the express inclusion of
no definitive decision was reached, not even in terms foundlings was no longer needed as their cases were
of a concrete proposal to deem them included, within rare and international law at that time already
the meaning of the parentage provisions of Article IV, recognized them as citizens of the country where they
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; there were only are born in.
vague and inconclusive discussions from which we Mr. Buslon, another member, voiced out
cannot and should not infer the intent of the framers of another point — that the matter should be left to the
the Constitution to consider and then to include them discretion of the legislature.
within its terms.
The present dispute essentially arose from
In this regard, the Court should not forget the these statements which preceded the vote on the
fine distinction between the evidentiary value of Rafols proposal (which did not reflect either of the
constitutional and congressional deliberations: observations made). For clarity, the exchanges among
constitutional deliberation discussions that are not the Convention members went as follows:
reflected in the wording of the Constitution are not as
material as the congressional deliberations where the Table 3
intents expressed by the discussants come from the Español English
very legislators who would reject or approve the law
SR. RAFOLS: Para una enmienda, Senor MR. RAFOLS: For an amendment, Mr.
under consideration. In constitutional
Presidente. Propongo que despues del Chairman. I propose that after the
deliberations, what the framers express do not
inciso 2by
necessarily reflect the intent of the people who se inserte lo siguiente: "Los hijos paragraph 2, the following be inserted:
naturales de un padre extranjero y de una
their sovereign act approve the Constitution on the The natural children of a foreign father
basis of its express wording. 254 ICHDca madre filipina no reconocidos por aquel," and a Filipino mother recognized that"
   
 xxx xxx  
  SR. MONTINOLA: Pero esa es la MR. Montinola: But that's the lay
RESIDENTE: La Mesa desea pedir THE PRESIDENT: interpretacion
The Board wishes de la ley toahora, de manera interpretation of law now, so there is no
clara. cion del proponente de la request a clarification
de que to nothehay
proponent
necesidad of de la enmienda. need for the amendment.
enda. ¿Se refiere Su Senoria a hijos the amendment. Does His Honor refer to  
ales o a toda clase de hijos natural children orSR.any RAFOLS:
kind of illegitimate
La enmienda debe leerse MR. RAFOLS: The amendment should be
mos? children. de esta manera: "Los hijos naturales o read this way: "The natural or illegitimate
  ilegitimos de un padre extranjero y de una children of a foreign father and a Filipino
RAFOLS: A toda clase de hijos MR. RAFOLS: To madre
all kindsfilipina,
of illegitimate
no reconocidos por aquel, mother, not recognized by either one, or
mos. Tambien se incluye a los hijos children. It also includes
o los hijos thedenatural
padres desconocidos." the children of unknown parents."
ales de padres conocidos, y los hijos children of unknown parentage, and    
ales o ilegitimos de padres natural or illegitimate children of unknown xxx xxx
onocidos. parentage.  
  SR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you MR. BUSLON: Mr. President, don't you
MONTINOLA: Para una aclaracion. MR. Montinola: for think
clarification.
it would beThey better
areto leave this matter think it would be better to leave this matte
e dice "de padres desconocidos." Los called "of unknown to the
parents."
hands The of the
Codes
Legislature? (original in to the hands of the Legislature?
gos actuates considera como filipino, actually consider them Filipino, that is, I  
cir, me refiero al Codigo espanol que mean the Spanish Code considers all  
dera como espanoles a todos los hijos children of unknownSR. parents
ROXAS:born Senor in Presidente, mi opinion MR. ROXAS: Mr. President, my humble
drea desconcidos nacidos en territorio Spanish territory as Spaniards because the opinion is that these are very insignificant
nol, porque la presuncion es que el presumption is thates que
the child
estosofsonunknown
casos muy insignificantes and rare cases for the Constitution to refe
e padres desconocidos es hijo de un parentage is the yson contados,
of a Spaniard;
para que thisla Constitucion to them. Under international law the
nol, y de igual manera se podra aplicar treatment can likewise
necesite bereferirse
applied in a ellos.
the Por las leyes principle that children or people born in a
n Filipinas, de que un hijo de padre Philippines so thatinternacionales
a child of unknown se reconoce el principio country and of unknown parents are
onocido y nacido en Filipinas se father born in thede Philippines
que los hijos is Filipino,
o las personas nacidas en citizens of that nation is recognized, and i
derara que es filipino, de modo que so there is no needun pais
. . . y de padres desconocidos son is not necessary to include in the
y necesidad . . .   ciudadanos de esa nacion, y no es necesario Constitution an exhaustive provision on th
  incluir en la Constitucion una disposicion matter.
RAFOLS: Hay necesidad, porque MR. RAFOLS: There taxativais asobre
need,elbecause
particular.  
mos relatando las condiciones de los we are relating those conditions to those    
an a ser filipinos. who are going to be Filipinos. xxx xxx
   citizens under international law; the Rafols proposal
RESIDENTE: La Mesa sometera a THE PRESIDENT: The Chair places was the not amended to reflect this reasoning and was
ion dicha enmienda. Los que esten amendment to a vote. Those who agreesimply rejected after an exchange of views.
rmes con la misma, que digan Si. with the amendment, say Yes. (A minority: To say under these circumstances that
minoria: Si.) Los que no lo esten, Yes.) Those who do not, say No. (thefoundlings were in fact intended to be included in
igan No. (Una mayoria: No.) the Filipino parentage provision is clearly already
majority: No.) The amendment is rejected.
a rechazada la enmienda.   a modification of the records to reflect what they
do not say.
 
The most that can perhaps be claimed under
Mr. Roxas, a known and leading lawyer of his
these records is that the framers were
time who eventually became the fifth President of the
inconclusive on the reason for the rejection. It should
Philippines, was clearly giving his personal "opinion
not be lost on the Court that the deemed inclusion
humilde" (humble opinion) following Mr. Buslon's
that Poe now claims does not logically arise from the
alternative view that the matter should be referred to
main provision that Mr. Rafols wanted to amend; his
the legislature. He did not propose to amend or
proposal had a premise different from the Filipino
change the original Rafols proposal which was the
parentage that was sought to be modified.
approval or the rejection of the inclusion to the
provision "[t]he natural or illegitimate children of a In clearer terms, the main provision sought to
foreign father and a Filipino mother, not recognized by be amended was based on the existence of a
either one,  or the children of unknown parents." Filipino mother; what Rafols wanted was to include
a situation of completely unknown parentage. This
The Convention rejected the Rafols proposal.
Rafols proposal was rejected. Nothing was
As approved, paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of
decided on why the rejection resulted. Anything
the 1935 Constitution finally read: "Those whose
beyond this simple reading is conjectural.
mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon
reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine To my mind, these considerations should
citizenship." caution us against bowing to petitioner Poe's self-
serving interpretation of Mr. Roxas's statement — in
Under these simple unadorned terms, nothing
effect, an interpretation, not of an express
was thus clear except the Rafols proposal to include
constitutional provision, but of an observation made
"children of unknown parents," after which a vote
in the course of the constitutional debate.
followed. As the transcripts show, the assemblage
rejected the proposal. To be sure, the rejection was To summarize my reasons for disagreeing with
not because foundlings were already Philippine this proposition are as follows:
(1) another member of the 1934 Constitutional (6) the deemed inclusion would have rendered
Convention provided for a different paragraph 3 of Section 1 absurdly unfair
reason for not including foundlings in the as foundlings would be considered
enumeration of citizens under Article Filipino citizens while those born of
IV, i.e., that the matter should be left to Filipina mothers and foreign fathers
the discretion of the legislature; TCAScE would have to undertake an election; and
lastly,
(2) Mr. Roxas' statement could in fact
reasonably be construed to be in support (7) the sovereign Filipino people could not be
as well of this alternative reason; what is considered to have known and ratified
certain is that Mr. Roxas did not support the observation of one member of the
the Rafols proposal; Constitutional Convention, especially
when the provisions which supposedly
(3) Mr. Roxas's view is only one view that was
reflect this observation do not indicate
not supported by any of the members of
even a hint of this intent.
the Constitutional Convention, and
cannot be considered to have been These reasons collectively provide the
representative of the views of the other justification under the circumstances that lead us to the
201 delegates, 102 of whom were also first and primordial rule in constitutional construction,
lawyers like Mr. Roxas and might be that is, the text of the constitutional provision
presumed to know the basics of statutory applies and is controlling. Intent of the
construction; Constitution's drafters may only be resorted to in
case of ambiguity, and after examining the entire
(4) references to international law by members
text of the Constitution. Even then, the opinion of
of the Constitutional Convention cannot,
a member of the Constitutional Convention is
without its corresponding text in the
merely instructive, it cannot be considered
Constitution, be considered as appended
conclusive of the people's intent.
to or included in the Constitution;
III.A.4. The application of Article IV, Section
(5)  Poe's position is based on an interpretation
1 of the 1935
of a lone observation made in the course
Constitution does not violate social
of the constitutional debate; it is not even
justice principles
an interpretation of a constitutional
or the equal protection clause.
provision;
In light of the clarity of the text of Article IV,
Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution regarding the
exclusion of foundlings and the unreliability of the that ratified the 1935 Constitution, and push the Court
alleged intent of the 1934 Constitutional Convention to to the forbidden road of judicial legislation.
include foundlings in the list of Philippine citizens, I do Moreover, determining the parameters of
not think the 1987 Constitution's provisions on social citizenship is a sovereign decision that inherently
justice and the right of a child to assistance, as well as discriminates by providing who may and may not be
equal access to public office should be interpreted to considered Philippine citizens, and how Philippine
provide Philippine citizenship to foundlings born under citizenship may be acquired. These distinctions had
the 1935 Constitution. been ratified by the Filipino nation acting as its own
As I earlier pointed out, there is no doubt in the sovereign through the 1935 Constitution and should
provision of Article IV, Section 1 of the 1935 not be disturbed.
Constitution. Foundlings had been contemplated at In these lights, I also cannot give credence
one point to be included in the provision, but this to Poe's assertion that interpreting the 1935
proposition was rejected, and the ultimate provision of Constitution to not provide Philippine citizenship to
the text did not provide for the inclusion of persons foundlings is "baseless, unjust, discriminatory, contrary
with both parents' identities unknown. to common sense", and violative of the equal
Additionally, I do not agree that the Court protection clause.
should interpret the provisions of a new Note, at this point, that the 1935 Constitution
Constitution (the 1987 Constitution) to add creates a distinction of citizenship based on parentage;
meaning to the provisions of the previous 1935 a person born to a Filipino father is automatically
Constitution. Indeed, we have cited past considered a Philippine citizen from birth, while a
Constitutions to look at the history and development of person born to a Filipino mother has the inchoate right
our constitutional provisions as a tool for constitutional to elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of
construction. How our past governments had been majority. Distinguishing the kind of citizenship
governed, and the changes or uniformity since then, based on who of the two parents is Filipino is a
are instructive in determining the provisions of the hallmark (justly or unjustly) of the 1935 Constitution,
current 1987 Constitution. and allowing persons with whom no parent can be
I do not think that a reverse comparison can identified for purposes of tracing citizenship would
be done, i.e., that what the 1935 Constitution contravene this distinction.
provides can be amended and applied at present Lastly, as earlier pointed out, adhering to the
because of what the 1987 Constitution now clear text of the 1935 Constitution would not
provides. It would amount to the Court amending what necessarily deprive foundlings the right to become
had been agreed upon by the sovereign Filipino nation
 Philippine citizens, as they can undergo naturalization that obligations entered into by states are
under our current laws. cTDaEH binding on them and requires them to perform their
obligations in good faith. 259 This principle finds
III.A.5. The Philippines has no treaty
expression under Article 27 of the Vienna
obligation to
Convention on the Law of Treaties, 260 which provides
automatically bestow Philippine
that "[a] party may not invoke the provisions of its
citizenship to
internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
foundlings under the 1935
treaty." 261
Constitution.
Thus, in the international plane, the Philippines
Treaties are entered into by the President and
cannot use its domestic laws to evade compliance with
must be ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Philippine
its international obligations; non-compliance would
Senate in order to have legal effect in the
result in repercussions in its dealings with other States.
country. 255 Upon ratification, a treaty is transformed
into a domestic law and becomes effective in the On the other hand, under Article VIII of the 1987
Philippines. Depending on the terms and character of Constitution, a treaty may be the subject of judicial
the treaty obligation, some treaties need additional review, 262 and is thus characterized as an instrument
legislation in order to be implemented in the with the same force and effect as a domestic
Philippines. This process takes place pursuant to law. 263 From this perspective, treaty provisions
the doctrine of transformation. 256 cannot prevail over, or contradict, constitutional
provisions; 264 they can also be amended
The Philippines has a dualist approach in its
by domestic laws, as they exist and operate at the
treatment of international law. 257 Under this
same level as these laws. 265
approach, the Philippines sees international law and its
international obligations from two perspectives: first, As a last point, treaties are — in the same
from the international plane, where international law manner as the determination of a State's determination
reigns supreme over national laws; and second, from of who its citizens are — an act made in the exercise
the domestic plane, where the international of sovereign rights. The Philippines now has every
obligations and international customary laws are right to enter into treaties as it is independent and
considered in the same footing as national laws, and sovereign. Such sovereignty only came with the full
do not necessarily prevail over the latter. 258 grant of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946.
  Thus, the Philippines could not have entered
into any binding treaty before this date, except with the
The first approach springs from the international
consent of the U.S. which exercised foreign affairs
customary law of pacta sunt servanda that recognizes
powers for itself and all colonies and territories under
its jurisdiction. No such consent was ever granted by while Article 7, Section 1 of the UNCRC provides:
the U.S. so that any claim of the Philippines being 1. The child shall be registered
bound by any treaty regarding its citizens and of immediately after birth and shall have the
foundlings cannot but be empty claims that do not right from birth to a name, the right
even deserve to be read, much less seriously to acquire a nationality and, as far as
considered. ITAaHc possible, the right to know and be cared
III.A.5(a). The Philippines' treaty for by his or her parents. [emphasis
obligations under the supplied]
ICCPR and UNCRC do not The right to acquire a nationality is different
require the from the grant of an outright Filipino
immediate and automatic grant nationality. Under the cited treaties, States are
of Philippine merely required to recognize and facilitate the
citizenship to foundlings. child's right to acquire a nationality.
While the International Covenant for Civil and The method through which the State complies
Political Rights (ICCPR) and United Nations' with this obligation varies and depends on its
Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) are discretion. Of course, the automatic and outright grant
valid and binding on the Philippines as they have been of citizenship to children in danger of being stateless is
signed by the President and concurred in by our one of the means by which this treaty obligation may
Senate, our obligations under these treaties do not be complied with. But the treaties allow other means of
require the immediate and automatic grant of compliance with their obligations short of the
Philippine citizenship, much less of natural-born status, immediate and automatic grant of citizenship to
to foundlings. stateless children found in their territory.
Treaties are enforceable according to the terms These treaties recognize, too, that the
of the obligations they impose. The terms and obligations should be complied with within the
character of the provisions of the ICCPR and UNCRC framework of a State's national laws. This view is
merely require the grant to every child of the right reinforced by the provisions that implement these
to acquire a nationality. treaties.
Section 3, Article 24 of the ICCPR on this point Article 2 of the ICCPR on this point provides:
provides:
2. Where not already provided for by
3. Every child has the right to acquire a existing legislative or other measures,
nationality. [emphasis supplied] each State Party to the present Covenant
 undertakes to take the necessary steps, Taken together, these ICCPR and UNCRC
in accordance with its constitutional implementation provisions reveal the measure of
processes and with the provisions of the flexibility mentioned above. 266 This flexibility runs
present Covenant, to adopt such laws or from the absolute obligation to recognize every child's
other measures as may be necessary to right to acquire a nationality, all the way to
give effect to the rights recognized in the the allowable and varying measures that may be taken
present Covenant. to ensure this right. These measures may range from
an immediate and outright grant of nationality, to the
On the other hand, Article 4 of the UNCRC
passage of naturalization measures that the child may
states:
avail of to exercise his or her rights, all in accordance
States Parties shall undertake all with the State's national law.
appropriate legislative, administrative,
This view finds support from the history of the
and other measures for the
provision "right to acquire nationality" in the ICCPR.
implementation of the
During the debates that led to the formulation of this
rights recognized in the present
provision, the word "acquire" was inserted in the draft,
Convention. With regard to economic,
and the words "from his birth" were deleted. This
social and cultural rights, States Parties
change shows the intent of its drafters to, at the very
shall undertake such measures to the
least, vest discretion on the State with respect to the
maximum extent of their available
means of facilitating the acquisition of citizenship.
resources and, where needed, within the
framework of international co-operation. Marc Bussoyt, in his Guide to the "Travaux
[emphasis and italics supplied] Préparatoires" of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights," 267 even concluded that "the
These terms should be cross-referenced with
word 'acquire' would infer that naturalization was not to
Section 2, Article 7 of the UNCRC, which provides:
be considered as a right of the individual but was
States Parties shall ensure the accorded by the State at its discretion."
implementation of these rights in
III.A. 5(b). The right to a nationality
accordance with their national law and
under the UDHR
their obligations under the relevant
does not require its signatories
international instruments in this field, in
to
particular where the child would
automatically grant citizenship
otherwise be stateless. [emphasis, italics,
to
and underscoring supplied]
 foundlings in its respective (1) Everyone has the right
territories. to a nationality.
Neither does the Philippines' participation as (2) No one shall be
signatory to the United Nations Declaration on Human arbitrarily deprived of his
Rights (UDHR) 268 obligate it to automatically grant nationality nor denied the
Filipino citizenship to foundlings in its territory. CHTAIc right to change his
nationality.
Allow me to point out at the outset that
the UDHR is not a treaty that directly creates legally- Thus, the language of the UDHR itself
binding obligations for its signatories. 269 It is an recognizes the right of everyone to a nationality,
international document recognizing inalienable human without imposing on the signatory States how they
rights, which eventually led to the creation of several would recognize this right.
legally-binding treaties, such as the ICCPR and the Interestingly, Benigno Aquino, the then
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Philippine delegate to the United Nations, even
Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 270 Thus, the Philippines is opposed the declaration of the right to nationality
not legally-obligated to comply with the provisions of under the UDHR, and opined that the UDHR should be
the UDHR per se. It signed the UDHR because it confined to principles whose implementation should be
recognizes the rights and values enumerated in the left to the proposed covenant.
UDHR; this recognition led it to sign both the ICCPR
and the ICESCR. 271 III.A.5(c). The Philippines' compliance
with its
To be sure, international scholars have been international obligations does
increasingly using the provisions of the UDHR to argue not include
that the rights provided in the document have reached the grant of natural-born
the status of customary international law. Assuming, Philippine
however, that we were to accord the right to nationality citizenship to foundlings.
under the UDHR the status of a treaty obligation or of
a generally-accepted principle of international law, it In legal terms, a State is obliged to ensure
still does not require the Philippine government to every child's right to acquire a nationality through laws
automatically grant Philippine citizenship to foundlings in the State's legal system that do not contradict the
in its territory. treaty.
Article 15 of the UDHR provides: In the Philippines, the Constitution defines the
overall configuration of how Filipino citizenship should
Article 15. be granted and acquired. Treaties such as the ICCPR
 and UNCRC should be complied with, in so far as they allow persons to acquire Philippine citizenship already
touch on citizenship, within the terms of the constitutes compliance.
Constitution's Article on Citizenship. Petitioner Poe argues against naturalization as
In the context of the present case, compliance a mode of compliance on the view that this mode
with our treaty obligations to recognize the right of requires a person to be 18 years old before he or she
foundlings to acquire a nationality must be undertaken can apply for a Philippine citizenship. The sufficiency
under the terms of, and must not contradict, the of this mode, in light particularly of the petitioner's
citizenship provisions of our Constitution. needs, however, is not a concern that neither
the COMELEC nor this Court can address given that
The 1935 Constitution defined who the citizens
the country already has in place measures that the
of the Philippines then were and the means of
treaties require — our naturalization laws.
acquiring Philippine citizenship at the time the
respondent was found (and born). This constitutional As likewise previously mentioned, the ICCPR
definition must necessarily govern the petitioner's and the UNCRC allow the States a significant measure
case. of flexibility in complying with their obligations. How the
Philippines will comply within the range of the flexibility
As repeatedly mentioned above, Article IV of
the treaties allow is a policy question that is fully and
the 1935 Constitution generally follows the jus
wholly within the competence of the Congress and of
sanguinis rule: Philippine citizenship is
the Filipino people to address.
determined by blood, i.e., by the citizenship of one's
parents. The Constitution itself provides the instances To recall an earlier discussion and apply this to
when jus sanguinis is not followed: for inhabitants who the petitioner's argument, the country has adopted a
had been granted Philippine citizenship at the time the dualist approach in conducting its international affairs.
Constitution was adopted; those who were holding In the domestic plane where no foreign element is
public office at the time of its adoption; and those who involved, we cannot interpret and implement a treaty
are naturalized as Filipinos in accordance with law. provision in a manner that contradicts the Constitution;
a treaty obligation that contravenes the Constitution is
 
null and void.
As earlier explained, the constitutional listing is
For the same reason, it is legally incorrect for
exclusive. It neither provided nor allowed for the
the petitioner to argue that the ICCPR, as a curative
citizenship of foundlings except through naturalization.
treaty, should be given retroactive application. A null
Since the obligation under the treaties can be complied
and void treaty provision can never, over time, be
with by facilitating a child's right to acquire a
accorded constitutional validity, except when the
nationality, the presence of naturalization laws that
Constitution itself subsequently so provides. EATCcI
 The rule in the domestic plane is, of course, Generally accepted principles of international
separate and different from our rule in the international law are legal norms that are recognized as customary
plane where treaty obligations prevail. If the country in the international plane. States follow them on the
fails to comply with its treaty obligations because they belief that these norms embody obligations that
contradict our national laws, there could be these States, on their own, are bound to
repercussions in our dealings with other States. This perform. Also referred to as customary international
consequence springs from the rule that our domestic law, generally accepted principles of international law
laws cannot be used to evade compliance with treaties pertain to the collection of international behavioral
in the international plane. Repercussions in the regularities that nations, over time, come to view as
international plane, however, do not make an binding on them as a matter of law. 272
unconstitutional treaty constitutional and valid. These In the same manner that treaty obligations
repercussions also cannot serve as an excuse to partake of the character of domestic laws in the
enforce a treaty provision that is constitutionally void in domestic plane, so do generally accepted principles of
the domestic plane. international law. Article II, Section 2 of the 1987
III.A.6. The alleged generally accepted Constitution provides that these legal norms "form part
principles of of the law of the land." This constitutional declaration
international law presuming the situates in clear and definite terms the role of generally
parentage of accepted principles of international law in the hierarchy
foundlings is contrary to the of Philippine laws and in the Philippine legal system.
1935 Constitution. Generally accepted principles of international
III.A.6(a). Generally law usually gain recognition in the Philippines through
accepted decisions rendered by the Supreme Court, pursuant to
principles of the doctrine of incorporation. 273 The Supreme Court,
international in its decisions, applies these principles as rules or as
law. canons of statutory construction, or recognizes them
as meritorious positions of the parties in the cases the
Unlike treaty obligations that are ratified by the
Court decides. 274
State and clearly reflect its consent to an obligation,
the obligations under generally accepted principles of Separately from Court decisions, international
international law are recognized to bind States law principles may gain recognition through actions by
because state practice shows that the States the executive and legislative branches of government
themselves consider these principles to be when these branches use them as bases for their
binding. actions (such as when Congress enacts a law that
incorporates what it perceives to be a generally judicial decisions, recitals in treaties and other
accepted principle of international law). international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the
same form, the practice of international organs, and
But until the Court declares a legal norm to be a
resolutions relating to legal questions in the United
generally accepted principle of international law, no
Nations General Assembly. 278
other means exists in the Philippine legal system to
determine with certainty that a legal norm is indeed a Sometimes referred to as evidence of
generally accepted principle of international law that international law, these sources identify the substance
forms part of the law of the land. and content of the obligations of States and are
indicative of the state practice and the opinio
The main reason for the need for a judicial
juris requirements of international law.
recognition lies in the nature of international legal
principles. Unlike treaty obligations that involve In the usual course, this process passes
the express promises of States to other States, through the courts as they render their decisions in
generally accepted principles of international law do cases. As part of a court's function of determining the
not require any categorical expression from States for applicable law in cases before it (including the manner
these principles to be binding on them. 275 a law should be read and applied), the court has to
determine the existence of a generally applied
A legal norm requires the concurrence of two
principle of international law in the cases confronting it,
elements before it may be considered as a generally
as well as the question of whether and how it applies
accepted principle of international law:
to the facts of the case.
the established, widespread, and consistent
practice on the part of States; and a psychological To my mind, the process by which courts
element known as the opinio juris sive recognize the effectivity of general principles of
necessitates (opinion as to law or international law in the Philippines is akin or closely
necessity). 276 Implicit in the latter element is the similar to the process by which the Supreme Court
belief that the practice is rendered obligatory by the creates jurisprudence. Under the principle of stare
existence of a rule of law requiring it. decisis, courts apply the doctrines in the cases the
Supreme Court decides as judicial precedents in
The most widely accepted statement of sources
subsequent cases with similar factual
of international law today is Article 38 (1) of the Statute
situations. 279 DHITCc
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which
provides that the ICJ shall apply international custom, In a similar manner, the Supreme Court's
as evidence of a general practice accepted as pronouncements on the application of generally
law. 277 The material sources of custom include state accepted principles of international law to the cases it
practices, state legislation, international and national decides are not only binding on the immediately
resolved case, but also serve as judicial precedents in Petitioner Poe argues that the presumption of
subsequent cases with similar sets of facts. That both the parentage of foundlings is a legal norm that has
jurisprudence and generally accepted principles of reached widespread practice and is indicative of
international law form "part of the law of the the opinio juris of States so that the presumption is
land" (but are not laws per se) is, therefore, not pure binding. Thus, it is a generally-accepted principle of
coincidence. 280 international law that should be recognized and
applied by the Court.
To be sure, the executive and legislative
departments may recognize and use customary I cannot agree with this reasoning as the very
international law as basis when they perform their nature of generally accepted principles of international
functions. But while such use is not without legal law is inconsistent with and thus inapplicable to, the
weight, the continued efficacy and even the validity of State's sole and sovereign prerogative to choose who
their use as such cannot be certain. While their basis may or may not be its citizens, and how the choice is
may be principles of international law, their carried out.
inapplicability or even invalidity in the Philippine legal A generally accepted principle of international
setting may still result if the applied principles are law is considered binding on a State because evidence
inconsistent with the Constitution — a matter that is for shows that it considers this legal norm to be obligatory.
the Supreme Court to decide. No express consent from the State in agreeing to the
Thus viewed, the authoritative use of general obligation; its binding authority over a State lies from
principles of international law can only come from the the inference that most, if not all States consider the
Supreme Court whose decisions incorporate these norm to be an obligation.
principles into the legal system as part of  
jurisprudence.
In contrast, States have the inherent right to
III.A.6(b). The concept and nature of
decide who may or may not be its citizens, including
generally-
the process through which citizenship may be
accepted principles of
acquired. The application of presumptions, or
international law is
inferences of the existence of a fact based on the
inconsistent with the State's
existence of other facts, is part of this process of
sovereign
determining citizenship.
prerogative to determine who
may or may This right is strongly associated with and
not be its citizens. attendant to state sovereignty. Traditionally, nationality
has been associated with a State's "right to exclude
others", and to defend the territory of the nation from Additionally, the imposition of an implied
external aggression has been a predominant element obligation on a State simply because other States
of nationality. 281 recognize the same obligation contradicts and
impinges on a State's sovereignty.
Sovereignty in its modern conception is
described as the confluence of independence and Note at this point, that treaty obligations that a
territorial and personal supremacy, expressed as "the State enters into involving the determination of its
supreme and independent authority of States over all citizens has the express consent of the State; under
persons in their territory." 282 Philippine law, this obligation is transformed into a
municipal law once it is ratified by the Executive and
Indeed, a State exercises personal supremacy
concurred in by the Senate.
over its nationals wherever they may be. The right to
determine who these nationals are is a pre-requisite of The evidence presented by petitioner Poe to
a State's personal supremacy, and therefore of establish the existence of generally-accepted
sovereignty. 283 principles of international law actually reflects
the inherent inconsistency between the State's
It is in this context that Oppenheimer said that:
sovereign power to determine its nationals and the
It is not for International Law, but for nature of generally-accepted principles of international
Municipal Law to determine who is, and law as a consensus-based, implied
who is not considered a subject. 284 obligation. Poe cites various laws and international
Given that the State's right to determine who treaties that provide for the presumption of parentage
may be its nationals (as well as how this determination for foundlings. These laws and international treaties,
is exercised) is inextricably linked to its sovereignty, I however, have the expressed imprimatur of the States
cannot see how it can properly be the subject of state adopting the presumption.
consensus or norm dictated by the practice of other In contrast, the Philippines had not entered into
States. In other words, the norm pertaining to the any international treaty recognizing and applying the
determination of who may or may not be a citizen of a presumption of parentage of foundlings; neither is it so
State cannot be the subject of an implied obligation provided in the 1935 Constitution. References to
that came to existence because other States impliedly international law in the deliberations of the 1934
consider it to be their obligation. Constitutional Convention — without an actual ratified
In the first place, a State cannot be obligated to treaty or a provision expressing this principle — cannot
adopt a means of determining who may be its be considered binding upon the sovereign Filipino
nationals as this is an unalterable and basic aspect of people who ratified the 1935 Constitution. The
its sovereignty and of its existence as a State. ratification of the provisions of the 1935 Constitution is
a sovereign act of the Filipino people; to reiterate for that the petitioner's biological parents are Filipino
emphasis, this act cannot be amended by citizens.
widespread practice of other States, even if these Jus soli, of course, is a theory on which
other States believe this practice to be an citizenship may be based and is a principle that has
obligation. been pointedly rejected in the country, at the same
III.A.6(c). The presumption of time that jus sanguinis has been accepted. From this
parentage perspective, the petitioner's advocated presumption
contradicts the distinction set runs counter to the 1935 Constitution.
out in The same result obtains in the line of reasoning
the 1935 Constitution. that starts from the consideration that a principle of
Further, even if this presumption were to be international law, even if it is widely observed, cannot
considered a generally-accepted principle of form part of the law of the land if it contravenes the
international law, it cannot be applied in the Philippines Constitution.
as it contradicts the jus sanguinis principle of the 1935 Petitioner Poe's desired presumption works at
Constitution, as well as the distinction the 1935 the same level and can be compared with existing
Constitution made between children born of Filipino presumptions in determining the parentage of children
fathers and of Filipina mothers. cEaSHC and their citizenship, which are based on the Civil
As earlier discussed, a presumption is Code as interpreted by jurisprudence. 286 These are
an established inference from facts that are proven by the presumptions formulated and applied in applying
evidence. 285 The undisputed fact in the present case our citizenship laws, particularly when the parentage of
is that the petitioner was found in a church in Jaro, a child is doubtful or disputed.
Iloilo; because of her age at that time, she may For instance, a child born during his or her
conceivably have been born in the area so that Jaro parent's marriage is presumed to be the child of both
was her birth place. parents. 287 Thus, the child follows the citizenship of
This line of thought, if it is to lead his or her father. A child born out of wedlock, on the
to Poe's presumption, signifies a presumption other hand, can only be presumed to have been born
based on jus soli or place of birth because this is the of his or her mother, and thus follows the citizenship of
inference that is nearest the established fact of his or her mother until he or she proves paternal
location of birth. Jus sanguinis (blood relationship) filiations. These Civil Code presumptions are fully in
cannot be the resulting presumption as there is accord with the constitutional citizenship rules.
absolutely no established fact leading to the inference
 A presumption that a child with no known This inherent irreconcilability
parents will be considered to have Filipino of Poe's desired presumption with the 1935
parents, on the other hand, runs counter to the Constitution renders futile any discussion of
most basic rules on citizenship under the 1935 whether this desired presumption has reached the
Constitution. status of a generally accepted principle of
international law applicable in the Philippines. We
Other than through naturalization or through
cannot (and should not) adopt a presumption that
outright constitutional grant, the 1935 Constitution
contradicts the fundamental law of the land,
requires that the father or the mother be known to be
regardless of the status of observance it has
Filipino for a person to acquire Filipino citizenship. This
reached in the international plane.
is a consequence of the clear and categorical jus
sanguinis rule that the 1935 Constitution established I recognize of course that in the future,
for the country. Congress may, by law, adopt the petitioner's desired
presumption under the 1987 Constitution.
Under its terms, should a child's father be
A presumption of Filipino parentage necessarily
Filipino, then he or she acquires Philippine
means a presumption of jus sanguinis for
citizenship. On the other hand, should his or her father
foundlings.
be a foreigner but the mother is a Filipina, the 1935
constitutional Rule is to give the child the right to elect But even if made, the presumption remains
Philippine citizenship when he or she reaches 18 years what it is — a presumption that must yield to the reality
of age. of actual parentage when such parentage becomes
known unless the child presumed to be Filipino by
Without the identity of either or both parents
descent undertakes a confirmatory act independent of
being known in the case of foundlings, no
the presumption, such as naturalization.
determination of the foundling's citizenship can be
made under jus sanguinis. Specifically, whose Note that the 1987 Constitution does not
citizenship shall the foundling follow: the significantly change the jus sanguinis rule under the
citizenship of the father, or the option to elect the 1935 Constitution. Currently, a natural-born Filipino is
citizenship of the mother? one whose father or mother is a Filipino at the time of
the child's birth. As in 1935, the current 1987
Applying Poe's desired presumption would
Constitution speaks of parents who
obviously erase the distinction that the 1935
are actually Philippine citizens at the time of the child's
Constitution placed in acquiring Philippine citizenship,
birth; how the parents acquired their own Philippine
and only strengthens the lack of intent (aside from a
citizenship is beside the point and is not a
lack of textual provision) to grant Philippine citizenship
to foundlings.
 consideration for as long as this citizenship status is obligations include the right to automatically vest
there at the time of the child's birth. CTIEac Philippine citizenship to foundlings in its territory.
A presumption of Filipino parentage cannot With her failure on these two points, the rest
similarly apply or extend to the character of being of Poe's arguments on her natural-born citizenship
natural-born, as this character of citizenship can only status based on the 1935 Constitution and under
be based on reality; when the Constitution speaks of international law, and the grave abuse of discretion
"natural-born," it cannot but refer to actual or natural, the COMELEC allegedly committed in cancelling her
not presumed, birth. A presumption of being natural- CoC, must also necessarily fail. The unavoidable
born is effectively a legal fiction that the definition of bottom line is that the petitioner did indeed actively,
the term "natural-born" under the Constitution and knowingly, and falsely represent her citizenship
the purposes this definition serves cannot and natural-born status when she filed her CoC.
accommodate. IV.
To sum up, the petitioner's argument The Claim of Grave Abuse of Discretion
based on a foundling's presumed Filipino parentage in relation with the RESIDENCY Issues.
under a claimed generally accepted principle of
international law is legally objectionable under the I likewise object to the majority's ruling that
1935 Constitution and cannot be used to recognize or the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
grant natural-born Philippine citizenship. cancelling Poe's CoC for falsely representing that she
has complied with the ten-year residence period
  required of Presidential candidates.
III.B. Grave Abuse of Discretion in Resolving The COMELEC correctly applied prevailing
the Citizenship Issues: Conclusions. jurisprudence in holding that Poe has not established
Based on all these considerations, I conclude her legal residence in the Philippines for at least ten
that the COMELEC laid the correct premises on the years immediately prior to the May 9, 2016 elections.
issue of citizenship in cancelling Poe's CoC. In addition, I offer my own views regarding the
To recapitulate, Poe anchors her arguments political character of the right to establish domicile,
mostly on two basic points: first, that the framers of which necessarily requires Philippine citizenship
the 1935 Constitution agreed to include foundlings in before domicile may be established in the Philippines.
the enumeration of citizens in Article IV, Section 1 of In my view, aliens who reacquire Philippine
the 1935 Constitution although they did not expressly citizenship under RA No. 9225 may only begin
so provide it in its express provisions; establishing legal residence in the Philippines from the
and second, that the Philippines' international
time they reacquire Philippine citizenship. This is the To my mind, the conclusion
clear import from the Court's rulings in Japzon and Caballero is not just based on the
in Japzon  v.  COMELEC  288 and Caballero  v.  COM evidence that the candidates therein presented. The
ELEC, 289 cases involving candidates who reacquired conclusion that candidates who reacquired Philippine
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225; their legal citizenship under RA No. 9225 may only establish
residence in the Philippines only began after their residence in the Philippines after becoming Philippine
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. citizens reflects the character of the right to
establish a new domicile for purposes of
I find it necessary to elaborate on this legal
participating in electoral exercises as a political
reality in light of Poe's insistence that the Court's
right that only Philippine citizens can
conclusions in Coquilla, 290 Japzon, and Caballero do
exercise. Thus, Poe could only begin establishing her
not apply to her. To emphasize, these cases
domicile in the Philippines on July 18, 2006, the date
— Coquilla, Japzon and Caballero — are one in
the BID granted her petition for reacquisition of
counting the period of legal residence in the
Philippine citizenship.
Philippines from the time the candidate reacquired
Philippine citizenship. Furthermore, an exhaustive review of the
evidence Poe presented to support her view shows
Poe resists these rulings and insists that she
that as of May 24, 2005,  Poe had not complied with
established her legal residence in the Philippines
the requirements for establishing a new domicile
beginning May 24, 2005, i.e., even before the BID
of choice.
Order, declaring her reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, was issued on July 18, 2006. IV.A. Domicile for purposes of determining
political rights and civil rights.
She distinguishes her situation
from Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero, on the position The term "residence" is an elastic concept that
that the candidates in these cases did not prove their should be understood and construed according to the
legal residence in the Philippines before acquiring object or purpose of the statute in which it is employed.
their Philippine citizenship. In contrast, Poe claims to Thus, we have case law distinguishing residence to
have sufficiently proven that she established her mean actual residence, in contrast to domicile, which
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005, pertains to a permanent abode. Note, however, that
or ten years and eleven months prior to the May 9, both terms imply a relation between a person and a
2016 elections. That the COMELEC ignored the place. 291 Determining which connotation of the term
evidence she presented on this point constitutes grave residence applies depends on the statute in which it is
abuse of discretion. found.
 Generally, we have used the term "residence" or the election laws speak of residence, it refers to
to mean actual residence when pertaining to the the legal or juridical relation between a person and
exercise of civil rights and fulfilment of civil a place — the individual's permanent home
obligations. SaCIDT irrespective of physical presence.
Residence, in this sense pertains to a place of To be sure, physical presence is a major
abode, whether permanent or temporary, or as the indicator when determining the person's legal or
Civil Code aptly describes it, a place of habitual juridical relation with the place he or she intends to be
residence. Thus, the Civil Code provides: voted for. But, as residence and domicile is
synonymous under our election laws, residence is a
Art. 50. For the exercise of civil
legal concept that has to be determined by and in
rights and the fulfillment of civil
connection with our laws, independent of or in
obligations, the domicile of natural
conjunction with physical presence.
persons is the place of their habitual
residence. (40a) Domicile is classified into three, namely:
(1) domicile of origin, which is acquired by every
Art. 51. When the law creating or
person at birth; (2) domicile of choice, which is
recognizing them, or any other provision
acquired upon abandonment of the domicile of origin;
does not fix the domicile of juridical
and (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law
persons, the same shall be understood to
attributes to a person independently of his residence or
be the place where their legal
intention.
representation is established or where
they exercise their principal functions. Domicile of origin is the domicile of a person's
(41 a) [emphases supplied] parents at the time of his or her birth. It is not easily
lost and continues until, upon reaching the majority
Still, the actual residence for purposes of civil
age, he or she abandons it and acquires a new
rights and obligations may be further delineated to
domicile, which new domicile is the domicile of choice.
residence in the Philippines, or residence in a
municipality in the Philippines, depending on the The concept of domicile is further distinguished
purpose of the law in which they are employed. 292 between residence in a particular municipality, city,
province, or the Philippines, depending on the political
On the other hand, we generally reserve the
right to be exercised. Philippine citizens must be
use of the term residence as domicile for purposes
residents of the Philippines to be eligible to vote, but to
of exercising political rights. Jurisprudence has long
be able to vote for elective officials of particular local
established that the term "residence" in election laws
government units, he must be a resident of the
is synonymous with domicile. When the Constitution
geographical coverage of the particular local and subjective proposition that can only be determined
government unit. from the surrounding circumstances. It must be
appreciated, too, that aside from intent is the question
To effect a change of domicile, a person must
of the actions taken pursuant to the intent, to be
comply with the following requirements: (1) an actual
considered in the light of the applicable laws,
removal or an actual change of domicile; (2) a bona
rules, and regulations.
fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts Jurisprudence, too, has laid out three basic
which correspond with such purpose. foundational rules in the consideration of residency
issues, namely:
In other words, a change of residence
requires animus manendi coupled with animus non First, a man must have a residence or
revertendi. The intent to remain in or at the domicile domicile somewhere;
of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the Second, when once established, it remains
change of residence must be voluntary; and the until a new one is acquired; and
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile
must be actual. 293 Third, a man can have but one residence or
domicile at a time. 296
In Limbona v. COMELEC, 294 the Court
enumerated the following requirements to effect a These jurisprudential foundational rules, hand in
change of domicile or to acquire a domicile by choice: hand with the established rules on change of domicile,
should be fully taken into account in
(1) residence or bodily presence in the appreciating Poe's circumstances.
new locality;
IV.A.1. The right to establish domicile is
(2) a bona fide intention to remain there;
imbued
and
with the character of a political right
(3) a bona fide intention to abandon the that
old domicile. only citizens may exercise.
The latter two are the animus manendi and Domicile is necessary to be able to participate
the animus non revertendi that those considering a in governance, i.e., to vote and/or be voted for, one
change of domicile must take into account. must consider a locality in the Philippines as his or her
Under these requirements, no specific permanent home, a place in which he intends to
unbending rule exists in the appreciation of compliance remain in for an indefinite period of time (animus
because of the element of intent 295 — an abstract
 manendi) and to return to should he leave (animus It is the sovereign Filipino people (i.e., the
revertendi). cHECAS citizens through whom the State exercises
sovereignty, and who can vote and participate in
 
