Balanta, Joan Mae C.

BSBA-2201

People of the Philippines vs. Fernandez GR 199211

FACTS

Out of the testimonies of the complainants that the appellant promised them employment abroad.
The appellant represented to the complainants that he had the power and ability to send them in
Hong Kong, and that by virtue of this representation and fraud, the complainants were convinced
to part with their money in order to be employed.

ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT IN LARGE SCALE IS

COMMITTED AT THE CASE AT BAR

RULING:

For illegal recruitment in large scale to prosper, the prosecution has to prove three essential
elements, namely: (1) the accused undertook a recruitment activity under Article 13(b) or any
prohibited practice under Article 34 of the Labor Code; (2) the accused did not have the license
or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (3) the
accused committed such illegal activity against three or more persons individually or as a group

There is illegal recruitment when one who does not possess the necessary authority or license
gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad. Corollarily, where the offense
is committed against three or more persons, as in this case, it is qualified to illegal recruitment in
large scale which provides a higher penalty under Article 39(a) of the Labor Code.

Article 38 of the Labor Code defines illegal recruitment as "any recruitment activities, including
the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of (the Labor Code), to be undertaken by
non-licensees or non-holders of authority." The term "recruitment and placement" refers to any
act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers,
including referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not, provided that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers
or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in
recruitment and placement.

The CA held that the appellant’s acts of promising the complainants that they would be deployed
for work abroad after they paid him their placement fees, and his misrepresentations concerning
his purported power and authority despite the lack of license, are constitutive of illegal
recruitment in large scale.

We point out that conviction under the Labor Code for illegal recruitment does not
preclude punishment under the Revised Penal Code for the crime of estafa. The appellant ’s act of
falsely pretending to possess power and qualifications to deploy the complainants to Hong Kong,
even if he did not have the authority or license for the purpose, undoubtedly constitutes estafa
under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of deceit and damage are
clearly present; the appellant’s false pretenses were the very cause that induced the complainants
to part with their money.Thus there can be illegal recruitment on Large Scale with Estafa.
 People vs. Lago

G.R. No. 121272. June 6, 2001

The Facts

Prosecution’s Version

In its Brief, the Office of the Solicitor General presents the prosecution ’s version of the facts as
follows:

"Rosana Capacillo of 80 A.T. Reyes Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila, was one of victim
Benjamin Raymundo’s neighbors. On that fateful morning of July 24, 1991, around 7:30 a.m. to
8:00 a.m., she was waiting for her husband outside their house. While so engaged, [she] saw a
man, whom she [later] identified as Rainier Lisbog, come out of Raymundo’s house. Rosana and
this person looked at each other. Later in the evening when Rosana and her husband came home
from work, they learned that their neighbor, Benjamin Raymundo, had been robbed and killed.

"Ramon Bernardo, a refrigeration/aircon technician, testified that in the morning of July 24,
1991, he went to the house of Benjamin Raymundo to get a refrigeration gasket. Before reaching
the gate of the compound where Benjamin lived, he met a man whom he described as wearing a
ball cap, white T-shirt, black pants; was thin faced, dark skinned, of medium build and about 16
to 20 years old. He identified that person in open court as Jayson Diadid. When he was already
inside the compound, he called out ‘Mang Ben, Mang Ben’. A man opened the door and
demonstrated that Benjamin Raymundo was still asleep. In turn, Ramon made a sign indicating
that he would be back. A little later at about 9:00 in the morning, Ramon came back and learned
that Benjamin Raymundo had been robbed and killed. Ramon Bernardo identified the man who
made a sign to him as Rainier Lisbog.

"Cozette Aragon, one of appellant’s co-accused, was called to testify as a witness during
appellant’s trial. Cozette testified that he was introduced to Jayson Diadid by a classmate named
Dennis Sison. Dennis introduced Cozette to Jayson because the latter could do whatever had to
be done in the robbery being planned by Cozette. When Jayson and Cozette were planning the
robbery, Jayson asked Cozette if he wanted to have his uncle killed, to which Cozette replied in
the negative as he merely wanted to rob his uncle.

