SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

BANK OF AMERICA, NA SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff / Appellee 081273
S-114-17
-v- APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.
A-002411-17T1
LOWER COURT CIVIL ACTION NO.
F-015414-14

FAROOQ ALI
Defendant / Appellant
____________________________________/

APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF EVICTION

PENDING OUTCOME OF APPEAL WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Now comes Farooq Ali, et. al., (Hereinafter Petitioners) hereby moves for an

emergency motion for stay of the eviction and writ of possession; stay of the State Court

Action pending the outcome of the appeal and litigation in the US District Court. The

lower court refused to grant the stay and the Court of Appeals similarly denied the stay.

BASIS FOR THE EMERGENCY:

Petitioner’s doctor has advised that if he moves, the stress of the same could cause

his death. Real Property is unique and by virtue of the sequence of events, the only holder

and owner of the subject property is the Appellant. Appellant is literally at risk of losing

his life and his property if the eviction is not stayed.

AUTHORITY FOR GRANTING EMERGENCY STAY

The emergency stay is authorized pursuant to state law which permits the Court to

stay any eviction for six months or within the discretion of the Court based on the medical
necessities of the Plaintiff / Petitioner. Here, the Petitioner has suffered severe cardiac

issues which resulted in a medical procedure and any additional stress could literally prove

to be fatal. Pending the outcome of these proceedings, the court should stay the eviction so

irreparable harm does not occur to the Plaintiff / Petitioner. Relief is further sought on the

basis that the appeal is brought in good faith, has merit, and will likely succeed on appeal.

The Defendant Ali Farooq and Shazia Mehr are requesting an emergency stay of

any writ given Ali Farooq’s severe medical condition. Ali Farooq is suffering with a

serious heart and medical condition. He is in no physical condition to relocate his family

if he is disposed of their homestead home before the wrongful foreclosure can be undone.

GOOD CAUSE EXISTS FOR THE APPEAL AND THE LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON

THE MERITS OF THE APPEAL IS GREAT.

A. BACKGROUND FACTS AND SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The background facts of this case are very simple.

Plaintiff ’s home was foreclosed upon by Bank of America. Prior to the foreclosure

being instigated, the property was sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC by the

county tax assessor for unpaid property taxes. Bank of America admits that a tax deed has

priority over the recorded mortgage. The tax deed specifically states that “I Judith

Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th day of December, 2013 at a public sale of lands for

delinquent liens, pursuant to the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, Title 54, Chapter

5, and the amendments and supplements thereto, I sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A,

LLC… the land and known as 36-38 Washington Avenue…”

The Bank of America foreclosure was not instigated until AFTER the sale and US

BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC was NOT named in the foreclosure action by Bank of

America. Clearly, they were a necessary party to the action who Bank of America chose
NOT to sue and further did not disclose their existence to the foreclosure court.

AFTER the foreclosure judgment was final, Ali Farooq repaid the taxes paid by US

BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC, redeemed the property and then he obtained a quitclaim

deed (EXHIBIT 3 – QUITCLAIM DEED) from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC.

B. THE UNDERLYING FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT IS VOID.

This underlying foreclosure judgment is VOID as Bank of America, the plaintiff in

this case, FAILED TO SERVE THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC, WHO ACQUIRED THE title BEFORE the foreclosure was ever filed and

CONVENIENTLY CONCEALED THAT INFORMATION FROM the trial court,

REFUSING TO EVEN PUT THE TAX DEED IN ITS LIST OF EXHIBITS IN THEIR

MOTION TO DISMISS, PERPETRATING YET ANOTHER FRAUD, THIS TIME, ON

THIS COURT. Bascom Corp. v. CHASE MANHATTEN BANK, 832 A. 2d 956 - NJ:

Appellate Div. 2003. (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE MANHATTAN)

C. THE DOCUMENTS USED TO FORECLOSE UPON WERE FORGERIES

What’s worse, is that the note and mortgage upon which the wrongful foreclosure

was based is a forged document. The signatures do not even belong to the Appellant. The

Appellant has started an investigation

CONCLUSION

WHEREFORE, Defendant Ali Farooq and his spouse, Shazia Mehr, respectfully pray

that the court vacate the existing writ, and stay the issuance of any new writ of possession

until such time as the Court of Appeals rules on the appeal currently being prepared by

the Defendant Ali Farooq on the above-cited grounds in Appellate Docket Number A-

002411-17T1.
Dated: _________

Respectfully submitted:

______________________
Farooq Ali All Rights Reserved

_______________________
Shazia Mehr All rights Reserved
36-38 Washington Ave.
North Plainfield, NJ 07060
DEFENDANT / APPELLANT PRO SE
TEL: 917 584-7173
EMAIL: KFAALI@GMAIL.COM
 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

BANK OF AMERICA, NA SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff / Appellee 081273
S-114-17
-v- APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.
A-002411-17T1
LOWER COURT CIVIL ACTION NO.
F-015414-14

FAROOQ ALI
Defendant / Appellant
____________________________________/

BRIEF AND MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF

MOTION FOR EMERGENCY STAY OF WRIT PENDING THE OUTCOME OF THE

APPEAL.

INTRODUCTION

The Defendant Ali Farooq and Shazia Mehr are requesting an emergency stay of any

writ given Ali Farooq’s severe medical condition. Ali Farooq is suffering with a serious

heart and medical condition. He is in no physical condition to relocate his family if he is

disposed of their homestead home before the wrongful foreclosure can be undone. The case

is very simple. Bank of America had no interest that they could convey because the

property was sold at tax sale prior to the foreclosure action even being filed. As a result,

Bank of America did not name a necessary party and Bank of America had no standing to

foreclose. The property had already been sold at a tax sale. Since that time, the property

which was sold by tax sale to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC, was REDEEMED by

the Defendant Ali Farooq and Defendant Ali Farooq has in his possession a quitclaim deed

from (EXHIBIT 3 – QUITCLAIM DEED) the prior purchasers, re-conveying the property

back from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC.

