Babad, Liezel S.

Torts and Damages

The United States vs Bonifacio

Carson, J.:

Facts:

On the 31st of October, 1913, the accused engineer while operating a heavy freight train, which had just
rounded a curve, saw Eligio Castillo, a deaf-mute, running down and attempting to cross the railroad
track in the barrio of Santa Rita, Batangas. Castillo was about 175 meters ahead of the engine. The
engineer immediately blew his whistle twice, and noticing, a few moments afterwards, that Castillo did
not respond to the warning by stepping aside from the track, he tried to slow down the engine, but did
not succeed in stopping in time to avoid running down the pedestrian. He did not attempt to stop his
engine when he first saw the man walking along the side of the track; but he claims that he did all in his
power to slow down a few moments afterwards, that is to say after he had blown his whistle without
apparently attracting the attention of the pedestrian, who, about that time, turned and attempted to
cross the track. The deaf-mute Castillo was killed as he attempted, for some unknown reason, to cross
over to the other side.

The appellant was charged in the court with homicide committed with reckless negligence, and was
convicted of homicide committed with simple negligence under Article 568 of the Criminal Code and
sentenced to four months and one day of arresto mayor and to pay the costs of the proceedings.

Issue:

Whether or not the negligence of the accused is the proximate and immediate cause of the injury
inflicted hence his conviction.

Ruling:

No. The Court ruled that there is no obligation on an engine driver to stop, or even to slow down his
engine, when he sees an adult pedestrian standing or walking on or near the track, unless there is
something in the appearance or conduct of the person on foot which would cause a prudent man to
anticipate the possibility that such person could not, or would not avoid the possibility of danger by
stepping aside. Ordinarily, all that may properly be required of an engine driver under such
circumstances is that he give warning of his approach, by blowing his whistle or ringing his bell until he is
assured that the attention of the pedestrian has been attracted to the oncoming train.

Any other rule would render it impracticable to operate railroads so as to secure the expeditious
transportation of passengers and freight which the public interest demands. If engine drivers were
required to slow down or stop their trains every time they see a pedestrian on or near the track of the
railroad it might well become impossible for them to maintain a reasonable rate of speed. As a result,
the general traveling public would be exposed to great inconvenience and delay which may be, and is
readily avoided by requiring all persons approaching a railroad track, to take reasonable precautions
against danger from trains running at high speed.

The provisions of article 568 of the Criminal Code under which the accused was convicted are as follows:

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Any person who, while violating any regulation, shall, by any act of imprudence or negligence not
amounting to reckless imprudence, commit an offense, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its
medium and maximum degrees.

This does not mean that in every case in which one accidentally injures or kills another he is criminally
liable therefor, if at the moment he happens to be guilty of a violation of some petty regulation
(reglamento). The injury or death must have resulted from some "imprudence or negligence"
(imprudencia o negligencia) on his part. True it need only be slight negligence, if accompanied by a
violation of the regulations, but the relation of cause and effect must exist between the negligence or
imprudence of the accused and the injury inflicted. If it appears that the injury in no wise resulted from
the violation of the regulations, or the negligent conduct of the accused, he incurs no criminal liability
under the provisions of this article.

The undisputed evidence of record, sufficiently and conclusive demonstrates that the death of the deaf-
mute was the result of a regrettable accident, which was unavoidable so far as the accused was
concerned.

Philippine National Bank vs Santos

Leonen, J.:

Facts:

Sometime in May 1996, respondents discovered that their father Angel C. Santos, who died on March
21, 1991, maintained a premium savings account with PNB, Sta. Elena-Marikina City Branch. As of July
14, 1996, the deposit amounted to 1,759,082.63. Later, respondents would discover that their father
also had a time deposit of 1,000,000.00 with PNB.

Respondents went to PNB to withdraw their father’s deposit.

Lina B. Aguilar, the Branch Manager of PNB-Sta. Elena-Marikina City Branch, required them to submit
the documents needed for the withdrawal. However, on April 26, 1998, when respondents had obtained
the necessary documents, Aguilar informed them that the deposit had already been released to a
certain Bernardito Manimbo on April 1, 1997.

On May 20, 1998, respondents filed before the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City a complaint for sum
of money and damages against PNB, Lina B. Aguilar, and a John Doe. Respondents questioned the
release of the deposit amount to Manimbo who had no authority from them to withdraw their father’s
deposit and who failed to present to PNB all the requirements for such withdrawal. Respondents prayed
that they be paid: (a) the premium deposit amount; (b) the certificate of time deposit amount; and (c)
moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, and costs of suit.

