Husserl and Heidegger On Phenomenology 1 PDF
Husserl and Heidegger On Phenomenology 1 PDF
Husserl and Heidegger On Phenomenology 1 PDF
AND
THE CONFRONTATION WITH HEIDEGGER
(1927-1931)
EDMUND HUSSERL
COLLECTED WORKS
TRANSLATORS AND EDITORS:
THOMAS SHEEHAN AND RICHARD E. PALMER
VOLUME VI
TRANSLATIONS
PREPARED UNDER THE AUSPICES OF
THE HUSSERL-ARCHIVES (LEUVEN)
EDMUND HUSSERL
AU Rights Reserved
PREFACE:
Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer xi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . xvii
GENERAL INTRODUCTION:
Husserl and Heidegger: The Making and Unmaking of a Relationship
Thomas Sheehan .......................... 1
PART ONE
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
(1927-1928)
INTRODUCTION:
The History of the Redaction of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article
Thomas Sheehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Draft A
translated by Thomas Sheehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 83
Draft C, Selections
translated by Thomas Sheehan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
viii PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Draft D
translated by Richard E. Palmer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
Draft E
edited and translated by Christopher V. Salmon . . . . . . . . . . 181
PART TWO
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES
(1928)
PART THREE
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS ON HEIDEGGER'S WORKS
PART FOUR
APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE
"For Edmund HusserI on his Seventieth Birthday" (April 8, 1929)
by Martin Heidegger
translated by Thomas Sheehan . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . . 475
ApPENDIX Two
Letter to Alexander Pfander (January 6, 1931) by Edmund HusserI
translated by Burt C. Hopkins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 479
APPENDIX THREE
Edmund HusserI: ''Phenomenology and Anthropology" (June, 1931)
translated by Thomas Sheehan and Richard E. Palmer 485
INDEX 501
PREFACE
The materials translated in the body of this volume date from 1927 through
1931. The Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and the Amsterdam Lectures
were written by Edmund Hussed (with a short contribution by Martin Heideg-
ger) between September 1927 and April 1928, and Hussed's marginal notes to
Sein und Zeit and Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik were made between
1927 and 1929. The appendices to this volume contain texts from both Hussed
and Heidegger, and date from 1929 through 1931. As a whole these materials
not only document Hussed's thinking as he approached retirement and emeri-
tus status (March 31, 1928) but also shed light on the philosophical chasm that
was widening at that time between Hussed and his then colleague and protege,
Martin Heidegger.
I The Gennan edition of Draft D of the EB Article was first published in Edmund Husserl, Phiinome-
nologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925, ed. Walter Biemel, Husserliana: Gesammelte
Werke, vol. IX, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962; 2nd edition, 1968; "Erganzende Texte, A. Abhandlun-
gen," pp. 277-301. This Gennan edition is hereinafter abbreviated as "Hu IX" followed by the page number.
xii PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
final draft of the EB Article, and an unreliable paraphrase at that. It is true that
Husserl did commission Dr. Salmon to cut that fourth and final draft in half
(since it was twice the length that the Britannica had requested) and to trans-
late the result into English. It is not at all clear, however, that Husserllicensed
Salmon's gross paraphrase and rearrangement of his text. Scholars have long
challenged the legitimacy of designating Salmon's published version of the
EB Article a "text by Husserl." The English Article has been called, at the
kindest, a "very free" translation (Biemel), and has been characterized, less
kindly, as full of "amazing statements," a "wild paraphrase of Husserl's text,"
and thus a mere "semblance" of the German original (Spiegelberg).2 The 1962
publication of the complete German text of Husserl's fourth draft finally
restored the EB Article to its rightful place in Husserl's corpus. 3
The present volume provides complete translations of all Husserl's drafts of
the Article except Draft C, which, to avoid repetition, appears here only in
part. Draft E - Salmon's unfortunate condensation and "translation" of the
Draft D - is also reprinted here as it left his hand and before it too was cut
back by the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica. Included as well are:
• Heidegger's notes and comments on Husserl's Drafts A and B of the
Article,
• the pages that Heidegger contributed to the Draft B of the Article, and
• Heidegger's October 22, 1927, letter to Husserl about Draft B.
2 Herbert Spiegelberg, "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article
'Phenomenology,'" Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 2 (1971), 74-76.
3 Richard E. Palmer's translation of Draft D made the full, original text available in English:
"'Phenomenology,' Edmund Husserl's Article for the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1927): A New, Complete
Translation," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 2 (1971), 77-90.
4 Hu IX, p. 617
5 Hu IX, p. 302-49.
PREFACE xiii
Between April 1927 and September 1929 Husserl read twice 9 through
Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (published in early April 1927), and in the summer
6 See Iso Kern, Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung aber Husserls Verhiiltnis zu Kant und zum Neu-
kantianismus, Phaenornenologica 16, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964, pp. 194-238; also his "The Three
Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl," in
Frederick A. Elliston and Peter McCormick, eds., Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, South Bend, Indiana:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1977, 126-149.
7 For example: (1) On December 8, 1927, Husser! wrote to Heidegger: "An expanded version, which
takes into consideration a topic that went untreated - the double meaning of psychology: as naturalistic and
as humanistically oriented (myoId antithesis) - should go into the lahrbuch as an introduction to further
publications." Briefwechsel IV, p, 149. (2) A few weeks later (December 26,1927) Husser! wrote to Roman
Ingarden: "[The EB Articlel should appear in an expanded form in the next volume of the lahrbuch. 1 would
like to shape the Article in such a way that it serves to some extent as a useful guide for the series of publica-
tions to follow ...." Briefwechsel m, p. 237. (3) On May 9,1928, shortly after delivering the Lectures, Husserl
told Heidegger: "I worked out my Holland lectures on the basis of the so-called Encyclopaedia article,"
Briefwechsel IV, p. 154; and (4) to Ingarden he described the content of the Lectures as "the more fully
developed [expliciertel, and also improved, line of thought that was set down for the Encyclopaedia
Britannica." BriefwechsellII, p. 241 (July 13, 1928). For Briefwechsel, see note 13, below.
8 Husser! wrote at the head of his manuscript of the Lectures: "Diese Uberarbeitung des Entwurfs in
Schreibmaschine fur die Encyclopaedia Britannica... ": Hu IX, pp. 615 and 617.
9 Fritz Heinemann, Existentialism and the Modem Predicament, New York: Harper & Row, 1953, p. 48;
information from HusserI, 1931.
xiv PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
of 1929 he also studied Heidegger's Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik,1O
which had just appeared. These readings made it clear to Hussed how differ-
ent Heidegger's work was from his own, and the margins of Hussed's per-
sonal copies of the two works are filled with notes, queries, and marks, most
of them quite critical of Heidegger's work. Hussed's marginal notes to both
works are translated in Part Three below. The translation of the notes to Kant
und das Problem der Metaphysik follows the German edition of those notes
published by Roland Breeur in 1994, whereas the notes to Sein und Zeit are
newly edited from the pages of Hussed' s copy of that book.ll
4. The Appendices
10 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Erste Hlilfte, Sonderdruck aus lahrbuch fUr Philosophie und
phiinomenologische Forschung, Band vn [sic], Halle a.d. Saale, Niemeyer 1927; and Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik, Bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1929.
11 The Gennan edition of the marginal notes is "Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit
und Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik," ed. Roland Breeur, Husserl Studies 11, 1 (1994), 3-36; notes
to Sein und Zeit, pp. 9-48; notes to Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. pp. 49-63. Husserl's copy of
Sein und Zeit is catalogued as BP 78 at the Husserl-Archives, Leuven.
PREFACE xv
Draft A
author: Hussed, September 1927
Gennan text: Hu IX, pp. 237-55, 592-5
translation: the entire text, by Thomas Sheehan
DraftB
authors: Hussed and Heidegger, October 10-21, 1927
Gennan text: Hu IX, pp. 256-77, with pp. 595-9
translation: the entire text, by Thomas Sheehan
Draft C, selections
author: Hussed, late October, 1927
Gennan text: Hu IX, pp. 517-9 (introduction), pp. 519-26
(conclusion), 591 and 645 (footnotes)
translation: by Thomas Sheehan
DraftD
author: Hussed, late October to December 8, 1927
Gennantext: Hu IX, pp. 277-301
translation: the entire text, by Richard E. Palmer
Husserl's Marginalia
Appendices
12 Martin Heidegger, "Edmund Husser! zum 70. Geburtstag," Akademische Mitteilung (Organ fur die
gesamten Interessen der Studentschaft von der Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat in Freiburg/Br.), 4. Folge, 9.
Semester, Nr. 14 (May 14,1929), pp. 46-47.
13 Edmund Husser!, Briefwechsel, Husser!iana: Dokumente, Band ill, Briefwechsel, ed. Karl Schuhmann
in collaboration with Elisabeth Schuhmann, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994; vol. II, pp. 180-184. Hereinafter,
references to this ten-volume edition of Husserl's letters is given as: Briefwechsel, plus the volume number
and the pages.
14 Edmund Husser!, Aujsiitze und Vortriige (1922-1937), Husser!iana Gesammelte Werke, XXVII, ed.
Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Dordrecht: KIuwer, 1989, pp. 164-181, with critical notes at pp.
300-307. An earlier English translation by Richard G. Schmitt appeared in Realism and the Background oj
Phenomenology, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm, Glencoe, illinois: Free Press, 1960, pp. 129-142, and in
Edmund Husser!, Shoner Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, South Bend, Indiana:
Notre Dame University Press, 1981, pp. 315-323.
ACKNO~DGEMENTS
The editors of this volume gratefully acknowledge the support and editorial
advice of the staff of the Hussed-Archives, Leuven, Belgium, especially
Professors Samuel Usseling, Rudolf Bernet, and Roland Breeur; and they
thank Mr Phil Johnstone and Ms Maja de Keijzer of Kluwer Academic Pub-
lishers for their superb editorial work.
Thomas Sheehan is grateful to Messrs Colin Hubbard, Daniel Price, Craig
Greenman and Donald Ringelstein for their invaluable assistance in the prepa-
ration of this volume. Richard Palmer thanks the staff of the Hussed-Archives
for their hospitality during his visit to the Archives to receive specific advice,
and is grateful to Steven Spileers for transcribing Hussed's shorthand mar-
ginal remarks in Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik. He also thanks
MacMurray College Library for their unwavering support and the Department
for general technical support services. For major fmancial support he thanks
the Fulbright Commission for two research fellowships to study in Heidelberg,
Germany, in 1991-1992 and 1995-1996. For advice and encouragement
during his stay at the Philosophical Seminar of the University of Heidelberg,
he thanks Professor Hans-Georg Gadamer, Reiner Wiehl, Dominic Kaegi, and
Carsten Dutt. He gratefully acknowledges the constant support and encour-
agement at MacMurray College of his colleague and friend, Meredith Cargill.
For clerical chores in connection with the index and with the reading of proofs
he hastens to thank his present student assistant, Tiffany Hermon, and his
former student, Elizabeth Brown of Springfield, lllinois. He also thanks the
editors of Man and World for permission to use selected portions of his essay,
"Hussed's Debate with Heidegger in the Margins of Kant and the Problem of
Metaphysics" (May 1997) to serve as a short introduction in this volume. He
thanks fudiana University Press for permission to cite from Richard Taft's
translation, Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
Thomas Sheehan
1 Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, Briefwechsel 1920-1963, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner,
Frankfurt am Main. VittorioKiostermann,1990,p. 71 (December26,1926).
2 Heidegger's texIs include: (1) Letter to William J. Richardson, April 1962, in "Preface I Vorwort" to
William J. Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1963, pp. vii-xxiii. (2) "Mein Weg in die Phllnomenologie," Zur Sache des Denkens, Tfibingen: Max
Niemeyer, 1969, pp. 81-90; B.T., "My Way Into Phenomenology" in On Time and Being, ed. and trans. Joan
Stambaugh, New York: Harper & Row, 1972. (3) "Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten," Der Spiegel, 23 (May
31, 1976), 193-219; B.T. by William J. Richardson, ''Only a God Can Save Us," in Heidegger, the Man and
the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan, New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers/Transaction Publishers, 1981, pp.
45-72. See Karl Schuhmann's response to this interview: ''Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gesprach fiber Husserl,"
Zeitschriftfiir philosophische Forschung, 32, 4 (October-December, 1978),591-612. (4) Martin Heidegger,
"Seminar in Ziihringen 1973" in Vier Seminare, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977, pp. 110-
138; originally published as "Le seminaire de Ziihringen" in Martin Heidegger, Questions lV, ed. and trans.
by Jean Beaufret, Fran~ois Fedier, Jean Lauxerois, and Claude Roeis, Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1976, pp.
307-39. (5) "Uber das Zeitverstlindnis in der Phlinomenologie und im Denken der Seinsfrage" in Helmut
Gehrig, ed., Phiinomenologie -lebendig oder tot? Karlsruhe: Badenia, 1969, p. 47; B.T. ''The Understand-
ing of Time in Phenomenology and in the Thinking of the Being-Question" by Thomas Sheehan and
Frederick Ellison, The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, X, 2 (Summer, 1979), p. 201.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 3
available many of the lecture courses that the young Professor Heidegger
delivered at the universities of Freiburg (1919-1923) and Marburg (1923-
1928).3 A third factor was the publication in 1962 of the four drafts of
Hussed's EB Article - including Heidegger's contributions to and criticisms
of the project - all of which are translated in the present volume. Most re-
cently, the publication of Hussed's massive correspondence has shed further
light on the matter. 4
This introduction covers only the very early years of Hussed and Heideg-
ger's relationship (up to 1919) and the years when that relationship fell apart
(1927-1931). The middle years (1919-1926), when Heidegger began forging
his own radical version of phenomenology, is thoroughly treated in the books
and articles of Theodore Kisiel, John Van Buren, and others, to which the
reader is referred. 5
3 Martin Heidegger, GesamJausgabe, various volumes, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostennann, 1976-.
4 Edmund Hussed, Briefwechsel, 10 volumes, ed. Karl Schuhmann in collaboration with Elisabeth
Schuhmann, Husserliana: Dokurnente, Band III, Dordrecht I Boston I London: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1994. Hereinafter abbreviated as Briefwechsel, followed by the individual volume and pagels.
5 Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, Berkeley: University of California Press,
1993, pp. 480 ff., and his articles listed there at pp. 573-4, including "Why the First Draft of Being and Time
Was Never Published," Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 20/1 (January 1989), 3-22. John
Van Buren, The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana
University Press, 1994. Also Thomas Sheehan, "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical
Biography," in Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas Sheehan, New Brunswick, New Jersey:
Rutgers/fransaction Publishers, 1981, pp. 3-20; ''Time and Being, 1925-27," in Robert W. Shahan and 1. N.
Mohanty, eds., Thinking About Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought, Norman, Oklahoma: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1984, pp. 179-183; and "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," in John Sallis, Ciiuseppina Moneta, and
Jacques Tarninaux, eds., The Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1988, pp. 77-137.
6 ce. r.
for example, Aristotle, Metaphysics, 2,1003 a 33 and K, 3,1061 a 11.
4 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
remained "the 'rod and staff of my fIrst awkward attempts to penetrate into
philosophy.,,7 Thus, when he matriculated in theology at Freiburg University
in 1909 and learned fromjournal articles that Brentano had taught Hussed and
influenced his work, Heidegger began reading Hussed's Logische Unter-
suchungen in the hopes that the work would help him solve his question about
the unifIed meaning ofbeing.8
And eventually it did. Initially, however, Heidegger's efforts came to
naught, in part because Hussed's problematic simply did not coincide with
Heidegger's question, and in part because Heidegger did not yet know how to
use phenomenology in the service of the question about being. "My efforts [at
that time] were in vain," Heidegger said late in life, "because I was not
searching in the right way.,,9 Heidegger simply did not know how to do phe-
nomenology. "My basic philosophical convictions," he wrote in 1915,
"remained those of Aristotelian-Scholastic philosophy."l0 Nonetheless, Hei-
degger was, and ever remained, drawn by Hussed's insistence on a return "zu
den Sachen selbst," to real issues and the questions they prompted. Thus, in
1911 when he read Hussed's recently published article "Philosophy as Rigor-
ous Science" and came to the sentence ''The impulse to research must take its
start not from philosophies but from issues and problems," he wrote in the
margin, "We take Hussed at his word" ("Wir nehmen Husserl beim Wort,,).ll
When Heidegger withdrew from theological studies in 1911, he wanted to
study with Hussed at the University of Gottingen, but fInancial diffIculties
prevented him from doing SO.12 Instead, from 1911 through 1913 he studied
philosophy at Freiburg University under Heinrich Rickert. During those two
years, as his philosophical interests broadened to include modem logic and
epistemology, Heidegger had a second and more profound encounter with
Hussed's Logical Investigations. "Rickert's seminars," Heidegger wrote in
7 Franz Brentano, Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles, Freiburg: Herder,
1862; reprinted, Dannstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1960; B.T. by Rolf George, On the Several
Senses of Being in Aristotle, Betkeley: University of Califotnia Press, 1975. Heidegger's remark on ''rod and
staff' (Stab and Stecken) is from "Mein Weg in die Phiinomenologie", p. 81; B.T. (where it is rendered "chief
helf and guide"), p. 74.
Edmund Husser!, Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Teil: Prolegomena Vlr reinen Logik, Halle an der
Salle: Max Niemeyer, 1900; Zweiter Teil: Untersuchungen Vlr Phiinomenologie und Theorie der Er-
kenntnis. Halle an der Salle: Max Niemeyer, 1901; new edition in Edmund Husserl, Husserliana vol. XIX, 1
and 2, Logische Untersuchungen, ed. by Elmar Holenstein (vol. XIX, 1) and Ursula Panzer (vol. XIX, 2),
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975 and 1984. B.T. by J. N. Findlay, Logical Investigations, two volumes,
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New YOlk The Humanities Press, 1970.
9 ''Mein Weg in die Phiinomenologie," p. 82; B.T., p. 75.
10 Martin Heidegger, "Cuniculum Vitae, 1915," in Sheehan. "Heidegger's Lehljahre," p. 79.
11 Husserl's sentence is from "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," Logos, 1. 3 ([March] 1911), 289-
341, here 341; B.T., "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis
of Philosophy, ed. and trans. Quentin Lauer, New Yorlc: Harper Torchbooks, 1965, pp. 71-147, here, p. 146.
For Heidegger's remade, see Sheehan ''Heidegger's Lehrjahre," p. 131, n. 89.
12 Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, 2nd edition, vol 1,
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971, p. 276.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 5
The only person who has taken up these investigations positively from outside the
main stream of phenomenological research, has been E. Lask, whose Logik der
Philosophie (1911) was as strongly influenced by the sixth Untersuchung ('Uber
sinnliche und Imtegoriale Anschauungen,' pp. 128ff. [of the second edition]) as
his Lehre yom Urteil (1912) was influenced by the aforementioned sections on
evidence and truth [namely, Investigation VI, §§ 36-39].,,16
13 Martin Heidegger, "A Recollection (1957)," trans. Hans Seigfried in Sheehan, Heidegger, the Man and
the Thinker, pp. 21-22, here p. 22. German text in Heidegger, Frahe Schriften, p. 56.
14 Both books are reprinted in Emil Lask, Gesammelte Schrijten, ed. Bugen Herrigel, vol. 2, Tiibingen:
J.C.B. Mohr (paul Siebeck), 1923, 1-282 and 283-463 respectively. See Theodore Kisiel, ''Why Students of
Heidegger Will Have to Read Emil Lask," in EmilLask and the Search for Concreteness, ed. Deborah G.
Chaffin, Athens: Ohio University Press, 1993.
IS Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen; in the first German edition, pp. 587-636; in the Husserliana
edition, vol. XIX, 2, pp. 645-693; B.T. by J.N. Findlay, pp. 760-802.
16 Sein and Zeit, 11th edition, Tiibingen: Max Niemeyer, 1967,218, n. 1. The translation here is taken
from Being and Time, trans. John Macquanie and Edward Robinson, New York: Harper and Row, 1962,
493f., n. H. 218.
17 Die Lehre vom Uneil im Psychologismus. Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik, I..cipzig: Ambrosius
Barth, 1914; reprinted in Martin Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe, 1, Frtihe Schriften, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von
Hemnann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978, pp. 59-188.
18 Die Kategorien- and Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus, Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr (paul Siebeck), 1916;
reprinted in Gesamtausgabe 1, Frtihe Schriften, pp. 189-411.
6 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Personal contacts between Hussed and Heidegger began only when Hussed
transferred to Freiburg University in April of 1916, and even so until the fall
of 1917 their meetings were not particularly productive. The first record of
communication that we have between the two philosophers is a postcard that
Hussed sent Heidegger in the spring of 1916:
Dear colleague,
I would very much like to take advantage of your kind offer to let me see
your Habilitationsschrift. Would you be good enough to send it on to me?
Yours truly,
EHusserl
May 27, 191619
Heidegger did give Hussed a published copy of his Duns Scotus' Doctrine
of Categories and Meaning inscribed "For Professor E. Hussed, with most
grateful respect,,,20 and apparently Hussed perused it and passed on a few
comments. Two months later, however, Hussed did not seem to be clear on its
contents, or to have much to say about it, or even to be very encouraging about
it. He wrote to Heidegger on July 21, 1916:
Dear colleague,
Perhaps you would have time to visit me on Sunday morning [July 23]
(sometime before visiting hours, 10:00). I really have not had any possibility to
go through your work again, and my ideas have perhaps faded a bit; I doubt I
would have anything further to say that might be useful. I have had too many dif-
ferent things to do. Still, I would be pleased if you could come.
With cordial greetings,
Yours,
EHusserl21
19 Briefwechsel, N, p. 127. Most of Heidegger's letters to Husser! were destroyed in an Allied bombing
during World War ll. The only letters preserved are printed in Briefwechsel: April 14, 1922 (N, pp. 136-7),
October 22, 1927 (N, pp. 144-148; translated in this volume, below), and the letter of April 29, 1933 (N,
pp. 160-1) from Elfriede Heidegger.
20 "Herm Professor E. Husser! in dankbarster Verehrung iiberreicht vom Verfasser": Husserl's copy of the
wode: is in the Hussser!-Archives, Leuven, catalogue no. BP 75.
21 Briefwechsel IV, p. 127. A few months later Heidegger presented Husserl with an inscribed copy of his
trial lecture for the Habilitation (delivered a year earlier, July 27, 1915). "Der Zeitbegriff in der Geschichts-
wissenschaft," which had just been published in Zeitschrift fliT Philosophie und philosophische Kritik, 161
(1916), 173-188. Husser! responded: "Esteemed Doctor, Thank you very much for kindly sending me your
qualifying lecture. Your gift has pleased me very much. With best wishes, Yours, E Husser!, 28.9.16."
Briefwechsel N, p. 127.
GENERAL INTRODUCfION 7
Hussed nonetheless helped Heidegger get the work published that year,
presumably by intervening with the Wissenschaftliche Gesellschaft in Frei-
burg in order to get Heidegger a publication grant. 22 Hussed also helped to
arrange for the young Privatdozent to teach a course during the winter semes-
. ter of 1916, "Basic Questions of Logic," in Seminar II (the Catholic program)
of the Philosophy Department. 23 Moreover, at least twice Hussed expressed
his willingness to help Heidegger in his studies. On December 10, 1916 he
wrote: "If I am able to assist you in your studies, and if you so wish, I will not
let you down in the matter.,,24 Likewise, as the autumn semester of 1917 was
about to begin, Hussed (who was still away on vacation) wrote to Heidegger:
Bemau
September 24,1917
Esteemed colleague,
I shall return to Freiburg from my stay in Bernau only on September 30 or
October 1. I am sorry that I cannot be of help to you before that. We can agree on
the details when I return, but I will happily help you with your studies as much as
I am able. On October 4 I begin my lecture course on logic, an effort to bring my
work on the problem of time to some kind of conclusion.
With cordial greetings to you and your wife,
Yours truly,
E HusserI2S
However, just two weeks after this second offer of help, on October 8,
1917, Hussed wrote a letter about Heidegger that described the young scholar
with faint praise at best and thereby may have cost him a full-time university
position.26 In response to a query from Professor Paul Natorp of Marburg
University concerning Heidegger's eligibility for a professorship at Marburg,
Hussed wrote that ''up to this time I have not had sufficient opportunity to get
to know him closely and to form a reliable judgment for myself about his
personality and character. In any case I have nothing bad to say about him."
While Hussed was pleased to tell Natorp that Heidegger has distanced himself
22 See Heidegger's relIlllIk at the end of his Preface to the work, Frllhe Schriften, p. 19l.
23 See Karl Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls, The Hague: Mar-
tinus Nijhoff, 1977, p. 203, re: October 10, 1916; also Bernhard Casper, "Martin Heidegger und die
Theologische FakulUit Freiburg 1909-1923," in Remigius Bliumer, Karl Suso Frank, and Hugo Ott, eds.,
Kirche am Obe"hein. Beitriige zur Geschichte der Bistiimer Konstanz und Freiburg, Freiburg im Breisgau:
Herder, 1980, pp. 534-541, here p. 539. Also Kisiel, The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, p. 461
and p. 553, n. 5. On the Catholic program in philosophy see Sheehan, "Heidegger's Lehrjahre," p. 96 and p.
131, n. 9l.
24 BriejWechsel IV, p. 128.
2!1 BriejWechsel IV, p. 128.
26 BriejWechsel V, pp. 131-2.
8 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
from Rickert's work, he nevertheless wrote that he found Heidegger too young
and not mature enough for the job. And remarking on Heidegger's qualifying
dissertation on Duns Scotus, HusserI judged the work to be merely a begin-
ner's effort (Erstlingsbuch).
One of the major obstacles to a better rapport between HusserI and Heideg-
ger at this time was HusserI's fear that Heidegger was a Catholic-Thomistic
philosopher of a dogmatic stripe. This was at a time when the Vatican, in its
efforts to eradicate what it called "modernism" in the church, was demanding
that Catholic intellectuals adhere to conservative interpretations of traditional
philosophy and theology.27 HusserI, who called himself a "free Christian" and
a "non-dogmatic Protestant,,28 and who once denounced what he termed "the
Catholic International,,,29 vigorously opposed ecclesiastical interference with
philosophical research. "Scientific work would be deprived of its freedom," he
once said with explicit reference to the Vatican, "if one had to fear being
censured by some learned commission.,,3o
It seems HusserI read his fears of confessional dogmatism into Privatdozent
Heidegger. From November of 1914 through June of 1916 Heidegger had
been an active candidate for the chair in Catholic philosophy (Seminar II) at
Freiburg University. HusserI was present at the faculty meeting of June 23,
1916 when professor of history Heinrich Finke, a staunch and very conserva-
tive Catholic layman, recommended Heidegger as a fitting candidate for the
chair precisely because Heidegger was a practicing Catholic. More than a year
later, in the aforementioned letter to Natorp (October 8, 1917) HusserI would
recall:
Not without strong inner struggles did the two of them [Heidegger and Ochsner]
gradually open themselves to my suggestions and also draw closer to me per-
sonally. In that same period they both underwent radical changes in their funda-
mental religious convictions.
It was at this point that Hussed began to open up to Heidegger both per-
sonally and professionally. Mter only a short while, however, their few direct
personal contacts were broken off. On January 17, 1918 Heidegger was called
32 See Heidegger's letter to Father Engelbert Krebs, July 19, 1914, in Ott, Martin Heidegger, p. 83; B.T.
p. 81 and in Sheehan, "Heidegger's LehTjahre," p. 113.
33 On December 23,1918 Mrs. Heidegger told Father Engelbert Krebs: ''My husband has lost his church
faith .... At the time of our marriage [March 20, 1917], his faith was already undennined by doubts." Ott,
Martin Heidegger, p. 108; B.T. p. 109. See also, Thomas Sheehan, ''Reading a Life: Heidegger and Hard
Times," in The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger, ed. Charles Guignon, Cambridge, U.K., and New
Yolk: Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 70. Elfriede Heidegger's influence on her husband's turn from
Catholicism is mentioned in Gerda Walther, Zum anderen Ufer: Yom Marxismus und Atheismus zum
Christenturn, Remagen: Der Leuchter/Otto Reichl Verlag, 1960, p. 207.
34 Briejwechsel V, p. 139 (February II, 1920, Hussed to Natorp).
3' Briejwechsel vn, pp. 205-208; for the following passages, p. 205 and 207; in Sheehan, Heidegger, the
Man and the Thinker, p. 23 and p. 24f.
10 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
up for active duty in the war, and at the end of August 1918, he was sent off to
the Western Front.
Heidegger was absent from Freiburg on military duty from January 17,
1918 through late November of that same year. It was during this period that
the relation between him and Husserl blossomed - by mail. The Husserl-
Archives possess four letters that Husserl wrote to Heidegger during 1918,
always in response to letters or cards from Heidegger. The first three are
addressed to Heidegger at his army camp at Heuberg in east Baden, where
Heidegger was training with the 4th Company of the 113th Ersatz-Bataillon.
They are brief but cordial, and full of promise of future collaboration. In a
letter posted two weeks after Heidegger's departure from Freiburg, Husserl
writes:
36 It seems Heidegger had written to say he would visit Freiburg on leave in the coming days or weeks.
From February 1 to April 27, 1918, HusserJ vacationed in Bernau, near St. Blasien, some 15 miles southeast
of Freiburg.
37 BriejWechsel IV, p. 129. The word OUI.UplAOOOcpeiV ["philosophizing together"] is an allusion to the
passage in Aristotle's remark on friendship in Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 12, 1172 a 4-7: iXAAOl
OE...OUllcplAOOOcpoiiolV, excx01:01 tV "toll"t'!> OUVTJIlEPEIlOV1:I:<; 0 "t\ ltEp lleXA10"tCX aYCXltWOl "twv tv
"t4> ~\,!> .... ("[Whereas some friends drink together or play dice together], others [work out at the gymnasium
together or hunt together or]. .. philosophize together, each of these groups passing the day together doing
what they most love of all the things in life..."). The editors of BriejWechsel identify the personages named in
the postscript as Dr. Theophil Rees (born in 1889), a doctor of internal medicine practicing in Constanz, and
his wife Martha (deceased in 1919). See below, Husserl's letter of September 10, 1918.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 11
Dear colleague,
I was immensely pleased to receive your greetings from the training camp.
So now I don't have to worry about how your health is bearing up under the
strains of military service. The refreshing disposition that speaks through the lines
of your cordial letter is the best testimony that you are healthy and happy. The
fact that you now have to put philosophy entirely aside for a while is very good.
Hopefully, after the glorious victories in the Wesr 8 the war will not drag on too
much longer, and afterwards you can return with even greater vigor to the diffi-
cult problems you raise, and I will gladly do my part to bring you in medias res
and to familiarize you with those res in (JU~q)\AO(JOq>EiV?9 I firmly hope that
this period in the army will redound to your benefit. It would be a pleasure for me
if from time to time you again shared your news. Up here in this quiet valley a
large project is coming to fruition for me: time and individuation, a renewal of a
rational metaphysics based on principles.
With cordial greetings from my wife and me,
Yours,
EHusserl40
Heidegger wrote Hussed again in April, and Hussed responded some weeks
later, after returning from vacation in Bemau:
38 On March 21, a week before Husserl wrote this letter, General Erich Ludendorff had begun a series of
immense (and, as it turned out, ultimately unsuccessful) offensives against the Allied forces in northeast
France near Amiens. In February of that year Hindenburg had told a secret session of the Reichstag that the
attacks had to take place before United States troops entered the battlefield in full strength. He predicted the
attacks would result in 1.5 million Gennan deaths but would lead to victory in four months. Heidegger was
sent to the front in late August, long after the main force of these Gennan attacks was spent.