"On the day of the robbery, Cozette, Rainier, Jayson and appellant arrived together at the house
of Benjamin Raymundo. Cozette removed one jalousie block of a window, through which he was
able to unlock the door. They then entered the house. At first they sat on the sofa. After that,
Cozette pointed out to Jayson the room of his uncle. Jayson saw a wallet and 3 packs of
cigarettes on top of a refrigerator. He took them and handed them to appellant. When Cozette
and Jayson entered Benjamin’s room, Rainier acted as a look-out posted by the door while
appellant sat on the sofa, waiting for Cozette and Jayson, just outside Benjamin Raymundo ’s
room. During the robbery, Benjamin was repeatedly stabbed by Jayson, leading to Benjamin’s
death.

"Dr. Alberto Reyes, a medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that he performed the autopsy on
the cadaver of Benjamin Raymundo. According to Dr. Reyes, the victim sustained 21 stab
wounds, 7 in the front and 14 at the back. The stab wounds affected some vital organs such as
the lung, the liver and the pancreas. He gave the immediate cause of death as severe hemorrhage
resulting from stab wounds."
Defense’s Version

On the other hand, appellant gives the following narration of facts:

"Accused Reyderick Lago testified that on June 24, 1991, the regular classes opened. At around
6:30 to 7:00 in the morning, accused Cozette Aragon who was his classmate in English
approached him and asked him to accompany him to the house of his uncle to get a project and
collect his salary. Aragon also invited Lisbog to go with them. Thereafter, he came to know that
Diadid also proceeded to the house of Aragon’s uncle at the back of Don Bosco in Kalentong.

"Upon entering the gate of the house, Aragon opened the jalousie window with the use of a
‘beinte nueve’ balisong and unlocked the door. Aragon let them in. Lisbog was instructed to wait
outside. While he was seated on the sofa, Aragon and Diadid went inside the room. Suddenly, he
heard somebody was groaning from the room. Afraid, he immediately left the place and went to
the house of his grandmother in Mandaluyong who advised him not to leave the place anymore.

"On cross-examination, he testified that Cozette Aragon was his classmate in one of his back
subjects at Jose Fabella Memorial School. Lisbog was also his classmate. He did not know
personally Jayson Diadid and Dennis Sison. He admitted that when he heard the groaning inside
the room, he did not bother to verify what was happening. He went out of the house immediately
and did not attend his classes anymore. He stopped schooling. "

Issue:

The trial court erred in convicting accused-appellant Reyderick Lago of the crime of robbery
with homicide despite insufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution.

Ruling:

The second paragraph of Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code defines conspiracy, as follows:

A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission
of a felony and decide to commit it.

The elements of conspiracy are the following:

(1) Two or more persons came to an agreement,

(2) The agreement concerned the commission of a felony, and

(3) The execution of the felony was decided upon. Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on
direct evidence, because it may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a common
understanding among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an explicit agreement
setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be carried out. The conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode or manner in which the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred
from the acts of the accused evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action
and community of interest.

Time and time again, this Court has ruled that when conspiracy is proven, the act of one is the
act of all. The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that conspiracy had
attended the commission of the crime of robbery with homicide. Despite the protestations of
appellant that he did not conspire to rob and kill, but only to rob, the victim, we hold that
appellant is liable for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.

The elements of this special complex crime are the following:

(1) The taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against a person;

(2) The property taken belongs to another;

(3) The taking is done with animo lucrandi; and

(4) By reason of the robbery or on occasion thereof, homicide (used in its generic sense) is
committed.

As aforesaid, whenever a homicide is committed as a consequence of or on the occasion of a

robbery, all those who took part in the asportation will be held guilty of the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide, even if they did not all actually take part in the homicide, unless
it appears that those who did not do so endeavored to prevent the killing.

Appellant, upon hearing the groaning emanating from the bedroom, did not do anything to check
on what was happening. Thinking that his cohorts were stabbing the victim, appellant simply
allowed them to finish their dastardly deed. He hid for two years first in the house of his
grandmother and, later on, in that of his mother. On January 6, 1994, a barangay official
apprehended and brought him to the Mandaluyong jail.

It is therefore clear that appellant did not do anything to prevent his co-conspirators from
stabbing and ultimately killing the victim. When he left the scene of the crime; he could have
gone to the police to report the crime, but he hid and tried to escape the arm of the law. Because
he did not do anything to prevent the homicide, he is therefore equally guilty of robbery with
homicide.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against
appellant.