governance) who shall establish the Government of
In this sense, the establishment of a domicile the country (i.e., one of the purposes why citizens get
not only assumes the color of, but becomes one with a together and collectively act), and they themselves
political right because it allows a person, not otherwise ordain and promulgate the Constitution (i.e., the
able, to participate in the electoral process of that citizens themselves directly act, not anybody else).
place. To logically carry this line of thought a step
Corollarily, a person who does not possess
further, a person seeking to establish domicile in a
Philippine citizenship, i.e., an alien, cannot participate
country must first posses the necessary citizenship to
in the country's political processes. An alien does not
exercise this political right.
have the right to vote and be voted for, the right to
Note, at this point, that Philippine citizenship is donate to campaign funds, the right to campaign for or
necessary to participate in governance and exercise aid any candidate or political party, and to directly, or
political rights in the Philippines. The preamble of our indirectly, take part in or influence in any manner any
1987 Constitution cannot be clearer on this point: election.
We, the sovereign Filipino The character of the right to establish domicile
people, imploring the aid of Almighty as a political right becomes even more evident under
God, in order to build a just and humane our election laws that require that a person's domicile
society, and establish a and citizenship coincide to enable him to vote and be
Government that shall embody our voted for elective office. In more concrete terms
ideals and aspirations, promote the (subject only to a few specific exceptions), a Philippine
common good, conserve and develop citizen must have his domicile in the Philippines in
our patrimony, and secure to ourselves order to participate in our electoral processes.
and our posterity, the blessings of
Thus, a Philippine citizen who has chosen to
independence and democracy under the
reside permanently abroad may be allowed the limited
rule of law and a regime of truth, justice,
opportunity to vote (under the conditions laid down
freedom, love, equality, and peace, do
under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act) 297 but he
ordain and promulgate this
or she cannot be voted for; he or she is disqualified
Constitution. [emphases, italics, and
from running for elective office under Section 68 of the
underscoring supplied]
Omnibus Election Code (OEC). 298
 In the same light, an alien who has been Once a Philippine citizen permanently resides in
granted a permanent resident visa in the Philippines another country, or becomes a naturalized citizen
does not have the right of suffrage in the Philippines, thereof, he loses his domicile of birth (the Philippines)
and this should include the right to establish legal and establishes a new domicile of choice in that
domicile for purposes of election laws. An alien can country.
reside in the Philippines for a long time, but his stay, If a former Filipino reacquires his or her
no matter how lengthy, will not allow him to participate Philippine citizenship, he reacquires as well the
in our political processes. political right to reside in the Philippines, but he does
Thus, an inextricable link exists among not become a Philippine domiciliary unless he validly
citizenship, domicile, and sovereignty; citizenship effects a change of domicile; otherwise, he remains a
and domicile must coincide in order to participate Filipino physically in the Philippines but is
as a component of the sovereign Filipino people. In domiciled elsewhere. The reason is simple: an
plainer terms, domicile for election law purposes individual can have only one domicile which
cannot be established without first becoming a remains until it is validly changed.
Philippine citizen; they must coincide from the time In Coquilla, 299 the Court pointed out that
domicile in the Philippines is established. "immigration to the [U.S.] by virtue of a greencard,
IV.A.2. The right to RE-ESTABLISH domicile which entitles one to reside permanently in that
in country, constitutes abandonment of domicile in the
the Philippines may be exercised only Philippines. With more reason then does naturalization
after in a foreign country result in an abandonment of
reacquiring Philippine citizenship. domicile in the Philippines."
Unless a change of domicile is validly Thus, Philippine citizens who are naturalized as
effected, citizens of another country not only abandon their
one with reacquired Filipino Philippine citizenship; they also abandon their domicile
citizenship acquires in the Philippines.
the right to reside in the country, but To re-establish the Philippines as his or her new
must have a domicile of choice, a returning former Philippine citizen
change of domicile; otherwise, he is a must thus comply with the requirements of physical
Filipino presence for the required period (when exercising
physically in the Philippines but is his political right), animus manendi, and animus
domiciled non-revertendi. AHDacC
elsewhere.
 Several laws govern the reacquisition of citizenship — logically applies in general to all former
Philippine citizenship by former Philippine citizens- Filipinos regardless of the character of their Philippine
aliens each providing for a different mode of, and citizenship, i.e., natural-born or naturalized.
different requirements for, Philippine citizenship The difference in the procedure provided by
reacquisition. These laws are Commonwealth these modes of Philippine citizenship reacquisition
Act (CA) No. 473; RA No. 8171; and RA No. 9225. presumably lies in the assumption that those who had
All these laws are meant to facilitate an alien's previously been natural-born Philippine citizens
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship by law. CA No. already have had ties with the Philippines for having
473 300 as amended, 301 governs reacquisition of been directly descended from Filipino citizens or
Philippine citizenship by naturalization; it is also a by virtue of their blood and are well-versed in its
mode for original acquisition of Philippine customs and traditions; on the other hand, the alien-
citizenship. RA No. 8171, 302 on the other hand, former Filipino in general (and no matter how long they
governs repatriation of Filipino women who lost have resided in the Philippines) could not be presumed
Philippine citizenship by marriage to aliens and to have such ties.
Filipinos who lost Philippine citizenship by political or In fact, CA No. 473 specifically requires that an
economic necessity; while RA No. 9225 303 governs applicant for Philippine citizenship must have resided
repatriation of former natural-born Filipinos in general. in the Philippines for at least six months before his
Whether termed as naturalization, application for reacquisition by naturalization.
reacquisition, or repatriation, all these modes fall Ujano v. Republic 305 interpreted this
under the constitutional term "naturalized in residence requirement to mean domicile, that is, prior
accordance with law" as provided under the 1935, to applying for naturalization, the applicant must have
the 1973, and the 1935 Constitutions. maintained a permanent residence in the Philippines.
Note that CA No. 473 304 provides a more In this sense, Ujano held that an alien staying in the
stringent procedure for acquiring Philippine citizenship Philippines under a temporary visa does not comply
than RA Nos. 9225 and 8171 both of which provide for with the residence requirement, and to become a
a more expedited process. Note, too, that under our qualified applicant, an alien must have secured a
Constitution, there are only two kinds of Philippine permanent resident visa to stay in the Philippines.
citizens: natural-born and naturalized. As RA Nos. Obtaining a permanent resident visa was, thus, viewed
8171 and 9225 apply only to former natural-born as the act that establishes domicile in the Philippines
Filipinos (who lost their Philippine citizenship by for purposes of complying with CA No. 473. cAaDHT
foreign naturalization), CA No. 473 — which is both a The ruling in Ujano is presumably the reason for
mode for acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine the Court's reference that residence may be waived
separately from citizenship in Coquilla. In Coquilla, the establish domicile in the Philippines after becoming a
Court observed that: Philippine citizen through direct act of Congress.
The status of being an alien and a Note, at this point, that the permanent residence
non-resident can be waived either requirement under CA No. 473  does not provide the
separately, when one acquires the status applicant alien with the right to participate in the
of a resident alien before acquiring country's political process, and should thus be
Philippine citizenship, or at the same distinguished from domicile in election laws.
time when one acquires Philippine  
citizenship. As an alien, an individual
may obtain an immigrant visa under In other words, an alien may be considered a
13[28] of the Philippine Immigration Act permanent resident of the Philippines, but without
of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate of Philippine citizenship, his stay cannot be considered in
Residence (ICR)[29] and thus waive his establishing domicile in the Philippines for purposes of
status as a non-resident. On the other exercising political rights. Neither could this period be
hand, he may acquire Philippine retroactively counted upon gaining Philippine
citizenship by naturalization under C.A. citizenship, as his stay in the Philippines at that time
No. 473, as amended, or, if he is a was as an alien with no political rights.
former Philippine national, he may In these lights, I do not believe that a person
reacquire Philippine citizenship by reacquiring Philippine citizenship under RA No.
repatriation or by an act of Congress, in 9225 could separately establish domicile in the
which case he waives not only his status Philippines prior to becoming a Philippine citizen,
as an alien but also his status as a non- as the right to establish domicile has, as earlier
resident alien. 306 [underscoring pointed out, the character of a political right.
supplied]
RA No. 9225 restores Philippine citizenship
The separate waiver refers to the application for upon the applicant's submission of the oath of
Philippine citizenship under CA No. 437, which allegiance to the Philippines and other pertinent
requires that the applicant alien be domiciled in the documents to the BID (or the Philippine consul should
Philippines as evidenced by a permanent resident the applicant avail of RA No. 9225 while they remain in
visa. An alien intending to become a Philippine citizen their country of foreign naturalization). The BID (or the
may avail of CA No. 473 and must first waive his Philippine consul) then reviews these documents, and
domicile in his country of origin to be considered a issues the corresponding order recognizing the
permanent resident alien in the Philippines, or he may applicant's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
 Upon reacquisition of Philippine citizenship reacquisition of Philippine
under RA No. 9225, a person becomes entitled to full citizenship on November 10, 2000,
political and civil rights, subject to its attendant petitioner did not reacquire his legal
liabilities and responsibilities. These include the right to residence in this
re-establish domicile in the Philippines for purposes of country. 307 [underscoring supplied]
participating in the country's electoral processes. In Japzon, the Court noted:
Thus, a person who has reacquired Philippine
citizenship under RA No. 9225 does not "[Ty's] reacquisition of his
automatically become domiciled in the Philippines, Philippine citizenship under [RA] No.
but is given the option to establish domicile in the 9225 had no automatic impact or
Philippines to participate in the country's electoral effect on his residence/domicile. He
process. could still retain his domicile in the USA,
and he did not necessarily regain his
This, to my mind, is the underlying reason domicile in the Municipality of General
behind the Court's consistent ruling Macarthur, Eastern Samar, Philippines.
in Coquilla, Japzon, and Caballero that domicile in the Ty merely had the option to again
Philippines can be considered established only upon, establish his domicile in the Municipality
or after, the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
under the expedited processes of RA No. 8171 or RA Philippines, said place becoming his new
No. 9225. More than the insufficiency of evidence domicile of choice. The length of his
establishing domicile prior to the reacquisition of residence therein shall be determined
Philippine citizenship, this legal reality from the time he made it his domicile of
simply disallows the establishment of domicile in the choice, and it shall not retroact to the
Philippines prior to becoming a Philippine citizen. time of his birth." 308
To reiterate, the Court in these three cases held Caballero, after quoting Japzon, held:
that the candidates therein could have established
their domicile in the Philippines only after reacquiring Hence, petitioner's retention of his
their Philippine citizenship. Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
did not automatically make him regain his
Thus, the Court in Coquilla said: residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must
In any event, the fact is that, by still prove that after becoming a
having been naturalized abroad, he lost Philippine citizen on September 13,
his Philippine citizenship and with it his 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
residence in the Philippines. Until his Batanes as his new domicile of choice
 which is reckoned from the time he made ruling that Poe does not meet the Constitution's ten-
it as such. 309 HCaDIS year residence requirement for the Presidency.
In these lights, the COMELEC correctly IV.B.1. Poe  was not a natural-born citizen
applied the doctrine laid out in  Coquilla, Japzon, who could
and Caballero in Poe's case, i.e., that her physical validly reacquire Philippine
presence allegedly coupled with intent should be citizenship under
counted, for election purposes, only from her RA No. 9225; hence, she could not
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or surrender have re-
of her immigrant status. Any period of residence established residence in the
prior to such reacquisition of Philippine citizenship or Philippines under
surrender of immigrant status cannot simply be the laws' terms even with the BID's
counted as Poe, at such time, was an alien non- grant of
resident who had no right to permanently reside her RA No. 9225 application.
anywhere in the Philippines. The simplified repatriation procedure under RA
Significantly, these are the established Court No. 9225 applies only to former natural-born Filipino
rulings on residency of former natural-born citizens who became naturalized foreign citizens.
Filipinos seeking elective public office that would Thus, persons who were not natural-born citizens
be disturbed if the Court would allow  Poe to run prior to their foreign naturalization cannot
for the Presidency in the May 9, reacquire Philippine citizenship through the
2016 elections. Application of the social justice and simplified RA No. 9225 procedure, but may do so
equity principles that some sectors (within and outside only through the other modes CA No.
the Court) urge this Court to do and their persistent 63 310 provides, i.e., by naturalization under CA
appeal to fairness must not be allowed to weigh in and No. 473, as amended by RA No. 530, or by direct
override what the clear terms laws and these act of Congress.
jurisprudence provide. Prior to a valid reacquisition under RA No.
IV.B. Poe's  representation as to her 9225, a former Philippine citizen does not have
residence:  Poe  has political rights in the Philippines, as he or she is
not been a Philippine resident for the period considered an alien. His political rights begin only upon
required by Article VII, Section 2 of the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship: the right to
Constitution. establish domicile as an aspect in the exercise of
these political rights begin only upon becoming a
Based on the foregoing laws, principles, and
Philippine citizen. aCIHcD
relevant jurisprudence, I find the COMELEC correct in
 In Poe's case, she was not a natural-born When Poe returned to the Philippines on May
citizen who could have validly repatriated under RA 24, 2005, she was a non-resident alien — a
No. 9225. As she did not reacquire Philippine naturalized American citizen. She used her U.S.
citizenship under the appropriate mode, she likewise passport in her travel to and arrival in the Philippines
did not reacquire the right to reside in the Philippines under a "Balikbayan" visa, as the parties' evidence
save only as our immigration laws may have allowed show and as even Poe admits. These dates stamped
her to stay as visitor. But regardless of its length, in her U.S. passport, in particular, bear the mark "BB"
any such period of stay cannot be counted as (which stands for Balikbayan) or "1YR" (which stands
residence in the Philippines under the election for 1-Year stay in the Philippines): September 14,
laws' terms. 2005, January 7, 2006 (arrival), March 11, 2006
(arrival), July 5, 2006 (arrival), and November 4, 2006
IV.B.2. Assuming, arguendo,
(arrival). 311
that  Poe  reacquired
Philippine citizenship, she still has The term "balikbayan" refers to a Filipino citizen
not been who has been continuously out of the Philippines for a
a Philippine resident for "10 years and period of at least one (1) year, a Filipino overseas
11 worker, or former Filipino citizen and his or her
months"  on  the day before the family who had been naturalized in a foreign country
election. and comes or returns to the Philippines. 312
Even assuming, arguendo, that Poe reacquired In other words, a balikbayan may be a Filipino
Philippine citizenship with the BID's grant of her RA citizen or a former Filipino who has been naturalized in
No. 9225 application, she still fails to meet the a foreign country. Notably, the law itself provides that a
Constitution's ten-year residence requirement, as former Filipino citizen may "come or return" to the
explained below. Philippines — this means that he/she may be returning
to permanently reside in the country or may just visit
IV.B.2(a). Poe  arrived in the
for a temporary stay.
Philippines using her U.S.
passport as an American RA No. 6768, as amended, further provides for
citizen and under a the privilege of a visa-free entry to the Philippines for a
"Balikbayan" visa; hence, she period of one (1) year for foreign passport holders, with
could not have the exception of restricted nationals. 313 I stress in this
re-established Philippine regard that not all balikbayans enter the
residence beginning Philippines via a visa-free entry, as the privilege
May 24, 2005. applies only to foreign passport holders and not to
 Filipino citizens bearing Philippine passports upon permanently reside in the Philippines save only in
entry. the instances and under the conditions our
Immigration laws allow to foreign citizens. This
The distinction is significant because a
period of stay under a temporary visa should thus not
Filipino balikbayan, by virtue of his Philippine
be considered for purposes of Article VII, Section 2 of
citizenship, has the right to permanently reside in any
the Constitution as it does not fall within the concept of
part of the Philippines. Conversely, a foreigner-
"residence."
balikbayan, though a former Philippine citizen,
may only acquire this right by applying for an IV.B.2(b). Poe  reacquired Philippine
immigrant visa and an immigrant certificate of citizenship only
residence or by reacquisition of Philippine on  July 18, 2006 when the BID
citizenship. 314 Evidently, the nature of the stay of a granted her
foreigner-balikbayan who avails of the visa-free entry RA No. 9225 application; hence,
privilege is only temporary, unless he acquires an July 18,
immigrant visa or until he reacquires Philippine 2006 should be the earliest
citizenship. possible
reckoning point for her
The BID itself designates a balikbayan visa-free
Philippine
entry under the temporary visitor's visa category for
residence.
non-visa required nationals. 315 In addition, the visa-
free entry privilege is limited to a period of one (1) year To recall, Poe reacquired Philippine citizenship
subject to extensions for another one (1), two (2) or six only on July 18, 2006 when the BID granted her RA
(6) months, provided that the balikbayan presents No. 9225 application. 317 Under Section 5 (2) of RA
his/her valid passport and fills out a visa extension No. 9225, the right to enjoy full civil and political rights
form and submits it to the Visa Extension Section in that attach to Philippine citizenship begins only upon
the BID Main Office or any BID Offices nationwide. its reacquisition. Thus, under RA No. 9225, a person
After thirty-six (36) months of stay, an additional acquires the right to establish domicile in the
requirement will be asked from a balikbayan who Philippines upon reacquiring Philippine citizenship.
wishes to further extend his/her stay. 316 Prior to this, a former Philippine citizen has no right to
reside in the Philippines save only temporarily as our
 
Immigration laws allow.
From her arrival  on  May 24, 2005 until the
In this light, the COMELEC correctly ruled that
BID Order recognized her Philippine
July 18, 2006 is the earliest possible date for Poe to
citizenship  on  July 18, 2006,  Poe  was an alien
establish her domicile in the Philippines, as it is only
under a balikbayan visa who had no right to
then that Poe acquired the right to establish domicile in (6) securing a Tax Identification Number (TIN) from the
the Philippines. Counting the period of her residence in BIR on July 22, 2005. 325
the Philippines to begin on July 18, 2006, however, I clarify, however, that any overt resettlement
renders Poe still ineligible to run for President, as the moves Poe made beginning May 24, 2005 up to and
period between July 18, 2006 to May 9, 2016 is 9 before July 18, 2006 may be considered merely for
years, 9 months, and 20 days, or 2 months and 10 the purpose of determining   the existence of the
days short of the Constitution's ten-year subjective intent to re-establish Philippine
requirement. cHaCAS residence (animus revertendi), but should not be
IV.B.2(c). Poe's  moves to resettle in considered for the purpose of establishing the fact
the Philippines of residence that the Constitution contemplates.
prior to July 18, 2006 may have As earlier explained, entitlement to the
supported enjoyment of the civil and political rights that come with
her intent which intent became the reacquired citizenship that RA No. 9225 grants
truly attaches when the requirements have been completed
concrete beginning and Philippine citizenship has been reacquired. Only
only  on  July 18, 2006. then can reacquiring Filipino citizens secure the
I do not deny that Poe had taken several moves right to reside in the country as Filipinos with the
to re-establish her residence in the Philippines prior to right to vote and be voted for public office under
July 18, 2006. As the evidence showed, which the requirements of the Constitution and
the COMELEC considered and reviewed, Poe had applicable existing laws. Prior to reacquisition of
taken several actions that may arguably be read as Philippine citizenship, they are entitled only to such
moves to relocate and resettle in the Philippines rights as the Constitution and the laws recognize as
beginning May 24, 2005, namely: (1) enrolling her inherent in any person.
children in Philippine schools in July 2005 as shown by Significantly, these pieces of evidence do not
their school records; 318 (2) purchasing real property prove Poe's intent to abandon U.S. domicile (animus
in the Philippines as evidenced by the February 20, non-revertendi) as she was, between May 24, 2005
2006 condominium unit and parking lot titles, 319 the and July 18, 2006, a temporary visitor physically
June 1, 2006 land title, 320 and the tax declarations for present in the Philippines. I submit the following
these; 321 (3) selling their U.S. home as shown by the specific reasons.
April 27, 2006 final settlement; 322 (4) arranging for
the shipment of their U.S. properties from the U.S. to Poe's  purchase of real property in the
the Philippines ; 323 (5) notifying the U.S. Postal Philippines. Aliens, former natural-born Filipinos or
Service of their change of their U.S. address; 324 and not, can own condominium units in the Philippines;
while aliens who were former natural-born Filipinos without the U.S.) but it does not automatically result in
can purchase Philippine urban or rural land even the change of domicile from the U.S. to the Philippines.
without acquiring or reacquiring Philippine citizenship The notice to the U.S. Postal Service in late
with the right to permanently reside herein. March of 2006, on the other hand, merely shows that
Under RA No. 4726 326 as amended by RA No. they may have complied with the U.S. laws when
7899, 327 aliens or foreign nationals, whether former transferring residence, for convenience and for mail
natural-born Filipino citizens or not, can acquire forwarding purposes while on extended but temporary
condominium units and shares in condominium absence. This act, however, does not conclusively
corporations up to 40% of the total and outstanding signify abandonment of U.S. residence, more so re-
capital stock of a Filipino owned or controlled establishment of Philippine domicile.
condominium Corporation. Note that at both these times, Poe did not have
On the other hand, under RA No. 7042, 328 as the established legal capacity or the right to establish
amended by RA No. 8179, former natural-born residence in the Philippines. Besides, the winding up
Filipinos who lost their Philippine citizenship and who of a would-be candidate's property affairs in another
has the legal capacity to contract "may be a transferee country is not a qualification requirement under the law
of a private land up to a maximum area of five for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship nor is it a
thousand (5,000) square meters in the case of urban condition to the residency requirement for holding
land or three (3) hectares in the case of rural land . . . public office.
for business or other purposes." 329 The enrollment of her children in Philippine
In short, Poe's purchase of a condominium unit schools. The enrollment of Poe's children in Philippine
and an urban land, as well as her declaration of these schools in June 2005 establishes their physical
for tax purposes, do not sufficiently prove that she re- presence in the Philippine during this time, but not her
established residence in the Philippines. At most, they intent to abandon U.S. domicile. Note that her children
show that she acquired real property in the Philippines entered the Philippines for a temporary period under
for purposes which may not necessarily be for their balikbayan visas. Enrollment, too, in schools is
residence, i.e., business or other purposes; and that only for a period of one school year, or about ten
she complied with the law's requirements for owning months. DACcIH
real property in the Philippines. Moreover, aliens or foreign national students
The sale of U.S. home and notice to the U.S. can, in fact, enroll and study in the Philippines without
Postal service. The sale of their U.S. home on April having to acquire Philippine citizenship or without
27, 2006 establishes only the fact of its sale. At most, it securing immigrant visas (and ICRs). Foreigners or
may indicate intent to transfer residence (within or aliens at least 18 years of age may apply for non-
immigrant student visa, while those below 18 years of cannot override or supersede the laws and the
age elementary and high school students may apply State's right, even though the alien is a former
for Special Study Permits. 330 natural-born Filipino citizen who intends to
reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA No.
Poe's  BIR TIN number. Poe's act of securing a
9225.
TIN from the BIR on July 22, 2005 is a requirement for
taxation purposes that has nothing to do with In short, these pieces of
residence in the Philippines. Under Section 236 (i) of evidence Poe presented may be deemed material only
the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), "[a]ny for the purpose of determining the existence of the
person, whether natural or juridical, required under the subjective intent to effect a change of residence (from
authority of the Internal Revenue Code to make, the U.S. to the Philippines) prior to reacquiring
render or file a return, statement or other documents, Philippine citizenship (with the concomitant right to re-
shall be supplied with or assigned a Taxpayer establish Philippine domicile). For the purpose of
Identification Number (TIN) to be indicated in the counting the period of her actual legal residence to
return, statement or document to be filed with the determine compliance with the Constitution's residency
Bureau of Internal Revenue, for his proper qualification requirement, these antecedent
identification for tax purposes." Under the same Tax actions are immaterial as such residence should be
Code, nonresident aliens are subject to Philippine counted only from her reacquisition of Philippine
taxation under certain circumstances, 331 thus citizenship.
likewise requiring the procurement of a TIN number.
To summarize all these: Poe may have hinted
Over and above all these reasons, it should be her intention to resettle in the Philippines on May 24,
pointed out, too, that the nature and duration of an 2005, which intention she supported with several overt
alien's stay or residence in the Philippines is a matter actions. The legal significance of these overt actions,
determined and granted by the Constitution and by the however, is at best equivocal and does not fully
law. As the COMELEC correctly noted, a foreigner's support her claimed animus non-revertendi to the U.S.
capacity to establish Philippine residence is limited by She can be considered to have acted on this intention
and is subject to regulations and prior authority of the under the election laws' terms only on July 18, 2006
BID. 332 Indeed, the State has the right to deny entry when she reacquired Philippine citizenship legally
to and/or impose conditions on the entry of aliens in securing to herself the option and the right to re-
the Philippines, as I have elsewhere discussed in this establish legal residence in the Philippines. (But even
Opinion; and, in the exercise of this right, the State can then, as discussed below, when she became a dual
determine who and for how long an alien can stay in its RP-U.S. citizen, she could at anytime return to the
territory. An alien's intent regarding the nature and
duration of his or her stay in the Philippines
U.S.; thus her abandonment of her U.S. domicile is, at so long as he or she has animus revertendi or intent to
best, an arguable matter.) return to it. We have allowed the defense of animus
revertendi for challenges to a person's domicile on the
IV.C. Poe  was still an American citizen with
ground that he or she has left it for a period of time,
residence in the United States between
and held that a person's domicile, once established,
May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006.
does not automatically change simply because he or
Conversely, Poe's incapacity to establish she has not stayed in that place for a period of time.
domicile in the Philippines because she lacks the
Applying these principles to Poe's case, as of
requisite Philippine citizenship reflects her status as an
May 24, 2005, her overt acts may have established
American with residence in the United States.
an intent to remain in the Philippines, but do not
As a requirement to establish domicile, a person comply with the required animus non-revertendi
must show that he or she has animus non-revertendi, with respect to the U.S., the domicile that she was
or intent to abandon his or her old domicile. This abandoning.
requirement reflects two key characteristics of a
On May 24, 2005, Poe and her family's home
domicile: first, that a person can have only one
was still in the U.S. as they sold their U.S. family
residence at any time, and second, that a person is
home only on April 27, 2006. They also
considered to have an animus revertendi (intent to
officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of their
return) to his current domicile.
change of their U.S. address only in late March
Thus, for a person to demonstrate his or 2006. Lastly, as of this date (May 24,
her animus non-revertendi to the old domicile, he or 2005), Poe's husband was still in the U.S. and a
she must have abandoned it completely, such that he legal resident thereof.
or she can no longer entertain any animus
Taken together, these facts show that as of May
revertendi with respect to such old domicile. This
24, 2005, Poe had not completely abandoned her
complete abandonment is necessary in light of
domicile in the U.S.; thus, she had not complied with
the one-domicile rule.
the necessary animus non-revertendi at that date.
In more concrete terms, a person seeking to
Note, too, that Poe's travel documents
demonstrate his or her animus non-revertendi must not
between May 24, 2005 and July 18, 2006 strongly
only leave the old domicile and is no longer physically
support this conclusion. In this period, she travelled
present there, he or she must have also shown acts
to and from the Philippines under a balikbayan visa
cancelling his or her animus revertendi to that place.
that, as earlier pointed out, has a fixed period of
Note, at this point, that a person who has left his validity and is an indication that her stay in the
or her domicile is considered not to have abandoned it Philippines during this period was temporary.
 While it is not impossible that she could have Philippines that shows a pattern of
entered the Philippines under a balikbayan visa with deliberate attempt to mislead and to
the intent to eventually establish domicile in the qualify her for the Presidency.
Philippines, her return to the U.S. several times Lest we forget, I reiterate that Poe declared in
while she was staying in the Philippines under a her 2012 CoC for Senator that she has been a resident
temporary visa prevents me from agreeing to this of the Philippines for at least "6 years and 6 months"
possibility. before the May 13, 2013. This was a personal
On the contrary, Poe's acts of leaving the declaration made under oath, certified to be true
Philippines for the U.S. as an American citizen who and correct, and which she announced to the public
had previously stayed in the Philippines under a to prove that she was eligible for the Senatorial
temporary visa is an indication of her animus post.
revertendi to the U.S., her old domicile. Six (6) years and six (6) months counted back
Worthy of note, too, is that in from the day before the May 13, 2013 elections point
between Poe's arrival on May 24, 2005 and her to November 2006 as the beginning of her Philippine
acquisition of Philippine citizenship, Poe made four residence — which period of residence before the May
trips to and from the U.S. in a span of one year and 9, 2016 elections leads to only 9 years and 6 months,
two months; this frequency over a short period of time short of the ten-year requirement for the Presidency.
indicates and supports the conclusion that she has not When she realized this potential
fully abandoned her domicile in the U.S. during this disqualifying ground sometime in June of 2015,
period. she told a different story to the public by claiming
Additionally, too, during this time, Poe continued that she counted the "6-year 6-month" period as of
to own two houses in the U.S., one purchased in 1992 the day she filed her CoC for Senator  on October 2,
and another in 2008 (or after her reacquisition of the 2012. 334 Effectively, she claimed that she had been a
Philippine citizenship. 333 The ownership of these resident of the Philippines since April 2006 thereby
houses, when taken together with her temporary visa removing her ineligibility. EHaASD
in travelling to the Philippines from May 24, 2005 to Subsequently, she claimed that she has been a
July 18, 2006, manifest the existence of an animus resident of the Philippines since May 24, 2005 when
revertendi to the U.S., which means that as of May 24, she arrived in the Philippines and has allegedly
2005, she had not yet completely abandoned the U.S. decided to re-settle here for good. Thus, in her 2015
as her domicile. CoC for President, she declared the "10-year and 11-
IV.D. Poe  made several inconsistent claims month" period as her Philippine residence.
regarding her period of residence in the
 As with her 2012 CoC, this was a personal CONCLUSION
declaration which she made under oath and which In light of all these considerations, I vote for the
she announced to the public to prove that she was reversal of the majority's ruling granting the petitions
eligible, this time for the Presidency. This declaration, based on the COMELEC's grave abuse of discretion.
however, is contrary to the declaration she made in In lieu thereof, the Court should enter a Revised Ruling
her 2012 CoC as well as to the declarations she made dismissing the petitions and ordering the COMELEC to
to the public in 2015 when she tried to explain away proceed with the cancellation of the Certificate of
her potential disqualifying circumstance. Candidacy of petitioner Grace Poe.
I clarify that these declarations, particularly the ||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
declaration Poe made in the 2012 CoC, are not — and
Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March
the COMELEC did not consider them to be —
evidence of the actual number of years she had been 8, 2016])
legally residing in the Philippines from which I draw the
conclusion that she has not been a Philippine resident
for ten years and thus committed false material [G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
representation. As the COMELEC did, I do not
conclude that Poe has only been a Philippine resident MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
for 9 years and 6 months following her 2012 CoC LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
declaration. SION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA
Rather, I consider these declarations to C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
be evidence of falsehoods and inconsistent
representations with respect to her residency
[G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
claim: she made a representation in her 2015 CoC
that is completely different from her representation
in her 2012 CoC as well as from her public MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
declarations. Poe's public declarations under LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
oath considered as a whole reveal a pattern that SION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S.
confirms her deliberate attempt to mislead and to TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
falsely represent to the electorate that she was AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
eligible for the Presidency. This evidence fully
justified the COMELEC decision to cancel her CoC.
V. DISSENTING OPINION
CARPIO, J.: utterly wasted their votes. This is not how the natural-
born citizenship qualification for elective office
I dissent from the majority opinion. mandated by the Constitution should be applied by the
With the ruling of the majority today, a highest court of the land.
presidential candidate who is deemed a natural-born There is no dispute that petitioner is a Filipino
Filipino citizen by less than a majority of this Court, citizen, as she publicly claims to be. However, she has
deemed not a natural-born Filipino citizen by five failed to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino
Justices, and with no opinion from three Justices, can citizen and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
now run for President of the Philippines even after years immediately preceding the 9 May
having been unanimously found by 2016 elections. Petitioner is not eligible to run for
the Commission on Elections En Banc (COMELEC) to President of the Republic of the Philippines for lack of
be not a natural-born Filipino citizen. What is clear and the essential requirements of citizenship and residency
undeniable is that there is no majority of this Court that under Section 2, Article VII of the 1987
holds that petitioner Mary Grace Natividad Constitution. 1 Petitioner's certificate of candidacy
S. Poe Llamanzares (petitioner) is a natural-born (COC), wherein she stated that she is qualified for the
Filipino citizen. This ruling of the majority will lead to position of President, contains false material
absurd results, making a mockery of our representations, and thus, must be cancelled.
national elections by allowing a presidential candidate Petitioner, not being a natural-born Filipino citizen, is
with uncertain citizenship status to be potentially also a nuisance candidate whose COC can motu
elected to the Office of the President, an office proprio be cancelled by the COMELEC under Section
expressly reserved by the Constitution exclusively for 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.
natural-born Filipino citizens.
The Case
This means that the majority of this Court wants
These consolidated certiorari petitions 2 seek to
to resolve the citizenship status of petitioner after
nullify the Resolutions 3 of the COMELEC for allegedly
the elections, and only if petitioner wins the elections,
being issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting
despite petitioner having already presented before
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. In the assailed
the COMELEC all the evidence she wanted to present
Resolutions, the COMELEC cancelled petitioner's
to prove her citizenship status. This will make a
COC for the position of President for the 9 May
mockery of our election process if petitioner wins
2016 elections on the ground of "false material
the elections but is later disqualified by this Court for
representations" when she stated therein that she is a
not possessing a basic qualification for the Office of
"natural-born Filipino citizen" and that her "period of
the President — that of being a natural-born Filipino
residence in the Philippines up to the day before May
citizen. Those who voted for petitioner would have
09, 2016" is "10 years and 11 months," which is are qualified to file certificates of
contrary to the facts as found by the COMELEC. candidacies with the Comelec clearly
falls within this all-encompassing
The Issues
constitutional mandate of the Comelec.
The core issues in this case are (1) whether The conduct of an election necessarily
petitioner, being a foundling, is a natural-born Filipino includes the initial determination of who
citizen, and (2) whether she is a resident of the are qualified under existing laws to run
Philippines for ten years immediately preceding the 9 for public office in an election. Otherwise,
May 2016 national elections. The resolution of these the Comelec's certified list of candidates
issues will in turn determine whether petitioner will be cluttered with unqualified
committed false material representations in her COC candidates making the conduct
warranting the cancellation of her COC. If petitioner is of elections unmanageable. For this
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, the issue arises as a reason, the Comelec weeds out every
necessary consequence whether she is a nuisance presidential election dozens of
candidate whose COC can motu proprio be cancelled candidates for president who are
by the COMELEC. deemed nuisance candidates by
COMELEC Jurisdiction the Comelec.