39 The Latin phrase is from Horace, Epistolarum Uber Secundus, m("Ars Poetica") Complete Worb,
two volumes in one, ed. Charles E. Bennett, revised by John C. Rolfe, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1958, vol. 2,
Satires and Epistles, revised edition by John C. Rolfe, p. 115: "semper ad eventum festinat et in medias res I
non secus ac notas auditorem rapit...". (1be successful epic poet "always hastens into the action and sweeps
the listener into the midst of things that are not otherwise familiar ....") In using the phrase Husserl might be
indicating that Heidegger is still a novice, not entirely familiar with phenomenology.
40 Briefwechsel N, p. 129-30.
12 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
the start I had more to do than I expected. I found that my "Introduction to Phi-
losophy" was not clear enough as regards developing (by way of the history of
ideas) the ideal of strict science beginning from Plato's methodological concep-
tions, and so I have to work out a new lecture course.41 (It is also a question of the
original motivating force of the critique of reason as regards Gorgias' second ar-
gument and then as regards Descartes' field of pure cogitatio - in contrast to the
development among the ancients, which runs along logical-epistemological and
ontological lines, which nonetheless bore lasting fruit for modem times in the ex-
act sciences.) In the meantime your recent cordial and delightful postcard arrived.
If I had only known that you were still here when I got back on April 26, I would
have invited you over right away!42 During this Pentecost week I was thinking of
going back up to Bemau with the children (if they have vacation). The muggy
spring weeks weigh me down and stifle me in these lower altitudes, and perhaps I
might relax a bit after this overlong period of work. I am glad that, as I hoped,
you are managing to get through basic training so well. You are like a house plant
that had grown languid in the stale air of a closed room but that thrives when
placed outside in the open air and in the light of the open sky. It is good that you
are also able to read a little, and you have made a fine choice. For you this is not
the time for abstract speculations. Go a bit easier on yourself and keep in good
spirits. Let your health and strength increase. That which grows freely from
within and stretches towards the heights will reach its telos of itself.
With cordial greetings,
Yours,
E Husser143
41 Two years earlier Husserl had given a sununer semester course, "Einleitung in die Philosophie," on the
possibility of philosophy as an exact systematic science. He reworlred it in part for the summer semester
(M'¥ to July) of 1918.
4 Husserl mistakenly writes "May 26" [26. V.], which still lay fifteen days in the future. Judging from a
letter to Roman Ingarden, Husserl actually returned from Bernau to Freiburg on April 27: Briefwechsel m, p.
183 (April 27, 1918: "Jch bin eben in der Heimfahrt....").
43 Briefwechsel, IV, p. 131.
44 This is the longest letter we have from Husserl to Heidegger: Briefwechsel IV, pp. 131-136.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION . 13
Dear colleague,
Today I am taking a bit of a holiday. This is the sixth week that I have been
here, and what with working nine to ten hours a day, with only one full day off so
far, the threat of going thick and numb in the head has finally set in. What better
way to enter into the energy of a revitalizing and refreshing life than to write to
you! 0 how your youth is ajoy to me, how truly heartening it is that you allow me
to share in it through your letters. And yours is a true and authentic youth that can
still well up and throw itself at the world, full of feeling and with clear vision, and
absorb a true image of that world deep into your soul - and then speak itself forth
in honest language and forge its own particular way of expressing the image it has
formed. In that, you are "learned" as only someone primus in prima, and yet with
all that, you still have eyes and heart and words. [... ] It is impossible to imagine
you ever betraying that for some silly gains or frittering it away - the treasure of
such a pure and unspoiled youth, your soul's clear vision, that pure heart, that
clear sense of purpose with its solid diathesis [disposition] for pure and noble
goals - to lose all that in the drive to become some pompous, self-important
"famous philosopher" - no, it's unthinkable. In fact, there is not a chance of that
so long as you can still write letters full of such freedom and serenity of spirit.
The letter goes on to discuss Hussed' s recent work and to range widely
through a report of what Hussed had been reading: Rudolf Otto's Das Heilige,
a book that Heidegger in fact may have recommended to him45 and which
Hussed regrets Heidegger does not have time to review; an essay by Eduard
Spranger; Johannes Volkelt's Gewissheit und Wahrheit (1918), and especially
Paul Natorp's Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode (1912), of
which he is particularly critical ("[it] shows that Natorp was incapable of
grasping the clear and obvious sense of phenomenology as an eidetic analysis
of pure consciousness, prior to and independent of already existing philosophy
and science, and that in general he could not valorize seeing and what is given
to seeing.,,46). Finally Hussed concludes:
I have to close now, joining the very cordial greetings of my wife and of
Dr. and Mrs. Rees (who, to our great joy, have been here - for three weeks) to
our own good wishes and friendship. I need not tell you how heavily the recent
events of the war weigh upon our spirits.47 Yet it will certainly turn out for the
45 Briefwechsel VD, p. 206 (Husser! to Rudolf Otto, March 5, 1919); B.T., Heidegger, the Man and the
Thinker, p. 24.
46 Heidegger would attack this work of Natorp's during his first lecture course after the war, in February
and March of 1919: Martin Heidegger, Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem in Zur
Bestimmung der Philosophie, ed. Bernd Heimbiichel, Gesamtausgabe n, 56/57, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio
Klostermann, 1987, pp. 77 ff.
47 The collapse of the Western front began on August 8, 1918 and continued unabated for three months
until the armistice and the surrender of the Second Reich on November 11. For Husser!'s reactions, see his
14 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfAL PHENOMENOLOGY
good, and if we mean to hold our ground against it all - and we do, and of course
we will - it will happen in the correct form of re-action, whereby we will declare
our faith in the good in the only way we can - actively: by standing our ground
and putting our small powers (which, in the overall reckoning, also count) at the
service of that good. Each must do his part as if the salvation of the world de-
pended on it: I in phenomenology, you as a weatherman and [soon enough] as a
phenomenologist of religion in the office next door. 48
NB. I too have next to me my Holderlin, whom I love very much and yet
know too little, and so you and I will be in touch, reading him.49
Best wishes to you.
Yours,
E Husserl 50
laterletters to Gustav Albrecht, Briefwechsel IX, p. 56 (April 12, 1919): ''The events since August [of 1918],
followed by the frightful collapse [of imperial Gennany], threaten to consume me from within. I have
suffered unspeakably, and at times was as if paralyzed." And to Fritz Kaufmann, Briefwechsel m, p. 343
(January 17, 1919): "You can imagine how much I, like everyone with patriotic sentiments, suffered and still
suffer at the frightful collapse of our great and noble nation. I sought to save myself by plunging deeply into
philosophical work - just as I waged the struggle for spiritual self-preservation throughout the war years."
48 Heidegger the weatherman had the job of helping plan poison gas attacks on American soldiers who
were advancing northeast towards Sedan: Ott, Martin Heidegger, pp. l04f. and 151; E.T. pp. 105 and 154.
For anecdotal accounts of the effects of these gas attacks, see Elaine George Collins, ed., If Not for War,
Redwood City, Calif.: D. G. Collins, 1989, pp. 86f. and 123f.
49 Years later Heidegger remarked: ''During the campaign [of the Great War] HOiderlin's hymns were
stuffed into one's backpack right along with the cleaning gear." "Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes," Gesamt-
ausgabe II5, p. 3; E.T. in Basic Writings, revised and expanded edition, ed. David Farrell Krell, San Fran-
cisco: Harper SanFrancisco, 1993, p. 145.
50 Briefwechsel IV, pp. 135-6.
51 I derive the phrase ''philosophical soulmates" from Hussed's ironic remark in Briefwechsel m, p. 493
(Hussed to Dietrich Mahnke, May 4/5, 1933): "Der schonste AbschluB dieser vermeintlichen philoso-
phischen Seelenfreundschaft. ... "
52 Information from the late Mrs. Elfriede Heidegger, August 1977.
53 "Die Idee der Philosophie und das Weltanschauungsproblem," in Zur Bestimmung tier Philosophie,
Gesamtausgabe II, 56157, pp. 3-117. The numbers within parentheses in this and the following paragraphs,
unless otherwise indicated, refer to this text. Heidegger delivered this course during the "war emergency
semester" (Kriegsnotsemester) which ran from January 25 through April 16, 1919. Heidegger's course began
GENERALINTRODUcnON 15
very beginning, the radical differences between Husserl and Heidegger were
in evidence. No sooner had Heidegger started his new course, presumably
teaching as a phenomenologist in the tradition of Husserl, than he started
attacking the Master for attributing primacy to theory over lived experience,
and specifically for privileging the pure transcendental ego over what Heideg-
ger at this point called the "historical ego" and the "ego of the situation."S4
"We find ourselves at a methodological crossroads," he told his students on
March 14, 1919, "where it will be decided whether philosophy shall live or
die" (p. 63). For Heidegger everything depends on first getting clear about
what philosophy's true issue is. "What is distorting the real problematic is not
just naturalism, as some people think," he said with explicit reference to
Husserl, ''but the overall dominance and primacy of the theoreticar (p. 87).55
For Heidegger the theoretical orientation of the pure ego of Husserlian
phenomenology sucks the blood out of the richly textured Umwelt, that "first-
hand world" of lived experience in which one primarily exists and carries out
practical tasks. In this first-hand world, things are not just "there," and they do
not primarily have "value." They are not even just "things." They are "the
significant - that's what is primary .... When you live in a first-hand world
[Umwelt], everything comes at you loaded with meaning, allover the place
and all the time, everything is enworlded, 'world happens' ..." (p. 73). In this
way of living, we do not know ourselves as egos who observe the entities
lying around us. Rather (this was Heidegger's rereading of intentionality), we
are the act of experientially "living out unto something" [ein "Leben auf etwas
zu"], which has "absolutely nothing to do with an ego." (p. 68f.) This primary
level of experience is intensely personal: "Only in the resonances of one's
own individual 'I' does a first-hand thing [ein Umweltliches] get experienced,
only there does 'world happen,' and wherever and whenever world does
happen for me, I am somehow entirely there" (p. 73).
Heidegger argues that this richly textured first-hand world gets drained of
all life, meaning, and history when it becomes infected by theory.56 The dy-
namic, personal and historical "happening" (Er-eignis) of world, which is
intimately bound up with the living and appropriating of one's own life, gets
flattened out to a "process" (Vor-gang) of objective knowledge. Ultimately the
human being is reduced to a level of experience that is "absolutely without
world, world-alien, a sphere where the breath is knocked out of you, and you
on February 7. For the following, see Sheehan, ''Reading a Ufe," in Cambridge Companion to Heidegger,
pp.77-79.
54 Gesamtausgabe, n. 56157, p. 205f.
55 Heidegger was referring to Husserl's "Philosophie aIs strenge Wissenschaft," Logos 1(1910-11),289-
341; B.T. by Quentin Lauer, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the
Crisis o/Philosophy, ed. Quentin Lauer, New York: Harper & Row, 1965, pp. 71-147.
56 Gesamtausgabe n. 56157, p. 89: ent-lebt, ent-deutet, ent-geschichtlicht,lnjizierung.
16 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
subject only of acts directed to theoretical objects."s9 Five years later (June 12,
1925) Heidegger told his students in the classroom at Marburg: "Let me say
that Hussed is aware of my objections from my lecture courses in Freiburg as
well as here in Marburg and from personal conversations, and is essentially
making allowances for them....,,60 But it was this same Heidegger who, only
two years earlier (February 20, 1923), had written to Karl Lowith to describe
the last hours of his seminar of winter semester 1922-23:
In the final hours of the seminar, I publicly burned and destroyed the Ideas to
such an extent that I dare say that the essential foundations for the whole [of my
work] are now cleanly laid out. Looking back from this vantage point to the Logi-
cal Investigations, I am now convinced that Husserl was never a philosopher, not
even for one second in his life. He becomes ever more ludicroUS. 61
Likewise on May 8, 1923, Heidegger again wrote to Lowith, this time to say
that Heidegger's lecture course that semester, Ontologie: Hermeneutik der
Faktizitat
Husserl has come entirely unglued - if, that is, he ever was "glued," which more
and more I have begun to doubt of late. He goes from pillar to post, uttering
trivilialties that would make you weep. He lives off his mission as the "Founder
of Phenomenology," but nobody knows what that means. 63
59 Ms. Gerda Walther's letter to Alexander Pfiinder, written on Friday. June 20. 1919. describes a philo-
sophical attack on the pure ego that Heidegger and others were planning for the following morning. when
Husserl would hold his accustomed Saturday discussions with his students. The attack, she says. is to be
spearheaded by Julius Ebbinghaus and to be followed up by Heidegger in the manner indicated above. (See
R m Pfiinder. 20.VlI9. Hussed-Archives. Leuven). See also her Zum anderen Vfer: Yom Marxismus und
Atheismus zum Christentum, Remagen: Der Leuchter-Otto Reichl Verlag, 1960. p. 213f.
60 Martin Heidegger. Prolegomena zur Geschichte des ZeitbegrijJs, Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 20, ed. Petra
Jaeger, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979, p. 167; E.T.: History of the Concept of Time, trans.
Theodore Kisiel, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 121.
61 The translation here is by Theodore Kisiel, to whom I am grateful for this and the next text, which do
nat appear in "Drei Briefe Martin Heideggers an Karl LOwith." ed. Hartmut Tietjen. in Zur philosophischen
Aktualitiit Heideggers. ed. Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Poggeler. 3 vols .• Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann.
1990. 1991. here n (1990). pp. 27-39. The seminar in question was ''Phenomenological Exercises for
Be~ers in Connection with Husserl. Ideas I."
2 See the previous footnote.
63 Heidegger/Jaspers. Briefwechsel (July 14. 1923), p. 42.
18 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
The question of the differences between Husserl and Heidegger that emerge
in Heidegger's lecture courses between 1919 and 1928 lies beyond the scope
of the present work. It has been exhaustively treated in Theodore Kisiel's The
Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time, and in shorter form in his article
"Husserl and Heidegger.,,65 With only passing reference to some of the criti-
cisms, we now tum to the other end of the relation between Husserl and
Heidegger, the parting of the ways.66
The EB Article and the Amsterdam Lectures were composed at a time
(1927-28) when Husserl and Heidegger's relationship was falling apart over
philosophical differences. It had long been public knowledge that Heidegger's
approach to phenomenology was quite different from HusserI's and perhaps
even opposed to it. But in 1927-28 the personal and philosophical relation
between the two men came under great strain and finally ruptured. While we
cannot engage all the details, we may note at least the following events.
64 I draw the title from James C. Morrison's "Husserl and Heidegger: The Parting of the Ways," in Freder-
ick Elliston, ed., Heidegger's Existential Analytic, The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978, pp. 47-60.
65 Theodore Kisiel, "Husserl and Heidegger" in Encyclopaedia of Phenomenology, ed. Lester Embree.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1997, pp. 333-339.
66 A list of examples of criticisms of Husserl that Heidegger made during his lecture courses would in-
clude the following. (1) Summer semester, 1920, "Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of
Philosophical Concept-Formation": July 19 (critique of Husserl's notion of intuitive presentation and the idea
of constitution); July 22 (general critique of the primacy of the theoretical); July 26 (critique of the ideas of
philosophy as science and of a priori grammar). (2) Summer semester, 1923, "Ontology: Hermeneutics of
Facticity": July 4 (critique of the model of mathematical rigor and of the epistemological emphasis and lack
of history in phenomenology); cf. Martin Heidegger, Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitiit), Gesamtaus-
gabe IJI63, ed. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988, pp. 71 and 75. (3)
Winter semester, 1923-24, "Introduction to Phenomenological Research": November 19 and 20 (attack on
Husserl's notion of certitude, evidence, and absolute knowledge); December 4 (critique of the primacy of
theoretical interests); February 15-26 (generalized critique of Husserl via critique of Descartes on, e.g.,
mathematical method). (4) Summer semester, 1925, "History of the Concept of Time": June 9-16 (critique of
Husserl's notion of consciousness and his neglect of the question of being); Martin Heidegger, Prolegomena
zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, pp. 140-182; E.T. History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, pp. 102-
131. (5) Winter semester, 1925-26, "Logic (Aristotle)": November 24-30 (passim: critique of Husserl's
notion of truth): cf. Martin Heidegger, Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit, Gesamtausgabe IJI21, ed.
Walter BiemeI, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976, pp. 89-125. (6) Summer semester, 1927,
"Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie": May 4 (differences between Husserl's and Heidegger's notion of
phenomenological reduction); May 11 (critique of Russerl's notion of intentionality); May 28 (critique of
Husserl's notion of being as consciousness); June 22 (critique of Husserl's inadequate treatment oflogic): cf.
Martin Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie, Gesamtausgabe, IJI24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm
von Herrmann, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975, pp. 81 (cf. 89-90), 175-6, and 253; E.T.,
The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1982, pp. 54 (cf. p. 64), 124-5, and 178. (7) Summer semester, 1928, "Logic (Leibniz)": July 2
(critique of Husserl on the being of consciousness, on intentionality, on V07]CJ"as primarily cognitive); July
12 (critique of Russerl's notion of ontology): cf. Martin Heidegger, Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der
Logik, Gesamtausgabe IJI26, ed. Klaus Held, Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978, pp. 167 and
190; E.T. by Michael Heim, The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana
University Press, 1984, pp. 133 and 150.
GENERAL INTRODUCfION 19
extend until April 29. 70 On April 1, true to his promise, Heidegger sent off to
Niemeyer Publishers the manuscript of the first thirty-eight sections of Sein
und Zeit. Exactly one week later, on Hussed's sixty-seventh birthday, Heideg-
ger presented the Master with a bouquet of flowers and a handwritten page,
inscribed: 7 !
To Edmupd Husserl
in grateful respect and friendship.
Hussed saved this paper and, a year later when the book was published, glued
it into his own copy of Sein und Zeit.
70 Briefwechsel IX, p. 66 (April 28, 1926, to Albrecht). The Husserls were lodged for the duration in the
home of a Frau Ratzinger.
71 See Briefwechsel m, p. 230 (April 16, 1926, Malvine Husserl to Ingarden): "Brilliant sunshine, cordial
birthday letters from everywhere, and Heidegger (who has his own cabin up here, where he spends all his
holidays with his family) brought a scroll, covered with flowers, on which was inscribed the dedication of the
work he has just completed: 'To Edmund Husserl in grateful respect and friendship.' This book bears the title
Being and Time and will be published as the leading article in the next volume [i.e, Volume VIll] of the
Jahrbuch." In the 1960s Heidegger recalled that at this point the manuscript of Sein und Zeit was "almost
finished [nahezu fertig]." See the editor's introduction to Edmund Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren
Zeitbewusstseins (1893-1917), Husserliana: Gesammelte Werke, vol. X, ed. Rudolf Boehm, The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, p.xiv.
72 For further details on this dedication page, and the changes that would be made in it in the published
version, see below, ''The Marginal Remarks in Being and Time."
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 21
73 See Hussed's letter to Heidegger concerning this, Briejwechsel IV, p. 139 (December 1926).
74 SZ was not published "in February [of 1927]" as Heidegger reports in "Mein Weg in die Phiinome-
nologie," p. 88, E.T. p. 81. But when it was published is a matter of some debate. (1) Bast and Delfosse note
that the separately printed version ("Sonderdruck") appeared "shortly after" the lahrbuch edition: "Wenig
spater erschien die Separatausgabe, der in den Aufl[age] sogenannte 'Sonderdruck,'" Rainer A. Bast and
Heinrich P. Delfosse, Handbuch zum Textstudium von Martin Heideggers 'Sein und Zeit', vol. 1: Stellenin-
dizes, philologisch-kritischer Apparat, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1979, p. 382. (2) However, Kisiel gives good
evidence, based on Briejwechsel IV, p. 144 (May 8, 1927, to Heidegger) that the order of publication was
reversed (Genesis, p. 487 taken with p. 565, n. 30). (3) Kisiel likewise dates the publication of SZ to "late
April 1927" (Genesis, p. 489); however, the work may have appeared earlier than that. Hussed's
"Sonderdruck" version, in which he made his marginal notes, is inscribed by Heidegger "Zum 8. April
1927," that is, Hussed's sixty-eighth birthday. Had the separate printing appeared by that date - hence, in
earlYfllther than late April? Did the separate printing appear after that date and did Heidegger backdate his
inscription to Hussed' s birthday?
75 (1) Sein und Zeit, Erste Hiilfte, Sonderdruck aus lahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phiinomenologische
Forschung, Band vn [sic!], Halle a.d. Saale, Niemeyer 1927 (format: 23 x 17 cm.), pp. xii + 438; and (2) in
lahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, vol. vm, pages v-ix + 1-438, sharing that
volume with Oskar Becker's Mathematische Existenz: Untersuchungen zur Logik und Ontologie mathema-
tischer Phiinomene, pages ix-xii + 439-809. The printer of both the "Sonderdruck" and the lahrbuch was
the same: Buchdruckerei des Waisenhauses, in Halle.
76 Heidegger/Jaspers, Briejwechsel p. 74 (March 1, 1927) and p. 76 (April 18, 1927); also Martin Hei-
degger and Elisabeth Blochmann, Briejwechsel, 1918-1969, ed. Joachim W. Storck, Marbach am Neckar:
Deutsches Literaturarchiv, 1989, p. 19 (March 27,1927). Hereinafter abbreviated as: HeideggerlBlochmann,
Briejwechsel.
77 On Tuesday, AprilS, Hussed arrived back in Freiburg after spending a month with his son Gerhart in
Kiel. He immediately wrote to Heidegger in Todtnauberg: "Dearest friend, I have just gotten home from the
railroad station, and I hear of your inquiry [presumably to visit Hussed, perhaps on the 8th]. It goes without
saying that you and your wife are cordially welcome. But I can't believe it is possible that you are already
planning to go back to Marburg. You must visit with me a while and be my guest so that we can also have
some time to talk philosophy [wissenschaftlich]. Naturally you can lodge with us." Briejwechsel IV, p. 140
(AprilS, 1927, to Heidegger).
22 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Lessing
April 8, 1927.
M. Heidegger.
Adumbrations of Conflict
HusserI's alienation from Sein und Zeit was arguably a reasonable reaction.
In 1926 HusserI apparently did not know either how deeply Heidegger was
opposed to HusserI's transcendental phenomenology or how long this had
been the case (see Heidegger's remarks to Lowith in 1923, cited above). And
of course he could not have known what Heidegger wrote to Jaspers at
Christmas of 1926: "Ifthe treatise has been written 'against' anyone, then it
has been written against HusserI; he saw that right away, but from the start he
has remained focused on the positive. What I write against - only with indi-
rection, to be sure - is sham-philosophy .... "81 Nonetheless, HusserI was not
entirely oblivious of Heidegger's opposition. For some years he had been
hearing rumors that Heidegger was not just taking a different approach to
phenomenology but also working against Husserl. Years later Hussed con-
fided bittedy to Alexander Pfander,
Mter Sein und Zeit was published Heidegger took steps to mitigate
Hussed's fears, and there is some evidence that he may have succeeded for a
while. As Hussed told Pfander: "He himself steadily denied that he would
abandon my transcendental phenomenology, and he referred me to his future
second volume [of Sein und Zeit, which never appeared]. Given my low self-
confidence at the time, I preferred to doubt myself, my capacity to follow and
appreciate the unfamiliar themes of his thought, than to doubt him."s3
But, Heidegger's denials aside, Hussed soon began to catch on. On August
3, 1927, while he was engaged on his first reading of the published volume,
Hussed told Dietrich Mahnke, "On the face of it, [Sein und Zeit] distances
itself entirely from my analytic phenomenology....,,84 Perhaps it was in order to
test that impression that Hussed invited Heidegger first to criticize, and then to
collaborate on, the Encyclopaedia Britannica article.
embedded in "factical Dasein." In a letter written to Hussed two days after the
visit, Heidegger made a brief effort "to characterize the fundamental orienta-
tion of Sein und Zeit within the transcendental problem."gS In the Introduction
to the EB Article, I shall go into the details of that visit. At this point suffice it
to say that this abortive effort at collaboration made it amply clear to Hussed
that Heidegger was not about to follow in his philosophical footsteps. Those
days mark the turning point in the relation of Hussed and Heidegger insofar as
they let Hussed see for the first time just how far apart the two philosophers
were.
Having completed the fourth and fmal draft of his EB Article by early
December, 1927, Hussed devoted himself to fmishing his reading of Sein und
Zeit. The result was that his "focus on the positive," as Heidegger had put it to
Jaspers (December 26, 1926), quickly faded. His letters to Roman Ingarden
and Dietrich Mahnke towards the end of 1927 clearly exhibit a growing disap-
pointment with Heidegger. To Ingarden, for example, he expressed his decided
regrets:
Heidegger has become a close friend of mine, and I am one of his admirers, as
much as I must really regret that, regarding method and content, his work (and his
lecture courses too, for that matter) seem to be essentially different from my
works and courses; in any event, up to now there is still no bridge between him
and me that the students we share in common can cross. As regards any further
philosophy [between us], a lot depends on how and whether he works his way
through to grasping my general intentions. Unfortunately I did not determine his
philosophical upbringing; clearly he was already into his own way of doing things
when he began studying my writings. 86
85 .....die grundslitzliche Tendenz von 'Sein und Zeit' innerhalb des transzendentalen Problems zu kenn-
zeichnen": Heidegger's letter to Husserl, October 22, 1927, Hu IX, 600; B.T., in Part One, below.
86 Briefwechsel Ill, p. 234 (November 19, 1927, to 1ngarden); cr. also Ill, p. 236 (December 26,1927, to
Jngarden) and Ill, p. 457ff. (December 26, 1927, to Mahnke).
GENERAL lNTRODUCfION 25
tion of its most important basic concepts and the basic doctrines they desig-
nate. Only now do I see how much I was lacking in understanding, for I had
not yet gotten it right on the chapters dealing with temporality and historic-
ity.,,87
Whether or not Heidegger brought HusserI the requested abstract on his
way to Todtnauberl8 (no such document has yet been found in HusserI's
papers), five days after Christmas Mrs. HusserI followed up with a letter to
Heidegger at his cabin: "My husband would like you to break your return trip
[from Todtnauberg to Marburg] in such a way that you could give him a whole
day for philosophical discussion of your book. He has devoted the entire
[Christmas] vacation exclusively to studying the work, and he finds it indis-
pensable to be instructed by you on a number of points that he cannot get
entirely clear on.,,89
The meeting took place at HusserI's home on Sunday, January 8, 1928, as
Heidegger was about to leave Todtnauberg for Marburg. We do not know
what was said between the two philosophers. Certainly it is possible that
Heidegger succeeded in explaining to HusserI the more obscure parts of Sein
und Zeit. However, it is difficult to imagine that Heidegger persuaded HusserI
that the criticisms he had been leveling against the phenomenology of absolute
subjectivity were merely "formalistic," or convinced him that factical Dasein
"harbors within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.,,90 All we
have is one brief, almost telegraphic, report about the meeting. It stems from
Heidegger, and seems a bit too optimistic. Apparently he did not realize how
bad things had gotten between him and HusserI. On January 11, 1928, he
wrote to Elisabeth Blochmann: "Last Sunday I walked down to Freiburg [from
Todtnauberg] and had yet another beautiful, rich day with Husserl.,,91
Since at least April 8, 1926 Husserl had urged upon Heidegger the editing
and publishing of Husserl's Gottingen lectures on the intentional character of
time-consciousness. (In interviews and conununications from the 1940s
through the 1960s Heidegger took pains to deny rumors that he took the
initiative and persuaded Husserl to let him edit the lectures for the purpose of
revealing the contrast between Husserl's conception of time and his own.92)
As Heidegger later recalled events, Husserl first made the proposal to him in
Todtnauberg on the very day Heidegger dedicated Sein und Zeit to him; and
Heidegger accepted, perhaps reluctantly, with the understanding that he could
not take up the work until at least the autumn of 1927.93 In fact, he did not turn
to the task until the end of February 1928.
The lectures deal with the self-constitution of the "phenomenological time"
that underlies the temporal constitution of the pure data of sensation. They
stem from Husserl's lecture course of the winter semester 1904-1905, "Major
Points in the Phenomenology and Theory of Knowledge," and specifically
from the concluding fourth section of the course (February 1905) entitled
"Phenomenology of Internal Time-consciousness" or equally "On the Phe-
nomenology of Time." The manuscript was a very complicated affair.
Husserl's original, handwritten text of the lectures had been heavily (and
controversially) edited and then typed out by Edith Stein in the sununer of
1917.94 Jt was these pages (not the original manuscript, written in shorthand)
92 See Vincente Marrero, Guardini. Picasso. Heidegger (Tres Visitas), Madrid, 1959, p. 43f.: "No faltan
en Friburgo quienes digan que las lecciones de Husser! sobre el tiempo, publicados con antelaci6n a todo esto
por el mismo Heidegger en la lahrbuch, no escondieron otro prop6sito que mostrar las diferentes concepcio-
nes que habfa entre su maestro y la suya."
93 See the editor's introduction to Edmund Husser!, Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins
(1893-1917), Husserliana: Gesammelte Wake, vol. X, ed. Rudolf Boehm, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff,
1966, p. xxiii-xxiv. Boehm bases his remarks in part on recollections that Heidegger shared with him: see p.
xxiii, n. 1. Boehm's introduction, with this infonnation, is not found in the B.T.: Edmund Husserl, On the
Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time (1893-1917), trans. John Barnett Brough, Collected
Works, ed. Rudolf Bernet, lV, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991. This B.T. supplants the earlier one by Jarnes S.
Churchill, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness. Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1964.
94 The complexities of the text - and the strong redactional role of Edith Stein - are discussed in the
editor's introduction to Husserl, Zur Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, especially pp. xix-xxi,
and in the introduction to the B.T. by John Barnett Brough. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of
Internal Time, pp. xi-xviii. Cf. Ms. Stein's remarks on the matter ("I have just come upon the bundle on
Zeitbewu,fttsein ... a mther sorry mess .... Still 1 am very eager to see whether it can be made into some kind of
monograph" etc.): German text in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 23 (1962), pp. 171-173;
B.T., Edith Stein, Self-Portrait in Letters. 1916-1942, trans. Josephine Koeppel, Collected Works, ed. by L.
Gelber and Romaeus Leuven, vol. 5, Washington, D.C.: Institute of Cannelite Studies, 1993, pp. 18-21.
GENERAL INTRODUcnON 27
95 On Wednesday, February 29, 1928, Husserl and Heidegger met in Freiburg as they were going their
separate ways to vacations in the Black Forest (Heidegger to Todlnauberg, Husserl to Breilnau). Husser! gave
Heidegger the manuscript of the lectures on time-consciousness so that Heidegger could begin editing them.
See Husserl/Jaspers, Briefwecluiel, pp. 90-1 (February 25 and March 6,1928, Heirlegger to Jaspers); Husser!
BriefwecluiellV, p. 152 (March 5, 1928, to Heidegger),
96 Ironically, on the first of the galley pages the author of the text was designated as "Martin Heidegger"
rather than Edmund Husserl. Heidegger caught the error. See Briefwecluiel IV, p. 158 (July 10, 1928,
Malvine Husserl to Heidegger).
97 BriefwecluiellV, p. 157 (May 9, 1928, to Heidegger). See Husserl's lelter to Ingarden, Briefwecluielm.
p. 214 (July 28, 1928): "[The lectures will soon be published] unchanged, merely cleaned up a bit as regards
style, and edited by Heidegger. I didn't even get to see the revisions."
98 "Auch heute noch ist dieser Ausdruck kein Losungswort, sondem der Titel eines zentralen Problems."
lahrbuch flir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, IX (1928), 367; reprinted in Husserl, Zur
Phiinomenologie des inneren Zeitbewusstseins, p. xxiv-xxv, here p. xxv; and found in the earlier E.T. by
James S. Churchill, The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, p. 15. Here Heidegger was only
echoing what he had told his students one year before, on May II, 1927: "Nonetheless, it must be said that
this enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality is far from having been adequately grasped philosophically."
Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie, p. 81; cf. pp. 89-90; The Basic Problems of Phe-
nomenology, p. 54; cf. p. 64.