PEOPLE v. HADJA JARMA LALLI Y PURIH, GR No. 195419, 2011-10-12

The Facts

The findings of fact of the RTC, which were affirmed in toto by the CA, are as follows:

In the evening of June 3, 2005, while Lolita Sagadsad Plando, 23 years old, single, was in
Tumaga, Zamboanga City on her way to the house of her grandfather, she met Ronnie Masion
Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy Cañete. Ronnie greeted Lolita, "Oy, it's good you are here" ("oy,
maayo kay dia ka"). Rachel asked Lolita if she is interested to work in Malaysia. Lolita was
interested so she gave her cellphone number to Ronnie. After their conversation, Lolita
proceeded to her grandfather's house.
On June 4, 2005, at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning, Lolita received a text message from
Ronnie Aringoy inviting her to go to the latter's house. At 7:30 in the morning, they met at
Tumaga on the road near the place where they had a conversation the night before. Ronnie
brought Lolita to the house of his sister in Tumaga. Lolita inquired what job is available in
Malaysia. Ronnie told her that she will work as a restaurant entertainer. All that is needed is a
passport. She will be paid 500 Malaysian ringgits which is equivalent to P7,000.00 pesos in
Philippine currency. Lolita told Ronnie that she does not have a passport. Ronnie said that they
will look for a passport so she could leave immediately. Lolita informed him that her younger
sister, Marife Plando, has a passport. Ronnie chided her for not telling him immediately. He told
Lolita that she will leave for Malaysia on June 6, 2005 and they will go to Hadja Jarma Lalli who
will bring her to Malaysia. Ronnie sent a text message to Lalli but the latter replied that she was
not in her house. She was at the city proper.
On June 5, 2005, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ronnie Aringoy and Rachel Aringoy
Cañete arrived on board a tricycle driven by Ronnie at the house where Lolita was staying at
Southcom Village. Ronnie asked if Lolita already had a passport. Lolita said that she will borrow
her sister's passport. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to Buenavista where Lolita's other sister,
Gina Plando was staying. Her sister Marife Plando was there at that time. Lolita asked Marife to
let her use Marife's passport. Marife refused but Lolita got the passport. Marife cried. Ronnie,
Rachel and Lolita proceeded to Tumaga. Ronnie, Rachel and Lolita went to the house of Hadja
Jarma Lalli just two hundred meters away from the house of Ronnie in Tumaga. Ronnie
introduced Lolita to Hadja Jarma, saying "Ji, she is also interested in going to Malaysia." Lolita
handed a passport to Hadja Jarma telling her that it belongs to her sister Marife Plando. Hadja
Jarma told her it is not a problem because they have a connection with the DFA (Department of
Foreign Affairs) and Marife's picture in the passport will be substituted with Lolita's picture.
Nestor Relampagos arrived driving an owner-type jeep. Hadja Jarma introduced Nestor to Lolita
as their financier who will accompany them to Malaysia. Lolita noticed three other women in
Hadja Jarma's house. They were Honey, about 20 years old; Michele, 19 years old, and another
woman who is about 28 years old. The women said that they are from Ipil, Sibugay Province.
Ronnie told Lolita that she will have many companions going to Malaysia to work. They will
leave the next day, June 6, and will meet at the wharf at 2:30 in the afternoon.

On June 6, 2005, Lolita went to Zamboanga City wharf at 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon bringing
a bag containing her make-up and powder. She met at the wharf Hadja Jarma Lalli, Ronnie
Aringoy, Honey and Michele. Ronnie gave to Lolita her boat ticket for the vessel M/V Mary Joy
bound for Sandakan, Malaysia; a passport in the name of Marife Plando but with Lolita's picture
on it, and P1,000.00 in cash. Hadja Jarma, Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded
the boat M/V Mary Joy bound for Sandakan. Ronnie Aringoy did not go with them. He did not
board the boat. After the boat sailed, Hadja Jarma Lalli and Nestor Relampagos approached
Lolita and her companions. Nestor told them that they will have a good job in Malaysia as
restaurant entertainers. They will serve food to customers. They will not be harmed.