Section 2 (1), Article IX-C of the Constitution Section 2 (3), Article IX-C of the
vests in the COMELEC the power, among others, to Constitution also empowers
"[e]nforce and administer all laws and regulations the Comelec to "[D]ecide, except those
relative to the conduct of an involving the right to vote, all questions
election, . . . ." 4 Screening initially the qualifications of affecting elections . . . ." The power to
all candidates lies within this specific power. In my decide "all questions affecting elections"
dissent in Tecson v. COMELEC, 5 involving the issue necessarily includes the power to decide
of Fernando Poe, Jr.'s citizenship, I discussed whether a candidate possesses the
the COMELEC's jurisdiction, to wit: qualifications required by law for election
to public office. This broad constitutional
. . . . Under Section 2 (1), Article power and function vested in
IX-C of the Constitution, the Comelec is designed precisely to
the Comelec has the power and function avoid any situation where a dispute
to "[E]nforce and administer all laws and affecting elections is left without any legal
regulations relative to the conduct of an remedy. If one who is obviously not a
election." The initial determination of who natural-born Philippine citizen, like
 Arnold Schwarzenneger, runs for Nuisance candidates are
President, the Comelec is certainly persons who file their certificates of
not powerless to cancel the certificate candidacy "to put the election process
of candidacy of such candidate. There in mockery or disrepute or to cause
is no need to wait until after confusion among the voters by the
the elections before such candidate similarity of the names of the registered
may be disqualified. 6 (Italicization in candidates or by other circumstances or
the original; boldfacing supplied) acts which clearly demonstrate that the
candidate has no bona fide intention to
Clearly, pursuant to its constitutional mandate,
run for the office for which the certificate
the COMELEC can initially determine the qualifications
of candidacy has been filed and thus
of all candidates and disqualify those found lacking
prevent a faithful determination of the
any of such qualifications before the conduct of
true will of the electorate." . . . .
the elections. In fact, the COMELEC is empowered
(Emphasis supplied)
to motu proprio cancel COCs of nuisance
candidates. 7 In Timbol v. COMELEC, 8 the Court It cannot be disputed that a person, not a natural-born
stated thus: CAIHTE Filipino citizen, who files a certificate of candidacy for
President, "put[s] the election process in mockery" and
Respondent's power to motu
is therefore a nuisance candidate. Such person's
proprio deny due course to a
certificate of candidacy can motu proprio be cancelled
certificate of candidacy is
by the COMELEC under Section 69 of the Omnibus
subject to the candidate's
Election Code, which empowers the COMELEC to
opportunity to be heard.
cancel motu proprio the COC if it "has been filed to
Under Article II, Section 26 of the put the election process in mockery."
Constitution, "[t]he State shall guarantee
In Pamatong v. COMELEC, 9 cited
equal access to opportunities for public
in Timbol, 10 the Court explained the reason why
service[.]" This, however, does not
nuisance candidates are disqualified to run for public
guarantee "a constitutional right to run for
office:
or hold public office[.]" To run for public
office is a mere "privilege subject to  
limitations imposed by law." Among
The rationale behind the
these limitations is the
prohibition against nuisance candidates
prohibition on nuisance candidates.
and the disqualification of candidates
who have not evinced a bona
fide intention to run for office is easy to joke. The poll body would be bogged by
divine. The State has a compelling irrelevant minutiae covering every step of
interest to ensure that its electoral the electoral process, most probably
exercises are rational, objective, and posed at the instance of these nuisance
orderly. Towards this end, the State candidates. It would be a senseless
takes into account the practical sacrifice on the part of the State.
considerations in conducting elections. To allow a person, who is found by
Inevitably, the greater the number of the COMELEC not to be a natural-born Filipino citizen,
candidates, the greater the opportunities to run for President of the Philippines constitutes a
for logistical confusion, not to mention mockery of the election process. Any person, who is
the increased allocation of time and not a natural-born Filipino citizen, running for President
resources in preparation for the election. is obviously a nuisance candidate under Section 69 of
These practical difficulties should, of the Omnibus Election Code. Allowing a nuisance
course, never exempt the State from the candidate to run for President renders meaningless
conduct of a mandated electoral the COMELEC's constitutional power to "[e]nforce and
exercise. At the same time, remedial administer all laws . . . relative to the conduct of an
actions should be available to alleviate election, . . . ." The election process becomes a
these logistical hardships, whenever complete mockery since the electorate is mercilessly
necessary and proper. Ultimately, a offered choices which include patently ineligible
disorderly election is not merely a candidates. The electorate is also needlessly misled to
textbook example of inefficiency, but a cast their votes, and thus waste their votes, for an
rot that erodes faith in our democratic ineligible candidate. The COMELEC cannot be a party
institutions. . . . . to such mockery of the election process; otherwise,
xxx xxx xxx the COMELEC will be committing a grave abuse of
discretion.
. . . . The organization of an
election with bona fide candidates Citizens of the Philippines
standing is onerous enough. To add into It is the sovereign power and inherent right of
the mix candidates with no serious every independent state to determine who are its
intentions or capabilities to run a viable nationals. The Philippines, and no other state, shall
campaign would actually impair the determine who are its citizens in accordance with its
electoral process. This is not to mention Constitution and laws.
the candidacies which are palpably
ridiculous so as to constitute a one-note
 In this case, the 1935 Philippine Constitution the father (or the mother under the 1987 Constitution)
shall be applied to determine whether petitioner is a who must be a Filipino citizen; and (2) by naturalization
natural-born citizen of the Philippines since she was according to law. 11
born in 1968 when the 1935 Constitution was in effect. The Philippines adheres to the jus
Section 1, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution sanguinis principle or the "law of the blood" to
identifies who are Filipino citizens, thus: determine citizenship at birth. An individual acquires
Filipino citizenship at birth solely by virtue of biological
Article IV. — Citizenship
descent from a Filipino father or mother. The framers
Section 1. The following are citizens of of the 1935 Constitution clearly intended to make the
the Philippines: acquisition of citizenship available on the basis of
1. Those who are citizens of the Philippine the jus sanguinis principle. This view is made evident
Islands at the time of the adoption of by the suppression from the Constitution of the jus
this Constitution. soli principle, and further, by the fact that the
Constitution has made definite provisions for cases not
2. Those born in the Philippine Islands of covered by the jus sanguinis principle, such as those
foreign parents who, before the found in paragraph 1, Section 1 of Article
adoption of this Constitution, had IV, i.e., those who are citizens of the Philippines at the
been elected to public office in the time of the adoption of the Constitution, and in
Philippine Islands. paragraph 2, Section 1 of the same Article, i.e., those
3. Those whose fathers are citizens of the born in the Philippines of foreign parents who, before
Philippines. the adoption of the Constitution, had been elected to
4. Those whose mothers are citizens of the public office in the Philippines. 12
Philippines and, upon reaching the In terms of jurisprudence, there was a period
age of majority, elect Philippine when the Court was uncertain regarding the
citizenship. application of jus soli or "law of the soil" as a principle
5. Those who are naturalized in of acquisition of Philippine citizenship at
accordance with law. birth. 13 In Tan Chong v. Secretary of
Labor, 14 decided in 1947, the Court finally abandoned
From this constitutional provision, we find that, the jus soli principle, and jus sanguinis has been
except for those who were already considered citizens exclusively adhered to in the Philippines since then. 15
at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, there
were, as there are still now, only two methods of Based on Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
acquiring Philippine citizenship: (1) by blood relation to Constitution, petitioner's citizenship may be
determined only under paragraphs (3), (4) and (5). those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino mothers
Paragraph (1) of Section 1 is not applicable since and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching
petitioner is not a Filipino citizen at the time of the the age of majority are also deemed natural-born
adoption of the 1935 Constitution as petitioner was Filipino citizens. DETACa
born after the adoption of the 1935 Constitution. In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Paragraph (2) of Section 1 is likewise inapplicable Representatives, 18 the Court held that the
since petitioner was not born in the Philippines of constitutional provision treating as natural-born Filipino
foreign parents who, before the adoption of the citizens those born before 17 January 1973 of Filipino
Constitution, had been elected to public office in the mothers and alien fathers, and who elected Philippine
Philippines. citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, has a
Of the Filipino citizens falling under paragraphs retroactive effect. The Court declared that this
(3), (4) and (5), only those in paragraph (3) of Section constitutional provision was enacted "to correct the
1, whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines, can be anomalous situation where one born of a Filipino father
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since they are and an alien mother was automatically granted the
Filipino citizens from birth without having to perform status of a natural-born citizen while one born of a
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine Filipino mother and an alien father would still have to
citizenship. 16 In short, they are Filipino citizens by the elect Philippine citizenship. If one so elected, he was
mere fact of birth. not, under earlier laws, conferred the status of a
natural-born." 19 The Court explained:
Under paragraph (4) of Section 1, those Filipino
citizens whose mothers are Filipinos and whose The provision in Paragraph 3 was
fathers are aliens cannot be considered natural-born intended to correct an unfair position
Filipino citizens since they are still required to elect which discriminates against Filipino
Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of women. There is no ambiguity in the
majority — they are not Filipino citizens by the mere deliberations of the
fact of birth. Constitutional Commission, viz.:
However, under paragraph (2), Section 1 of Mr. Azcuna: With respect to
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, those whose fathers the provision of section 4,
are Filipino citizens and those whose mothers are would this refer only to
Filipino citizens are treated equally. They are those who elect Philippine
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. 17 Moreover, citizenship after the
under Section 2, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, in effectivity of the 1973
relation to paragraph (3), Section 1 of the same Article, Constitution or would it also
cover those who elected it Fr. Bernas: Yes.
under the 1973 xxx xxx xxx
Constitution?
Mr. Nolledo: And I
Fr. Bernas: It would apply remember very well that in
to anybody who elected the Reverend Father
Philippine citizenship by Bernas' well written book,
virtue of the provision of he said that the decision
the 1935 Constitution was designed merely to
whether the election was accommodate former
done before or after delegate Ernesto Ang and
January 17, that the
1973. (Records of the definition on natural-born
Constitutional Commission, has no retroactive effect.
Vol. 1, p. 228; Emphasis Now it seems that the
supplied.) Reverend Father Bernas is
xxx xxx xxx going against this intention
by supporting the
Mr. Trenas: The
amendment?
Committee on Citizenship,
Bill of Rights, Political Fr. Bernas: As the
Rights and Obligations and Commissioner can see,
Human Rights has more or there has been an evolution
less decided to extend the in my thinking. (Records of
interpretation of who is a the
natural-born citizen as Constitutional Commission,
provided in section 4 of the Vol. 1, p. 189)
1973 Constitution by xxx xxx xxx
adding that persons who
have elected Philippine Mr. Rodrigo: But this
citizenship under the 1935 provision becomes very
Constitution shall be important because his
natural-born? Am I right Mr. election of Philippine
Presiding Officer? citizenship makes him not
 only a Filipino citizen but a mothers were natural-born
natural-born Filipino citizen Filipinos. However, those
entitling him to run for born of Filipino mothers but
Congress. . . alien fathers would have to
elect Philippine citizenship
 
upon reaching the age of
Fr. Bernas: Correct. We are majority; and if they do
quite aware of that and for elect, they become Filipino
that reason we will leave it citizens but not natural-born
to the body to approve that Filipino citizens. (Records
provision of section 4. of the
Mr. Rodrigo: I think there is Constitutional Commission,
a good basis for the Vol. 1, p. 356)
provision because it strikes The foregoing significantly reveals the
me as unfair that the intent of the framers. To make the
Filipino citizen who was provision prospective from February 3,
born a day before January 1987 is to give a narrow interpretation
17, 1973 cannot be a resulting in an inequitable situation. It
Filipino citizen or a natural- must also be retroactive. 20
born citizen. (Records of
Therefore, the following are deemed natural-
the
born Filipino citizens: (1) those whose fathers or
Constitutional Commission,
mothers are Filipino citizens, and (2) those whose
Vol. 1, p. 231)
mothers are Filipino citizens and were born before 17
xxx xxx xxx January 1973 and who elected Philippine citizenship
Mr. Rodrigo: The purpose upon reaching the age of majority. Stated differently,
of that provision is to those whose fathers or mothers are neither Filipino
remedy an inequitable citizens are not natural-born Filipino citizens. If they
situation. Between 1935 are not natural-born Filipino citizens, they can acquire
and 1973 when we were Philippine citizenship only under paragraph (5),
under the 1935 Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which
Constitution, those born of refers to Filipino citizens who are naturalized in
Filipino fathers but alien accordance with law.
 Intent of the Framers of the 1935 Constitution during the deliberations of the Convention shows this
unequivocally.
Petitioner concedes that she does not fall under
paragraphs (1) and (2) of Section 1, Article IV of the ENGLISH
1935 Constitution. However, petitioner claims that the  
mere fact that she is a foundling does not exclude her
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
from paragraphs (3) and (4) of the same Para provision.
una enmienda. Propongo que despues For an amendment, I propose that after
Petitioner argues in her Petition that "thedelpertinent
inciso 2 se inserte lo siguiente: "Los subsection 2, the following is inserted:
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional
hijos naturales de un padre extranjero y de "The natural children of a foreign father
Convention, on what eventually became Article IV of
unaofmadre
the filipina no reconocidos por and a Filipino mother not recognized by
the 1935 Constitution, show that the intent
framers was not to exclude foundlings from the the father.
term "citizens" of the Philippines." 21 . . . 
 
Likewise, the Solicitor General asserts in his
EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
Comment 22 that "[t]he deliberations of the 1934
 
Constitutional Convention indicate the intention to
La Mesa desea pedir una aclaracion del
categorize foundlings as a class of persons considered [We] would like to request a clarification
proponente de la enmienda. Se refiere Su
as Philippine citizens. . . . . The 1935 Constitution's from the proponent of the amendment. Th
Señoria of
silence cannot simply be interpreted as indicative a hijos naturales o a toda clase de gentleman refers to natural children or to
an intent to entrench a disadvantaged class hijos
in ilegitimos?
their any kind of illegitimate children?
tragedy. Not only is there no evidence of such  
intent, but also the silence can be explained in a
SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
compassionate light, one that is geared towards  
addressing a fundamental question of justice." 23
A toda clase de hijos ilegitimos. Tambien To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also
se gravely
Petitioner and the Solicitor General are incluye a los hijos naturales de padres includes natural children of unknown
mistaken. The framers of the 1935 Constitutiondesconocidos,
voted los hijos naturales o parentage, natural or illegitimate children
to categorically reject the proposal toilegitimos,include de padres desconocidos. of unknown parents.
foundlings as citizens of the Philippines. Petitioner's  
Petition, and the Solicitor General's
SR. MONTINOLA: MR. MONTINOLA:
Comment, glaringly omitted that the 1934  
Constitutional Convention actually voted Paraupon,
una aclaracion. Alli se dice "de For clarification. The gentleman said "of
and rejected, the proposal to include foundlings as
padres desconocidos." Los Codigos unknown parents." Current codes conside
citizens of the Philippines. The following exchange
 les consideran como filipino, es decir, them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish  
fiero al codigo español quien Code wherein all SR.children
BRIONES:
of unknown MR. BRIONES:
dera como españoles a todos los hijos parentage born in Spanish territory are  
dres desconocidos nacidos en considered Spaniards,
Para una because
enmienda
the con el fin de significar The amendment [should] mean children
rio español, porque la presuncion es presumption is thatlosahijos
childnacidos
of unknown
en Filipinas de padres born in the Philippines of unknown
l hijo de padres desconocidos es hijo parentage is the son
desconocidos.
of a Spaniard. This parentage.
español, y de esa manera se podra may be applied in the Philippines in that a  
r en Filipinas de que un hijo child of unknown SR.parentage
RAFOLS: born in the MR. RAFOLS:
onocido aqui y nacido en Filipinas se Philippines is deemed to be Filipino, and  
derara que es hijo filipino y no hay there is no need .Es . . que el hijo de una filipina con un The son of a Filipina to a foreigner,
sidad . . .   extranjero, aunque este no reconozca al although the latter does not recognize the
  hijo, no es desconocido. child, is not of unknown parentage.
RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:  
  EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
ecesidad, porque estamos relatando There is a need, because we are relating the  
ndiciones de los que van a ser conditions that areAcepta
[required]
Su Señoria
to be o no la enmienda? Does the gentleman accept the amendme
os. Filipino. or not?
  SR. RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS:
MONTINOLA: MR. MONTINOLA:  
  No acepto la enmienda, porque la I do not accept the amendment because th
esa es la interpretacion de la ley, But that is the interpretation
enmienda excluiria
of the law,
a los hijos de una amendment would exclude the children of
, de manera que no hay necesidad de therefore, there isfilipina
no [more]
con un
needextranjero
for the que este no a Filipina with a foreigner who does not
mienda. amendment. reconoce. No son desconocidos y yo creo recognize the child. Their parentage is not
  que esos hijos de madre filipina con unknown and I believe that these children
RAFOLS: MR. RAFOLS: extranjero y el padre no reconoce, deben of a Filipino mother by a foreigner who
  ser tambien considerados como filipinos. does not recognize them should also be
mienda debe leerse de esta manera: The amendment should read thus: considered Filipinos.
ijos naturales o ilegitimos de un Natural or illegitimate children of a  
extranjero y de una madre filipina foreign father andEL a Filipino
PRESIDENTE:
mother PRESIDENT:
ocidos por aquel o los hijos de padres recognized by the former, or the children of  
onocidos. unknown parentage."La cuestion en orden es la enmienda a la The question to be settled is the
enda del Delegado por Cebu, Sr. amendment to theNo amendment
tengo especial
of the
interes, señor Presidente, I have no special interest, Mr. President, in
es. delegate from Cebu,en esa
Mr. enmienda
Briones. y la retiro. the amendment and I withdraw.
   
BUSLON: MR. BUSLON: EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
   
resident, don't you think it would be Mr. President, don't you think it would be Withdrawn.
to leave this matter in the hands of the better to leave the matter in the hands of  
ature? the Legislature? LA ENMIENDA RAFOLS ES THE RAFOLS AMENDMENT IS
  REJECTED
ROXAS: MR. ROXAS:  
  EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
r Presidente, mi opinion humilde es Mr. President, my humble opinion is that  
stos son casos muy pequeños y these cases are very
Insiste
insignificant
el Caballeroandporvery
Cebu, Sr. Rafols, Does the gentleman from Cebu, Mr.
dos, para que la constitucion necesite few that the constitution
en su enmienda?
need not make Rafols, insist in his amendment?
se a ellos. Por leyes internacionales reference to them. International law  
conoce el principio de que los hijos o recognizes the principle
SR. RAFOLS:
that the children or SR. RAFOLS:
ersonas nacidas en un pais de padres persons in a country of unknown parents  
onocidos son ciudadanos de esa are citizens of that nation and it is not Yes.
n, y no es necesario incluir una necessary to include a restrictive provision  
sicion taxativa sobre el particular. on this subject. EL PRESIDENTE: PRESIDENT:
   
NMIENDA BRIONES ES THE BRIONES AMENDMENT
La Mesa sometera IS a votacion dicha Let us submit to a vote the amendment.
RADA WITHDRAWN enmienda. Los que esten conformes con la Those who agree with it, say yes. (a
  misma, que digan si. (Una minoria: SI.) minority: YES.) Those who are not, say
RESIDENTE: PRESIDENT: Los que no lo esten, que digan no. (Una no. (a majority: NO.) The amendment is
  mayoria: NO.) Queda rechazada la rejected. (Emphasis supplied)
e el Caballero por Cebu, Sr. Briones, Does the gentleman from Cebu,   Mr.  
enmienda? Briones, insist in his amendment?  
 
RIONES: SR. BRIONES: During the 26 November 1934 deliberations of
the Constitutional Convention, Delegate Rafols
 
 proposed an amendment to declare as Filipino citizens but simply to avoid redundancy occasioned by
those natural or illegitimate children of Filipino mothers explicating what to them was already a clear principle
and alien fathers who do not acknowledge them. Such of existing domestic and international law." 25
proposed amendment, according to Delegate Rafols, Petitioner is again gravely mistaken.
included "children of unknown parentage."
There was no domestic law as well as
  international law existing during the proceedings of the
Three delegates voiced their objections to 1934 Constitutional Convention explicitly governing
Rafols's amendment, namely Delegates Buslon, citizenship of foundlings, and thus, there could not
Montinola, and Roxas. have been a redundancy of any law to speak of.
Delegate Teofilo Buslon suggested that the Delegate Montinola applied the Spanish Civil
subject matter be left in the hands of the legislature, Code provision, stating that children of unknown
which meant that Congress would decide whether to parentage born in Spanish territory were considered
categorize as Filipinos (1) natural or illegitimate Spaniards, and opined that the same concept could be
children of Filipino mothers and alien fathers who do applied in the Philippines and thus children of unknown
not recognize them; and (2) children of unknown parentage born in the Philippines should be
parentage. If that were the case, foundlings were not considered Filipino citizens.
and could not validly be considered as natural-born However, this was an erroneous application
Filipino citizens as defined in the Constitution since since the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code (which
Congress would then provide the enabling law for Delegate Montinola was relying on) were no longer in
them to be regarded as Filipino citizens. Foundlings effect as of the end of Spanish rule in the Philippines.
would be naturalized citizens since they acquire The provisions of the Spanish Civil Code cited by
Filipino citizenship "in accordance with law" under Delegate Montinola ceased to have effect upon the
paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 cession by Spain of the Philippines to the United
Constitution. Significantly, petitioner and the Solicitor States. As early as 1912, in Roa v. Collector of
General, who agrees with petitioner's position, Customs, 26 the Court stated:
conveniently left out Delegate Buslon's opinion.
Articles 17 to 27, inclusive, of the
Petitioner quotes the opinions of Delegates Civil Code deal entirely with the subject
Ruperto Montinola and Manuel Roxas to support her of Spanish citizenship. When these
theory. Petitioner argues that "the pertinent provisions were enacted, Spain was and
deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention is now the sole and exclusive judge as to
show that the intent of the framers was not to exclude who shall and who shall not be subjects
foundlings from the term 'citizens of the Philippines,'
 of her kingdom, including her territories. birth of foundlings, was in existence during the
Consequently, the said articles, being deliberations on the 1935 Constitution. As will be
political laws (laws regulating the discussed further, the 1930 Hague Convention does
relations sustained by the inhabitants to not guarantee a nationality to a foundling at
the former sovereign), must be held to birth. Therefore, there was no prevailing customary
have been abrogated upon the cession international law at that time, as there is still none
of the Philippine Islands to the United today, conferring automatically a nationality to
States. foundlings at birth. aDSIHc
"By well-settled public law, upon Moreover, none of the framers of the 1935
the cession of territory by one nation to Constitution mentioned the term "natural-born" in
another, either following a conquest or relation to the citizenship of foundlings. Again, under
otherwise, . . . those laws which are the 1935 Constitution, only those whose fathers were
political in their nature and pertain to the Filipino citizens were considered natural-born Filipino
prerogatives of the former government citizens. Those who were born of Filipino mothers and
immediately cease upon the transfer of alien fathers were still required to elect Philippine
sovereignty." (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July citizenship, preventing them from being natural-born
10, 1889.) Filipino citizens. If, as petitioner would like us to
believe, the framers intended that foundlings be
Thus, Delegate Montinola's opinion was based on an
considered natural-born Filipino citizens, this would
erroneous premise since the provisions of the Spanish
have created an absurd situation where a child with
Civil Code he cited had already long been repealed
unknown parentage would be placed in a better
and could no longer be applied in the Philippines.
position than a child whose mother is actually known to
The same can be said of Delegate Manuel be a Filipino citizen. The framers of the 1935
Roxas's opinion regarding the supposed international Constitution could not have intended to create such an
law principle which recognizes a foundling to be a absurdity.
citizen of the country where the foundling is found. At
In any event, Delegate Rafols's amendment,
that time, there was nothing in international law which
when put to a vote, was clearly rejected by the majority
automatically granted citizenship to foundlings at birth.
of the delegates to the 1934 Constitutional
In fact, Delegate Roxas did not cite any international
Convention. To reiterate, Delegate Rafols's
law principle to that effect.
proposal was defeated in the voting. The rejection
Only the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain of the Rafols amendment not only meant the non-
Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, inclusion in the text of the Constitution of a provision
which articulated the presumption on the place of that children with unknown parentage are Filipino
citizens, but also signified the rejection by the Constitution and contravenes the jus
delegates of the idea or proposition that foundlings are sanguinis principle underlying the citizenship
Filipino citizens at birth just like natural-born citizens. provisions of the Constitution.
While the framers discussed the matter of foundlings Besides, there is nothing in the deliberations of
because of Delegate Rafols's amendment, they not the 1934 Constitutional Convention indicating that a
only rejected the Rafols proposal but also clearly majority of the delegates agreed with the opinion of
manifested that foundlings could not be citizens of the either Delegate Montinola or Delegate Roxas. The
Philippines at birth like children of Filipino fathers. opinions of Delegates Montinola and Roxas remained
Stated differently, the framers intended to exclude their personal opinions, just like the countless opinions
foundlings from the definition of natural-born Filipino of other delegates who aired their opinions during the
citizens. deliberations of the Convention without such opinions
Clearly, there is no "silence of the being put to a vote. Delegate Buslon proposed that the
Constitution" on foundlings because the majority of the citizenship of foundlings be addressed through
delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention legislation by Congress, a proposal that carried more
expressly rejected the proposed amendment of weight since it falls squarely under paragraph 5,
Delegate Rafols to classify children of unknown Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution
parentage as Filipino citizens. There would have been authorizing Congress to enact naturalization laws.
"silence of the Constitution" if the Convention never Definition of the Term "Natural-Born Citizens"
discussed the citizenship of foundlings. There can
never be "silence of the Constitution" if the The term "natural-born citizen" was first
Convention discussed a proposal and rejected it, discussed by the framers of the 1935 Constitution in
and because of such rejection the subject of the relation to the qualifications of the President and Vice-
proposal is not found in the Constitution. The President. In particular, Delegate Roxas
absence of any mention in the Constitution of such elaborated on this term, explaining that a natural-born
rejected proposal is not "silence of the Constitution" citizen is a "citizen by birth" — a person who is a
but "express rejection in the Constitution" of such citizen by reason of his or her birth and not by
proposal. operation of law. Delegate Roxas explained:
Further, to include foundlings among those born Delegate Roxas. — Mr. President,
of Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers based the phrase, 'natural-born citizen,' appears
solely on Montinola's and Roxas's opinions during the in the Constitution of the United States;
deliberations of the Constitutional Convention is a but the authors say that this phrase has
strained construction of the Constitution which clearly never been authoritatively interpreted by
runs counter to the express provisions of the the Supreme Court of the United States
in view of the fact that there has never born citizen,' as it is used in the English
been raised the question of whether or text means a Filipino citizen by birth,
not an elected President fulfilled this regardless of where he was
condition. The authors are uniform in the born. 27 (Emphasis supplied)
fact that the words, 'natural-born  
citizen,' means a citizen by birth, a
person who is a citizen by reason of Clearly, it was the intent of the framers of the
his birth, and not by naturalization or 1935 Constitution to refer to natural-born citizens as
by a further declaration required by only those who were Filipino citizens by the mere fact
law for his citizenship. In the of being born to fathers who were Filipino citizens —
Philippines, for example, under the nothing more and nothing less. To repeat, under the
provisions of the article on citizenship 1935 Constitution, only children whose fathers were
which we have approved, all those born Filipino citizens were natural-born Filipino citizens.
of a father who is a Filipino citizen, be Those who were born of alien fathers and Filipino
they persons born in the Philippines mothers were not considered natural-born Filipino
or outside, would be citizens by birth citizens, despite the fact that they had a blood relation
or 'natural-born.' to a Filipino parent. Since a natural-born citizen is a
citizen by birth who need not perform any act to
And with respect to one born of a
acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship, then those
Filipino mother but of a foreign father, the
born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers and who had
article which we approved about
to elect citizenship upon reaching the age of majority,
citizenship requires that, upon reaching
an overt act to perfect citizenship, were not considered
the age of majority, this child needs to
natural-born Filipino citizens. As a matter of course,
indicate the citizenship which he prefers,
those whose parents are neither Filipino citizens or are
and if he elects Philippine citizenship
both unknown, such as in the case of foundlings,
upon reaching the age of majority, then
cannot be considered natural-born Filipino citizens.
he shall be considered a Filipino
citizen. According to this Foundlings and International Law
interpretation, the child of a Filipino A. Each State Determines its Citizens
mother with a foreign father would not
be a citizen by birth, because the law Fundamental is the principle that every
or the Constitution requires that he independent state has the right and prerogative to
make a further declaration after his determine who are its citizens. In United States v.
birth. Consequently, the phrase, 'natural-
Wong Kim Ark, 28 decided in 1898, the United States acquired. 31 Whether an individual possesses the
Supreme Court enunciated this principle: citizenship of a particular state shall be determined in
accordance with the constitution and statutory laws of
It is the inherent right of every
that state.
independent nation to determine for
itself, and according to its own B. Conventional International Law, Customary
constitution and laws, what classes of International Law, and
persons shall be entitled to its Generally Accepted Principles of International Law
citizenship. Petitioner invokes conventional international
In our jurisdiction, the Court similarly echoed in law, customary international law and generally
the 1912 case of Roa v. Collector of Customs 29 this accepted principles of international law to support her
incontrovertible right of each state to determine who claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. A
are its citizens. Hence, every independent state cannot review of these concepts is thus inevitable.
be denied this inherent right to determine who are its Article 38 of the Statute of the International
citizens according to its own constitution and Court of Justice sets out the following sources of
laws. ATICcS international law: (1) international conventions,
Article 1, Chapter I of the 1930 Hague whether general or particular, establishing rules
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the expressly recognized by the contesting states; (2)
Conflict of Nationality Laws explicitly provides: international custom, as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law; (3) general principles of law
It is for each state to determine
recognized by civilized nations; and (4) judicial
under its own law who are its nationals.
decisions and the teachings of the most highly
This law shall be recognized by other
qualified publicists of the various nations as subsidiary
States in so far as it is consistent with
means for the determination of rules of law. 32
international conventions, international
custom, and the principles of law Essentially, conventional international law is the
generally recognized with regard to body of international legal principles contained in
nationality. treaties or conventions as opposed to customary
international law or other sources of international
This means that municipal law, both constitutional and
law. 33
statutory, determines and regulates the
conditions on which citizenship is acquired. 30 There is Customary international law is defined as a
no such thing as international citizenship or general and consistent practice of states followed by
international law by which citizenship may be them from a sense of legal obligation. 34 I had
occasion to explain the concept of customary In the North Sea Continental Shelf
international law as used in our Constitution in this Cases, 36 the International Court of Justice held that
wise: "[n]ot only must the acts concerned amount to a settled
practice, but they must also be such, or be carried out
Generally accepted principles of
in such a way, as to be evidence of a belief that this
international law, as referred to in the
practice is rendered obligatory by existence of a rule of
Constitution, include customary
law requiring it. The need for such a belief, i.e., the
international law. Customary international
existence of a subjective element is implicit in the very
law is one of the primary sources of
notion of the opinio juris sive necessitatis."
international law under Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Moreover, to be considered as customary
Justice. Customary international law international law, a rule must apply to all, or majority of
consists of acts which, by repetition of all, states. One possible exception to the universal
States of similar international acts for a applicability of customary international law is local or
number of years, occur out of a sense of special custom. A local or special customary
obligation, and taken by a significant international rule binds only a group of states, regional
number of States. It is based on custom, or otherwise. 37 "Regional customary international law
which is a clear and continuous habit of refers to customary international law that arises from
doing certain actions, which has grown state practice and opinio juris of a discrete and limited
under the aegis of the conviction that number of states; as it departs from generally
these actions are, according to applicable customary international law, it is only
international law, obligatory or right. binding upon and opposable against those states
Thus, customary international law participating in its formation." 38
requires the concurrence of two Generally accepted principles of international
elements: [1] the established, wide- law are those legal principles which are so basic and
spread, and consistent practice on the fundamental that they are found universally in the legal
part of the States; and [2] a psychological systems of the world. These principles apply all over
element known as opinio juris sive the world, not only to a specific country, region or
necessitatis (opinion as to law or group of states. Legal principles such as laches,
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is estoppel, good faith, equity and res judicata are
a belief that the practice in question is examples of generally accepted principles of
rendered obligatory by the existence of a international law. 39 In Pharmaceutical and Health
rule of law requiring it. 35 Care Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 40 the
Court further explained the concept of generally Petitioner anchors her claims on the (1) 1989
accepted principles of law, to wit: Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), (2) 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Some legal scholars and judges
(ICCPR), (3) 1948 Universal Declaration of Human
look upon certain "general principles of
Rights (UDHR), (4) 1930 Hague
law" as a primary source of international
Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
law because they have the "character
Conflict of Nationality Laws (1930 Hague Convention),
of jus rationale" and are "valid through all
and (5) the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
kinds of human societies." (Judge
Statelessness (CRS), among others.
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the
1966 South West Africa Case, 1966 1. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
I.C.J. 296). O'Connell holds that certain Article 7
principles are part of international law
because they are "basic to legal systems 1. The child shall be registered
generally" and hence part of the jus immediately after birth and shall have the
gentium. These principles, he believes, right from birth to a name, the right to
are established by a process of acquire a nationality and as far as
reasoning based on the common identity possible, the right to know and be cared
of all legal systems. If there should be for by his or her parents.
doubt or disagreement, one must look to 2. States Parties shall ensure the
state practice and determine whether the implementation of these rights in
municipal law principle provides a just accordance with their national law and
and acceptable solution. . . . . their obligations under the relevant
C. There is No Customary International Law international instruments in this field, in
Presuming a Foundling as a Citizen particular where the child would
of the Country Where the Foundling is Found otherwise be stateless. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that under customary
international law and generally accepted principles of The Philippines signed the Convention on the
international law, she (1) has a right to a nationality Rights of the Child on 26 January 1990 and ratified the
from birth; (2) has a right to be protected against same on 21 August 1990. The Convention defines a
statelessness; and (3) is presumed to be a citizen of child to mean every human being below the age of
the Philippines where she was found. eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to the
child, the age of majority is attained earlier.
 Since petitioner was born in 1968 or more than 3. Every child has the right to acquire
20 years before the Convention came into existence, a nationality. (Emphasis supplied)
the Convention could not have applied to the status of Adopted on 16 December 1966 and entered
her citizenship at the time of her birth in 1968. into force on 23 March 1976, the International
Petitioner's citizenship at birth could not be affected in Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognizes "the
any way by the Convention. ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and political
The Convention guarantees a child the right to freedom and freedom from fear and want which can
acquire a nationality, and requires the contracting only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
states to ensure the implementation of this right, in everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well
particular where the child would otherwise be as his economic, social and cultural rights." 41
stateless. Thus, as far as nationality is concerned, the The Philippines is a signatory to this
Convention guarantees the right of the child to acquire international treaty. Similar to the text of the
a nationality so that the child will not be stateless. The Convention on the Rights of the Child, the ICCPR does
Convention does not guarantee a child a not obligate states to automatically grant a nationality
nationality at birth, much less a natural-born to children at birth. The Covenant merely recognizes
citizenship at birth as understood under the the right of a child to acquire a nationality. In short,
Philippine Constitution, but merely the right to the Covenant does not guarantee a foundling a
acquire a nationality in accordance with municipal nationality at birth, much less natural-born
law. citizenship at birth as understood under the
  Philippine Constitution.
2. The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 3. The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Political Rights Article 15.
Article 24 (1) Everyone has the right to a
1. Every child shall have, without any nationality.
discrimination as to race, colour, sex, (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of
language, religion, national or social his nationality nor denied the right to
origin, property or birth, the right to such change his nationality. (Emphasis
measures of protection as are required supplied)
by his status as a minor, on the part of
his family, society and the State. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was
adopted by the United Nations General
xxx xxx xxx
Assembly on 10 December 1948 whereby "Member Where the nationality of a State is not
States (including the Philippines) have pledged acquired automatically by reason of
themselves to achieve, in cooperation with the United birth on its territory, a child born on the
Nations, the promotion of universal respect for and territory of that State of parents having
observance of human rights and fundamental no nationality, or of unknown nationality,
freedoms." 42 It sets out, for the first time, fundamental may obtain the nationality of the said
human rights to be universally protected. 43 State. The law of that State shall
determine the conditions governing
Article 15 (1) of the UDHR simply affirms the
the acquisition of its nationality in
right of every human being to a nationality. Being a
such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
mere declaration, such right guaranteed by the
UDHR does not obligate states to automatically The Philippines is not a signatory to this
confer nationality to a foundling at birth, much less Convention, and therefore, it is not bound by the
natural-born citizenship at birth as understood Convention. Petitioner, however, claims that this
under the Philippine Constitution. Convention is evidence of "generally accepted
principles of international law," which allegedly created
4. The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
the presumption that a foundling is a citizen at birth of
Questions Relating to the Conflict of
the state in which the foundling is found. TIADCc
Nationality Laws
Article 14 merely states that a foundling "shall
Article 14.
have the nationality of the country of birth." It does
A child whose parents are both not say that a foundling shall have
unknown shall have the nationality of the nationality at birth of the country where the
the country of birth. If the child's foundling is found. Nowhere in Article 14 is nationality
parentage is established, its nationality guaranteed to a foundling at birth, much less
shall be determined by the rules natural-born citizenship at birth as understood
applicable in cases where the parentage under the Philippine Constitution. Likewise, Article
is known. 14 merely lays down the presumption that a foundling
A foundling is, until the contrary is is born in the territory of the state in which the
proved, presumed to have been foundling is found. This is the only presumption that
born on the territory of the State in Article 14 establishes.
which it was found. Article 15 acknowledges the fact that acquisition
Article 15. of nationality by reason of birth in a state's territory is
not automatic. Article 15 expressly states that
municipal law shall "determine the conditions Article 2
governing the acquisition of its nationality" by a A foundling found in the territory of a
foundling. Thus, to implement the Convention the Contracting State shall, in the
contracting parties have to enact statutory legislation absence of proof to the contrary, be
prescribing the conditions for the acquisition of considered to have been born within
citizenship by a foundling. This rules out any automatic that territory of parents possessing
acquisition of citizenship at birth by a foundling. the nationality of that State. (Emphasis
5. The 1961 Convention on the Reduction of supplied)
Statelessness A 1961 United Nations multilateral treaty, the
Article 1 primary aim of the Convention is the prevention of
statelessness by requiring states to grant citizenship to
1. A Contracting State shall grant its
children born in their territory, or born to their nationals
nationality to a person born in its territory
abroad, who would otherwise be stateless. To prevent
who would otherwise be stateless. Such
statelessness in such cases, states have the
nationality shall be granted:
option to grant nationality (1) at birth by operation
(a) at birth, by operation of law, or of law, or (2) subsequently by application. In short,
(b) upon an application being lodged a contracting state to the Convention must enact
with the appropriate authority, by an implementing law choosing one of the two
or on behalf of the person concerned, options before the Convention can be
in the manner prescribed by the implemented in that state.
national law. Subject to the provisions of The Philippines is not a signatory to this
paragraph 2 of this Article, no such Convention, and thus, the Philippines is a non-
application may be rejected. contracting state. The Convention does not bind the
A Contracting State which provides for Philippines. Moreover, this Convention does not
the grant of its nationality in accordance provide automatically that a foundling is a citizen at
with sub-paragraph (b) of this paragraph birth of the country in which the foundling is found.
may also provide for the grant of its Article 2 of the Convention provides, "A
nationality by operation of law at such foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State
age and subject to such conditions as shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
may be prescribed by the national law. considered to have been born of parents possessing
xxx xxx xxx the nationality of that state." Dr. Laura van Waas
explains the meaning of Article 2 of the Convention, as Second, there must be "absence of proof" that
follows: the parents of the foundling do not possess the
nationality of another state. This means there must be
Once more, the wording of this provision
an administrative or judicial proceeding to determine
is evidence of the compromise reached
this factual issue, an act necessary to acquire the
between jus soli and jus
citizenship of the state where the foundling is found.
sanguinis countries. Rather than
This also means that the grant of citizenship under
determining that a child found
Article 2 is not automatic, as Dr. Laura van Waas
abandoned on the territory of the state
explains. This factual determination prevents the
will automatically acquire the
foundling from acquiring natural-born citizenship at
nationality of that state, it declares that
birth as understood under our Constitution, assuming
the child will be assumed to have both
Article 2 applies to the Philippines.
the necessary jus soli and jus
sanguinis links with the state: Third, the grant of citizenship under Article 2
born on the territory to parents is ex lege — which means by operation of law —
possessing the nationality of the referring to municipal statutory law. Assuming Article
state. This means that the child will 2 applies to the Philippines, and it does not, this grant
then simply acquire nationality ex of citizenship refers to naturalization by operation of
lege under the normal operation of law, the category of citizens under paragraph (5),
the state's nationality regulations — Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution (now
the effect being the same in both jus Section 1 (4), Article IV of the 1987 Constitution), or
soli and jus sanguinis regimes. No "[t]hose who are naturalized in accordance with law."
attempt is made to further define the type Nationality at birth may result because the law
of evidence that may be accepted as applicable is either jus soli or jus sanguinis. A child
"proof to the contrary", this being left to born in the United States to foreign parents is a citizen
the discretion of the contracting of the United States at birth because the United States
states. 44 (Emphasis supplied) adopts the jus soli principle. Under the jus
First, Article 2 applies only to a "foundling soli principle, the place of birth determines citizenship
found in the territory of a Contracting State." The at birth, not blood relation to the parents. In contrast, a
Philippines is not a contracting state to the Convention child born in the Philippines to foreign parents is not a
and thus Article 2, and the entire Convention, does not Philippine citizen at birth but a foreigner because the
apply to the Philippines. Philippines follows the jus sanguinis principle. Under
the jus sanguinis principle, citizenship at birth is
determined by blood relation to the parents.
 Nationality at birth does not necessarily mean provisions on foundlings contained in the international
natural-born citizenship as prescribed under the conventions cited by petitioner have become part of
Philippine Constitution. The Constitution recognizes customary international law or generally accepted
natural-born citizens at birth only under the principle principles of international law on nationality.
of jus sanguinis — there must be a blood relation by We shall first lay down the basic premise for an
the child to a Filipino father or mother. Even assuming, international rule to be considered customary
and there is none, that there is an international law international law. Such a rule must comply with the
granting a foundling citizenship, at birth, of the country twin elements of widespread and consistent state
where the foundling is found, it does not necessarily practice, the objective element; and opinio juris sive
follow that the foundling qualifies as a natural-born necessitatis, the subjective element. State practice
citizen under the Philippine Constitution. In the refers to the continuous repetition of the same or
Philippines, any citizenship granted at birth to a child similar kind of acts or norms by states. It is
with no known blood relation to a Filipino parent can demonstrated upon the existence of the following
only be allowed by way of naturalization as mandated elements: (1) generality or widespread practice; (2)
by the Constitution, under paragraph 5, Section 1 of uniformity and consistency; and (3) duration. On the
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, 45 paragraph 4, other hand, opinio juris, the psychological element,
Section 1 of Article III of the 1973 Constitution, 46 and requires that the state practice or norm be carried out
paragraph 4, Section 1 of Article IV of the 1987 in the belief that this practice or norm is obligatory as a
Constitution. 47 Such a child is a naturalized matter of law. 50
Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino citizen.
The pertinent provisions on foundlings are
  found in the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
In sum, there is no international treaty to which Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. Article
the Philippines is a contracting party, which provides 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention and Article 2 of the
expressly or impliedly that a foundling is deemed 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
a natural-born citizen of the country in which the state, respectively: (1) "A foundling is, until the contrary
foundling is found. 48 There is also obviously no is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory
international treaty, to which the Philippines is not a of the State in which it was found"; and (2) "A foundling
party, obligating the Philippines to confer automatically found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the
Philippine citizenship to a foundling at birth. absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to
have been born within that territory of parents
Since the Philippines is not a signatory to the
possessing the nationality of that State."
various international conventions regulating
nationality, 49 we shall scrutinize whether the relevant
 We shall limit our discussion to Article 2 of the the majority of users begin to follow the
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness since same line which becomes a single path.
the presumption in Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Not long elapses before that path is
Convention concerns merely the place of birth of transformed into a road accepted as the
foundlings. In this case, the parties admit that only regular way, even though it is not
petitioner was born in Jaro, Iloilo in the Philippines, possible to state at which precise
which is the same place where she was found. moment this latter change occurs. And
Therefore, it is no longer presumed that petitioner was so it is with the formation of a custom. De
born in the territory of the Philippines since it is already Visscher develops this idea by reflecting
an admitted fact that she was born in the Philippines. that just as some make heavier footprints
than others due to their greater weight,
There are only 64 States which have ratified the
the more influential states of the world
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness as of
mark the way with more vigour and tend
February 2016. 51 Out of the 193 Member-States of
to become the guarantors and defenders
the United Nations, 52 far less than a
of the way forward. 53 (Emphasis
majority signified their agreement to the Convention.
supplied)
One of the essential elements of customary
Prof. Shaw concludes, "Accordingly, custom should to
international law is the widespread and consistent
some extent mirror the perceptions of the majority of
practice by states of a specific international principle,
states, since it is based upon usages which are
in this case, that foundlings are presumed to be born
practiced by nations as they express their power and
to parents who are citizens of the state where the
their hopes and fears." 54
foundling is found. Petitioner failed to prove this
objective element. Prof. Malcolm N. Shaw, in his Petitioner manifestly failed to show that Article 2
widely used textbook International Law, explains the of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness is
meaning of widespread and consistent practice in this an "established, widespread and consistent
way: practice" of a majority of sovereign states. There is
no showing that this Convention was in fact enforced
One particular analogy that has
or practiced by at least a majority of the members of
been used to illustrate the general nature
the United Nations. Petitioner claims that "ratification
of customary law as considered by de
by a majority of states is not essential for a principle
Visscher. He likened the growth of
contained in an international treaty or convention to be
custom to the gradual formation of a road
across vacant land. After an initial 'customary international law.'" 55 On the other hand, it
is generally accepted by international law writers that
uncertainty as to direction,
the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness
does not constitute customary international law nationality by foundlings. 58 This means that the
precisely because of the small number of states that majority of the contracting states to the Convention do
have ratified the Convention. Dr. Laura van Waas not automatically confer nationality to foundlings at
summarizes the state of the law on this issue: AIDSTE birth. In fact, the majority of the contracting states
impose various conditions for the acquisition of
In order to contend that a rule of
nationality to prevent statelessness, such as proof of
customary international law has thereby
unknown parentage, the specific place where the
been established, we must also prove
foundling is found, and whether the foundling is a
that states are legislating in this way due
newborn infant or a child of a certain age, among
to the conviction that they are legally
others. These conditions must necessarily be
compelled to do so — the opinio juris
established in the appropriate proceeding before the
sive necessitatis. The codification of
foundling can acquire citizenship. These conditions for
the obligation to grant nationality to
the acquisition of citizenship effectively prevent a
foundlings in the 1930 Hague
foundling from being automatically considered a citizen
Convention and the 1961
at birth. In the Philippines, such conditions will prevent
Statelessness Convention cannot be
a foundling from being considered a natural-born
taken as sufficient evidence due,
citizen as defined under the Philippine Constitution.
mainly, to the low number of state
parties to both Since the first essential element for an
instruments. 56 (Emphasis supplied) international rule to be considered a customary
international law is missing in this case, the second
It is hornbook law that there is no general
essential element of opinio juris is logically lacking as
international law, whether customary international law
well. In fact, petitioner failed to demonstrate that any
or generally accepted principle of international law,
compliance by member states with the
obligating the Philippines, or any state for that matter,
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was
to automatically confer citizenship to foundlings at
obligatory in nature. In Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 59 the
birth. As Prof. Serena Forlati writes: "It is thus not
Court held:
possible to conclude that every child who would
otherwise be stateless is automatically entitled to the Absent the widespread/consistent-
nationality of her or his country of birth under the practice-of-states factor, the second or
ICCPR, the CRC or general international law." 57 the psychological element must be
deemed non-existent, for an
Out of the 64 parties to the Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness, only 13 states provide inquiry on why states behave the way
they do presupposes, in the first place,
for the automatic and unconditional acquisition of
that they are actually behaving, as a
 matter of settled and consistent practice, The Philippines is not a signatory to the 1930
in a certain manner. This implicitly Hague Convention or to the Convention on the
requires belief that the practice in Reduction of Statelessness. However, the Philippines
question is rendered obligatory by the is a signatory to the Convention on the Rights of the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. Like Child and to the International Covenant on Civil and
the first element, the second element has Political Rights. The Philippines also adheres to the
likewise not been shown to be present. Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Moreover, aside from the fact that the The salient provisions of the CRC, the ICCPR
Philippines is not a contracting party to the and the UDHR on nationality establish principles that
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Article are considered customary international law because of
2 of the Convention is inapplicable to this case the widespread and consistent practice of states and
because the Convention, which took effect after the their obligatory nature among states. Generally, most
birth of petitioner, does not have retroactive effect. states recognize the following core nationality
Paragraph 3, Article 12 of the Convention explicitly provisions: (1) every human being has a right to a
states: nationality; (2) states have the obligation to avoid
statelessness; and (3) states have the obligation to
3. The provisions of Article 2 of this
facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons,
Convention shall apply only to foundlings
including foundlings living within such states.
found in the territory of a Contracting
State after the entry into force of the Right to a Nationality
Convention for that State. (Emphasis
Article 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human
supplied)
Rights affirms that "everyone has the right to a
In short, even if the Philippines were to ratify the nationality." With these words, the international
Convention today, the Convention would still not community recognizes that every individual,
benefit petitioner who was born in 1968. everywhere in the world, should hold a legal bond of
D. Applicable Customary International Law on nationality with a state. 60
Citizenship of Foundlings The right to a nationality is a fundamental
While there is no customary international law human right 61 from which springs the realization of
conferring nationality to foundlings at birth, there is no other cardinal human rights. Possession of a
dispute that petitioner has the right to a nationality and nationality carries with it the diplomatic protection of
the corollary right to be protected against the country of nationality and is also often a legal or
statelessness. practical requirement for the exercise of political and
civil rights. Consequently, the right to a nationality has Considering that there is no conventional or
been described as the "right to have rights." 62 customary international law automatically conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth, there are only two
Obligation to Avoid Statelessness
general principles of international law applicable to
Closely linked to the right of the individual to a foundlings. First is that a foundling is deemed
nationality is every state's obligation to avoid domiciled in the country where the foundling is
statelessness since the non-fulfillment of such right found. A foundling is merely considered to have
results in statelessness. 63 In determining who are its a domicile at birth, not a nationality at birth. Stated
nationals, every state has an obligation to avoid cases otherwise, a foundling receives at birth a domicile of
of statelessness. origin which is the country in which the foundling is
Obligation to Facilitate the Naturalization of found. 64 Second, in the absence of proof to the
Stateless Persons, Including Foundlings contrary, a foundling is deemed born in the country
where the foundling is found. 65 These two general
The right to confer nationality, being an inherent principles of international law have nothing to do with
right of every independent state, carries with it the conferment of nationality. AaCTcI
obligation to grant nationality to individuals who would
otherwise be stateless. To do this, states must F. Status of International Law Principles in the
facilitate the naturalization of stateless persons, Philippines
including foundlings. Therefore, states must institute Under Section 3, Article II of the 1935
the appropriate processes and mechanisms, through Constitution, 66 Section 3, Article II of the 1973
the passage of appropriate statutes or guidelines, to Constitution, 67 and Section 2, Article II of the 1987
comply with this obligation. Constitution, 68 the Philippines adopts the generally
Most states recognize as customary accepted principles of international law as part of the
international law the right of every human being to a law of the land. International law can become part of
nationality which in turn, requires those states to avoid domestic law either by transformation or
statelessness, and to facilitate the naturalization of incorporation. 69 The transformation method requires
stateless persons, including foundlings. However, that an international law be transformed into a
there is no customary international law conferring domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such
automatically citizenship at birth to foundlings, much as domestic legislation. 70 The incorporation method
less natural-born citizenship at birth as understood applies when, by mere constitutional declaration,
under the Philippine Constitution. international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law. 71 The Philippine Constitution adheres
E. General Principle of International Law to the incorporation method.
Applicable to Foundlings
 Any treaty, customary international law, or of the provision. Later, however, during
generally accepted international law principle has the the period of
status of municipal statutory law. As such, it must amendment, Commissioner Azcuna
conform to our Constitution in order to be valid in the clarified this by saying that generally
Philippines. If a treaty, customary international law or accepted principles of international
generally accepted international law principle does not law were made part only of statutory
contravene the Constitution and statutory laws, then it law and not of constitutional
becomes part of the law of the land. If a treaty, law. 73 (Emphasis supplied)
customary international law or generally accepted Treaties, customary international law and the
international law principle conforms to the Constitution generally accepted principles of international law
but conflicts with statutory law, what prevails is the concerning citizenship cannot prevail over the
later law in point of time as international law has the provisions of the Constitution on citizenship in case of
same standing as municipal statutory conflict with the latter. 74 Treaties, customary
law. 72 However, if a treaty, customary international international law or generally accepted international
law or generally accepted international law principle law principles on acquisition of citizenship that
conflicts with the Constitution, it is the Constitution that contravene the language and intent of the Constitution
prevails. The Constitution remains supreme and cannot be given effect in the Philippines for being
prevails over any international legal instrument or unconstitutional.
principle in case of conflict. In explaining Section 2,
Article II of the 1987 Constitution, the constitutionalist Assuming arguendo that there was in 1935 and
Father Joaquin Bernas, S.J. narrated: thereafter a customary international law conferring
nationality to foundlings at birth, still foundlings could
When Commissioner Guingona asked not be considered as natural-born Filipino citizens
whether "generally accepted principles of since to treat them as such would conflict with the
international law" were adopted by this concept of jus sanguinis under the 1935 Constitution.
provision as part of statutory law or of As stated, in case of conflict between customary
constitutional law, Nolledo's answer was international law and the Constitution, it is the
unclear. He seemed to suggest that at Constitution that prevails. The 1935 Constitution
least the provisions of the United Nations clearly required blood relation to the father to establish
Charter would form part of both the natural-born citizenship of a child. The 1935
constitutional and statutory law. Nobody Constitution did not contain any provision expressly or
adverted to the fact that Nolledo's impliedly granting Filipino citizenship to
interpretation was a departure from what foundlings on the basis of birth in the Philippines (jus
had hitherto been the accepted meaning soli or law of the soil), 75 with the presumption of
Filipino parentage so as to make them natural-born Foundlings as Naturalized Filipino Citizens
citizens. If a child's parents are neither Filipino citizens,
Even assuming there was in 1935 and the only way that the child may be considered a
thereafter a customary international law granting to Filipino citizen is through the process of naturalization
foundlings citizenship at birth, such citizenship at birth in accordance with statutory law under paragraph (5),
is not identical to the citizenship of a child who is Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution. If a
biologically born to Filipino parents. The citizenship of child's parents are unknown, as in the case of a
a foundling can be granted at birth by operation of law, foundling, there is no basis to consider the child as a
but the foundling is considered "naturalized in natural-born Filipino citizen since there is no proof that
accordance with law" and not a natural-born citizen. either the child's father or mother is a Filipino citizen.
Since a foundling's nationality is merely granted by Thus, the only way that a foundling can be considered
operation of statutory law, specifically customary a Filipino citizen under the 1935 Constitution, as well
international law (which has the status of statutory law) as under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is for the
assuming such exists, a foundling can only be deemed foundling to be naturalized in accordance with law.
a Filipino citizen under paragraph 5, Section 1 of In the Philippines, there are laws which provide
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution which refers to for the naturalization of foreigners. These are
naturalized Filipino citizens. To add another category Commonwealth Act No. 473, 76 as amended by
of natural-born Filipino citizens, particularly foundlings Republic Act No. 530, known as the Revised
born in the Philippines whose parents are unknown, Naturalization Law, which refers to judicial
conflicts with the express language and intent of the naturalization, and Republic Act No. 9139, 77 which
1935 Constitution to limit natural-born Filipino citizens pertains to administrative naturalization.
to those whose fathers are Filipino citizens.
Significantly, there is no Philippine statute which
In short, there is a difference between provides for the grant of Filipino citizenship specifically
citizenship at birth because of jus soli, and citizenship to foundlings who are found in the Philippines. The
at birth because of jus sanguinis. The former may be absence of a domestic law on the naturalization of
granted to foundlings under Philippine statutory law foundlings can be sufficiently addressed by customary
pursuant to paragraph (5), Section 1 of Article IV of the international law, which recognizes the right of every
1935 Constitution but the Philippine citizenship thus human being to a nationality and obligates states to
granted is not that of a natural-born citizen but that of a grant nationality to avoid statelessness. Customary
naturalized citizen. Only those citizens at birth because international law can fill the gap in our municipal
of jus sanguinis, which requires blood relation to a statutory law on naturalization of foundlings in order to
parent, are natural-born Filipino citizens under the prevent foundlings from being stateless. Otherwise, a
1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
 foundling found in the Philippines with no known recognition by the Philippines that the foundling is
parents will be stateless on the sole ground that there indeed its citizen. Thus, the application for citizenship
is no domestic law providing for the grant of nationality. may be as simple as applying for a Philippine
This not only violates the right of every human being to passport, which serves as evidence of
a nationality but also derogates from the Philippines' citizenship. 78 An application for a passport is an
obligation to grant nationality to persons to avoid application for recognition that the holder is a citizen of
statelessness. the state issuing such passport. In the case of
petitioner, she applied for, and was issued a Philippine
 
