1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 29TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2018

BEFORE

THE HON’BLE MR.JUSTICE G.NARENDAR

WRIT PETITION Nos.2953-2954/2012 (SCST)

BETWEEN
1. SRI T B MAHADEVAIAH
S/O LATE BASAPPA
AGED ABOUT 56 YEARS

2. SRI T B NAGARAJ
S/O LATE BASAPPA
AGED ABOUT 52 YEARS

BOTH ARE R/O THYAGATOOR

NITTOR HOBLI, GUBBI TQ.,
TUMKUR DISTRICT. ... PETITIONERS

(BY SRI. M B CHANDRA CHOODA, ADV.)

AND
1. STATE OF KARNATAKA
BY ITS SECRETARY TO GOVT.
REVENUE DEPARTMENT
M S BUILDINDG,
DR. AMBEDKAR VEEDHI,
BANGALORE-560001.

2. THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER,

TUMKUR DISTRICT,
TUMKUR.

3. THE ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,

TUMKUR SUB DIVISION,
TUMKUR.

4. SRI T C MAHALINGAPPA
S/O CHIKKAMALLAIAH,
AGED ABOUT 50 YEARS,
R/O MADENAHALLI VILLAGE,
CHELUR HOBLI, GUBBI TQ.,
TUMKUR DISTRICT.

4(a) SHANTHA KUMAR

S/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
AGE: MAJOR
 2

4(b) MAHADEVAIAH
S/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
AGE: MAJOR

BOTH ARE RESIDENTS OF

MADENAHALLI AT & POST:
HOBLI: CHELUR, TALUK: GUBBI
DISTRICT: TUMKUR

4(c) SMT.VANAJAKSHAMMA
D/O.LATE MAHALINGAPPA
W/O.NANJAPPA
AGE: MAJOR, R/A.SATHENAHALLI
HOBLI: CHELUR, TALUK: GUBBI
DISTRICT: TUMKUR. ... RESPONDENTS

(BY SMT. SAVITHRAMMA, HCGP FOR R1 TO R3,

R-4 (A TO C) - SERVED UNREPRESENTED.)

THESE WRIT PETITIONS ARE FILED UNDER ARTICLES 226 & 227
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, PRAYING TO QUASH THE ORDER
DT.4.11.11 PASSED BY THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, TUMKUR DIST.
TUMKUR VIDE ANN-B, BY ISSUE OF WRIT OF CERTIORARI ETC.

THESE WRIT PETITIONS HAVING BEEN HEARD AND RESERVED

AND POSTED FOR FURTHER ORDERS THIS DAY, THE COURT
PRONOUNCED THE FOLLOWING:

ORDER

Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners

and learned counsel for the respondents.

2. The case of the petitioner is that the land to an

extent of 2 acres of Ankapura Village, Nittoor Hobli, Gubbi,

Tumkur District was allotted to one Chikkamallaiah in

Sy.No.18/12 under the `Grow More Food’ scheme as per

the order GMS No.07/1956-57 dated 31.05.1957. That the

allottee sold 1 acre 20 guntas of land in favour of one

 3

Channabasamma under the registered sale deed dated

05.05.1966.

3. That the petitioners are the successors to the

said Channabasamma and succeeded to her estate after

her demise. That pursuant to the registered sale deed, the

name of said Channabasamma has been mutated and

entered in the revenue records. Subsequently, names of the

petitioners have been entered as the legal representatives

and that they continued to be in absolute possession and

enjoyment of the said property except in respect of 20

guntas of land out of the said survey number. That

proceedings were initiated before the land Tribunal, Gubbi

and the said proceedings got concluded in favour of a third

party vide order dated 13.06.1977 and that the said 20

guntas of land is not part and parcel of the land alienated

in favour of the petitioners predecessors-in-title.

4. On 17.06.2000, respondent No.4 preferred an

application under the PTCL Act alleging that as he belongs

to Scheduled Caste and land having been allotted in favour

of his father under the GMF scheme, the alienation on

 4

05.05.1966 is contrary to the conditions imposed at the

time of allotment of the land under GMF Scheme and

hence, the application under Section 4 of the Karnataka

Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribes (PTCL) Act, 1978

was preferred.

5. The petitioners entered appearance and filed

their objections contending that the conditions imposed

under Rule 43-G of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969

was not attracted to the land leased under GMF Scheme

and which lease was confirmed under Rule 43-G.

6. In this regard, the petitioners placed reliance on

the ruling of this Court in the case of Smt.Shivlingamma v.