M/V Mary Joy arrived at the port of Sandakan, Malaysia at 10:00 o'clock in the morning of June
7, 2005. After passing through the immigration office, Hadja Jarma Lalli, Nestor Relampagos,
Lolita, Honey, Michele and two other women boarded a van for Kota Kinabalu. At the hotel,
Nestor Relampagos introduced to Lolita and her companions a Chinese Malay called "Boss" as
their employer. After looking at the women, "Boss" brought Lolita, Honey, Diane and Lorraine
to a restaurant near the hotel. Diane and Lorraine were also on board M/V Mary Joy when it left
the port of Zamboanga for Sandakan on June 6, 2005. When they were already at the restaurant,
a Filipina woman working there said that the place is a prostitution den and the women there are
used as prostitutes. Lolita and her companions went back to the hotel. They told Hadja Jarma and
Nestor that they do not like to work as prostitutes. After about five minutes, another person
called "boss" arrived. [T]hey were fetched by a van at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening and
brought to Pipen Club owned by "Boss Awa", a Malaysian. At the club, they were told that they
owe the club 2,000 ringgits each as payment for the amount given by the club to Hadja Jarma
Lalli and Nestor Relampagos. They will pay for the said amount by entertaining customers. The
customers will pay 300 ringgits for short time services of which 50 ringgits will go to the
entertainer and 500 ringgits for over night service of which 100 ringgits will be given to the
entertainer. Pipen Club is a big club in a two-storey building. There were about 100 women
working in the club, many of them were Filipina women.

Lolita Plando was forced to work as entertainer at Pipen Club. She started working at 8:30 in the
evening of June 14, 2005. She was given the number 60 which was pinned on her. That night,
she had her first customer who selected her among the other women at the club. He was a very
big man, about 32 years old, a Chinese-Malay who looked like a wrestler. The man paid for short
time service at the counter. Lolita was given by the cashier a small pink paper. She was
instructed to keep it. A small yellow paper is given to the entertainer for overnight services. The
customer brought Lolita to a hotel. She did not like to go with him but a "boss" at the club told
her that she could not do anything. At the hotel, the man poked a gun at Lolita and instructed her
to undress. She refused. The man boxed her on the side of her body. She could not bear the pain.
The man undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. He had sexual intercourse with her
every fifteen minutes or four times in one hour. When the customer went inside the comfort
room, Lolita put on her clothes and left. The customer followed her and wanted to bring her back
to the hotel but Lolita refused. At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of June 15, 2005, Lolita was
chosen by another customer, a tall dark man, about 40 years old. The customer paid for an
overnight service at the counter and brought Lolita to Mariner Hotel which is far from Pipen
Club. At the hotel, the man told Lolita to undress. When she refused, the man brought her to the
comfort room and bumped her head on the wall. Lolita felt dizzy. The man opened the shower
and said that both of them will take a bath. Lolita's clothes got wet. She was crying. The man
undressed her and had sexual intercourse with her. They stayed at the hotel until 11:00 o'clock in
the morning of June 15, 2005. The customer used Lolita many times. He had sexual intercourse
with her every hour.

Lolita worked at Pipen Club from June 14 to July 8, 2005. Every night, a customer used her. She
had at least one customer or more a night, and at most, she had around five customers a night.
They all had sexual intercourse with her. On July 9, 2005, Lolita was able to contact by
cellphone at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning her sister Janet Plando who is staying at
Sipangkot Felda. Janet is married to Said Abubakar, an Indonesian national who is working as a
driver in the factory. Lolita told Janet that she is in Labuan, Malaysia and beg Janet to save her
because she was sold as a prostitute. Janet told Lolita to wait because her husband will go to
Pipen Club to fetch Lolita at 9:00 o'clock that evening of that day. She told Janet to instruct her
husband to ask for No. 60 at Pipen Club. At 9:00 o'clock in the evening, Lolita was told by
Daddy Richard, one of the bosses at the club, that a customer requested for No. 60. The man was
seated at one of the tables. Lolita approached the man and said, "good evening." The man asked
her if she is the sister of Janet Plando. Lolita replied that she is, and asked the man if he is the
husband of her sister. He said, "yes." The man had already paid at the counter. He stood up and
left the place. Lolita got her wallet and followed him. Lolita told her sister about her ordeal. She
stayed at her sister's house until July 22, 2005. On July 21, 2005 at 7:00 o'clock in the evening, a
policeman went to her sisters house and asked if there is a woman staying in the house without a
passport. Her sister told the policeman that she will send Lolita home on July 22. At dawn on
July 22, Lolita and her brother-in-law took a taxi from Sipangkot Felda to Mananamblas where
Lolita will board a speedboat to Sibuto, Tawi-Tawi.
Upon arrival in Zamboanga City on July 24, 2005, Lolita went directly to the house of her eldest
sister Alejandra Plando Maywila at Sta. Catalina, Zamboanga City. She left her things at her
sister's house and immediately went to the sister of Ronnie Aringoy in Tumaga. Ronnie was not
there. She asked Russel, niece of Ronnie, to call for the latter. Ronnie arrived and said to her, "so
you are here, you arrived already." He said he is not involved in what happened to her. Lolita
asked Ronnie to accompany her to the house of Nestor Relampagos because she has something
to get from him. Ronnie refused. He told Lolita not to let them know that she had already arrived
from Malaysia.