passport on the following dates: (1) 4 April 1988; 79 (2)
Customary international law has the same 5 April 1993; 80 (3) 19 May 1998; 81 (4) 13 October
status as a statute enacted by Congress. Thus, it must 2009; 82 (5) 19 December 2013; 83 and (6) 18 March
not run afoul with the Constitution. Customary 2014. 84
international law cannot validly amend the Constitution
In any event, for a foundling to be granted
by adding another category of natural-born Filipino
citizenship, it is necessary that the child's status as a
citizens, specifically by considering foundlings with no
foundling be first established. It must be proven that
known parents as natural-born citizens. Again, under
the child has no known parentage before the state can
paragraphs (3) and (4) of Section 1, Article IV of the
grant citizenship on account of the child being a
1935 Constitution, in relation to Sections 1 and 2,
foundling. In the Philippines, a child is determined to
Article IV of the 1987 Constitution, only those born of
be a foundling after an administrative investigation
Filipino fathers or Filipino mothers are considered
verifying that the child is of unknown parentage. The
natural-born Filipino citizens.
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of Act No.
Applying customary international law to the 3753 85 and Other Laws on Civil Registration provide
present case, specifically the right of every human that the barangay captain or police authority shall
being to a nationality and the Philippines' obligation to certify that no one has claimed the child or no one has
grant citizenship to persons who would otherwise be reported a missing child with the description of the
stateless, a foundling may be naturalized as a Filipino foundling. 86 Rule 29 of the said IRR provides:
citizen upon proper application for citizenship. This
RULE 29. Requirements for Registration
application should not be interpreted in the strictest
of Foundling. — No foundling shall be
sense of the word. On the contrary, the term
recorded in the civil registrar unless the
"application" for purposes of acquiring citizenship must
following requirements are complied with:
be construed liberally in order to facilitate the
naturalization of foundlings. The application for
citizenship may be any overt act which involves
 a) Certificate of Foundling (OCRG Form is a necessary act to acquire Philippine citizenship,
No. 101, Revised January 1993) preventing the foundling from being a natural-born
accomplished correctly and completely; Filipino citizen. In contrast, for natural-born Filipino
citizens, no factual determination in an administrative
b) Affidavit of the finder stating the facts
proceeding is required to grant citizenship since the
and circumstances surrounding the
certificate of live birth speaks for itself — it establishes
finding of the child, and the fact that the
natural-born citizenship. SDHTEC
foundling has been reported to the
barangay captain or to the police Erroneous Interpretation of Statistics
authority, as the case may be; and During the Oral Arguments, the Solicitor
c) Certification of General insisted that petitioner is a natural-born
the barangay captain or police Filipino citizen based on the 99.93% statistical
authority regarding the report made probability that any child born in the Philippines from
by the finder, stating among other 2010 to 2014 would be a natural-born Filipino citizen.
things, that no one has claimed the From 1965 to 1975, there is a 99.83% statistical
child or no one has reported a probability that a child born in the Philippines would be
missing child whose description may a natural-born Filipino citizen. To buttress his position,
be the same as the foundling as of the the Solicitor General presented a certification from the
date of the certification. (Emphasis Philippine Statistics Authority showing the "number of
supplied) foreign and Filipino children born in the
Philippines: 1965-1975 and 2010-2014."
Before a foundling is conferred Philippine citizenship,
there must first be a factual determination of the child's This is grave error.
status as a foundling after an administrative There is no law or jurisprudence which supports
investigation. Once factually determined that a child is the Solicitor General's contention that natural-born
a foundling, that child through its guardian may citizenship can be conferred on a foundling based
thereafter initiate proceedings to apply for Philippine alone on statistical probability. Absent any legal
citizenship, e.g., apply for a Philippine passport. foundation for such argument, the Solicitor General
This need for a factual determination prevents cannot validly conclude that a 99.93% (or 99.83%)
the foundling from automatically acquiring Philippine statistical probability that a foundling born in the
citizenship at birth. The fact of unknown parentage Philippines is a natural-born Filipino citizen legally
must first be proven in an administrative proceeding confers on such foundling natural-born citizenship.
before a foundling is granted citizenship on account of There is no constitutional provision or statute that
the child's foundling status. Such factual determination
confers natural-born citizenship based on statistical General's proposition is fallacious in concluding that
probability. foundlings in the Philippines are natural-born Filipino
citizens.
The Solicitor General's data speak of foreign
and Filipino births in the Philippines. The data Further, if there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%)
collected show the number of foreign and Filipino probability that a child born in the Philippines is a
children born in the Philippines during the periods natural-born Filipino citizen, it does not automatically
covered. This means that the figures reflect the total follow that there is a 99.93% (or 99.83%) probability
number of children born in the Philippines with known that a foundling born in the Philippines is a natural-
parents, either Filipino or foreigner. The data do not born Filipino citizen. The data, if any, on the universe
show the number of foundlings (those with unknown of foundlings may show a different statistical
parentage) born in the Philippines from 1965 to 1975 probability. There is evidently no such statistical data.
and from 2010 to 2014. The data also do not show the Therefore, the Solicitor General's argument that the
number of foundlings who were later determined to probability that a foundling born in the Philippines
have Filipino parentage. This is precisely because would be a natural-born Filipino is 99.93% (or 99.83%)
foundlings have unknown parents. A foundling's based on the number of children born in the
unknown parentage renders it quite difficult, if not Philippines with known parents is glaringly non-
impossible, to collect data on "the number of foreign sequitur.
and Filipino foundlings." The following exchange between Justice Carpio
For the Solicitor General's proposition to be and the Solicitor General illustrates the fallacy of the
correct, he should have presented statistics specifically so-called 99.93% (99.83%) statistical probability
based on the number of foundlings born in the advanced by the Solicitor General. Such statistical
Philippines, and not on the number of children born in probability would result in patent absurdities.
the Philippines with known foreign or Filipino parents. JUSTICE CARPIO:
Children with known parents constitute a class entirely
different from foundlings with unknown parents. Now, how does the Constitution define
Gathering data from the number of children born in the natural-born citizen?
Philippines with known parents to determine the xxx xxx xxx
number of foundlings born in the Philippines to confer
natural-born citizenship on foundlings resembles SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
comparing apples with oranges and avocados. Since Natural-born citizens of the Philippines
the figures were collected from the universe of children from birth without having to perform
with known parents, either Filipinos or foreigners, and
not from the universe of foundlings, the Solicitor
 any act to acquire or perfect their SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
citizenship. It's possible for Filipinos to have blue eyes,
JUSTICE CARPIO: Your Honor.
Okay. Let us assume that an infant is JUSTICE CARPIO:
found, a three-day infant is found Blonde hair?
today in front of the Manila
Cathedral. The infant has blue SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
eyes, blonde hair, milky white It's possible Your Honor.
skin. The parish priest looks
around and doesn't find any one JUSTICE CARPIO:
claiming the child. So, the parish How many percent?
priest goes to the DSWD, turns
over the child to the DSWD. The SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
DSWD conducts an investigation, Again, Your Honor, if we are looking at
a formal investigation, to find out percentage. . . .
if the biological parents are
JUSTICE CARPIO:
around if they can be found.
Nobody comes out, so the DSWD How many percent of Filipinos, natural-
issues a foundling certificate, born, have blue eyes, blonde hair,
okay. What is the nationality of white skin, 99.9 percent?
the child? Is the child a natural- SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
born citizen of the Philippines?
I don't know about the specific numbers. . .
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: ..
I would consider the child a natural- xxx xxx xxx
born citizen of the Philippines
because 99.9 percent of the time,  
that child will be a natural-born JUSTICE CARPIO:
citizen.
You don't have the statistics.
JUSTICE CARPIO:
xxx xxx xxx
So even if the child has blue eyes, blonde
hair, Caucasian skin. . . SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
I don't, Your Honor, I don't. at all, would you say they are
natural-born citizens of the
xxx xxx xxx
Philippines?
JUSTICE CARPIO:
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
So, you would say that every child born in
Well, it's possible for Caucasians to be
the Philippines who has blue eyes,
Filipinos, Your Honor, and natural-
blonde hair, white skin, whose
born Filipinos.
parents cannot be found, and there
is a certificate by the DSWD that's a JUSTICE CARPIO:
foundling, they are all natural-born If their parents are Filipinos.
citizens of the Philippines. If Filipino.
... SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY: Yes, exactly, Your Honor.
Your Honor, I am not threatened by people JUSTICE CARPIO:
with blue eyes and, you know, But if you don't know who their parents. . . .
blonde. . .
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Then I, again, would go back to 99.9
Yes, but my question is, what is the percent, which is a rather
nationality of those children, of comfortable number for me.
those infants?
JUSTICE CARPIO:
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Yes, but how many percent of Filipinos
Natural-born Filipinos still, Your Honor. have blue eyes, blonde hair and
xxx xxx xxx white skin?
JUSTICE CARPIO: SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
Supposing now, there is a DNA taken That is an irrelevant fact for me, Your
from the child[ren], you say they Honor. I'm not looking at the class
are natural-born citizens. The of citizens. . . .
DNA shows that they have xxx xxx xxx
Caucasian genes, no Asian genes
 JUSTICE CARPIO: Section 8. Who May Be Adopted. — The
following may be adopted:
You have to look at the statistics also.
(a) Any person below eighteen (18) years
SOLICITOR GENERAL HILBAY:
of age who has been administratively or
Yes, Your Honor, of course. 87 (Emphasis judicially declared available for adoption;
supplied)
(b) The legitimate son/daughter of one
For the Solicitor General to assert that a spouse by the other spouse;
foundling with blond hair, blue eyes, and milky white
(c) An illegitimate son/daughter by a
Caucasian skin, with no Asian gene in the foundling's
qualified adopter to improve his/her
DNA, is a natural-born Filipino citizen, is the height of
status to that of legitimacy;
absurdity. The Solicitor General's position amends the
Constitution and makes jus soli the governing principle (d) A person of legal age if, prior to the
for foundlings, contrary to the jus sanguinis principle adoption, said person has been
enshrined in the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. consistently considered and treated by
the adopter(s) as his/her own child since
Philippine Laws and Jurisprudence on Adoption
minority;
Not Determinative of Natural-Born Citizenship
(e) A child whose adoption has been
During the Oral Arguments, the Chief Justice
previously rescinded; or
cited Republic Act No. 8552 (RA 8552) or
the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998 and Republic Act (f) A child whose biological or adoptive
No. 8043 (RA 8043) or the Inter-Country Adoption Act parent(s) has died: Provided, That no
of 1995 in arguing that there are domestic laws which proceedings shall be initiated within six
govern the citizenship of foundlings. (6) months from the time of death of said
parent(s). HESIcT
This is an obvious mistake.
RA 8053, Section 8
The term "natural-born Filipino citizen" does not
appear in these statutes describing qualified adoptees. Sec. 8. Who May be Adopted. — Only a
In fact, while the term "Filipino" is mentioned, it is legally free child may be the subject of
found only in the title of RA 8552 and RA 8043. The inter-country adoption. . . . .
texts of these adoption laws do not contain the term Clearly, there is no specific provision in these
"Filipino." Specifically, the provisions on the qualified adoption laws requiring that adoptees must be
adoptees read: Filipinos, much less natural-born Filipinos. These
RA 8552, Section 8 adoption laws do not distinguish between a Filipino
child and an alien child found in the Philippines, and amend the law either by abridging or
thus these adoption laws apply to both Filipino and expanding its scope. (Emphasis
alien children found in the Philippines. In other words, supplied)
either Filipino or alien children found in the Philippines, In Hijo Plantation, Inc. v. Central Bank of the
over which the Philippine government exercises Philippines, 90 the Court ruled:
jurisdiction as they are presumed domiciled in the
Philippines, may be subject to adoption under RA 8552 . . . [I]n case of discrepancy
or RA 8043. between the basic law and a rule or
regulation issued to implement said law,
However, the Implementing Rules and the basic law prevails because said rule
Regulations of RA 8552, issued by the Department of or regulation cannot go beyond the terms
Social Welfare and Development, provide that they and provisions of the basic law. Rules
shall "apply to the adoption in the Philippines of that subvert the statute cannot be
a Filipino child by a Filipino or alien qualified to adopt sanctioned.
under Article III, Section 7 of RA 8552." 88 The IRR, in
effect, restricted the scope of RA 8552 when the IRR In Cebu Oxygen & Acetylene Co., Inc. v.
expressly limited its applicability to the adoption of a Drilon, 91 the Court stated:
Filipino child when the law itself, RA 8552, does not . . . [I]t is a fundamental rule that
distinguish between a Filipino and an alien child. In implementing rules cannot add or
such a case, the IRR must yield to the clear terms of detract from the provisions of law it is
RA 8552. Basic is the rule that the letter of the law is designed to implement. The provisions
controlling and cannot be amended by an of Republic Act No. 6640, do not prohibit
administrative rule. In Perez v. Phil. Telegraph and the crediting of CBA anniversary wage
Telephone Co., 89 the Court declared: increases for purposes of compliance
At the outset, we reaffirm the time- with Republic Act No. 6640. The
honored doctrine that, in case of implementing rules cannot provide for
conflict, the law prevails over the such a prohibition not contemplated by
administrative regulations the law.
implementing it. The authority to Administrative regulations
promulgate implementing rules proceeds adopted under legislative authority by
from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or a particular department must be in
regulation must conform to and be harmony with the provisions of the
consistent with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole
enabling statute. As such, it cannot
 purpose of carrying into effect its Does it say there that the adoptee must be
general provisions. The law itself a citizen of the Philippines?
cannot be expanded by such COMMISSIONER LIM:
regulations. An administrative agency
cannot amend an act of Yes, Your Honor.
Congress. (Emphasis supplied) JUSTICE CARPIO:
The following exchange during the Oral . . . Can you read Section 8.
Arguments highlights the Chief Justice's glaringly
erroneous interpretation of RA 8552 and RA 8043, COMMISSIONER LIM:
thus: I stand corrected, Your Honor, it does not
JUSTICE CARPIO: require citizenship.
Okay, Let's go to . . . adoption laws. . . . JUSTICE CARPIO:
[W]e have an adoption law, correct? There is no requirement.
COMMISSIONER LIM: COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: JUSTICE CARPIO:
. . . Republic Act . . .8552? Because the law covers citizens of the
COMMISSIONER LIM: Philippines and children not citizens
of Philippines but found here.
Yes, Your Honor.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
It says who can be adopted, correct? Who
may be adopted? Section 8, JUSTICE CARPIO:
correct? If a foundling cannot be shown to be a
COMMISSIONER LIM: citizen of the Philippines, can we
exercise jurisdiction and have that
Yes, Your Honor. child adopted?
JUSTICE CARPIO: COMMISSIONER LIM:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE CARPIO: JUSTICE CARPIO:
Do we have the power, the State has the Okay. So, the law does not distinguish
power? Yes, because a foundling is whether Philippine citizen or non-
deemed to be domiciled where? Philippine citizen, whether natural
born-Filipinos or naturalized, none.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
There's no distinction?
In the place of his birth.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
That's correct, Your Honor.
If his place [of] birth is unknown, where is
JUSTICE CARPIO:
he presumed to be domiciled?
Okay. Let's go to the Supreme Court . . .
COMMISSIONER LIM:
rule on adoption. We adopted this in
He is presumed to be domiciled in the 2002. What does it say? Who may
territory of the State where the be adopted?
foundling is found.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Any person below 18 years of age. . .
Yes, because the domicile of a foundling is
JUSTICE CARPIO:
presumed to be where he is found.
Does it say that only citizens of the
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Philippines?
Yes, Your Honor.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
No, Your Honor.
That's why the State has jurisdiction over
JUSTICE CARPIO:
him for adoption purposes. And if no
other State will claim him with more There's no. . .
reason, we will have jurisdiction COMMISSIONER LIM:
over a foundling, correct?
Yes, Your Honor.
COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO:
Yes, Your Honor.
 . . .nothing there which says only citizens Okay. It says here applicability, Section 2,
of the Philippines can be adopted. the Rule shall apply to the adoption
in the Philippines of a Filipino child
COMMISSIONER LIM:
by a Filipino or alien qualified to
Yes, Your Honor. adopt. So it limits adoption to
JUSTICE CARPIO: Philippines citizens, to a Filipino
child? caITAC
Precisely because we don't know the
citizenship of a foundling. COMMISSIONER LIM:

COMMISSIONER LIM: Yes, Your Honor.

That's right, Your Honor. JUSTICE CARPIO:

JUSTICE CARPIO: Okay, This is supposed to implement the

law. Can the implementing rules
That's why it's not required that he would restrict the law?
be a Filipino, correct?
COMMISSIONER LIM:
COMMISSIONER LIM:
Water cannot rise higher than its source,
Yes, Your Honor. Your Honor. . .
JUSTICE CARPIO: JUSTICE CARPIO:
Okay. Let's go to the implementing rule Okay.
and regulation of R.A. 8552. . . . . It
says here, this is an implementing COMMISSIONER LIM:
rule and regulation to implement The IRR. . . .
Republic Act 8552. So this was
JUSTICE CARPIO:
promulgated by the administrative
agency, by DSWD, correct? Do you have a decision, jurisprudence for
that, that an Implementing Rule
 
cannot expand and cannot deduct
COMMISSIONER LIM: from what the law provides?
Correct, Your Honor. COMMISSIONER LIM:
JUSTICE CARPIO: I cannot cite one now, Your Honor.
 JUSTICE CARPIO: delivered Baby Rose at the Caloocan Maternity
Hospital but left Baby Rose four days later to the Heart
Okay. Cebu Oxygen v. Drilon, . . . . It says
of Mary Villa, an institution for unwed mothers and
here it is a fundamental rule that
their babies. The Court in Ellis stated:
Implementing Rules cannot add or
detract from the provisions of law it Baby Rose was born on September 26,
is designed to implement. . . . . But 1959, at the Caloocan Maternity Hospital.
this implementing rule says only Four or five days later, the mother of
Filipinos can be adopted. That Rose left her with the Heart of Mary Villa
cannot be done, correct? — an institution for unwed mothers and
their babies — stating that she (the
COMMISSIONER LIM:
mother) could not take of Rose without
Yes, Your Honor. bringing disgrace upon her (the mother's
JUSTICE CARPIO: family.). 95

Fundamental rule, if the Court says In short, Baby Rose was not a foundling because her
fundamental rule, all practicing mother was known. The Court merely mentioned in the
lawyers must know that, correct? decision that Baby Rose was a "citizen of the
Philippines," thus, the local courts have jurisdiction
COMMISSIONER LIM: over her status. The term "natural-born Filipino citizen"
Yes, Your Honor. 92 is not found in the decision.
Moreover, contrary to the opinion of the Chief On the other hand, the case of Duncan involved
Justice during the Oral Arguments, the cases solely the issue of whether or not the person who gave
of Ellis v. Republic of the the consent for adoption, Atty. Corazon de Leon
Philippines 93 and Duncan v. CFI Rizal 94 do not Velasquez, was the proper person required by law to
apply in this case since the Ellis and Duncan cases do give such consent. The unwed mother entrusted the
not involve foundlings or their citizenship. These two baby to Atty. Velasquez who knew the mother. The
cases are about adoption, not about citizenship or Court in Duncan stated:
foundlings. Sometime in May of 1967, the child
In Ellis, the only issue before the Court was subject of this adoption petition,
whether petitioners, not being permanent residents in undisputedly declared as only three days
the Philippines, were qualified to adopt Baby Rose. old then, was turned over by its mother to
The citizenship of the abandoned Baby Rose was not witness Atty. Corazon de Leon
put in issue. Baby Rose's mother was known since she Velasquez. The natural and unwedded
 mother, from that date on to the time of the court that he is really a Filipino. No
the adoption proceedings in court which presumption can be indulged in favor
started in mid-year of said 1967, and up of the claimant of Philippine
to the present, has not bothered to citizenship, and any doubt regarding
inquire into the condition of the child, citizenship must be resolved in favor of
much less to contribute to the livelihood, the State. 99 (Emphasis
maintenance and care of the supplied) ICHDca
same. . . . .We are convinced that in fact This statement in Paa was reiterated in the
said mother had completely and 2009 case of Go, Sr. v. Ramos. 100 Paa and Go lay
absolutely abandoned her child. 96 down three doctrines: First, a person claiming
In short, the baby was not a foundling because the Philippine citizenship has the burden of proving his
mother was known. Again, the Court did not mention claim. Second, there can be no presumption in favor of
the term "natural-born Filipino citizen." Neither did the Philippine citizenship. This negates petitioner's claim to
Court classify the abandoned infant as a Filipino any presumption that she is a natural-born Filipino
citizen. citizen. Third, any doubt on citizenship is resolved
against the person claiming Philippine citizenship.
Burden of Proof
Therefore, a person claiming to be a Filipino citizen,
Any person who claims to be a citizen of the whether natural-born or naturalized, cannot invoke any
Philippines has the burden of proving his or her presumption of citizenship but must establish such
Philippine citizenship. 97 Any person who claims to be citizenship as a matter of fact and not by
qualified to run for the position of President of the presumptions, with any doubt resolved against him or
Philippines because he or she is, among others, a her.
natural-born Filipino citizen, has the burden of proving
While it is the burden of the private respondents
he or she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any doubt
to first prove the fact of disqualification before the
whether or not he or she is natural-born Filipino citizen
petitioner is called upon to defend herself with
is resolved against him or her. The constitutional
countervailing evidence, 101 in this case, there is no
requirement of a natural-born citizen, being an express
dispute that petitioner is a foundling with unknown
qualification for election as President, must be
biological parents. Since petitioner's parentage is
complied with strictly. As the Court ruled in Paa v.
unknown as shown in her Certificate of Live Birth, such
Chan: 98
birth certificate does not show on its face that she is a
It is incumbent upon the natural-born Filipino citizen. This shifted the burden of
respondent, who claims Philippine evidence to petitioner to prove that she is a natural-
citizenship, to prove to the satisfaction of
born Filipino citizen eligible to run as President of the procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and
Philippines. the qualification of the analyst who conducted the
tests. 105 More specifically, they must be evaluated in
Since the Constitution requires that the
accordance with A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC or the
President of the Philippines shall be a natural-born
Rule on DNA Evidence: 106
citizen of the Philippines, it is imperative that petitioner
prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, despite Sec. 9. Evaluation of DNA Testing
the fact that she is a foundling. The burden of evidence Results. — In evaluating the results of
shifted to her when she admitted her status as a DNA testing, the court shall consider the
foundling with no known biological parents. At that following:
moment, it became her duty to prove that she is a (a) The evaluation of the weight of
natural-born Filipino citizen. 102 matching DNA evidence or the relevance
DNA Evidence of mismatching DNA evidence;
As the burden of evidence has shifted to (b) The results of the DNA testing in the
petitioner, it is her duty to present evidence to support light of the totality of the other evidence
her claim that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen, and presented in the case; and that
thus eligible to run for President. The issue of (c) DNA results that exclude the putative
parentage may be resolved by conventional methods parent from paternity shall be conclusive
or by using available modern and scientific proof of non-paternity. If the value of the
means. 103 One of the evidence that she could have Probability of Paternity 107 is less than
presented is deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) 99.9% the results of the DNA testing
evidence 104 which could conclusively show that she shall be considered as corroborative
is biologically (maternally or paternally) related to a evidence. If the value of the Probability of
Filipino citizen, which in turn would determine whether Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen. be a disputable presumption of paternity.
The probative value of such DNA evidence, Petitioner is Not a Natural-Born Filipino Citizen
however, would still have to be examined by the Court.
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, the The 1987 Philippine Constitution is clear: "No
Court would consider, among others things, the person may be elected President unless he is
following data: how the samples were collected, how a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, . . ., and a
they were handled, the possibility of contamination of resident of the Philippines for at least ten years
the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the immediately preceding such election." Is petitioner,
samples, whether the proper standards and being a foundling, a natural-born Filipino citizen?
 The answer is clearly no. First, there is no merely of municipal statutory law. This means that
Philippine law automatically conferring Philippine customary international law is inferior to the
citizenship to a foundling at birth. Even if there were, Constitution, and must yield to the Constitution in case
such a law would only result in the foundling being a of conflict. Since the Constitution adopts the jus
naturalized Filipino citizen, not a natural-born Filipino sanguinis principle, and identifies natural-born Filipino
citizen. citizens as only those whose fathers or mothers are
Filipino citizens, then petitioner must prove that either
Second, there is no legal presumption in favor
her father or mother is a Filipino citizen for her to be
of Philippine citizenship, whether natural-born or
considered a natural-born Filipino citizen. Any
naturalized. Citizenship must be established as a
international law which contravenes the jus
matter of fact and any doubt is resolved against the
sanguinis principle in the Constitution must of course
person claiming Philippine citizenship.
be rejected.
Third, the letter and intent of the 1935
Sixth, petitioner failed to discharge her burden
Constitution clearly excluded foundlings from being
to prove that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen.
considered natural-born Filipino citizens. The
Being a foundling, she admitted that she does not
Constitution adopts the jus sanguinis principle, and
know her biological parents, and therefore she cannot
identifies natural-born Filipino citizens as only those
trace blood relation to a Filipino father or mother.
whose fathers or mothers are Filipino citizens.
Without credible and convincing evidence that
Petitioner failed to prove that either her father or
petitioner's biological father or mother is a Filipino
mother is a Filipino citizen.
citizen, petitioner cannot be considered a natural-born
Fourth, there is no treaty, customary Filipino citizen.
international law or a general principle of international
Seventh, a foundling has to perform an act, that
law granting automatically Philippine citizenship to a
is, prove his or her status as a foundling, to acquire
foundling at birth. Petitioner failed to prove that there is
Philippine citizenship. This being so, a foundling can
such a customary international law. At best, there
only be deemed a naturalized Filipino citizen because
exists a presumption that a foundling is domiciled, and
the foundling has to perform an act to acquire
born, in the country where the foundling is found.
Philippine citizenship. Since there is no Philippine law
Fifth, even assuming that there is a customary specifically governing the citizenship of foundlings,
international law presuming that a foundling is a citizen their citizenship is addressed by customary
of the country where the foundling is found, or is born international law, namely: the right of every human
to parents possessing the nationality of that country, being to a nationality, and the State's obligations to
such presumption cannot prevail over our Constitution avoid statelessness and to facilitate the naturalization
since customary international law has the status of foundlings. TCAScE
 During the Oral Arguments, the purportedly sad [e]very time the citizenship of a person is
and depressing plight of foundlings if found not to be material or indispensable in a judicial or
natural-born Filipino citizens, particularly their administrative case, whatever the
disqualification from being elected to high public office corresponding court or administrative
and appointed to high government positions, had been authority decides therein as to such
pointed out once again. As I have stated, this appeals citizenship is generally not considered
plainly to human emotions. 108 This emotional plea, as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
however, conveniently forgets the express language of threshed out again and again as the
the Constitution reserving those high positions, occasion may demand. . . . .
particularly the Presidency, exclusively to natural-born Likewise, in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 112 which
Filipino citizens. Even naturalized Filipino citizens, involved the citizenship of Jimmy T. Go, as well as his
whose numbers are far more than foundlings, are not father Carlos, who was alleged to be an illegal and
qualified to run for President. The natural-born undesirable alien in our country and thus was
citizenship requirement under the Constitution to subjected to deportation proceedings, the Court stated
qualify as a candidate for President must be complied that citizenship cases are sui generis and res
with strictly. To rule otherwise amounts to a patent judicata does not apply in such cases:
violation of the Constitution. It is basic in Constitutional
Law that the qualification requirements prescribed by . . . Cases involving
the Constitution must be complied with by all issues on citizenship are sui
presidential candidates, regardless of popularity or generis. Once the citizenship of an
circumstances. Being sworn to uphold and defend the individual is put into question, it
Constitution, the Members of this Court have no other necessarily has to be threshed out and
choice but to apply the clear letter and intent of the decided upon. In the case
Constitution. of Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections, 
we said that decisions declaring the
However, a decision denying natural-born acquisition or denial of citizenship cannot
citizenship to a foundling on the ground of absence of govern a person's future status with
proof of blood relation to a Filipino parent never finality. This is because a person may
becomes final. 109 Res judicata does not apply to subsequently reacquire, or for that
questions of citizenship. In Moy Ya Lim Yao v. matter, lose his citizenship under any of
Commissioner of Immigration, 110 cited in Lee v. the modes recognized by law for the
Commissioner of Immigration, 111 this Court declared purpose. Indeed, if the issue of one's
that: citizenship, after it has been passed
upon by the courts, leaves it still open to
future adjudication, then there is more Consequently, if in the future, petitioner can find
reason why the government should not a DNA match to a Filipino parent, or any other credible
be precluded from questioning one's and convincing evidence showing her Filipino
claim to Philippine citizenship, especially parentage, then petitioner can still be declared a
so when the same has never been natural-born Filipino citizen.
threshed out by any tribunal. Not being a natural-born Filipino citizen,
xxx xxx xxx petitioner is a nuisance candidate whose certificate of
candidacy for President can motu proprio be cancelled
Citizenship proceedings, as
by the COMELEC. In fact, the COMELEC is duty-
aforestated, are a class of its own, in
bound to cancel petitioner's COC because to allow a
that, unlike other cases, res
person who, as found by the COMELEC is not a
judicata does not obtain as a matter of
natural-born Filipino citizen, to run for President makes
course. In a long line of decisions, this
a mockery of the election process. Since petitioner is
Court said that every time the citizenship
not a natural-born Filipino citizen, I deem it irrelevant to
of a person is material or indispensable
discuss the issue of whether petitioner complied with
in a judicial or administrative case,
the ten-year residency requirement to run for
whatever the corresponding court or
President. At any rate, assuming petitioner is a natural-
administrative authority decides therein
born Filipino citizen, which she is not, I concur with
as to such citizenship is generally not
Justice Mariano C. Del Castillo's Dissenting
considered as res judicata; hence, it has
Opinion on the residency issue.
to be threshed out again and again as
the occasion may demand. Res A final word. The Constitution defines natural-
judicata may be applied in cases of born citizens as "those who are citizens of the
citizenship only if the following concur: Philippines from birth without having to perform
any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
1. a person's citizenship must be raised
citizenship." "From birth" means that the possession
as a material issue in a controversy
of natural-born citizenship starts at birth and continues
where said person is a party;
to the present without interruption. The
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized phrase "without having to perform any act to
representative took active part in the acquire or perfect their Philippine
resolution thereof; and citizenship" means that a person is not a natural-born
3. the finding or citizenship is affirmed by Filipino citizen if he or she has to take an oath of
this Court. allegiance before a public official to acquire or
reacquire Philippine citizenship. This precludes the
reacquisition of natural-born citizenship that has been  
lost through renunciation of Philippine citizenship. The ||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
fact that the reacquisition of citizenship is made
Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March
possible only through legislation by Congress —
Republic Act No. 9225 113 — means that Philippine 8, 2016])
citizenship is acquired pursuant to paragraph (4), [G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
Section 1 of Article IV of the 1987 Constitution,
referring to "[t]hose who are naturalized in accordance
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
with law."
LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
In short, natural-born Filipino citizens who have SION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA
renounced Philippine citizenship and pledged C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
allegiance to a foreign country have become aliens,
and can reacquire Philippine citizenship, just like other
aliens, only if "naturalized in accordance with [G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
law." Otherwise, a natural-born Filipino citizen who
has absolutely renounced and abjured allegiance MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
to the Philippines and pledged sole allegiance to the LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
United States, undertaking to bear arms against any SION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S.
foreign country, including the Philippines, when TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND
required by U.S. law, 114 could still become the AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents.
Commander-in Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines by performing a simple act — taking an
oath of allegiance before a Philippine public official — DISSENTING OPINION
to reacquire natural-born Philippine citizenship. The
framers of the Constitution, and the Filipino people
who ratified the Constitution, could not have intended
such an anomalous situation. For this reason, this PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Court should one day revisit the doctrine laid down
in Bengson III v. HRET. 115 I dissent.