99 Edmund Husser!, "Vor!esungen zur Phiinomenologie des inneren ZeitbewuBtseins," lahrbuch flir
Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung IX (1928), 367-498 [=Hu X, 3-134], with Heidegger's
"Vorbemerkung des Herausgebers" on pp. 367-338 [=Hu X, xxiv-xxv]. Cf. also Briefwecluiel IX, p. 356
(June 29,1928, Malvine Husser! to Elisabeth Rosenberg) and m, 241 (July 13, 1928, Husser! to Ingarden).
100 Briefwecluiel V, p. 186 (December 26,1928, to Rickert).
28 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Hussed had worked hard over the years to guarantee that Heidegger would
succeed him in the chair of philosophy (Seminar 1) at the Albert Ludwig's
University in Freiburg. However, by the time that Hussed was ready to retire
and the offer was made to Heidegger (February 1928), the split between the
two philosophers had widened beyond repair. If Sein und Zeit was not enough,
the three works that Heidegger published in 1929 - "Vom Wesen des Grun-
des," Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, and "Was ist Metaphysik?" -
confirmed beyond a shadow of a doubt how far apart the two philosophers had
grown. t02
Once Heidegger moved to Freiburg in the autumn of 1928, personal con-
tacts between the two philosophers grew less and less frequent,103 and the "life
of profound intellectual exchange and steady philosophical continuity,,,t04
which Hussed had long hoped for, vanished like smoke. In Hussed's eyes it
was not just that he had lost one more disciple. Heidegger was intended to be
the disciple, whose assigned role was to preserve and advance Hussed' s work
after the Master's demise. But the disciple chose to ignore his mission.
Eventually Heidegger admitted as much. On April 8, 1929, as he publicly
presented Hussed with a collection of essays in celebration of his seventieth
birthday and in honor of his life's work, Heidegger said: "The works we
101 (1) "Insufficient introduction": Dorion Cairns, Conversations with Husserl and Fink, ed. by the
Husserl-Archives, The Hague: Nijhoff, 1976, pp. 16 and 28. (2) "Durchaus angemessen": BriefwechsellV, p.
156 (May 9, 1928, to Heidegger).
102 (1) "Vom Wesen des Grundes" was part of the Festschrift for Husserl. Even though the volume was
not officially published until May 14, 1929, it was available in some form by the time of the celebration,
April 8, 1929. (2) Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik appeared at least by July of 1929 (Jaspers received
a copy between July 7 and 14: Heidegger/Jaspers, Briefwechsel, pp. 123, 124). On April 12, 1929 Heidegger
had said he expected it to be printed in May (HeideggerlBlochmann, Briefwechsel, p. 30), but in fact he
wrote the preface to the book only on May 12, 1929. Heidegger's handwritten dedication in Husserl's copy
of the book ("Mit herzlichem GruB. I M. Heidegger") is undated. (3) Was ist Metaphysik? appeared only
around Christmas of 1929. Heidegger's handwritten dedication in Husserl's copy ("Edmund Husserll in aller
Verehrung und Freundschaft iiberreicht I Martin Heidegger") is dated "Christmas 1929"; cf. also Heideg-
gerlBlochmann, Briefwechsel, p. 34.
103 " ••• from the very beginning after he moved here (with the exception of the first few months) he stopped
coming to visit me..... : Briefwechsel m, p. 473 (January 8, 1931, to Mahnke). "I see him once every couple
months, less frequently than 1 see my other colleagues": IT, 183 (January 6, 1931, to pflinder), E.T. in
Ap~ndix below.
04 Briefwechsel IT, p. 182 (to pflinder, January 6, 1931); also lV, 269 (to Landgrebe, October 1, 1931).
GENERAL ThITRODUCTION 29
present you are merely a testimony that we wanted to follow your leadership,
not proof that we succeeded in becoming your disciples."los It was downhill
from then on.
That summer, 1929, Hussed began a close and very critical reading of
Heidegger's recent texts. As he wrote to Pflinder: "Immediately after the
printing of my last book [Formale und transzendentale Logik], in order to
come to a clear-headed and definitive position on Heideggerian philosophy, I
dedicated two months to studying Sein und Zeit, as well as his more recent
writings."I06 Those other writings were Kant und das Problem der Meta-
physik, which had just appeared, and "Vom Wesen des Grundes" (although
Hussert's personal c0fcy has only two insignificant marks in it). This was
Hussed's second time 07 through Sein und Zeit. In the middle of this effort
Hussed attended Heidegger's official Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg Univer-
sity, "What is Metaphysics?" (July 24, 1929), a text that only confirmed the
abyss between the two philosophers.
Hussed continued his close reading and note-taking during his vacation in
Tremezzo, Italy (August 15 to September 5, 1929), on the west shore of Lake
Como. I08 There, as his wife would later recall, Hussed ''worked through
Heidegger's book thoroughly."I09 From this three-week vacation, as well as
the six weeks previous, stem all of Hussed's notes in Kant und das Problem
der Metaphysik and presumably many of those in Sein und Zeit. The results of
those readings, spread over the margins of both works, appear in Part Three of
this volume. They are almost entirely negative. Hussed summed up his study
of Heidegger in one heavy sentence: "I came to the conclusion that I can not
admit his work within the framework of my phenomenology and unfortunately
that I also must reject it entirely as regards its method, and in the essentials as
regards its content.,,110 His later remark to Dietrich Mahnke was even stronger:
" .. .1 came to the conclusion that his 'phenomenology' has nothing to do with
120 Husser! delivered "Phenomenology and Anthropology" to members of the Kantgesellschaft in Frank-
furt (June 1, 1931, by invitation of Max Horldleimer), Berlin (June 10), and Halle (June 16). (The date
"1932" given in Hu IX, p. 615, second paragraph, is erroneous.) The lecture was first published under the
title "Phiinomenologie und Anthropologie" in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2 (1941), 1-14.
The definitive version appears in Edmund Husser!, Aufsatze und Vonrage (1922-1937), Gesammelte Werke,
XXVII, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989, pp. 164-181, with critical notes
at pp. 300-307. English translation by Richard G. Schmitt in Realism and the Background of Phenomenol-
ogy, ed. Roderick M. Chisholm, New Yorlc and Glencoe, lliinois: Free Press, 1960, pp. 129-142, and in
Edmund Husser!, Shoner Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, South Bend, Indiana:
Notre Dame University Press, 1981, pp. 315-323. A new and improved translation appears in the Appendix,
below.
121 Husser!, Aufsiitze und Vonriige (1922-1937), p. 164. For Husser!'s charge that Heidegger's work is
"anthropology" see Briefwechsel VI, p. 277 (August 3, 1929, to Misch) and ill, p. 478 (May 12, 1931, to
Mahnke).
122 Heidegger read Heinrich Miihsam's report on the lecture, "Die Welt wird eingeklarnmert," Unterhal-
tungsblatt der Vossischen Zeitung (June 12, 1931). Years later in his Spiegel-interview (1966) Heidegger
would confuse this Heinrich Miihsam with the German poet, playwright, and anarchist Erich Miihsam, who
died in a Nazi concentration camp in 1934. See Martin Heidegger, "Nur noch ein Gott karin uns retten," Der
Spiegel, 23 (May 31,1976), p. 199; E.T. '''Only a God Can Save Us': The Spiegel Interview (1966)," trans.
William 1. Richardson, in Thomas Sheehan, ed., Heidegger, the Man and the Thinker, Brunswick, New
Jersey: Rutgers U.P.fTransaction Publishers, 1981, p. 51. Also Karl Schuhmann, "Zu Heideggers Spiegel-
Ges~riich iiber Husser!," Zeitschrift for philosophische Forschung, 32 (1978), 603-608.
1 3 For the earliest record (autumn, 1945) of Heidegger's vexation at reading the Miihsam article see
Alfred de Towarnicki, "Visite it Martin Heidegger," Temps flUJdemes, 1, 4 (1945-1946), p. 716. For the
remarlcs he made in 1996 see the Spiegel-interview (previous footnote).
124 BriefwechsellX, p. 378 (June 22, 1930) and IX, 416 (January 25, 1933): both letters are from Malvine
Husser! to Elisabeth Rosenberg.
125 Briefwechsel III, p. 493 (May 4-5, 1933, to Mahnke).
126 BriefwechsellV, p. 289 (May 28, 1932, to Landgrebe) and III, 493 (May 4/5, 1933, to Mahnke); on
Heidegger's treatment of Eduard Baumgarten: IX, 406 (May 31,1932, to Elisabeth Rosenberg), IX 401,409
(February 3 and June 21,1932: Malvine Husser! to Elisabeth Rosenberg). See also the anecdotes that Eduard
Baumgarten related to David Luban: Berel Lang, Heidegger's Silence, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1996, pp. 104-108.
32 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
National Socialism.127 These matters, however, are not our direct concern
here, nor is the question of Heidegger's absence from Hussed's funeral (April
29, 1938) or his later, and contradictory, explanations of that matter. 128
127 See, for example, Briefivechsel IV, p. 290-1 (to Jngarden, December 11, 1933): "Heidegger is the
National-Socialist rector (in accordance with the Fuhrer-principle) in Freiburg, and likewise from now on the
leader of the reform of the universities in the new Reich."
128 See Schuhmann, ''Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gesprach tiber Husserl," pp. 611-612. Also, Antonio Gnoli
and Franco Volpi's interview with Hermann Heidegger, "Mio padre, un genio normale," La Repubblica
(Rome), April 12, 1996, pp. 38-39; and Hugo Ott, "Der eine fehlte, der nicht hiitte fehlen dtirfen: Heideg-
ger," Badische Zeitung, Nr. 191 (August 19,1996). I am grateful to Prof. Hans Seigfried for pointing out this
last article.
PART ONE
Thomas Sheehan
Outline
Thomas Sheehan
HusserI's writing and redacting of the EB Article extended from early Sep-
tember 1927 through at least February 1928. The present introduction, in the
form of a Redaktionsgeschichte, focuses on the development of the drafts of
the Article, and particularly the first and second drafts. The pioneering edito-
rial work of Professor Walter Biemel, published in Hu IX, is the indispensable
foundation for what follows.' To his work we have added our own close study
of the available manuscripts in the light of other materials, and we place this
research in the appendix following the present introduction. It is indispensable
for understanding the intricate and often puzzling questions pertaining to the
chronology of drafts of the Article.
It is not known exactly when in 1927 James Louis Garvin, British editor of
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, contacted HusserI with an invitation to write
the entry "Phenomenology" for the new, fourteenth edition.2 No relevant letter
1 Prof. Biemel provides an earlier (1950) and a later (1962) description of the manuscripts of the EB
Article (which are catalogued in the Hussed-Archives as M ill 10). Only the later description, which is found
in Hu IX (1962), pp. 590--591, is correct. The earlier description is almost entirely wrong and should be
discarded. It is found in Walter Biemel, "Husseds Encyclopaedia-Britannica Artikel und Heideggers
Anmerkungen dazu," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 12 (1950), p. 247-248, n. 1; in E.T., "Hussed's Encyclo-
paedia Britannica Article and Heidegger!s Remarks Thereon," trans. P. McConnick and F. Elliston in
Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals, p. 303, n. 1. As regards the later description of the manuscripts in Hu
IX, the following printers errors have been found: (1) p. 590, three lines from the bottom: Instead of "264,15"
read: "264,1-266,15." (2) p. 591.2: Instead of "Gruppe 1" read ''Gruppe 2." (3) p. 591, ten lines from the
bottom: Instead of"M ill 104" read: "M ill 10 ill 4." (4) p. 605, re 277.22: Add "Letzte Ausarbeitung" to the
title of C2: cf. the same title at p. 591. (5) At p. 607.20--21, Biemel attributes an interlinear remark in C2, p.
6.8 ("seelischer Innerlichkeiten?") to Heidegger, whereas it is virtually certain that Heidegger did not read
C2. The words may stem from Ingarden.
2 The thineenth edition of the Britannica had appeared in 1926, but, like the twelfth edition of 1922, it
consisted only of supplements (even if extraordinary ones - by Trotsky and Einstein, for example) to the
famous eleventh edition brought out by Hugh Chisholm in 1911. The founeenth edition would remain in
print (with revisions) from 1929 until 1974. Thefifteenth edition (1974 to the present; designed by Mortimer
Adler) carries a new sub-title - 'The New Encyclopaedia Britannica" - which replaced the subtitle that had
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 37
has been found in Husserl's papers, and in 1993 the Editorial Offices of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. reported that the company's correspondence
with Husserl was destroyed after the edition appeared. We do know that in
Aprill927 Garvin set September 1929 as the target date for publication of the
new Britannica (that goal was, in fact, met), and that sometime after February
of 1928 the final English version of HusserI's Article was completed by
Christopher V. Salmon. The first recorded mention of the EB Article comes
on September 30, 1927, in Husserl's letter to his friend Paul Jensen of Gottin-
gen: 3
.. .1 have had to work hard, and perhaps a bit too much, during this vacation pe-
riod, in the last instance on another article, entitled "Phenomenology," for the En-
cyclopaedia Britannica. It also proved to be quite difficult since I was held to a
very restricted length (equal to about twelve pages of the lahrbuch). But it finally
turned out to my satisfaction.4
been used from 1768 through 1973: "A New Survey of Universal Knowledge." Beginning in 1928 the
Britannica was owned by Sears, Roebuck, and Co., which was the company that paid Hussed for his Article.
The fourteenth edition of the Encyclopaedia was printed in Chicago and was published in September 1929
(just weeks before the New York Stock Market crashed) at an estimated cost of $2.5 million. See Eugene P.
Sheehy, ed., Guide to Reference Books, 10th ed., Chicago: American Library Association, 1986, pp. 134-
135; and Herman Kogan, The Great EB, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958, chapters 17 and
18.
3 The first edition of Karl Schuhmann's Husserl-Chronik, p. 320, incorrectly indicates that Husserl's
earliest mention of the Article dates to a letter of "3.n.27" (i.e., February 3, 1927) written to Gustav Albrecht.
I am grateful to Prof. Karl Schuhmann for clarifying (in his letter of August 12, 1994) that "3.n.27," is a
misprint for "13.x1.27."
4 Briefwechsel IX, p. 306. A lahrbuch page averaged about 360 words; hence the article was limited to
around 4000 words. Salmon's condensed translation comes to 3844 words without bibliography, 4017 with
bibliography.
38 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
S pp. 24-25 of Draft Al (Le., the last lines of the Gennan draft plus the two pages of bibliography) are
attached to the end of this text.
6 Here and in the following draft, p. i is the cover sheet, and p. ii is the introductory paragraph, whereas
pp. 1-2 are the bibliography at the end. Concerning the missing pages, see BriejWechsel IV, p. 152 (March 5,
1928, Husserl to Heidegger).
7 The original is lost.
S The original is lost.
40 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Draft A
(September 1927)
The composing of Draft A: HusserI wrote Draft A, the first version of the
Article, in September 1927. He began the work while on vacation in Switzer-
land (September 1-15) and finished it thereafter at his home in Freiburg. 9 This
original text, written in Gabelsberg shorthand, came to some 5000 words, and
has since been lost. We call it Draft AO.
Not long after September 15 HusserI had Ludwig Landgrebe, his research
assistant at Freiburg University, type out this shorthand manuscript into
twenty-five double-spaced pages, with two carbon copies.lO After studying the
typed version, HusserI added two more pages, numbered as "Sa" and "7a," for
a total of twenty-seven pages. This original typescript of the shorthand version
of Draft A has since been lost. We call it Draft AOO. However, the two carbon
copies have survived, and we refer to them as Draft Al and Draft A2.11
The outline of Draft A: Draft A is formally divided into two parts -
"Psychological Phenomenology as 'Pure' Phenomenology" and "Transcend-
ental Phenomenology as Contrasted with Psychological Phenomenology."
However, it actually deals with three topics that would continue to occupy
HusserI throughout all the drafts for the Article. And as a sign of the tentative-
ness of the draft, the second of the three topics - the historical treatment of
phenomenology - is awkwardly split between the Parts I and II:
9 On the vacation in Switzerland: Briejwechsel VIII, p. 39, n. 2, correcting Edmund Husseri, Briefe an
lngarden, ed. Roman Ingarden, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968, p. 152.
10 Page 1 through the first half of p. 24 is double-spaced; the bibliography (second half of p. 24, plus p.
25) is single-spaced.
11 On p. 1 of Draft A2 Husseri writes in pencil: "Erste Entwurf 1-21" ("First Draft, [pp.] 1-21"). How-
ever, ADO was made up of twenty:five pages, numbered 1-25, with two inserted pages numbered "5a" and
"7a."
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 41
DRAFT A
GENERAL OUTLINE OF MAIN TOPICS
12 See Heidegger's letter to Karl LOwith, August 20,1927, in Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto P6ggeler, eds.
Zur philosophischen Aktualitiit Heideggers, n, 33 and 34; English translation by Gary Steiner in Karl
LOwith, Martin Heidegger and European Nihilism, ed. Richard Wolin, New Yorlc: Columbia University
Press, 1995, pp. 239 and 240.
13 Heidegger had been rereading Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in preparation for his autumn lecture
course, ''Phiinomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vemunft." The course, edited by
Ingtraud G6rland, has been published under that same title in Gesamtausgabe W25, Frankfurt am Main:
Vittorio Klostennann, 1977.
42 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Original plan
(September 27, 1927)
October 10-11: visit with Husserl (Monday and Tuesday)
October 11-16: visit with his brother Fritz in Messkirch
October 16-24: stay with Jaspers in Heidelberg
October 24: return to Marburg
14 In his letter of October 22, 1927 from Messkirch, Heidegger mentions having read yet a second time
("Ich habe ibn jetzt noch einmal durchgelesen") "the three sections of the manuscript that Landgrebe typed"
("den drei Abschnitten des von Landgrebe getippten Ms."), and he refers to these texts as "the second draft
for the 'Studien'" ("den zweiten Entwurf fUr die 'Studien"'). Heidegger adjudges the text to contain "the
essential elements" of "a pure psychology" ("reine Psychologie...die wesentlichen Stiicke") and urges Husserl
to publish this research (Hu IX, p. 601; E.T. in Appendices to Draft B, infra). The typescript of this manu-
script, kept at the Husserl-Archives under the signature M m 3, is in three parts: I. Aktivitiit und Passivitiit; II.
Wertkonstitution, Gemiit, Wille; and m. Modalitiiten und Tendenz.
15 Cf. Heidegger's letter to Husserl, October 22, 1927: "Diesmal stand alles unter dem Druck einer drin-
genden und wichtigen Aufgabe." Hu IX, p. 600.
16 A major motive for Heidegger's trip to Messkirch was to visit the grave of his mother, who had died in
his absence five months earlier. See Heidegger's letter to Dietrich Mahnke, October 21, 1927: Ms. 862
(Nachla8 Mahnke) der Universitiitsbibliothek Marburg: "Da ich bier in meiner Heimat nach das Grab meiner
in diesem Sommer verstorbenen Mutter besuchen will ...." Also Heidegger's remarks to Jaspers in their
Briejwechsel, p. 79 (September 27, 1927). That this visit was part of the original plan can be deduced from
Heidegger/Jaspers Briejwechsel, p. 82 (October 19, 1927): "Ich fahre erst heute nach meiner Heimat...."
emp,hasis added.
7 Heidegger/Jaspers, Briejwechsel, p. 79 (September 27, 1927): "Heute mochte ich nur fragen, ob Sie
bzw. Ihre Frau mich als Gast brauchen konnen nach dem 15. Oktober." That the stay with Jaspers was
planned to last something like eight days is presumed from ibid., p. 81 (October 6, 1927).
THE HISTORY OFTHE REDACfION OF THE EB ARTICLE 43
comments that he wrote into Draft Al were quite minimal, mostly minor
corrections to the text and repbrasings of Hussed' s prose. They were hardly
substantial and, as far as they went, certainly not controversial. Heidegger had
also read the "Studien," and sometime before October 6 he communicated his
evaluation of this text (and maybe of the EB Article as well) in a letter to
Hussed, which is now 10st. IS
It seems that once Hussed had ~ Heidegger's letter he requested a longer
visit with Heidegger than had been planned, no doubt to discuss the issues
raised by the two texts and especially by Draft A of the Article. He asked that
Heidegger plan to extend his scheduled stay from two days to a week. Heideg-
ger agreed and changed his schedule accordingly. On October 6 he wrote to
Jaspers that he could not come to Heidelberg by October 16, as at first
planned, but only around October 20. 19 Thus, Heidegger's new end-of-
vacation plans looked like this:
Second pian
(October 6, 1927)
October 10-17: visit with Hussed (one week)
October 17-20: visit with his brother Fritz in Messkirch
October 20-28: visit with Jaspers in Heidelberg
October 28: return to Marburg
Heidegger began his visit with Hussed on October 10; bUt after they had
worked together on the Article for a few days, Heidegger's plans changed yet
again. The working visit was now extended from six to ten days, surely at
Hussed's request. This constitutes Heidegger's third end-of-vacation sched-
ule. And so on October 19 - ten days into the visit - Heidegger wrote Jaspers
to say that only today ("erst heute") was he about to leave for Messkirch. This
meant that his trip to Heidelberg could not happen before October 23 or 24.
And yet even after writing that to Jaspers, Heidegger stayed with Hussed
yet one more day, for a total of eleven days of work on the EB Article. He
would not leave Freiburg for Messkirch until Thursday, October 2Oth.20
Hussed and Heidegger's visit in Freiburg led to a new draft of the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica Article. It also spelled the beginning of the end of their
18 On our hypothesis, this now lost letter is the one that Heidegger refers to in his letter to HusserI dated
October 22, 1927: "[Ich] halte mein UrteiI im Yorigen Brief aufrecht." I date that letter before October 6,
1927 on the hypothesis that this letter (and the "Urteil" that Heidegger expressed in it) led to HusserI's new
~uest that Heidegger extend his visit beyond just two days (see below).
9 HeideggerlJaspers, Briefwechsel, p. 81 (October 6, 1927): "Ich komme erst urn den 20. Oktober herum
und mllchte dann, wenn es Ihnen recht is, acht Tage bleiben."
20 On Friday, October 21, 1927, Heidegger wrote to Dietrich Mahnke from Messkirch: "Durch eine
gemeinsame Arbeit mit Husserl (Artikel liber Phanomenologie fUr die Encycl. Britannica) war ich bis gestern
in FreibUIg festgehalten." Ms. 862 (NachIaB Mahnke) der Universitiitsbibliothek MarbUIg.
44 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Final schedule
October 10-20: visit with Hussed (eleven daysil
October 20-23: visit with his brother Fritz in Messkirch
October 23-28: visit with Jaspers in Heidelber~
October 28/29: return to Marburg
DraftB
(October 10-22,1927)
DRAFTB
in manuscript in Hu IX (startingpa~es)
Section i 256.1
Section ii-a 264.1
Section ii-b 266.16
Section iii 271.1
21 On Wednesday, October 12, Husserl had a social evening at his house for the Oskar Beckers, Heideg-
gee, Paul Hoffman, Erik Honecker, the Fritz Kaufmanns, Ludwig Langrebe, and, from Japan, Baron Sh6z6
Kuki and his wife. See Schuhmann, HUlillerl-Chronik, p. 325, and Hussed, Briefe an Roman lngarden, p.
157, where Ingarden wrongly reports that "Heidegger had merely come from Marburg for a short visit."
22 HeideggerlBlochmann, Briefwechllel, p. 22 (October 21, 1927): "iibermorgen fahre ich bis zum 27.
Okt. zu Jaspers nach Heidelberg." However, Heidegger's letter to Mahnke, dated Marburg, Saturday,
October 29, 1927, opens: "Eben bin ich angekommen...": Ms. 862 (NachlaB Mahnke) der Universitlitsbiblio-
thek Marburg.
23 We capitalize the word "Sections" in order to indicate the crucial role these divisions of the text play in
the articulation of Draft B. Biemel refers to them as "groups" (''Groppe''). He distinguishes only three of
them (Hu IX, p. 591), thereby underplaying the break at the top ofB p. 15 (= Hu IX, p. 266.15) that leads us
to divide Section ii into "a" and ''b.''
24 BriejWechilellX, p. 306; see above.
THE InSTORY OF THE REDACI10N OF THE EB ARTICLE 45
2S As was his custom, Landgrebe left the first typed page unnumbered and typed the page numbers only
on the second and third pages. (As regards the Husserl-Archives' own penciled page-numbering of Draft B:
the pages ofBl that the Archives has page-numbered in pencil as pp. 24, 25, and 26 are in the wrong order.
Their correct order should be p. 25, p. 24, p. 26.)
26 The title that Husserl gives to Draft B2 (the only complete copy of Draft B to survive) is
"Encyclopaedia Britannica. The attempt at a second elaboration (during Heidegger's stay), pp. 15-28, plus
Heidegger's pp. 1-10." (''Encycl Brit Zum Versuch der zweiten Bearbeitung (wiihrend Heid. Anwesenheit)
undHeid. 1-10": in Husserl's shorthand on a cover sheet preceding the text ofB2: Hu IX, p. 597 and in part,
p. 590.) The last phrase, "1-10", is a mistake for "1-11." The "second elabomtion" does not include the three
pages that come between 1-11 and 15--28 - because they were the three pages dmfted before Heidegger's
visit.
46 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
the extent to which your emphasis on pure psychology provides the basis for
clarifying - or unfolding for the first time with complete exactness - the question
of transcendental sUbjectivity and its relation to the pure psychic. My disadvan-
tage, to be sure, is that I do not know your concrete investigations of the last few
years?7
27 Letter of October 22, 1927. Compare Heidegger's admission in the classroom on February 7, 1925: "I
am not sufficiendy conversant with the contents of the present stance of his investigations." Prolegomena mr
Geschichte des ZeitbegrijJs, p. 168; B.T., History o/the Concept ofTitne, p. 121.
2B Less than thirty lines: Hu IX, p. 249.11-19 and 25-34; p. 250.10-16; the 166 lines: Hu IX, pp. 250.25-
254.38.
29 Draft A, Part n, §I: pp. 14.27-15.3; = Hu IX, p. 247.31-248.2. And in the next sentences Hussed
mentions that, historically, Locke looked upon pure psychology only as "the means to a universal solution of
the problem of 'understanding,'" i.e., transcendental philosophy.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 47
30 For the following see Heidegger, Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie, p. 29-32; E.T. p. 21-23.
See also the thorough treatment in Burt C. Hopkins, Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger: The Problem
of the Original Method and Phenomenon of Phenomenology, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993, Parts Two and
Three.
31 Die Grundprobleme der Phiinomenologie, p. 29; E.T. p. 21.
32 Cf. ibid.: " ...die Riickfiihrung des phiinoroenologischen Blickes...auf das Verstehen des Seins
(Entwerfen [des Seienden] auf die Weise seiner Unverborgenheit)." See Steven Galt Crowell, "Husser!,
Heidegger, and Transcendental Philosophy: Another Look at the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article,"
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1,3 (March 1990), 501-51S.
33 See Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 1I/9, Wegmarken, Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1976, pp. 243-4
and 264, where Heidegger interprets E1t(XYWytl as it appears in Aristotle's Physics, A 2, IS5 a 12f. This term
is already present in 1927 in Heidegger's use of Hinftlhrung and Leitung.
34 Loc. cit., p. 29; E.T., p. 21.
48 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
the introduction and the first half of the Article. That is, (1) he would present
the ontological contextualization of the entire project by situating phenome-
nology within his own vision of revitalizing the question of being via an
inquiry into the essence of subjectivity; and (2) he would reorganize Part I: the
object and method of pure phenomenological psychology, and its function as a
foundation for empirical psychology.
HusserI, meanwhile, would continue working on (1) the intertwined histori-
cal development of phenomenological psychology and transcendental phe-
nomenology and (2) the need to distinguish between the two. He would also
(3) flesh out the all-too-brief paragraphs on transcendental reduction as giving
access to the transcendental field, and (4) say something about phenomenol-
ogical psychology as a propaedeutic to transcendental phenomenology.
But as regards the third main topic listed above - the possible role of uni-
versal transcendental philosophy - HusserI considered it to have been handled
adequately enough in Draft A and therefore not to need any further attention at
this point.
The projected outline of the new draft: The plan, then, was finally to collate
their individual work, gathering it around the three new pages that HusserI had
already written prior to Heidegger's visit. The resultant new Draft B would
consist of four Sections (somewhat awkwardly stitched together among them-
selves) with the last pages of Draft A added at the end. See the chart "DRAFf
B: Overview" on the following page.
The order in which the Sections of Draft B were written: The evidence
shows that the chronological order of the writing (or at least the typing) of the
Sections of Draft B is as follows:
October 10-20:
Section ii-b
Section iii
Section i
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACI10N OF THE EB ARTICLE 49
DRAFfB
Overview
Section i Heidegger
Introduction:
The idea of phenomenology,
and
the step back to consciousness.
Part I Heidegger
Pure psychology:
Its object, method, and function
Partll
Section iii: B.
The transcendental reduction as giving access to
the transcendental ego.
Transcendental Philosophy
50 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
The clue to this chronological order lies in determining the specific stages in
which the pages of the manuscript, specifically Draft B2 (the first carbon
copy) were numbered. I provide that numeration schematically in the chart
below and then follo,w with a narrative presentation of the order in which the
Sections were written.
35 The hand-numbering is preserved only in 82. Section ii-b is missing from what remains of 81, and, on
our hypothesis, no second carbon (83) was ever typed up for Sections ii-a and ii-b, only for Sections i and iii,
which were typed after Sections ii-a and ii-b.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 51
Section i:
(Bl, B2) The page numbers were already typed as 1-11.
Section ii-a:
(Bl, B2) The already typed page numbers, 1-3, were crossed
out and replaced by handwritten page numbers 12,
13,14?7
Section ii-b:
(Bl, B2) The already handwritten pages numbers, 4-9, were
replaced (without being crossed out) by typed page
numbers 15-20.
Section iii:
(Bl, B2, B3) When the above had been done, page numbers 21-28
were typed onto the pages of this final Section.
pages of B3, Section iii, (2) the eight pages of his cover letter and its appendi-
ces, and (3) the copy of the "Studien zur Struktur des BewuBtseins" that he
had taken from Freiburg - and mailed it all off to Husserl.
Human beings in the world - belonging to it, each one present-at-hand for the
other, the way things are present-at-hand for everyone. But to have these pres-
ences-at-hand [Vorhandenheiten], there must be I-subjects who have conscious-
ness of the presences-at-hand, who have an idea of them, knowledge [of them];
[these I-subjects] must have a desiring and willing "consciousness" and must re-
late themselves, as conscious subjects, in various ways - striving, valuing, acting
- to what they are conscious of; must also relate to other people as human beings,
as presences-at-hand or realities that are not just here or there and do not simply
have real properties of whatever kind, but which, instead, are conscious subjects,
etc., as was just mentioned.
However, these various properties are properties of realities in the world.
And so too are my properties, I who am a man and come upon myself as precisely
that.
Ontology as science of the world and of a possible world in general. The
I. Phenomenological psychology
A. ad intra: eidetic science of the pure psyche
B. ad extra: foundation for empirical psychology
(2) Draft B also gave Part I of the Article the articulation that, in general
terms, would perdure through the final draft: phenomenological psychology
both in itself (its object and method) and vis-a-vis pure psychology (its func-
tion as grounding). Husserl would add to this section and rewrite it, but at the
end of the entire process of writing the Article he could tell Heidegger that in
Draft D, as regards Part I, "something essential [of Heidegger's suggestions]
was retained.,,45
(3) Draft B likewise determined the pattern that Part II of the Article would
follow through the final draft. Draft B focused Part II on five distinct topics,
which here emerged clearly for the first time. The first of those five topics
finally gathered into one place the treatment of the pre-history of phenomenol-
ogy that in Draft A had been awkwardly divided between Part I, §6 and Part II,
§ 1. More importantly, the center of Part II became the section on the transcen-
44 Hu IX, p. 603 (=M m 10, m 3 [in B3]), numbered as p. 8 in the Hussed-Archives cataloguing of the
manuscript.