Special Deputy Commissioner and others reported in

1991(2) Kar.L.J.421, wherein this Court has been pleased

to hold that the conditions of non-alienation are

inapplicable to land originally leased under the GMF

Scheme and lease under Section 43-G of the Rules and

subsequent confirmation under Rule 43-J of the Rules and

hence, it is contended that the said Act is inapplicable.

 5

7. The respondent No.3 after hearing the parties

was pleased to reject the application preferred under

Section 4 of the Act. The respondent No.4 being aggrieved

by the order dated 30.11.2004 preferred an appeal before

respondent No.2. That respondent No.2 without looking

into the validity of the condition was pleased to allow the

appeal by its order dated 04.11.2011 vide Annexure-B to

the writ petition. Being aggrieved, the petitioners are before

this Court.

8. Respondent No.4 having passed away during

the pendency of the petition, his legal representatives have

been brought on record as respondent Nos.4(a) to 4(c).

Respondents have not preferred any statement of

objections.

9. There is no dispute with regard to the dates &

events mentioned above.

10. Learned counsel for the petitioners would

submit that the application under Section 4 of the PTCL

 6

Act is unsustainable in the light of the law laid down by

this Court as stated supra in Smt.Shivalingamma’s case.

11. Learned counsel for the respondents would

reiterate the findings rendered by respondent Nos.2 and 3.

12. Though the contentions with regard to the

applicability of the conditions enumerated under Rule 43-

G of the Rules is put forth, learned counsel for the

petitioners would also alternatively contend that the

application is also vitiated by delay and laches and the

action of respondent Nos.2 and 3 is also vitiated on

account of the same being beyond a reasonable period.

13. The learned AGA would submit that the instant

writ petition is covered by the orders passed by this Court

in similar circumstances while disposing of WP

No.30614/2015 DD 4.6.2018. The dates and events are

undisputed. There is no dispute that the land in question

was allotted under Grow More Food Scheme on 31.5.1957

and allottees were in possession and cultivation of the land

even prior to the order of allotment. The allottee, one

 7

Chikkamallaiah alienated the to an extent of 1 acre 20

guntas under a registered sale deed dated 5.5.1966 to the

purchaser one Smt.Channabasamma who is predecessor in

title of the present petitioners. The petitioners are

successors in interest of said Channabasamma and

contend that the provisions of PTCL Act are not attracted.

14. It is submitted that an application was preferred

by the 4th respondent during the year 200-01 before the

third respondent who, by order dated 30.11.2004 rejected

the application preferred under Section 5 of the PTCL Act.

Aggrieved by the same, the 4th respondent preferred an

appeal before the second respondent. The second

respondent by order dated 4.11.2011 was pleased to allow

the appeal and thereby rendered void the sale transaction

of the year 1966 by which, the property came to be

conveyed to the mother of the petitioners.

15. It is contended by the learned counsel for the

petitioners that the proceedings under Section 5 of the

PTCL Act is vitiated by a delay of more that 38 years and

assuming the first sale is of the year 1966, the respondent

 8

nos. 1 to 3 were required to act within a reasonable time.

They geared up into action after the lapse of 34 years.

That, the 4th respondent permitted the legal heirs of

grantee to invoke the provisions of PTCL Act 25 years after

the Act coming into force.

16. This Court in similar circumstances upholding

the contention of delay and laches and the action of the

official respondents entertaining the application beyond

reasonable time has been pleased to dispose of several

petitions in the light of the order dated 04.06.2018

rendered in W.P.No.30614/2015 wherein this Court has

been pleased to hold as follows:

“5. Learned counsel for the petitioner

places reliance on the ruling of the Apex
Court rendered in the case of Nekkanti
Rama Lakshmi Vs. State of Karnataka
and Another reported in 2018(1) Kar.
L.R.5 (SC) wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court
was pleased to hold as hereunder:
“8. However, the question that
arises is with regard to terms of
Section 5 of the Act which enables
any interested person to make an
application for having the transfer
 9