ACCORDINGLY, there being no grave abuse of Amid the complexity of the legal issues and
discretion on the part of political implications involved, this Court, in
the Commission on Elections En Banc, I vote ruling on this matter — as in every other similar matter
to DISMISS the petitions. before it — must always harken back to its parameters
of review over rulings of have been done in grave abuse of discretion when the
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). It is on this same was performed in a capricious or whimsical
basic but resolute premise that I submit this dissent. exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so
I.
patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
In Mitra v. COMELEC 1 (Mitra), it was positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a
explained that "[t]he basis for the Court's review duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of
of COMELEC rulings under the standards of Rule 65 law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary
of the Rules of Court is Section 7, Article IX-A of the and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
[1987] Constitution which provides that '[u]nless hostility . . . . An error of judgment committed in the
otherwise provided by the Constitution or by law, any exercise of its legitimate jurisdiction is not the
decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be same as 'grave abuse of discretion.' An abuse of
brought to the Supreme Court on  certiorari by the discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the
aggrieved party within thirty [(30)] days from receipt of issuance of a writ of certiorari. The abuse must be
a copy thereof.' For this reason, the Rules of Court grave and patent, and it must be shown that the
provide for a separate rule (Rule 64) specifically discretion was exercised arbitrarily and
applicable only to decisions of the COMELEC and despotically . . . ." 5
the Commission on Audit. This Rule expressly refers to
In this case, the COMELEC held that petitioner
the application of Rule 65 in the filing of a petition
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner)
for certiorari, subject to the exception clause — 'except
made false representations in her certificate of
as hereinafter provided.'" 2
candidacy (CoC) for President filed on October 15,
"The purpose of a petition 2015 6 (2015 CoC) when she declared under oath that
for certiorari is to determine whether the she is a natural-born citizen of this country and would
challenged tribunal has acted without or be a resident thereof for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave months on the day immediately preceding the May 9,
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or 2016 Elections. 7 Accordingly,
excess of jurisdiction. Thus, any resort to the COMELEC cancelled petitioner's CoC. 8
a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
Finding the verdict to be "deadly diseased with
relation to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
grave abuse of discretion from root to
Civil Procedure is limited to the
fruits," 9 the ponencia nullifies
resolution of jurisdictional issues." 3
the COMELEC's assailed rulings, 10 and even goes to
In Miranda v. Abaya, 4 this Court held that "an the extent of declaring petitioner as an eligible
act of a court or tribunal may only be considered to candidate. 11
 As to its first reason, the ponencia posits that intent, this Court has not been
the COMELEC, in ruling on a petition to deny due niggardly in defining the parameters
course to or cancel a CoC, is restrained "from going of powers of COMELEC in the conduct
into the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for of our elections. 15 (Emphasis and
the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet underscoring supplied)
undecided or undetermined by the proper Likewise, in Bedol v. COMELEC (Bedol): 16
authority." 12 Consequently, "[t]he COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the The quasi-judicial power of
qualification or lack thereof of the candidate." 13 the COMELEC embraces the power to
resolve controversies arising from the
I disagree. enforcement of election laws, and to be
The COMELEC's power to deny due course to the sole judge of all pre-proclamation
or cancel a candidate's CoC stems from Section 2, controversies; . . . . 17 (Emphasis and
Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which grants it the underscoring supplied)
authority to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and Based on the text of the Constitution, and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, bearing in mind the import of cases on the matter,
plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall" and there is no perceivable restriction which qualifies the
to "[d]ecide, except those involving the right to exercise of the COMELEC's adjudicatory power to
vote, all questions affecting elections . . . ." declare a candidate ineligible and thus, cancel his/her
In Loong v. COMELEC, 14 it was elucidated that: CoC with the need of a prior determination coming
Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the from a "proper authority." ATICcS
Constitution gives the COMELEC the Contrary to the ponencia's interpretation,
broad power "to enforce and administer the COMELEC, under Rule 25 of its Resolution No.
all laws and regulations relative to the 9523 18 dated September 25, 2012, may disqualify
conduct of an election, plebiscite, any candidate found by the Commission to be
initiative, referendum[,] and suffering from any disqualification provided by law
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and or the Constitution:
intent of this provision is to
give COMELEC all the necessary and Rule 25 — Disqualification of
incidental powers for it to achieve the Candidates
objective of holding free, orderly, Section 1. Grounds. — Any
honest, peaceful, and candidate who, in an action or protest in
credible elections. Congruent to this which he is a party, is declared by final
 decision of a competent court, guilty to deny due course or to cancel a
of, or found by the Commission to be certificate of candidacy may be filed by
suffering from any disqualification the person exclusively on the ground
provided by law or the Constitution. that any material representation
contained therein as required under
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Section 74 22 hereof is false. The
It is confounding that the ponencia ignores the petition may be filed at any time not later
second prong of the provision and myopically zeroes- than twenty-five days from the time of the
in on the first which but procedurally reflects filing of the certificate of candidacy and
the COMELEC's power to disqualify a candidate shall be decided, after due notice and
already declared by final decision of a competent court hearing, not later than fifteen days before
guilty of any disqualification, such as those accessory the election. (Emphasis and
to a criminal conviction. 19 underscoring supplied)
As edified in Bedol, it is the COMELEC which is As worded, a Section 78 petition is based
the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation exclusively on the ground that a CoC contains a
controversies." 20 Thus, it would greatly emasculate material representation that is false. "The false
the COMELEC's constitutionally-conferred powers by representation contemplated by Section 78 of the
treating it as a mere administrative organ relegated to [OEC] pertains to [a] material fact, and is not simply an
the task of conducting perfunctory reviews only to spot innocuous mistake. A material fact refers to a
falsities on the face of CoCs or ministerially enforce candidate's qualification for elective office such as
declarations from a prior authority. ATICcS one's citizenship and residence." 23
As in this case, a "pre-proclamation While there are decided cases wherein this
controversy" may arise from a petition to deny due Court has stated that "a false representation under
course to or cancel a CoC. This remedy — which is Section 78 must consist of 'a deliberate attempt to
filed before and falls under the adjudicatory jurisdiction mislead, misinform, or hide a fact, which would
of the COMELEC — is governed by Section 78, Article otherwise render a candidate ineligible'", 24 nowhere
IX of Batas Pambansa Bilang 881, otherwise known as does the provision mention this requirement.
the "Omnibus Election Code of the In Tagolino v. House of Representatives Electoral
Philippines" 21 (OEC): Tribunal (Tagolino), 25 this Court enunciated that:
Section 78. Petition to deny due [T]he deliberateness of the
course to or cancel a certificate of misrepresentation, much less one's
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking intent to defraud, is of bare
 significance in a Section 78 petition as fact which pertains to his eligibility and thus
it is enough that the person's qualification to run for public office." 29
declaration of a material qualification
In Hayudini v. COMELEC, 30 this Court, while
in the CoC be false. In this relation,
dealing with a case that involved material
jurisprudence holds that an express
representations pertaining to residency and voter
finding that the person committed any
registration, did not discuss the circumstances which
deliberate misrepresentation is of little
would demonstrate the intent of the candidate behind
consequence in the determination of
his CoC representations. It again parroted precedent
whether one's CoC should be deemed
without any devoted discussion on the matter of
cancelled or not. What remains material
intent. 31
is that the petition essentially seeks to
deny due course to and/or cancel the Similarly, in Jalover v. Osmeña 32 (Jalover) this
CoC on the basis of one's ineligibility and Court just repeated precedent when it said that
that the same be granted without any "[s]eparate from the requirement of materiality, a false
qualification. 26 (Emphasis and representation under Section 78 must consist of a
underscoring supplied) 'deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a
fact, which would otherwise render a candidate
Albeit incorporating the intent requirement into
ineligible,'" 33 but did not apply the same. In fact, a
their respective discussions, a survey of certain cases
closer scrutiny of Jalover, which cited Mitra, would lead
decided after Tagolino only prove to demonstrate the
to the reasonable conclusion that jurisprudence has all
"bare significance" of the said requisite.
the while presumed deliberateness of intent from the
For instance, materiality of the falsity. The quoted passage
in Villafuerte v. COMELEC, 27 this Court echoed from Mitra reads: "[t]he deliberate character of the
precedent, when it stated that "a false representation misrepresentation necessarily follows from a
under Section 78" must be made "with an intention to consideration of the consequences of any material
deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for falsity . . . ." 34 The "separateness" of the requirement
public office." 28 However, this Court never looked into of intent from the requisite of materiality is hence, more
the circumstances that surrounded the candidate's apparent than real. The bottom line according
representation. Instead, it equated deliberateness of to Jalover, citing Mitra, is that "a candidate who
representation with the materiality of the fact being falsifies a material fact cannot run." 35 This statement
represented in the CoC. Thus, it held therein that therefore demonstrates that the intent requirement is
"respondent's nickname 'LRAY JR. MIGZ' written in his but a fictional superfluity, if not anomaly, which is
COC is [not] a material misrepresentation," reasoning actually devoid of its own conceptual relevance. As
that the nickname "cannot be considered a material
such, its existence in jurisprudence only serves as a Notably, the Dissenting Opinion of former
perplexing, if not, hazardous, mirage. Supreme Court Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga
(Justice Tinga)
In the more recent case
in Tecson v. COMELEC 40 (Tecson) explains the
of Agustin v. COMELEC, 36 this Court, while again
irrelevance of the candidate's intention or belief in
quoting the same passages from Mitra, upheld "the
ruling on a Section 78 petition. There, he even pointed
declaration by the COMELEC En Banc" — which was,
out the jurisprudential missteps in the cases
by the way, acting on a Section 78 petition — "that
of Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC 41 (Romualdez-
[therein] petitioner was ineligible to run and be voted
Marcos) and Salcedo II v. COMELEC 42 (Salcedo
for as Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos
II) wherein the phantom requirement of "deliberate
Norte" on the ground that he "effectively repudiated his
intention to mislead" was first foisted:
oath of renunciation" by the use of his US passport
and, thus, "reverted him to his earlier status as a dual [I]n accordance with Section 78, supra,
citizen." 37 Interestingly, this Court, consistent with the the petitioner in a petition to deny due
above-cited passage from Tagolino, stated that "[e]ven course [to or] cancel a certificate of
if it made no finding that the petitioner deliberately candidacy need only prove three
attempted to mislead or misinform as to warrant the elements. First, there is a representation
cancellation of his CoC, the COMELEC could still contained in the certificate of
declare him disqualified for not meeting the required candidacy. Second, the representation is
eligibility under the Local Government Code." 38 required under Section 74. Third, the
representation must be "material," which,
Again, the plain text of Section 78 reads that the
according to jurisprudence, means that it
remedy is based "on the ground that any material
pertains to the eligibility of the candidate
representation contained therein as required under
to the office. Fourth, the representation is
Section 74 hereof is false." It pertains to a material
false.
representation that is false and not a
"material misrepresentation." In my view, the latter is a Asserting that proof of intent to
semantic but impactful misnomer which tends to conceal is also necessary for a petition
obfuscate the sense of the provision as it suggests — under Section 78 to prosper, Mr. Justice
by employing the word "misrepresent," ordinarily Kapunan wrote in Romualdez-Marcos v.
understood to mean as "to give a false or misleading [COMELEC], thus:
representation of usually with an intent to deceive or It is the fact of
be unfair" 39 — that intent is crucial in a Section 78 residence, not a statement
petition, when, in fact, it is not. in a certificate of candidacy
 which ought to be decisive Undeniably, the
in determining whether or question on the citizenship
not an individual has [of] respondent falls within
satisfied the [C]onstitution's the requirement of
residency qualification materiality under Section
requirement. The said 78. However, proof of
statement becomes misrepresentation with a
material only when there is deliberate attempt to
or appears to be a mislead must still be
deliberate attempt to established. In other words,
mislead, misinform, or hide direct and substantial
a fact which would evidence showing that the
otherwise render a person whose certificate of
candidate ineligible. It candidacy is being sought
would be plainly ridiculous to be cancelled or denied
for a candidate to due course, must have
deliberately and knowingly known or have been aware
make a statement in a of the falsehood as
certificate of candidacy appearing on his
which would lead to his or certificate. [Italics in the
her disqualification. [Italics original]
in the original] The pronouncements
The Court, reiterated in Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II,
the Kapunan pronouncement in Salcedo however, are clearly not supported by a
II v. [COMELEC]. CAacTH plain reading of the law. Nowhere in
Section 78 is it stated or implied that
Adverting to Romualdez-
there be an intention to deceive for a
Marcos and Salcedo
certificate of candidacy to be denied
II, the COMELEC En Banc ruled that
due course or be cancelled. All the law
while the element of materiality was not
requires is that the "material
in question the intent to deceive was not
representation contained [in the
established, not even the knowledge of
certificate of candidacy] as required
falsity, thus:
under Section 74 . . . is false." Be it noted
that a hearing under Section 78 and Rule of the pronouncement of only one
23 is a quasi-judicial proceeding where Justice, or 6% of a Supreme Court. While
the intent of the respondent is irrelevant. several other Justices joined Justice
Also drawing on the principles of criminal Kapunan in upholding the residence
law for analogy, the "offense" of material qualification of Rep. Imelda Romualdez-
representation is malum Marcos, they did not share his dictum. It
prohibitum not malum in se. Intent is was his by his lonesome. Justice Puno
irrelevant. When the law speaks in clear had a separate opinion, concurred in by
and categorical language, there is no Justices Bellosillo and Melo. Justice
reason for interpretation or construction, Mendoza filed a separate opinion too, in
but only for application. aScITE which Chief Justice Narvasa concurred.
Justices Romero and Francisco each
The reason for the irrelevance
had separate opinions. Except for Chief
of intent or belief is not difficult to
Justice Narvasa and Justice Mendoza,
divine. Even if a candidate believes
the Justices in the majority voted to grant
that he is eligible and purports to be
Rep. [Marcos's] petition on the ground
so in his certificate of candidacy, but
that she reestablished her domicile in
is subsequently proven in a Rule 23
Leyte upon being widowed by the death
proceeding to be, in fact or in law, not
of former President Marcos.
eligible, it would be utterly foolish to
allow him to proceed with his On the other hand, the reiteration
candidacy. The electorate would be of the Kapunan pronouncement
merely squandering its votes for — in Salcedo is a mere obiter dictum. The
and the COMELEC, its resources in Court dismissed the disqualification
counting the ballots cast in favor of — case on the ground that the respondent's
a candidate who is not, in any case, use of the surname "Salcedo" in her
qualified to hold public office. certificate of candidacy is not a material
representation since the entry does not
The Kapunan pronouncement
refer to her qualification for elective
in the Romualdez-Marcos case did not
office. Being what it is,
establish a doctrine. It is not
the Salcedo obiter cannot elevate
supported by law, and it smacks of
the Kapunan pronouncement to the level
judicial legislation. Moreover, such
of a doctrine regardless of how many
judicial legislation becomes even more
egregious[,] considering that it arises out
 Justices voted for Salcedo. Significantly, law, not by his good faith." 45 With this,
Justice Puno concurred in the result only. the Romualdez-Marcos and Salcedo II rulings which
"judicially legislated" this requirement should,
Thus, in this case, it does not
therefore, be abandoned as legal aberrations.
matter that respondent knows that he
was not a natural-born Filipino citizen Neither is it acceptable to think that the matter
and, knowing such fact, proceeded to of eligibility — particularly, that of a candidate for
state otherwise in his certificate of President — can only be taken up before the
candidacy, with an intent to deceive the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) after a candidate
electorate. A candidate's citizenship has already been voted for.
eligibility in particular is determined The COMELEC's constitutional mandate cannot be
by law, not by his good faith. It was, any clearer: it is empowered to "[e]nforce and
therefore, improper for the COMELEC to administer all laws and regulations relative to the
dismiss the petition on the ground that conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
petitioner failed to prove intent to referendum, and recall" and to "[d]ecide, except those
mislead on the part of involving the right to vote, all questions
respondent. 43 (Emphases and affecting elections . . . ." 46 As observed by Senior
underscoring supplied) Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio in his own opinion
I could not agree more with Justice Tinga's in Tecson:
exposition. Truly, "[n]owhere in Section 78 is it stated This broad constitutional power and
or implied that there be an intention to deceive for a function vested in the COMELEC is
certificate of candidacy to be denied due course or be designed precisely to avoid any situation
cancelled." 44 At the risk of belaboring the point, the where a dispute affecting elections is left
candidate's intent to mislead or misinform on a without any legal remedy. If one who is
material fact stated in his/her CoC is of no obviously not a natural-born Philippine
consequence in ruling on a Section 78 petition. To citizen, like Arnold [Schwarzenegger],
premise a Section 78 petition on a finding of intent or runs for President, the COMELEC is
belief would create a legal vacuum wherein certainly not powerless to cancel the
the COMELEC becomes powerless under the OEC to certificate of candidacy of such
enjoin the candidacy of ineligible presidential candidate. There is no need to wait until
candidates upon a mere showing that the material after the elections before such candidate
representations in his/her CoC were all made in good may be disqualified. 47
faith. It should be emphasized that "[a] candidate's
citizenship eligibility in particular is determined by
 Verily, we cannot tolerate an absurd situation sole judge of all contests
wherein a presidential candidate, who has already relating to the election,
been determined by the COMELEC to have missed a returns, and qualifications
particular eligibility requirement and, thus, had made a of the President or Vice-
false representation in his/her CoC by declaring that President, and may
he/she is eligible, is still allowed to continue his/her promulgate its rules for the
candidacy, and eventually be voted for. The purpose.
proposition 48 that the matter of eligibility should be xxx xxx xxx
left to the PET to decide only after the elections is a
dangerous one for not only does it debase Ordinary usage would
the COMELEC's constitutional powers, it also characterize a "contest" in reference to
effectively results in a mockery of the electoral a post-election scenario. Election
process, not to mention the disenfranchisement of the contests consist of either an election
voters. Clearly, the votes of the Filipino people would protest or a quo warranto which,
be put to waste if we imprudently take away from although two distinct remedies, would
the COMELEC its capability to avert the fielding of have one objective in view, i.e., to
ineligible candidates whose votes therefor shall be dislodge the winning candidate from
only considered stray. The Filipino people deserve to office. A perusal of the phraseology in
know prior to the elections if the person they intend to Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of
vote for is ineligible. In all reasonable likelihood, they the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral
would not have cast their votes for a particular Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme
candidate who would just be ousted from office Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would
later on. support this premise —
At any rate, the jurisdictional boundaries have Rule
already been set: the COMELEC's jurisdiction ends, 12. Jurisdiction. — The
and that of the PET begins, only when a candidate Tribunal shall be the sole
therefor has already been elected, and thereafter, judge of all contests
proclaimed. 49 In Tecson, this Court explained that the relating to the election,
PET's jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the returns, and qualifications
1987 Constitution is limited only to a post-election of the President or Vice-
scenario: President of the
Philippines.
The Supreme Court,
sitting en banc, shall be the
 Rule 13. How contests relating to the election, returns
Initiated. — An election and qualifications of the "President" or
contest is initiated by the "Vice-President," of the Philippines, and
filing of an election protest not of "candidates" for President or
or a petition for quo Vice-President. A quo
warranto against the warranto proceeding is generally defined
President or Vice- as being an action against a person who
President. An election usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds
protest shall not include a or exercises a public office. In such
petition for quo warranto. A context, the election contest can only
petition for quo contemplate a post-election scenario.
warranto shall not include In Rule 14, only a registered candidate
an election who would have received either the
protest. DcHSEa second or third highest number of votes
could file an election protest. This rule
Rule 14. Election
again presupposes a post-election
Protest. — Only the
scenario.
registered candidate for
President or for Vice- It is fair to conclude that the
President of the Philippines jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
who received the second or defined by Section 4, paragraph 7,
third highest number of [Article VII] of the 1987
votes may contest the Constitution, would not include cases
election of the President or directly brought before it, questioning
the Vice-President, as the the qualifications of a candidate for
case may be, by filing a the presidency or vice-presidency
verified petition with the before the elections are
Clerk of the Presidential held. 50 (Emphases supplied)
Electoral Tribunal within Thus, I respectfully object to the ponencia's
thirty (30) days after enfeebling take on the COMELEC's power to
the proclamation of the determine the eligibility of a candidate prior to
winner. the elections.
The rules categorically speak of
the jurisdiction of the tribunal over
 In fact, the ponencia's view is also inconsistent as long as he or she is a natural-born citizen of the
with its declaration that petitioner is "QUALIFIED to be Philippines and a resident thereof for at least ten (10)
a candidate for President in the National and years immediately preceding the elections, among
Local Elections of 9 May 2016." 51 If other requirements. These citizenship and residency
the COMELEC had no power to determine the requirements are delineated in Section 2, Article VII of
eligibility of petitioner, then this Court — which is only the 1987 Constitution:
tasked to exercise its power of review under the Section 2. No person may be
parameters of a petition for certiorari and, thus, should elected President unless he is a natural-
have either nullified or affirmed the assailed rulings — born citizen of the Philippines, a
could not proceed and assume jurisdiction outside of registered voter, able to read and write,
the context of the case before it and make this ad at least forty years of age on the day of
hoc pronouncement. The declaration not only serves the election, and a resident of the
to confuse the true powers of the COMELEC, it also Philippines for at least ten years
distorts the manner of our review. immediately preceding such election.
II. All of the requirements must concur. Otherwise,
The central question in this case, to which the the candidate is ineligible to run for President; and,
analysis of grave abuse of discretion is applied, is hence, a contrary declaration therefor, already
whether or not the representations of petitioner amounts to a false material representation within the
regarding her residency — particularly, that she would ambit of Section 78 of the OEC.
be a resident of this country for ten (10) years and On the issue of residency, the ponencia claims
eleven (11) months on the day immediately preceding that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in
the May 9, 2016 Elections — and her citizenship — concluding that petitioner falsely represented in her
particularly, that she is a natural-born citizen of the 2015 CoC that she is a resident of the Philippines for
Philippines — in her 2015 CoC are false. Notably, a at least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months
finding of falsity even as to one representation would immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 Elections as,
already be enough for the COMELEC to deny due in fact, it found her representation to be true. 52 In so
course to or cancel her 2015 CoC. To recount, Section finding, the ponencia gave credence to the voluminous
74 — to which the false representation ground under and undisputed evidence which petitioner presented
Section 78 of the OEC relates to — provides that "[t]he showing that she and her family abandoned their US
certificate of candidacy shall state that the person filing domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good,
it is announcing his candidacy for the office stated which began on her arrival on May 24, 2005. 53 It also
therein and that he is eligible for said office . . . ." A pointed out that petitioner's entry in the Philippines
candidate is eligible to run for the post of President for
visa-free as a balikbayan should not be taken against reestablished her residence in the Philippines was
her since, consistent with the purpose of the law, she when she reacquired her Filipino citizenship in July
actually reestablished life here. 54 Finally, 2006.
the ponencia disregarded petitioner's prior statement  
in her 2012 CoC for Senator wherein she declared to
be a resident of the Philippines for six years (6) years In Coquilla, the Court ruled that an alien, such
and six (6) months before May 13, 2013, thus implying as petitioner, may waive his/her status as a non-
that she started being a Philippine resident only in resident and thus, become a resident alien by
November 2006. 55 obtaining an immigrant visa under the Philippine
Immigration Act of 1948 and an Immigrant Certificate
I beg to differ. DHITCc
of Residence. Prior to this waiver, he/she is a visitor, a
"To successfully effect a change of domicile[,] non-resident alien. 60 Hence, without this waiver,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual petitioner remained to be a visitor or a non-resident
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of alien until July 2006. DACcIH
abandoning the former place of residence and
On the other hand, in Japzon, the Court
establishing a new one and definite acts which
declared that reacquisition under Republic Act No.
correspond with the purpose. In other words, there
(RA) 9225, 61 otherwise known as the "Citizenship
must basically be animus manendi coupled
Retention and Reacquisition Act of 2003," has no
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain
automatic impact on a candidate's domicile as he/she
in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite
only had the option to again establish his/her
period of time; the change of residence must be
domicile. 62
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for
the new domicile must be actual." 56 Meanwhile, in Caballero, this Court held that a
candidate must still prove that after becoming a
In ruling that petitioner failed to reestablish her
Philippine citizen, he/she had reestablished his new
domicile in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 as she
domicile of choice. 63
claimed, the COMELEC primarily observed that all of
the evidence presented by petitioner were executed To my mind,
before July 2006, which is the date of reacquisition of the COMELEC's reliance on Coquilla is apt. As the
her Filipino citizenship. Citing the cases records disclose, petitioner returned to the
of Coquilla v. COMELEC (Coquilla), 57 Japzon v. CO Philippines on May 24, 2005 under
MELEC (Japzon), 58 and Caballero v. COMELEC (C the Balikbayan Program, 64 and therefore, only
aballero), 59 the COMELEC pronounced that the obtained the status of a temporary resident.
earliest possible date that she could have Specifically, Section 3 of RA 6768, 65 as amended by
RA 9174, 66 merely accorded her the benefit of visa- Philippine Schools for the school year 2005 to 2006;
free entry to the Philippines for a period of one (1) and purchased a condominium unit in the Philippines
year: in the second half of 2005, 67 petitioner never
bothered applying for permanent residency up until
Section 3. Benefits and Privileges
July 2006, 68 which is the date when she reacquired
of the Balikbayan. — The balikbayan and
Filipino citizenship under RA 9225, and consequently,
his or her family shall be entitled to the
waived her status as a non-resident alien. This means
following benefits and privileges:
that from her return on May 24, 2005 up until July
xxx xxx xxx 2006, she, despite the above-mentioned overt acts,
(c) Visa-free entry to the stayed in the Philippines only as a temporary resident.
Philippines for a period of If at all, her inattention to legitimize her so-called
one (1) year for foreign "permanent residence" in the Philippines in
passport holders, with the accordance with our Immigration Laws stamps a
exception of restricted significant question mark on her animus
nationals[.] (Emphasis and manendi and animus non revertendi on May 24, 2005.
underscoring supplied) Thus, the COMELEC can hardly be blamed from
reaching its ruling as petitioner's intention to
As such, since she did not waive her status of permanently reside in the Philippines and to abandon
being a non-resident alien, her stay here upon her the US as her domicile on May 24, 2005 were,
return on May 24, 2005 up until she reacquired based on reasonable premises, shrouded in
Philippine citizenship in July 2006 should only be doubt. aScITE
considered as temporary.
At any rate, the overt acts on which petitioner
While it is not entirely indispensable that one premises her claims are insufficient to prove
first acquires the status of a permanent resident in her animus manendi and animus non-revertendi. In
order to reestablish his/her domicile in the Philippines, fact, same as her failure to promptly address her
it is, nonetheless, highly indicative of his/her animus permanent residency status, some of these overt acts
manendi and animus non revertendi. While it is might even exhibit her ambivalence to reestablish her
undisputed that petitioner resigned from her work in domicile in the Philippines on May 24, 2005. For
the US in 2004; acquired, together with her husband, instance, while she purchased a condominium unit in
quotations and estimates from property movers the Philippines in the second half of 2005 (which
regarding the relocation of all their goods, furniture, period is even past May 24, 2005), records unveil that
and cars from the US to the Philippines as early as petitioner had other real properties in the US, one of
March 2005; enrolled two (2) of her children in which was purchased in 1992 and another in
2008. 69 Relevantly, these dates are before and after I further observe that the need for stronger proof
May 24, 2005. Likewise, petitioner's correspondence becomes more apparent when the person involved is
with the property movers in the US in the first half of one who has been domiciled in another country as part
2005 falters, in light of the fact that she and her of his/her naturalization as a citizen therein. As such,
husband commenced actual negotiations for their while citizenship and residency are different from and
transfer only in the following year, or in January 2006, independent of each other — this, being the key
months after May 24, 2005. 70 Similarly, after this premise in the Court's rulings
date, it was only in March 2006 when petitioner's in Japzon and Caballero — I do believe that "one may
husband informed the US Postal Service of a change invariably affect the other." 73 Being still a citizen of
of address, without even specifying their new address the US at the time of her return to the
in the Philippines. 71 While it is true that the visa-free Philippines on May 24, 2005, petitioner remained
entry of petitioner under the Balikbayan Program entitled to the rights, privileges, and the protection the
should not automatically hinder her ability to — as US government extends to its nationals, including the
the ponencia would say — "reestablish her life here," it right to residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to
remains that the parameters of domicile October 20, 2010, petitioner availed of this privilege
reestablishment under the auspices of political law when she returned to the US, on separate dates,
have not been clearly proven. Hence, because all the significantly, for no less than five times. 74 To my
overt acts prior to that time had no impact in mind, the ability to enjoy the privileges of foreign
establishing her animus manendi and animus non- citizenship at any time, while remaining under that
revertendi, the earliest date that petitioner could have status, conjures a reasonable presumption that the
reestablished her residence was in July 2006. The latter continues to avail of these privileges, which,
overall conclusion of the COMELEC was therefore among others, include the privilege to reside in that
correct. foreign country. Hence, absent compelling evidence to
show that he/she had reestablished domicile in
At this juncture, let me express my assent to the
another country, it should therefore be presumed that
view that "[s]tronger proof is required in the
he/she continues to be domiciled in the country he/she
reestablishment of national domicile." 72 This is
is a citizen of.
because a person who has been domiciled in another
country has already established effective legal ties with Moreover, the necessity of presenting stronger
that country that are substantially distinct and separate proof as herein discussed is impelled by the very
from ours. Such a situation hardly obtains when what reason underlying the residency requirement. 75 The
is involved is the change of domicile between localities discernment of pervading realities in the place where
within the same country. one seeks to be elected is objectively farther from a
person who has been domiciled in a foreign country.
Thus, a higher standard of proof should be applied to a matter of public knowledge; and (c) petitioner was a
candidate previously domiciled in a foreign country for well-educated woman and a high-ranking official with a
he/she has been out of touch with the needs of the competent staff and a band of legal advisers and is not
electoral constituency he/she seeks to represent. entirely unacquainted with Philippine politics, and thus,
would know how to fill-up a pro-forma CoC in 2012. As
For another, the COMELEC cannot be faulted
I see it, these reasons are not barren of any
for relying on petitioner's admission in her 2012 CoC
considerable merit. At the very least, they are plausible
for Senator that her period of residence from May 13,
enough to negate the finding that the conclusion
2013 is "6 years and 6 months," which, hence, implies
amounted to grave abuse of discretion. Besides, I
that she started being a Philippine resident only in
believe that the falsity of the material representation
November 2006. While it is true that "[i]t is the fact of
already justifies the cancellation of petitioner's CoC. As
residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
above-intimated, a candidate's intent is immaterial to a
which ought to be decisive in determining whether or
Section 78 analysis. HEITAD
not an individual has satisfied the [C]onstitution's
residency qualification III.
requirement," 76 the COMELEC cannot be said to Neither did the COMELEC gravely abuse its
gravely abuse its discretion when it considered discretion in ruling that petitioner made a false material
petitioner's admission against interest as another representation in her 2015 CoC when she declared
circumstance which militates against her claim's that she was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
legitimacy. It is certainly not patent and grave error for
the COMELEC to regard a CoC as a notarized I depart from the ponencia's stand that
document and accord it the presumption of petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
regularity. 77 Also, while petitioner may later impugn demonstrable on account of statistical probability, and
an admission against interest, the COMELEC found other circumstantial evidence, namely, her
that her residency declaration in her 2012 CoC could abandonment as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church
not be borne out of an "honest mistake," in light of the in Iloilo City, as well as her typical Filipino features. 78
following considerations: (a) the bulk, if not all, of the  
evidence she presented were executed before she
reacquired her Philippine citizenship, which cannot be A run-through of the basic tenets on citizenship
done in light of Coquilla, among others; (b) while she is apropros.
made statements acknowledging that there was a "There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1)
mistake in her 2015 CoC, they were nonetheless by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These ways of
delivered at a time when, at the very least, the acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of
possibility of her running for President was already a
citizens: the natural-born citizen, and the naturalized under the 1973 and 1987
citizen." 79 Constitutions." 85 Following this principle, proof of
blood relation to a Filipino parent is therefore
"A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen
necessary to show that one is a Filipino citizen by
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
birth.
thereof." 80 As defined under the present Constitution,
"[n]atural-born citizens are those who are citizens In this case, petitioner has shown no evidence
of the Philippines from birth without having to of blood relation to a Filipino parent to prove that she
perform any act to acquire or perfect their acquired Filipino citizenship by birth under the jus
Philippine citizenship." 81 "On the other hand, sanguinis principle. While petitioner did not bear the
naturalized citizens are those who have become initial burden of proving that she made a false material
Filipino citizens through naturalization . . . ." 82 representation on her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, as
that burden belonged to those who filed the petitions to
"[I]t is the inherent right of every independent
deny due course to or cancel her CoC before
nation to determine for itself and according to its own
the COMELEC, 86 the burden of evidence shifted to
constitution and laws what classes of persons shall be
her 87 when she voluntarily admitted her status as a
entitled to its citizenship . . . ." 83 With respect to
foundling. Under Section 1, Article IV of the 1935
citizenship by birth, a particular jurisdiction generally
Constitution, which governs petitioner's
subscribes to either the principle of jus sanguinis or the
case, 88 foundlings are not included in the
principle of jus soli, although it may adopt a mixed
enumeration of who are considered as Filipino
system with features of both. SCaITA
citizens: AHDacC
"The Philippine law on citizenship adheres to
Section 1. The following are
the principle of jus sanguinis. Thereunder, a child
citizens of the Philippines:
follows the nationality or citizenship of the parents
regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed to (1) Those who are citizens of the
the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or Philippine Islands at the time
citizenship on the basis of place of of the adoption of this
birth." 84 In Valles v. COMELEC, this Court held that Constitution.
"[t]he signing into law of the 1935 Philippine (2) Those born in the Philippine
Constitution has established the principle of jus Islands of foreign parents
sanguinis as basis for the acquisition of Philippine who, before the adoption of
citizenship . . . . So also, the principle of jus this Constitution, had been
sanguinis, which confers citizenship by virtue of elected to public office in the
blood relationship, was subsequently retained Philippine Islands.
 (3) Those whose fathers are citizens alterius 90 and verba legis non est recedendum, 91 as
of the Philippines. well as firmly abided by the jus sanguinis principle
(4) Those whose mothers are which, as repeatedly stated, necessitates proof of
citizens of the Philippines blood relation, of which petitioner presented none.
and, upon reaching the age Accordingly, its analysis was grounded on sound legal
of majority, elect Philippine basis and therefore unreflective of grave abuse of
citizenship. discretion.
(5) Those who are naturalized in Further, while petitioner argues that foundlings
accordance with law. should be considered as natural-born Filipinos
based on the intent of the framers of the 1935
A "'foundling' refers to a deserted or abandoned Constitution, 92 it should be pointed out that the 1935
infant or child whose parents, guardian or relatives are Constitution, as it was adopted in its final form, never
unknown; or a child committed to an orphanage or carried over any proposed provision on foundlings
charitable or similar institution with unknown facts of being considered or presumed to be Filipino citizens.
birth and parentage and registered in the Civil Its final exclusion is therefore indicative of the framers'
Register as a 'foundling.'" 89 The fact that a prevailing intent. Besides, in Civil Liberties Union v.
candidate's parents are unknown directly puts into The Executive Secretary, 93 this Court remarked that:
question his/her Filipino citizenship because the
candidate has no prima facie link to a Filipino parent Debates in the constitutional convention
from which he/she could have traced her Filipino "are of value as showing the views of
citizenship. This is why the burden of evidence shifted the individual members, and as
to petitioner. indicating the reasons for their
votes, but they give us no light as to the
Without any proof of blood relation to a Filipino views of the large majority who did not
parent, and without any mention in the 1935 talk, much less of the mass of our fellow
Constitution that foundlings are considered or are even citizens whose votes at the polls gave
presumed to be Filipino citizens by birth, that instrument the force of fundamental
the COMELEC's finding that petitioner was not a law. We think it [is] safer to construe
natural-born citizen cannot be taken as patently the constitution from what appears
unreasonable and grossly baseless so as to amount to upon its face." 94 (Emphases and
grave abuse of discretion. As it is apparent, underscoring supplied) ATICcS
the COMELEC, with good reason, relied on the plain
text of the 1935 Constitution based on the statutory I also find no merit in petitioner's invocation of
construction axioms of expressio unius est exclusio international covenants 95 which purportedly evince a
generally accepted principle in international law that physical characteristics, hardly assuage this possibility.
foundlings are presumed to be citizens of the country By parity of reasoning, they do not prove that she was
where they are found. Since the 1935 Constitution, born to a Filipino: her abandonment in the Philippines
and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions thereafter, is just a restatement of her foundling status, while her
consistently subscribe to the jus sanguinis principle, it physical features only tend to prove that her parents
is axiomatic that no international agreement or likely had Filipino features and yet it remains uncertain
generally-accepted principle of international law — if their citizenship was Filipino. SaCIDT
even assuming that there is a binding one which For all of these reasons, I dissent to the
supports petitioner's averred presumption — could majority's ruling that the COMELEC gravely abused its
contravene the same. "Under the 1987 Constitution, discretion. In the final analysis, my conscience reminds
international law can become part of the sphere me that the high duty demanded of me — to apply the
of domestic law either by transformation or law according to the parameters set by our previous
incorporation." 96 Thus, in our legal hierarchy, treaties rulings — transcends politics or controversy, popularity
and international principles belong to the same plane or personality. It is a public trust which values nothing
as domestic laws and, hence, cannot prevail over the higher than fidelity to the Constitution. I, therefore, vote
Constitution. to DISMISS the petitions.
Finally, I oppose petitioner's resort to statistical ||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
probability as basis to presume natural-born
Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March
citizenship in this case. Allow me to point out that
these statistics surfaced only in the proceedings before 8, 2016])
this Court and hence, could not have been weighed [G.R. No. 221697. March 8, 2016.]
and assessed by the COMELEC En Banc at the time it
rendered its ruling. Be that as it may, the constitutional
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
requirements for office, especially for the highest office
LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
in the land, cannot be based on mere probability.
SION ON ELECTIONS AND ESTRELLA
"[M]atters dealing with qualifications for public elective
C. ELAMPARO, respondents.
office must be strictly complied with." 97 The proof to
hurdle a substantial challenge against a candidate's
qualifications must therefore be solid. We cannot make [G.R. Nos. 221698-700. March 8, 2016.]
a definitive pronouncement on a candidate's
citizenship when there is a looming possibility that
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-
he/she is not Filipino. Also, the circumstances
LLAMANZARES, petitioner, vs. COMMIS
surrounding petitioner's abandonment, as well as her
 SION ON ELECTIONS, FRANCISCO S. Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad Poe-
TATAD, ANTONIO P. CONTRERAS AND Llamanzares (petitioner) aspires to occupy the exalted
AMADO D. VALDEZ, respondents. position of the President of the Republic of the
Philippines so that on October 15, 2015, she filed her
Certificate of Candidacy (2015 CoC) attesting that she
DISSENTING OPINION is a natural-born Filipino citizen and a resident of this
country for 10 years and 11 months immediately
preceding the May 9, 2016 elections. However, several
sectors were not convinced of petitioner's
  representations, prompting them to file petitions to
deny due course to and cancel her 2015 CoC and for
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
disqualification.
A person who aspires to occupy the highest  
position in the land must obey the highest law of the
land. 1 The cases

