Levitas and Bloch Utopia
Levitas and Bloch Utopia
Levitas and Bloch Utopia
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perfect principle than in the author's community, this construction being based on
estrangement arising out of an alternative historical hypothesis. (Moylan 33)
For Bloch, such a definition is far too narrow. Not only a broader field of
literature, but also architecture and music may be important vehicles of
utopia. What binds this diverse mass of material together is that all of itcan
be seen as embodying 'dreams of a better life.' All of itventures beyond the
present reality, and reaches forward to a transformed future. It embodies
both the act of wishing and what iswished for.
Wishing is a crucially important human activity, not just because the
range and variety of the content of wishes is an interestingaspect of cultural
anthropology. The importance of Utopian wishes hinges on the unfinished
ness of thematerial world. The world is in a constant state of process, of
becoming. The future is 'not yet' and isa realm of possibility. Utopia reaches
toward that future and anticipates it.And in so doing, ithelps to effect the
future. Human activity plays a central role here in choosing which possible
future may become actual: 'the hinge in human history is its producer'
(Bloch 1:249). Utopia is the expression of hope, but that hope is to be under
stood'not . . . only as emotion . . . but more essentially as a directing act
of a cognitive kind' (1:12).
Bloch's discussion may be read as a celebration of the range and
tenacity of Utopian wishing. Yet because the function of utopia isnot just to
express desire, but to reach forward and be the catalyst of a better future, he
is also critical of the content of thesewishes. As Fredric Jameson argues in
Marxism and Form, we may locate within Bloch's work a system of positive
hermeneutics whose project is the restoration of lost or hidden meanings,
the recovery of the genuine element of aspiration and anticipation which is
at the heart of these various Utopian expressions; but there is also a
philosophical system, which ismore critical, and which is concerned not
with recovery but with distinguishing between truth and falsehood (125).
The way inwhich Bloch is being incorporated into contemporary Utopian
studies emphasizes the celebratory and prophetic aspects of his work, rather
than itsmore critical elements. But the question of the evaluation of Utopian
wishes is also essential, because Bloch did not seekmerely to rehabilitate the
concept of utopia, but to rehabilitate utopia withinMarxism as a neglected
Marxist category. Thus although Bloch remains adamant that all forms of
Utopian venturing beyond are better than anti-utopian or pragmatic
attitudes which close off the future, not all Utopian imagining is as good as
any other.
Fundamental to thismore critical project is the distinction which Bloch
makes between abstract and concrete utopia. Abstract utopia is fantastic
Despite the fact that, in the hands ofMarx and Engels, the term Utopian is
derogatory, and despite their sharp criticisms of Utopian socialism, they also
praised it for its criticisms of bourgeois society. For example, in The
Manifesto of theCommunist Party we read:
Such fantastic pictures of future society, painted at a time when the proletariat
is still in a very underdeveloped state and has but a fantastic conception of its
own position, correspond with the first instinctive yearnings of that class for a
society. Hence they are full of the most valuable materials for the enlighten
ment of the working class. (Marx and Engels 6:515-6)
Utopian function is the widespread and ripe old platitude of the way-of-the
world philistine, of the blinkered empiricist whose world is far from being a
stage, in short, the confederacy in which the fat bourgeois and the shallow
practicist have always not only rejected outright the anticipatory, but despised
it. . . .We do not need to emphasize that the genuine struggle against imma
Our motto must therefore be: reform of consciousness not through dogmas,
but through the analysis of mystical consciousness which is still unclear to
itself. Itwill then become apparent that theworld has long possessed the dream
of a matter, of which itmust only possess the consciousness in order to possess
it in reality. Itwill become apparent that it is not a question of a great thought
dash between past and future, but of the carrying-through of the thoughts of
the past. (1:155-6)
Like many who have addressed the question of the relationship between
Marxism and utopia, Bloch also refers to a passage inWhat is to be Done
where Lenin cites Pisarev:
'There are rifts and rifts,' wrote Pisarev concerning the rift between dreams
and reality. . . . 'The rift between dreams and reality causes no harm if only
the person dreaming believes seriously in his dream, ifhe attentively observes
life, compares his observations with his castles in the air and if, generally
Lenin adds: 'of this kind of dreaming there isunfortunately too little in our
movement' (211). It is a passage, says Bloch, 'which has come to be very
much praised over the years, but not so eagerly taken to heart' (1:9). And
'the point of contact between dreams and life,without which dreams only
yield abstract utopia, life only triviality, is given in the Utopian capacity
which is set on its feet and connected to the Real-Possible' (1:145-6).