45 BriefwechsellV, p. 149.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACl10N OFTHE EB ARTICLE 55
B. their relation
the positive outcome of distinguishing the two (propaedeutic) (=0 §10)
DraftC
(October 23-?, 1927)
The dating of Draft C: Husserl produced much if not all of the penultimate
Draft C in the week between October 23 and 31. The terminus a quo of these
dates is calculated from Husserl' s receipt of Heidegger's mailing from
Freiburg, and the terminus ad quem is deduced from certain remarks of
Husserl's Polish colleague Roman Ingarden, who, before departing Freiburg at
the end of October, read Draft C at Husserl's home. Ingarden, then thirty-four
years old, had received a six-month research grant, two months of which
(September 1 to October 31) he spent in Freiburg. But because Husserl was on
vacation in Switzerland and did not return to Freiburg until September 15,
56 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Ingarden, as he notes in a memoir, "had only six weeks to talk with Husserl.,,46
He writes:
Ingarden says he read and discussed "the third or fourth version" ("die dritte
oder vierte Redaktion") of the EB Article, but it was certainly the third. Draft
C was a transitional text between the one that was worked out during Heideg-
ger's visit and the final version that Hussed would send off to England to be
translated. At fifty-two full pages, it was the longest of the four versions, and
Hussed referred to it as "the large draft" (die groBere Fassung).48 The final
draft, D, is basically a compression of C,49 with some pages taken over entirely
and others rewritten in shorter form. It is highly unlikely that Hussed com-
posed two drafts by October 31: the 52-page Draft C and the twenty-one new
pages that make up Draft D. Thus we conclude that Ingarden read Draft C.
The title of Draft C: The Article as commissioned by the Encyclopaedia
Britannica was to be entitled simply "Phenomenology." Hussed himself had
said as much in his first reference to the work, on September 30, 1927.50 But
with Draft C Hussed for the first and last time gives the Article a descriptive
46 Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, ''Besuch bei Husser! im Herbst 1927," pp. 152-3. Ingarden mis-
takenly says Husser! vacationed in the Black Forest: p. 152.
47 Ibid., pp. 153. Ingarden continues (pp. 153-4): ''Quietly within myself I found it unfortunate that
Husser! was spending so much time on the Article. I was convinced that the Article was much too long and
that he would have to cut it back it substantially. I also feared that when it came to shortening it and putting it
into English, an editor-ttanslator would be chosen who was not up to the matter and that to some degree he
might be without resources, since English is not suited to Husserl's subtle conceptual formations (and
basically remains so even today)."
4S In shorthand in the top margin of Draft D2, p. 1; cf. Hu IX, p. 591-2.
49 The transitional nature of C with regard to D can be seen in the descriptive rubric that Husserl wrote on
the outer cover of the first carbon, C2: "Final draft [sic!] - Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental
Phenomenology - Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last elaboration [sic!]." (''Endfassung - phiinomenologische
Psychologie und ttanszendentale Phiinomenologie - Encyclopaedia Britannica. Letzte Ausarbeitung"): Hu
K'
IX, 591 with p. 60S.
S BriefwechsellX, p. 306. See above.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACflON OF THE EB ARTICLE 57
DraftD
(November, 1927)
The dating of Draft D: HusserI reduced the fifty-two typed pages of Draft C
to the thirty-five pages of Draft D sometime between November 1 and De-
cember 1, 1927. The terminus a quo of these dates is calculated from Roman
Ingarden's departure from Freiburg on October 31 after he had read (perhaps
only some ot) Draft C. The terminus ad quem is calculated from a letter that
HusserI addressed to Heidegger on December 8, 1927:
51 Hussed writes at the top of C2 (carbon copy): "...phlinomenologische Psychologie und transzendentale
Philosophie...." Hu IX, p. 591; cf. p. 605.
52 Hu IX, p. 615; cf. pp. 617 and 621.
53 But in a letter to Roman lngarden (January 1, 1929) Husserl referred to the two Lectures by the tides (1)
''Pblinom[enologie] u[nd] Psychologie" and (2) ''Transzend[entale] Phlinom[enologie)": Briefwechsel m, p.
245.
54 B, p. 2.2-9, partially omitted byBiemel atHu IX, p. 256.24-31.
55 C Ib =Hu IX, p. 517.39-40, emphasis added.
58 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDBNTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Freiburg 8.XII.27
Dear friend,
[.... ] Many thanks for your lovely letter.56 Why did I not answer [your letter
of October 22], why did I not write at all? Naturally because of a lack of inner
calm. The new version of the London Article, now very carefully thought out and
arranged,57 turned out nicely, although quite differently from the way you would
like to have it, even though something essential [of your suggestions] was re-
tained. In the end it was - and I left it - altogether too long, but I did not want to
have to do anything more with it, and it just could not be shortened any further.
So I sent if off to England and still have no answer. An expanded version, which
takes into consideration a topic that went untreated - the double meaning of psy-
chology: as naturalistic and as humanistically oriented (myoId antithesis) -
should go into the lahrbuch as an introduction to further publications.
Very cordial greetings from our family to yours,
Your faithful friend,
EH58
I argue that Draft D was fmished and sent off to England on or before
December 1. My reasons are as follows: (1) I take it that the above letter is
saying that HusserI had not answered Heidegger's letter of October 22 until
''today,'' December 8, because throughout November HusserI had been too
preoccupied ("weil es an innerer Rube fehlte") with fmishing Draft D by the
deadline. (2) And insofar as HusserI says that "today," eight days into Decem-
ber, he "stilt' has had no answer from England (or equally "has had no answer
yef'), we might calculate that he mailed off Draft D at the very least one week
before December 8, that is, on or before December 1.
The writing of Draft D: The fourth draft is, in the main, a condensation of
the third draft, with some significant omissions and changes. 59 (1) The Intro-
duction to Draft D represents HusserI's abandonment of Heidegger's contex-
tualization of the Article in terms of the question of being. Instead, HusserI
reverts to Draft A's Introduction, which he rewrites and expands. (2) HusserI
takes over one-third of Draft C (eleven pages) and inserts them whole into
Draft D (see accompanying chart). The remaining two-thirds of Draft D is
comprised of twenty-one newly typed pages, which are often quite close to the
material of Draft C. (3) The major condensation takes place in Part ill, where
Draft D reduces the fifteen pages of C by more than half, to the six-and-a-half
pages ofD.
S6 Presumably not the letter of October 22 but one that anived close to December 8, inquiring why
Husser! had not answered that of October 22.
S7 A reference, perhaps, to Heidegger's suggestions, in Appendix n of his October 22 letter, about the
II1TaI1gement of Part n of the Article.
S8 BriefwechsellV, p. 149.
S9 In the following chart arrows indicate pages that are taken over whole (without retyping) from Draft C
and inserted into Draft D. The other pages of Draft D were newly typed.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACfION OF THE EB ARTICLE 59
60 ''Bin Entwurf zorn Artikel dec Encyclopaedia Britannica, die Ein1dammerungen sind bloB Anzeigen
fur VerkUrzungen, vorgeschlagen um den vorgeschriebenen engen Raum des englischen Artikels (Salmon)
innehalten zu ktsnnen." Hu IX, 592 and 605.
60 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
TRANsmON FROM:
DRAFTC TO DRAFTD
INTRODUcrION
la la
b (returns 10, and rewrites, AI)
c
d
PART I
PURE PSYCHOLOGY: ITS FIELD OF EXPERIENCE, ITS MEmOD, AND FUNcrION
1 Ib §1 278.8
2 2 §2 279.6
3 ~ 3
4 ~ 4
S S
6 6 §3 281.24
7
8 7
8a
9 8
10 9 §4 284.4
11
12 10 §S 28S.3
13 11
13a ~ 11a
13b ~ 11b
PART II
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
14 12 §6 287.2
IS
16 13 §7 288.14
17
18
19 ~ 16 §8 290.11
20 17
21 ~ 18
22 19 §9 292.10
23 20
24 21
15
26 ~ 22
27 ~ 23
28 24 §10 29S.7
29
30 15
PART III
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY AS UNIVERSAL SCIENCE WITH
ABSOLUTE FOUNDATIONS
31 10 43 top half: Cut entirely.D, 26 §11 296.22
§I2 297.16
27 §13 298.1
~
28 §14 298.15
§IS 299.3
43 bottom half 29
44 29b §16 299.33
4S top half 30
bottom half 31
61 These pages are translated below, Draft C, "From the Later Pages of the Third Draft."
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 61
DRAFfD
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
PART I:
PURE PSYCHOLOGY:
ITS FIELD OF EXPERIENCE, ITS METHOD, AND ITS FUNCTION
PART II
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY AND TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY
PARTm
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY AS
UNIVERSAL SCIENCE WITH ABSOLUTE FOUNDATIONS
DraftE
(December 1, 1927 to February [March?] 1928)
Draft E is the name we give to the two English versions of Draft D that
Christopher V. Salmon prepared in Oxford, England, between December 1,
1927 and the end of February, 1928. In many passages Draft E represents a
paraphrase rather than a translation of Draft D; in fact, it is the paraphrase of a
severely condensed, and in some sections significantly rearranged, Draft D. As
we argued above, Hussed sent Salmon Draft D on or about December 1, 1927.
Christopher V. Salmon. Having received his M.A. in philosophy at Oxford,
Christopher Verney Salmon studied with Hussed in Freiburg during the winter
semester of 1922 and again during 1926-1927.62 In the summer of 1927
Salmon defended the doctoral dissertation that he had written under Hussed' s
direction, "The Central Problem of Hume's Philosophy: A Phenomenological
Interpretation of the First Book of the Treatise on Human Nature.,,63 The work
was published a year later in Hussed's Jahrbuch, and Hussed refers to that
forthcoming publication in his Bibliography to Draft A of the Article.64 A year
after translating the EB Article, Salmon was appointed a lecturer at the Uni-
versity of Belfast, and he continued to present Hussed's philosophy to the
English-speaking pUblic. On December 2, 1929 he delivered a lecture to the
Aristotelian Society in London, "The Starting-Point of Hussed's Philo so-
phy.,,65 Soon after that he helped W.R. Boyce Gibson read the page proofs of
Boyce Gibson's translation of Hussed's Ideas,66 and in 1932, a year after the
work came out in English, Salmon published a review of it.67 However, con-
tact between Salmon and Hussed fell off after that, and in the spring of 1937
Hussed noted that Professor Salmon had not written to him over the last
62 See, respectively: Briefwechsel ill, p. 44 (December 13, 1922, to Winthrop Pickard Bell) and VI, p. 136
(October 23,1929, to W.R. Boyce Gibson). On Hussed's estimation of him as hochbegabter Engllinder, see
W.R. Boyce Gibson, "From Hussed to Heidegger: Excerpts from a 1928 Freiburg Diary," ed. Herbert
Spiegelberg, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 2 (1971), 58-83: p. 63; see also pp. 66 and
71.
63 Hussed's evaluation of the work is found in Briefwechsel IV, pp. 469-470 (July 12, 1927: Gutachten
tiber Salmons Dissertation).
64 Jahrbuchjiir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung X (1929), 299-449; incorrectly cited as
"X (1928)" in Briefwechsel IV, p. 469, n. 1. The work was likewise published in Halle by Niemeyer in the
same year. (For the correct date, see Schuhmann, "Hussed's Yearbook," Philosophy and Phenomenological
Research, 50, Supplement, Fall 1990, p. 20.) The Bibliography to Draft A refers to the forthcoming work
simfly as: "Chr. Salmon, Bume's Philosophy (in English)."
6 Published under that title in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, new series, 30 (1930), 55-78.
Hussed mentions the lecture in Briefwechsel VI, p. 137 (October 28, 1929, to Gibson).
66 Briefwechsel IV, pp. 136-140 (1929-30, various letters to Boyce Gibson), and Boyce Gibson's glow-
ing remarks in the "Translator's Preface" to Hussed, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology,
London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1931 (reprinted: New York: Collier Books, 1962), p. 24.
67 Mind,41 (1932),226-236. See Briefwechsel Vll, p. 66 (May 12, 1932) and p. 70 (April 3, 1933) Both
of these are letters from Ernest Wood Edwards to Husser!.
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 63
Dear friend,
In the folder with the time manuscript (which I originally had wanted to
take with me to Breitnau) there are some pages from the English version of my
Encyclopaedia Article: Salmon's typewritten pages, to which I added corrections.
Would you please send these pages, as my corrections, directly to ehr. V.
Salmon, Oxford, 14 St. Giles, with a simple note saying they are from me. I am
also writing to him directly.74
(6) The (four) pages that Husserl was referring to, and that Heidegger did
indeed sent on to Salmon, were pp. 14-16 and p. 20; they are missing from
Elb.7s We are faced, then, with the anomaly of Husserl sending off corrections
of El in early March 1928 after Salmon had already typed up and dedicated
E2 in late February. Moreover, there is no manuscript evidence that the pages
of E2 that correspond to the missing pages of El were changed by Salmon in
any significant way.76 It seems, then, that Husserl's effort to amend some
pages of Draft E failed. Salmon sent off E2b to the editorial offices of the
Encyclopaedia Britannica in London (and E2a to Husserl in Freiburg) without
benefit of Husserl' s suggestions.
73 See HusserllJaspers, Briefwechsel p. 90-1 (February 25 and MIlICh 6, 1928, Heidegger to Jaspers). On
February 25 Heidegger had received the official "call" to be Husserl's successor in the chair of philosophy at
Freiburg, effective October 1 of that year, and of course he and Husser! would have discussed that during
their visit in Freiburg.
74 The letter continues: "I got a sore throat in Breitnau, with a cold, etc., so despite the wonderful weather
I had to come home on Sunday [MIlICh 4] already. Fortunately it is not a flu, but I still have to stay in bed
about two more days and gulp down aspirin. I Best wisbes. Surely you are enjoying the lovely weather. Are
you able to ski [in Todtnauberg]? All the best to your wife, I Yours, I EH." BriefwechselIV, pp. 152-153.
75 Pages 14-16 correspond to material from §9 ofDraftD, while p. 20 corresponds to material from §15.
76 While it is true that the first five lines ofp. 13 ofE2 do not follow from p. 12 (indicating that p. 12 was
retyped), they are not changed at all from the last five lines of p. 12. I take it that this indicates Salmon did
not appropriate any suggestions from Husser! at this point.
THE IDSTORY OF THE REDACTION OF THE EB ARTICLE 65
The structure of Drafts E and F: One should not conflate Draft E, and specifi-
cally E2, with the version that was finally published in the Encyclopaedia
Britannica in 1929. E2 is the twenty-five-page typescript that Salmon submit-
ted to the London offices of the Britannica around March of 1928. Itself a
radical condensation of Husserl's Draft D, Draft E2 was further cut back by
the editors of the Britannica - two full pages were omitted - before getting
into print. We call the published version Draft F.77
In the broadest terms, Draft E represents a reversion to the outline of Draft
A. Whereas Draft D (explicitly) and Drafts Band C (implicitly) were divided
into three Parts, E reverts to the two-part outline of A - that is, it gathers the
topics of Draft D's Part ill ("Transcendental Phenomenology and Philosophy
as Universal Science with Absolute Foundations") under Draft E's Part n
("Transcendental Phenomenology"). Moreover, Draft E radically reduces the
sixteen divisions of Draft D to only four, and Draft F further reduces even
these.
The lifespan of Draft F: 1929-1956. By September of 1929 it was over: the
4000-word Draft F of the Article was published in the fourteenth edition of
the Encyclopaedia Britannica over the signature "E. Hu.,,78 Although this
fourteenth edition stayed in print (with various up-dates and revisions) until
1974, Husserl's entry "Phenomenology" survived only until 1956, when it was
replaced by another article with the same title, written by John N. Findlay.
After it went out of print with the Encyclopaedia Britannica in 1956,
Husserl's Draft F was republished with one important orthographical correc-
tion - and one glaring mistake - in Roderick M. Chisholm's collection, Real-
ism and the Background of Phenomenology.79 In 1966 Findlay's text was
replaced by one written by Herbert Spiegelberg. Beginning with the fifteenth
edition of the Britannica (1974), the article "Phenomenology" was embedded
within the larger entry "Philosophical Schools and Doctrines," and Spiegel-
77 Besides omitting the two pages, the editors also made some orthographical changes in the text.
Whereas Salmon tends to capitalize a number of words - for example: Reflection, Phenomena, Intentional,
Perception, hnagined, Remembered, Copied - the editors put such terms in lower case. The editors, however,
repeated Salmon's erroneous accents on two Greek words: Salmon's £i60~ instead of d60~, and his VOEW
instead of vofw.
78 The Encyclopaedia Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge, 14th edition London and New
York The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company, 1929, vol. 17 ("P to Planting of Trees"), pp. 699-702. The
identification of the author is given in that same volume on p. viii: ''Edmund Husserl. Professor of Philoso-
phy, University of Freiberg [sic]."
79 Roderick M. Chisholm, ed., Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, New York and Glencoe:
Free Press, 1960, pp. 118-128. The orthographical correction: from Salmon's erroneous ''phenomenalists'' to
the correct translation "phenomenologists" in the last sentence. The glaring mistake: the translator was
identified (in this, the year he died) as "Christopher V. Solomon."
66 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
DRAFrE DRAFrF
(Salmon's typescript) (Encyclopaedia Britannica)
Introduction Introduction
(untitled) (untitled)
PART I PART I
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL
PSYCHOLOGY PSYCHOLOGY
PART II PART II
TRANSCENDENTAL TRANSCENDENTAL
PHENOMENOLOGY PHENOMENOLOGY
REFERENCE BIBLIOGRAPHY
THE HISTORY OF THE REDACfrON OF THE EB ARTICLE 67
In the following chart the boxed and shaded material indicates the sections of Draft D that are (severely)
condensed under the various titles of Draft E.
Introduction
(untitled)
PART!
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
§ 1. Natural Science and Psychology, Intentional Experience
BIBUOGRAPHY
68 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDENTALPHBNOMENOLOGY
80 The fifteenth edition was the one newly designed by Mortimer Adler and others (Micropaedia, Macro-
paedia, Propaedia). I am grateful to Mr. Shennan Hollar of the Britannica offices in Chicago for the
infonnation in this paragraph on the editorial history of the article.
APPENDIX:
THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EB ARTICLE
Thomas Sheehan
Group M is divided into three Sub-groups. The third of these, M ill, con-
tains seventeen "Projects for Publication," each project being designated by an
Arabic numeral. Number 10 of those projects is the EB Article. Hence, the
lead-in signature that is common to all the drafts of the EB Article is "M ill
10."
70 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
MI courses (Vorlesungen)
1 The cataloguing of Drafts A, B, and C (and especially B) at the Hussed-Archives leaves much to be
desired. The drafts are all lumped together under the lead-in signature "M ill 10 ill," accompanied by Van
Breda's uninformative rubric "Fragments for the preparation of the article 'Phenomenology' in the Encyclo-
paedia Britannica. Included: M. Heidegger's letter and notes on the article - 1927." ("Bruchstiicke zur
Vorbereitung des Artikels "Phenomenology" in En. Br. Dabei: Brief und Noten dazu von M. Heidegger-
1927.")
If one wanted to follow this cataloguing and gather all the preparatory drafts (A, B, C) under one heading,
the three copies of Draft B (the typed original and the two carbons) should have been numbered separately so
as to keep consistency with the copies in Drafts A and C. The current cataloguing makes no distinction
between the copies of Draft B: (I) they are all lumped together as M ill 10 ill 3; and (2) the first two copies of
Draft B are hand-numbered by the Hussed-Archives staff as if they constituted a single, consecutive text: the
typed original is hand-numbered pp. 2-45; the first carbon copy is hand-numbered pp. 46-74 (as if it were a
continuation of, not a copy of, the first forty-five pages).
APPENDIX: THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EB ARTICLE 71
, [Cl] 15-18,20,22-25,28-30,
43 (first half)
2 pp. 24-25 of Draft Al (Le., the last lines of the Gennan draft plus the two pages of bibliography) are
attached to the end of this !ext
3 Here and in the following draft, p. i is the cover sheet, and p. ii is the introductory paragraph, whereas
pp. 1-2 are the bibliography at the end. Concerning the missing pages, see Briefwechsel IV, p. 152 (March 5,
1928, Husserl to Heidegger).
4 The original is lost.
, The original is lost.
72 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
6 Briefwechsel, Vm, p. 39, n.2, cOrrecting the infonnation in Hussed, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, p. 152.
Cf. also Briefwechsel, m, p. 456 (August 3, 1927, to Mahnke).
7 This phrase - ''ErsterEntwurf 1-21" - appears in Husserl's shorthand on p. 1 of the text; cr. Hu IX, p.
592. However, the text has 26 pages (see immediately below). Could the last two lines of p. 21, where the
paragraph begins with a hand-numbered "3" (=Hu lX, p. 252.38-39) have been a later addition to Husserl's
"first draft"?
74 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND lRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOLOGY
DraftBl
Form: typed original (incomplete). Heidegger wrote the fIrst 11 pages
(Section i), HusserI the remaining 17 pages (Sections ii-a, ii-b, and
iii.
Date: between September 15 and October 10,1927 (section ii-a), between
October 10 and 20, 1927 (Sections i, ii-b, and iii).
Status: incomplete typed version of HusserI's and Heidegger's attempt to
compose a second draft: Section ii-b is missing. Many editorial
marks.
Title: None.
Pages: 24 pages: (1) In the editing process pp. 15-20 were removed, leaving
22 out of the original 28 pages; and then (2) two pages were inserted
from elsewhere. 8
DraftB2
Form: fIrst carbon copy of typed original, in four sections as above.
Status: complete (and clean) carbon copy of HusserI's and Heidegger's
attempt to compose a second draft.
Title: "Encyclopaedia Britannica. The attempt at a second draft (during
Heidegger's stay), pp. 15-28, plus Heidegger's ppA_1O.,,9
Pages: 28 out of 28 pages.
8 Re the two inserted pages: (1) After p. 14 of this draft Huss~ has inserted p. 14 of Draft Cl. (2) Next to
p. 21 of the present draft Husserl has placed the bottom half ofp. 21 (i.e., lines 19-28) of Draft B3.
9 "Encycl Brit Zum Versuch der zweiten Bearbeitung (wiihrend Heid. Anwesenheit) und Heid. l-lO"(in
Hussed's shorthand on a cover sheet preceding the article; only ''Encycl Brit" and "Heid." are in Husserl's
cursive; the rest is in shorthand; underlinings are from Husserl): Hu IX, p. 597 (and in part, 590). Note,
however, that Heidegger's text takes up eleven, not ten, pages.
10 "Dublette. Dec neue Text fUr Heidegger 21-28 mit Heideggers kritischen Noten." Hu IX, p. 591.
APPENDIX: THE MANUSCRIPTS OF THE EB ARTICLE 75
Draft Cl [=111,6]
Fonn: typed original of third draft
Date: between October 23 and October 31 (?), 1927
Status: incomplete; much edited; served as basis for Draft D.
Title: none
Pages: 28 out of 52 pages
Draft C2 [=ill, 4]
Fonn: carbon copy of typed original
Status: incomplete
Title: "Final draft - Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental
Phenomenology - Encyclopaedia Britannica. Last e1aboration.,,12
(from Husser!, on outer cover)
Pages: 48 out of 52 pages
Draft C3 [=111, 5 ]
Fonn: carbon copy of typed original
Status: only complete version of Draft C
Title: "Last draft, fourth copy.,,13 (from Husserl, on outer cover)
Pages: 52 out of 52 pages
11 Husserl calls Draft C "die gro8ere Fassung" - ''the larger draft." (Hu IX, p. 592, line I).
12 "Endfassung - phiinomenologische Psychologie und transzendentale Phiinornenologie - Encyclopaedia
Britannica. Letzte Ausarbeitung": Hu IX, p. 591 with p. 605.
\3 "Letzte Fassung, 4. Duplikat." Hu IX, p. 591; cf. p. 605. (Why "fourth"?)
76 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfALPHENOMENOLOGY
Draft Dl [=1, 1]
Form: typed original
Date: between October 23 and December 1, 1927
Status: complete
Title: "A draft of the Encyclopaedia Britannica Article. The brackets are
merely indications for the proposed abridgments, so as to stay within
the restricted length of the English version (Salmon).,,14
Pages: 33 out of 33 pages: pp. 1-31, plus lla and llb; eleven of these
pages are taken from Cl.
Draft D2 [=1, 2]
Form: second carbon copy of I, 1
Status: incomplete copy of typed original
Title: ''Third copy of the Encyclopaedia Britannica article, not corrected.
Lacking pages 3-4, 16 (which is p. 19 of the larger draft [Le., Draft
CD, 18-21,22-23 (which are 26/27 of the larger draft), 30-31
([which equals] p. 43, second paragraph through p. 45 [of the larger
draftD.,,15
Pages: See immediately above.
14 ''Bin Entwurf zum Artikel der Encyclopaedia Britannica, die Einklammerungen sind bl08 Anzeigen fUr
Verkiirzungen, vorgeschlagen um den vorgeschriebenen engen Raum des englischen Artikels (Salmon)
innehalten zu kannen." The title is from Husserl, in shorthand on p. 1 of the text: Hu IX, pp. 592 and 605.
IS ''3. Abdruck des Encyclopaedia Britannica Artikels, nicht ausgebessert. Es fehlt 3-4, 16 (19 in der
gra8eren Fassung), 18-21,22-23 (26/27 der gra8eren Fassung), 30-31 (43,2. Absatz - 45)." This title is
from Husserl, in shorthand on p. 1 of the text: Hu IX, pp. 591-2. I take it that ''3. Abdruck" refers to the
second carbon copy of the typed original, the first carbon copy having been sent to Salmon. Thus, the typed
original would be the "1. Abdruck," and the copy Salmon got would be the ''2. Abdruck." On the folder-
cover of D2 Father Van Breda identifies it as: - ''Bin unvollstiindiges Exemplar der dritte (fast definitive)
Fassung des Artikels "Phenomenology" der Encyc1. Brit. Ende 1927 [V.B.]," i.e.... "An incomplete copy of
the third (almost definitive) draft of the article ''Phenomenology'' for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. End of
1927 [Van Breda]."
APPENDIX: THE MANUSCRIPfS OF THE EB ARTICLE 77
Elb[=n,2]
Form: carbon copy of lost original: Salmon's ftrst condensed translation of
Draft D (presumably made from the German D3).
Date: between December 1, 1927 and the end of February 1928.
Status: incomplete.
Title: "Phenomenology.! Edmund Husserl."
Pages: 22 out of 26 pages (Plus two German pages appended):
title page + unnumbered page with fIrst paragraph of the translation
+ pp. 1-13, 17-19,21-22 + two pages of bibliography
("Reference") in English, numbered 1 and 2. (The last two German
pages of Draft A2 are appended.)16
E2a[=n,l]
Form: typed original: Salmon's second condensed translation of Draft D,
incorporating corrections to E 1.
Date: by the end of February 1928.
Status: complete. No corrections by Husserl.
Title: "Encyclopaedia Britannica.! Phenomenology.! Edmund Husserl.!
Done into English! by! Christopher V. Salmon." The title page
bears a handwritten dedication: "Herrn Geheimrat Edmund Husserl,
! with Affection and all Respect! from! Christopher V. Salmon. !
Feb. 1928."
Pages: 25 pages: title page with dedication; unnumbered page containing
the ftrst paragraph of the translation; pp. 1-21; two pages ofbibliog-
raphy ("Reference"), numbered 1-2.
16 Husser! removed pp. 14-16 and 20 and had Heidegger send them, with Husserl's corrections, to
Christopher V. Salmon. See Briefwechsel,lV, p. 152 (March 5, 1928).
78 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
F
Form: printed in seven columns over four pages in The Encyclopaedia
Britannica: A New Survey of Universal Knowledge, 14th edition
London and New York: The Encyclopaedia Britannica Company,
1929, vol. 17, pp. 699-702. Signed "E. Hu."
Date: edited after February 1928, published September 1929
Status: Same as E2a except for orthographical changes and the omission of
two manuscript pages of E2a.
Title: "Phenomenology"
EDMUND HUSSERL
Within the footnotes to the translation I often indicate the line as well as the
page of the German texts, separating the two by a period. For example:
(a) "Hu IX, p. 238.9" refers to page 238, line 9 of the published German
version.
(b) "AI, p. 1.21" refers to page 1, line 21 of the typed manuscript of
Draft A.
In this translation, Heidegger's changes to, or remarks on, Drafts A and B are
provided in the footnotes in boldface print.
have wanted to present the original text that Heidegger read and commented
on, rather than the text as Husserl revised it afterwards and in the light of
Heidegger's comments.
However, within the sections that Husserl contributed - that is, Part IT - I
follow the text from Draft B2.
"PHENOMENOLOGY"
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
DRAFfA
[Introduction]
[Phenomenological Reflection 1]
1. Every experience and every other way we are consciously involved with
objects clearly allows of a "phenomenological tum," a transferral into a proc-
ess of "phenomenological experience." In simple perception we are directed
toward perceived matters, in memory toward remembered matters, in thinking
toward thoughts, in valuing toward values, in willing toward ends and means,
and so on. Thus every such pursuit has its "object" [Thema]. But at any given
I Hu IX, p. 238.9-240.4. The material under this heading generally corresponds to some of the material in
Draft D §2, ''The Pure Psychical [etc.]."
84 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
time we can effect a change of focus that shifts our thematic gaze away from
the current matters, thoughts, values, ends, etc., and directs our gaze instead
toward the manifoldly changing "subjective ways" in which2 they "appear,"
the ways they are consciously known.
For example, to perceive a fixed and unchanged brass cube means to run
through its form as a cube - the individual surfaces, edges, corners, as well as
its color, luster and other determinations as a spatial thing - [po 238] and thus
to bring the cube to cognizance for oneself. But instead of proceeding like that,
we can attend phenomenologically to how - for example, in what kind of
variously changing "perspectives" - <po 2> the cube presents itself and yet is
still experienced as unchanged; or how the very same cube appears differently
as "something nearby" than as "something far off'; or which modes of appear-
ance it offers when we change our orientation; and also how each individual
determination within the process of perception presents itself as the one de-
termination in the multiple modes of appearance belonging particularly to that
perception.
This return to reflective experience teaches us that there is no progressively
perceived thing, nor any element perceived as a determination within it, that
does not appear, during perception, in multiplicities of different appearances,
even though it is given and grasped as continuously one and the same thing.
But in normae ongoing perception, only this unity, only the thing itself, stands
in the comprehending gaze while the functioning processes of lived experience
remain extra-thematic, ungrasped, and latent. Perception is not some empty
it having" of perceived things, but rather a flowing lived experience of subjec-
2 Heidegger (AI, p. 1.21, within the text) changes Husserl's Gennan from "wie" to ''in denen," i.e., from
"how" or "as" to ''in wbich." (Cf. Hu lX, p. 237.20). Unless otherwise noted, Heidegger's remaIks appear in
the left margin of Husserl's texts.
3 Heidegger (AI, p. 2.13, within the text) changes "normal" [nonnal] to ''unreflective'' [unreflektierl].
See Hu lX, p. 238.15.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFT A 85
sponding acts of] experiencing, thinking, and insight, then the concrete and
complete exploration of the world that exists and has scientific and evidential
validity for us requires also the universal phenomenological exploration of the
multiplicities of consciousness in whose synthetic changes the world subjec-
tively takes shape as valid for us and perhaps as given with insight. 6 The task
extends to the whole [po 240] of life - including aesthetic life, valuing life of
whatever type, <po 5> and practical life - through which the concrete
life-world with its changing content likewise continuously takes shape for us
as a value-world and a practical world. 7
2. Does posing the task in this way lead to a new science?9 Is there - corre-
sponding to the idea of a universal experience directed exclusively to
"subjective phenomena" - a self-contained field of experience that stands over
against universal experience of the world, and thus a basis for a self-contained
science? At first one may object that a new science is not required, since all
merely subjective phenomena, all modes of appearance of what appears,
6 Heidegger's note (AI p. 4.24, Gennan cursive; cf. Hu lX, p. 239.32 and n. I): Heidegger underlines
e orden' uires" twice and writes:
"Why? First off, all it requires is that we exhibit and give a pure ontological clarification of its
field which lies behind us as it were."