 The language on the tax deed is indisputable. It is readily apparent from the attached

Bascom case (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE MANHATTAN) and the

two documents (the tax deed which says, “I Judith Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th day

of December, 2013 at a public sale of lands for delinquent liens, pursuant to the Revised

Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, Title 54, Chapter 5, and the amendments and supplements

thereto, I sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC… the land and known as 36-38

Washington Avenue… This is a tax deed, not some sale of a right to collect, but the land. I

do not want to die and I do not want to lose my property. I am begging the court to stay

the status quo until the outcome of this case.

Said quitclaim deed (EXHIBIT 3 – QUITCLAIM DEED) was executed and recorded

AFTER the wrongful foreclosure judgment, cutting off any right that Bank of America had

to foreclose.

This underlying foreclosure judgment is VOID as Bank of America, the plaintiff in this

case, FAILED TO SERVE THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC, WHO ACQUIRED THE title BEFORE the foreclosure was ever filed and

CONVENIENTLY CONCEALS THAT INFORMATION FROM THIS COURT, REFUSING

TO EVEN PUT THE TAX DEED IN ITS LIST OF EXHIBITS IN THEIR MOTION TO

DISMISS, PERPETRATING YET ANOTHER FRAUD, THIS TIME, ON THIS COURT.

STANDARD ON GROUNDS FOR EMERGENCY STAY OF WRIT

A. The Court Has The Discretionary Authority To Vacate A Void Judgment.

Under State law, a trial judge, guided by principles of equity, has the sound

discretion to grant a motion to vacate a judgment. Housing Auth. of Town of Morristown v.

Little, 135 N.J. 274, 283 (1994). A final judgment can be set aside if it was void or has been
discharged. R. 4:50-1(d) and (e). A motion seeking relief under Rule 4:50-1(d) or (e) gener-

ally must be filed "within a reasonable time." R. 4:50-2. The fundamental proposition is

both of long standing and easily stated: "the judgment of a tribunal lacking jurisdiction to

enter such judgment is utterly void." Id. at 153, 1 A.2d 445. The court had no jurisdiction

over a necessary party, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A.

B. The Foreclosure Judgment Is Void Ab Initio For Failure To Join A Necessary

Party; Bank Of America Had No Standing To Sue; The Mortgage Documents Were

Forgeries; Bank Of America Concealed From The Court The Tax Deed; And Appel-

lant Re-Acquired Title From US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC After The Fore-

closure Judgment, Leaving The Appellants As The True Owners Of The Property

Free And Clear Of Any Liens.

BANK OF AMERICA concealed from the State Court the tax deed and did not name

US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A in the action. (“[T]he failure to provide anywhere for ade-

quate notice was a jurisdictional defect which made the lower court's judgment in that case

void. See Driscoll v. Burlington-Bristol Bridge Co., 8 N.J. 433, 492-93 (1952).” That tax

deed made the entire foreclosure action void ab initio. The controlling case in this matter

is Bascom Corp. v. CHASE MANHATTEN BANK, 832 A. 2d 956 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2003.

There, the court held that the tax deed took priority over the foreclosure judgment, and the

foreclosure judgment was void. The Tax deed that was issued is an exhibit attached hereto

and incorporated herein as Exhibit 4. (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE

MANHATTAN) That tax deed and US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC, however, is MISS-

ING FROM THE FORECLOSURE CASE. That, in order to perpetrate the fraud fully, not

only did Bank of America conceal from the lower court the tax deed that was issued prior
to recording the lis pendens, Bank of America used a series of fraudulently executed as-

signments in order to fabricate standing to sue. The only thing they could not do was fix

the tax deed, so they simply did not disclose it either to this court or the lower court.

The procedures that govern tax foreclosure are set down in the Tax Sale Law,

N.J.S.A. 54:5-1 et seq. “Also, we conclude the request to eliminate the judgment from the

public records is not subject to the reasonable-time requisites of Rule 4:50-2, because the

defect in the judgment's entry is non-waivable.” Bascom Corp., supra, 363 N.J. Super. at

342-43. NATIONAL COMMUNITY BANK OF NEW JERSEY v. VALOR FOODS, INC. ,

NJ: Appellate Div. 2009 (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE MANHAT-

TAN)

POINT TWO

DEFENDANT ALI FAROOQ HAS SOUGHT AND OBTAINED FROM US BANK

SUPERIOR TITLE TO THAT OF THE APPELLEE AND THUS THE STAY SHOULD

BE GRANTED.

The simple fact is, that after the foreclosure judgment, Plaintiff purchased the

property back from the real party in interest, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC and

received his quit claim deed from the non-party, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC. It

is readily apparent from the attached Bascom case (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM

CORPORATION v CHASE MANHATTAN) and the two documents (the tax deed which

says, “I Judith Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th day of December, 2013 at a public sale

of lands for delinquent liens, pursuant to the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, Title

54, Chapter 5, and the amendments and supplements thereto, I sold to US BANK CUST /

TLCF 2012A, LLC… the land and known as 36-38 Washington Avenue… This is a tax deed,

not some sale of a right to collect, but the land and the reconveyance back to the Plaintiff,
that he has a very real chance of success on this appeal.

The power of our courts at the instance of a party to open a final judgment in a civil

action upon good cause shown has long been settled beyond controversy. Assets

Development Co. v. Wall, 97 N.J.L. 468 (E. & A. 1922). Rule 3:60-2 merely declares the

previously existing law in that regard. It reads:

"On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his

legal representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons:

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence

which would probably alter the judgment, order or proceeding and which by due diligence

could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 3:59-2; (3) fraud

(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other

misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment or order is void; (5) the judgment or order

has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment or order upon which it is

based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment

or order should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from

the operation of the judgment or order. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time,

and for reasons (1), (2) and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order or

proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under Rule 3:60-2 does not suspend the

operation of any judgment, order or proceeding or affect the finality of a final judgment.

This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve

a party from a judgment, order or proceeding; nor does it limit the court's power to set aside

a judgment, order or proceeding for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram vobis,

audita querela, venire facias de novo, motions to award a repleader, to arrest a judgment

or, to give judgment notwithstanding a verdict, bills of review, bills in the nature of a bill
of review and petitions for rehearing are superseded, and the procedure for obtaining a

new trial or any relief from a judgment or order shall be by motion as prescribed in these

rules or, where such relief is sought, by an independent action."