Lolita was advised to file a complaint with the police regarding her ordeal in Malaysia. On
August 2, 2005, at past 9:00 o'clock in the morning, Lolita Plando went to Zamboanga Police
Office at Gov. Lim Avenue to file her complaint.

In her Counter-Affidavit, Hadja Jarma Lalli admitted that she met Lolita Plando on June 6, 2005
on board M/V Mary Joy while the said vessel was at sea on its way to Sandakan, Malaysia. The
meeting was purely coincidental. By coincidence also, Hadja Jarma, Nestor Relampagos and
Lolita Plando boarded the same van for Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. Upon arrival, they parted
ways. They did not see each other anymore at Kota Kinabalu, Malaysia. She did not know what
happened to them. She went to Kota Kinabalu to visit his son-in-law. She denied having
recruited Lolita Plando for employment abroad

In his Counter-Affidavit Ronnie Aringoy affirmed that he personally knows Lolita Plando since
she was a teenager and he knows for a fact that her name is Cristine and not Marife "as she
purports it to appear." Sometime in the first week of June 2005, Lolita borrowed P1,000.00 from
Ronnie because she wanted to go to Malaysia to work as a guest relation officer (GRO). Ronnie
lent her P1,000.00. He told her that he knows "a certain Hadja Jarma Lalli, distant neighbor, who
frequents to Malaysia and with whom she can ask pertinent information on job opportunities."
The entries in Philippine Passport No. MM401136 issued to Hadja Jarma Lalli on January 29,
2004 showed that she traveled to Malaysia no less than nine (9) times within the period from
March 2004 to June 2005.
Nora Mae Adling, ticketing clerk of Aleson Shipping Lines, owner of the vessel M/V Mary Joy 2
plying Zamboanga City to Sandakan, Malaysia route and of M/V Kristel Jane 3, testified that
Hadja Jarma Lalli bought passenger tickets for her travel to Sandakan, not only for herself but
also for other women passengers.
Ronnie Aringoy submitted the Affidavit of his witness Rachel Cañete and the Joint Affidavits of
witnesses Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan. Rachel Canete declared that Lolita Plando
whom she knows as Cristine Plando worked as a GRO (guest relation officer) and massage
attendant at Magic 2 Videoke and Massage Parlor, that Lolita Plando has four children sired by
different men; and that she knows for a fact that Lolita Plando has been going to and from
Malaysia to work in bars. When she testified in court, Rachel did not present other evidence to
substantiate her allegations. Mercedita Salazar and Estrella Galgan declared in their Joint
Affidavit that Lolita Plando who is known to them as Marife Plando was their co-worker as
massage attendant and GRO (guest relation officer) at Magic 2 Massage Parlor and Karaoke bar
where she used the names Gina Plando and Cristine Plando. She worked in the said
establishment for nine months from February to October 2002. She has four children from four
different men. No other evidence was submitted in court to prove their assertions.
Issues:
Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming in toto the RTC
Decision.
Ruling:

It does not change the fact that the accused recruited Lolita to work in Malaysia without the
requisite POEA license, thus constituting the crime of illegal recruitment. Worse, the accused
deceived her by saying that her work in Malaysia would be as restaurant entertainer, when in
fact, Lolita would be working as a prostitute, thus, constituting the crime of trafficking.