(More literally: "Why? First of all [what is required is] only to exhibit - purely in ontological clarification
- its field, which lies in the rear, as it were."
7 The text here reflects Landgrebe's changes in Husserl's text: AI, p. 5.2-4; cf. Hu lX, p. 593, note to p.
240.2-4. As the typing of AI, p. 4 shows, Landgrebe's changes were made before the Al was sent to
Heidegger.
8 Hu lX, p. 240.5-241.36. The material under this heading generally corresponds to some of the material
in Draft D § I, "Pure Natura1 Science and Pure Psychology."
9 Heidegger's note (AI, p. 5.6-7; cf. Hu lX, p. 593):
II "cr. 5a below."
Disposition of the note:
(1) What sentence is the note keyed to? Although Heidegger's note appears in the left margin at
this point (AI, p. 5.5-6), it may be linked by a line to the last sentence of the previous paragraph (AI, p. 5.4);
Biemel so takes it.
(2) What page does the note refer to? Heidegger is referring to ms. p. 5a, which is inserted be-
tween pp. 5 and 6 in both Al and A2 and which, in Hu lX, corresponds to pp. 240.14-241.7 and, in the
present translation, to the text running from "That is doubtless true" to the sentence, "From this vantage
point...meaning and necessity of a pure psychology."
(3) What passage does the note refer to? I believe Heidegger's note refers to p. 240.15-18 (ms. p.
5a.3-5), i.e., to the second sentence of the next paragraph where, in A2, the latter half of the sentence (from
"in much the same way" on) is crossed out. However, Biemel (Hu lX, p. 593) takes it as referring to all of p.
5a, i.e., Hu lX, pp. 240.32-241.7.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFf A 87
\0 At this point in both Al and A2 (where p. 5.13 = Hu IX, p. 240.14) the second half of the page is
crossed out along with the first three lines ofp. 6; the deleted passage is reproduced in Hu IX, p. 593. For this
deleted passage Husserl substitutes IDS. p. 5a, which follows.
11 Heidegger (A2, p. 5a.1, within the text) changes "doj3" ("[the fact] that") to "ob" (''whether''), thus
changing the reading to: " ••.it leaves open [the question] whether...."
12 In A2, p. 5a.3-5, the remainder of this sentence is crossed out - although it is retained in Hu IX, p. 15-
18 - and may be the referent of Heidegger's marginal note in the previous paragraph.
13 Heidegger (A2, p. 5a.6, within the text) changes Husserl's "psychical being" [Seelisches Sein] to
''psycllical entities" (Seelisch Seiendes. ("Seelisches [also Seelisch] is capitalized because it begins the
sentence.) SeeHu IX, p. 240.19.
14 The flISt two-and-a-half lines of AI, p. 6 are crossed out Those lines, plus the second half of p. 5.14-
27, were dropped in favor of p. 5a.
88 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
IS In the bottom margin of AI, p. 6.27 Husser! adds in shorthand: "Accordingly, among the 'basic con-
cepts' of psychology - the original elements of psychological theory - the purely psychological concepts
have intrinsic priority and precede psychophysical concepts and therefore all psychological concepts in
general." (This sentence is taken over at this point in Hu IX, p. 241.32-36.) This shorthand sentence in Al
may be a replacement for the words "the ultimate theoretical elements of all psychology, which precede all
other psychological concepts" from the next paragraph, which are crossed out in AI, p. 7.6-7 (but retained in
Hu IX, p. 242.3-5).
16 At this point in the typed ms. Husser! substitutes two typed pages, 7 and 7a, for a previous page 7. The
first four lines of rns. p. 8, which followed from the original p. 7, are crossed out. They are reproduced in Hu
lX,p.594.
17 Heide er's note A2, .7.1-5; cf. Hu IX, .594:
cede all other psychological concepts - must be drawn from original psycho-
logical intuition. 19 Such intuition has two levels: self-experience and intersub-
.• . 20
Jectlve expenence.
The first,21 which itself is gradated according to originality, is carried out in
the form of self-perception and its variations (remembering oneself, imagining
oneself); this provides the psychologist with original psychological intuitions,
but only of his or her own (present, past, etc.) psychic [experience]. Obvi-
ously22 the sense of anl3 experience of someone else's "interiority" implies
that his or her interiority is an analogous variation of my own, such that the
other person's interiority24 can fit under the same basic concepts as (and no
other than) those I originally fashioned from my experience of myself. Yes,
the experience of personal community and community life, which is founded
in experience of the self and of the other, does indeed yield new concepts, but
they are concepts that in any case presuppose the concepts of self-
. 25
expenence.
If we now ask what it is that first of all brings self-experience, both actual
and possible, originarily to intuition, then Descartes' classical formula, the ego
cogito, provides the only possible answer to that question - so long as we
leave aside all the concerns that determined him in a transcendental-
philosophical way. In other words, we hit upon nothing other than the ego,
consciousness, and the conscious object as such. <po 7a> In its purity, the
19 Heidegger (A2, p. 7.8) suggests changing the passage to read: "must be drawn from original intui-
tion of the psychic as such." Husser! carries the change over into AI, p. 7.8 (= Hu IX, p. 242.6-7).
20 Heide er's note A2 .7.10; cf. Hu IX, .594:
In A2 Husser! changes the sentence to: "Such intuition has three levels founded one upon the other: self-
experience, intersubjective experience, and community experience as such." This reading appears in Hu IX,
p.242.8-10.
21 Heidegger (A2, p. 7.10, in the text) suggests beginning the sentence with "the former" (Jene: not
Diese as in Hu IX, p. 594, note to p. 242.9), just as he will suggest beginning the next sentence with "the
latter." See the following footnote.
22 Heidegger (A2, p. 7.14) suggests use of "the latter" (diese) here, so as to read perhaps: "In the latter
case obviously ••• " Husser! does not carry over the suggestion into A2 (Hu IX, p. 242.14).
23 Heidegger (A2, p. 7.15, within the text) adds the word "intersubjektiven" [''intersubjective''] at this
point.
24 Husser! (AI and A2, p. 7.16) adds "as an individual psyche," at this point. Cf. Hu IX, p. 242.16.
25 Heidegger's note (A2, p. 7.16-21, keyed to the end of this sentence but apparently pertaining to the last
two sentences of the ara h; cf. Hu IX, . 594 :
90 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
psychic is nothing other than what we might call the specifically egoical: the
life of consciousness and being-as-ego within that life. If, when we consider
the human community, we also maintain a firm focus on the purely psychic,
then over and above the pure individual subjects (psyches), there arise inter-
subjectivity's modes of consciousness that bind those subjects together on a
purely psychic level. Among these are the "social acts" (appealing to other
persons, making agreements with them, subduing their wills, and so on)26 as
well as, related to those, the abiding interpersonal bonds linking pure [po 243]
persons to personal communities at different levels. <po 8>27
26 The remainder of this sentence (=Hu IX, p. 242.37-243.2) appears in Al and A2, p. 7a.8 as a short-
hand addition by Husser!.
27 Regarding what immediately follows in Draft A, p. 8: The first four lines of p. 8 are crossed out (this
was part of the substitution of pp. 7 and 7a for the original p. 7) and the next fifteen lines are bracketed. The
omitted text is reproduced in Hu IX, pp. 594-595.
28 Hu IX, p. 243.3-244.29. The material under this heading corresponds generally to Draft D, §3, "The
Self-contained Field of the Purely Psychical. - Phenomenological Reduction and True Inner Experience."
29 Heidegger's note (AI, p. 8.20-27, left and bottom margins, keyed to the first two sentences of this
aragraph):
''More succinctly:
The possibility of a pure psychology in general depends on the correct performance of the origi.
nal intuition of the psychic as such. This performance is determined and guided by the
'phenomenological reduction.' The essential characteristics of this method are the following:
1. a view of the psychic as essentially intentional;
2. in connection with that, the epoche;
3. constitution of the intentum in the multiplicity of its modes of appearance;
4. [the] universal validity of this basic structure of the method in keeping with the univer·
sality of the intentional structure."
THE EB ARTIClE - DRAFT A 91
u "cr. p. 7" U
Heidegger seems to be referring Al and A2, p. 7.6 (see above). Husser1 copies Heidegger's note into the
=
corresponding place in A2, but with the remark: "However, there [i.e., p. 7.6, Hu lX, p. 242.3-4] the
discussion was only about concepts as first theoretical elements."
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFT A 93
er writes:
94 PSYCHOWGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOWGY
can run its course with harmony and confirmation and can then, with consis-
tent confirmation, indicate a "foreign subjectivity" - all of that leads to the
expansion of the phenomenological reduction into a reduction to pure inter-
subjectivity. There then arises, as purely psychological phenomenology in its
completeness, the eidetic doctrine of a community constituted purely psycho-
logically, in whose intersubjectively entwined acts (acts of community life)
there is constituted the "objective" <po 13> world (the world for everyone) as
"objective" nature, as a world of culture and as a world of "objectively"
existing communities.
38 Hu IX, p. 245.37-247.23. In all the later drafts, the material under this heading was combined with the
material that comes in the next section (ll. I), and the combination was made into a single section that opens
Part ll. In Draft D that single section is §6, "Descartes' Transcendental Tum and Locke's Psychologism."
39 [Translator's note: Franz Brentano, Psychologie yom empirischen Standpunkt, Leipzig: Duncker and
Humblot, 2 volumes, 1874; second edition, ed. Oskar Kraus, Leipzig: Felix Meiner, 2 vols. 1924-1925,
reprinted: Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1955. English translation: Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, ed.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFT A 95
1. The new phenomenology did not originally arise as pure psychology and
thus was not born of a concern for establishing a radically scientific psychol-
ogy;41 rather, it arose as "transcendental phenomenology" with the purpose of
reforming philosophy into a strict science. Because transcendental and psycho-
logical phenomenology have fundamentally different meanings, they must be
kept most rigorously distinct. This is the case even though one science turns
into the other through a mere change in focus, <po 15> such that the "same"
Oskar Kraus, English edition by linda L. McAlister, translated by Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrell, and
linda L. McAlister, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1973.]
40 Hu IX, p. 247.24-249.4. The material under this heading generally corresponds to Draft D, §6, with
intimations of §7 (the need to distinguish the transcendental and the psychological problematics; cf. pp.
248.15-28: Descartes' transcendental view) and §8 (the inadequacies ofpsychologism; cf. pp. 248.28-249.4:
Locke's psychologism).
41 Heide er's erased mar 'nal note AI, . 14.23; cf. Hu IX, .247, n. I :
In Al and A2 Husser! changed his text here to read: "establishing a strictly scientific empirical psychol-
ogy." See Hu IX, p. 247.25-26.
96 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
phenomena and eidetic insights occur in both sciences, [po 248] albeit under a
different rubric, so to speak, which changes their meaning fundamentally.
Even Locke's interest lay not primarily in establishing a pure psychology;
rather, this was to be only the means to a universal solution of the problem of
"understanding." Thus his primary theme was the enigma of the functions of
understanding that are carried out as knowledge and science within subjectiv-
ity while making claims to objective validity. In short, Locke's Essay was
intended as the projection of a theory of knowledge, a transcendental philoso-
phy. He42 and his school have been charged with "psychologism." But if the
thrust of the transcendental problem is to interrogate the sense and the legiti-
macy of an objectivity that becomes consciously known in the immanence of
pure subjectivity and that presumably is demonstrated within the subjective
grounding-processes, then this question equally concerns anything and every-
thing objective.
[Intimations of the Transcendental Problem] Already in Descartes'
Meditations (and this is precisely the reason why he was the epoch-making
awakener of the transcendental problematic) the insight was already prepared,
namely, that, as far as the knowing ego is concerned, everything we declare to
really be and to be-thus-and-so - and finally this means the whole universe - is
only as something believed-in within SUbjective beliefs, and is-thus-and-so
only as something represented, thought, and so on, as having this or that sense.
Hence, the subjective conscious life in pure immanence is the place where all
sense is bestowed and all being is posited and confirmed. Thus if we are to
clarify what subjectivity can and does accomplish here in its hidden imma-
nence, we need a systematic and pure self-understanding <po 16> of the
knower, a disclosure of the life of thinking, exclusively by means of "inner
experience."
[Psychologism] Although Locke was guided by this great insight, he lacked
the [necessary] basic purity and fell into the error of psychologism. Insofar as
objective-real experience and knowledge in general were being subjected to
transcendental questioning, it was absurd of him to presuppose any kind of
objective experiences and knowledge - as if the very sense and legitimacy of
their objective validity were not themselves part of the problem. A psychology
could not be the foundation of transcendental philosophy. Even pure psychol-
ogy in the phenomenological sense, thematically delimited by the psychologi-
cal-phenomenological reduction, still is and always will be a positive science:
it has the world as its pre-given foundation. The pure psyches [po 249] and
42 This and the next sentence are joined within brackets in A2, p. 15.12-19. In the left margin there is a
note in shorthand, possibly from Heidegger:
I ''Unusable.''
The sentences are retained in Hu IX, p. 248.10-15.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFf A 97
46 Hu IX, p. 250.25-251.23. The material corresponds generally to Draft D, m, §11, from which we
derive this title.
THE EB ARTIClE - DRAFf A 99
possible subjectivity as such, in whose conscious life [po 251] and constitutive
experiences and cognitions a possible objective world comes to consciousness.
The world as experienced in factual experience is the theme of the fully
thought-out system of the positive empirical sciences. But on the basis of a
free ideal variation of factual experience in relation to its world of experience
there arises the idea of possible experience in general as experience of a
possible world, and consequently the idea of the possible system of experien-
tial sciences as belonging a priori to the unity of a possible world. So, on the
one hand there is an a priori ontology that systematically explores the struc-
tures that essentially and necessarily belong to a possible world, that is, every-
thing without which a world as such could not be ontically thought. But on the
other hand there is phenomenological correlation-research, which explores the
possible world and its ontic structures (as a world of possible experience) with
regard to the possible bestowal of sense and the establishment of being, with-
out which that world equally could not be thought. In this way transcendental
phenomenology, once realized, encompasses a universal ontology in a broad-
ened sense: a full, universal, and concrete ontology in which all correlative
ontological concepts are drawn from a transcendental originality that leaves no
questions of sense and legitimacy in any way unclarified.
<po 20> The a priori sciences that have developed historically do not at all
bring to realization the full idea of a positive ontology. They deal only (and in
this regard, even incompletely) with the logical form of every possible world
(formal mathesis universalis) and the eidetic form of a possible physical
nature. They remain stuck in transcendental nalvete and consequently are
burdened with those shortcomings in foundation-building that necessarily
follow from it. In this nalve form they function as methodological instruments
for the corresponding "exact" empirical sciences, or to put it more accurately,
they serve: to rationalize the regions of empirical data; to supply a methexis
between the factual and the necessary by means of a reference back to the
eidetic structure of a possible world-fact in general; and thereby to provide a
foundation of laws to undergird merely inductive rules. The "basic concepts"
of all positive sciences - those from out of which all concepts of worldly
reality are built - are at the same time the basic concepts of the corresponding
rational sciences. [po 252] If there is any lack of clarity as regards their origins,
and consequently any failure regarding knowing their genuine and necessary
47 Hu IX, p. 251.23-252.15. The material corresponds generally to Draft D, m. §12, from which we take
this title.
100 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
sense, this lack of clarity gets transmitted to the whole theoretical make-up of
the positive sciences. In most recent times the defectiveness of all positive
sciences has been disclosed by the crisis of foundations into which all positive,
empirical and a priori sciences have fallen, as well as by the battle over the
"paradoxes," over the either genuine or merely apparent evidentiality of the
traditional basic concepts and principles in arithmetic, chronology, and so
forth. In light of the whole character of their method, the positive sciences can
no longer be considered genuine sciences - sciences that <po 21> can com-
pletely understand and justify themselves and that can sketch out sure paths
for themselves with comprehensive insight. Modem science can be liberated
from this intolerable situation only by a phenomenological reform.
48 Hu IX, p. 252.15-253.21. The material corresponds generally to that in Draft D, ill, §13, from which
we derive this title.
49 This sentence is struck out in both Al and A2, p. 21.23-24.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFT A 101
priori that belongs to the eidetic forms of sociality. Obviously every normative
discipline and every philosophical discipline in the specialized sense belongs
within the circle of phenomenology, just as, historically, philosophical phe-
nomenology arose in connection with clarifying the idea of a pure logic, a
formal axiology, and a theory of practice. Phenomenology is anti-metaphysical
insofar as it rejects every metaphysics concerned with the construction of
purely formal hypotheses. 5o But like all genuine philosophical problems, all
metaphysical problems return to a phenomenological base, where they find
their genuine transcendental form and method fashioned from intuition.
Moreover, phenomenology is not at all a system-philosophy in the traditional
style, but rather a science that works via systematic, concrete investigations.
Even the lowest level - the purely descriptive eidetic analysis of the structures
of a transcendentally pure subjectivity (of the ego as a monad) - is already an
immense field of concrete investigative work, whose results are basic for all
philosophy (and psychology).
[p.255]
LITERATURE56
"Dates" Jahreszahkn •
The remaining footnotes in this bibliography are taken from pp. 24 and 25 of A2, found with Salmon's
first translation draft..
57 For a brief history of the Jahrbuch see Karl Schuhmann, "Husserl's Yearbook," Philosophy and Phe-
nomenological Research, 50, Supplement (Fall 1990), 1-25.
58 Following the Mahnke entry, there is typed in and then crossed out: "w. Reyer. Einfiihrung in die
Phiinomenologie, Leipzig 1926."
59 This entry refers to the dissertation that Christopher v. Salmon had written under Husserl's direction
and defended in the sununer of 1927. It was published late in 1928 as: "The Central Problem of Hume's
104 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
3. PSYCHOLOGY
A. Pfander,
"Psychologie der Gesinnungen," 1913 (= lb. I).
W. Schapp,
Beitriige zur Phiinomenologie der Wahrnehmung, Halle, 1910.
4. ETHICS
M. Scheler,
Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materia Ie Wertethik, 1913f.
(= lb. I, II).60
5. AESTHETICS
M. Geiger,
Beitriige zur Phiinomenologie des iisthetischen Genusses, Halle, 1913.
R. Odebrecht,
Grundlegung einer iisthetischen Werttheorie, Berlin, 1927.
7. PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION
M. Scheler,
Yom Ewigen im Menschen, Leipzig, 1921.
Philosophy: A Phenomenological Interpretation of the Treatise on Human Nature" in !ahrbuch fur Philoso-
phie und phiinomenologische Forschung IX (1928), 299-449.
60 In the margin next to the Scheler entry Husser! wrote: "D. v. Hildebrand," i.e., Dietrich von Hildebrand.
THE EB ARTICLE - DRAFT A 105
K. Stavenhagen,
Absolute Stellungnahmen, Edangen, 1925.
Jean Hering,
Phenominologie et philosophie religieuse, Strasbourg, 1925.
<p.2S>
F. Kaufmann,
Logik und RechtswissenschaJt, Tiibingen, 1922.
F. Schreier,
Grundbegriffe und Grundformen des Rechts, Vienna, 1924.
Gerh. Hussed,
RechtskraJt und Rechtsgeltung, I., Berlin, 1925.
M. Scheler,
Wesen und Formen der Sympathie, Bonn, 1923.
Th. Litt,
Individuum und GemeinschaJt, Leipzig, 1924.
E. Stein,
Eine Untersuchung uber den Staat, 1925 (= Jb. VII).
EDMUND HUSSERL
"PHENOMENOLOGY"
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
DRAFfB
("ATTEMPT AT A SECOND DRAFT',I)
INTRODUCTION:
THE IDEA OF PHENOMENOLOGY,
AND
THE STEP BACK TO CONSCIOUSNESS
drafted by
Martin Heidegger
The universe of entities is the field from which the positive sciences of
nature, history, space2 acquire their respective areas of objects. Directed
straight at entities, these sciences in their totality undertake the investigation of
everything that is. So apparently there is no field of possible research left over
for philosophy, which since antiquity has been considered the fundamental
science. 3 But does not Greek philosophy, right from its decisive origins,
precisely make "entities" its object of inquiry? Certainly it does - not, how-
1 ''Encyc1 Brit Zum Versuch der zweiten Bearbeitung (wiihrend Heid. Anwesenheit) und Heid. J-J(1': in
Husserl's shorthand on a cover sheet preceding the text ofB2. Hu IX, p. 597 (and in part, p. 590).
2 Husserl (BI, p. 1.4) glosses the words ''history, space" with "spirit history."
3 Husserl (B 1, p. 1.7-8) puts square brackets around the phrase ''which since antiquity has been consid-
ered the fundamental science."
108 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
ever, in order to detennine this or that entity, but rather in order to understand
entities as entities, that is to say, with regard to their being. 4 Efforts at answer-
ing the question "What are entities as such?" remain shaky for a long time
because the posing of the question is itself entangled in essential obscurities.
Nonetheless, already in the first steps of the science of the being of entities
something striking comes to light. 5 Philosophy seeks to clarify being6 via a
reflection on one's thinking about entities (parmenides).7 Plato's disclosure of
the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul's soliloquy (logos) with itself.s The
Aristotelian categories originate with regard to reason's assertoric knowledge.
Descartes explicitly founds First Philosophy on the res cogitans. Kant's trans-
cendental problematic operates in the field of consciousness. Is this turning of
the gaze away from <po 2> entities and onto consciousness something acciden-
tal, or is it demanded, in the fmal analysis, by the specific character of that
which, under the title "being," has constantly been sought for as the prob-
lem-area of philosophy?9
The fundamental insight into!O the necessity of the return to consciousness;
the radical and explicit detennination of the path of, and the procedural rules
for, this return; the principle-based determination and systematic exploration
of the field that is to be disclosed!! in this return - this we designate as phe-
nomenology .!2 It stands in the service of the guiding philosophical problem-
atic, namely, the question about the being of entities in the articulated mani-
13 Husserl (Bl, p. 2.8-11) brackets this sentence and in the left margin substitutes the following for it:
'The ultimate clarification of the philosophical problem of being, and its methodic reduction to scientifically
executed philosophical woIk, overcome the vague generality and emptiness of traditional [po 257] philoso-
phizing. The mode of inquiry, the methodic research and solutions, follow the classification, according to
principles, of what [the attitude of} positivity straightforwardly accepts as 'entities' in all their kinds and
levels." SeeHu IX 256.31 to 257.3.
14 Husserl (Bl, p. 2.12, within the text) overwrites this phrase with "since Locke."
15 Husserl (Bl, p. 2.11-14) amends this sentence to read: "But since Locke, has not this task been taken
over by psychology? Does the radical grounding of philosophy demand anything other than simply a
psychology of pure conscious subjectivity, methodically and consistently restricted to inner experience?" See
Hu IX, p. 257.4-8.
16 Husserl (81, p. 2.15) brackets out this word [gerade]. SeeHu IX, p. 257.8.
17 Husserl (81, p. 2.17) changes this from "secure" [sichern] to "provide" [beistellen]. See Hu IX, p.
257.11.
18 Husserl (Bl, p. 2.18-20) amends this sentence to read: "For psychology is itself a positive science, and
in keeping with the way any positive science does its research, psychology leaves untouched the question that
concerns all these sciences equally, namely, the question about the meaning of being in the regions of being
of these sciences."See Hu IX, p. 257.12-15.
19 On the back of Bl, p. 2 Husserl writes a long shorthand memo. It is difficult to ascertain to what pas-
sage of the typescript (if at all) it is intended to pertain. Biemel transcribes the text at Hu IX, p. 598-599. For
a translation of the text, see below: Husserl's Shorthand Note from Bl, p.2.
110 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
PART I
THE IDEA OF A PURE PSYCHOLOGY
How in general is one to characterize the entity that becomes the object
through the phenomenological turn of gaze? In all of the psyche's pure lived
experience (in the perceiving of something, in the remembering of something,
in the imagining of something, in the passing of judgment about something, in
the willing of something, in the enjoying of something,22 in the hoping for
something, and so forth) there is an intrinsic directedness-toward.... Lived
experiences are intentional. This relating-oneself-to... is not merely added on
20 In BI, p. 3.12 this phrase is crossed out in the typescript. See Hu IX, p. 257.33.
21 Husserl (BI, p. 3.14) adds the word "purely" after "lived experiences." SeeHu IX, p. 257.36.
22 Biemellransposes this phrase from here to the position after ''in the imaging of something." Compare
BI, p. 4.16 and Hu IX, 258.26.
DRAFfB 111
23 In 81 p. 4.23 the phrase "that is to say" [lias heijJt] is crossed out. In Hu IX. p. 258.34 the phrase is
changed, without apparent manuscript evidence, to read: "Das Ganze eines Erlebniszusammenhangs, eines
seelischen Lebens existiert..." ("The whole of a complex of lived experience. of a psychic life...").
24 In 81, p. 5.5-6 "the one thing" is crossed out, and the earlier word "one" is underlined. See Hu IX, p.
259.5-6.
2.5 Heidegger (81, p. 5.6, calligraphy) crosses out this word in his original text and substitutes "for its
part." SeeHu IX, p. 259.6.
26 Heidegger (81, p. 5.9, calligraphy) writes in the word "alone." See Hu IX. p. 259.10.
27 The phrase "that same object" is crossed out in 81, p. 5.12 [cf. Hu IX, p. 259.12]. The reference is to
the cube mentioned above.
28 Heidegger (81, p. 5.21, calligraphy) changes this to "Nonetheless." See Hu IX, p. 259.22.
112 PSYCHOWGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTALPHENOMENOWGY
The essential components of the method are determined by the basic struc-
ture and kind of being of the object. If the pure psychic is essentially inten-
tional and initially accessible in one's experience of one's individual self, the
phenomenological tum of the gaze onto lived experiences must be carried out
in such a way that these lived experiences are shown in their intentionality and
become comprehensible in30 their formal types. Access to entities that are, by
their basic structure, intentional is carried out <po 7> by way of the phenome-
nological-psychological reduction. Remaining within the reductive attitude,
one carries out the eidetic analysis of the pure psychic, that is to say, one lays
out the essential structures of particular kinds of lived experience, their forms
of interrelation and occurrence. Inasmuch as the psychic becomes accessible
both in experience of the self and in intersubjective experience, the reduction
is correspondingly divided into the egological and the intersubjective reduc-
tions.
The turning of the gaze away from the non-reflective perception of, for
example, a thing in nature [Naturdinges] and onto this very act of perceiving
has a special characteristic: in it the direction of the comprehending act, which
was previously directed at the thing, is pulled back from the non-reflective
perception in order to be directed at the act of perceiving as such. This lead-
ing-back (reduction) of the direction of the comprehending act from the per-
ception, and the shifting of the comprehending [po 261] onto the act of per-
ceiving, changes almost nothing in the perception; indeed, the reduction
actually renders the perception accessible as what it is, namely, as perception
of the thing. Of course, the physical thing in nature, by reason of its very
essence, is itself never a possible object of a psychological reflection. Never-
theless, it shows up in the reducing gaze that focuses on the act of perceiving,
because this perceiving is essentially a perceiving of the thing. The thing
belongs to the perceiving as its perceived. The perceiving's intentional rela-
tion is certainly not some free-floating relation directed into the void; rather, as
intentio it has an intentum that belongs to it essentially. Whether or not what-
is-perceived in the perception is itself in truth 32 present at hand, <po 8> the
perception's intentional act-of-meaning [Vermeinen], in keeping with its own
tendency to grasp something, is nonetheless directed to the entity as bodily
present. Any perceptual illusion makes this plain. Only because the perceiv-
ing33 essentially has its intentum, can it be modified into a deception about
something.
Through the performance of the reduction the full intentional make-up of a
lived experience becomes visible for the first time. But because all pure lived
experiences and their interrelations are structured intentionally, the reduction
guarantees universal access to the pure psychic, that is to say, to the phenom-
ena. For this reason the reduction is called "phenomenological." However,
that which first of all becomes accessible in the performance of the phenome-
31 Heidegger (Bl, p. 7.9, calligraphy) subsequently amends this by inserting "-psychological" here, so as
to read:
''The Phenomenolo ical- cholo ical Reduction,"
See Hu IX, p. 260.26-27. In 1925 Heidegger called this reduction ''the first stage within the process of
phenomenological reductions" [note the plural] and referred to it as "the so-called transcendental reduc-
tion." See his Prolegomena zur Geschichte des ZeitbegrijJs, GA II, 20, edited by Petra Jaeger, Frankfurt am
Main: Vittorio Klostennann, 1979, p. 137; E.T. History of the Concept of Time, translated by Theodore
Kisiel, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985, p. 100.
32 Heidegger (Bl, p. 7.26, calligraphy) subsequently substitutes "truly" (wahrhaft) for "in truth." See Hu
p.
IX, 261.12.
3 After "perceiving" Heidegger (B I, p. 7.4, calligraphy) inserts
il "as intentional" II
See Hu IX, p. 261.16-17.
114 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
34 On May 29, 1925, in his course Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Heidegger referred to this as the eidetic
reduction rather than eidetic analysis. See GA vol. 20, p. 137; History ojthe Concept ojTime, p. 100.
35 Heidegger (HI, p. 9.12) crosses out this phrase.
36 Husser! (HI, p. 9.14) changes "directly" to "directly-and-intuitively via the method of variation." Cf.
Hu IX, p. 262.21.
DRAFfB 115
The reduction opens the way to the pure psychic as such. The eidetic
analysis discloses the essential interrelations of what has become accessible in
the reduction. 42 Consequently in the reductive eidetic investigation of the pure
psychic there emerge the determinations that belong to the pure psychic as
such, that is to say, the basic concepts of psychology, insofar as psychology, as
an empirical science of the psychophysical whole of the concrete human
PART II
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
drafted by
Edmund Husserl
[Section ii-at5
The idea of pure psychology did not grow out of psychology's own needs to
fulfill the conditions essential to its systematic construction. Rather, the his-
tory of pure psychology takes us back to John Locke's famous and founda-
tional work, and back to David Hume's noteworthy elaboration of the tenden-
cies that stem from Locke. Hume's brilliant Treatise already has the form of a
rigorous and systematic structural exploration of the sphere of pure lived
experience. Thus in a certain sense it [is46 ] the first attempt at a "phenomen-
ology."
But here in the beginning, the restriction [of the investigation] to the realm
of the pure subjective was determined by interests coming from outside psy-
chology. Psychology was at the service of the problematic of "understanding"
or "reason" that Descartes had reawakened47 in a new form - namely, the fact
that entities in the true sense are known to be such only via these sUbjective
faculties. In our current way of speaking, it was a matter of "transcendental
45 In B2, pp. 12-14 = "pp. 1-3." (The original page numeration is always given in quotation marks.) This
equals Hu IX, pp. 264.1-266.15. The material of Section ii-a, which is continued in Section ii-b, generally
corresponds to the topics treated in Draft D, Part n, §6, from which we take the title that immediately follows.
Husser! put no paragraph breaks in Section ii-a. I have added those that appear below.
46 The bracketed word is added by Biemel, Hu IX, 264.8.
47 Within the text of B 1, p. 12.12 Husser! here adds in shorthand "and raised to a new level of conscious-
ness" ["und aUf eine neue Stufe des Bewusstseins erhobenen"]. The addition is taken over into Draft C
(typed p. 3, hand-numbered p. 14, although the page is actually found in Bl; cf. Hu IX, p. 610). However,
the sentence was radically edited in Draft C to read: "Psychology stood in the service of the transcendental
problem awakened by Descartes." In that form it entered the D draft atHu IX, p. 287.l3-14. These changes-
made in B 1 but not in B2, included in some but not all the C drafts, and yet taken into the D draft - show the
fluidity that existed between drafts B, C, and D between mid-October and December 8, 1927.