Since the second Monday of May of 1992 and Before us are petitioner's consolidated Petitions
every six years thereafter, 2 the Filipino people have for Certiorari assailing the Commission on Elections'
been exercising their sacred right to choose the leader (Comelec) Resolutions which cancelled her 2015 CoC.
who would steer the country towards a future that is in In G.R. No. 221697, the Petition for Certiorari 7 assails
accordance with the aspirations of the majority as the Second Division's December 1, 2015
expressed in the fundamental law of the land. At stake Resolution 8 and the En Banc's December 23, 2015
is the Presidency, the highest position in the land. Resolution 9 in SPA No. 15-001 (DC) which granted
private respondent Estrella C. Elamparo's (Elamparo)
The President wields a vast array of powers Petition and cancelled petitioner's 2015 CoC for
which includes "control of all the executive President. In G.R. Nos. 221698-700, the Petition
departments, bureaus and offices." 3 He/she is also for Certiorari 10 assails the First Division's December
the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the 11, 2015 Resolution 11 and the En Banc's December
Philippines 4 and can "grant reprieves, commutations, 23, 2015 Resolution 12 which granted private
and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after respondents Francisco S. Tatad (Tatad), Antonio P.
conviction by final judgment," 5 as well as amnesty, Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez's
subject to the concurrence of Congress. 6 For the rest (Valdez) petitions in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No.
of the world, he/she is the representation and the 15-007 (DC), and SPA No. 15-139 (DC), respectively,
representative of the Filipino people.
and likewise cancelled petitioner's 2015 CoC for On October 6, 2010, petitioner was appointed
President. as Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review
and Classification Board (MTRCB).
Factual Antecedents
On October 20, 2010, petitioner executed an
On September 3, 1968, petitioner, who was
Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United
then still an infant, was found abandoned in Jaro, Iloilo
States of America and Renunciation of American
City. 13 Her biological parents were unknown. Five
Citizenship (Affidavit of Renunciation). 21 The
years later, petitioner was adopted by spouses Ronald
following day, October 21, 2010, petitioner took her
Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe. In 1991,
Oath of Office as MTRCB Chairperson before
petitioner graduated from Boston College in
President Benigno S. Aquino III. 22
Massachusetts, with a degree of Bachelor of Arts in
Political Studies. CAIHTE On July 12, 2011, petitioner executed a
document entitled Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of
On July 27, 1991, petitioner married Teodoro
Nationality of the United States 23 before the U.S.
Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the
Vice-Consul. Thus, on December 9, 2011, the latter
Philippines and the United States of America (U.S.A.
issued her a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the
or U.S.) from birth, at the Santuario de San Jose
United States. 24
Parish in San Juan. 14 On July 29, 1991, the couple
left the Philippines, settled in the U.S., and started a In a bid for a Senate seat, petitioner secured
family there. On October 18, 2001, petitioner became and accomplished a CoC for Senator 25 on September
a naturalized U.S. citizen. 15 27, 2012 (2012 CoC). To the question "PERIOD OF
RESIDENCE IN THE PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 13,
On July 7, 2006, petitioner took her Oath of
2013," she answered six years and six months.
Allegiance 16 to the Republic of the Philippines
Then on October 2, 2012, petitioner filed said CoC with
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9225 17 (RA
the Comelec.
9225). On July 18, 2006, the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) issued an Order 18 granting her Petitioner won and was proclaimed Senator of
petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under the Philippines on May 16, 2013.
the said law. In June 2015, Navotas Rep. Tobias M. Tiangco
On August 31, 2006, petitioner registered as a pointed out through the media that
voter in Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Juan. 19 After more based on petitioner's entry in her 2012 CoC, she does
than three years, petitioner secured a Philippine not meet the 10-year residency requirement for
passport valid until October 12, 2014. 20 purposes of the 2016 presidential election.
 Desirous of furthering her political career in the they do not determine citizenship which is a political
Philippines, and notwithstanding the looming matter. 30
issue on her period of residency in the Philippines, c) No international agreement or treaty supports
petitioner next focused on the Presidency and filed her petitioner's claim of natural-born citizenship.
CoC therefor on October 15, 2015.
c-1) The 1930 Hague Convention on Certain
The Petitions before the Comelec: Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
1) SPA No. 15-001 (DC) — (Elamparo Petition, now provides that State laws determine who are its
G.R. No. 221697) nationals. 31
On October 21, 2015, Elamparo filed before c-2) Petitioner could not rely on the presumption
the Comelec a Petition to Deny Due Course to or provided in Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy. 26 Elamparo asserted Reduction of Statelessness that a "foundling found in
that petitioner falsely represented to the Filipino people the territory of a Contracting State" is born to "parents
that she had been a resident of the Philippines for a possessing the nationality of that State" for the
period of 10 years and 11 months immediately prior to following reasons: One, the Philippines could not be
the May 9, 2016 elections and that she is a natural- considered as a "Contracting State" since it did not
born Filipino citizen. Elamparo advanced the following ratify or accede to the 1961 Convention on the
arguments in support of her position that petitioner is Reduction of Statelessness. 32 Two, even on the
not a natural-born Filipino: assumption that the Philippines will ratify the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, it will
a) Under the 1935 Constitution which was in
not have any retroactive application on the case of
force at the time of petitioner's birth, "the status of
petitioner pursuant to Section 2, Article 28 of the
natural-born citizen could be determined only by
Vienna Convention on the Law on Treaties 33 and
descent from a known Filipino father or
Section 12 (3) of the 1961 Convention on the
mother." 27 Since petitioner's biological parents were
Reduction of Statelessness. Three, while admittedly,
unknown, she could not categorically declare that she
non-signatories to international agreements may be
descended from Filipino parents.
bound by such agreements if such agreements are
b) Petitioner's subsequent adoption by Filipino transformed into customary laws, 34 the presumption
citizens did not vest upon her a natural-born status. under Article 2 of the 1961 Convention on the
Adoption merely "established a juridical relationship Reduction of Statelessness has not yet ripened into
between her and her adoptive parents" 28 but did not customary international law as to bind the
confer upon her the citizenship of her adoptive Philippines. 35
parents. 29 Moreover, adoption laws are civil in nature;
 c-3) The 1959 United Nations h) "When she applied for reacquisition of her
Declaration on the Rights of the Child and the 1989 Philippine citizenship and took her oath of allegiance,
Convention on the Rights of the Child have no binding she had to perform an act to acquire her Philippine
force. 36 The principle stated therein that a child is citizenship" 46 which is anathema or antithetical to the
entitled to a nationality is merely "an authoritative concept of natural-born citizenship.
statement" with no corresponding "demandable i) The use by the petitioner of her U.S. passport
right." 37 In any case, what is conferred by these even after she renounced her American citizenship is
declarations is nationality, not natural-born status. tantamount to recantation of the renunciation of her
Moreover, municipal law governs matters of U.S. citizenship 47 pursuant to the rulings
nationality. 38 DETACa in Maquiling v. Commission on Elections 48 and Arna
d) Mere presumption of natural-born citizenship do v. Commission on Elections. 49 During oral
does not comply with the strict constitutional arguments before the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET),
requirement. 39 No uncertainty on the qualification of Atty. Manuelito Luna argued that the records of the
the President must be entertained. 40 U.S. Department of State Bureau of Consular Affairs
showed that petitioner still used her U.S. passport in
e) "Place of birth is not a recognized means of
September 2011 or after her renunciation of U.S.
acquiring such citizenship, much less a reason to claim
citizenship.
that one is a natural-born Filipino." 41 Petitioner has
the burden of proving her natural-born status. 42 As regards residency, Elamparo put forth that,
at most, petitioner's residency in the Philippines is only
f) RA 9225 applies only to former natural-born
nine years and 10 months, or short of two months to
Filipinos. Since petitioner is not a natural-born Filipino,
comply with the residency requirement for Presidency.
then she is not qualified to apply for reacquisition or
In support of her contention, she argued that:
retention of citizenship under RA 9225. 43
a) Petitioner abandoned her domicile of origin in
g) Even assuming that petitioner is a natural-
the Philippines when she became a naturalized U.S.
born Filipino, she lost such status by becoming a
citizen and established her new domicile of choice in
naturalized U.S. citizen. 44 And assuming that she
the U.S. 50
could avail herself of the benefits of RA 9225, her
status as Filipino citizen is considered "not from birth" b) Petitioner "did not go to the U.S. and be
but from July 18, 2006 when the BID approved her naturalized as a U.S. citizen to pursue any calling,
application for reacquisition of Philippine profession or business" but with the intention of
citizenship. 45 starting a family there. 51 Thus, her trips back/visits to
the Philippines prior to July 2006 (when she took the
oath of allegiance to the Philippines and applied to
reacquire her Philippine citizenship with the BID) g) Petitioner is estopped from denying that her
should be considered temporary in nature and for a residency in the Philippines prior to the May 13,
specific purpose only;" 52 i.e., to visit family and 2013 elections is six years and six months as stated in
friends and not to establish a new domicile or her 2012 senatorial CoC. 59
residence. h) The period of residency stated in petitioner's
c) Having established her domicile of choice in 2012 CoC cannot be considered as an honest
the U.S., the burden of proof rests upon petitioner to mistake. 60
prove that she is abandoning her domicile in the U.S. 2) SPA Nos. 15-002 (DC), 15-007 (DC) and 15-139
and establishing a new domicile in the Philippines. 53 (DC) — (the Tatad
d) Petitioner's status as a naturalized U.S. Petition, Contreras Petition, and Valdez Petition,
citizen and her continued use of her U.S. passport now G.R. Nos. 221698-
from 2006 to 2011 are indicative of her intention to 700)
retain her domicile in the U.S. 54 Valdez and Contreras also filed petitions
e) Not being a natural-born Filipino, petitioner is seeking to cancel or deny due course to petitioner's
not eligible to apply for reacquisition of Philippine 2015 CoC while Tatad filed a petition for
citizenship under RA 9225. Consequently, she could disqualification.
not have established her domicile of choice in the Invoking Section 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Philippines. 55 Procedure, 61 Tatad, in his Petition, echoed most of
f) Even on the argument that petitioner Elamparo's arguments that petitioner miserably lacked
reacquired her Philippine citizenship upon taking the the residency and citizenship requirements. In
oath of allegiance, it cannot be said that she addition, he contended that in case of conflict between
automatically regained or reestablished her new international conventions and treaties on one hand,
domicile. At most, what she had was the option to and the Constitution on the other, the latter prevails.
choose or establish a new domicile. 56 Thus, the Moreover, since petitioner has no jus
earliest date that she could have reestablished her sanguinis citizenship she could not be considered a
legal residence in the Philippines was on July 18, 2006 natural-born Filipino and would not be permitted to run
when she reacquired her status as a Filipino for President. 62 Citing the Hague Convention of
citizen. 57 Reckoned from July 18, 2006, petitioner's 1930 on the Conflict of Nationality Laws, he argued
residence in the country by May 2016 would only be that any question relating to nationality must be
nine years and 10 months, or two-months shy of the resolved in accordance with the law of the state. 63 He
10-year residency requirement for presidential also pointed out that the 1930 Protocol in Relation to
candidates. 58 Certain Case of Statelessness, the 1930 Hague
Special Protocol Concerning Statelessness, the 1948 and void. 69 Finally, Tatad asserted that petitioner's
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the 1961 travels to the U.S. after renouncing her U.S. citizenship
United Nations Convention on the Reduction of are equivalent to a repudiation of her earlier
Statelessness, do not have binding effect. 64 He renunciation. 70
explained that international rules are at par only with The Petition 71 filed by Contreras focused
congressional acts and could not in any manner only on the failure of petitioner to comply with the
supplant or prevail over the Constitution. 65 aDSIHc residency requirement and her false representation —
Anent the issue of residency, Tatad noted that that by May 9, 2016 she would have resided in the
in the 2012 senatorial CoC, petitioner's period of country for 10 years and 11 months. 72 For Contreras,
residence in the country immediately before the May it "is a blatant attempt to undermine the rule of law and
13, 2013 elections is six years and six months. Adding the Constitution when one submits a certificate of
the period from May 13, 2013 up to May 9, 2016, candidacy falsely claiming the possession of a
petitioner's period of residence in the Philippines would qualification that is specified in the Constitution as a
only be nine years and five months, which is short of requirement to run for President of the Republic of the
the 10-year requirement. 66 Tatad likewise alleged Philippines." 73 According to Contreras, petitioner is
that petitioner's intention to abandon the U.S. domicile deemed to have abandoned her domicile in the
and establish a new domicile in the country could not Philippines when she became a naturalized U.S.
be inferred from her acts. At most, petitioner's visits citizen. And, in order for her to have at least 10 years
here were only for the purpose of consoling her of residency in the country, she should have
adoptive mother and participating in the settlement of reacquired her Philippine domicile at the latest by May
the estate of her adoptive father since her husband 9, 2006. However, since she reacquired her Philippine
remained in the U.S. during this period. In fact, citizenship only on July 18, 2006, petitioner failed to
petitioner renounced her U.S. citizenship comply with the 10-year residency requirement. Her
only on October 20, 2010, 67 or long after the death of visits in the country before July 18, 2006 should not
her adoptive father. inure to her benefit since at that time she was traveling
not as a Filipino but as a U.S. citizen. 74 By his
Tatad maintained that petitioner is not qualified
reckoning, petitioner's residency in the country by May
to avail herself of RA 9225 because she is not a
9, 2016 would only be nine years, nine months and 22
natural-born Filipino. There is no showing that she
days. 75
descended from parents who are Filipino
citizens. 68 He further posited that the Order of the Contreras postulated that had petitioner really
BID granting petitioner's application for reacquisition of intended to establish a new domicile in the Philippines
Philippine citizenship was not signed by Immigration and to abandon her U.S. domicile, she should have
Commissioner Alipio F. Fernandez, Jr.; hence, it is null applied for an immigrant status before the BID which
will in turn issue an Immigrant Certificate of Residence only since November 13, 2006. 83 For Valdez, the
(ICR). 76 Contreras noted that in her application to "conflicting admissions . . . [petitioner] voluntarily,
reacquire Philippine citizenship under RA 9225, willingly, and knowingly executed as to when she
petitioner did not indicate an ICR or an Alien Certificate established her residency in the Philippines
of Registration, unlike on the part of her three children, [demonstrate] a deliberate attempt on her part to
which "would have been relevant mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would render
information . . . on the issue of her residence." 77 her ineligible for the position of President of the
Philippines." 84
For his part, Valdez, in his Petition 78 to cancel
or deny due course to petitioner's CoC, argued that Valdez reckoned that July 18, 2006 would be
since petitioner had to perform an overt act to the earliest date that petitioner could have established
reacquire her citizenship, then she is not a natural- her new domicile of choice as this was the time she
born Filipino citizen as defined in Article IV, Section 2 reacquired her Philippine citizenship. Valdez insisted
of the 1987 Constitution. 79 Valdez asserted that it is that her stay in the Philippines prior to reacquiring
not possible for petitioner to reacquire a natural-born Philippine citizenship could not be favorably
status on July 18, 2006 since at that time she had dual considered for purposes of the residency
allegiance to the Philippines and the U.S. which is requirement. 85 He emphasized that at that time,
prohibited under Article IV, Section 5 of the petitioner did not even secure a permanent resident
Constitution. 80 Neither did RA 9225 bestow a natural- visa; consequently, she could only be considered as a
born status upon her; at most, she was "only 'deemed' foreigner temporarily residing in the country. 86 He
not to have lost her Philippine citizenship." 81 elaborated that petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship did not affect her domicile; what petitioner
Valdez also contended that petitioner lacked the
had at the time was only an option to change or
residency requirement or misrepresented her period of
establish a new domicile of choice. 87 ETHIDa
residency. He pointed out that petitioner cited varying
dates regarding the establishment of her residency in Valdez averred that petitioner could not claim
the Philippines. 82 In her 2015 CoC, petitioner claimed "honest mistake made in good faith" 88 especially
that by May 9, 2016 she would have resided in the "when one runs for public office and for a national
country for a period of 10 years and 11 months. By post . . . [as] natural human experience and logic
simple mathematical computation, petitioner was dictate that one should be very well aware of the
claiming that she started residing in the Philippines in qualifications required for that position and whether . . .
June 2005. In stark contrast, petitioner stated in her one possesses those qualifications. . . . More
2012 CoC that her residency in the country prior to importantly, one is highly expected to give accurate
May 13, 2013 is six years and six months, which information as regards his/her qualifications." 89
means that she has been a resident of the Philippines
 Finally, Valdez opined that petitioner failed to rule on the validity of the June 18, 2006 Order of the
prove that she intended to permanently reside in the BID granting her natural-born status; 95 and pending
Philippines for a period of 10 years prior to the May 9, this determination, the Comelec must refrain from
2016 elections. Having already abandoned her ruling on whether she could avail herself of the
domicile in the Philippines upon her naturalization as a benefits of RA 9225. 96 In addition, she averred that
U.S. citizen, it can only be construed that her the Elamparo Petition is essentially one for quo
subsequent trips to the Philippines were temporary in warranto since it seeks a ruling on her eligibility or lack
nature. More importantly, petitioner's 2014 Statement of qualifications and therefore must be lodged with the
of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) showed Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET). However, since
that she still maintains two houses in the U.S. 90 which there is no election yet and no winner had been
she bought in 1992 and in 2008. proclaimed, the Petition is premature. 97
The Answers of Petitioner before the Comelec: Petitioner asserted that she is a natural-born
Filipino based on the intent of the framers of the 1935
1) SPA No. 15-001 (DC) (Elamparo Petition)
Constitution 98 and treaties such as the United
Petitioner claimed that Elamparo's Petition Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 99 and
failed to state a cause of action for it did not aver that the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
there was a false representation in her 2015 CoC Rights. 100 She averred that although these treaties
amounting to a deliberate attempt to mislead, were not yet in force at the time of her birth, they could
misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a be given retroactive application. 101 In addition,
candidate ineligible or that it was intended to deceive generally accepted principles of international law and
the electorate as regards the candidate's customary international law support her thesis that she
qualifications. 91 She also posited that the burden of is a natural-born Filipino. She also cited the 1930
proof rests upon Elamparo to show that her Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to
representations in the CoC are false. 92 She alleged Conflict of Nationality Laws 102 and the 1961
that the pronouncement in the 1967 case of Paa v. Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness. 103
Chan 93 to the effect that there is no presumption of
Petitioner insisted that "the natural-born
Philippine citizenship had already been superseded by
citizenship of a person may be established using
later rulings. 94
presumptions." 104 She maintained that "there is
  nothing unconstitutional about presuming that [she]
Petitioner also assailed the jurisdiction of was born of Filipinos or that she is a natural-born
the Comelec. She claimed that it is the Department of Filipino, even though she cannot, as yet, prove that
Justice (DOJ) which has the primary jurisdiction to she is related by blood to citizens of the
Philippines." 105 Petitioner claimed that by the official
acts of the Philippine Government, she had been Petitioner also contended that she could legally
repeatedly and consistently recognized as a natural- establish her domicile in the Philippines even before
born Filipino thereby giving rise to the presumption that reacquiring her Philippine citizenship. 118 She
she is a natural-born Filipino. 106 Moreover, she surmised that domicile or residence required only
surmised that since she was not naturalized, then she physical presence and intent, and not necessarily
is natural-born. 107 Filipino citizenship. 119 She posited that "residency is
independent of, or not dependent on,
Petitioner conceded that she abandoned her
citizenship." 120 In fact, RA 9225 by which she
Philippine citizenship by becoming a naturalized U.S.
reacquired her Filipino citizenship "treats citizenship
citizen on October 18, 2001. However, she claimed
independently of residence." 121 She argued that if
that she reacquired her natural-born Filipino status by
only Filipinos could establish residence in the
virtue of RA 9225 108 particularly when she took her
Philippines, "then no alien would ever qualify to be
oath of allegiance 109 on July 7, 2006. Thereafter, she
naturalized as a Filipino, for aliens must be residents
renounced her U.S. citizenship. She insisted that she
before they can be naturalized." 122
never repudiated the renunciation of her U.S.
citizenship. 110 Finally, petitioner admitted that she committed a
mistake, albeit an honest one and in good faith, when
As regards the issue of residency, petitioner
she claimed in her 2012 senatorial CoC that her period
maintained that by May 9, 2016, she would have
of residence was six years and six months. 123 She
resided in the Philippines for 10 years and 11 months.
insisted that despite said mistake, she still complied
She asserted that since May 24, 2005 111 she had
with the two-year residency requirement for senatorial
been bodily present in the Philippines and that her
candidates; that she misinterpreted the phrase "period
subsequent acts, which "must be viewed 'collectively'
of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013;"
and not 'separately' or in isolation," 112 were indicative
and that she reckoned her period of residence in the
of her intention to permanently stay in the
Philippines from March-April 2006 as this was the time
country. 113 Otherwise stated, on May 24, 2005, she
that her family had substantially wrapped up their
left the U.S. for good 114 without intention of returning
affairs in the U.S. 124 She claimed that her period of
there. 115 She opined that her occasional trips to the
residence should be reckoned from May 24, 2005, as
U.S. did not negate her intent to reside permanently in
stated in her 2015 presidential CoC. 125 She asserted
the Philippines. 116 Neither would possession of a
that she is not estopped from correcting her mistake,
U.S. passport be considered indicative of her intent to
which in fact she did when she executed her 2015
return to the U.S. She explained that she kept her U.S.
CoC. 126 cSEDTC
passport "in the meantime because it was plainly
convenient for travel purposes." 117 2) SPA No. 15-002 (DC) — (Tatad Petition)
 Petitioner's Answer 127 to Tatad's Petition is U.S. citizenship, petitioner countered that such
almost a restatement of the arguments she raised in argument "would be tantamount to adding a fourth
her Answer to the Elamparo Petition. In addition, she requisite" 135 in establishing a new domicile of choice,
averred that although Tatad's Petition was filed under that is, possession of permanent resident
Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code 128 (OEC) visa/possession of Philippine citizenship and/or prior
in relation to Section 1, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules, renunciation of U.S. citizenship. 136 Petitioner
it failed to allege grounds for disqualification as reiterated that she could legally reestablish her
enumerated thereunder. 129 Instead, it cited lack of Philippine domicile even before renouncing her U.S.
citizenship and residency requirements which are not citizenship in 2010. 137 As regards Valdez's allegation
grounds for a petition filed under Section 68 of the that petitioner still maintains two houses in the U.S.
OEC. According to petitioner, if Tatad's Petition were (after she took her oath of allegiance to the
to be considered a quo warranto petition, it should be Philippines, and even purchased one of the houses in
filed with the PET and only if petitioner "is elected and 2008 after she took her oath in 2006, and after they
proclaimed President, and not before then." 130 As supposedly sold their family home in the U.S. in 2006),
such, the Tatad Petition must be dismissed for failure petitioner couched her denial as follows:
to state a cause of action. 131 Moreover, the Tatad 2.13. The allegation in paragraph 98 of
Petition could not be considered as a petition to deny the Petition is DENIED insofar as it is
due course to or cancel a CoC as it did not allege as made to appear that Respondent
ground material misrepresentation in the CoC; neither "resides" in the 2 houses mentioned in
did it pray for the cancellation of or denial of due said paragraph. The truth is that
course to petitioner's CoC. 132 Respondent does not "reside" in these
3) SPA No. 15-139 (DC) — Valdez Petition houses, but in her family home in
Corinthian Hills, Quezon City (where she
Likewise, petitioner's Answer 133 to the Petition
has lived with her family for almost a
of Valdez repleads the arguments in her Answer to the
decade). 138
Elamparo Petition. At the same time, she stressed that
considering that her "representation in her 4) SPA No. 15-007 (DC) — (Contreras Petition)
[CoC] on her citizenship is based on prevailing law and Petitioner's Answer 139 to the Petition filed by
jurisprudence on the effects of repatriation and [RA Contreras is likewise a reiteration of her contentions in
9225] . . . said representation in her [CoC] cannot be the Answer she filed to the Elamparo Petition. She
considered 'false.'" 134 As regards the issue of maintained that she did not commit any material
residency, particularly on Valdez's postulation that misrepresentation in her 2015 CoC when she stated
petitioner's period of residence must be counted only that by May 9, 2016, she would have resided in the
from October 20, 2010 or upon renunciation of her
Philippines for 10 years and 11 months. 140 She also save as our immigration laws may have allowed her to
averred that she could legally reestablish her domicile stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. 144
in the Philippines even before she reacquired her The Comelec's Second Division rejected
natural-born citizenship. 141 petitioner's claim that she is a natural-born Filipino
Rulings of the Commission on Elections citizen. It held that the provisions of the 1935
Constitution on citizenship clearly showed that only
A. SPA No. 15-001 (DC) — Elamparo Petition
children born of Filipino fathers are considered natural-
On December 1, 2015, the Second Division of born. As such, the representation in the 2015 CoC that
the Comelec issued its Resolution 142 granting she is a natural-born Filipino is false. 145 The Second
Elamparo's Petition and cancelling petitioner's 2015 Division also ruled that as a well-educated Senator,
CoC. It held that petitioner's representations in her petitioner ought to know that she is not a natural-born
CoC with regard to her citizenship and residency are Filipino citizen since our country has consistently
material because they pertain to qualifications for an adhered to the jus sanguinis principle. 146 It likewise
elective office. 143 Next, it ruled that petitioner's rejected petitioner's argument that the members of the
representation that she would have resided in the 1934 Constitutional Convention intended to include
Philippines for 10 years and 11 months immediately children of unknown parents as natural-born citizens,
preceding the May 9, 2016 elections is false vis-a- reasoning out that a critical reading of the entire
vis the admission she made in the 2012 CoC that her records of the 1934 Constitutional Convention
residence in the Philippines prior to May 13, 2013 was discloses no such intent. 147 It also gave short shrift to
only six years and six months. It characterized petitioner's invocation of international law, particularly
petitioner's claim of honest mistake as self-serving. the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions
Besides, there was no showing of any attempt to Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws, the 1948
correct the alleged honest mistake. The Second Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1961
Division also noted that the earliest point from which to Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, and
reckon petitioner's residency would be on July 18, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
2006 when the BID granted her application for Rights, because the Philippines is not a signatory
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225. thereto; besides, these international laws/conventions
Thus, her period of residence prior to May 2016 would do not categorically state that children of unknown
only be nine years and 10 months, or two months short parents must be categorized as natural-born.
of the required period of residence. The Second Furthermore, even assuming that these conventions or
Division opined that prior to July 2006, petitioner was treaties classified these children as natural-born, the
an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines same could not supplant or alter the provisions of the
1935 Constitution on citizenship. 148 SDAaTC
 The Comelec's Second Division found that declared that petitioner is likewise guilty of
petitioner deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform, misrepresenting her citizenship in her 2015 CoC, viz.:
or hide a fact, when she declared in her 2015 CoC that WHEREFORE, premises
her period of residency immediately prior to May 9, considered, the Verified Motion for
2016 would be 10 years and 11 months. 149 However, Reconsideration of [petitioner] is hereby
as regards her citizenship, it ruled that there was no DENIED and the Motion for Partial
conclusive evidence of any deliberate attempt to Reconsideration of [Elamparo] is hereby
mislead, misinform or hide a fact from the electorate. It GRANTED.
ratiocinated that the citizenship issue regarding
foundlings is one of first impression and thus petitioner ACCORDINGLY, the Resolution
could be presumed to have acted in good faith in dated 1 December 2015 of
making such a declaration. 150 the COMELEC Second Division is
hereby AFFIRMED WITH
Both petitioner and Elamparo moved for MODIFICATION. [Petitioner's] Certificate
reconsideration. While petitioner prayed for a complete of Candidacy for President in the 9 May
reversal of the Comelec's Second Division ruling, 2016 National, Local and
Elamparo prayed for partial reconsideration, 151 that ARMM Elections contains material
is, for the Comelec to pronounce petitioner as likewise misrepresentations as to both her
guilty of misrepresenting her citizenship status. She citizenship and residency.
pointed out that there is a pattern of
misrepresentation on the part of petitioner regarding THEREFORE, the Certificate of
her citizenship. She claimed that in three certificates of Candidacy for President in the 9 May
title 152 issued prior to July 2006, petitioner declared 2016 National, Local and
that she was a Filipino when in fact she was not; and, ARMM elections filed by [petitioner] Mary
that in her Petition for Retention and/or Reacquisition Grace Natividad
of Philippine Citizenship Under RA 9225, petitioner Sonora Poe Llamanzares is hereby
also falsely represented that she "is a former natural- CANCELLED.
born Philippine citizen born . . . to Ronald Allan FURTHER, the Urgent Motion to
Kelley Poe, a Filipino citizen and Jesusa Sonora Poe, Exclude of [Elamparo] is hereby
a Filipino citizen." DENIED.
On December 23, 2015, the Comelec En SO ORDERED. 154
Banc issued its Resolution 153 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration and granting Elamparo's The Comelec En Banc debunked petitioner's
motion for partial reconsideration. Accordingly, it allegation in her motion for reconsideration that the
Second Division based its Resolution on the 2012 CoC educated as [petitioner], who was then
alone. It clarified that the Second Division, much like already a high-ranking public official with,
trial courts, is not obliged to itemize all the evidence no doubt, a competent staff and a band
presented by the parties, but only that it should duly of legal advisers, and who is not herself
evaluate such evidence. 155 In any event, entirely unacquainted with Philippine
the Comelec En Banc again scrutinized the evidence politics being the daughter of a former
presented by the petitioner and concluded that they all high-profile presidential aspirant, would
pertained to events that transpired before July not know how to correctly fill-
2006, 156 or prior to her reacquisition of her Philippine up [sic] a pro-forma COC in 2013. We
citizenship. Thus, the same had no probative value in are not convinced that the subject entry
light of settled jurisprudence that "the earliest possible therein was [an] honest mistake. 162
date that petitioner could reestablish her residence in On the issue of citizenship, the Comelec En
the Philippines is when she reacquired her Filipino Banc ruled that petitioner cannot rely on presumptions
citizenship [in] July 2006." 157 The Comelec En to prove her status as natural-born citizen. 163 It
Banc held that petitioner's statement in her 2012 CoC concurred with the Second Division that the cited
was properly considered as an admission against international laws/conventions have no binding
interest and being a notarial document is presumed to force. 164 It also held that it is not bound by the
be regular. 158 It also held that the burden rests upon November 17, 2015 Decision of the SET in a quo
petitioner to prove that the 2015 CoC contained true warranto proceeding questioning petitioner's
statements and that the declarations made in the 2012 qualification as a Senator where she was declared as
CoC were not done in bad faith. 159 a natural-born Filipino. The Comelec En
The Comelec En Banc was not convinced that Banc ratiocinated that it is an independent
petitioner "stated truthfully her period of residence in constitutional body which does not take its bearings
the [2015] CoC" and that "such false statement was from the SET or any other agency of the government;
made without a deliberate attempt to mislead." 160 It and that in any case, the SET's Decision has been
considered petitioner's so-called public elevated to and is still pending with this
acknowledgment of her mistakes as contrived since Court. 165 acEHCD
they were delivered at the time when the possibility of In addition, the Comelec En Banc lent credence
her running for President was already a matter of to Elamparo's claim that there is substantial evidence,
public knowledge. 161 The Comelec En Banc held borne out by public documents, showing petitioner's
that: pattern of misrepresentation as regards her
Indeed, this Commission finds it citizenship. 166 The Comelec En Banc opined that
hard to believe that a woman as well- petitioner's educational attainment and other prevailing
circumstances, coupled with the simplicity and clarity As to the Comelec's jurisdiction over the
of the terms of the Constitution, lead to no other questioned citizenship, the Comelec's First Division
conclusion than that she made the false material held that it is not bound by the BID Order; otherwise, it
representation in her 2015 CoC to mislead the would be deprived of its constitutionally-granted power
electorate into thinking that she is a Filipino and to inquire into the aspiring candidate's qualifications
eligible to run for President. 167 Thus, and to determine whether there is commission of
the Comelec En Banc modified the Resolution of the material misrepresentation. 171
Second Division by holding that petitioner committed Lastly, the Comelec's First Division thumbed
material false representation in her citizenship as well. down petitioner's claims that the petitions are
B. On the Tatad, Contreras, and Valdez Petitions premature and that the issues raised therein are
appropriate in a quo warranto proceeding.
The Comelec's First Division, in its December
The Comelec's First Division pointed out that the
11, 2015 Resolution, 168 arrived at the same
petitions raised the issue of material
conclusion that petitioner falsely represented her
misrepresentation; 172 it also declared that petitioner's
citizenship and period of residency. Hence it ordered
CoC is riddled with inconsistencies with regard to her
the cancellation of petitioner's 2015 CoC. Apart from
period of residency, which is indicative of her
the ratiocinations similar to those made in the
deliberate attempt to mislead; and that
resolution of Elamparo's Petition, the Comelec's First
the Comelec has jurisdiction over the petitions since
Division made some additional points.
they were filed before proclamation. 173
On the procedural aspect, the Comelec's First
On the substantive aspect, the Comelec's First
Division held that although the Petition of Tatad was
Division, with regard to petitioner's citizenship status,
denominated as a petition for disqualification, it is not
held that those persons who are not included in the
barred from taking cognizance of the same since it
enumeration of Filipino citizens in the 1935
"impugns the citizenship and residency of [petitioner],
Constitution, such as petitioner, should not be
and therefore generally questions the truthfulness of
considered as Filipino citizens. 174 It opined that
her CoC stating that she has the qualification and
"[e]xtending its application to those who are not
eligibility to run for and be elected
expressly included in the enumeration and definition of
President . . . ." 169 And since the said Petition raised
natural-born citizens is a disservice to the rule of law
proper grounds for cancellation of a CoC under
and an affront to the Constitution." 175 It ruled that
Section 1, 170 Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
one's citizenship must not be anchored on mere
Procedure, it falls within the Comelec's jurisdiction
pursuant to Section 78 of the OEC. presumptions and that any doubt thereon must be
resolved against the claimant who bears the burden of
proof. 176
 The Comelec's First Division also held that no The Comelec En Banc denied petitioner's
international law supports petitioner's claim of natural- Motion for Reconsideration 183 and affirmed the First
born citizenship. 177 In any event, the status of Division in a Resolution 184 dated December 23,
international laws is equivalent to or at par with 2015.
legislative enactments only and could not in any Aside from upholding the reasons underlying
manner supplant or prevail over the the Comelec's First Division's Resolution,
Constitution. 178 Neither can petitioner find solace in the Comelec En Banc stressed that assuming, for the
generally accepted principles of international law and sake of argument, that petitioner may invoke the
customary international law as there is no showing that presumption that she is a natural-born citizen,
recognition of persons with unknown parentage as establishing this presumption by solid, incontrovertible
natural-born citizens of the country where they are evidence is a burden that shifted to her when she
found has become established, widespread and admitted that she does not know who her biological
consistently practiced among parents are. 185
states. 179 The Comelec's First Division posited that, if
at all, persons with no known parents may be The dispositive portion of the Comelec En
considered Filipino citizens, but not natural-born Banc Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez
Filipino citizens. 180 Ergo, petitioner could not have Petitions reads as follows: SDHTEC
validly availed of the benefits of repatriation under RA WHEREFORE, premises
9225. Even on the assumption that she is a natural- considered,
born Filipino citizen, it could not be said that she the Commission RESOLVED, as it
reacquired such status by virtue of RA 9225; what she hereby RESOLVES, to DENY the
reacquired was merely Philippine citizenship, not her Verified Motion for Reconsideration of
purported natural-born status. 181 SENATOR MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
As regards petitioner's residency, SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The
the Comelec's First Division pointed out that petitioner Resolution dated 11 December 2015 of
can only start counting her residency, at the earliest, the Commission First Division is affirmed.
from July 2006 when she reacquired her Philippine SO ORDERED. 186
citizenship; and that from that point, her intent to
permanently reside here became manifest only when Hence, these Petitions for Certiorari brought via
she registered as a voter of Barangay Sta. Lucia, San Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of
Juan City on August 31, 2006. Hence, she is deemed Court. 187 In both Petitions, petitioner "seeks to nullify,
to have reestablished her Philippine domicile only from for having been issued without jurisdiction or with
said date. 182
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess the Comelec acted without or in excess of its
of jurisdiction" 188 the assailed Comelec Resolutions. jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On December 28, 2015, this Court issued
Temporary Restraining Orders 189 enjoining We explained in Mitra that:
the Comelec from cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC As a concept, 'grave abuse of
due to time constraints before these petitions could be discretion' defies exact definition;
resolved and so as not to render the same moot and generally, it refers to 'capricious or
academic should this Court rule in petitioner's favor. whimsical exercise of judgment as is
Then, in a Resolution 190 dated January 12, 2016, the equivalent to lack of jurisdiction'; the
petitions were consolidated. abuse of discretion must be patent and
I find that the Comelec did not gravely abuse its gross as to amount to an evasion of a
discretion or exercise its judgment in a whimsical or positive duty or a virtual refusal to
capricious manner as to amount to lack or excess of perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act
jurisdiction in ordering the cancellation of and denying at all in contemplation of law, as where
due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC. the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion
The power of this Court to review the
and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is
assailed Resolutions is limited to the
not enough; it must be grave. We have
determination of whether the Comelec
held, too, that the use of wrong or
committed grave abuse of discretion;
irrelevant considerations in deciding an
the burden lies on the petitioner to
issue is sufficient to taint a decision-
indubitably show that the Comelec
maker's action with grave abuse of
whimsically or capriciously exercised
discretion.
its judgment or was "so grossly
unreasonable" as to exceed the limits Closely related with the limited
of its jurisdiction in the appreciation focus of the present petition is the
and evaluation of the evidence. condition, under Section 5, Rule 64 of the
Rules of Court, that findings of fact of
It bears stressing at the outset that these
the COMELEC, supported by substantial
petitions were brought before this Court via Rule 64 in
evidence, shall be final and non-
relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Therefore, as
reviewable. Substantial evidence is that
held in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 191 this
degree of evidence that a reasonable
Court's review power is based on a very limited ground
— the jurisdictional issue of whether
 mind might accept to support a is so grossly unreasonable. 194 Pursuant thereto, it is
conclusion. incumbent upon petitioner to clearly demonstrate via
these petitions that the Comelec was so grossly
In the light of our limited authority
unreasonable in the appreciation and evaluation of the
to review findings of fact, we do
pieces of evidence submitted that it overstepped the
not ordinarily review in a certiorari case
limits of its jurisdiction.
the COMELEC's appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by In short, petitioner must satisfactorily hurdle this
the COMELEC in this regard generally high bar set in Sabili and companion cases in order for
involves an error of judgment, not of the petitions to be granted.
jurisdiction. In these petitions, the Comelec found that
In exceptional cases, however, petitioner committed material misrepresentation when
when the COMELEC's action on the she stated in her 2015 CoC that her period of
appreciation and evaluation of evidence residence in the Philippines up to the day before May
oversteps the limits of its jurisdiction to 9, 2016 is 10 years, 11 months and that she is a
the point of being grossly unreasonable, natural-born Filipino citizen. Petitioner, on the other
the Court is not only obliged, but has the hand, insists that her evidence, which
constitutional duty to intervene. When the Comelec allegedly disregarded, negates any false
grave abuse of discretion is present, material representation on her part. AScHCD
resulting errors arising from the grave But first off, the procedural questions.
abuse mutate from error of judgment to
one of jurisdiction. 192 I. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
In fine, there is grave abuse of discretion when The respective petitions filed by
the exercise of judgment is capricious, whimsical, respondents with the Comelec
despotic or arbitrary, engendered by reason of passion were properly characterized as
and hostility. Also, the abuse of discretion must be so petitions for cancellation and/or
gross and so patent as to amount to an evasion of denial of due course to petitioner's
positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty 2015 CoC
enjoined by law. Section 2 (1), Article IX (C) of the 1987
In Sabili v. Commission on Elections, 193 this Constitution vests upon the Comelec the power and
Court spoke, through Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. function to "[e]nforce and administer all laws and
Sereno, that there is an error of jurisdiction when regulations relative to the conduct of an election,
the Comelec's appreciation and evaluation of evidence plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall." This
constitutional grant of power is echoed in Section 52 of cause/s of action for a Section 78 petition. 201 The
the OEC which emphasizes that the Comelec has Petitions of Elamparo and Valdez both alleged that
"exclusive charge of the enforcement and petitioner made material misrepresentations in her
administration of all laws relative to the conduct CoC in stating that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen
of elections." Also, and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at least
in Bedol v. Commission on Elections, 195 this Court 10 years. The Petition of Contreras alleged the
explained that the Comelec's quasi-judicial functions same commission by petitioner of material
pertain to its power "to resolve controversies arising misrepresentation with respect to her period of
from the enforcement of election laws, and to be the residency. All three petitions sought the cancellation or
sole judge of all pre-proclamation denial of due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC
controversies . . . ." 196 based on the said material misrepresentations which
were allegedly made with the intention to deceive the
In line with this power, Section 78 197 of the
electorate as to her qualifications for President.
OEC, in relation to Section 74 198 thereof, provides for
a mechanism for the cancellation or denial of due With respect to Tatad's Petition, petitioner
course to a CoC based on the exclusive ground of points out that the same was fatally infirm because
material misrepresentation. The misrepresentation while captioned as a "Petition for Disqualification"
must refer to a material fact, such as one's citizenship under Section 68 of the OEC in relation to Rule 25 of
or residence. 199 the Comelec Rules, the allegations therein did not
make out a case for disqualification. Petitioner posits
To be sufficient, a Section 78 petition must
that Tatad clearly resorted to a wrong remedy, hence,
contain the following ultimate facts: "(1) the candidate
the Comelec should have dismissed his petition
made a representation in his certificate; (2) the
outright and should not have taken cognizance of it as
representation pertains to a material matter which
a petition for cancellation or denial of due course to a
would affect the substantive rights of the candidate
CoC.
(the right to run for the elective position for which he
filed his certificate); and (3) the candidate made the Contrary to petitioner's argument, I believe that
false representation with the intention to deceive the the Comelec acted correctly in not outrightly
electorate as to his qualification for public office or dismissing Tatad's Petition. In Spouses Munsalud v.
deliberately attempted to mislead, misinform or hide a National Housing Authority, 202 this Court held that
fact which would otherwise render him ineligible." 200 the dismissal of a complaint "should not be
based on the title or caption, especially when the
I find that the Petitions filed by Elamparo,
Contreras, and Valdez with the Comelec distinctly and allegations of the pleading support an
action." 203 "The caption of the pleading should not be
sufficiently alleged the ultimate facts constituting the
the governing factor, but rather the allegations in it
should determine the nature of the action, because OEC to assail the CoC of candidates regardless of the
even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the position for which they are aspiring.
courts [or tribunal] may nevertheless grant the proper Petitioner further argues that the issues raised
relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the by respondents in their petitions properly pertain to
complaint and the evidence introduced." 204 Here, I a quo warranto proceeding which can only be initiated
agree with the Comelec that the essential facts alleged after she should have won the election for and
by Tatad in his Petition do really establish a clear case proclaimed as President.
for the cancellation of or denial of due course to
petitioner's 2015 COC. Hence, the Comelec properly This Court in Fermin had already
treated the same as a Section 78 petition. explained, viz.:
In Fermin v. Commission on Elections, 205 this Lest it be misunderstood, the
Court declared a petition for disqualification filed with denial of due course to or the
the Comelec as one for cancellation of or denial of due cancellation of the CoC is not
course to therein petitioner Mike A. Fermin's CoC. This based on the lack of qualifications
was after it found that although captioned as a petition but on a finding that the candidate made
for disqualification, the allegations contained therein a material representation that is false,
made out a case for cancellation and/or denial of due which may relate to the
course to a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC. qualifications required of the public office
he/she is running for. It is noted that the
Anent the contention that the Comelec lacks candidate states in his/her CoC that
jurisdiction over candidates for national positions, he/she is eligible for the office he/she
suffice it to state that Section 78 of the OEC does not seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore,
distinguish between CoCs of candidates running for is to be read in relation to the
local and those running for national positions. It simply constitutional and statutory
mentions "certificate of candidacy." Ubi lex non provisions on qualifications or eligibility
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus — when the for public office. If the candidate
law does not distinguish, we must not distinguish. This subsequently states a material
is a basic rule in statutory construction that is representation in the CoC that is false,
applicable in these cases. Hence, the Comelec has the the COMELEC, following the law, is
power to determine if the CoC of candidates, whether empowered to deny due course to or
running for a local or for a national position, contains cancel such certificate. Indeed, the
false material representation. In other words, any Court has already likened a
person may avail himself/herself of Section 78 of the proceeding under Section 78 to a quo
 warranto proceeding under Section The Comelec did not usurp the
253 of the OEC since they both deal jurisdiction of the Presidential
with the eligibility or qualification of a Electoral Tribunal.
candidate, with the distinction mainly Apropos to the above discussion is petitioner's
in the fact that a "Section 78" petition argument that the Comelec usurped the PET's
is filed before proclamation, while a jurisdiction.
petition for quo warranto is filed after
proclamation of the winning As heretofore stated, a petition under Section
candidate. 206 (Emphasis supplied. 78 seeks to cancel a candidate's CoC before there has
Italics in the original.) AcICHD been an election and proclamation. Such a petition is
within the Comelec's jurisdiction as it is "the sole judge
While it is admitted that there is a similarity of all pre-proclamation controversies. " 207
between a petition under Section 78 of the OEC and
a quo warranto proceeding in that they both deal with On the other hand, the PET is "the sole judge of
the eligibility or qualification of a candidate, what sets all contests relating to the election, returns, and
them apart is the time when the action is filed, that qualifications of the President or Vice-President of the
is, before or after an election and proclamation. As the Philippines." 208 Particularly, the PET has jurisdiction
election subject of these petitions is yet to be held, over an election contest initiated through an election
there can be no doubt that the issues raised by protest or a petition for quo warranto against the
respondents were properly set forth in their respective President or Vice-President. 209 The PET's
petitions for cancellation and/or denial of due course to adjudicative powers come into play after the President
petitioner's CoC. or the Vice-President concerned had been elected and
proclaimed. Under the PET Rules an election protest
Therefore, the Comelec was not so grossly may be filed only within 30 days after proclamation of
unreasonable that it exceeded the limits of its the winner, 210 while a quo warranto petition may be
jurisdiction when it duly characterized the petitions as initiated within 10 days after the proclamation of the
ones for cancellation and/or denial of due course to winner. 211 In other words, it is the date of
petitioner's 2015 CoC. Indeed, in these cases proclamation of the candidate concerned that is
the Comelec did not exercise its judgment in a determinative of the time when the PET's jurisdiction
whimsical, capricious, arbitrary, or despotic manner. attaches.
Otherwise stated, petitioner failed to show that
the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion Pertinently,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in holding in Tecson v. Commission on Elections, 212 this Court
that the petitions before it are for cancellation and/or held that ordinarily, the term "contest" refers to "post-
denial of due course to petitioner's 2015 CoC. election scenario" and that election contests have one
objective, which is to unseat the winning candidate. be applicable, to suspend the
Hence it stressed that the PET's jurisdiction covers proclamation of the candidate concerned,
contests relating to the election, returns and provided that the evidence for the
qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President," grounds for denial to or cancel certificate
and not of "candidates" for President or Vice- of candidacy is strong. For this purpose,
President. at least three (3) days prior to any
election, the Clerk of
Against this backdrop, it is beyond cavil that
the Commission shall prepare a list of
the Comelec has the power and jurisdiction to
pending cases and furnish all
rule on a petition to deny due course to or to cancel
Commissioners copies of the said list.
the CoC of a candidate, whether for a local or national
position, who may have committed material A Decision or Resolution is
misrepresentation in his/her CoC. deemed final and executory if, in case of
a Division ruling, no motion for
Verily, the Comelec did not usurp, as indeed it
reconsideration is filed within the
could not have usurped, the PET's jurisdiction if only
reglementary period, or in cases of
because the herein petitioner remains a mere
rulings of the Commission En Banc, no
candidate for President and has not yet been elected
restraining order is issued by the
and proclaimed President. Therefore, the petitioner
Supreme Court within five (5) days from
failed to prove that the Comelec acted with grave
receipt of the decision or
abuse of discretion equivalent to lack or excess of
resolution. (Emphasis supplied) TAIaHE
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of these cases.
Petitioner argues that paragraph 2 of Section 8
The validity of Section 8, Rule 23 of the
above, which declares that rulings of the Comelec En
Comelec Rules is upheld.
Banc shall be final within five days from receipt of the
Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 8, resolution or decision sans any temporary restraining
Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules which reads as follows: order from this Court, is invalid because it violates
Section 8. Effect if Petition Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution which
Unresolved. — If a Petition to Deny Due gives the aggrieved party 30 days from receipt of the
Course to or Cancel a Certificate of assailed Comelec Resolution within which to challenge
Candidacy is unresolved by final it before the Supreme Court. Section 7 reads:
judgment on the day of elections, the Each Commission shall decide by
petitioner may file a motion with the a majority vote of all its Members, any
Division or Commission En Banc as may case or matter brought before it
 within sixty days from the date of its At the risk of belaboring a point, the 1987
submission for decision or resolution. A Constitution explicitly grants the Comelec rule-making
case or matter is deemed submitted for powers in deciding election cases. Thus, in fulfilment
decision or resolution upon the filing of of its Constitutional mandate of deciding election cases
the last pleading, brief, or memorandum with reasonable dispatch, the Comelec promulgated
required by the rules of rules of procedure to provide for an orderly means,
the Commission or by ways or process of deciding election cases. The
the Commission itself. Unless otherwise insertion in the above-quoted Section 7, Article IX of
provided by this Constitution or by the 1987 Constitution of the qualifying phrase "unless
law, any decision, order, or ruling of otherwise provided by this Constitution or law," makes
each Commission may be brought to the it abundantly clear that the Constitution itself
Supreme Court on certiorari by the recognizes the rule-making power of the Comelec and,
aggrieved party within thirty days from as a necessary corollary, invests it with authority to
receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis determine the reasonable period within which its
supplied) decision or resolution shall be considered final and
executory.
I am, however, unable to perceive any conflict
between the two provisions. Thus, far from invalidating paragraph 2, Section
8 of Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules for being contrary
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Rule 23 emanates
to Section 7, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution, the
from the Comelec's rule-making power under Section
two provisions in fact do work in harmony. Under the
3 of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
principle of interpretare et concordare leges legibus
Section 3. est optimus interpretandi modus, every statute must be
The Commission on Elections may sit en so construed in harmony with other statutes as to form
banc or in two divisions, and shall a uniform system of jurisprudence. 213
promulgate its rules of procedure in order
 