In this case, none of these exceptions to the general rule on conclusiveness of facts are
applicable.

It is clear that a person or entity engaged in recruitment and placement activities without the
requisite authority from the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), whether for profit
or not, is engaged in illegal recruitment.

The commission of illegal recruitment by three or more persons... conspiring or confederating

with one another is deemed committed by a syndicate and constitutes economic sabotage

The penalties in Section 7 of RA 8042 have already been amended by Section 6 of Republic Act
No. 10022, and have been increased to a fine of not less than 2,000,000 but not more than
5,000,000. However, since the crime was committed in 2005, we shall apply the penalties in
the... old law, RA 8042.

(1) the offender undertakes either any activity within the meaning of "recruitment and
placement" defined under Article 13(b), or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Art.
34 of the Labor Code;

(2) he has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and

(3) the illegal recruitment is committed by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or
confederating with one another.

illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give
the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.

In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court, found Lalli, Aringoy and
Relampagos to have conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and place Lolita for
work in Malaysia, without a POEA license. The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment
are present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no valid license or authority required
by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; (2) the
accused engaged in this activity of recruitment and placement by... actually recruiting, deploying
and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal recruitment was committed by three persons
(Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one another.

Aringoy claims and admits that he only referred Lolita to Lalli for job opportunities to Malaysia.
Such act of referring, whether for profit or not, in connivance with someone without a POEA
license, is already considered illegal recruitment, given the broad definition of recruitment and
placement in the Labor Code.
Lalli, on the other hand, completely denies any involvement in the recruitment and placement of
Lolita to Malaysia, and claims she only met Lolita for the first time by coincidence on board the
ship M/V Mary Joy. Lalli's denial does not deserve credence because it completely conflicts with
the testimony of Aringoy who claims he referred Lolita to Lalli who had knowledge of the job
opportunities in Malaysia.

Aringoy claims that no conspiracy existed in illegal recruitment, as he denies even knowing
Relampagos, who is currently at-large. Lalli denies any involvement in the illegal recruitment,
and claims that she only met Relampagos through Lolita on board the ship M/V Mary Joy on 6

June 2005, and learned that Relampagos was bringing Lolita and their other girl companions to
Malaysia to work as sales ladies.

the flight of accused Relampagos, who is still at-large, shows an indication of guilt in the crimes
he has been charged.

It is clear that through the concerted efforts of Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos, Lolita was
recruited and deployed to Malaysia to work as a prostitute. Such conspiracy among Aringoy,
Lalli and Relampagos could be deduced from the manner in which the crime was perpetrated -
each of the accused played a pivotal role in perpetrating the crime of illegal recruitment, and
evinced a joint common purpose and design, concerted action and community of interest.

Ronnie Aringoy y Masion and Hadja Jarma Lalli y Purih guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate in trafficking in Persons under Sections
3(a) and 4 of RA 9208 is not only limited to transportation of victims, but also includes the act of
recruitment of victims for trafficking.

That all the three accused (Aringoy, Lalli and Relampagos) conspired and confederated with one
another to illegally recruit Lolita to become a prostitute in Malaysia, it follows that they are also
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons committed by a
syndicate under RA 9208 because the crime of recruitment for prostitution also constitutes
trafficking.
Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate...
accused Lalli and Aringoy guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Illegal Recruitment
and Trafficking in Persons committed by a syndicate.

SUNACE INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES v. NLRC, GR NO. 161757,

2006-01-25

Facts:

Petitioner, Sunace International Management Services (Sunace), a corporation duly organized

and existing under the laws of the Philippines, deployed to Taiwan Divina A. Montehermozo
(Divina) as a domestic helper under a 12-month contract effective February 1, 1997. The
deployment was with the assistance of a Taiwanese broker, Edmund Wang, President of Jet
Crown International Co., Ltd.

After her 12-month contract expired on February 1, 1998, Divina continued working for her
Taiwanese employer, Hang Rui Xiong, for two more years, after which she returned to the
Philippines on February 4, 2000.
Shortly after her return or on February 14, 2000, Divina filed a complaint before the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against Sunace, one Adelaide Perez, the Taiwanese
broker, and the employer-foreign principal alleging that she was jailed for three months and that
she was underpaid.