118 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
philosophy.,,48 Descartes put in doubt the general possibility that any knowl-
edge could legitimately transcend the knowing subject. That, in turn, made it
impossible to understand the genuine ontological sense49 of any entity qua
objective reality, insofar as its existence is intended and demonstrated only by
way of subjective experiences. The "transcendent" world, which, from a naIve
point of view, is given as existing, becomes problematic from a "transcend-
ental" point of view: it cannot serve as a basis for cognition the way it does in
the positive sciences. According to Descartes, such a basis requires that we get
a pure grasp of that which is presupposed in the transcendental inquiry and
which is itself beyond question: the ego cogito. Descartes' Meditations al-
ready gained the insight that everything real - ultimately this whole world -
has being for us only in terms <po 13="p. 2"> of our experience and cogni-
tion, and that even the performances of reason, aimed at objective truth with
the character of "evidence," unfold purely within subjectivity.50 For all its
primitiveness, Descartes' methodical attempt at universal doubt is the ftrst
radical method of reduction to pure subjectivity.
It was Locke, however, who first saw in all of this a broad area of concrete
[po 265] tasks and began to work on it. Because rational cognition in general
occurs only in cognitive subjectivity, the only way to get a transcendental
clariftcation of the transcendental validity of cognition is by way of a sys-
tematic study of all levels of cognitive experiences, activities, and faculties
exactly as these present themselves in pure "inner experience" - a study that
was guided, however, by the naIvely developed basic concepts of the experi-
ential world and their logical elaboration. What is required, in short, is inner-
directed descriptions and the exploration of pure psychological genesis. 51
But Locke did not know how to sustain this momentous idea at the high
level of the principles that characterize Descartes' inquiry. With Locke the
methodically reduced Cartesian ego - the ego that would remain in being even
if the experiential world did not - once again becomes the ordinary ego, the
human psyche in the world. Although Locke certainly wanted to solve the
transcendental questions of cognition, they get transformed in his work into
psychological questions about how human beings living in the world attain
and justify knowledge of the world that exists outside the mind. In this way
Locke fell into transcendental psychologism, which then got passed down
through the centuries (although Hume knew how to avoid it). The contradic-
tion consists in this: Locke pursues the transcendental exploration of cognition
as a psychological (in the natural positive sense of that word) exploration of
cognition, thereby constantly presupposing the ontological validity of the
experiential <po 14="p. 3"> world - whereas that very world, along with all
the positive cognition that can relate to it, is what is transcendentally prob-
lematic in its ontological sense and validity. Locke confuses two things: (1)
questions about natural legitimacy in the realm of positivity (that52 of all the
positive sciences), where the experiential world is the general and unques-
tioned presupposition, and (2) the question of transcendental legitimacy,53
where what is put into question is the world itself - everything that has the
sense of "being-in-itself' over against cognition - and where we ask in the
most radical way not whether something is valid but rather what sense and
import such validity can have. With that, all questions about cognition within
the realm of positivity (that54 of all the positive sciences) are burdened from
the outset with the transcendental question about sense.
Nevertheless, the historical insurmountability of Locke's psychologism
points back to a deeply rooted [po 266] sense of truth that can be utilized in the
transcendental project, a sense of truth that, despite the contradiction in
[Locke's] transcendental claim, necessarily belongs to every carefully carried
out part of a pure psychology of knowledge and reason. Moreover, as tran-
scendental phenomenology (whose proper idea we are striving for) makes
clear for the first time, the reverse is equally true: every correctly (hence,
52 This word, "die," instead of refening to "positivity," could be in the plural ("those") and could refer to
"questions of natural legitimacy" (lIatiirlichen Rechtsfragell).
53 Heidegger (BI, p. 14.7, calligraphy) suggests ending this sentence here and changing the remainder of
the sentence, and the next sentence, to:
"Here the world itself - that is, every entity with the characteristic of 'in-itself-ness' with regard to
cognition - is put into question. We ask not whether something 'is valid' but rather what sense
and, in keeping with this sense, what import such a validity can have. The transcendental question
of sense weighs upon the positive sciences."
Husser! does not take this into C.
54 This word, "die," could be in the plural ("those") and could refer to "questions about cognition"
(Erkellnmisfrage).
120 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[Section ii-b]56
<po 15="p. 4"> In the beginning such insights were unavailable. People
were not prepared to grasp the profound meaning of Descartes' radicalism in
exhibiting the pure ego cogito, nor to draw out its consequences with strict
consistency. One was unable to distinguish the attitudes of positive research
from those of transcendental research and, as a result, one could not delimit
the proper sense of positive science. And given the ardent efforts to create a
scientific psychology that could compete in fruitfulness and rigor with the
pace-setting natural sciences, people failed to radically think through the
requirements of such a psychology.
In this situation, which entrapped later thinkers too, neither transcendental
philosophy nor psychology was able to attain the "sure path of a science" - a
rigorous science fashioned originally from the sources of experience peculiar
to it - nor could the ambiguous interpenetration [of transcendental philosophy
and psychology] be clarified. The psychologism of the empiricists had the
advantage to the degree that it ignored the objections of the anti-psychologists
and followed the evidence that any science which questions cognition in all its
forms can get answers only by systematically studying these forms via direct
"inner" intuition. The knowledge thus acquired about the essence of cognition
could not go astray if only it questioned [p.267] the ontological sense of the
DRAFfB 121
objective world, that is, if it followed Descartes' shift of focus and his reduc-
tion to the pure ego. The charge that this was psychologism had no real effect
because the anti-psychologists, out of fear of succumbing to psychologism,
avoided any systematically <po 16=''p. 5"> concrete study of cognition; and,
as they reacted ever more vociferously against the increasing power of em-
piricism in the last century, they finally fell into an empty aporetics and dia-
lectics that managed to get what meager sense it had only by secretly borrow-
ing it from intuition.
Even though much valuable preparatory work towards a pure psychology
can be found in Locke's Essay and in the related epistemological and psycho-
logical literature of the ensuing years, nevertheless pure psychology itself still
attained no real foundation. For one thing, its essential meaning as what we
might call "first psychology" - the eidetic science of the logos (?)57 of the
psychic - remained hidden, and thus the genuine guiding idea for systematic
work [on it] was lacking. For another thing, the great efforts of individual
psychological investigations, whether concerned with the transcendental or
not, could bear no real fruit so long as naturalism, which dominated every-
thing, remained blind to intentionality - the essential characteristic of the
psychic sphere - and therefore blind to the infinite breadth of the pure psycho-
logical problematic and methodology that belong to intentionality.
Pure psychology, in the fundamental sense sketched out in Part I, arose
from outside general psychology; specifically, it blossomed as the final fruit of
a methodologically new development of transcendental philosophy, in which it
became a rigorously systematic science constructed concretely from below.
But of course pure psychology arose not as the goal of transcendental philoso-
phy or as a discipline belonging to it, but rather as a result of the fact that the
relations between positivity and transcendentality were finally clarified. This
clarification made possible for the first time a principled solution to the prob-
lem of psychologism; and following from that, <po 17=''p. 6"> the methodo-
logical reform of philosophy into rigorous science was concluded and phi-
losophy was freed from the persistent hindrances of inherited confusion.
The prior event that made this development possible was Brentano's great
discovery: his transformation of the scholastic concept [po 268] of intentional-
ity into an essential characteristic of "mental phenomena" as phenomena of
"inner perception." In general, Brentano's psychology and philosophy have
had an historical impact on the rise of phenomenology but no influence at all
on its content. Brentano himself was still caught in the prevailing naturalistic
misunderstanding of conscious life, and into that orbit he drew those "mental
phenomena." He was unable to grasp the true sense of a descriptive and ge-
netic disclosure of intentionality. His work lacked a conscious utilization of
57 This question mark appears typed in the B drafts at this point (B2, p. 16="5.11 "),
122 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
58 The literal meaning is "that is connected with" (anknfJpfende); but it is clear that Husserl is referring
here to his own phenomenology, which was connected with, but grew away from, Brentano's work.
DRAFfB 123
59 Husserl is referring to his l.ogische Untersuchungen (1900--01). The topic of pure logical granunar is
treated there in vol. n, Investigation N, pp. 286-321 (1984 ed., pp. 301-351), B.T. vol n, 491-529. The idea
of pure logic as a fonnal ontology or mathesis universalis is sketched out in vol. I, pp. 22S-257 (1975 ed., pp.
230-258), B.T. vol. I, pp. 225-247.
IiO Husserl is referring to himself.
61 Husserl is again referring to himself.
124 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[Section iii]62
62 In Draft B, pp. 21-28 = "pp. 10--17" = Hu IX, pp. 271.1-277.21. The material of Section iii generally
corresponds to the topics treated in Draft D, Part n, §§7-1O.
63 Hu IX, p. 271.1-26. We supply this title from Draft D, n, §7, to which its contents correspond.
64 At the top of p. 21 in B3 Husserl writes: "Duplicate. The new text [that was prepared] for Heidegger
21-28 with Heidegger's critical notes." These pages in B3 are the ones Heidegger took from Freiburg to
Messkirch on Thursday, October 20, 1927, for the purpose of correcting and commenting upon them, and it
is to these pages that Heidegger refers in his letter of October 22, 1927.
65 The German word that we translate as "all-inclusiveness" is "Universalitiit." As the text below shows
(Hu IX, p. 273.31; ms. p. 24 = "pJ3"), this "universality" refers to the all-encompassing breadth of the
transcendental epocM.
66 Following on Heidegger's criticisms (see below in this same paragraph), Husserl changes this sentence
in B3 and Bl to read: "As soon as one's theoretical concern turns toward the life of consciousness in which
each and every thing that is real for us is always 'present,' a cloud of unintelligibility spreads over the whole
world, this world that we talk about straightforwardly and that is the constant field - pre-given as
self-evidently real- of all our theoretical and practical activities." This latter reading is reproduced in Hu IX,
p.217.2-8.
67 Heide er's note B3, .21.7; cf. Hu IX, .271, n. 1, where Biemel fails to underscore "Auf abe" :
thinking, evaluating (and so on) life and that takes shape in subjective genesis;
every acceptance of being is carried out within ourselves, all experiential or
theoretical evidence grounding that acceptance is active within us and ha-
bitually motivates us onward. This applies to the world in each of the determi-
nations [we make about it], including the taken-for-granted determination that
what belongs to the world is "in and for itself' just the way it is, regardless of
whether or not I or anyone else happen to take cognizance of it. If we vary68
the factical world into any world that can be thought, we also undeniably vary
the world's relativity to conscious subjectivity. Thus the notion of a world
existing in itself is unintelligible, due to that world's essential relativity to
consciousness. An equal [degree of] unintelligibility - and this too belongs to
the transcendental question - is offered by any ideal "world," such as, for
example, the world of numbers, which, in its own way, does exist "in itself.,,69
(1) Hussed copied this note in shorthand into the corresponding margin of Bland, in that text,
changed the word "lnunanenz," to which Heidegger's note is keyed, to "Innerlichkeit" (see Hu
lX, p. 271.10-11).
(2) In Hu lX, p. 271, n. 1 Heidegger's marginal note given above is incorrectly keyed to the word
"Variieren" at Hu lX, p. 271.19, whereas it should be keyed to Hu lX, p. 271.11. See the follow-
ing footnote.
68 Heidegger (B3, p. 21.13) inserts a red "T' at the beginning of this sentence so as to call into question
the discussion of "unintelligibility" that follows (as well as in the second sentence of this paragraph). This
mark directs Hussed's attention to Appendix II, first point: Heideg,ger's letter of October 22, 1927:
The first thing in the presentation of the transcendental problem is to clarify what the
"unintelligibility" of entities means.
• In what respect are entities unintelligible? i.e., what higher claim of intelligibility is possible
and necessary.
• By a return to what is this intellildbility achieved?
Disposition of the note:
(1) The fact that Hussed understood Heidegger's red mark to refer to the Appendices is indicated by
Hussed's own marginal note - "Bei/age" ("Appendix") - written in the left margins of both B3
andBI.
(2) Biemel wrongly states that this appendix has not been retained ["(nicht erhalten)": Hu lX, p. 603]
and then wrongly relates Heidegger's red mark here to Heidegger's previous marginal note seven
lines earlier ("It is the task of transcendental philosophy ... "; cf. the previous footnote).
(3) The fact that Hussed understood that Heidegger was criticizing the notion of "unintelligibility" is
shown by the fact that in B3 and B I Hussed (a) crossed out the two sentences that begin "Thus
the notion of a wodd existing in itself is unintelligible ..." and "An equal [degree of] unintelligibil-
ity ..." (Hu lX, p. 271.21-26), and (b) changed part of the related second sentence of the para-
graph: ''Each and every entity ... " (B3, p. 21.2-5, corresponding to Hu lX, p. 271.2-8: see above).
(4) Biemel's editing here is paradoxical. (a) At Hu lX, p. 271.21-26, he retains the two sentences that
Husser! crosses out, whereas (b) at Hu lX, p. 271.2-8 he substitutes the revised text of Husser!.
69 Hussed (Bl and B3, left margins) writes a second time: "Bei/age" ("Appendix"), which Biemel again
incorrectly says is "not retained" (Hu lX, p. 603). As mentioned above, the present sentence and the previous
one are crossed out in Bl and B3.
126 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
70 Hu IX, pp. 271.26-273.13. The contents of this section correspond generally to Draft D, II. §8,
"Psychologism's Solution as a Transcendental Circle."
71 (1) In editing Draft B, Husserl cut page 21 ofB3 in half and placed the bottom half (lines 19 to 28 = Hu
IX, 271.24 [mitgehOrig) to 271.36 [berufen)) in Bl at this point. (2) In the transition from Draft B to C, this
sentence and some of what follows carries over to C p. 19.18 ff. (3) In the transition from Draft C to D, p. 19
ofC gets inserted into D and renumbered as p. 18. There the present sentence begins §8 (Hu IX, p. 290.11).
72 Reading "sich ergebenden" instead of the manuscripts' "sie ergebenden" at B (all drafts) p. 22.2-3 and
Hu IX, p. 272.2.
73 Heidegger (B3, p. 22.4-16; cf. Hu IX, p. 603, re 272.4-16) IIIlIIks off the rest of this sentence as well as
the following three sentences - i.e., from "that for the purpose" to "And so on in every case" - and notes in
themar 'n:
''These lines should be put [above] in section I·a to fill out my altogether too brief presentation of
the reduction."
By "Ia" Heidegger is referring to section 1.2.aofhis own draft (BI, p. 7.9; = Hu IX, p. 260.27), the section
ori~nally entitled ''The Phenomenological Reduction."
4 For the next two sentences I follow Husserl's original version in B2, p. 22.16-25 (the unmarked type-
script).
75 Heidegger (B3, p. 22.16-23; see Hu IX, p. 604, re 274.17-23) edits this and the next sentence to read:
DRAFTB 127
reduction to my psyche, the world that has been rendered questionable in the
transcendental inquiry is certainly no longer presupposed - and the same for
all psyches as regards their purity. Here in this context of statements about the
purely psychic, the world that has straightforward validity for these minds
themselves is not the focus of attention, but rather only the pure being and life
of the very psyches in which the world appears and naturally, via the corre-
sponding subjective modes of appearance and belief, acquires meaning and
validity.
Nonetheless, it is still a question of "psyches" and connections between
them, psyches belonging to bodies that are always presupposed and that are
only temporarily excluded from theoretical consideration.76 To put it con-
cretely, [pure psychology] is concerned with77 the animals and human beings
that inhabit a presupposed <po 23="p. 12"> spatial world;78 and just as physi-
cal somatology explores such animals and human beings with a systematic
methodical focus on only one side of them - the animate organism aspect - so
pure psychology explores them with an equally systematic focus on only the
other side - the pure psychic aspect. 79 Even when doing pure psychology we
still stand, as psychologists, on the ground of positivity; we are and remain
explorers simply of the world or of a [particular] world, and thus all our re-
search remains transcendentally [po 273] naive. Despite their purity, all pure
''When I make a general reduction to my pure psyche and that of all others, the world that has
been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry is certainly no longer presupposed.
Although the world still has straightforward validity for these psyches, it is not the focus of
attention; rather, the focus is only the pure being and life of the very psyches in which the world,
via the correspondine: subjective modes of appearance and belief acquires meauine: and validitv."
HusserJ (Bl, p. 22.16-25) changed these two sentences to read: "When I make a general and, as is re-
quired, a rigorously consistent reduction to the pure psyches of myself and others, I practice epoche with
regard to the world that has been rendered questionable in the transcendental inquiry, that is, the world that
these psyches accept, in a straightforward manner, as valid. The theme is to be simply the pure being and life
of the very psyches in which the world appears and in which, via the corresponding subjective modes of
appearance and belief, that world acquires meaning and validity for their ego-subjects." This changed text
appears in Hu IX, p. 272.16-24.
76 Heidegger's note here (B3, p. 22.28, bottom margin, keyed to this passage; cf. Hu IX, p. 272, n. 1) is
hi . ted in red:
78 Husserl (Bl, p. 22.28 and p. 23.1) changes this to read: "To put it concretely, [pure psychology] is
concerned with presumptively [vorausgesetztennqj3en] existent animals and human beings of an existent
spatial world." See Hu IX, p. 272.27-29.
79 See Heidegger's "Appendix 1," paragraph 4, below, where Heidegger argues that these "one-sided"
treatments presuppose the concrete ontological totality of the human being.
128 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
psychic phenomena have the ontological sense of worldly real facts,SO even
when they are treated eidetically as possible facts of a world which is posited
as general possibility but which, for that very reason, is also unintelligible
from a transcendental point of view. For the psychologist, who as psychologist
remains in positivity, the systematic psychological-phenomenological reduc-
tion, with its epoch€! regarding the existing world, is merely a means for
reducing the human and animal psyche to its own pure and proper essence, all
of this against the background of the world that, as far as the psychologist is
concerned, remains continually in being and constantly valid. Precisely for
that reason this phenomenological reduction, seen from the transcendental
viewpoint, is characterized as inauthentic and transcendentally non-genuine.
80 "weltlich reale Tatsachen" is underlined in pencil in B3, p. 23.9. (See Hu IX, p. 273.2). This appar-
ently is the phrase Heidegger refers to in his Appendix I, third paragraph ("'weltlich reale Tatsache"';
Heidegger neglects to close the quotes in his IDS.) when he remarks that the human being is "never a 'worldly
real fact.'"
81 Hu IX, pp. 273.13-276.22. The contents of these pages correspond in general to Draft D, ll. §9, ''The
Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction and the Semblance of Transcendental Doubling."
82 Heidegger at this point (B3, p. 23.28; cf. Hu IX, p. 604, re 273.21) inserts a red ''T' and in the left
margin he writes:
n ''meaning?'' [hei/!t?]
The note is circled in red and thus refers to the appendices to Heidegger's letter, presumably to Appendix I
but also to Appendix ll, the fourth paragraph: "Was heijJt absolutes ego im Unterschied vom rein
Seelischen?" ("What does the absolute ego mean as distinct from the pure psychic?") and perhaps the fifth
paragraph. Two other marginal notes by Heidegger are erased in the margin here.
DRAFfB 129
cr.our conversation in Todtnauberg [April, 1926] about 'being-in-tbe-world' (Sein und Zeit, I,
§12 §69 and its essential difference from resence-at-hand 'within' such a world."
Regarding the disposition of this marginal note: Heidegger underlines Husserl's words "world" and "pure
ego" and connects them with a line; he underlines "transcendent"; and in the left margin he writes the above
note. The first sentence is bracketed in red.
Heidegger then draws a line separating the first sentence from the second one, which is not bracketed in
red. The word "presence-at-hand" [Vorhandensein] is underlined in Heidegger's handwritten marginal note
in B3, but not in Husserl's shorthand transcription of it in the corresponding margin in Bl.
86 Heide er's note at this int B3, ,2S.4,left mar 'n; cf. Hu IX .274, n, 2 is hi hli ted in red:
130 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
theme is inserted as a worldly thing, Of course all these [acts] - in general, all
apperceptive performances and validations - belong to the psychological
realm, but always in such a way that the apperception of the world remains
universally accepted as valid; and whenever something new emerges, it always
becomes, within [that] apperception, a worldly thing. The disclosing of the
mind is an infinite process, but so too is psychic self-apperception in the form
of worldliness.
It is the transcendental reduction's fundamental and proper character that,
from the very beginning and with one blow - by means of an all-inclusive
theoretical act of will - it checks this transcendental naiVete that still remains
as a residue87 in pure psychology: it encompasses the whole of current and
habitual life with this act of will: 88 This will demands that we practice no
transcendent apperception and no transcendent validation, whatever its condi-
tion. It demands that we "put [all this] in brackets" and take it only as what it
is in itself: a pure subjective act of perceiving, meaning, positing-as-valid, and
so on. After I do this to [po 275] myself, I am not a human eg089 even though I
This and three more marginal notes all appear in B3, on p. 25, and three of the four are numbered by
Heidegger. The present note, which Heidegger designates with a "1," is bordered in red and topped off with a
red circle. Husser! copied it in shorthand into the corresponding margin in B 1.
87 Heidegger (B3, p. 25.15), using red, (1) underlines "remains as a residue", (2) also underlines the word
"whole" [ganze] towards the end of that line, and (3) puts an exclamation point in the left margin. Apparently
the exclamation point indicates a contradiction between, on the one hand, saying the transcendental reduction
affects the whole of habitual life and, on the other hand, saying that such naivete is there merely as a residue.
In B 1 Husser! copies the exclamation point into the corresponding margin and changes the phrase "remains
as a residue" [ubrig bleibt] to "dominates" [herrscht]. See Hu IX, p. 274.28.
88 Heidegger's note at this point (B3, p. 25.16-17, left margin; cf. Hu IX, p. 274, n. 3) is underlined in
red:
"2. And [what about] this will itself!" ["Und dieser Wille selbsttj."
Heidegger may be indicating that, if the transcendental epoche is as universal as Husser! claims, it must
paradoxically bracket out even this act of will itself. Or he may be alluding to the need to question this ''will''
in terms of what he calls "Entschlossenheit" [resoluteness].
Disposition of this second note on p. 25: (1) Husser! copies Heidegger's note, in shorthand, into Bl,
along with the exclamation point. (2) Unlike Husser!, Biemel (Hu IX, p. 274, n. 3) takes Heidegger's
explanation point to be a question mark.
89 In B3 Heidegger provides two marginal notes on this phrase, both of which are highlighted in red, and
both of which Husser! copies in shorthand into the corresponding margin in Bl (see Hu IX, p. 275, n. 1):
Note [A]: AtB3, p. 25.21, leftmarlrin and runninll: down to the bottom marlrin:
"3b. Why not? Isn't this action a possibility of the human being, but one which, precisely because
the human being is never present-at-hand, is a comportment [a way of 'having oneself'], i.e., a way
of being which comes into its own entirely from out of itself and thus never belongs to the positivity
of something present-at-hand." [''Warum nicht? 1st dieses Tun nicht eine Miiglichkeit des Men-
schen, aber eben weil dieser nie vorhanden ist, ein Verholten, d.h. eine Seinsart, die eben von
Hause aus sich sich selbst verschafft, also nie zur Positivitiit des Vorhandenen aehiirt."]
Note [B]: At B3, top margin:
DRAFfB 131
lose nothing of the proper and essential content of my pure psyche (and thus,
nothing of the pure psychological). What is bracketed is only the posit-
ing-as-valid that I had performed in the attitude of "I, this human being" and
the attitude of "my psyche in the world"; what is not bracketed is that positing
and that having-as-valid qua lived experience. This reduced ego is certainly
[still] my "f' in the whole concretion of my life, but it is seen directly in
transcendentally reduced inner experience <po 26=''p. 15"> - and now it
really is the concrete ego, the absolute presupposition for all transcendence
that is valid for "me." In fact it is evident that the ego in its [now transcenden-
tally] reduced peculiarity is the only one90 that is positable [setzbar]91 with all
its intentional correlates, and that it therefore offers me the most fundamental
and primordial experiential ground for transcendental exploration. The phen-
"3a. Or maybe [one is) precisely that [namely, a hwnan ego) in its ownmost 'wondersome'
possibility-of-Existenz. Compare p. 27 below, where you speak of a 'kbid of transformation of
one's whole way of life.'" ["Oder vielleicht gerade solches, in seiner eigensten, 'wuodersamen'
Existenzmiiglichkeit. Vg. S. 27 unten, wo Sie von einer 'Art Anderung der Lebensfonn' spre-
chen."]
Disposition of these nares:
Note [A}: In Husserl's text Heidegger underlines "I am" and ''not'' in the phrase "I am not a human ego"
(B3, p. 25.21; Hu IX, p. 275.1) and, a few lines below, underlines the words ''is certainly" in the phrase ''is
certainly my 'f" (B3, p. 25.27; Hu IX, p. 275.7) and connects the two underlinings with a line, as if to point
to an apparent contradiction. At that point, it would seem, Heidegger writes out the first note - "[AJ" (above)
in the left margin and numbers it simply as "3" and blocks it in red, topping it off with a red circle. Husser!
copies it into B 1.
Note [B}: Apparently later, after reading ahead to B3, p. 27.26 (Hu IX, p. 276.34-35) where the phrase "a
kind of transformation of one's whole form of life" appears, Heidegger returned to B3, p. 25 and wrote the
second note - "[B]" above - in the top margin, keyed it to the phrase "I am not a human ego," numbered it as
''3a,'' and then renumbered note "3" as "3b" - so that they would be read in the reverse order in which they
were written. Prof. Biemel provides these two marginal notes in the 3a-3b order at Hu IX, p. 275, n. 1.
In Note [B] Heidegger's phrase "p. 27" refers ahead to B3, p. 27.26 (Hu IX, p. 276.34-35), specifically to
the German words "eine Art Anderung tier gamen Lebensform." In Hu IX, p. 275, n. 1, Prof. Biernel
erroneously takes the reference to be to Hu IX, p. 276.36, where in fact a different and distinct note of
Heidegger's appears.
90 " .. .ist... ausschliesslich setzbar...": literally "is.... exclusively positable."
91 Heidegger underlines "setlbar' in red. His note in the left margin (B3, p. 26.4, left margin, blocked in
red' cf. Hu IX 604 re 275.12-13) is hi2hliJdlted in red:
"[So it is a] posllum! Something positive! Or else what kind of positing is this? In what sense [can
one say] that this positeti-something is - if it is supposed to be not DIItbiD& [but] rather in a certain
way everything?" [''positum! Positives! Oder was ist das fiir eine Setzung? In welchem Sinne ist
dieses GesetrJe, wenn es nicht IIi:b&a [underlined twice), vielmehr in gewisser Weise Alles sein
soli?',] .
Concerning the note: (l) Husser! copies the note, in shorthand, into the corresponding margin in B 1. Also
in BI he crosses out "ausschliesslich setWar' and substitutes for it "ein [in} sich abgeschlossenes Er-
fahrungsfeld" ["a self-enclosed field of experience"]. This latter is the text reproduced in Hu IX, p. 275.12-
13. (2) Heidegger's marginal note is apparently related to [A] "Appendix 1," paragraph 5: "That which does
the constituting is not nothing; hence it is something and it is in being - although not in the sense of
something positive." and [B] "Appendix n," sixth paragraph: ''What is the character of the positing in which
the absolute ego is something-posited? To what extent is there no positivity (positedness) hereT' (3) It may be
that Heidegger, in his phrase ''in gewisser Weise Alles," intends to echo Aristotle's'; 1Jroxil 't& ov'ta n:61C;
i:o'tt ltCxv'ta (De Anima r, 8,431 b 21): 'The soul is in some way all things."
132 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
92 Husser! (B 1, p. 26.6-8) brackets out this sentence in the original draft and substitutes for it the follow-
ing: "Transcendental experience is nothing other than the transcendentally reduced objective world, or, what
amounts to the same thing, transcendentally reduced pure psychological experience. In place of psychological
'phenomena' we now have transcendental ·phenomena. '" See Hu IX, p. 275.15-19.
93 In B1, p. 26.20 to 27.7, Husserl changes this sentence and the next three sentences (that is, down to
"".both egological and intersubjective.") to read as follows: "The same holds if I as a psychologist practice
the intersubjecti ve reduction and, by prescinding from all psychophysical connections, thereby discover the
pure psychic nexus of a possible personal community, and then, as a second step, carry out the transcenden-
tal purification. This purification is quite unlike that of the psychologist, which remains within natural
positivity and then, by prescinding from the bodies co-present with psyches, reveals the social bonds of pure
psyches. Rather, it consists in the radical epoche of the intersubjectively present wor!d and in the reduction to
that [level of) intersubjectivity in whose inner intentionality this intersubjective presence occurs. This is what
yields us all as transcendental subjects of a transcendental, intersubjectively connected life within which the
intersubjective world of natural positivity has become a mere phenomenon. However, (and historically this is
the road phenomenology took) one may take up, from the very beginning and with a single stroke, the
transcendental reduction (both egological and intersubjective)." This amended text is the one that appears in
Hu IX, p. 275.33 to 276.16.
DRAFI'B 133
egological and intersubjective. In that case, what emerges is not at all pure
psychology but immediately94 transcendental phenomenology as a science
(fashioned purely from transcendental experience) both of transcendental
intersubjectivity - indeed, thanks to the requisite eidetic method, an a priori
possible transcendental intersubjectivity - as well as of possible worlds (or
environments95) as transcendental correlates.96
94 Changed in Bl, p. 27.7-8 to: .....pure psychology as a connecting link but. from the very start,...."
95 Reading "Umwelten" for the "Unwelten" that appears at B2, p. 27.12.
96 In BI, p. 27.9-12 Husserl changes the second half of this sentence to read: ..... transcendental phenome-
nology as a science (fashioned purely from transcendental intuition) of transcendental intersubjectivity -
indeed, thanks to the requisite eidetic method, a transcendental intersubjectivity that is a priori possible and
related to possible worlds as intentional correlates." This changed text is reproduced in Hu IX, p. 276.19-22.
'11 Hu IX, p. 276.22-277.21 (Le., the end of Section iii). The content of these pages corresponds generally
to Draft D, n, § 10, "Pure Psychology as a Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology."
98 Changed in BI, p. 27.19-20, to "propaedeutic."
99 The following dependent clause is crossed out in B I, p. 27.21-23.
100 Heidegger (83, p. 27.25-26, left margin) draws a red circle next to the line "eine Art Anderung der
ganzen Lebensfonn...." The red circle refers Husserl back to Heidegger's note in the top margin of B3, p. 25
(Note "3a": .....Compare p. 27 below, where you speak of a 'kind of transfonnation of one's whole way of
life. "'). That Husserl understood Heidegger's mark in this way is shown by his own note in the left margin of
BI at this point: ''Cf. Heideggerp. 25" (81, p. 27.26).
101 Heidegger underlines this word (iibersteigt) in red. Keyed to this word, he writes a note in the left
margin, running to the bottom margin; (83, 27.27, cf. Hu IX, p. 276, n. 1):
134 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
ence heretofore and that, due to its absolute foreignness, is hard to understand
both in its possibility and [po 277] actuality. <po 28=''p. 17"> The same holds
correspondingly for a transcendental science. Although phenomenological
psychology is relatively new and, in its method of transcendental analysis,
even novel, nonetheless it is as universally accessible as are all the positive
sciences. 102 Once one has systematically disclosed, in (pure psychology), the
realm of the pure psychic, one thereby already possesses, implicitly and even
materially, the content of the parallel transcendental sphere, and all that is
needed is the doctrine that is capable of merely reinterpreting [the pure psy-
chological sphere] rather than supplementing it [by adding something on to
it].103 104
To be sure, because the transcendental concern is the supreme and ultimate
human concern, it would be better "in itself' if, both historically and facti-
cally, the theories of subjectivity, which for profound transcendental reasons
are ambiguous, were developed within transcendental philosophy. Then, by a
corresponding change in focus, the psychologist can "read" transcendental
phenomenology for his own purposes "as" pure psychology. The transcenden-
"An ascent (a climbing up) that nonetheless remains 'inunanent,' that is, a human possibility in
which, precisely, human beings come to tbcnw:Jyes." ["Ascendenz (Hinaufstieg), die doch
'immaDent' bleibt, d.h. eine menschliche Moglichkeit, in der der Mensch zu deb !iGlbat {underlined
twice konnnt.'