to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. There being no conflict between Section 8, Rule
All such election cases shall be heard 23 of the Comelec Rules and Section 7, Article IX-A of
and decided in division, provided that the 1987 Constitution and given that this Section 8,
motions for reconsideration of decisions Rule 23 recognizes the Comelec's rule-making power,
shall be decided by the Commission en the validity of the subject Comelec rule must be
banc. sustained.
The Comelec is not precluded by the that there is "only one Supreme Court from whose
SET's Decision from determining decisions all other courts [or tribunals] should take
petitioner's citizenship. their bearings." 215 Here, the November 17, 2015 SET
Decision is the subject of a Petition
Despite the November 17, 2015 Decision of the
for Certiorari entitled David v. Senate Electoral
SET declaring petitioner a natural-born Filipino citizen,
Tribunal, and docketed as G.R. No. 221538, that is still
the Comelec is not precluded from
pending before this Court. Until said petition is decided
ruling on petitioner's citizenship.
with finality by this Court, any ruling on petitioner's
As earlier explained, the Comelec, under citizenship does not, subject to the conditions that will
Section 78 of the OEC, has the power to determine be discussed later, constitute res judicata.
whether a candidate committed any material
Consequently, the Comelec correctly held that it
misrepresentation in his or her CoC. In view thereof,
is not precluded from determining petitioner's
the Comelec can also properly determine the
citizenship insofar as it impacts on its determination of
candidate's citizenship or residency as an adjunct to or
whether the petitioner's CoC contains material false
as a necessary consequence of its
representation. Conversely stated, petitioner failed to
assessment on whether the CoC contains material
prove that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of
misrepresentation. To my mind, this does not amount
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
to a usurpation of the SET's power to determine the
taking cognizance of these cases.
qualifications or eligibility of a candidate; neither does
it amount to a usurpation of this Court's prerogative to The July 18, 2006 Order of the Bureau
resolve constitutional issues. Rather, I view it as part of of Immigration and Deportation is not
the Comelec's duty to examine a candidate's binding on the Comelec
representations in his/her CoC pursuant to the Petitioner argues that it is only the DOJ which
aforementioned Section 78. Clearly, for the Comelec to can revoke the BID's Order presumptively finding her a
shirk or evade from, or to refuse to perform, or natural-born Filipino citizen and approving her petition
abandon this positive duty would amount to grave for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship. 216 cDHAES
abuse of discretion.
The argument is specious. It is settled that
Furthermore, the Comelec is an independent whenever the citizenship of a person is material or
constitutional body separate and distinct from the SET. indispensable in a judicial or administrative case, the
While the SET is the sole judge of all contests relating decision of the court or tribunal on the issue of
to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members citizenship is generally not considered as res judicata.
of the Senate, 214 its decisions do not have any This is so because the issue on citizenship may be
doctrinal or binding effect on the Comelec. It is settled "threshed out again and again as the occasion may
demand." 217 To accept petitioner's contention that it time by evidence to the contrary. Most importantly and
is the DOJ that has jurisdiction to revoke the grant of as correctly held by the Comelec, it cannot be bound
her petition for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship by the BID Order because a contrary view will deprive
would be to veer away from the said settled rule it of its constitutional mandate to inquire into and
because this implies that no subsequent contrary examine the qualifications of candidates, and
findings may be arrived at by other bodies or tribunals. determine whether they committed material
misrepresentation in their CoC. 221 Clearly, thus,
In Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 218 this Court held
petitioner's purported natural-born Filipino citizenship
that res judicata may apply in citizenship cases only if
may be correctly determined by the Comelec, as it in
the following conditions or circumstances concur:
fact already did, despite the aforesaid BID Order.
1. a person's citizenship must be raised
In sum, petitioner failed to prove that
as a material issue in a controversy
the Comelec capriciously and whimsically exercised its
where said person is a party;
judgment, or that it acted in an arbitrary or despotic
2. the Solicitor General or his authorized manner by reason of passion and hostility, or was so
representative took active part in the grossly unreasonable when it took cognizance of the
resolution thereof; and cases; indeed, in these cases, the Comelec committed
3. the finding o[f] citizenship is affirmed no error of jurisdiction.
by this Court. II. SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
Since the foregoing conditions or circumstances Material misrepresentation
are not present in these cases, the BID's previous
Under Section 74 222 of the OEC, a person
finding on petitioner's citizenship cannot be
running for public office is required to state in his CoC
binding on the Comelec.
the following details:
Moreover, while the BID stated in its July 18,
(1) if running for Member of the [House of
2006 Order that "petitioner was a former citizen of the
Representatives], the province,
Republic of the Philippines being born to Filipino
including its component cities,
parents," 219 this is contrary to petitioner's own
highly urbanized city or district or
assertion that she had no known blood relatives — the
sector which he seeks to represent;
very reason why her citizenship is now being
questioned. Notably, too, the BID did not categorically (2) the political party to which he belongs;
declare that petitioner is a natural-born Filipino, but (3) civil status;
merely presumed her to be one. 220 Being merely
presumed, that presumption can be overturned at any (4) his date of birth;
 (5) residence; required by Section 74 of the OEC, is false. In the
(6) his post office address for all election same vein, Section 1, Rule 23 of the Comelec Rules of
purposes; and Procedure states that a CoC may be denied due
course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground that any
(7) his profession or occupation. material representation contained therein as required
In addition, the aspirant is required to state by law is false."
under oath that: In Marcos v. Commission on Elections, 223 thi
(1) he/she is announcing his/her candidacy s Court declared that there is material
for the office stated therein and that misrepresentation when a statement in a CoC is made
he/she is eligible for the said office; with the intent to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate
(2) he/she will support and defend the
ineligible. ASEcHI
Constitution of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and In Salcedo
allegiance thereto; II v. Commission on Elections, 224 it was explained
that to constitute a material misrepresentation, the
(3) he/she will obey the laws, legal orders,
false representation must not only pertain to a material
and decrees promulgated by the
fact which would affect the substantive right of a
duly constituted authorities;
candidate to run for the position stated in the CoC, but
(4) he/she is not a permanent resident or must also consist of a "deliberate attempt to mislead,
immigrant to a foreign country; misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render
(5) the obligation imposed by his/her oath a candidate ineligible." 225 Simply put, the false
is assumed voluntarily, without representation must have been done "with an intention
mental reservation or purpose of to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications for
evasion; and public office." 226
(6) the facts stated in the certificate of Gonzalez v. Commission on Elections 227 reit
candidacy are true to the best of erated the pronouncement that a material
his/her knowledge. misrepresentation is not just the falsity of the
information declared in the CoC but also consists in
As previously discussed, Section 78 of the OEC
the very materiality of the said information, and the
provides that within 25 days from the time of filing of
deliberate attempt by the candidate to mislead or
the CoC, any person may file a petition to deny due
deceive the electorate as to that candidate's
course to and/or to cancel it on the exclusive ground
qualification for public office.
that any material representation stated therein as
 Stated differently, before the Comelec may In its assailed Resolutions, the Comelec found
deny due course to and/or cancel a CoC, it must be petitioner to have falsely represented material facts in
shown: (a) that the representation pertains to a her 2015 CoC.
material fact; (b) that it is in fact false; and (c) that Residency
there was a deliberate attempt to deceive, mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact, which would otherwise The controversy with respect to petitioner's
render the candidate ineligible to run for the position. residency qualification arose when it was observed
Under the third element, the deception must be such that she made the following entry in Item 11 of her
as to lead the electorate to believe that the candidate 2012 CoC for Senator:
possesses the qualifications for the position he/she is PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
running for, when in truth the candidate does not PHILIPPINES BEFORE MAY 13, 2013:
possess such qualifications, thus making him/her
ineligible to run. 06 No. of Years 06 No. of Months
Here, petitioner wants to run for the Presidency Based on the said entry, it could be deduced
in the 2016 elections and claims in her 2015 CoC that that by her own reckoning, petitioner started residing in
she possesses the five qualifications set forth in the Philippines in November 2006. Thus by May 8,
Section 2, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which 2016, or the day immediately preceding
states: the elections on May 9, 2016, her period of residency
in the Philippines would only be nine years and six
Section 2. No person may be months, or short of the mandatory 10-year residency
elected President unless he is a natural- requirement for the presidential post. In contrast,
born citizen of the Philippines, a petitioner attested in her 2015 CoC that her period of
registered voter, able to read and write, residency in the Philippines on the day before the May
at least forty years of age on the day of 9, 2016 elections is "10 years and 11 months." Clearly,
the election, and a resident of the these are contrasting declarations which give the
Philippines for at least ten years impression that petitioner adjusted the period of her
immediately preceding such residency in her 2015 CoC to show that she is eligible
election. (Emphases supplied) to run for the Presidency. This rendered her vulnerable
Respondents, however, insist that petitioner to the charge that she committed material
committed false material representation when she misrepresentations in her 2015 CoC.
declared in her 2015 CoC that she is a natural-born Section 2 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution,
Filipino and that she is a resident of this country for as reproduced above, requires, among others, that a
more than 10 years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections. person aspiring to become a President must be a
resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years aspirations, potentials for growth and development,
immediately preceding the election. This requirement and all matters vital to their common welfare.
is mandatory and must be complied with strictly. For Familiarity, or the opportunity to be familiar, with these
one, no less than our Constitution itself imposes it. For circumstances can only come with
another, Section 2 was couched in a negative form — residency . . . ." 234 At the same time, the residency
an indication of the intention of the framers of our requirement gives the electorate sufficient time to
Constitution to make it mandatory. "A statute or know, familiarize themselves with, and assess the true
provision which contains words of positive prohibition, character of the candidates. ITAaHc
such as 'shall not,' 'cannot,' or 'ought not,' or which is Domicile is classified into three types
couched in negative terms importing that the act shall according on its source, namely: (1) domicile of origin,
not be done otherwise than designated, is which an individual acquires at birth or his first
mandatory." 228 Moreover, Section 63 229 of Article domicile; (2) domicile of choice, which the individual
IX of the OEC imposes the same 10-year residency freely chooses after abandoning the old domicile; and
requirement. (3) domicile by operation of law, which the law assigns
For purposes of election laws, this Court, as to an individual independently of his or her
early as 1928, 230 held that the term residence is intention. 235 A person can only have a single
synonymous with domicile. 231 Domicile denotes the domicile at any given time. 236
place "'where a party actually or constructively has his To acquire a new domicile of choice, one must
permanent home,' where he, no matter where he may demonstrate:
be found at any given time, eventually intends to return
and remain" 232 (animus manendi). 1. Residence or bodily presence in the
new locality;
In deviating from the usual concepts of
residency, the framers of our Constitutions intended 2. An intention to remain there (animus
"'to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with manendi); and
the conditions and needs of the community' from 3. An intention to abandon the old
taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing domicile (animus non
in that community for electoral gain." 233 Their revertendi). 237
decision to adopt the concept of domicile "is rooted in
the recognition that [elective] officials . . . should not "To successfully effect a change of domicile,
only be acquainted with the metes and bounds of their one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
constituencies; more importantly, they should know change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
their constituencies and the unique circumstances of abandoning the former place of residence and
their constituents — their needs, difficulties, establishing a new one and definite acts which
correspond with the purpose." 238 In the absence of ineligible to run for the position
clear and positive proof of the above mentioned of President.
requisites, the current domicile should be deemed to A. Residency as a material
continue. Only with clear evidence showing fact.
concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity of residence be rebutted, for As to the first element, it is jurisprudentially
a change of legal residence requires an actual and settled that residence is a material fact because it
deliberate abandonment of the old involves the candidate's eligibility or qualification to run
domicile. 239 Elsewise put, if any of the above for public office. 241 In view of this and considering
requisites is absent, no change of domicile will that the parties do not dispute that the matter of a
result. 240 candidate's residency in the Philippines is a material
fact, there is no need to dwell further upon this
Having dispensed with the above preliminaries, element.
I shall now discuss whether petitioner satisfactorily
proved that the Comelec acted with grave abuse of B. Falsity of petitioner's
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction declaration as to the period
in ruling that there was material misrepresentation of her residency in her 2015
when she declared in her 2015 CoC that on the day CoC
immediately preceding the May 9, 2016 elections, she At this juncture, it must be stressed
would have been a resident of this country for 10 years that on October 18, 2001, petitioner not only formally
and 11 months. Otherwise stated, was there abandoned the Philippines as her domicile, but she
substantial evidence showing that petitioner committed also renounced her Philippine citizenship by becoming
material misrepresentation as regards her period of a naturalized American citizen. She preferred and
residency? chose to be domiciled in the U.S. than in the
Elements of material Philippines. And she did so not out of necessity or for
misrepresentation in temporary leisure or exercise of profession but to
relation to petitioner's permanently live there with her family. Fifteen years
claimed period of residence later, petitioner is before this Court claiming that she
in the Philippines: a) materiality; had decided to abandon and had in fact abandoned
b) falsity; and c) deliberate her U.S. domicile and that she had decided to
attempt to deceive, mislead, establish and had in fact established a new domicile of
misinform, or hide a fact which choice in the Philippines. She would want us to believe
would otherwise render her that she had complied with all the requirements in
establishing a new domicile of choice.
 The question now is: As a U.S. citizen who was children's arrival in the Philippines in
domiciled in the U.S., how can petitioner reestablish early 2005, they first lived with her in
her domicile in the Philippines? Obviously, petitioner Greenhills, San Juan;
must abandon or lose her domicile in the U.S. Also, c. school records which show that her children
she has to satisfactorily prove intent to permanently had been attending Philippine schools
stay in the country and make the Philippines her new continuously since June 2005;
domicile of choice.
d. TIN which shows that shortly after her return
For easy reference, I hereby reiterate the to the Philippines in May 2005, she
requirements in establishing a new domicile of choice, considered herself a taxable resident and
to wit: a) residence or bodily presence in the new a subject of the country's tax jurisdiction;
locality; b) an intention to remain there (animus
manendi); and c) an intention to abandon the old e. Condominium Certificate of Title for Unit 7F
domicile (animus non revertendi). and a parking lot at One Wilson Place
purchased in early 2005 and its
Petitioner's evidence corresponding Declarations of Real
of animus manendi; Property for real property tax purposes;
earliest possible date
that her physical f. reacquisition of her natural-born Filipino
presence in the citizenship and applications for derivative
Philippines can be citizenship for her minor children;
characterized as g. registration as a voter on August 31, 2006;
coupled with animus
manendi. h. renunciation of her U.S.
citizenship on October 20, 2010;
In support of her claim that from the time she
arrived in the Philippines on May 24, 2005 her physical i. acceptance of her appointment as MTRCB
presence here was imbued with animus manendi, Chairperson on October 21, 2010;
petitioner offered the following evidence: CHTAIc j. Questionnaire — Information for Determining
a. travel records which show that she would Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship
consistently return to the Philippines from wherein petitioner indicated that she
her trips abroad; considered herself a resident of the
Philippines starting May 2005.
b. the affidavit of her adoptive mother attesting
to the fact that after petitioner and her Petitioner claims that had
the Comelec considered her evidence in its totality and
not in isolation, it would have concluded that she allows such balikbayans to stay in the Philippines for a
intended to remain in the Philippines since May 24, limited period of one year only. Thus:
2005. SEC. 3. Benefits and Privileges of
I do not agree. the Balikbayan. — The balikbayan and
his or her family shall be entitled to the
What must not be overlooked is that these
following benefits and privileges:
pieces of evidence fly in the face of the fact that from
May 24, 2005 to July 18, 2006 petitioner was an xxx xxx xxx
alien on temporary sojourn here. It should be (c) Visa-free entry to the
emphasized that after petitioner abandoned the Philippines for a period of one (1) year
Philippines as her domicile and became a naturalized for foreign passport holders, with the
U.S. citizen on October 18, 2001, the U.S. became her exception of restricted nationals.
domicile of choice.
In Coquilla v. Commission on Elections 242 and Since petitioner availed herself of RA 6768, her
reiterated stay in the Philippines from the time she arrived here
in Japzon v. Commission on Elections, 243 this Court as a foreigner balikbayan on May 24, 2005 was not
held that a Filipino who applies for naturalization as an permanent in character or for an indefinite period of
American citizen has to establish legal residence in the time. It was merely temporary. At most, her stay in the
U.S. which would consequently result in the Philippines would only be for one year. This only
abandonment of Philippine domicile as no person can proves that her stay was not impressed with animus
have two domiciles at any given time. Hence, manendi, i.e., the intent to remain in or at the domicile
beginning October 18, 2001, petitioner was domiciled of choice for an indefinite period of time. 248 Thus
in the U.S. 244 in Coquilla, we did not include the period of the
candidate's physical presence in the Philippines while
When petitioner arrived in the he was still an alien. In that case, Teodulo M. Coquilla
Philippines on May 24, 2005, she in fact did so as a (Coquilla) was naturalized as U.S. citizen in 1965. He
foreigner balikbayan as she was then still a U.S. returned to the Philippines in 1998 and was repatriated
citizen. Normally, foreign nationals are required to under RA 8171 on November 7, 2000. He took his
obtain a visa before they can visit the Philippines. But oath as a citizen of the Philippines on November 10,
under RA 6768, 245 as amended by RA 2000. Subsequently, he filed his CoC for Mayor of
9174, 246 foreigner balikbayans 247 are accorded the Oras, Eastern Samar. A petition to cancel Coquilla's
privilege of visa-free entry to the Philippines. This visa- CoC was filed on the ground of material
free privilege is, however, not without conditions for it misrepresentation based on his representation that he
met the one-year residency requirement. This Court
affirmed the Comelec finding that Coquilla lacked the the residence requirement of Commonwealth Act No.
required residency. While Coquilla arrived in the 63." 252 Clearly, as early as 1966, jurisprudence has
Philippines as early as 1998, his presence here from unrelentingly and consistently applied the rule that the
that point until his naturalization on November 10, law does not include temporary visits in the
2000 was excluded in counting the length of his determination of the length of legal residency or
residency in the Philippines because during that time domicile in this country. Indeed, it is illogical and
he had no right to reside permanently here. Thus: absurd to consider a foreign national to have complied
with the requirements of animus manendi, or intent to
In the case at bar, petitioner lost
permanently stay in this country, if he/she was
his domicile of origin in Oras by
only on a temporary sojourn here. EATCcI
becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in
the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and Petitioner's claim that she had
until November 10, 2000, when he established animus manendi upon setting foot in this
reacquired Philippine citizenship, country on May 24, 2005 has, therefore, no leg to
petitioner was an alien without any right stand on. The pieces of evidence she presented in
to reside in the Philippines save as our support of this proposition are irrelevant, and are
immigration laws may have allowed him negated by the undisputed fact that she was then a
to stay as a visitor or as a resident foreigner temporarily staying here as a balikbayan. In
alien. 249 this context, petitioner's imputation of grave abuse of
discretion falls flat on its face.
Also, in the 1966 case of Ujano v.
Republic, 250 the trial court denied Melecio Clarinio I also subjected petitioner's evidence of animus
Ujano's (Ujano) petition to reacquire citizenship for manendi to utmost judicial scrutiny, particularly in
failure to meet the six months residency requirement. relation to her claim that such intent concurs with her
In so ruling, it reasoned out that Ujano, "who is physical presence in the Philippines beginning May 24,
presently a citizen of the United States of America, 2005. However, I find them wanting and insufficient.
was admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, a I start off with the fundamental precept that if a
status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the person alleges that he/she has abandoned her
present petition for reacquisition of Philippine domicile, it is incumbent upon that person to prove that
citizenship and which continues up to the he/she was able to reestablish a new domicile of
present." 251 This Court adopted and sustained the choice. 253 Applied to this case, this means that it is
trial court's ratiocination and added that "[t]he only way upon the intrinsic merits of petitioner's own evidence
by which [Ujano] can reacquire his lost Philippine that her claim of reestablishment of domicile in the
citizenship is by securing a quota for permanent Philippines on May 24, 2005 must rise or fall.
residence so that he may come within the purview of
 After a critical review, I am satisfied that parking lot were acquired in the second half of 2005,
the Comelec correctly found petitioner's evidence the lot in Corinthian Hills was bought in 2006, and the
relative to her claim of animus manendi beginning May house standing thereon was constructed that same
24, 2005 both wanting and insufficient. For instance, year (2006) — all after May 24, 2005.
securing a TIN is not conclusive proof of intent to The claimed intent also becomes shrouded in
remain in the Philippines considering that under the doubt in light of petitioner's maintaining a house in the
country's tax laws, any person, whether a citizen, non- U.S. which she bought in 1992 and the subsequent
citizen, resident or non-resident of the Philippines, is acquisition of a residential house in the U.S. in 2008.
required to secure a TIN for purposes of tax payment.
If at all, procurement of a TIN merely suggests or It must be stressed that in the Petition of Valdez
indicates an intention to comply with the obligation to before the Comelec, particularly par. 98 thereof, he
pay taxes which may be imposed upon any person, pointed out that: "per respondent's [herein petitioner]
whether a citizen or an alien. In fact, by her own own Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth for
admission, petitioner secured a TIN precisely for the 2014, she still maintains two (2) residential houses in
purpose of "settling her late father's estate." 254 At any the U.S., one purchased in 1992, and the other in
rate, a TIN was issued to petitioner on July 22, 2008." 258 Petitioner had the opportunity to
2005, 255 or almost two months after her claimed categorically deny, refute or discuss head on this
starting point of residency in the Philippines. contention of Valdez in her Verified Answer.
Unfortunately, she did not seize the chance. Instead, in
Under the same parity of reasoning, petitioner's paragraph 2.13 of her Verified Answer, petitioner
acquisition of a condominium unit and parking lot at couched her "denial" that she still owns two houses in
One Wilson Place in San Juan City, as well as her the U.S. as follows:
acquisition of a parcel of land in Corinthian Hills,
Quezon City and the subsequent construction of a 2.13. The allegation in paragraph
house thereon, do not evince an intent to remain in the 98 of the Petition is DENIED insofar as it
Philippines for good. Speaking for the Court is made to appear that [Petitioner]
in Svetlana "resides" in the 2 houses mentioned in
Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 256 Chief said paragraph. The truth is that
Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno declared that [Petitioner] does not "reside" in these
"ownership of a house or some other property does not houses, but in her family home in
establish domicile." 257 After all, acquisition of Corinthian Hills, Quezon City (where she
properties may also very well be for investment has lived with her family for almost a
purposes only. Besides, it bears emphasis that by decade). 259
petitioner's own allegation, the condominium unit and
 From the foregoing, petitioner in effect admitted 174. Her counsel also admitted in
the veracity and truthfulness of Valdez's assertion the clarificatory hearing that
regarding the acquisition of the two residential houses; PETITIONER still own[s] two properties
her denial pertained only to the fact that she was in the US, one purchased in 1992, and
residing thereat. Thereafter, no further mention of this the other in 2008, up to the present time.
matter was made. This is inconsistent with animus non
revertendi. In fact, the properties remain
The care by which petitioner crafted her Answer
as a physical link with the US which is
regarding the sale of her family's real property in the
her domicile of choice for many years,
U.S. is also obvious. In her four Verified Answers, she
which is inconsistent with her claim that
averred thus:
she completely abandoned. 263
. . . The family home in the U.S.A. was
Furthermore, during the oral
eventually sold on 27 April 2006. 260
argument on January 19, 2016, the undersigned
By adverting solely and exclusively to the inquired if petitioner's family still owns properties of
"family home" as the real property that had been sold whatever kind in the U.S. Her counsel denied any
in April 2006, petitioner effectively avoided, and knowledge. 264 When it was the turn of Valdez to be
withheld, mentioning and discussing her family's other interpellated and the undersigned again brought up the
remaining real properties in the U.S., such as the two alleged ownership of petitioner's family of two or more
other residential houses. properties in the U.S., Valdez affirmed the
Also, in Valdez's Comment/Opposition to the allegation. 265 Constrained to discuss the matter,
Petition for Certiorari, 261 particularly in paragraphs petitioner now admits in her Memorandum 266 that
11.14 and 174, he manifested that the existence of she and her family indeed do own two houses in the
these two houses in the U.S. was in fact admitted, not U.S.
at all denied, by petitioner. Thus: DHITCc These houses are obviously not considered by
11.14. . . . In 2014, petitioner petitioner as their family home; nonetheless,
indicated in her Statement of Assets and considering the circumstances prevailing in the case,
Liabilities that she has two (2) residential their acquisition and maintenance are relevant to the
properties in the U.S.A., a fact that she determination of whether petitioner had indeed
also confirmed during the clarificatory abandoned her U.S. domicile and whether she had
hearing on 25 November 2015 as herein effectively reestablished her domicile in the
provided. 262 Philippines.
 Thus, to follow petitioner's proposition that were also foreign nationals like her, with
acquisition of residential properties is the BI to obtain an ACR for each of them,
an indicia of aminus manendi is actually detrimental to as such would have been a requirement
her cause considering that subsequent to her for enrolment in schools. It is for this that
purchase of a condominium unit and a residential lot in she could not feign ignorance of the real
the Philippines in 2006, she later on acquired a nature of her residency status in the
residential property in the U.S. in 2008. In addition, she country from 24 May 2005 until July
maintained one other residential property in the U.S. 2006, when she did not possess an ACR
which was bought in 1992. since she failed to register with the BI,
and hence did not acquire the status of a
I also agree with the observation of respondent
permanent resident in the country. As
Contreras regarding the failure of petitioner to secure
such, she did not lose her domicile in the
an ICR for herself as she did with her children. For
US during that period, and could
Contreras, this not only shows that petitioner was fully
therefore not rightfully claim to have re-
cognizant of the nature of her residency status and the
established her domicile in the
applicable laws/rules regarding the same; more
Philippines. 267
significantly, it was clear and positive evidence of her
intention or ambivalence not to become a permanent . . . [T]he fact that she obtained
resident of the Philippines at that time. Thus: immigration documents for her three (3)
children in the form of Alien Certificate of
. . . For foreign nationals, of which
Registration (ACR), even if she failed to
petitioner was one prior to her
obtain one for herself, is an
reacquisition of her Filipino citizenship,
incontrovertible proof that she could not
intent to remain for good could not just
claim total ignorance about the limitations
rest on being physically present, and
imposed on a non-resident alien in the
performing acts such as buying a
country. 268
condominium unit and enrolling her
children here, for such are also the acts Finally, it is my opinion that
of expatriates who are working in the the Comelec correctly considered petitioner's
country. As foreign nationals, to be even declarations in her 2012 CoC as an admission against
considered as resident aliens, these interest. An admission is any statement of fact made
expats and their dependents have to by a party against his/her interest or is inconsistent
obtain the appropriate visas for their stay with the facts alleged by him/her. 269 It is governed by
to be legal. Petitioner fully knew this well, Section 26 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which
when she registered her children, who states:
 Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. — fault if it does not. 272 It bears emphasizing, though,
The act, declaration or omission of a that this does not preclude a declarant from refuting
party as to a relevant fact may be given his/her admission. 273 In this case, petitioner must
in evidence against him. show clear, convincing, and more than preponderant
evidence in order to refute the facts stated in her 2012
"To be admissible, an admission must: (a)
CoC considering that it is a sworn document which the
involve matters of fact, and not of law; (b) be
Rules of Court presumes had been executed in the
categorical and definite; (c) be knowingly and
regular course of law. 274
voluntarily made; and (d) be adverse to the admitter's
interests, otherwise it would be self-serving and Petitioner thus asserts that the statement in the
inadmissible." 270 2012 CoC about her period of residence was a result
of an honest mistake and not binding on her. She
All these requisites are present in these cases.
invokes Marcos v. Commission on Elections where
The entry in petitioner's 2012 CoC, i.e., six years and
we held that "it is the fact of residence, not a statement
six months, refers to her period of residence in the
in a certificate of candidacy, which ought to be
Philippines before May 13, 2013 — a matter which
decisive in determining whether or not an individual
without a doubt involves a question of fact. The same
has satisfied the Constitution's residency qualification
is categorical and definite, and was made under oath.
requirement."
The entry is adverse to petitioner's interest, specifically
in respect to her present claim in her 2015 CoC that However, I am not convinced with petitioner's
she has been a resident of the Philippines for 10 years invocation of honest mistake. Among other reasons,
and 11 months up to the day before the May 9, the defense of honest mistake interposed
2016 elections. Clearly, the questioned entry in in Marcos was found tenable because therein
petitioner's 2012 CoC is admissible as an admission petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos (Imelda) wrote in
against her interest. her CoC "seven" months as her period of residence —
an entry which was obviously short of the one-year
"Admissibility, however, is one thing, weight is
residency requirement for the position for which she
another." 271 Indeed, when the admission is contained
filed her CoC. Hence, the Court stated that it would be
in a document as in this case, the document is the best
plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and
evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the
knowingly make a statement in a CoC which would
facts in dispute. The rationale for the rule is
lead to her disqualification. It can be concluded,
based on the presumption that no man would declare
therefore, that the defense of honest mistake is
anything against himself/herself unless such
declaration was true. Thus, it is fair to presume that the available only if the mistake in the CoC would make a
qualified candidate ineligible for the position. It cannot
declaration corresponds with the truth, and it is his/her
be invoked when the mistake would make an ineligible
candidate qualified for the position. For in the first 4.149. Petitioner claims to have
case, no candidate in his/her right mind would re-established her domicile in the
prevaricate or make the electorate believe that he/she Philippines on 24 May 2005. . . .
is not qualified for the position he/she is aspiring for. 4.150. It is incorrect
Hence, there could be no other conclusion than that based on petitioner's own submissions
the mistake was committed honestly. Whereas in the which are conflicting.
second case, the intention to mislead can be deduced
from the fact that an aspirant, although not qualified, 4.151. In her COC for Senator in
makes it appear in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible the May 2013 election filed in October
to run for public office when in truth he/she is not. 2012, [petitioner] stated:
Here, petitioner made it appear that she did meet the "PERIOD OF RESIDENCE
10-year residency requirement when in fact, she did IN THE PHILIPPINES
not. BEFORE MAY 13, 2013 —
And even assuming that she committed an 6 YEARS AND 6
honest mistake, still, the same cannot outweigh her MONTHS".
categorical, definite, voluntary, and sworn declaration The above sworn entry in her
in her 2012 CoC, which is favored by the prima COC for Senator meant that [petitioner]
facie presumption of regularity. 275 Said entry in had been a Philippine resident only
petitioner's 2012 CoC which, as previously discussed since November 2006.
is an admission against interest, tends to prove that
she intended to stay permanently in the Philippines 4.152. She later claimed that
starting only in November 2006 (or in April 2006 the Comelec form confused her, that
assuming her claim of honest mistake is true, but still actually that entry of "6 years and 6
far from her claim of May 24, 2005). In other words, months" was meant to be up to the date
petitioner has miserably failed to present evidence of filing said COC in October 2012.
sufficient to overthrow the facts she herself supplied in Assuming this to be correct, and applying
her 2012 CoC. She cannot now, therefore, adjust or the "6 years and 6 months" as up to
readjust the dates from which to reckon her October 2012, this means that [petitioner]
reestablishment of domicile in the Philippines in order had been a Philippine resident only
to meet the 10-year constitutional residency since April 2006.
requirement. As correctly observed by the Comelec, 4.153. In her present COC for
petitioner's actions only highlight her ambivalence in President in the May 2016 elections, her
reestablishing domicile, viz.: IAETDc sworn entry on residency is "10 years
 and 11 months" up to the day before May petitioner could have made her stay in the Philippines
9, 2016 which would be a permanent in character beginning May 24, 2005 or
residency since June 2005. thereabouts had she applied for an immigrant status
as provided in Commonwealth Act No. 613 or The
4.154. So which is which?
Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by RA
May 24, 2005 as the date she 4376, 278 which allows a natural-born Filipino citizen
claims to have re-established her (assuming that she is) who was naturalized abroad to
Philippine domicile? return as a non-quota immigrant entitled to permanent
Or is it April 2006 as she also residence. As correctly argued by respondent
claims relative to her 2012 senatorial Contreras, "[t]he possession of a permanent resident
COC reckoned up to the date of its filing visa is not an added element, but is simply evidence
in October 2012? that sufficiently proves the presence of an act that
would indicate the element of animus manendi that
Or is it November 2006 which is applies to foreign nationals who would like to make the
the plain import of her sworn entry in her Philippines as their new domicile of choice." 279 But
senatorial COC? for some reason petitioner did not apply for an
Or is it June 2005 which would be immigrant status, and there is no indication that she
the reckoning date per her 2015 COC for was subsequently granted an immigrant visa, or a
President in the May 2016 elections? 276 permanent resident status.
In fine, even if it be conceded that petitioner's As a U.S. citizen, petitioner failed to perform an
evidence (i.e., TIN, acquisition of residential properties, act necessary to show that as of May 24, 2005 she
enrollment of her children in Philippine schools), taken intended to permanently remain in the Philippines.
singly or collectively, somehow evinces her claimed Such intention may be inferred from her waiver of non-
intent to remain in the Philippines, the same cannot resident status by obtaining a permanent resident visa
outweigh the evidence on record that her presence in or an ACR or by taking an oath of allegiance to the
the country as of May 24, 2005 was temporary in Philippines, which petitioner neither availed of on or
nature. "Evidence is assessed in terms of quality, not before May 24, 2005.
quantity. It is to be weighed, not counted." 277 Nevertheless, while petitioner entered the
At this point, I wish to make it abundantly clear Philippines on May 24, 2005 as a
that it is not my position that petitioner could not foreigner balikbayan with a limited period of stay, her
reestablish her domicile in the country prior to taking status changed when she took her Oath of Allegiance
the oath of allegiance to the country. In retrospect, to the Republic under RA 9225 on July 18, 2006. This
conferred upon her not only Philippine citizenship but case, Rogelio Batin Caballero (Caballero) ran for
also the right to stay in the Philippines for an unlimited Mayor of Uyugan, Batanes in the May 13,
period of time. Section 5 of the said law provides: 2013 elections. His rival candidate, however, filed a
petition to cancel his CoC on the ground of false
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights
representation as Caballero declared in his CoC that
and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re-
he was eligible to run for Mayor despite being a
acquire Philippine citizenship under this
Canadian citizen and not a resident of Uyugan,
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights
Batanes for at least one year immediately before
and be subject to all attendant liabilities
the elections. Caballero argued that Uyugan has
and responsibilities under existing laws
always been his domicile because he was born and
of the Philippines . . . .
baptized there; that he studied, worked, and built his
Thus, it is from this date, July 18, 2006, that house in Uyugan; that he was a registered voter of
petitioner can rightfully claim that her physical said municipality and used to vote there; and, that he
presence in the Philippines was with animus manendi. availed herself of RA 9225 on September 13, 2012
Her becoming a Filipino, albeit still a dual and renounced his Canadian citizenship on October 1,
citizen, on said date, allowed her to thenceforth stay 2012. DcHSEa
permanently here.
In denying Caballero's petition, the Court En
However, it must be emphasized that Banc speaking through Justice Diosdado P. Peralta
petitioner's reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and with no member dissenting, ruled that Caballero's
neither automatically resulted in the reestablishment of reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under RA 9225
her Philippine domicile nor in the abandonment of her did not enable him to automatically regain his domicile
U.S. domicile. It is settled that RA 9225 treats in Uyugan. He must still prove that after reacquiring his
citizenship independently of residence. 280 It does not Philippine citizenship, he had reestablished his
provide for a mode of reestablishing domicile and has domicile in Uyugan, Batanes for at least one year
no effect on the legal residence of those availing of it. immediately preceding the May 13, 2013 elections.
"This is only logical and consistent with the general Thus:
intent of the law for dual citizenship. Since a natural-
Petitioner was a natural-born
born Filipino may hold, at the same time, both
Filipino who was born and raised in
Philippine and foreign citizenships, he[/she] may
Uyugan, Batanes, Thus, it could be said
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the
that he had his domicile of origin in
foreign country of which he[/she] is also a citizen." 281
Uyugan, Batanes. However, he later
A case in point worked in Canada and became a
is Caballero v. Commission on Elections. 282 In that Canadian citizen.
In Coquilla v. Comelec, we ruled that impact or effect on his
naturalization in a foreign country may residence/domicile. He
result in an abandonment of domicile in could still retain his
the Philippines. This holds true in domicile in the USA, and he
petitioner's case as permanent residence did not necessarily regain
status in Canada is required for the his domicile in the
acquisition of Canadian citizenship. Municipality of General
Hence, petitioner had effectively Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
abandoned his domicile in the Philippines. Ty merely had
Philippines and transferred his domicile the option to again
of choice in Canada. His frequent visits establish his domicile in the
to Uyugan, Batanes during his vacation Municipality of General
from work in Canada cannot be Macarthur, Eastern Samar,
considered as waiver of such Philippines, said place
abandonment. becoming his new domicile
of choice. The length of his
The next question is what is the