annulled as void under Section 4 of

the Act. This Section does not
prescribe any period within which
such an application can be made.
Neither does it prescribe the period
within which suo motu action may be
taken. This Court in the case of
Chhedi Lal Yadav & Ors. vs. Hari
Kishore Yadav (D) Thr. Lrs. &
Ors., 2017(6) SCALE 459 and also
in the case of Ningappa vs. Dy.
Commissioner & Ors. (C.A.
No.3131 of 2007, decided on
14.07.2011) reiterated a settled
position in law that whether Statute
provided for a period of limitation,
provisions of the Statute must be
invoked within a reasonable time. It
is held that action whether on an
application of the parties, or suo
motu, must be taken within a
reasonable time. That action arose
under the provisions of a similar Act
which provided for restoration of
certain lands to farmers which were
sold for arrears of rent or from which
they were ejected for arrears of land
from 1st January, 1939 to 31st
December, 1950. This relief was
granted to the farmers due to flood in
the Kosi River which make
agricultural operations impossible.
An application for restoration was
made after 24 years and was
allowed. It is in that background that
this Court upheld that it was
unreasonable to do so. We have no
hesitation in upholding that the
present application for restoration of
land made by respondent-Rajappa
was made after an unreasonably
 10

long period and was liable to be

dismissed on that ground.
Accordingly, the judgments of the
Karnataka High Court, namely,
R.Rudrappa vs. Deputy
Commissioner, 2000 (1) Karnataka
Law Journal, 523, Maddurappa vs.
State of Karnataka, 2006 (4)
Karnataka Law Journal, 303 and G
Maregouda vs. The Deputy
Commissioner, Chitradurga
District, Chitradurga and Ors,
2000(2) Kr. L.J.Sh. N.4B holding that
there is no limitation provided by
Section 5 of the Act and, therefore,
an application can be made at any
time, are overruled. Order
accordingly.”

6. By the said ruling, the Hon’ble Apex

Court has settled the law, in respect of
inordinate and gross delay in invoking the
statutory provisions or exercising powers
vested by the statute. After examining the
issue and following its earlier ruling
rendered in the case of Chhedi Lal Yadav &
Ors. vs. Hari Kishore Yadav (D) Thr.Lrs.&
Ors. reported in 2017(6) SCC 459 wherein
it has been reiterated that in respect of a
statute that does not provide for a period of
limitation to exercise the power, then the
statutory provisions must be invoked within
a reasonable time.
 11

7. Learned HCGP would also place on

record the Judgment rendered by this Court
in WP No.6051/2008(SC/ST) C/w.WP
No.1951/2016(SC/ST) disposed of by order
dated 20.2.2018 whereby, a co-ordinate
Bench of this Court, placing reliance on the
ruling of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Nekkanti
Ram Lakshmi’s case referred supra was
pleased to dismiss the writ petitions
preferred by the legal heirs of the original
grantee.

8. In the instant case, the provisions of

Section 5 are invoked after passage of more
than 30 years. And by no stretch of
imagination can it be considered as a
reasonable period. The law in this regard
has been well settled and is squarely
applicable to the facts of the case.

9. The contention on behalf of the

petitioner merits consideration. The counsel
for respondent would submit that the
decision reported in the case cited supra
cannot be looked into in view of the law laid
down by the Apex Court in the case of
Manchegowda vs. State of Karnataka
reported in (1984) 3 SCC 301. That in the
 12

case of Manchegowda, the law is settled by a

Division Bench of three Judges whereas, the
cited ruling is rendered by a Division Bench
of two Judges. This contention requires to be
rejected in the light of the fact that, the
Hon’ble Apex Court was not seized with the
issue regarding delay in invoking the
provisions of the Act while disposing of
Manchegowda’s case. Thus, the Apex Court
has not considered the issue with regard to
unreasonable delay in invoking the
provisions of the statute as the said ruling
came to be rendered in a short span after
coming into force of the enactment.

10. The Hon’ble Apex Court in

Manchegowda’s case referred supra in fact
visualized the present conundrum by
holding that any negligence and delay on the
part of the authorities, entitled to take action
to avoid such transfers through appropriate
legal process for resumption of such grant
may be further impediments in the matter of
avoiding such transfers and resumption of
possession of the granted lands. The relevant
paragraph is extracted hereunder for quick
reference.
 13