This note likewise refers back to B3, p. 25, both to Note 3b, where Heidegger spoke of the transcendental
reduction as "eine Moglichkeit des Menschen" and to Note 3a, where he spoke of it as a "transfonnation" in
which Dasein becomes "its ownmost 'wondersome' possibility-of-EXistenz."
102 This sentence and the previous are taken over virtually verbatim into Draft C, p. 29 and Draft D, p. 24.
103 Husserl's original text in B3, p. 28.7-8 is: ..... und es bedaif nur der nicht ergiinzenden sondem zur
ihrer Umdeutung berufenen Lehren."
104 Heide's note B3, . 28.8, left
''But on the contrary, isn't this 'reinterprellltion' really only a 'supplementlll' application [or:
utilization] of the transcendental problematic that you find incompletely [worked out] in pure
psychology, such that when the psychical comes on the scene as a self-transcending [entity], from
that moment on, everything positive Is rendered transcendentally problematic - everything: both
the psychical Itself and the entities (world) constituted in it."
["Aber 1st diese 'Umdeutung' nicht doch nur die 'ergiinzende' Anwendung der transzendentalen
Problematik, die Sle unvollstiindig in der reinen Psychologie finden, soda8 mit dem Einriicken des
Psychlschen aIs elnes Selbsttranszendenten nunmebr aIIes Positive transzendental problematisch
wird - aIIes - das ~ chlsche selbst und das in ihm sich konstituierende Seiende elt ."
Conceming the note:
(1) Heidegger's note is preceded by"! X !" heavily marked in red in the left margin. Husserl reproduces
these latter marks, along with Heidegger's note, in the corresponding margin of B 1.
(2) In B 1 Husserl changes the preceding sentence and this one to read: .....one has thereby - implicitly and
even materially - the content of the parallel sphere. All that is needed is the doctrine of the transcen-
dental reduction, which is capable of reinterpreting [the pure psychological sphere] into the transcen-
dental [sphere]." See Hu IX, p. 277.6-9.
(3) Biemel transcribes Heidegger's handwritten phrase "eines selbst transzendenten" as "eines selbst
Transzendenten." But it could equally be read as "eines Selbst-transzendenten" or "eines selbsttrans-
zendenten [Seienden}." In any case, the word "transcendent" in this context means "self-transcending"
rather than "transcendent" in the sense of "present-at-hand in the physical world."
DRAFfB 135
End of Draft B
136 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Messkirch
October 22, 1927
Dear fatherly friend,
My thanks to you and Mrs. Husserl for the recent days in Freiburg. I truly
had the feeling of being accepted as a son.
Only in actual work do the problems become clear. Therefore, mere holiday
conversations, enjoyable as they are, yield nothing. But this time everything
was under the pressure of an urgent and important task. And only in the last
few days have I begun to see the extent to which your emphasis on pure psy-
chology provides the basis for clarifying - or unfolding for the first time with
complete exactness - the question of transcendental subjectivity and its rela-
tion to the pure psychic. My disadvantage, to be sure, is that I do not know
your concrete investigations of the last few years. * Therefore, my objections
appear simply as formalistic. 107
<po 2>In the enclosed pages I attempt once more to fix the essential points.
This also gives me an occasion to characterize the fundamental orientation of
Being and Time within the transcendental problem. lOS
Pages 21_28 109 are written essentially more concisely than the first draft.
The structure is transparent. After repeated examination, I have put the stylis-
tic abbreviations and glosses directly into the text. The marginal notes in red
concern questions about issues that I summarize briefly in Appendix I to this
letter.
Appendix II deals with questions about the arrangement of those same
pages. The only thing that matters for the article is that the problematic of
phenomenology be expressed in the form of a concise and very impersonal
report. Granted that the clarity of the presentation presupposes an ultimate
clarification of the issues, nonetheless your aim, or that of the article, must
remain confmed to a clear presentation of the essentials.
[po 601] <po 3>
For all intents and purposes the course of our conversations has shown that <
105 Page numbers in angled brackets indicate the eight pages of Heidegger's handwritten letter and ap-
pendices.
106 Asterisks in the text of Heidegger' s letter and appendices refer to explanatory notes found below.
107 Presumably Heidegger is refening to his objections to Husserl's Draft A of the EB article.
108 Heidegger crosses out a redundant "des Problems" between "innerhalb" (''within'') and "des tran-
szendentalen Problems" ("of the transcendental Problem").
109 That is, Section iii above.
DRAFfB 137
you should not delay any further with your longer publications. In the last few
days you repeatedly remarked that a pure psychology does not yet really exist.
Now - the essential elements are there in the three sections of the manuscript
typed by Landgrebe. l1O
These investigations [relating to pure psychology] must be published first,
and that for two reasons: (1) so that one may have the concrete investigations
in front of him and not have to go searching in vain for them as some promised
program, and (2) so that you yourself may have some breathing space for
[preparing] a fundamental exposition of the transcendental problematic.
I would ask you to stick to the second draft for the "Studien [zur Struktur
des Bewuj3tseins]" as a guide. I have now read it through once again, and I
stand by the judgment I made in my previous letter. _Ill
***
Yesterday I received from my wife the letter from Richter (a copy of which
is in Appendix 111). I have written to Mahnke. *
Of course here I do not get down to my own work. That will be a fine mess,
what with the lecture course and the two seminars* and the lectures <po 4> in
Cologne and Bonn, * and Kuki besides. *
However, the requisite enthusiasm for the problem is alive; the rest will
have to be done by force.
Next week I leave here to see Jaspers, 112 whom I will ask for some tactical
advice for myself.
I wish you a successful conclusion of the Article, which will keep many
problems astir in you as a starting point for further publications.
Again, you and Mrs. Hussed have my cordial thanks for those lovely days. I
send you my greetings in true friendship and respect.
Yours,
Martin Heidegger
110 The "Studien zur Struktur des Bewufltseins," (Husserl-Archives, M m 3, I to D1). See BriefwechsellV,
p. 145, n. 70.
III Heidegger uses a dash, followed by a space (omitted at Hu lX, p. 601), to separate this paragraph and
the next.
112 That is, on Monday, October 23. See HeideggerlBlochmann, Briefwechsel, p. 22 (October 21, 1927),
postscript.
138 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfALPHENOMENOLOGY
APPENDIX 1*
Difficulties With Issues
We are in agreement on the fact that entities in the sense of what you call
"world"l13 cannot be explained in their transcendental constitution by return-
ing to an entity of the same mode of being.
But that does not mean that what makes up the place of the transcendental is
not an entity at all; mther, precisely at this juncture there arises the problem: 114
What is the mode of being of the entity in which "world" is constituted? That
is Being and Time's central problem - namely, a fundamental ontology of
Dasein. It has to be shown that the mode of being of human Dasein is totally
different from that of all other entities and that, as the mode of being that it is,
it harbors right within itself the possibility of transcendental constitution.
Transcendental constitution is a central possibility of the [po 602] eksis-
tence ll5 of the factical self. This factical self, the concrete human being, is as
such - as an entity - never a "worldly real fact,,116 because the human being is
never merely present-at-hand but rather eksists. And what is "wondersome"*
is the fact that the eksistence-structure of Dasein makes possible the transcen-
dental constitution of everything positive.
Somatology's and pure psychology's "one-sided" treatments [of the psycho-
physical]1l7 are possible only on the basis of the concrete wholeness of the
human being, and this wholeness as such is what primarily determines the
human being's mode of being.
The [notion of the] "pure psychic" has arisen without the slightest regard
for the ontology of the whole human being, that is to say, without any aim of
[developing] a psychology - mther, from the beginning, since the time of
Descartes, it has come out of epistemological concerns.
That which constitutes is not nothing; hence it is something, and it is in
being - although not in the sense of something positive. 1IS
The question about the mode of being of what does the constituting is not to
be avoided.
Accordingly the problem of being is related - all-inclusively - to what
constitutes and to what gets constituted.
113 It would seem Heidegger has in mind Husserl's use of ''world'' at, for example, Hu IX, p. 274.16 (=
<po 24». See Heidegger's note thereto.
114 Cf. the series of questions in Sein und Zeit, p. 351.34-37 (E.T., p. 402.37-41), which Husserl duly
noted in his own copy of the work.
115 In German, "Existenz," Heidegger's word for Dasein's being (das Sein des Daseins) as a "standing out
into" ("ek-sistence") possibility; hence: eksistence.
116 Heidegger seems to be refening to Husserl's phrase "weltlich reale Tatsachen" (B3, p. 23.9; Hu IX. p.
273.2). Cf. n. 81 above.
117 Cf. Hu IX, p. 272.27-33.
118 ce. Hu IX, p. 275.
DRAFfB 139
APPENDIXll*
Re: Arrangement of Pages 2lff. 1l9
APPENDIXll
"I have the pleasure of being able to inform you that the Minister has de-
cided to assign you the chair as full professor of philosophy at the University
[of Marburg].* On consideration of your present income your basic salary
would be set at 6535 Reich Marks yearly, increasing as is customary every
two years to the sum of 9360 Reich Marks.
"While inviting you to express your opinion on this settlement, I likewise
have the honor of informing you that Privatdozent Dr. Mahnke from Greifs-
wald has been called to the professorship that you have held up to now.
With best regards,
[Richter]"
"[ do not know your concrete investigations of the last few years": On
February 7, 1925, Hussed wrote to Heidegger: "Ever since I began in Frei-
burg, however, I have made such essential advances precisely in the questions
of nature and spirit that I had to elaborate a completely new exposition with a
content which was in part completely altered." This excerpt is from a letter
that is not found in the Briefwechsel. Heidegger read the above lines to his
students on June 12, 1925, prefacing the reading by saying: "I am not suffi-
ciently conversant with the contents of the present stance of his investigations.
But let me say that Hussed is aware of my objections from my lecture courses
in Freiburg as well as here in Marburg and from personal conversations, and is
essentially making allowances for that, so that my critique today no longer
applies in its full trenchancy." Cited from Heidegger, Prolegomena zur
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, Gesamtausgabe TI120, p. 167-8; E.T. History of
the Concept of Time, p. 121. See also Sein und Zeit, p. 47, n. 1; Being and
Time, p. 489, n. ii (H. 47): "Hussed has studied these problems [of the consti-
tution of nature and spirit] still more deeply since this first treatment of them;
essential portions of his work have been communicated in his Freiburg lec-
tures."
" ... the lecture course and the two seminars": In the winter semester of
1927-1928, Heidegger delivered a four-hour-per-week lecture course on the
Critique of Pure Reason. See Heidegger/Jaspers, Briefwechsel, p. 81, letter of
October 6, 1927. The text has been published under the same title as the
course: Phiinomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Ver-
nunjt, edited by Ingtraud Godand, GA II, 25, Frankfurt am Main: Kloster-
mann, 1977, second edition, 1987. As Heidegger wrote to Blochmann: ''The
work-weeks in my study [in Todtnauberg] were nonetheless very productive
for me. I worked through Kant's Critique of Pure Reason in one stretch ...":
HeideggerlBlochmann, Briefwechsel, p. 21.
The two seminars ("Ubungen," that is, "exercises") were: (1) for advanced
students: "Schelling, Ober das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheif' (cf. Heideg-
ger/Jaspers, Briefwechsel, p. 80: letter of September 27, 1927; and p. 62: letter
of April 24, 1926); (2) for beginners: "Begriff und Begriffsbildung" ("[The]
Concept and Concept-formation"), a topic that in Sein und Zeit, p. 349, n. 3
(omitted in later editions but included in Being and Time, p. 498) Heidegger
said would be treated in the (unpublished) Part One, Division Three of Sein
und Zeit, specifically in Chapter Two.
" ... the lectures in Cologne and Bonn": Theodore Kisiel (private communi-
cation, September 28, 1996) places the lectures between November 1-4, 1927,
citing Heidegger's letter of November 11, 1927, to Georg Misch: "Last week I
gave lectures in Cologne and Bonn, and in fact they required some preparation
of me" ["Vorige Woche hatte ich Vortriige in Koln und Bonn, die mich auch
einige Vorbereitungen kosteten."] A month later he mentioned the lectures to
Elisabeth Blochmann as well: "In Cologne and Bonn I met with some quite
nice and genuine success" ["In Koln u. Bo[nn] hatte ich einen schOnen u.
echten Erfolg"]. HeideggerlBlochmann, Briefwechsel, p. 22 (December 19,
1927). The content of the lectures is not known, but Kisiel suggests they may
have dealt with Sein und Zeit, which Scheler and Hartmann were elaborating
142 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
<p.7a>
Difficulties with Issues
" ... the chair as full professor of philosophy... ": The opening had been
occasioned by the transference of Professor Nicolai Hartmann to Cologne in
1925. Heidegger accepted the position and on November 2, 1927, was offi-
cially named to the position, with retroactive appointment to October 1, 1927
(Akten Universitiit Marburg / Betreffend Die Professoren der philosophischen
Fakultiit" [1922-1940], Bestand 307d, Nr. 28, Document of November 9,
1927, Nr. 5980, archived November 12, 1927, Nr. 523.)
DRAFfB 145
"PHENOMENOLOGY"
THE ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
DRAFfC
SELECTIONS
[p.517]
[INTRODUCTION]
[The Idea of Phenomenology and the Step Back to Consciousness]!
The world, the all-inclusive unity of entities in real actuality, is the field
whence the various positive sciences draw their realms of research. Directed
straight at the world, these sciences in their allied totality seem to aim at a
complete knowledge of the world and thus to take charge of answering all
questions that can be asked about entities. It seems there is no field left to
philosophy for its own investigations. But does not Greek science, already in
its first decisive beginnings, direct its unceasing efforts towards entities as
such? Do not entities as such serve it as the subject matter of a fundamental
science of being, a "first philosophy"? For Greek science, to directly deter-
mine entities - both individuals and even the universal whole, and in whatever
regard they be taken - did it not mean to understand entities as such? Entities
as entities - that is, with regard to their being - are enigmatic? For a long time
the lines of inquiry and the answers remain tangled in obscurities.
Nonetheless, in the first steps of this "first philosophy,,3 one may already
see the source whence springs the questionability of entities as such. Parm-
enides seeks to clarify being4 via a reflection on one's thinking about entities.
1 As Biemel notes (Hu IX, pp. 591 and 645), this introduction IS a variation on the introduction that
Heidegger drafted, with similarities of content and tone but without any indication that it was edited by
Heidegger. The text is printed as "Addendum 29" inHu IX, pp. 517-519.
2 The italics in this and the previous sentence are added by the translator.
3 Changed by Husser! to: "in the first steps of this philosophy": (Hu IX, p. 645). The quotation marks are
added by the translator.
4 Within the text Husser! glosses ''being'' with "entities as such." [Bl, p. 1.18; Hu IX, p. 598]
148 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Plato's disclosure of the Ideas takes its bearings from the soul's soliloquy
(logos) with itself. The Aristotelian categories arise with regard to reason's
assertoric knowledge. The modem age of philosophy begins with Descartes'
explicit founding of first philosophy on the ego cogito. Kant's transcendental
problematic operates in the field of consciousness. The turning of the gaze
away from entities and onto consciousness renders perceptible a fundamental
relatedness of all entities to consciousness, a relatedness that somehow cap-
tures the ontological5 sense of those entities.
This relatedness must be thoroughly clarified, both in general and as re-
gards all the particular formations and levels of entities, if the cognitional task
[po 518] assumed by the positive sciences as a whole is not to remain caught in
naIve one-sidedness. At the start of modem times and in a less than pure form
at first, the realization begins to dawn that First Philosophy requires a science
of conscious subjectivity, specifically as that sUbjectivity in whose own con-
scious performances all entities are presented in their respective subjective
forms and modes of validity. The new phenomenology is this science: here its
idea is elaborated purely and fundamentally and carried out systematically. In
its comprehensive elaboration it is the realization of the idea of a scientific
philosophy. It arises from6 a fundamental clarification of the genuine sense
that the return to conscious subjectivity must have, as well as from radical
reflection on the paths and procedural rules of this return, and finally from a
method (motivated by the foregoing) for clearly highlighting the field of
intuition of "pure consciousness," a field that is presupposed in philosophical
inquiry as unproblematic. The systematic exploration of this field is then the
theoretical task of phenomenology as a science.
But is not psychology already competent to do the work assigned to phe-
nomenology? Is not psychology the science of conscious SUbjectivity, includ-
ing all the subjective forms whereby entities are presented in consciousness?
Therefore, what more could be required for philosophy besides a "pure"
psychology rigorously and consistently restricted to inner experience alone?7
However, a more thoroughgoing reflection on the region and the requisite
method of such a pure psychology soon leads one to the insight into the im-
possibility, on principle, of pure psychology providing foundations for First
Philosophy. All the same,8 there remains an extraordinarily close relation
between the psychological doctrines fashioned purely from inner intuition and
5 On the translation of "Seinssinn" by "ontological sense," see the relevant footnote to Draft B, section ii-
a, Hu IX, p. 264.20: p.l18, n. 49 above.
6 Changed by Husser! from "It is grounded in" (Hu IX, p. 645.)
7 Husser! crossed out the word "perhaps" after "alone" (Hu IX, p. 645).
8 It is with this sentence in particular that Husser! begins to change Heidegger's "Introduction" and,
specifically, to add paragraphs that refer ahead to the issues of Parts II and ill: the double significance of
"consciousness" and their parallelism, the propaedeutic function of phenomenological psychology, the future
full system of phenomenological philosophy, etc.
DRAFfC 149
9 Changed to: "In the interests not only of an unconfused philosophy but also of a final grounding of
psychology as an exact positive science" (Hu IX. p. 645).
10 Changed by Husserl to: ''under the tide 'pure or phenomenological psychology... • Hu IX. p. 645.
11 This last paragraph is taken from Husserl's shorthand appendix. Hu IX. p. 645.
150 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[po 519]
[pARTllI]
[Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology] 13
formation of all sciences of reality. Since Bacon modernity has been imbued
with the striving for a universal world-knowledge in the form of a complete
system of the sciences that deal with real things, which, if it is supposed to be
truly scientific knowledge fashioned via a method of rational insight, could in
fact be fulfilled only by systematically pursuing the a priori that belongs to the
concretion of the whole world and by unfolding that a priori in a systematic
assemblage of all a priori sciences of real things. Of course, Leibniz' grand
design lost its effective power as a consequence of Kant's critique of the
ontology of the Leibnizian-Wolffian school; not even the a priori of nature
was developed in systematic completeness. Nonetheless, that part of the
project that survived brought about the exact methodological form of the
physical disciplines. However, this [methodological] superiority does not yet
mean that these disciplines have a fundamentally complete methodological
form.
Closely connected with this is the fact that more and more the fundamental
principle of the method of mathematics is being shown to be inadequate, and
the much admired evidence of mathematics is being shown to need critique
and methodological reform. The crisis of foundations, <po 33> which today
has gripped all the positive sciences, also and most noticeably concerns the
pure mathematical sciences that are the foundations of the exact sciences of
nature. The conflict over the "paradoxes" - that is, over the legitimate or
illusory evidence of the basic concepts of set theory, arithmetic, geometry and
the pure theory of time, and also over the legitimacy of the empirical sciences
of nature - instead of taking charge of these sciences and transforming them in
terms of their requirements, has revealed that, as regards their whole methodo-
logical character, these sciences still [po 521] cannot be accepted as sciences in
the full and genuine sense: as sciences thoroughly transparent in their method
and thus ready and able to completely justify each methodical step.
Thus the realization of Leibniz' design of rationally grounding all positive
sciences by developing all the corresponding a priori sciences does not yet
mean that the empirical sciences have achieved an adequate rationality, espe-
cially when these a priori sciences themselves are developed only on the basis
of the evidence of naive positivity - after the fashion of geometry, for exam-
ple. The genuine basic concepts of all positive sciences, those from which all
14 Hu IX, pp. 520.34-521.27 (= C3 pp. 32.24- 34.9). The material generally corresponds to that of Draft
D, ill, § 12, from which we take the title.
152 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
scientific concepts of the real must be built up, are necessarily the basic con-
cepts of the corresponding a priori sciences as well. When a method based
entirely on insight lacks the legitimate formation in which the knowledge of its
genuine and necessary sense is founded, then that unclarity is transmitted to
the entire a priori and then to the entire theoretical store of the empirical
sciences.
Only by way of phenomenological reform can modem <po 34> sciences be
liberated from their intolerable situation. Of course, Leibniz' fundamental
demand for the creation of all the a priori sciences remains correct. But that
entails discovering the idea of a universal ontology, and this discovery must be
essentially complemented by the knowledge that any ontology drawn from
natural positivity essentially lacks self-sufficiency and methodological com-
pleteness, which come from the nexus of the only absolutely self-sufficient
and absolutely universal phenomenology.
IS Hu IX, pp. 521.27-525.40 (= C3 pp. 34.9-41.19). The material generally corresponds (at great length)
to that of Draft D, m, § 13, from which we derive this title.
DRAFfC 153
its actually necessary content and its import. Up to a certain point a science,
like any other goal-oriented undertaking, can be successful even if it is not
completely clear about basic principles of method. But the proper sense of
science nonetheless entails the possibility of a radical justification of all its
steps and not just a superficial reflection and critique. Its highest ideal has
always been the complete justification of every one of its methodological steps
from apodictic principles that, in tum, have to be justified for all times and all
people. Finally, the development of a priori disciplines was itself to serve the
method of scientific knowledge of the world, and all of this would have been
true of a universal ontology, if one had been developed in fulfillment of Leib-
niz' desideratum. But as we see, every a priori itself requires in tum a radical
methodological <po 39> justification, specifically within a phenomenology
that encompasses all a priori correlation.
Thus it is that the crises in the foundations of all the positive sciences that
are striving to advance indicate, and make understandable, the necessities of
research into the methods of those sciences. Although these sciences still are
not clear on it, they lack the method for the apodictic formation and justifica-
tion of the methods whence they are supposed to derive their unassailable
basic concepts and ultimate foundations with an evidence that leaves abso-
lutely no room for obscurity about their legitimate sense and import. Such
evidence cannot be acquired naively nor can it be one that merely is "felt" in
na'ive activity. Rather, it can be acquired only by means of a phenomenological
disclosure of certain structures of experiential and logical reason, structures
that come into question for the respective basic concepts - that is, by means of
very painstaking and thoroughly developed phenomenological research.
To be sure, this research could have first taken place as purely psychologi-
cal research - if, among the a priori sciences, a pure psychology had already
been developed. But then one could not have just stopped at that point. For, as
has become clear from our presentation, the consistent development of the
idea of such a psychology carries with it a strong incentive for awakening the
transcendental problem and thus for the awareness that an ultimately grounded
cognition can only be a transcendental cognition.
At this point it becomes clear that the full elaboration of the problematic of
the foundations of the positive sciences and of their inherent tendency to
transform themselves into radically genuine sciences - completely self--
transparent and absolutely self-justifying in their cognitive achievements - <po
40> leads, first of all, to the projection (within a complete system of a priori
disciplines) of the total a priori of the factual world as a world in general, and,
in conjunction with that, the projection of the complete system of the possible
disciplines of a mathesis universalis understood as the most broadly conceived
formal logic; and then leads to the transformation of all these disciplines into
[po 525] phenomenologically grounded ones and therewith it lets them emerge
156 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
16 Hu IX, pp. 525.40-526.36 (= C3 pp. 41.20--43.8). The material generally conesponds to that of Draft
D, m. § 15, from which we take this title.
17 "Themen."
158 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
hypothesizing. But the old metaphysical tradition and its genuine problems
must be placed on the transcendental level where they find their pure formula-
tion and the phenomenological methodology for their solution.
18 Hu IX, p. 526.36-44 (= C3 p. 43.8-17). This material corresponds to some of that of Draft D, §14,
from which we take the title.
19 Hussed took the remainder of Draft C (pp. 43.18-45.18 into Draft D, where he made it §16. (Hu IX, p.
526, n. 1)
EDMUND HUSSERL
"PHENOMENOLOGY"
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA ARTICLE
DRAFfD
<introduction>
To establish and unfold this guiding idea, the first thing that is necessary is
a clarification of what is peculiar to experience, and especially to the pure
experience of the psychical - and specifically the purely psychical that experi-
1 Or, simply the "mental." Because of the associations in English of the "psychic" with spiritualism and
telepathy, das Psychische could perhaps better be translated simply as the "mental" and adjectival variants
like psychische as "mental." But since in previous published versions of this translation, I used "psychical"
and "psychic," and this rendering is used by other translators and by Sheehan in the first three drafts of this
Article, I will continue this more technical rendering.
DRAFfD 161
changing of "orientation" - of right and left, nearness and farness, with the
consequent differences in perspective involved. There are further differences
in appearance between the "actually seen front" and the "unseeable"
["unanschaulichen"] and the relatively "undetermined" reverse side, which is
nevertheless "meant along with it." Observing the flux of modes of appearing
and the manner of their "synthesis," one finds that every phase and portion [of
the flux] is already in itself "consciousness-of' - but in such a manner that
there is formed within the constant emerging of new phases the synthetically
unified awareness that this is one and the same object. The intentional struc-
ture of any process of perception has its fixed essential type [seine Jeste We-
senstypik], which must necessarily be realized in all its extraordinary com-
plexity just in order for a physical body simply to be perceived as such. If this
same thing is intuited in other modes - for example, in the modes of recollec-
tion, fantasy or pictorial representation - to some extent the whole intentional
content of the perception comes back, but all aspects peculiarly transformed to
correspond to that mode. This applies similarly for every other category of
psychic process: the judging, valuing, striving consciousness is not an empty
having knowledge of the specific judgments, values, goals, and means. Rather,
these constitute themselves, with fixed essential forms corresponding to each
process, in a flowing intentionality. For psychology, the universal task pres-
ents itself: to investigate systematically the elementary intentionalities, and
from out of these [unfold] the typical forms of intentional processes, their
possible variants, their syntheses to new forms, their structural composition,
and from this advance towards a descriptive knowledge of the totality of
psychic process, towards a comprehensive type of a life of the psyche
[Gesamttypus eines Lebens der Seele]. Clearly, the consistent carrying out of
this task will produce knowledge which will have validity far beyond the
psychologist's own particular psychic existence.
Mental life is accessible to us not only through self-experience but also
through the experience of others. This novel source of experience offers us not
only what matches our self-experience but also what is new, inasmuch as, in
terms of consciousness and indeed as experience, it establishes the differences
between own and other, as well as the properties peculiar to the life of a
community. At just this point there arises the task of also making the psychic
life of the community, with all the intentionalities that pertain to it, phenome-
nologically understandable.
DRAFfD 163
The idea of a purely phenomenological psychology does not have just the
function described above, of reforming empirical psychology. For deeply
rooted reasons, it can also serve as a preliminary step for laying open the
essence of a transcendental phenomenology. Historically, this idea too did not
grow out of the needs peculiar to psychology itself. Its history leads us back to
John Locke's notable basic work, and the signiftcant development in Berkeley
and Hume of the impetus it contained. Already Locke's restriction to the
purely subjective was determined by extra-psychological interests: psychology
here stood in the service of the transcendental problem awakened through
Descartes. In Descartes' Meditations, the thought that had become the guiding
one for "ftrst philosophy" was that all of "reality," and ftnally the whole world
of what exists and is so for us, exists only as the presentational content of our
presentations, as meant in the best case and as evidently reliable in our own
cognitive life. This is the motivation for all transcendental problems, genuine
or false. Descartes' method of doubt was the ftrst method of exhibiting
"transcendental subjectivity," and his ego cogito led to its ftrst conceptual
168 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
The following applies to the world in every determination, even those that are
self-evident: that what belongs in and for itself to the world, is how it is
whether or not I, or whoever, become by chance aware of it or not. Once the
world in this full, all-embracing universality has been related back to the
subjectivity of consciousness, in whose living consciousness it makes its
appearance precisely as "the world" in the sense it now has, then its whole
mode of being acquires a dimension of unintelligibility or questionableness.
This "making an appearance" [Auftreten] , this being-for-us of the world as
only subjectively having come to acceptance and only subjectively brought,
and to be brought, to well-grounded evident presentation, requires clarifica-
tion. Because of its empty generality, one's first awakening to the relatedness
of the world to consciousness gives no understanding of how the varied life of
consciousness, barely discerned and sinking back into obscurity, accomplishes
such functions: how it, so to say, manages in its immanence that something
which manifests itself can present itself as something existing in itself, and not
only as something meant but as something authenticated in concordant experi-
ence. Obviously the problem extends to every kind of "ideal" world and its
"being-in-itself' (for example, the world of pure numbers, or of "truths in
themselves"). Unintelligibility is felt as a particularly telling affront to our
very mode of being [as human beings]. For obviously we are the ones
(individually and in community) in whose conscious life-process the real
world which is present for us as such gains sense and acceptance. As human
creatures, however, we ourselves are supposed to belong to the world. When
we start with the sense of the world [weltlichen Sinn] given with our mundane
existing, we are thus again referred back to ourselves and our conscious life-
process as that wherein for us this sense is first formed. Is there conceivable
here or anywhere another way of elucidating [it] than to interrogate con-
sciousness itself and the "world" that becomes known in it? For it is precisely
as meant by us, and from nowhere else than in us, that it has gained and can
gain its sense and validity.
Next we take yet another important step, which will raise the "trans-
cendental" problem (having to do with the being-sense of "transcendent"
relative to consciousness) up to the final level. It consists in recognizing that
the relativity of consciousness referred to just now applies not just to the brute
fact of our world but in eidetic necessity to every conceivable world whatever.
For if we vary our factual world in free fantasy, carrying it over into random
conceivable worlds, we are implicitly varying ourselves whose environment
the world is: in each case we change ourself into a possible subjectivity,
whose environment would always have to be the world that was thought of, as
a world of its [the subjectivity's] possible experiences, possible theoretical
evidences, possible practical life. But obviously this variation leaves un-
touched the pure ideal worlds of the kind which have their existence in eidetic
170 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
sense of the transcendental question must be kept clearly in mind, and we must
try to judge how, in keeping with it, the regions of the problematic and un-
problematic are kept apart. The theme of transcendental philosophy is a con-
crete and systematic elucidation of those mUltiple intentional relationships
which, in conformity with their essences, belong to any possible world what-
ever as the surrounding world of a corresponding possible subjectivity, for
which it [the world] would be the one present as practically and theoretically
accessible. In regard to all the objects and structures present in the world for
these subjectivities, this accessibility involves the regulations of its possible
conscious life which in their typology will have to be uncovered. Among such
categories are "lifeless things," as well as men and animals with the internali-
ties of their psychic life. From this starting point the full and complete sense of
the being [Seinsinn] of a possible world, in general and in regard to all its
constitutive categories, shall be elucidated. Like every meaningful question,
this transcendental question presupposes a ground [Boden] of unquestionable
being, in which all means of solution must be contained. Here, this ground is
the subjectivity of that kind of conscious life in which a possible world, of
whatever kind, is constituted as present. On the other hand, a self-evident basic
requirement of any rational method is that this ground is presupposed as being
beyond question is not confused with what the transcendental question, in its
universality, puts into question. The realm of this questionability thus includes
the whole realm of the transcendentally naive and therefore every possible
world simply claimed in the natural attitude. Accordingly, all positive sci-
ences, and all their various areas of objects, are transcendentally to be sub-
jected to an epoche. And psychology, also, and the entirety of what it consid-
ers the psychical [das Psychische, the mental]. Therefore it would be circular,
a transcendental circle, to place the responsibility for the transcendental ques-
tion on psychology, be it empirical or eidetic-phenomenological. We face at
this point the paradoxical ambiguity: the subjectivity and consciousness to
which the transcendental question recurs can thus really not be the subjectivity
and consciousness with which psychology deals.
learned about in its pure psychic ownness through the method of phenomenol-
ogical-psychological reduction. In eidetic modification it provides the basis for
a pure phenomenological psychology. Transcendental subjectivity, which is
inquired into in the transcendental problem, and which is presupposed by the
transcendental problem as an existing basis, is none other than again "I my-
self' and "we ourselves"; not, however, as found in the everyday natural
attitude, or of positive science - i.e., apperceived as components of the objec-
tively present world before us - but rather as subjects of conscious life, in
which this world and all that is present - for ''us'' - "makes" itself through
certain apperceptions. As persons, mentally as well as bodily present in the
world, we are for "ourselves"; we are appearances standing within an ex-
tremely variegated intentional life-process, "our" life, in which this being on
hand constitutes itself "for us" apperceptively, with its entire sense-content.