The rule simplifies the procedure and permits the exercise of the power to open a

final judgment, for the reasons specified in subdivisions (1), (2) and (3), upon motion made

within a reasonable time not more than one year after the entry of the final judgment [see,

however, as to this time limit, Klapprott v. U.S., 335 U.S. 601, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 266

(1949), remand modified in 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 384, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949), and Wilford

v. Sigmund Eisner Company, 13 N.J. Super. 27 (App. Div. 1951)], and, for the reasons

specified in subdivisions (4), (5) and (6) and for fraud upon the court, without limitation as

to time. The proceeding by motion in the cause, although not limiting the power of the court

to entertain an independent action in a proper case, supersedes the largely obsolete

ancillary common law and equitable procedures listed in the rule and is declaratory of the

long standing policy of our law to require that relief from a final judgment of a court of this

State be sought in the action in which the judgment was rendered when that remedy is

adequate. Kearns v. Kearns, 70 N.J. Eq. 483 (Ch. 1905). The motion procedure applies to

relief sought upon the ground of fraud upon the court, differing from the requirement under

the comparable amended Federal Rule 60(b) that relief on that ground must be the subject

of an independent action. Tentative Draft, Rules Governing all of the Courts of New Jersey,

Comment on fourth sentence of Rule 3:60-2, p. 224.

However, relief for any reason allowed by Rule 3:60-2 rests in the sound discretion

of the trial court, controlled by established principles. Equitable principles are the guide in

administering relief to determine whether in the particular circumstances justice and

equity require that relief be granted or denied. La Bell v. Quasdorf, 116 N.J.L. 368 (Sup.
Ct. 1936).

The Bank of America s stating that they had standing to bring this action and that

“no other interested party existed”. They specifically knew this statement to be false,

because the US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC tax Deed specifically stated the contrary

and it was recorded in the official records at the time. Bank of America knew that if they

disclosed this deed to the Court, they would not be entitled to proceed with the foreclosure

for want of standing.

The true facts were, that they did not have standing to sue and lost it when US

BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC bought the property at the tax sale. The Extrinsic fraud

is the concealment by the Bank of America of the existence of the tax deed. They did not

name a real party in interest. They did not file suit prior to the tax sale. No one notified

the Plaintiff herein of the existence of the tax sale and he did not receive actual notice from

the city.

That, not being enough, Bank of America wanted to be sure of success in the

foreclosure action, so they used a forged note and mortgage as evidence. They had no

standing to sue and they used forged documents in their litigation.

POINT THREE

ADDITIONAL AUTHORITY TO VACATE THE JUDGMENT EXISTS UNDER

THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES SET FORTH IN RULE 4:50(1)(e)

This court also has authority to grant the relief sought under subsection (e) on the

grounds it is no longer equitable to enforce the foreclosure judgment. The change in

circumstances since the entry of the foreclosure judgment was the grant of the quit claim

deed from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC to appellant.

 A motion to vacate a judgment pursuant to subsection (e) "on the ground that
it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion must be supported by evidence of changed circumstances." Id. at 285, 639
A.2d 286 (emphasis added). The moving party "bears the burden of proving
that events have occurred subsequent to the entry of a judgment that, absent
the relief requested, will result in `extreme' and `unexpected' hardship.'" Ibid.
That requirement is necessary to outweigh the courts' interest in the "finality
of judgments." Id. at 286, 639 A.2d 286.

In applying subsection (f) we have stated that "[t]he very essence of (f) is its
capacity for relief in exceptional situations. And in such exceptional cases its
boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." Ibid.
(quoting Court Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341, 225 A.2d 352 (1966)); see
also Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson County Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 122,
376 A.2d 1194 (1977)(stating that courts have authority under subsection (f)
to grant relief where it is "necessary to achieve a fair and just result"). Similar
to subsection (e), because of the importance in the finality of judgments, relief
under subsection (f) is available only when "truly exceptional circumstances
are present." Housing Auth., supra, 135 N.J. at 286, 639 A.2d 286 (citing Bau-
mann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395, 471 A.2d 395 (1984))(emphasis added).
Regardless of the basis, vacation of a judgment under Rule 4:50-1 should be
granted sparingly. Pressler, Current N.J. Court Rules, comment 1.1 on R.
4:50-1 (2001).

In re Guardianship of JNH, 799 A. 2d 518 - NJ: Supreme Court 2002

It is clearly no longer equitable to enforce the foreclosure judgment against the Appellant. The

Appellant re-acquired his interest to the property from the only entity that had ownership. It was US

BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC. The Quitclaim Deed from US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC to Appellant makes it inequitable to enforce the foreclosure judgment because

US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC was not a party to the foreclosure.

POINT FOUR

APPELLANT SHOULD SUCCEED ON APPEAL

A. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS:

Here, the documentary evidence speaks for itself. The sale to US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC via a tax deed transpired PRIOR to the foreclosure followed with a

conveyance from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC to the Appellant. The Case law
 clearly shows that the foreclosure is VOID since it transpired AFTER the tax sale. The

coup de gras, however, is the reconveyance from US Bank of the Tax Deed BACK to the

Appellant via quit claim deed AFTER the foreclosure. As a result, the ONLY PERSON

WHO OWNS THAT PROPERTY IS APPELLANT.

B. IRREPARABLE HARM DURING STAY:

Any failure to stay the state court action could result in the untimely DEATH OF THE

APPELLANT, and thus the harm would be IRREPARABLE. Furthermore, property is

unique. The land being stolen from the Appellant is in his name and conveyed to him by

US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC AFTER the foreclosure case was concluded. His

interest is therefore two fold. First, the interest from his deed; the second arises after

the foreclosure judgment by means of a quit claim deed from the purchaser at the tax

sale, US Bank.