Divina filed her Position Paper claiming that under her original one-year contract and the 2-year
extended contract which was with the knowledge and consent of Sunace.

Reacting to Divina's Position Paper, Sunace filed an answer to complainant's position paper"
alleging that Divina's 2-year extension of her contract was without its knowledge and consent,
hence, it had no liability attaching to... any claim arising therefrom, The Labor Arbiter, rejected
Sunace's claim that the extension of Divina's contract for two more years was without its
knowledge and consent, he accordingly decided in favor of Divina.

On appeal of Sunace, the NLRC, by Resolution of April 30, 2002, affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision.

Sunace elevated the case to the Court of Appeals

It is undisputed that petitioner was continually communicating with private respondent's foreign
employer (sic). As agent of the foreign principal, "petitioner cannot profess ignorance of such
extension as obviously, the act of the principal extending complainant (sic) employment contract
necessarily bound it." Grave abuse of discretion is not present in the case at bar.

Petition is hereby DENIED

Respecting the Court of Appeals following dictum:

As agent of its foreign principal, [Sunace] cannot profess ignorance of such an extension as
obviously, the act of its principal extending [Divina's] employment contract necessarily bound it,

Issues:

It too is a misapplication, a misapplication of the theory of imputed knowledge.

Ruling:

The theory of imputed knowledge ascribes the knowledge of the agent, Sunace, to the principal,
employer Xiong, not the other way around. The knowledge of the principal-foreign employer
cannot, therefore, be imputed to its agent Sunace.

There being no substantial proof that Sunace knew of and consented to be bound under the 2-
year employment contract extension, it cannot be said to be privy thereto. As such, it and its
"owner" cannot be held solidarily liable for any of Divina's claims arising from the 2-year
employment extension, as the New Civil Code provides. Furthermore, as Sunace correctly points
out, there was an implied revocation of its agency relationship with its foreign principal when,
after the termination of the original employment contract, the foreign principal directly
negotiated with Divina and entered into a new and separate employment contract in Taiwan.
 SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY v. JOY C. CABILES, GR No. 170139,
2014-08-05

Facts:

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency.
Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a
quality control job in Taiwan.

Joy's application was accepted. Joy was later asked to sign a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay
a placement fee of P70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.

Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged
that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year. In Taiwan,
she was asked to work as a cutter

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.She was.asked to "prepare for
immediate repatriation."

On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed. She asked for the
return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her salary for
23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas
Placement Agency's foreign principal.

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements [of]
her foreign [employer]."The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of
70,000.00. As evidence, it showed Official Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, bearing the
amount of 20,360.00. Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already
been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Pacific) as of August 6,
1997. Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower.

On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy's complaint. Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Pedro C. Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mere allegations.

Joy appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission.

In a resolution dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared that
Joy was illegally dismissed. It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the
dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer. It found that Sameer
Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination. There
was no sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to
comply with company requirements. Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in
terminating respondent.

The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of
salary in the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her, and
attorney's fees of NT$300.

Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations Commission's
resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with
respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy's entitlement to the equivalent of three months
worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney's fees. The Court
of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address the
validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.

Issues:

whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months' worth of
salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney's fees despite the alleged
existence of just causes of termination.

Ruling:

Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy's
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law.

Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.
They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these
standards. Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal. Certainly, employers cannot
be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the
interest of the employer. While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it
does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer." Management prerogative
is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.

This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee's right to
security of tenure." Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.

Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this
case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules
and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule
that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum's public
policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature.

Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC, to wit:

Petitioners admit that they did not inform private respondent in writing of the charges against
him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his side.
However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements of notice and hearing applies strictly
only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly observed
in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.

The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines or
abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the Contract of
Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was executed here
in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and regulations and other
laws affecting labor apply in this case.

By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized
cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.

Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus:

Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the
following causes:

(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his
employer or representative in connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly
authorized representative;

(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any
immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives; and

(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) the
employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be
judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the
employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee's
performance assessment.

The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the
probationary employee's fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular employee.
Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such standards at the time of
his or her engagement so he or she can adjust his or her character or workmanship accordingly.
Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employee's qualifications will be evaluated
will increase one's chances of being positively assessed for regularization by his or her employer.

In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
employer's work requirements and was inefficient in her work. No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not
met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent constituted
inefficiency.