residence therein shall be
effect of petitioner's retention of his
determined from the time
Philippine citizenship under RA No.
he made it his domicile of
9225 on his residence or domicile?
choice, and it shall not
In Japzon v. Comelec, wherein retroact to the time of his
respondent [Jaime S.] Ty reacquired his birth.
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
Hence, petitioner's retention of his
and [ran] for Mayor of General
Philippine citizenship under RA No. 9225
Macarthur, Eastern Samar and whose
did not automatically make him regain his
residency in the said place was put in
residence in Uyugan, Batanes. He must
issue, we had the occasion to state,
still prove that after becoming a
thus:
Philippine citizen on September 13,
[Petitioner's] 2012, he had reestablished Uyugan,
reacquisition of his Batanes as his new domicile of choice
Philippine citizenship which is reckoned from the time he made
under Republic Act No. it as such.
9225 had no automatic
 The COMELEC found that reestablished his domicile in Uyugan. He likewise had
petitioner failed to present competent to prove the date when he reestablished his domicile
evidence to prove that he was able to there for purposes of determining whether he met the
reestablish his residence in Uyugan one-year residency requirement. However, there being
within a period of one year immediately no other evidence showing his intent to reestablish his
preceding the May 13, 2013 elections. It domicile in the Philippines and abandon his former
found that it was only after reacquiring domicile abroad, and since Caballero took his oath of
his Filipino citizenship by virtue of RA No. allegiance under RA 9225 only on September 13, 2012
9225 on September 13, 2012 that or less than one year prior to the May 13,
petitioner can rightfully claim that he re- 2013 elections, he could no longer possibly prove
established his domicile in Uyugan, compliance with the one-year residency requirement.
Batanes, if such was accompanied by Similarly, I find no sufficient evidence showing
physical presence thereat, coupled with that petitioner intended to reestablish a new domicile in
an actual intent to re-establish his the Philippines prior to taking her Oath of
domicile there. However, the period from Allegiance on July 7, 2006; as such petitioner still has
September 13, 2012 to May 12, 2013 to prove that after taking said oath she has
was even less than the one year reestablished the Philippines as her new domicile by
residency required by law. demonstrating that her physical presence here is
xxx xxx xxx coupled with animus manendi and an undeniable and
definite intention to abandon her old domicile.
Records indeed showed that
However, since petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance
petitioner failed to prove that he had
in July 2006 and renounced her U.S. citizenship in
been a resident of Uyugan, Batanes for
October 2010, both events having occurred less than
at least one year immediately preceding
10 years prior to the May 9, 2016 elections, the
the day of elections as required under
conclusion becomes inexorable that she could no
Section 39 of the Local Government
longer possibly prove compliance with the 10-year
Code. 283 (Underlining ours)
residency requirement. SCaITA
Contrary to petitioner's interpretation, we did not
Petitioner's evidence
reckon the period of residency in Caballero from the
of animus non revertendi;
time Caballero reacquired Philippine citizenship under
earliest possible date
RA 9225. We there held that since Caballero
abandoned his Philippine domicile when he was that petitioner's physical
presence in the Philippines
naturalized abroad, he has to prove that he had
can be said to be coupled e. her husband's act of informing the U.S.
with animus non revertendi. Postal Service of the abandonment of
their former U.S. address on March
The element of intention to abandon an old
2006;
domicile is as important as in the case of acquisition of
new domicile. 284 Thus, if a person establishes a new f. their act of selling their family home in the
dwelling place, but never abandons the intention of U.S. on April 27, 2006;
returning to the old dwelling place, the domicile g. her husband's resignation from his work in
remains at the old dwelling place. 285 the U.S. in April 2006 and his return to
Upon this score, petitioner offered the following the Philippines on May 4, 2006;
pieces of evidence: h. Questionnaire — Information for Determining
a. the affidavit of her adoptive mother attesting Possible Loss of U.S. Citizenship
to the reasons which prompted petitioner wherein petitioner indicated that she no
to leave the U.S. and return permanently longer considered herself a resident of
to the Philippines; the U.S. since May 2005 until the
present.
b. the affidavit of Teodoro Misael Daniel V.
Llamanzares, corroborating her adoptive  
mother's statement and narrating how he
At first blush, it would seem that petitioner's
and petitioner were actively attending to
evidence did tend to prove her claimed intent to
the logistics of their permanent relocation
abandon her old domicile in the U.S. However, what
to the Philippines;
prevents me from lending unqualified support to this
c. the documented communication between posture is that all these pieces of evidence refer to
petitioner or her husband with the dates after May 24, 2005. Such evidence could not,
property movers regarding the relocation therefore, be of much help in establishing her claim
of their household goods, furniture, and that she changed domicile as of May 24, 2005.
cars from Virginia, U.S.A. to the
Furthermore, petitioner's evidence cannot
Philippines;
prove animus non revertendi prior to her renunciation
d. relocation of their household goods, furniture, of her U.S. citizenship on October 20, 2010. This is so
cars and other personal property from because prior thereto, petitioner could return anytime
Virginia, U.S.A. to the Philippines which to the U.S., stay there as its citizen and enjoy all the
were packed, collected for storage, and rights, privileges and protection the U.S. government
transported in February and April 2006; extends to its nationals, including the right to a legal
residence. In fact, from May 24, 2005 to October 20, abandoning U.S. domicile was when she renounced
2010, petitioner did go back to the U.S. no less than her U.S. citizenship. This conclusion is consistent with
five times: February 14, 2006, April 20, 2009, October our ruling in the 2013 case
19, 2009, December 27, 2009 and March 27, of Reyes v. Commission on Elections 288 where this
2010. 286 And when she went to the U.S. on those Court, speaking through Justice Jose P. Perez, said:
dates, she used her U.S. passport and stayed there As to the issue of residency,
not as an alien but as its citizen. It should also be proceeding from the finding that
recalled that petitioner and her family still own and petitioner has lost her natural-born
maintain two residential houses in the U.S. which they status, we quote with approval the ruling
purchased in 1992 and in 2008, or two years after of the COMELEC First Division that
petitioner had taken her oath of allegiance to the petitioner cannot be considered a
Philippines. Hence the only clear and positive proof resident of Marinduque:
that petitioner abandoned her U.S. domicile was when
she executed her Affidavit of Renunciation of "Thus, a Filipino
Allegiance to the United States of America and citizen who becomes
Renunciation of American Citizenship 287 on October naturalized elsewhere
20, 2010 because that was the point when she effectively abandons his
concretized and exteriorized her intention to abandon domicile of origin. Upon re-
her U.S. domicile. It is this act that unequivocally and acquisition of Filipino
irremissibly sealed off any intent of her retaining her citizenship pursuant to
U.S. domicile. Prior to that, it cannot be said that she RA 9225, he must still
has complied with the third requirement. show that he chose to
establish his domicile in
This is not to say that I am adding a fourth the Philippines through
requirement for relinquishing foreign citizenship as a positive acts, and the
condition to reestablishing domicile. My discussion is period of his residency
still premised on compliance with the third requirement shall be counted from the
of bona fide intent to abandon the former domicile. To time he made it his
be sure, petitioner could have established her animus domicile of choice.
non revertendi to the U.S. had she applied for a
Philippine resident visa on May 24, 2005 or In this case, there is
thereabouts, as earlier discussed. But since she did no showing whatsoever
not, the only fact or circumstance that can be that [petitioner] had already
considered as indicative of her clear and positive act of re-acquired her Filipino
citizenship pursuant to RA said locality can
9225 so as to conclude that substitute the fact that
she has regained her she has not abandoned
domicile in the her domicile of choice in
Philippines. There being no the USA." 289 (Underlining
proof that [petitioner] had ours)
renounced her American Against this backdrop, petitioner's evidence
citizenship, it follows that relative to animus non revertendi becomes irrelevant
she has not abandoned her for such evidence does not at all prove that she had in
domicile of choice in the fact abandoned her U.S. domicile on May 24, 2005.
USA. aTHCSE Nonetheless, I still tried to evaluate the pieces of
The only proof evidence that petitioner had submitted. However, I still
presented by [petitioner] to find them wanting and insufficient.
show that she has met the As part of the evidence to prove her intent to
one-year residency abandon her old domicile, petitioner puts forward her
requirement of the law and husband's act of informing the U.S. Postal Service in
never abandoned her March 2006 of the abandonment of their former U.S.
domicile of origin in Boac, address. I carefully studied the copy of the online
Marinduque is her claim acknowledgement from the U.S. Postal Service
that she served as regarding this 290 and deduced therefrom that what
Provincial Administrator of petitioner's husband did was actually to request the
the province from January U.S. Postal Service for a change of address and not to
18, 2011 to July 13, notify it of their abandonment of their U.S. address per
2011. But such fact alone se. At any rate, there was no showing that the change
is not sufficient to prove of address was from their old U.S. address to their new
her one-year Philippine address. And, again, it must be mentioned
residency. For, that this was done only in March 2006.
[petitioner] has never
regained her domicile in Likewise submitted to prove animus non
Marinduque as she revertendi was the series of electronic correspondence
remains to be an between petitioner/her husband on one hand, and the
American citizen. No Victory Van Corporation (Victory)/National Veterinary
amount of her stay in the Quarantine Service of the Bureau of Animal Industry of
the Philippines, on the other, regarding the logistics for their pet dog which bears the date August 3,
the transport of their personal properties and pet dog, 2005. AHDacC
respectively, from the U.S. to the Philippines. The first Notably, even petitioner did not reckon this
in the series of electronic mails (e-mails) from Victory date, March 18, 2005, as the starting point of
was dated March 18, 2005. 291 Apparently, the her animus non revertendi. Hence, it could be said that
communication was a reply to petitioner's inquiry about even petitioner herself could not categorically state
the rates for the packing, loading and transport of their that by March 18, 2005, she already had the intention
household goods and two vehicles to Manila. to abandon her U.S. domicile.
Petitioner's animus non revertendi to the U.S. at least
as of date of the said e-mail (March 18, 2005) cannot, Petitioner's conduct tending
however, be deduced from her mere act of making to show animus manendi
such inquiry. It must be stressed that the intent to and animus non revertendi
abandon an old domicile must be established by clear cannot be taken as part of
and positive proof. 292 While making such an inquiry an incremental process
may be construed as the initial step to the actual of/for changing domicile.
transport or transportation of the goods, that by itself, Petitioner invokes the cases of Mitra and
is short of the clear and positive proof required to of Sabili where this Court held that relocation to a new
establish animus non revertendi. At the most, all that domicile is basically an incremental process. Thus,
can be inferred from the said e-mail is petitioner's mere petitioner's counsel maintained during the oral
"interest" at that point but not yet the "intent" or the arguments that their evidence consisted of documents
resolve to have her family's personal properties that were executed, events that took place, and acts
shipped to the Philippines for purposes of relocation. It done, after May 24, 2005 precisely because they all
is true that petitioner's inquiry led to negotiations form part of a process which began on May 24, 2005
between her and/or her husband and Victory until the and continued to be in progress thereafter.
goods and effects were finally transported to the
Philippines starting February 2006 as shown by the Petitioner's case is nowhere nearly congruent
succeeding exchange of communication; however, to Mitra and Sabili because in those cases, the
these negotiations, based on the other e-mails evidence of therein petitioners were plainly viewed by
submitted, did not start immediately after March 18, the Court as positive acts that formed part of the
2005 or on or before May 24, 2005. The negotiations incremental process of changing domicile. That same
only actually started the following year, or in January perspective cannot, however, be applied to petitioner's
2006, months after May 24, 2005. The same is true case because, unlike in Mitra and Sabili, her change of
with respect to the e-mail relative to the transport of domicile, as previously discussed, was inevitably and
inextricably intertwined with her citizenship. It bears
reiterating that as a naturalized U.S. citizen, petitioner of the Philippines and the following
is duty-bound to comply with our immigration laws conditions:
before her stay in this country could be considered for xxx xxx xxx
purposes of the elections. Just because she thought of
permanently staying in the Philippines does not mean (3) Those appointed
that upon setting foot on this country she has instantly to any public office shall
reestablished domicile here. As an alien wanting to subscribe and swear to an
reestablish a domicile here, petitioner must first oath of allegiance to the
reacquire Philippine citizenship (or at least ought to Republic of the Philippines
have secured a permanent resident visa) before the and its duly constituted
totality of her acts or actions tending to show animus authorities prior to their
manendi can be regarded part of an incremental assumption of
process of establishing domicile. The same is true with office: Provided, That they
respect to animus non revertendi: she must have first renounce their oath of
renounced her U.S. citizenship (or applied for a allegiance to the country
Philippine immigrant visa). where they took that oath.
The records also show that petitioner has not When petitioner thus executed her Affidavit of
only procrastinated in renouncing her U.S. citizenship; Renunciation of Allegiance on October 20, 2010, there
in fact she also did it unwittingly. It should be recalled could be no two opinions about the fact that her
that the President appointed her Chairperson of the primary purpose was to meet the requirement for her
MTRCB on October 6, 2010. At that time, petitioner appointment as MTRCB Chairperson. This is
was still a dual citizen owing allegiance both to the buttressed by the fact that she assumed office the
Philippines and to the U.S. Hence she could not following day and by the answers she wrote in the
accept the said appointment without renouncing her Questionnaire/Information for Determining Possible
U.S. citizenship first, conformably with Section 5 (3) of Loss of U.S. Citizenship that she submitted with the
RA 9225, which reads: Bureau of Consular Affairs of the U.S. Department of
State. There she explicitly stated that she was
SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights relinquishing her U.S. citizenship because she was
and Liabilities. — Those who retain or re- appointed Chairperson of the MTRCB and she wanted
acquire Philippine citizenship under this to comply with both U.S. and Philippine laws. Even
Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights then, it bears notice that in that document she made
and be subject to all attendant liabilities no categorical declaration at all that she was
and responsibilities under existing laws relinquishing her U.S. citizenship to transfer domicile
here. In other words, petitioner did not renounce her was Aguinaldo's residence in the third district of
U.S. citizenship upon her own volition with the Cagayan, his residency in said province having been
deliberate intent or intention of reestablishing legal established beyond doubt. Jalover, on the other hand,
residence here. It only incidentally arose as an emanated from a petition to deny due course and/or to
inevitable consequence of her having to comply with cancel John Henry R. Osmeña's (Osmeña) CoC for
the requirements of Section 5 (3) of RA 9225. Be that Mayor of Toledo City on the ground that he made a
as it may, I consider her act of renouncing her foreign false declaration in his CoC when he stated that he
allegiance on October 20, 2010 as amounting to had been a resident of said city for 15 years prior to
sufficient compliance with the third requirement in the May 13, 2013 elections. Notably, Osmeña
reestablishing domicile for it carried with it a waiver of previously served as Congressman of the third district
her right to permanently reside in the U.S. Regrettably, of Cebu which includes Toledo City.
this date does not jibe with what petitioner declared in The present case, however, involves a
her 2015 CoC for President. personality who formerly abandoned the Philippines as
Stronger proof is required her domicile, and renounced her Philippine citizenship
in reestablishment of by becoming a naturalized U.S. citizen. Thus, what is
national domicile. involved here is a transfer of domicile from one country
to another by a naturalized U.S. citizen. Petitioner now
Petitioner protests that
tries to convince this Court that she had abandoned
in Perez v. Commission on Elections 293 and Jalover 
her U.S. domicile and had successfully reestablished
v. Osmeña 294 the candidates were deemed to have
her new domicile of choice in this country. To stress,
transferred their domiciles based on significantly less
this case involves relocation by an alien of the national
evidence compared to what she has
domicile from the U.S. to the Philippines, which
presented. IDSEAH
requires much stronger proof, both as to fact and
But there is a marked distinction between the intent, than in the case of a change of domicile from
present case and the cases one municipality, or subordinate subdivision of a
cited. Perez and Jalover involved transfer of domicile country, to another, by a Filipino citizen who never
within the same province or within the confines of our renounced such citizenship. 295 "[I]t requires stronger
country. In Perez, a petition to disqualify Rodolfo E. and more conclusive evidence to justify the court in
Aguinaldo (Aguinaldo) as candidate for Congressman deciding that a man has acquired a new domicile in a
of the third district of Cagayan in the May 11, foreign country, than would suffice to warrant the
1998 elections was filed on the ground that he, conclusion that he has acquired a new domicile in a
allegedly, is a resident of Gattaran which is in the first country where he is not a
(not third) district of Cagayan. What was in question foreigner." 296 In Perez and Jalover, for instance, it
was no longer necessary for this Court to determine affected by the growth or fluctuation of local economy,
whether the candidates had the legal right to and must brave and suffer the same natural calamities.
permanently reside in their chosen domicile because, These are beyond the immediate and direct senses
being Filipinos, they can reside anywhere in the and perceptions of foreigners or aliens living abroad.
Philippines. In the case of the herein petitioner, Likewise misplaced is petitioner's
however, it is not only the length of her stay in the reliance on the cases of Japzon and Rommel
Philippines that must be determined, but also the Apolinario
legality and nature thereof for, as heretofore Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, 297 considering
discussed, the period of her physical presence here, that said cases are not on all fours with her case. In
as an alien, should not be included in the computation said cases, the candidates who were charged with
of the length of her residency as the same was making false material representation in their CoC took
temporary in character or not permitted by our their oath of allegiance more than one year before
immigration laws. Also, while citizenship and residency the elections, thereby making it possible for them to
are different from and independent of each other, one prove compliance with the one-year residency
may invariably affect the other. For instance, petitioner requirement of the Local Government Code. Thus,
had to abandon her Philippine domicile when she in Japzon, Jaime S. Ty reacquired his Philippine
applied for U.S. naturalization in 2001. Corollarily, she citizenship under RA 9225 on October 2, 2005 and ran
cannot reestablish domicile here unless she first for Mayor of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar in the
reacquires her Philippine citizenship (or enter the May 14, 2007 election. While Rommel Apolinario
Philippines as an immigrant). Thus, unlike Jalosjos reacquired his Philippine citizenship under RA
in Perez and Jalover, the petitioner in this case has the 9225 on November 26, 2008, or four days after arrival
added burden of proving, among others, the character in the Philippines, and ran for Governor of Zamboanga
and legitimacy of her presence here since she earlier Sibugay in the May 10, 2010 elections.
abandoned her Filipino citizenship and Philippine
domicile to become a U.S. citizen and its domiciliary. In the case of petitioner, however, she took her
oath of allegiance only on July 7, 2006. Therefore, she
Another important reason for the distinction is could not possibly prove that she has been residing in
that demanded by the purpose of the residency the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately
requirement of election laws. Those living in the same preceding the May 9, 2016 elections. July 7, 2006 to
province albeit in another district as May 9, 2016 is about two months short of 10 years.
in Perez and Jalover, can still maintain familiarity with
the conditions and needs of nearby communities. They Under these circumstances, the entry in
and the people there are exposed to the same petitioner's 2015 CoC for President that her period of
environment, speak the same language, are similarly
residency in the Philippines as of May 9, 2016 is 10 convince the Court that the aforementioned phrase is
years and 11 months is, false, as indeed it is. susceptible of causing confusion, petitioner calls
attention to the fact that the Comelec, after apparently
C. Petitioner's deliberate
realizing the same, had revised the CoC forms for the
attempt to deceive, mislead,
May 9, 2016 elections. The amended phrase which
misinform, or hide a fact
can now be found under Item No. 7 of the latest CoC
which would otherwise render
form reads as follows:
her ineligible to run for the
position of President PERIOD OF RESIDENCE IN THE
PHILIPPINES UP TO THE
It was pointed out to petitioner as early as June
DAY BEFORE MAY 09, 2016:
2015 that the period of residence she entered in her
2012 CoC was six years and six months before May I am not persuaded.
13, 2013. Notwithstanding that her attention was called The import of the phrase "Period of Residence
to such fact, petitioner never bothered to correct her in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" as found in
2012 CoC. Instead, she filed her 2015 CoC for petitioner's 2012 CoC is too plain to be mistaken and
President declaring therein a period of residency that too categorical to be misinterpreted. As can be
is markedly different from and does not jibe with what observed, a fixed date was given as a reference
she declared under oath in her 2012 CoC. aCIHcD point, i.e., May 13, 2013. Indeed, even an average
Petitioner then proceeded to make the point that person would be able to tell that what comes before
the declaration about her period of residence in her May 13, 2013 is May 12, 2013. From a plain reading of
2015 CoC is correct. Explaining the discrepancy the said phrase, therefore, it can readily be discerned
between her 2012 and 2015 CoCs, she asserts that or understood that what was being required by item
her entry of six years and six months in her 2012 CoC No. 11 is a candidate's period of residence in the
was the result of an honest mistake. She claims that Philippines until May 12, 2013.
she accomplished her 2012 CoC without the
To argue that any period which is not until May
assistance of counsel and that she did not know that
12, 2013 but prior to May 13, 2013 is technically still a
what was required by the phrase "Period of Residence
period "before May 13, 2013" is like clutching at
in the Philippines before May 13, 2013" is the period of
straws. To an astute political aspirant like petitioner,
her residence on the day right before the May 13,
filing a CoC necessarily presupposes
2013 elections; that instead, she interpreted it to mean
knowledge on her part of the qualifications required by
as her period of residence in the Philippines as of her
the office where she seeks to be elected. After all, it is
filing of the 2012 CoC on October 2, 2012, which
presumed that a person takes ordinary care of his or
technically is also a period "before May 13, 2013." To
her concerns. 298 For a senatorial candidate, the
required qualifications are found under Section 3, immediately preceding May 13, 2013, which is May 12,
Article VI of the Constitution which provides, viz.: 2013.
Section 3. No person shall be a Totally unacceptable is the assertion that the
Senator unless he is a natural-born change in the wording of the item respecting the period
citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of residence as found in the latest CoC form is an
of the election, is at least thirty-five years acknowledgment by the Comelec that the previous
of age, able to read and write, a version is indeed unclear. The change is a mere
registered voter, and a resident of the semantic exercise devoid of any serious significance.
Philippines for not less than two years Petitioner's personal circumstances and those
immediately preceding the day of the surrounding the filing of her 2012 CoC provide little
election. (Emphasis supplied) solace to her claim of honest mistake. As petitioner
Thus, read in the light of the other material alleges, she pursued a college degree in Development
entries required in the 2012 CoC for Senator such as Studies in one of the country's premiere universities —
Age (Item No. 14), the fact of being a Natural-born the University of the Philippines in Manila. In 1988, she
Filipino Citizen (Item No. 8) and, of being a Registered went to Boston College in the U.S. where, as can
Voter (Item No. 19), it is obvious that what the form reasonably be expected, she learned
was trying to elicit were a senatorial candidate's concepts on politics after graduating with a degree of
qualifications in accordance with the above-quoted Bachelor of Arts in Political Studies. When she filed
constitutional provision. And assuming that the phrase her 2012 CoC, she was not technically a neophyte in
"Period of Residence in the Philippines before May 13, the Philippine political arena, she having been on her
2013" is indeed susceptible of causing confusion as to adoptive father's side during the campaign for his
until what period before May 13, 2013 was being presidential bid in 2004. At that time, she was, for two
asked, such confusion can easily be dispelled by a years, at the helm of MTRCB where her duties
quick reference to the constitutional provision which impacted not only media and entertainment culture but
states in no uncertain terms that a Senator must be a also society at large. Being the educated woman that
resident of the Philippines for not less than two she is, coupled by her brief but memorable stint in
years immediately preceding the day of the politics and relevant government experience, I find it
election. Under this premise, the only logical hard to believe that she misinterpreted the clear and
interpretation that should have been available to simple import of the phrase "Period of Residence in
petitioner at the time she was filling out her 2012 CoC the Philippines before May 13, 2013" as pertaining to
is that what was required by Item No. 11 — the period her period of residence in the Philippines as of the
of her residence in the Philippines as of the day submission of her 2012 CoC on October 2, 2012. To
repeat, the phrase is too plain to be mistaken and too
categorical to be misinterpreted, more especially by elected to the highest office in the land: the
one of her educational and professional stature. Presidency, from whom only the best and finest
attributes of the truly Filipino character, intellect,
That petitioner was not assisted by counsel
patriotism, allegiance and loyalty are sought after and
when she accomplished her 2012 CoC is of no
expected. Verily, this explains why the law provides for
moment. For one, the plain and simple language used
grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course
in the subject CoC form does not require a legal mind
to CoC. 302 Here it appears, however, petitioner's
to be understood. For another, it was not as if
actions evinced unusual regrettable tendency to
petitioner had no choice but to accomplish the subject
becloud plain and simple truth concerning such
CoC without the assistance of counsel. Her own
commonplace things as the real time-stretch of her
allegations revealed that she accomplished her 2012
residence in this country. Petitioner chose not to
CoC on September 27, 2012 and that she only filed
secure a resident visa. She therefore knew that prior to
the same five days thereafter or on October 2,
her taking her oath of allegiance to the Republic and
2012. 299 This shows that petitioner had had ample
her abandoning her U.S. domicile, her stay here was
time not only to reflect on the declarations she made in
merely temporary. This presumed knowledge is
her 2012 CoC, but also to consult a lawyer regarding
imposed upon every individual by Article 3 of the Civil
the entries that she provided therein should there be
Code which states that "[i]gnorance of the law excuses
matters which were indeed unclear to her. After all,
no one from compliance therewith." cHaCAS
she is not expected to have simply taken the filling out
of her CoC lightly since aside from its being a sworn Notably, when one runs for an elective public
document, a CoC is in the nature of a formal office, it is imperative to first know the qualifications
manifestation to the whole world of the candidate's required of the office and then to assess whether such
political creed or lack thereof. 300 It is a statement by qualifications have been met. Hence, petitioner is
a person seeking to run for a public office certifying reasonably expected to know the requirements of the
that he/she announces his/her candidacy for the office office she is running for, and to determine whether she
mentioned and that he/she is eligible for that satisfactorily meets those requirements. One cannot
office. 301 Indeed, a valid CoC, much like the sacred just aspire to occupy a position without making some
ballot that a voter casts in a free and honest elections, self-examination whether he/she is qualified. In
is the bedrock of the electoral process. Its execution or petitioner's case, precisely because her adoptive
accomplishment cannot be taken lightly, because it father's qualifications were then under question when
mirrors the character and integrity of the candidate he ran for President in 2004, then there is more reason
who executes or accomplishes it — that candidate's for petitioner to carefully evaluate and assess her
uncompromising fidelity to truth and rectitude. Yes, eligibility and qualifications so that she would not be
indeed, especially if that candidate is aspiring to be
trapped into the same quagmire her adoptive father fell District, private respondent Montejo
into. opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Petitioner invokes the case of Marcos. There,
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered
petitioner Imelda, in her CoC for Representative of the
in her place of actual residence in the
First District of Leyte for the May 8, 1995 elections,
First District, which was Tolosa, Leyte, a
initially answered "seven" months on the space
fact which she subsequently noted down
requiring information on her "residence in the
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close
constituency where she seeks to be elected
look at said certificate would reveal the
immediately preceding the election." A couple of
possible source of the confusion: the
weeks after her filing of the said CoC and also
entry for residence (Item No. 7) is
following the initiation by her then would-be opponent
followed immediately by the entry for
Cirilo Roy Montejo (Montejo) of a Petition for
residence in the constituency where a
Cancellation and Disqualification before the Comelec,
candidate seeks election thus:
Imelda sought to correct the said entry by changing it
from "seven" to "since childhood" through an 7. RESIDENCE (complete
Amended/Corrected CoC. During the proceedings Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
relative to the said petition, Imelda averred that the Leyte
entry of the word "seven" in her original CoC was the POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR
result of an "honest misinterpretation" which she ELECTION
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot,
in her Amended/Corrected CoC. Although debunked Tolosa, Leyte
by the Comelec, Imelda's claim of honest
representation was upheld when the case eventually 8. RESIDENCE IN THE
reached the Court. CONSTITUENCY WHERE I
SEEK TO BE ELECTED
To be sure, petitioner cannot rely on Marcos to IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING
support her claim of honest mistake. There, what THE ELECTION: ______
prompted Imelda to jot down the questioned entry in Years and Seven Months
her CoC was the confusion caused by the attendant
circumstances, viz.: Having been forced by private
respondent [Montejo] to register in her
[W]hen herein petitioner announced that place of actual residence in Leyte instead
she would be registering in Tacloban City of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
to make her eligible to run in the First appears that petitioner had jotted down
 her period of stay in her actual residence in her COC would disqualify her even as
in a space which required her period of the correct period satisfies the
stay in her legal residence or domicile. requirement by law and would therefore
The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and render her qualified to become a member
Item 8 — the first requiring actual of the House of Representatives, the
residence and the second requiring false entry in herein petitioner's COC
domicile — coupled with the would allow her to be qualified even as
circumstances surrounding petitioner's the true period of legal residence is
registration as a voter in Tolosa deficient according to law and would
obviously led to her writing down an render her unqualified for the position of
unintended entry for which she could be President. 304
disqualified. 303 It is in this context that I cannot accept
It was under the said factual milieu that this petitioner's claim of honest mistake.
Court held that Imelda committed an honest mistake True, petitioner did try to correct her alleged
when she entered the word "seven" in the space for mistakes through her public statements. But since her
residence in the constituency where she seeks to be defense of honest mistake is now debunked, this
elected immediately preceding the election. in the case becomes irrelevant. Besides, I cannot help but
of petitioner, no analogous circumstance exists as to conclude that these public statements were for the
justify giving similar credit to her defense of honest purpose of representing to the general public that
mistake. No seemingly related item was juxtaposed to petitioner is eligible to run for President since they
Item No. 11 of the 2012 COC as to cause confusion to were made at a time when she was already
petitioner. And as earlier discussed, Item No. 11 is contemplating on running for the position. They were
clear and simple as to its meaning and import. More not made at the earliest opportunity before the proper
important, the question raised in Marcos was Imelda's forum. These statements could even be interpreted as
lack of eligibility to run because she failed to comply part of petitioner's continuing misrepresentation
with residency requirement. In contrast, the question regarding her qualification and eligibility to run as
raised in petitioner's case is her false material President.
representations in the entries she made in her 2015
CoC. We also hasten to add that as correctly Based on the foregoing, it is my conclusion that
discerned by respondent Contreras: DACcIH petitioner knowingly made a false material
representation in her 2015 CoC sufficient to mislead
And unlike the petitioner the electorate into believing that she is eligible and
in Romualdez Marcos whose false entry qualified to become a President.
No grave abuse of discretion on the part regarding her period of residence in the Philippines,
of the Comelec in denying due course to and considering further that based even only thereon,
and/or cancelling petitioner's 2015 CoC her 2015 CoC should be cancelled and denied due
based on petitioner's material course, I deem it wise and prudent to withhold passing
misrepresentation as to her period of judgment at this time regarding petitioner's citizenship.
residence in the Philippines. Indeed, it is tempting to seize this opportunity to sit in
judgment on the issue of citizenship, which has
In sum, I find that the Comelec committed no
generated so much attention, invited heated and
grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess
vigorous discussion, and evoked heightened emotions;
of jurisdiction, in taking cognizance of the petitions and
not only that, the issue at hand is novel and of first
in denying due course to and cancelling petitioner's
impression. However, a loftier interest dictates that we
2015 CoC. To my mind, it properly exercised its power
take pause and exhaust all possible avenues and
to determine whether a candidate's CoC contains false
opportunities to study the issue more dispassionately.
material representation; its resolution was
After all, any judgment at this time upon this issue
anchored on settled jurisprudence and fair
might directly impact on G.R. No. 221538 (Rizalito Y.
appreciation of facts; and it accorded the parties ample
David v. Senate Electoral Tribunal), which is a Quo
opportunity to be heard and to present evidence.
Warranto case seeking the removal of petitioner as a
Conversely stated, it is my opinion that
Senator of the Philippines wherein her natural-born
the Comelec did not usurp the jurisdiction of the SET,
citizenship status is directly assailed.
or the PET, or the DOJ or any other tribunal; it did not
disregard or contravene settled jurisprudence; and it I believe that the resolution of the
did not violate the parties' right to due process. Thus, I issue on petitioner's citizenship must be carefully
find that petitioner miserably failed to hurdle the bar set studied and deliberated upon. I venture to say that we
by this Court in Sabili, that is, to prove that may not only be dealing with foundlings per se. Any
the Comelec was so grossly unreasonable in its hasty or ill-considered ruling on this issue could open
appreciation and evaluation of evidence as to amount the floodgates to abuse by certain groups and
to an error of jurisdiction. Petitioner miserably fell short individuals looking only after their own interest to the
of portraying that the Comelec had whimsically, prejudice and undoing of our motherland. Non-Filipinos
arbitrarily, capriciously and despotically exercised its might use the ruling to advance their vested interests
judgment as to amount to grave abuse of discretion. by simply posing as foundlings so that they would be
presumed or cloaked with natural-born citizenship.
Citizenship
They could use this as an avenue to obtain Filipino
Considering the conclusion I have reached citizenship or natural-born status which they could not
relative to petitioner's material misrepresentation ordinarily gain through ordinary naturalization
proceedings. I am not pretending to be a doomsayer, her genealogy. She could use this breather to gather
far from it, but I prefer to tread carefully. After all, it is such evidence. Petitioner surely has biological parents.
no less than the supremely precious interest of our It is indeed surprising that these parents, or any close
country that we wish both to defend and to protect. Our relatives, have not come forward to claim their ties to
country must not only be defended and protected someone so highly respected and so well recognized
against outside invasion, it must also be secured and as one of the worthy leaders of the country. While it
safeguarded from any internal threat against its defies human nature to resist the natural impulse to
sovereignty and security. I do not want to wake up claim one's own child, the sad reality is that there are
someday and see my beloved country teeming with still many parents who abandon their child, depriving
foreigners and aliens posing as natural-born Filipinos said child not only of parental love and care, but also
while the real natives are thrown into oblivion or identity and pedigree. Every opportunity should thus
relegated second or third class citizens who have be given to the innocent child to trace his/her
become strangers in their own homeland. My objective parentage and determine compliance with the
is only to secure, protect and defend the Philippines Constitution. This opportunity and this privilege should
from being ruled by non-Filipinos. This Court should not be time-bound, and should be afforded to every
stand firm on its own bearing and not allow itself to be foundling at any stage of his/her life. Thus, even if the
swept by the tides of sentimentality and emotion. The Court rules on her citizenship now, that ruling can be
Filipino people expect no less from us but to carefully, changed or altered any time when there is certainty or
deliberately, objectively and dispassionately resolve definiteness about her biological lineage because
the issue with national interest utmost in our heart and there is generally no res judicata in matters of
mind. HSCATc citizenship. As the Court has declared in Moy Ya Lim
Yao v. Commissioner of Immigration, 306 whenever
But there is more. For no less consequential is
the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable
the Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance, under which
in a judicial or administrative case, the ruling therein as
this Court may choose to ignore or side-step a
to the person's citizenship is generally not considered
constitutional question if there is some other ground
as res judicata. Thus, it may be threshed out again and
upon which the case can be disposed of. 305 Such is
again as the occasion demands, 307 stock being taken
the situation in this case.
of the fact that the requisites enumerated in In re
It is not improbable, of course, that petitioner Petition for Naturalization of Zita Ngo Burca v.
was born to Filipino parents; yet the fact remains that Republic, 308 reiterated in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 309 are
their identities are unknown. In short, petitioner's all present.
citizenship is uncertain. Thus, I feel that we should not
According unto petitioner ample opportunity to
overlook altogether her much publicized efforts to
trace her genealogy is also better than a) creating a
obtain deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence to prove
presumption that she is a natural-born citizen or the Comelec's Second Division in SPA No. 15-001
fashioning a new specie/category of citizenship (DC): "A person who aspires to occupy the highest
based on statistical probabilities; or b) denying her position in the land must obey the highest law of the
claim of citizenship outright. Aliens with known parents land."
may just take advantage of such presumption by This is as it should be.
representing themselves as foundlings if only to be
entitled to purchase real property, engage in  
nationalized business, or even run for public office For the foregoing reasons, I vote
where a natural-born status is required. On the other to DISMISS the petitions.
hand, we might unwittingly deny petitioner her rightful
citizenship which she could very well establish via the ||| (Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
exertion or employment of more deliberate, vigorous, Nos. 221697 & 221698-700 (Dissenting Opinion), [March
and sustained efforts. 8, 2016])
Indeed, it is imperative for the Court to carefully
tread on the issue of citizenship. As petitioner
postulates in her Petitions, "[w]hat is at stake in this
case is not only a foundling's right to run for high public
offices, but the enjoyment of a host of even seemingly
ordinary rights or positions which our laws reserve only
for natural-born citizens." 310 After all, the issue of
citizenship impacts not solely on petitioner but
also on those similarly situated like her; it also involves
the sovereignty and security of our country. We must
not lose sight of the fact that the citizens of the country
are the living soul and spirit of the nation, and the very
reason and justification for its existence and its
preservation. Our rights, prerogatives and privileges as
Filipino citizens are the bedrock of our Constitution.
In ending, I wish to reiterate the very precept
and principle that is at once the capstone and the
polestar that had guided the undersigned in drafting
his opinion in this landmark case: this statement from
the December 1, 2015 Resolution of