However, it is fundamental to Bloch's argument that reality does not
consist only of what is, but includes what isbecoming ormight become. The
material world is essentially unfinished and in a state of process?a process
whose direction and outcome are not predetermined. The future therefore
constitutes a realm of possibility?real possibility, rather than merely for
mal possibility. And although the fact that the future is indeterminatemeans
that not all real possibilities will in fact be realized, these possible futures
must be seen as a part of reality. Concrete utopia, understood both as con
tent and as function, iswithin the real, but relates towhat Bloch describes as
Front, or Novum, that part of reality which is coming into being on the
horizon of the real. This location within but on the edge of the realmeans
that utopia is transcendent, but 'transcendent without transcendence'
(1:146).
The process of extracting concrete utopia from its abstract trappings
results in what Bloch describes as {docta spes' or 'educated hope.' It
involves:
. . . knowledge and removal of the finished utopistic element, . . .
knowledge
and removal of abstract utopia. But what then remains: the unfinished for
ward dream, the docta spes which can only be discredited by the bourgeoisie,?
this seriously deserves the name utopia in carefully considered and carefully
applied contrast to utopianism; in its brevity and new clarity, this expression
then means the same as: a methodical organ for theNew, an objective aggregate
longer sealed methodically and the Novum no longer alien inmaterial terms.
(1:146)
With the removal of abstract utopia, the Utopian function 'tears the con
cerns of human culture away from ... an idle bed of contemplation' and
'opens up, on trulyattained summits, the ideologically unobstructed view of
human hope' (1:158). J?rgen Habermas says of Bloch's project of recovery
and criticism, 'within the ideological shell Bloch discovers theUtopian core,
within the yet false consciousness the true consciousness' (Bentley 87).
Bloch's distinction between abstract and concrete utopia can be clarified
by comparison with Mannheim's contrast between ideology and utopia, not
least because one of themain points at which Bloch discusses the issue is
headed 'The Encounter of theUtopian Function with Ideology.' There are
similarities, similar problems, and important differences. Mannheim
regarded both ideology and utopia as categories of ideas incongruous with
reality. However, utopias are oriented to the future, and are those ideas
which transform reality in theirown image, whereas ideologies are oriented
to the past and serve to legitimate the status quo. Consequently, not all
forms of wishful thinking are categorized as utopias. Mannheim does not
disagree that 'wishful thinking has always figured in human affairs'; but
despite the fact that 'myths, fairy-tales, other-worldly promises of religion,
humanistic fantasies, travel romances, have been continually changing
expressions of what was lacking in actual life' (184), they are largely com
pensatory and therefore ideological. For Mannheim, those forms of wishful
thinkingwhich do not serve to effect the future are not Utopian at all. For
Bloch, they are Utopian, but largely comprise abstract utopia.
Both Bloch and Mannheim point out that theirdistinctions are analytic
and their categories ideal types: concrete utopia contains abstract elements,
ideology may contain Utopian elements and utopia may contain elements of
ideology. Unlike Mannheim, who nevertheless consigns many forms of
The vision set out in the dream is thus not a literal goal, asMeier's approach
suggests, but an exploration of the values on which a socialist society should
be based.
A similar case isput byAbensour, who, likeThompson, rejectsMeier's
attempt to reduce Morris's thought to an illustration ofMarxist truth as an
exercise in theoretical repression. News from Nowhere should not be read
literally, since itspurpose is 'to embody in the forms of fantasy alternative
values sketched in an alternative way of life' (Thompson 790). Utopia's
function is estrangement, the disruption of the taken-for-granted nature of
present reality; thus:
... in such an adventuretwo things happen: our habitual values (the "com
monsense" of bourgeois society) are thrown into disarray. And we enter
Utopia's proper and new-found space: the education of desire. This is not the
same as "a moral education" towards a given end: it is rather, to open a way to
aspiration, to "teach desire to desire, to desire better, to desire more, and
above all to desire in a different way." (Thompson 790-1)
This passage contains ambiguities which relate directly to our original prob
lem, the dependence of the distinction between abstract and concrete utopia
upon specification of the Utopian content in Bloch's notion of educated
hope. First, though, we need to see how Thompson develops from this
debate about Morris the general problem of the relationship between
Marxism and utopia.