There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against
which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties' conflict as to the position
held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear.

Petitioner failed to comply with the due process requirements

A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.
The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before
termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may
cause his or her dismissal. The other notice must "[inform] the employee of the employer's
decision." Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given "an opportunity
to be heard."

Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the
unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney's fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of
twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract
or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of
his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited
or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of employment is due
solely to the fault of the worker, "which as we have established, is not the case.

The Labor Code also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney's
fees when the withholding is unlawful.

The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent's salary should, however, be increased to
the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.

In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., this court ruled
that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is
unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due process.
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all."

We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides:

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement
of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent's
termination from work in 1997. Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act
No. 10022 governs this case.

However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact
clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the
circumstances.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may
exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence
of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All
laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the
nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or
provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates
the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Petitioner as well as the Solicitor
General have failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us
to revisit the precedent.

We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power. A law is void on this
basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily. There is no violation of the equal protection
clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall
within the class. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification.

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
equally to all members of the same class."

Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary
as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month
equivalence of respondent's salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on
June 26,1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July
15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs,
and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning
agencies may violate an OFW's security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and
actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law.

Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign
employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims
including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section
also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such
money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED
with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay
respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner
is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent
attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.

The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

ATCI v. Echin October 11, 2010 G.R. No. 178551 Liability of the principal/employer and
the recruitment/placement agency, Probationary employment
SEPTEMBER 4, 2018

FACTS:

Josefina Echin was hired by petitioner ATCI Overseas Corporation in behalf of its principal-co-
petitioner, the Ministry of Public Health of Kuwait, for the position of medical technologist
under a two-year contract, denominated as a MOA.

Under the MOA, all newly-hired employees undergo a probationary period of one year.

Respondent was deployed on February 17, 2000 but was terminated from employment on
February 11, 2001, she not having allegedly passed the probationary period.

Respondent filed with the NLRC a complaint for illegal dismissal against ATCI as the local
recruitment agency, represented by Amalia Ikdal, and the Ministry, as the foreign principal.

The Labor Arbiter held that respondent was illegally dismissed and accordingly ordered
petitioners to pay her US$3,600.00, representing her salary for the three months unexpired
portion of her contract.

The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision.

Petitioners appealed to the CA, contending that their principal, the Ministry, being a foreign
government agency, is immune from suit and, as such, the immunity extended to them; and that
respondent was validly dismissed for her failure to meet the performance rating within the one-
year period as required under Kuwaits Civil Service Laws.

The CA affirmed the NLRC Resolution

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioner is liable for the illegal dismissal of respondent.

RULING:

Petitioner ATCI, as a private recruitment agency, cannot evade responsibility for the money
claims of OFWs which it deploys abroad by the mere expediency of claiming that its foreign
principal is a government agency clothed with immunity from suit, or that such foreign
principals liability must first be established before it, as agent, can be held jointly and solidarily
liable.

The imposition of joint and solidary liability is in line with the policy of the state to protect and
alleviate the plight of the working class. Verily, to allow petitioners to simply invoke the
immunity from suit of its foreign principal or to wait for the judicial determination of the foreign
principals liability before petitioner can be held liable renders the law on joint and solidary
liability inutile.

As to petitioners contentions that Philippine labor laws on probationary employment are not
applicable since it was expressly provided in respondents employment contract, which she
voluntarily entered into, that the terms of her engagement shall be governed by prevailing
Kuwaiti Civil Service Laws and Regulations as in fact POEA Rules accord respect to such rules,
customs and practices of the host country, the same was not substantiated.

It is hornbook principle, however, that the party invoking the application of a foreign law has the
burden of proving the law, under the doctrine of processual presumption which, in this case,
petitioners failed to discharge.

The Philippines does not take judicial notice of foreign laws, hence, they must not only be
alleged; they must be proven. To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy
thereof and comply with the Rules of Court.

These documents submitted by petitioners do not sufficiently prove that respondent was validly
terminated as a probationary employee under Kuwaiti civil service laws.

Respecting Ikdal’s joint and solidary liability as a corporate officer, the same is in order too
following the express provision of R.A. 8042:

The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law, shall be
answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation
or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.

The petition is DENIED.