C. ISSUANCE OF THE STAY WILL NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT.

If this court stays any further state court proceedings pending the outcome of this

action, the Defendant will not be harmed. The Defendant’s interest is tenuous at

best. The Defendant is a huge bank with billions if not trillions in assets

compared to the Appellant, who has suffered tremendously by the wrongful

conduct of the Defendant. Furthermore, the issue is so clear, that the stay will

not have to be very long, as it is Appellant’s intention to move for summary

judgment as soon as the Defendant files its answer.

D. THE PUBLIC INTEREST LIES IN ENFORCING THE LAWS REGARDING THE SALE

AND ENFORCEABILITY OF TAX DEEDS.

The tax deed, on its face, says that title was acquired by US Bank. This is not title of a

right to repayment of tax, but TITLE TO THE PROPERTY. That title was then conveyed
 to the Appellant. The Tax deed had priority over the interest in the mortgage lender, and

that tax deed was then reconveyed to the Appellant, who now is the sole owner of the

property. It is in the public interest to protect the homeowner from the wrongful

foreclosure of a tax deed without notice to the real party in interest (US Bank).

Furthermore, the Bascom Corporation case (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v

CHASE MANHATTAN) not only stands for the proposition that the foreclosure

judgment was superseded by the tax sale, making the foreclosure judgment void, but

also, “Tax foreclosure law, affecting as it does, the security of title to real estate involves

"an essential state interest" and "the power to ensure that security `inheres in the very

nature of [state] government.'" BFP v. Resolution Trust, 511 U.S. 531, 544, 114 S.Ct.

1757, 1764-1765, 128 L.Ed.2d 556, 558 (1994). The Court, therefore, has an interest in

staying the eviction action.

POINT FIVE

STATE LAW PERMITS A STAY

A stay is authorized under New Jersey Law. “A:18-59.1. Terminally ill tenants

Notwithstanding the provisions of any other law to the contrary, the Superior Court may

authorize and review one year stays of eviction during which the tenant shall be

entitled to renew the lease at its term of expiration, subject to reasonable changes

proposed to the tenant by the landlord in written notice, whenever:

a. The tenant fulfills all the terms of the lease and removal is sought under subsection

a. of N.J.S.2A:18-53 where a residential tenant holds over after written notice for

delivery of possession; and

b. The tenant has a terminal illness which illness has been certified by a licensed

physician; and

c. There is substantial likelihood that the tenant would be unable to search for,
 rent and move to a comparable alternative rental dwelling unit without serious

medical harm; and

d. The tenant has been a tenant of the landlord for a least two years prior to the

issuance of the stay.

In reviewing a petition for a stay of eviction, the court shall specifically

consider whether the granting of the stay of eviction would cause an undue

hardship to the landlord because of the landlord's financial condition or any other

factor relating to the landlord's ownership of the premises. HERE, there would be

NO HARDSHIP on the Appellee because there is ample equity in the property.

Furthermore, the Appellant is the owner of the subject property, not the Appellee.

The Appellant has a quit claim deed from the entity that acquired the title prior to

the foreclosure, and the Appellees’ own pleadings prove that the tax sale has priority

over any forged (or even real) mortgage belonging to the Appellee. The tax sale

occurred prior to the foreclosure. The tax DEED specifically states in unequivocal

terms that TITLE TO THE PROPERTY TRANSFERRED. Thereafter, the

foreclosure took place and the Appellee did not disclose the TAX SALE which had

already transpired. The Appellee has no interest to protect. Nonetheless, if the

Court requires a bond, the Appellant would be willing to deposit into the court

registry a fair bond amount on a monthly basis for the stay.

CONCLUSION

I do not want to die and I do not want to lose my property or even the equity in my

property. I am begging the court to stay the status quo until the outcome of this case. It is

readily apparent from the attached Bascom case (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION

v CHASE MANHATTAN) and the two documents (the tax deed which says, “I Judith
Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th day of December, 2013 at a public sale of lands for

delinquent liens, pursuant to the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, Title 54, Chapter

5, and the amendments and supplements thereto, I sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A,

LLC… the land and known as 36-38 Washington Avenue…

This is a tax deed, not some sale of a right to collect, but the land. After US BANK

CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC acquired my land, I bought it back from them and received a

quit claim deed. In between that time, the Defendant filed a foreclosure, and they did not

name US Bank, and acquired no interest from them.

Irreparable harm will occur on two fronts if a stay is not issued against the Appellee

seeking to evict the Appellant from his property. First, the Appellant could likely DIE, all

in the pursuit of saving his own property. Secondly, the property, which is unique, could be

lost. Both can be easily avoided by a short stay pending the outcome of this litigation;

saved by this Court vacating a fraudulent or inequitable foreclosure judgment. In the

pending Federal Court action, the Appellee herein is asking for a delay to answer the

complaint, while pressing to evict the Appellant (apparently hoping he will die from the

loss of his property).

The Court should issue an order against the Appellee, ordering them to stay any

further attempts to evict the Appellant pending the outcome of these proceedings; further

order them to answer the complaint forthwith so the Appellant may proceed with a motion

for summary judgment in that action; this Court should vacate the void foreclosure

judgment on the grounds that the real party in interest, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A,

LLC was not named in the foreclosure action; and deem the judgment void ab initio. This

matter is literally a matter of life and death. Please help.

Dated: ___________
Respectfully submitted,

______________________
Farooq Ali All Rights Reserved

_______________________
Shazia Mehr All rights Reserved
36-38 Washington Ave.
North Plainfield, NJ 07060
DEFENDANT / APPELLANT PRO SE
TEL: 917 584-7173
EMAIL: KFAALI@GMAIL.COM
 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

BANK OF AMERICA, NA SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff / Appellee 081273
S-114-17
-v- APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.
A-002411-17T1
LOWER COURT CIVIL ACTION NO.
F-015414-14

FAROOQ ALI
Defendant / Appellant
____________________________________/

AFFIRMATION OF FAROOQ ALI IN SUPPORT OF HIS EMERGENCY MOTION FOR

STAY OF EVICTION PENDING OUTCOME OF THIS LITIGATION WITH
INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

Farooq Ali, et. al., (Hereinafter Petitioners), if called to testify, could competently

do so from his personal knowledge to the following facts:

1. I hereby move for a stay of the eviction of the State Court Action pending the outcome

of this litigation; this Court should issue an order against the Appellee, ordering

them to stay any further attempts to evict the Appellant pending the outcome of

these proceedings; further order them to answer the complaint forthwith so the

Appellant may proceed with a motion for summary judgment in that action; this

Court should vacate the void foreclosure judgment on the grounds that the real party

in interest, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC was not named in the foreclosure

action; and deem the judgment void ab initio.

2. This matter is literally a matter of life and death. Please help.

3. I went to the State Courthouse and personally looked at the note and mortgage that

Bank of America submitted in the foreclosure action.

4. They were forgeries, and I have never had the opportunity to see them as they were
 filed and I was not given the opportunity to inspect them prior to the entry of the

foreclosure judgment.

5. The emergency stay is authorized pursuant to state law which permits the Court to

stay any eviction for six months or within the discretion of the Court based on the

medical necessities of the Plaintiff / Petitioner.

6. The stay also is within the power of this Court.

7. Here, the Petitioner has suffered severe cardiac issues which resulted in a medical

procedure and any additional stress could literally prove to be fatal to me.

8. If I am removed from my home I could literally die.

9. Pending the outcome of these proceedings, the court should stay the eviction so

irreparable harm does not occur to me.

10. Real property is also unique and the loss of it will cause irreparable harm.

11. I reviewed the docket and recorded documents in the state court and county records

and attached copies of the relevant tax deed.

12. I also attached a true and correct copy of the quitclaim deed (EXHIBIT 3 –

QUITCLAIM DEED) I received from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC conveying

the property back to me after the foreclosure judgment.

13. US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC acquired title to the property via the tax deed,

as evidenced on the face of the document itself I have attached.

14. Because I acquired the title back from them, US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC

and I were the only entities in the chain of ownership.

15. I request that pending the outcome of this case (after Bank of America answers, I

intend to file a motion for summary judgment based on the face of the exhibits, or in

the alternative, summary adjudication) that this Court order Bank of America not
 to proceed.

16. It is clearly no longer equitable to enforce the foreclosure judgment against the

Appellant. The Appellant re-acquired his interest to the property from the only

entity that had ownership. It was US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC. The

Quitclaim Deed from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC to Appellant makes it

inequitable to enforce the foreclosure judgment because US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC was not a party to the foreclosure.

17. I do not want to die and I do not want to lose my property.

18. The background facts of this case are very simple.

19. Plaintiff ’s home was foreclosed upon by Bank of America. Prior to the foreclosure

being instigated, the property was sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC by

the county tax assessor for unpaid property taxes.

20. Bank of America admits that a tax deed has priority over the recorded mortgage.

21. The tax deed specifically states that “I Judith Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th

day of December, 2013 at a public sale of lands for delinquent liens, pursuant to the

Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937, Title 54, Chapter 5, and the amendments and

supplements thereto, I sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC… the land and

known as 36-38 Washington Avenue…”

22. The Bank of America foreclosure was not instigated until AFTER the sale and US

BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC was NOT named in the foreclosure action by Bank

of America.

23. Clearly, they were a necessary party to the action who Bank of America chose NOT

to sue and further did not disclose their existence to the foreclosure court.

24. AFTER the foreclosure judgment was final, Ali Farooq repaid the taxes paid by US
 BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC, redeemed the property and then he obtained a

quitclaim deed (EXHIBIT 3 – QUITCLAIM DEED) from US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC.

25. THE UNDERLYING FORECLOSURE JUDGMENT IS VOID.

26. This underlying foreclosure judgment is VOID as Bank of America, the plaintiff in

this case, FAILED TO SERVE THE REAL PARTY IN INTEREST, US BANK CUST

/ TLCF 2012A, LLC, WHO ACQUIRED THE title BEFORE the foreclosure was ever

filed and CONVENIENTLY CONCEALED THAT INFORMATION FROM the trial

court, REFUSING TO EVEN PUT THE TAX DEED IN ITS LIST OF EXHIBITS IN

THEIR MOTION TO DISMISS, PERPETRATING YET ANOTHER FRAUD, THIS

TIME, ON THIS COURT. Bascom Corp. v. CHASE MANHATTEN BANK, 832 A. 2d

956 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2003. (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE

MANHATTAN)

27. THE DOCUMENTS USED TO FORECLOSE UPON WERE FORGERIES

28. What’s worse, is that the note and mortgage upon which the wrongful foreclosure

was based is a forged document.

29. The signatures do not even belong to the Appellant.

30. The Appellant has started an investigation

31. I am begging the court to stay the status quo until the outcome of this case.

32. It is readily apparent from the attached Bascom case (EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM

CORPORATION v CHASE MANHATTAN) and the two documents (the tax deed

which says, “I Judith Vassallo…, do certify that on the 4th day of December, 2013 at

a public sale of lands for delinquent liens, pursuant to the Revised Statutes of New

Jersey, 1937, Title 54, Chapter 5, and the amendments and supplements thereto, I
 sold to US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC… the land and known as 36-38

Washington Avenue…

33. This is a tax deed, not some sale of a right to collect, but the land.

34. After US Bank acquired my land, I bought it back from US BANK CUST / TLCF

2012A, LLC and received a quit claim deed.

35. In between that time, the Defendant filed a foreclosure, and they did not name US

Bank, and acquired no interest from them.

36. That there is ample equity in the property that a bond should not be required as the

property itself is worth more than that amount claimed, AND, according to the quit

claim deed from US BANK CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC, the prior purchaser, the

Defendant has no interest in the property that should be bonded.

37. That unless restrained the FAROOQ ALI & SHAZIA MEHR, Pro Se will suffer

irreparable harm because property is unique and cannot be valued.

38. A stay would be the best remedy in this situation until the appeal can fully be heard.

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY THAT THE FOREGOING IS TRUE AND

CORRECT AND THIS WAS EECUTED ON THE DATE SET FORTH BELOW

DATED: ________

Respectfully submitted,
______________________
Farooq Ali All Rights Reserved
_______________________
Shazia Mehr All rights Reserved
36-38 Washington Ave.
North Plainfield, NJ 07060
 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

BANK OF AMERICA, NA SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff / Appellee 081273
S-114-17
-v- APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.
A-002411-17T1
LOWER COURT CIVIL ACTION NO.
F-015414-14

FAROOQ ALI
Defendant / Appellant
____________________________________/

EXHIBITS IN SUPPORT OF APPELLANTS EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF

EVICTION / WRIT PENDING OUTCOME OF THIS LITIGATION WITH
INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

EXHIBIT 1 - DOCTOR’S AFFIRMATION

EXHIBIT 2 - TAX DEED
EXHIBIT 3 - QUITCLAIM DEED
EXHIBIT 4 -BASCOM CORPORATION v CHASE MANHATTAN
EXHIBIT 5 – DISPOSITION ON APPLICATION FOR EMERGENT MOTION
EXHIBIT 6 – SINGLE JUSTICE DISPOSITION
EXHIBIT 7 – WRIT
EXHIBIT 8 – CERTIFICATION IN SUPPORT OF WRIT
EXHIBIT 9 – CFPB COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 10 – ORDER ON EMERGENT APPLICATION
EXHIBIT 1 – DOCTOR’S AFFIRMATION
EXHIBIT 2 – CERTIFICATE OF SALE FOR UNPAID MUNICIPAL LIENS – BOOK
5700, PAGE 694-696, RECORDED FEBRUARY 10TH, 2014
EXHIBIT 3 – QUITCLAIM DEED
EXHIBIT 4 – BASCOM V. CHASE MANHATTAN BANK
Bascom Corp. v. CHASE MANHETTAN BANK, 832 A. 2d 956 - NJ: Appellate Div. 2003

832 A.2d 956 (2003)

363 N.J. Super. 334

BASCOM CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.
CHASE MANHATTAN BANK, as Trustee of IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-5 under
the Pooling and Servicing Agreement dated as of September 1, 1997, Defendant-Appel-
lant, and
Fannie Askew, Mr. Askew, husband of Fannie Askew, and Delta Funding Corporation,
Defendants.
Chase Manhattan Bank, As Trustee, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Fannie Askew, Defendant-Respondent.

Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

Submitted September 23, 2003.

Decided October 14, 2003.

Stern, Lavinthal, Frankenberg & Norgaard, Livingston, attorneys for appellant Chase
Manhattan Bank (Robert A. Pinel, of counsel and on the brief).

Robert A. Del Vecchio, attorney for respondent Bascom Corporation (Susan B. Fagan-
Limpert, of counsel and on the brief).

Before Judges PRESSLER, CIANCIA and COLEMAN.

The opinion of the court was delivered by PRESSLER, P.J.A.D.

These appeals, which arise out of the same series of transactions and which we consolidate
for purposes of this opinion, have their genesis in a mortgage foreclosure proceeding
brought by Chase Manhattan Bank (Chase) to foreclose the mortgage it had granted Fan-
nie Askew on property owned by her in Paterson and in a tax foreclosure proceeding
brought by Bascom Corporation to foreclose a tax sale certificate it held on the same prop-
erty. The appeal under Docket No. A-2485-02T5 arises out of the tax foreclosure proceed-
ing. Chase, a defendant in that action, appeals from an order of the Chancery Division
denying its motion pursuant to R. 4:50-1 whereby it sought to have the tax foreclosure
judgment set aside on the ground of voidness by reason of asserted violation of the bank-
ruptcy automatic stay. The appeal under Docket No. A-3332-02T5 arises out of the mort-
gage foreclosure proceeding. Chase, the plaintiff in that action, appeals from an order of
the Chancery Division entered on Askew's motion enjoining it from proceeding to sheriff's
sale of the property because its interest therein had already been foreclosed. We affirm
both orders appealed from.
The complaint in the tax foreclosure action was filed in May 2001 after Askew's failure to
respond to Bascom's pre-action notice served and filed in compliance with N.J.S.A. 54:5-
97. Chase was joined as the first mortgagee.[1] Both Chase and Askew were properly served.
Neither answered, and the action proceeded entirely uncontested. Bascom obtained an or-
der entered on September 4, 2001, duly served upon both Askew and Chase, fixing the
amount, time and place of redemption. See N.J.S.A. 54:5-98. Neither responded or made
any attempt to redeem. The final judgment foreclosing Askew and Chase from all right and
equity of redemption and vesting title in fee simple in Bascom was entered on October 24,
2001. Thereafter the property was sold to Bascom at a sheriff's sale. It appears that at least
as of the date of the entry of the orders under appeal Bascom had not yet resold the prop-
erty.

We turn now to the mortgage foreclosure action. Chase commenced its foreclosure action
in June 2000. Final judgment of foreclosure was entered in December 2000. Chase did not
immediately proceed to sheriff's sale because of Askew's intervening petition in bank-
ruptcy. In the meantime, Bascom, in February 2001, purchased from the City of Paterson
the tax sale certificate which was the subject of its foreclosure action. It further appears
that in preparation for its mortgage foreclosure sale, Chase had ordered a title search and
that its searcher missed Bascom's purchase of the tax sale certificate. Accordingly Chase's
title company issued an indemnification to Chase in May 2001 which made no reference to
it. Chase made no attempt to enforce its foreclosure judgment against Askew until October
2002, a year after Bascom's final judgment of foreclosure. A sheriff's sale was held on Oc-
tober 22, 2002, at which Chase was the highest bidder.

The proceedings now under review followed. Askew filed a pro se motion in the mortgage
foreclosure action seeking to set aside Chase's sheriff's sale on the ground that the property
had already been sold. Chase then filed a motion in the tax foreclosure action seeking to
set aside the tax foreclosure judgment under R. 4:50-1. The two motions were heard to-
gether by the Chancery Division, which granted Askew's and denied Chase's. We point out
that if Chase's motion was properly denied, 959*959 then patently Askew's motion was
properly granted since the tax foreclosure judgment foreclosed Chase's interest in the prop-
erty and its effect, as the Chancery judge concluded, was to require vacation of the mort-
gage foreclosure judgment.

The issue thus before us is whether the Chancery Division properly denied relief to Chase
pursuant to R. 4:50-1. The basis of Chase's assertion of a right to relief is its claim that the
tax foreclosure judgment was void because the order setting the amount, time and place of
redemption had been entered during the period of a bankruptcy court automatic stay. 11
U.S.C.A. § 362(a). It is, indeed, undisputed that Askew's response to the tax foreclosure
proceeding was the filing for protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code on July
16, 2001, a month after she was served with the tax foreclosure complaint. Although she
noticed Chase, she did not notice Bascom who remained unaware of the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. In any event, the automatic stay was in effect from that filing date until Askew's
petition was dismissed on October 6, 2001, two days after entry of the order fixing the terms
of redemption. Askew had, in fact, filed two subsequent petitions in bankruptcy, one on
November 19, 2001, which was dismissed on January 11, 2002, and the next on March 25,
2002, which was dismissed on October 31, 2002. As noted, however, the final judgment of
tax foreclosure was entered on October 24, 2001, after dismissal of the first petition and
prior to filing of the second. There was consequently no impediment in terms of the auto-
matic stay to the entry of a valid final judgment of foreclosure.

Chase argues that because the order fixing the terms of redemption violated the automatic
stay, the final judgment was void, entitling it to relief pursuant to R. 4:50-1(d), which au-
thorizes the court to grant relief from a void judgment. In addressing Chase's argument,
the court was of the view that it did not need to consider the effect of a violation, if any, of
the bankruptcy automatic stay but rather that Chase should seek any remedy to which it
might be entitled by reason thereof in the bankruptcy court.[2] Rather, the court viewed the
matter before it as implicating questions of state law only and concluded that Chase was
not entitled to relief under the court rule because of its failure to seek relief within a rea-
sonable time. The court stated its reasons for so concluding as follows:

4:50-1 and 2 permits a motion to be filed for relief from a judgment but that motion has to
be filed within a reasonable time. I find that this motion was not filed within a reasonable
period of time. It was filed by a party that was properly served with the complaint, that
defaulted, that did absolutely nothing to defend itself and did absolutely nothing to bring
to Bascom's attention the pendency of any bankruptcy action and did not file this motion
until more than a year had passed after Bascom received its final judgment in foreclosure.

There has been absolutely no showing in this matter of any excusable neglect by Chase. It
has been admitted that Chase received the summons and complaint in Bascom's tax fore-
closure action and no evidence has been placed before me at all to explain why Chase did
not defend itself in the tax foreclosure action. I find, therefore, that the conclusion is simply
unavoidable, that Chase simply sat on its rights during Bascom's 960*960 tax foreclosure
action and withheld the bankruptcy issue during the entire course of that tax foreclosure
case.

I also find that in that connection, that Bascom properly served Chase with the order set-
ting amount, time and place of redemption and, therefore, they had knowledge of that ap-
plication. And if they wanted to raise the defense of the bankruptcy stay at that time, they
could have certainly raised that defense during the course of Bascom's tax foreclosure ac-
tion.

Rather, as I said, rather than doing any of that, for whatever reason, Chase sat back and
let Bascom obtain a judgment without alerting them to the bankruptcy action of which
Bascom had no notice but which Chase was fully knowledgeable about. For those reasons,
I conclude that Chase has unclean hands in this matter and has not shown grounds for
relief under 4:50-1.

Neglect and failure to act sooner are inexcusable on this record. Further, it has failed to
show any grounds why it meets the standards for moving to vacate the tax foreclosure
judgment under the applicable statute which is N.J.S.A. 54:5-87.

[11/22/02 Transcript, pgs. 15-17] The record amply supports the judge's conclusions. We
note that although a claim of voidness of the judgment under section (d) of 4:50-1 is not
subject to the one-year limitation applicable to sections (a), (b), and (c) imposed by R. 4:50-
2, that rule nevertheless requires all motions under R. 4:50-1 to be brought within a rea-
sonable time. Since our decision in Garza v. Paone, 44 N.J.Super. 553, 556-560, 131 A.2d
32 (App.Div.1957), our courts have uniformly held that the reasonable-time requirement
applies to judgments alleged to be void because of a failure of in personam jurisdiction. See,
e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Russo, 334 N.J.Super. 346, 352, 759 A.2d 865 (App.Div.2000);
Wohlegmuth v. 560 Ocean Club, 302 N.J.Super. 306, 312, 695 A.2d 345 (App.Div.1997);
Berger v. Paterson Veterans Taxi Serv., 244 N.J.Super. 200, 204, 581 A.2d 1344 (App.
Div.1990); Last v. Audubon Park Assoc., 227 N.J.Super. 602, 606-607, 548 A.2d 236
(App.Div.1988), certif. denied, 114 N.J. 491, 555 A.2d 613 (1989). We point out, however,
that lack of personal jurisdiction is a waivable defense. See, e.g., Hupp v. Accessory Dis-
trib., Inc., 193 N.J.Super. 701, 711, 475 A.2d 679 (App.Div.1984). There is thus a concep-
tual symmetry in a rule which limits a challenge to a judgment on that ground to a reason-
able time thereafter. That is to say, just as the defense to the action itself may be waived,
so may the right to attack an ensuing judgment on that ground be deemed waived if not
exercised within a reasonable time.

The difficulty here is that we are not dealing with a waivable defect, and hence the trial
court should not, in our view, have declined to consider the consequence of the asserted
defect. In our view, determination of the effect of the asserted violation was necessary to
the ultimate decision. We decide that issue now on the basis of the undisputed record.

A state court judgment entered while the automatic stay is in place renders that judgment
void ab initio, see, e.g., Cho Hung Bank v. Ki Sung Kim, et al., 361 N.J.Super. 331, 339,
825 A.2d 566 (App.Div.2003), subject, however, to retroactive annulment by the bank-
ruptcy court under 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d). See In re Siciliano, 13 F.3d 748 (3d Cir.1994).
Unless cured by annulment, the defect in the judgment is not waivable because it goes to
the authority of the court to render the final judgment and is consequently more nearly
akin to a non-waivable lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Macysyn 961*961 v.
Hensler, 329 N.J.Super. 476, 481, 748 A.2d 591 (App.Div.2000). Our courts have not yet
spoken directly to a non-waivable defect in the context of time constraints on a motion for
relief brought pursuant to R. 4:50-1(d). It is, however, evident that if the final tax foreclo-
sure judgment here had been entered while the automatic stay was in effect, the judgment
would have been void ab initio and the issue of reasonable-time prerequisite for the attack
under R. 4:50-1(d) would have been far from clear.

The point here, however, is that the final judgment of tax foreclosure was entered after the
Chapter 13 petition was dismissed, and there was then no stay in effect. Consequently, it
is not the final judgment that was void. What was void was the order fixing the terms of
redemption, the only action in the proceeding that occurred while the stay was in effect.
Hence, as we view the issue, the question is not whether the final judgment is void ab initio
but rather whether a void interlocutory order, as a matter of federal bankruptcy law, au-
tomatically vitiates the final judgment as well. We conclude that it does not.

We do not believe that federal law is offended when the final judgment itself is free of the
impediment of the automatic stay. Tax foreclosure law, affecting as it does, the security of
title to real estate involves "an essential state interest" and "the power to ensure that se-
curity `inheres in the very nature of [state] government.'" BFP v. Resolution Trust, 511
U.S. 531, 544, 114 S.Ct. 1757, 1764-1765, 128 L.Ed.2d 556, 558 (1994). In our view, there-
fore, since foreclosure law is a matter uniquely within the state's competence, the state is
free to make its own determination as to the effect of the entry of a void interlocutory order
irrespective of the reason it is void.

As a matter of state law, we recognize that the order fixing the terms of redemption is a
necessary step in the processing of a tax foreclosure action. But we think it plain that the
function of the order was entirely fulfilled. Both the property owner and the mortgagee
were appropriately, accurately, and fully apprised of the amount, time and place for re-
demption. Both chose to ignore the information. Neither has ever asserted that the reason
for so choosing was a belief in or reliance on the voidness of the order. Chase's decision to
ignore the order fixing the terms of redemption was, rather, in keeping with its overarching
decision to ignore the entire tax foreclosure proceeding for whatever reason it may have
had. In sum, we are persuaded that in the circumstances here the validity of the final
judgment was in no way impaired by the voidness, under federal bankruptcy law, of the
interlocutory order. Accordingly plaintiff's attack under R. 4:50-1(d) fails. Beyond that and
for the reasons expressed by the trial judge, we are satisfied that plaintiff is not entitled to
relief under any other section of R. 4:50-1.

The order appealed from in each of the two appeals is affirmed.

[1] Chase was joined as Trustee of IMC Home Equity Loan Trust 1997-5 under the Pooling
and Servicing Agreement dated September 1, 1997. IMC Home Equity was the assignee of
the original Askew mortgage and assigned by it to Chase under the Pooling Agreement.
For convenience Chase is referred to as the mortgagee.

[2] We note that it is not only Chase which might have a remedy in the bankruptcy court.
Bascom as well was free to seek from the bankruptcy court an annulment of the automatic
stay if such is deemed necessary. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(d).
EXHIBIT 5 – DISPOSITION ON APPLICATION FOR EMERGENT MOTION
EXHIBIT 6 – SINGLE JUSTICE DISPOSITION
EXHIBIT 7 – WRIT
EXHIBIT 8 – CERTIFICATION IN SUPPORT OF WRIT
EXHIBIT 9 – CFPB COMPLAINT
EXHIBIT 10 – ORDER ON EMERGENT APPLICATION
 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

BANK OF AMERICA, NA SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO.

Plaintiff / Appellee 081273
S-114-17
-v- APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO.
A-002411-17T1
LOWER COURT CIVIL ACTION NO.
F-015414-14

FAROOQ ALI
Defendant / Appellant
____________________________________/

ORDER (PROPOSED)

Appellant brought an emergency motion for an order seeking a stay of the

eviction pending the outcome of these proceedings. The matter having been submitted,

and good cause having been shown, the Court hereby grants the motion on the

grounds that eviction of the Plaintiff could be fatal.

The Court further finds that the judgment of foreclosure in Case No. F-015414-

14 is void ab initio and stricken from the record. The Tax deed issued to US BANK

CUST / TLCF 2012A, LLC. preceded the foreclosure judgment, and by virtue of the quit

claim deed granted to the Appellant, the rights, if any, of Bank of America have been

cut off.

It is HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Bank of America, is barred from

proceeding with any eviction proceedings against the Plaintiff. They no longer possess

any interest upon which they can bring an action.

IT IS SO ORDERED:
PROPOSED ORDER submitted by Farooq Ali
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANT’S NOTICE OF
EMERGENCY MOTION FOR STAY OF EVICTION PENDING OUTCOME OF APPEAL
WITH INCORPORATED MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES was sent
to all of the Defendants listed below. Sent this day ________of_____________, 2018.

BANK OF AMERICA
c/o Zucker, Goldberg, & Ackerman
Attorney for Defendants Jamie Ackerman
200 Sheffield St. Suite 301
Mountainside, New Jersey07092

MUNICIPAL TAX COLLECTOR

JUDITH VASSALLO
Middletown Township, New Jersey.
1 Kings Highway Middletown, NJ 07748
Defendants,

US BANK CUST/TLCF 2012, LLC

c/o US BANK TAX LIEN SERVICES GROUP
50 SOUTH 16TH STREET
SUITE 1950
PHILADELPHIA, PA 19102
Defendant,

THE SHERIFF DEPARTMENT

FRANK J. PROVENZANO, SR. SHERIFF
20 GROVE STREET
SOMERVILLE, NJ 08876,
Defendant,

Respectfully submitted,
______________________
Farooq Ali All Rights Reserved
_______________________
Shazia Mehr All rights Reserved
36-38 Washington Ave.
North Plainfield, NJ 07060
DEFENDANT / APPELLANT PRO SE
TEL: 917 584-7173
EMAIL: KFAALI@GMAIL.COM