Thompson reiterates that the essence of his original argument was that
Morris transformed the Romantic tradition by integratingMarxist ideas
into it 'in such a way as to constitute a rupture in the older tradition,' thereby
creating a synthesis between the twowhich enriched both. That is,he did not
simply 'correct' the Romantic critique by the addition of Marxism, but
recovered an element missing fromMarxism. Thus when orthodox Marx
ism ignored or rejected Morris, it 'turned itsback upon a juncture which it
neglected to its own peril and subsequent disgrace' (779). For Abensour,
too, the problem became not whether Marxists should criticizeMorris, but
whether questions were raised about the adequacy of Marxism. Thus
Thompson suggested thatMorris's work raised the general question of the
relationship between Marxism and Utopia:
. . .what may be involved ... is the whole problem of the subordination of
the imaginative Utopian faculties within the laterMarxist tradition: its lack of a
moral self-consciousness or even a vocabulary of desire, its inability to project
any images of the future, or even its tendency to fall back in lieu of these upon
the Utilitarian's earthly paradise?the maximization of economic growth
... to vindicate Morris's utopianism may be at the same time to vindicate
utopianism itself, and set it free to walk the world once more without shame
and without accusations of bad faith. (792)
"dreaming," but the discipline is of the imagination and not of science. (793)
terms, it should articulate both thewarm and cold streams, both ends and
means.
Because the 'education of desire' eschews the prescription of a desired
end, it appears to be more open, more exploratory than Bloch's 'educated
hope.' Yet this is probably only because Bloch's specification of the content
of 'good' utopia is clearer and more explicit than Abensour's or
Thompson's. The question of 'disciplined dreaming' is comprehensible
only in so far as itdoes refer to the desirability and possibility of the Utopian
vision. And the education of desire, the disruption of the taken-for-granted
present is implicitly directed to a further end, that of transformation. Thus
Williams argues in 'Utopia and Science Fiction' that 'the element of trans
formation, rather than themore general element of otherness' is crucial to
the Utopian mode (197).
Yet these debates about the significance of Morris and ofNews from
Nowhere inparticular are, while dealing with similar issues, rather less clear
about the nature of the problem than Bloch was. Because of the tradition of
negativity towards utopianism that became characteristic ofMarxism after
Marx, the emphasis in both Thompson and Bloch is on defending utopia.
And indeed it is true that The Principle ofHope is an elaborated defense of
utopia, since utopia represents the reach forward to something better,
something missing. Contemporary use, or perhaps appropriation, of Bloch
emphasizes his celebration both of the ubiquity of utopia and of itspositive
value in the world. But much of this appropriation misses an essential
feature of Bloch's work, which arises from itsMarxist, or more generally its
politically committed, nature. Educated hope aims not only at an estrange
ment effect, but at social transformation. It is less open than the education
of desire precisely because the distinction between 'good' and 'bad' utopia is
pushed further.
It ispushed further.But it is at the same time pushed too far and not far
enough. Too far, in the sense that epistemologically Bloch's distinction be
tween abstract and concrete utopia is no more tenable than Mannheim's
separation of ideology and utopia. Not far enough, in that the grounds of
such a distinction are insufficiently spelt out, especially given itscentrality to
Bloch's project, and ultimately rest upon a teleological closure. To have
pursued it furtherwould have revealed the intrinsically political nature of
the dichotomy and undermined the pretensions of Marxism to absolute
verity and scientificity.
Yet for Bloch's critical project, the separation of abstract and concrete
utopia, the identification of educated hope, is essential. Without it, the
argument that utopia is anticipatory thinking falls flat on its face. At best, it
becomes indistinguishable from themuch-repeated idealist theme common
to early commentaries on utopia that Utopian images have a value only as
unattainable goals, the pursuit of which constitutes a spur to human
progress. And the centrality of educated hope arises from something quite
opposed to this: itarises out of political, rather than epistemological neces
sity?out of the commitment to the realization of utopia through, as well as
its rehabilitation within, Marxism.
NOTES
1. The themes discussed in this article are closely related to my discussions of Bloch and
Morris in The Concept of Utopia and in 'Marxism, Romanticism and Utopia: Ernst Bloch
and William Morris.'
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