“12. In pursuance of this

policy, the Legislature is
undoubtedly competent to pass
an enactment providing that
transfers of such granted lands
will be void and not merely
voidable for properly
safeguarding and protecting the
interests of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes for
whose benefit only these lands
had been granted. Even in the
absence of any such statutory
provisions, the transfer of
granted lands in contravention of
the terms of the grant or in
breach of any law, rule or
regulation covering such grant
will clearly be voidable and the
resumption of such granted
lands after avoiding the voidable
transfers in accordance with law
will be permitted. Avoidance of
such voidable transfers and
resumption of the granted lands
through process of law is bound
to take time. Any negligence and
delay on the part of the
authorities entitled to take action
to avoid such transfers through
appropriate legal process for
resumption of such grant may be
further impediments in the
matter of avoiding such transfers
and resumption of possession of
the granted lands. Prolonged
legal proceedings will
undoubtedly be prejudicial to the
interests of the members of the
Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes for whose
 14

benefit the granted lands are

intended to be resumed. As
transfers of granted lands in
contravention of the terms of the
grant or any law, regulation or
rule governing such grants can
be legally avoided and
possession of such lands can be
recovered through process of
law, it must be held that the
Legislature for the purpose of
avoiding delay and harassment
of protracted litigation and in
furthering its object of speedy
restoration of these granted
lands to the members of the
weaker communities is perfectly
competent to make suitable
provision for resumption of such
granted lands by stipulating in
the enactment that transfers of
such lands in contravention of
the terms of the grant or any
regulation, rule or law regulating
such grant will be void and
providing a suitable procedure
consistent with the principles of
natural justice for achieving this
purpose without recourse to
prolonged litigation in court in
the larger interests of benefiting
the members of the Scheduled
Castes and Scheduled Tribes.”

(underlining by this Court)

11. The Hon’ble Apex Court has been

prophetic in rendering the said ruling by
observing that, in statues where no
 15

limitation is provided, the Authorities and

the State must act consciously and if the
process of invoking the provisions of statute
is delayed and is initiated after a long lapse
of time, the delay by itself would act as an
impediment. The action on the application
filed by the third respondent after more than
30 years cannot by any standards or
parameters be construed as being made
within a reasonable period and hence,
cannot be sustained. Hence, the contention
of the learned counsel for the 3rd respondent
is liable to be rejected.

12. It is relevant to state the principle

enunciated by the Hon’ble Apex Court that
the exercise of power vested in an authority
should be exercised in a reasonable manner
and more importantly even a reasonable
time more so, when time is not stipulated
under the statute is not a principle of recent
origins and the Hon’ble Apex Court way back
in 1983 itself has enunciated the principle in
the case of Mansaram vs. S.P.Pathak and
others reported in 1984(1) SCC 125 where
the issue involved was one of eviction of a
tenant and the Hon’ble Apex Court has held
that where the time limit for taking action for
 16

eviction is not stipulated in the statute, the

eviction after an unreasonable long lapse of
time on the ground of initial occupation of
the premises being unlawful is not
sustainable. In para.12 the Hon’ble Apex
Court has held thus:
“12. What is stated
hereinbefore is sufficient to quash
and set aside the order of the
House Allotment Officer. However,
there is one more aspect of the
matter which we cannot overlook.
The appellant entered the
premises in 1954. There have
been numerous proceedings
between him and the late
Basantrai Sharma who let out the
premises to the appellant but no
one ever raised the question
whether the appellant had
entered the premises in
contravention of clause 22(2). Till
Basantrai Sharma died, no one
raised the controversy about the
entry of the appellant in the
premises as being unauthorised or
in contravention of clause 22.
Basantrai Sharma in his life time
tried to obtain possession of the
premises from the appellant
alleging grounds available to him
under the Rent Control Order
other than unauthorized entry.
This would permit an inference
that Basantrai Sharma accepted
the appellant as his tenant and
his tenancy did not suffer from
any infirmity. After
 17

Basantrai Sharma died, his

successor-in-interest one Smt.
Usha Rani N. Sharma did not
raise any controversy about the
occupation of the premises by the
appellant. One Mr. S.P. Pathak,
a total stranger has come forward
to complain about the
unauthorised entry of the
appellant in the premises. The
unauthorised entry according to
the appellant was in the year
1954. Appellant retired in 1967.
Basantrai Sharma was alive in
1967. If appellant came into the
premises because he was holding
an office of profit, obviously
Basantrai Sharma would not miss
the opportunity to evict the
appellant because he was
otherwise also trying to do the
same thing. Rent was accepted
without question from the
appellant by Basantrai Sharma
till his death and thereafter. Could
he be at this distance of time,
thrown out on the ground that his
initial entry was
unauthorized. To slightly
differently formulate the
proposition, could the initial
unauthorized entry, if there be
any, permit a House Allotment
Officer, 22 years after the entry, to
evict the appellant on the short
ground that he entered the
premises in contravention of
clause 22(2) ? Undoubtedly,
power is conferred on the Collector
to see that the provisions of the
Rent Control Order which
 18