Issue:

1. Whether or not PNB and Aguilar, as its manager, are solidarily liable for negligence.
2. Whether or not the respondents may claim moral damages and exemplary damages.

Ruling:

1. Yes. Petitioner PNB is a bank from which a degree of diligence higher than that of a good father
of a family is expected. Petitioner PNB and its manager, petitioner Aguilar, failed to meet even
the standard of diligence of a good father of a family. Their actions and inactions constitute
gross negligence. It is for this reason that the SC sustains the trial court’s and the Court of
Appeals’ rulings that petitioners PNB and Aguilar are solidarily liable with each other.

Petitioner Aguilar was aware that there were other claimants to Angel C. Santos’ deposit.
Respondents had already communicated with petitioner Aguilar regarding Angel C. Santos’
account before Manimbo appeared. Petitioner Aguilar even gave respondents the updated
passbook of Angel C. Santos’ account. Yet, petitioners PNB and Aguilar did not think twice
before they released the deposit to Manimbo. They did not doubt why no original death
certificate could be submitted. They did not doubt why Reyme L. Santos would execute an
affidavit of self-adjudication when he, together with others, had previously asked for the release
of Angel C. Santos’ deposit. They also relied on the certificate of time deposit and on Manimbo’s
representation that the passbook was lost when the passbook had just been previously
presented to Aguilar for updating.

2. Yes. The SC sustained the award for moral damages. Petitioners PNB and Aguilar’s gross
negligence deprived Angel C. Santos’ heirs what is rightfully theirs. Respondents also testified
that they experienced anger and embarrassment when petitioners PNB and Aguilar refused to
release Angel C. Santos’ deposit. The bank’s negligence was the result of lack of due care and
caution required of managers and employees of a firm engaged in so sensitive and demanding
business as banking.

Exemplary damages should also be awarded. The law allows the grant of exemplary damages by
way of example for the public good. The public relies on the banks’ sworn profession of
diligence and meticulousness in giving irreproachable service. The level of meticulousness must
be maintained at all times by the banking sector.
Since exemplary damages are awarded and since respondents were compelled to litigate to
protect their interests, the award of attorney’s fees is also proper.
Sanitary Steam Laundry vs Court of Appeals
300 SCRA 20 (1998)

Mendoza, J.:

Facts:

On August 31, 1980, at the Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite, a collision between a Mercedes Benz
panel truck of petitioner and a Cimarron happened which caused the death of three persons and the
injuries of several others. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was the
driver.

It appears that at about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way
back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's panel truck which was traveling
in the opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioner's plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite after
delivering some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver, Herman Hernandez, claimed that a
jeepney in front of him suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney
and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane.

The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident
and accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney's
fees. Its decision was affirmed  in toto  by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence since it is
overloaded. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and
regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was
presumed to be negligent.

Issue:

1. Whether or not there is contributory negligence on the part of the driver of Cimarron.
2. Whether or not the damages awarded are correct.

Ruling:

1. No. It has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the
collision between the vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection
between the injury received and the violation of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He
must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that
it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of
law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.

All testimonies and records point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the
negligence of petitioner's driver. As the trial court noted, the swerving of petitioner's panel truck
to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioner's driver was running the vehicle at a
very high speed but that he was tailgating the passenger jeepney ahead of it as well.
2. With respect to the question of damages, the SC finds no reversible error committed in the
award of actual damages to private respondents. To justify an award of actual damages, there
must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss.

As to the moral damages awarded, the SC finds them to be reasonable and necessary in view of
the circumstances of this case. Moral damages are awarded to allow the victims to obtain
means, diversion, or amusement to alleviate the moral suffering they had undergone due to the
defendant's culpable action.

The formula for determining the life expectancy of the deceased Dalmacio Salunoy must be
determined by applying the formula 2/3 multiplied by (80 minus the age of the deceased). Since
Salunoy was 46 years of age at the time of his death, as stated in his death certificate, then his
life expectancy was 22.6 years, or up to 68 years old. Next, his net earnings must be computed.
At the time of his death. Dalmacio Salunoy was earning more than P900.00 a month as
bookkeeper at the PMCI so that his annual gross earning was about P11,000.00. From this
amount, about 50% should be deducted as reasonable and necessary living expenses because it
seems his wife occasionally finds work and thus helps in the household expenses.

Life Expectancy Formula: