SAMSON vs.

CORRALES TAN QUINTIN

DOCTRINE: Weakness of the mind is not equivalent to an unsound mind. Evidence on the
soundness of mind must be testified by the Attending Physician

FACTS:
A document alleged to be the last will and testament of the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan is to be
probated. This was opposed by the son of the deceased, on the ground that the will is incomplete,
fraudulent, and does not express the true intent of the testator; that the testator acted under duress
and under undue influence, and that at the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and
disposing mind.

The physician, Dr. Tee Han Kee, testified that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had
been in comatose condition for several days prior to his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in
the evening of December 26, 1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of
the same day. However, all of the witnesses presented by Samson, five in number, testify that the
deceased was conscious, could hear and understand what was said to him and was able to indicate
his desires. Four of these witnesses state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth, Velhagen, says that
the deceased only moved his head in answer to questions.

ISSUE: Was the decedent of sound mind when he executed his last will and testament?

RULING: YES.

That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will was executed is
evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the petition told the truth there can be no doubt
that he was of sound mind and capable of making his will.

There is no reason to discredit any of the witnesses; the discrepancies found between their
respective versions of what took place at the execution of the document are comparatively
unimportant and so far from weakening their testimony rather lend strength to it by indicating the
absence of any conspiracy among them.

As against their testimony are only the testimony of Maximina Ong and Dr. Tee Han Kee. The former
is not a disinterested witness. As to the testimony of the latter, it is sufficient to say that mere
professional speculation of a non-attending physician cannot prevail over the positive statements of
five apparently credible witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
 CUYUGAN v. BARON
G.R. No. L-41947, JANUARY 16, 1936
BUTTE, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble

DOCTRINE: There is testamentary incapacity when the alleged testator harbors the belief that she
did not execute a will nor judge the propriety of revoking such will. Testamentary Incapacity
invalidates the whole will.

FACTS:
Silvestra Baron died on January 30, 1933, leaving an estate exceeding in value the sum of P80,000
which she disposed of by will dated December 17, 1932. She died single without forced heirs. The
will appointed Vivencio Cuyugan, her nephew, as executor. The petition for probate recites that on
the date of the execution of said will on December 17, 1932, the said testatrix was about 80 years
old, more or less, and was found in disposing mind, and not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or
undue influence, and was in every respect competent to dispose of her estate by will.

Guillermo Baron, brother of the deceased, and Faustina Baron, sister of the deceased, allege, that at
the time of the execution of the alleged will, Silvestra Baron was mentally and physically
incapacitated for the execution of a will; and, second, that her signature and alleged consent to the
said will was obtained and the attorney who prepared the document and the witnesses who affixed
their signatures thereto.

ISSUE: Did the testator possess testamentary capacity at the time of the making of the will?

RULING: NO.

An instrument purporting to be a will executed and witnessed in accordance with the formalities
required by the statute is entitled to the presumption of regularity. But the burden of the evidence
passed to the proponent when the oppositors submit credible evidence tending to show that the
supposed testator did not possess testamentary capacity at the time or that the document was not the
free and voluntary expression of the alleged testator or that the will, for any other reason, is void in
law.

She never saw the alleged will at any time again prior to her death which occurred forty-four days
later. It was immediately taken away by an attorney who kept it in his possession alleging that she
had instructed him to keep it secret. There is, however, credible evidence in the record that before her
death she had denied to several persons that she made any will.

This belief on her part that she had not made any will explains her failure to do any act of revocation
in the forty-four days during which she lingered in this life. The doctrine that where the testator has
had an opportunity to revoke his will subsequent to the operation of an alleged undue influence upon
him but makes no change in it, the courts will consider this fact as weighing heavily against the
testimony of undue influence, has no application to cases in which there has been an initial lack of
testamentary capacity.
 ORTEGA v. VALMONTE
G.R. No. 157451, DECEMBER 16, 2005
PANGANIBAN, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble

DOCTRINE: The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the
time of its execution. To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that the mind be
unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or otherwise.

FACTS:
Placido Valmonte died on October 8, 1984. He executed a notarial last will and testament in favor of
his wife alone, named Josefina, who is thrice lower his age. The will was written in English and
consisting of two (2) pages, and dated June 15, 1983 but acknowledged only on August 9, 1983.
Notary Public Floro Sarmiento testified that before the testator and his witnesses signed the prepared
will, he explained to them each and every term thereof in Ilocano, a dialect which the testator spoke
and understood. He likewise explained that though it appears that the will was signed by the testator
and his witnesses on June 15, 1983, the day when it should have been executed had he not gone out
of town, the formal execution was actually on August 9, 1983. The attesting witnesses to the will
corroborated the testimony of the notary public.

Oppositors Leticia and Mary Jane Ortega declared that Josefina should not inherit alone because
aside from her there are other children from the siblings of Placido who are just as entitled to inherit
from him. She attacked the mental capacity of the testator, declaring that at the time of the execution
of the notarial will the testator was already 83 years old and was no longer of sound mind.

They also contend that it was "highly dubious for a woman at the prime of her young life to almost
immediately plunge into marriage with a man who [was] thrice her age x x x and who happened to be
[a] Fil-American pensionado," thus casting doubt on the intention of respondent in seeking the
probate of the will. Moreover, it supposedly "defies human reason, logic and common experience" for
an old man with a severe psychological condition to have willingly signed a last will and testament.

ISSUE: Did Placido Valmonte possess testamentary capacity at the time he allegedly executed the
subject will?

RULING: YES.

The party challenging the will bears the burden of proving the existence of fraud at the time of its
execution. The burden to show otherwise shifts to the proponent of the will only upon a showing of
credible evidence of fraud. Unfortunately in this case, other than the self-serving allegations of Leticia,
no evidence of fraud was ever presented.

In determining the capacity of the testator to make a will, the Civil Code gives the following guidelines:
"Article 798. In order to make a will it is essential that the testator be of sound
mind at the time of its execution.
 "Article 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or shattered by disease, injury or other cause.

"It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to
know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of
his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.

"Article 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the
absence of proof to the contrary.

"The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the
time of making his dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate
of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before making his will was
publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will
must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval."

According to Article 799, the three things that the testator must have the ability to know to be
considered of sound mind are as follows: (1) the nature of the estate to be disposed of, (2) the proper
objects of the testator’s bounty, and (3) the character of the testamentary act. Applying this test to the
present case, Placido had testamentary capacity at the time of the execution of his will.
 BALTAZAR v. LAXA
G.R. No. 174489, APRIL 11, 2012
DEL CASTILLO, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble

DOCTRINE: The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so
as to render him unfit to execute a will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

FACTS:
Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled "Tauli Nang
Bilin o Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala"   (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981.
The Will, executed in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to
Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that
the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said
document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia
(Francisco) and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Will’s due execution by
affixing their signatures below its attestation clause and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,
in the presence of Paciencia and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent
Lorenzo R. Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and
Katherine Ross Laxa.

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring "something" for Paciencia to
sign at the latter’s house. Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that "something" was as
same was placed inside an envelope. However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to
first look for money before she signs them. A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia
went to the house of Antonio’s mother and brought with her the said envelope. Upon going home,
however, the envelope was no longer with Paciencia. Rosie further testified that Paciencia was
referred to as "magulyan" or "forgetful" because she would sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen
then start looking for it moments later. On cross examination, it was established that Rosie was
neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia was "magulyan" was based on
her personal assessment, and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify in court.

ISSUE: Was the testator of sound mind when she executed her last will and testament?

RULING: YES.

The state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render
him unfit to execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the nature of the
estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary act.
In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencia’s forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra.
Limpin’s testimony as to the soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpin’s
house and voluntarily executed the Will. "The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning
the testator’s mental condition is entitled to great weight where they are truthful and intelligent." More
importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the
burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor.

The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his dispositions is
on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one month, or less, before
making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who maintains the validity of the will must
prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies
upon the shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was
presented by them to prove the same, thereby, petitioners failed to discharge such burden.
 SUROZA v. HONRADO
A.M. No. 2026-CFI, DECEMBER 19, 1981
AQUINO, J.
Digested by: Faith Imee D. Roble

DOCTRINE: Lack of knowledge cannot be cured by interpretation or explanation of the contents of

FACTS:
Marcelina supposedly executed a notarial will in Manila on July 23, 1973, when she was 73 years
old. That will which is in English was thumbmarked by her. She was illiterate. Her letters in English to
the Veterans Administration were also thumbmarked by her. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her
estate to her supposed granddaughter Marilyn ( an “anak-anakan” allegedly begot by the deceased
Agapito from Arsenia, but in reality, the child was the daughter of the Spouses Sy and was merely
entrusted to Arsenia when the baby was only days old).

Marina Paje, alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and the executrix in her will (the alternate
executrix was Juanita Macaraeg, mother of Oscar, Marilyn's husband), filed with the Court a petition
for the probate of Marcelina's alleged will. The case was assigned to Judge Reynaldo P. Honrado,
who appointed Marina as administratrix.

The wife of Agapito, Nenita, filed an opposition thereto only after learning of the existence of the
testamentary proceeding (when an order for ejectment was issued by said judge upon motion of
Marina). One of the grounds for her opposition was that the alleged will is void because Marcelina did
not appear before the notary and because it is written in English which is not known to the deceased.
However, this was denied by the judge. This prompted Nenita to file a complaint charging Judge
Honrado for having probated the fraudulent will of Marcelina.

ISSUE: Being merely interpreted or translated to the testator, was the will valid?

RULING: NO.

Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the
testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedent's legal heirs
and not the instituted heiress in the void win should have inherited the decedent's estate.

Judge Honrado, on perusing the will and noting that it was written in English and was thumbmarked
by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could have readily perceived that the will is void.

In the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that English was a language "understood and
known" to the testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated that the will was read to the
testatrix "and translated into Filipino language". That could only mean that the will was written in a
language not known to the illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of the mandatory
provision of article 804 of the Civil Code that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator.
The hasty preparation of the will is shown in the attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment
where Marcelina Salvador Suroza is repeatedly referred to as the "testator" instead of "testatrix".

Had respondent judge been careful and observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as to
the language of the will but also that there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all to her supposed father who was still alive.