disclosed a public policy are

effectively implemented and
if the Collector therefore, comes
across information that there is a
contravention, he is clothed
with adequate power to set right
the contravention by ejecting
anyone who comes into the
premises in contravention of the
provisions. But when the power is
conferred to effectuate a purpose,
it has to be exercised in a
reasonable manner. Exercise of
power in a reasonable manner
inheres the concept of its exercise
within a reasonable time.
Undoubtedly, no limitation is
prescribed in this behalf but one
would stand aghast that a
landlord to some extent in pari
delicto could turn the tables
against the person who was in
possession for 22 years as a
tenant. In such a situation, even
though the House Allotment
Officer was to reach an
affirmative conclusion that the
initial entry 22 years back was an
unauthorised entry and that
failure to vacate premises till 9
years after retirement was not
proper, yet it was not obligatory
upon him to pass a peremptory
order of eviction in the manner in
which he has done. In such a
situation, it would be open to him
not to evict the appellant. In this
connection, we may refer to
Murlidhar Agarwal v. State of U.P.
wherein one Ram Agyan Singh
who came into possession of
 19

premises without an order of

allotment in his favour as required
by sec. 7(2) of the U.P.
(Temporary) Control of Rent and
Eviction Act, 1947, was permitted
to retain the premises by treating
his occupation lawful and this
court declined to interfere with
that order. No doubt it must be
confessed that sec. 7A conferred
power on the District Magistrate to
take action against unauthorised
occupation in contravention of the
provisions of the U.P. (Temporary)
Control of Rent and Eviction Act,
1947, but there was a proviso to
the section which enabled the
District Magistrate not to evict a
person found to be in
unauthorized occupation, if the
District Magistrate was
satisfied that there has been
undue delay or otherwise it is
inexpedient to do so. There is
no such proviso to clause 28
which confers power on the
Collector to take necessary action
for the purpose of securing
compliance with the Rent Control
Order. But as stated earlier,
where power is conferred to
effectuate a purpose, it has to be
exercised in a reasonable manner
and the reasonable exercise of
power inheres its exercise within
a reasonable time. This is too well
established to need buttressing by
a precedent. However, one is
readily available in State of
Gujarat v. Patel Raghav Natha &
Ors. In that case Commissioner
 20

exercised suo motu revisional

jurisdiction under sec. 211 of the
Bombay Land Revenue Code
which did not prescribe any
period of limitation for exercise of
revisional jurisdiction. The
Commissioner exercised revisional
jurisdiction one year after the
Collector made the order which
was sought to be revised. The
High Court set aside the order of
the Commissioner. In the appeal
by State of Gujarat, this Court
declined to interfere holding inter
alia that the revisional power in
the absence of prescribed period
of limitation must be exercised
within a reasonable time and
period of one year was held to be
too late. This aspect must be
present to the mind of House
Allotment Officer before just
rushing in on an unproved
technical contravention brought to
his notice contrived by the
successor-in-interest of the
deceased landlord, and evicting
the appellant 22 years after his
entry and 9 years after his
retirement on the short ground
that his entry in the year 1954
was in contravention of clause
22(2).”

13. The above decision has been

reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court in its
subsequent judgment in the case of
Santhoshkumar Shivgonda Patil &
others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale
 21

and others reported in (2009) 9 SCC 352

wherein at para.10 referring to the ruling in
the case of State of Punjab vs. Bhatinda
District Co-op Milk Producers Union Ltd.,
held that where the statute does not
prescribe the time limit, same has to be
exercised within a reasonable time be it suo
motu or otherwise. It was pleased to hold
that the reasonable period under the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code could be
three years subject to exceptional
circumstances and categorically held that
the exercise of revisional power after lapse of
17 years can by no stretch of imagination be
construed as being within a reasonable time.
The observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in
para.10,11 and 12 is reproduced below.

‘10. Recently, in the case of

State of Punjab and Others v.
Bhatinda District Coop. Milk
Producers Union Ltd. while dealing
with the power of revision under
Section 21 of the Punjab General
Sales Tax Act, 1948, it has been
held: (SCC p.367, paras 17-19)
"17. A bare reading of Section 21
of the Act would reveal that although
no period of limitation has been
prescribed therefore, the same would
not mean that the suo motu power can
be exercised at any time.
 22

18. It is trite that if no period of

limitation has been prescribed,
statutory authority must exercise its
jurisdiction within a reasonable
period. What, however, shall be the
reasonable period would depend upon
the nature of the statute, rights and
liabilities thereunder and other
relevant factors.
19. Revisional jurisdiction, in our
opinion, should ordinarily be exercised
within a period of three years having
regard to the purport in terms of the
said Act. In any event, the same
should not exceed the period of five
years. The view of the High Court,
thus, cannot be said to be
unreasonable. Reasonable period,
keeping in view the discussions made
hereinbefore, must be found out from
the statutory scheme. As indicated
hereinbefore, maximum period of
limitation provided for in sub-section
(6) of Section 11 of the Act is five
years."

11. It seems to be fairly settled

that if a statute does not prescribed
the time-limit for exercise of revisional
power, it does not mean that such
power can be exercises at any time;
rather it should be exercised within a
reasonable time. It is so because the
law does not expect a settled thing to
be unsettled after a long lapse of time.
Where the legislature does not provide
for any length of time within which the
power of revision is to be exercised by
the authority, suo motu or otherwise, it
is playing that exercise of such power
 23

within reasonable time is inherent

therein.

12. Ordinarily, the reasonable

period within which the power of
revision may be exercised would be 3
years under Section 257 of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code
subject, of course, to the exceptional
circumstances in a given case, but
surely exercise of revisional power
after a lapse of 17 years is not a
reasonable time. Invocation of
revisional power by the Sub-Divisional
Officer under Section 257 of the
Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is
plainly an abuse of process in the
facts and circumstance of the case
assuming that the order of the
Tahsildar passed on 30.03.1976 is
flawd and legally not correct.’

14. Thus, without exception and across

various fields of law, the Apex Court has
categorically stated the law in respect of
exercise of powers/jurisdiction under a
statute where no limitation is stipulated.
Hence, law in this regard is no more res
integra. Apart from the embargo placed by the
Apex Court in exercise of jurisdiction by the
authorities under the statute where no
limitation is specified, the Apex Court has also
settled the law in respect of delay on the part
of litigants in seeking redressal of the
grievances.
 24

15. Law on the point of delay and laches

is well settled by a catena of Judgments be it,
in the matter of land acquisition or in the field
of service law. The Apex Court has been
pleased to hold that unexplained gross delay
would be fatal to the right of the party, to seek
a judicial adjudication of his rights.”

17. The law settled by the Apex Court squarely

applies to the facts of the instant case also. The grant was of

the year 1957 and the alienation was on 05.05.1966. In

effect third party rights came to be created and the parties

were also in settled positions. There is no dispute with

regard to the dates.

18. In this context, gainful reference could be made

to the catena of decisions and the recent decisions in this

regard are:

1) (1996) 6 SCC 445 in the case of

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & OTHERS vs.
D.R.LAKSHMI & OTHERS wherein the
Hon’ble Apex Court has cautioned the
High Courts not to entertain the writ
petitions where there is inordinate delay
while exercising jurisdiction under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
 25

2) Similarly in the case of THE

MUNICIPAL COUNCIL, AHMEDNAGAR &
ANR. Vs. SHAH HYDER BEIG AND ORS.
(2002) 2 SCC 48 wherein it has been
opined that the real test for sound
exercise of discretion by the High Court in
this regard is not the physical running of
time such but the test is whether by
reason of delay, there is such negligence
on the part of the petitioner so as to infer
that he has given up his claim or where
the petitioner has moved the writ Court,
the rights of the third parties have come
into being which should not be allowed to
disturb unless there is reasonable
explanation for the delay.

19. On the ground of gross delay and laches also,

the application by the respondent-grantee under Section

5(2) of the Act requires to be rejected and consequently, the

writ petition requires to be allowed.

20. It is not in dispute that the PTCL Act came into

force with effect from 1.1.1979. Assuming that either the

grantee or his legal representatives were keen on

establishing the right vested in them under the provisions

of Sec.5, they were required to act in a diligent manner. In

the instant case, diligence is woefully lacking. The party

wakes up and gears into action after 38 years and there is

 26

absolutely no ground urged which is worthy of being called

as explanation for the gross and inordinate delay. Hence,

even on this ground, the writ petitions are required to be

allowed.

21. In view of the above discussion, this Court finds

merit in the present writ petitions. Accordingly, the writ

petitions are allowed. Annexure-B dated 4.11.2011 to the

writ petitions is quashed.

In the light of the law and facts involved in the

litigation, there shall be no order as to costs.

Sd/-
JUDGE

Sk/-
CT-HR