The (apperceived) 1 and we on hand presuppose an (apperceiving) 1 and we,
for which they are on hand, which, however, is not itself present again in the
same sense. To this transcendental subjectivity we have direct access through
a transcendental experience. Just as psychic experience requires a reductive
method for purity, so does the transcendental.
We would like to proceed here by introducing the "transcendental reduc-
tion" as built on the psychological reduction [or reduction of the psychical] -
as an additional part of the purification which can be perfonned on it any time,
a purification that is accomplished once more by means of a certain epoche.
This is merely a consequence of the all-embracing epoche which belongs to
the meaning of the transcendental question. If the transcendental relativity of
every possible world demands an all-embracing parenthesizing, it also postu-
lates the parenthesizing of pure psyches [Seelen, souls, minds] and the pure
phenomenological psychology related to them. Through this parenthesizing
they are transfonned into transcendental phenomena. Thus, while the psy-
chologist, operating within what for him is the naturally accepted world,
reduces to pure psychic subjectivity the subjectivity occurring there (but still
within the world), the transcendental phenomenologist, through his absolutely
all-embracing epoche, reduces this psychologically pure element to transcen-
dental pure subjectivity, [i.e.,] to that which perfonns and posits within itself
the apperception of the world and therein the objectivating apperception of a
"psyche [Seele] belonging to animal realities." For example, my actual current
psychic processes of pure perception, fantasy, and so forth, are, in the attitude
of positivity, psychological givens [or data] of psychological inner experience.
They are transmuted into my transcendental psychic processes if through a
radical epoche 1 posit them as mere phenomena of the world and my own
human existence, and now focus on the intentional life-process wherein the
entire apperception "of' the world, and in particular the apperception of my
mind, my psychologically real perception-processes, and so forth, are fonned.
DRAFfD 173
The content of these processes, that which belongs to the individual essence of
each, remains in all this fully preserved, although it is now visible as the core
of an apperception practiced again and again psychologically but not previ-
ously considered. For the transcendental philosopher, who through a previous
all-inclusive decision of his will has instituted in himself the habituality of this
transcendental "parenthesizing," even the "mundanization" [Verweltlichung,
treating everything as part of the world] of consciousness, which is omnipres-
ent in the natural attitude, is inhibited once and for all. Accordingly, the con-
sistent reflection on consciousness yields him time after time transcendentally
pure data, and more particularly it is intuitive in the mode of a new kind of
experience, transcendental "inner" experience. Arisen out of the methodical
transcendental epoche, this new kind of "inner" experience opens up the
limitless transcendental field of being. This is the parallel to the limitless
psychological field. And the method of access [to its data] is the parallel to the
purely psychological [method of access], that is, the psychological-
phenomenological reduction. And again, the transcendental ego and the tran-
scendental community of egos, conceived in the full concretion of transcen-
dental life are the transcendental parallel to the I and we in the customary and
psychological senses, concretely conceived as mind and community of minds,
with the psychological life of consciousness that pertains to them. My tran-
scendental ego is thus evidently "different" from the natural ego, but by no
means as a second, as one separated from it in the natural sense of the word,
just as on the contrary it is by no means bound up with it or intertwined with
it, in the usual sense of these words. It is just the field of transcendental self-
experience (conceived in full concreteness) which can in every case, through
mere alteration of attitude, be changed into psychological self-experience. In
this transition, an identity of the I is necessarily brought about; in transcenden-
tal reflection on this transition the psychological Objectivation becomes
visible as self-objectivation of the transcendental ego, and so it is as if in every
moment of the natural attitude the I fmds itself with an apperception imposed
upon it. If the parallelism of the transcendental and psychological experience-
spheres has become comprehensible out of a mere alteration of attitude [or
focus], as a kind of identity of the complex interpenetration of senses of being,
then the consequence that results from it also becomes intelligible, namely the
same parallelism and interpenetration of transcendental and psychological
phenomenology implied in that interpenetration, whose whole theme is pure
intersubjectivity in its dual meaning. Only in this case it has to be taken into
account that the purely psychic intersubjectivity, as soon as it is subjected to
the transcendental epoche, also leads to its parallel, that is, to transcendental
intersubjectivity. Manifestly this parallelism spells nothing less than theoreti-
cal equivalence. Transcendental intersubjectivity is the concretely autono-
mous, absolute ground of being [Seinsboden] out of which everything tran-
174 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
scendent (and, with it, everything that belongs to the real world) obtains its
existential sense as pertaining to something which only in a relative and
therewith incomplete sense is an existing thing, namely as being an intentional
unity which in truth exists from out of transcendental bestowal of sense, of
harmonious confinnation, and from an habituality of lasting conviction that
belongs to it by essential necessity.
tal terms. The basic difficulties for penetrating into the terrain of the new
phenomenology fall into these two steps [Stu/en], namely that of understand-
ing the true method of "inner experience," which already makes possible an
"exact" psychology as a rational science of facts, and that of understanding the
distinctive character of transcendental methods and questioning. True, simply
regarded in itself, an interest in the transcendental is the highest and ultimate
scientific interest, so it is entirely the right thing (it has been so historically
and should continue) for transcendental theories to be cultivated in the
autonomous, absolute system of transcendental philosophy, and to place
before us, through showing the characteristic features of the natural in contrast
to the transcendental attitude, the possibility within transcendental philosophy
itself of reinterpreting all transcendental phenomenological doctrine [or the-
ory] into doctrine [or theory] in the realm of natural positivity
§ 12. Phenomenology and the Crisis in the Foundations of the Exact Sciences
The unending task of setting forth the complete universe of the apriori in its
transcendental relatedness back to itself [or self-reference], and thus in its self-
sufficiency and perfect methodological clarity is itself a function of the
method for achieving an all-embracing and hence fully grounded science of
empirical fact. Genuine (relatively genuine) empirical science within the
realm of] positivity demands the methodical establishing of a foundation
[Fundamentierung] through a corresponding apriori science. If we take the
universe of all possible empirical sciences whatever and demand a radical
grounding that will be free from all "foundation crises," then we are led to the
all-embracing apriori with a radical, and that is [and must be] phenomeno-
logical, grounding. The genuine form of an all-embracing science of facticity
is thus the phenomenological [form], and as this it is the universal science of
the factual transcendental intersubjectivity, [resting] on the methodical foun-
dation of eidetic phenomenology as knowledge applying to any possible
transcendental SUbjectivity whatever. Hence the idea of an empirical phe-
nomenology which follows after the eidetic is understood and justified. It is
identical with the complete systematic universe of the positive sciences,
provided that we think of them from the beginning as absolutely grounded
DRAFfD 177
Precisely in this way the earliest and most original concept of philosophy is
restored - as an all-embracing science based on radical self-justification,
which in the ancient Platonic and again in the Cartesian sense is alone [truly]
science. Phenomenology rigorously and systematically carried out, phenome-
nology in the broadened sense [which we have explained] above, is identical
with this philosophy which encompasses all genuine knowledge. It is divided
into eidetic phenomenology (or all-embracing ontology) as first philosophy,
and second philosophy, the science of the universe of facta, or of the transcen-
dental intersubjectivity that synthetically comprises allfacta. First philosophy
is the universe of methods for the second, and is related back into itself for its
methodological grounding.
In phenomenology all rational problems have their place, and thus also
those that traditionally are in some special sense or other philosophically
significant. For the absolute sources of transcendental experience, or eidetic
intuiting, only receive their genuine formulation and feasible means for their
solution in phenomenology. In its universal relatedness back to itself, phe-
nomenology recognizes its particular function within a potential transcenden-
tal life [or life-process] of humankind. Phenomenology recognizes the abso-
lute norms which are to be picked out intuitively from it [that life or life-
process], and also its primordial teleological-tendential structure in a directed-
ness towards disclosure of these norms and their conscious practical operation.
It recognizes itself as a function of the all-embracing self-reflection by
(transcendental) humanity in the service of an all-inclusive praxis of reason
that strives towards the universal ideal of absolute perfection which lies in the
infinite, a striving that becomes free through disclosure. Or, in other words, it
is a striving in the direction of the idea (lying in the infinite) of a humanness
which is in action and continually wishes to live and be in truth and genuine-
ness. In its self-reflective function it finds the relative realization of the corre-
lated practical idea of a genuine human life [Menschheitsleben] in the second
sense (whose structural forms of being and whose practical norms it is to
investigate), namely as one [that is] consciously and purposively directed
towards this absolute idea. In short, the metaphysically teleological, the ethi-
178 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
cal, and the problems of philosophy of history, no less than, obviously, the
problems of judging reason, lie within its boundary, no differently from all
significant problems whatever, and all [of them] in their inmost synthetic unity
and order as transcendental spirituality [Geistigkeit].
eidetic is, on the other hand, rationalistic; it overcomes restrictive and dog-
matic Rationalism, however, through the most universal rationalism of inquiry
into essences, which is related uniformly to transcendental subjectivity, to the
ego, consciousness, and conscious objectivity. And it is the same in reference
to the other antitheses bound up with them. The tracing back of all being to
transcendental subjectivity and its constitutive intentional functions leaves
open, to mention one more point, no other way of contemplating the world
than the teleological. And yet phenomenology also acknowledges a kernel of
truth in Naturalism (or rather sensationism). That is, by revealing associations
as intentional phenomena, indeed as a whole basic typology of forms of pas-
sive intentional synthesis with transcendental and purely passive genesis based
on essential laws, phenomenology shows Humean fictionalism to contain
anticipatory discoveries; particularly in his doctrine of the origin of such
fictions as thing, persisting existence, causality - anticipatory discoveries all
shrouded in absurd theories.
Phenomenological philosophy regards itself in its whole method as a pure
outcome of methodical intentions which already animated Greek philosophy
from its beginnings; above all, however, [it continues] the still vital intentions
which reach, in the two lines of rationalism and empiricism, from Descartes
through Kant and German idealism into our confused present day. A pure
outcome of methodical intentions means real method which allows the prob-
lems to be taken in hand and completed. In the manner of true science this
path is endless. Accordingly, phenomenology demands that the phenome-
nologist foreswear the ideal of a philosophic system and yet as a humble
worker in community with others, live for a perennial philosophy [philosophia
perennis].
DRAFfE
PHENOMENOLOGY
EDMUND HUSSERL
by
Christopher V. Salmon
182 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
<p.ii>
[Introduction]
PART I
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
[=D Part I]
[Pure Psychology: Its Field of Experience, Its Method, and Its Function]
[=D,I§l]
[Pure Natural Science and Pure Psychology]
1 See Spiegelberg, "On the Misfortunes of Edrnund Husserl's ... Article," p. 19, column b.
2 In El this was originally typed as "International" and corrected to read as above.
DRAFrE 183
[=D, I §2]
The Purely Psychical in Self-experience and Community Experience.
The Universal Description of Intentional Experiences]
they were in the Perception, to correspond to their new modes. The same is
true of every kind of psychical experience. Judgment, valuation, pursuit, these
also are no empty having in consciousness of judgments, values, goals and
means, but are likewise, experiences compounded <4> of an intentional
stream, each conforming to its own fast type.
Phenomenological Psychology's comprehensive task is the systematic ex-
amination of the types and forms of intentional experience, and the reduction
of their structures to the prime intentions, learning thus what is the nature of
the psychical, and comprehending the being of the soul.
The validity of these investigations will obviously extend beyond the par-
ticularity of the psychologist's own soul. For psychical life may be revealed to
us not only in self-consciousness but equally in our consciousness of other
selves, and this latter source of experience offers us more than a reduplication
of what we find in our self-consciousness, for it establishes the differences
between "own" and "other" which we experience, and presents us with the
characteristics of the "social-life". And hence the further task accrues to
Psychology of revealing the Intentions of which the "social life" consists.
[=D, I §3]
[The Self-contained Field of the Purely Psychical. -
Phenomenological Reduction and True Inner Experience]
3 Salmon varies the spelling throughout the text: "bracketing" and ''bracketting.'' but always ''brack-
etted."
4 Sic, for VOE<o>.
186 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[=D, I §4]
[Eidetic Reduction and Phenomenological Psychology as an Eidetic Science]
[=D, I §5]
[The Fundamental Function of Pure Phenomenological Psychology for an
Exact Empirical Psychology]
Men now demand that empirical Psychology shall conform to the exactness
required by modern Natural Science. Natural Science, which was once a
vague, inductive empiric, owes its modern character to the a-priori system of
Forms, nature as it is "conceivable", which its separate disciplines, pure
Geometry, Laws of Motion, Time etc., have contributed. The methods of
Natural Science and Psychology are quite distinct, but the latter, like the
former, can only reach "exactness" by a rationalization of the "Essential."
The psycho-physical has an a-priori which must be learned by any complete
psychology; this a-priori is not Phenomenological, for it depends no less upon
the essence of physical, or more particularly organic Nature. 6
<9>
S Sic, for &tlio~. The error is reproduced in the Encyclopaedia Britannica printing of the Article.
6 Salmon's text omits two pages here. Those pages originally were pp. Ita and b in C, which Husser!
took over into D, where he renumbered them as pp. 13 a and b. They correspond to Hu IX, pp. 286.1-287.1.
DRAFfE 187
PART II
TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[=D, II §6]
[Descartes' Transcendental Tum and Locke's Psychologism]
[=A mixture of 0:
IT § 10 Pure Psychology as Propaedeutic to Transcendental Phenomenology
and
IT §8 Psychologism's Solution as a Transcendental Circle]
[=0, IT §7]
[The Transcendental Problem]
7 This sentence and the next three sentences are a broad paraphrase of various sentences and phrases in D
ill § 10, along with some elements of §8. For example, in this [lISt sentence, the reference to "priority" comes
from p. 295.28 ("Vo/'Zug"); "convenient stepping-stone" comes from p. 295.17 ("die propiideutische
Nutzlichkeif'); "nearer to the common attitude" echoes pp. 295.36--296.1 ("Zugiinglichkeit"). The next
sentence ("Psychology, both in its eidetic and empirical disciples ...") echoes §8, Hu IX, p. 290.25-29. The
third sentence (cf. "comparatively new ... completely new") returns to §IO, p. 295.34-36; and the last phrase
of the paragraph (" ... demands only a re-employment...of its formal mechanism") echoes §1O ("a mere
reversal [Wendung] of its doctrinal content"). The latter phrases (re-employment I reversal, translating
"Wendung") replace Draft B's "Umdeutung," which Heidegger had questioned in his remarks there at p. 28.8
(Hu IX, p. 277.8, n.). The last sentence of the section ("But it is not to be doubted ... ") picks up the theme of
§1O p. 296.13-21.
8 In Salmon's translation this sentence follows the previous one without a paragraph break.
DRAFfE 189
[=0, II §9]
[The Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction and the Semblance of
Transcendental Doubling]
9 In Salmon's translation this sentence follows the previous one without a paragraph break.
190 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
\0 Above the phrase "own existence" Husser! writes in longhand and in English (?) the words: "sensual
[?] (real)."
II Above the word "consciousness" Husser! writes in German "reines" in the neuter nominative, as if to
modify "Bewu,Ptsein."
DRAFfE 191
[=D, m§l1]
[Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology]
Once the a-priori disciplines, such as the mathematical sciences, are incor-
porated within Phenomenology, they cannot thereafter be beset by "para-
doxes" or disputes concerning principles: and those sciences which have
become a-priori independently of Phenomenology, can only hope to set their
methods and premises beyond criticism by founding themselves upon it. For
their very claim to be positive, dogmatic sciences, bears witness to their de-
pendency, as branches merely, of that universal, eidetic ontology which is
Phenomenology .
The endless task, this exposition of the Universum of the a-priori, by refer-
ring all objectives to their transcendental "origin", may be considered as one
function in the construction of a universal science of Fact, where every depart-
ment, including the positive, will be settled on its a-priori.
S012 that our last division of the complete Phenomenology is thus: eidetic
Phenomenology, or the Universal Ontology, for a First Philosophy; and Sec-
ond Philosophy as the Science of the Transcendental Inter-subjectivity or
Universum of Fact.
12 This sentence (which follows the previous one without a paragraph break) roughly corresponds to
Draft D, ill § 14, specifically to Hu IX, pp. 298.31-299.2, whereas the next sentence corresponds to the same
section, p. 298.25-31. That is: Salmon has inverted the order of sentences in D, ill, § 14.
DRAFI'E 193
All 13 rational problems, and all those problems, which for one reason or
another, have come to be known as "philosophical", have their place within
Phenomenology, finding from the ultimate source of transcendental experi-
ence or eidetic intuition, their proper form and the means of their solution.
Phenomenology itself learns its proper function of transcendental human
"living" from an entire relationship to "self'. It can intuit life's absolute norms
and learn life's original teleological structure. Phenomenology is not less than
man's whole occupation with himself in the service of the universal reason.
Revealing life's norms, he does, in fact, set free a stream of raw consciousness
intent upon the infinite idea of entire Humanity, Humanity in Fact and Truth.
Metaphysical, teleological, ethical problems, and problems of the history of
philosophy, the problem of Judgment, all significant problems in general, and
the transcendental bonds uniting them, lie within Phenomenology'S capability.
[=D,ill §16]
[The Phenomenological Resolution of All Philosophical Antitheses]
13In Salmon's translation this sentence follows the previous one without a paragraph break.
14In Salmon's version, this sentence follows from the previous one without a paragraph break. N.B.: The
vasion of the Article that got translated in the Encyclopaedia Britannica omits E, pp. 18.19-20.19, that is
the rest of the present paragraph beginning with this sentence, as well as the next four paragraphs. It takes up
again with the paragraph "Phenomenological philosophy is but developing ......
194 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
IS Husserl (Hu IX, p. 300.31-2; D, p. 30.13) has "Anschauung vom Eidos." Apparently Salmon is trying
to represent the Greek plural daTI.
16 The version of the Article that was published in the Encyclopaedia Britannica omits E, p. 18.19-
20.19, that is, the previous four and a half paragraphs, beginning with "Phenomenology proceeding from
intuited data...."
DRAFfE 195
<p.l>
REFERENCE17
Aesthetics, M. Geiger.
17 We reproduce below Salmon's own underlinings (or lack thereof) and spelling.
196 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
<p.2>
Jean Hering. Phenomenologie l8 et philosopbie religieuse. Strassburg. 1925.
K. Stavenhagen. Absolute Stellungnahmen[.] Erlangen. 1925.
(The Phenomenology of Religion).
Richard E. Palmer
There are several reasons that the Amsterdam Lectures, although Husserl
did not publish them during his lifetime, l still hold interest for present-day
readers:
First, they offer a relatively short but still slightly more nuanced introduc-
tion to Husserl's phenomenology than the Britannica article, and they were
written when he was at the height of his powers. Indeed, the Amsterdam
Lectures were the first major public lectures given by Husserl after his formal
retirement in Freiburg in early April, 1928.
Second, the Amsterdam Lectures are also the closing chapter to Husserl's
effort at collaboration with Heidegger in defining phenomenology for the EB,
as this volume makes clear. Joseph Kockelmans in his Edmund Husserl's
Phenomenological Psychology (1967), rightly referred to the Amsterdam
Lectures as a "fifth draft" of the Britannica article. 2 What Husserl hoped
would be a product of their joint endeavor ended up with Husserl dropping
even the few paragraphs of Heidegger's attempt at a draft. This was an omi-
nous signal to Husserl - perhaps too late - that his vision of phenomenology
as a universal, rigorous science established on absolute foundations was not
going to be continued by his trusted former assistant and eventual successor.
In this context, the Lectures, written and delivered in April 1928, some months
after the breakdown in their collaboration, offer Husserl a further opportunity
to explain and defend his standpoint in the EB article. In other words, the
Amsterdam Lectures may be of interest as an indirect response to Heidegger.
Third, quite apart from their link to the abortive collaboration with Heideg-
ger, the Amsterdam Lectures are also of value as a commentary on and elabo-
ration of the text of the EB article. One can fruitfully compare the two docu-
ments simply in terms of their elaboration of the topics of phenomenological
I "Die Amsterdamer Vortriige," along with the Britannica article, were published only in 1962 as an
appendix in Husserliana volume IX: PhiJtwmenologische Psychologie: Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1925.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. The four drafts of the Britannica article are found on pp. 237-301, plus text-
critical conunentary, 590-615. "Die Amsterdamer Vortriige" are found on pp. 302-349, plus text-critical
conunentary,615-624.
2 Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, p. 234.
200 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
3 Edmund Husser!. Briefwechsel. Edited by Karl Schuhmann in cooperation with Elisabeth Schuhmann.
10 volumes. DordrechtIBostonlLondon: K1uwer Academic Publishers. 1993-1994. See vol. 4: Die
Freiburger Schule. letter to Pos of March 9, 1925.
4 Hu IX: 615, 617.
5 Hu IX: xiv.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES 201
10 Edmund Husserl, Briefe an Roman Ingarden, edited by Roman Ingarden. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1968.
Letter of December 12, 1927.
11 These extensive cross-outs and rewordings in the manuscript are given in detail in the text-critical
commentary in the Gennan edition and may be referred to in Hu IX 615-624. Although they were translated
and a copy of the translation is preserved in the Husserl-Archives at Leuven, they did not seem needed for the
present English version of the text.
12 See the recent two-volume critical edition of this important text: Eugen Fink, VI. Cartesianische
Meditation. Teill. Die Idee einer transzendentalen Methodenlehre, ed. Hans Ebeling, Jann Holl, and Guy
van Kerckhove. Teil 2: Ergtinzungsband, ed. Guy van Kerckhoven. Texte aus tiem Nachlass Eugen Finks
(1932), mit Anmerkungen und Beilgen aus dem Nachlass Edmund Husserls. Husserliana Dokumente series
volume II11 and volume II12. DordrechtIBostonlLondon: Kluwer. 1987.
13 See CM. ibid.• Formale und Transzendentale Logile: Versuch einer Kritik tier logischen Vemunjt, ed.
Paul Janssen (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974). Husserliana vol. xvn. and in the 1930·s. Die Krisis du eu-
ropiiischen Wissenschaften and die transzendentale Phtinomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phtinome-
nologische Philosophie, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Nijhoff. 1954), Husserliana vol. VI. All are available
in English translations.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AMSfERDAM UlCTURES 203
II
The Amsterdam Lectures do not stand alone, however. They are the fifth
draft of another text that has exerted great effort toward offering a what Her-
bert Spiegelberg has called "the concisest introduction to phenomenology ever
prepared by Hussed": the Britannica article. 1s This is a text fraught with the
history of a fatefully failed collaboration with Heidegger in defming phe-
nomenology, a history which by offering all five drafts, this volume hopes in
part to illuminate. Hussed had remarked in earlier days, "Phenomenology,
that's Heidegger and me." Not so, it would seem. At least not as Hussed had
imagined. Yet even after this failed effort at collaboration, Hussed did not
oppose Heidegger's nomination to his chair, and did not publicly protest his
treatment by Heidegger. A highly confidential letter to Alexander Pfcinder
dated 6 January 1931, published only years later in the Pfiinder-Studien and
now in the 10-volume set of Hussed's Briefwechsel/ 6 sheds glaring light on
Hussed's feelings at the time. Pfcinder's correspondence with Hussed dates
back to 1904 and he had been Hussed's assistant for many years. He had co-
edited and published in the Jahrbuch from its first issue. He wrote in a letter
dated January 2, 1931, of his wife's painful illness and his own shattered
hopes for Hussed' s chair: "For ten years you told everyone who would listen
that you would name me as your successor.... Your behavior appears to me to
be a great disloyalty that leaves me deeply wounded.,,17 It is a heart-rending
letter, and it provoked Hussed to an unparalleled outburst of grieving in which
he gives vent to his sense of betrayal and outrage at his treatment by Heideg-
ger. He tells Pfcinder that he himself is more betrayed even than Pfcinder. His
life-work, his hopes and dreams, were at stake; his trust in a man who had
given himself out to be his friend and supporter had been betrayed. Because
this stunning confidential letter sheds such a revealing personal light on
14 Evidence that Husser! had definite plans to publish the Amsterdam Lectures can be seen in Malvine's
letter to Ingarden of December 2, 1929, where she speaks of Landgrebe interrupting Husserl's work on the
Amsterdam Lectures. Cf. Briefe an ROmLllllngarden, December 2, 1929.
IS "On the Misfortunes of Edmund Husserl's Encyclopedia Britannica artice, 'Phenomenology'," JBSP,
2,2 (1971), p. 76.
16 Pfdnder-Studien, Phaenornenologica 84, pp. 345-49 and in Briefwechsel, vol. 2., letter of January 6,
1931.
17 Briefwechsel, vol. 2, letter of Pflinder to Husserl, January 2,1931.
204 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
its own constituting acts using the method of eidetic, phenomenological, and
then transcendental reduction to arrive at the level of the transcendental ego.
For Heidegger, however, the ontological foundations of Dasein did not lie
in the transcendental ego but in the opaque realm of Dasein' s comprehension
of the lifewodd in terms of its factual-historical-temporal existence. With such
a foundation there can be no question of a "scientific philosophy" or "absolute
grounding" of knowledge. In this regard, as Walter Biemel points out in his
introduction to Hu IX, Hussed consciously allies himself with Dilthey's
project of developing objectively verifiable insights as a foundation for psy-
chology and the human sciences.20 Indeed, he attempts to fulfill Dilthey's
dream. But the project of providing a theoretical, more respectably scientific
foundation for psychology did not interest Heidegger, although the structures
of Dasein' S self-awareness with the call of conscience, sense of authenticity,
and being-towards-death might have some relevance to psychology. These, of
course, were never intended as a theoretical foundation for a more scientific
psychology. Hussed seems not to have allowed himself to face the implica-
tions of Heidegger's contempt for his scientific pretensions, so much was he
taken up with his definition of the role of phenomenology and his own plans
for branching out and applying it scientifically among the increasing number
of students interested in his phenomenology.
ill
considerable weight, and one can also understand that he would seek Heideg-
ger's help in it. There is also here a hermeneutical question of how much
"preunderstanding" is required to make sense of HusserI's argument in the
Britannica article. Are we perhaps talking about a "Mission Impossible"
undertaken with all good will by Husserl but intrinsically beyond the possibil-
ity of accomplishment? Certainly the drastic cutting by translator Christopher
Salmon further hampers Husserl's effort to clarify the meaning of phenome-
nology. Husserl not only undertakes to explain his overall project in that space
but also to clarify what it means to overcome psychologism, how the reduc-
tions work, and why the transcendental problem remained unsolved for three
centuries. Husserl is not here referring to matters already familiar to his read-
ers; rather, he is confronting some of the thorniest problems in the history of
modern thought and attempting to present his solution to them. Phenomenol-
ogy, he argues, holds the solution to problems still unsolved in the sciences,
which cannot overcome the chains of positivity because they lack the method
of an epoche that would place the world in parenthesis; they lack the technique
of eidetic variation as a way of finding the essential structures of conscious-
ness, and because they are lost in the positivity of the natural focus, they
cannot see the constitutive activities by which things in the world are given in
conSClOusness.
Can such a project as Husserl is proposing possibly be made persuasive in
so short a space as the Britannica article? Heidegger had suggested to Husserl
that exemplary studies would be needed to demonstrate his point. It would
seem that in preparing the Amsterdam Lectures Husserl was acutely aware of
this problem, and in reworking the Britannica article for presentation in Am-
sterdam, he took pains to expand and explain what had sometimes been stated
in a single sentence in the earlier text. It is clear that in the Amsterdam Lec-
tures Husserl takes advantage of having more space to unfold what might have
seemed enigmatic to readers of the Britannica article - either in the full Ger-
man version or the abridged version, cut by nearly in half, that emerged from
the translator. Husserl seems to have left the painful task of further cutting
entirely to the translator, Christopher Salmon, not even reviewing his work. 2I
Indeed, according to Herbert Spiegelberg, there is a possibility that Husserl
never even read the English version, since there are no reading marks at all to
be found on his copy . Yet despite the fact that Christopher Salmon had studied
in Freiburg and was a friend of Boyce Gibson's who helped with the transla-
tion of Ideas I, he even translated phenomenology as phenomenalism. 22
So we have in the Britannica article and the Amsterdam Lectures two
parallel but very different texts with special possibilities of mutual illumina-
tion. Both follow the same sequence of topics, although in the Amsterdam
Lectures Hussed does find himself early drawn into explanation of method in
relation to a pure psychology. The topics are parallel not just in possessing the
same three divisional headings but in the whole sequence of subheadings. The
insertion by the German editor of additional subheadings not in the manuscript
of the Lectures may somewhat obscure the parallelism. This might give the
impression that Hussed is choosing new headings when in fact he is merely
wandering off the topic under headings he has taken over from the Britannica
article as guides for his exposition. Fortunately these editorial additions are
clearly indicated in the text, so there are not grounds for confusion.
A systematic comparison of the two texts is beyond the scope of this intro-
duction, but we can at least compare the length with which different topics are
treated under the different headings. When we compare the main and subordi-
nate headings in the two texts, we fmd that both of them project the same three
main parts: I. Pure Psychology: Its Field of Experience, Its Method, and Its
Function; ll. Phenomenological Psychology and Transcendental Phenomenol-
ogy; and Ill. Transcendental Phenomenology and Philosophy as Universal
Science with Absolute Foundations. Yet the two Amsterdam Lectures take up
only the first two parts, so we have Part III only as represented in the Britan-
nica article. Since, in the German edition in Hu IX, both texts are printed in
the same type and line length, we may also compare the extent of coverage of
each topic by counting the relative number of lines in each parallel section of
the two texts. Of course, the headings added to the Amsterdam Lectures by the
German editor, Walter Biemel, do not have a parallel in the Britannica article,
but Biemel and we have indicated this by marking the headings with appro-
priate editorial insertion brackets.
208 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfALPHENOMENOLOGY
EB article Amsterdam
Lectures
<1. The Two Senses of Phenomenology: As
Psychological Phenomenology and as Transcendental no heading;
Phenomenology.> 17 lines 43 lines
Total lines in EB article without Part m, compared to AL 700 lines 1793 lines
Total lines in EB article including Part m, compared to AL 880 lines 1793 lines
AN INTRODUcnON TO THE AMSfERDAM LECTURES 209
The Britannica article, of course, contains the six sections in Part ill, num-
bered 11-16 in the Britannica article and containing 180 lines of text, but even
with this additional length, the Britannica article remains less than half as long
as the later text; a few sections are shorter, but others are three times as long,
and on the average they are twice as long. Among the new sections added, of
course, the longest is "The Ego-Pole as Center of the Acts of the Ego: The
Synthetic Character of Consciousness," numbering 252 lines of text. Clearly,
it is fair to see the Amsterdam Lectures both as a reply to Heidegger and as a
further elaboration and commentary on ideas presented more concisely in the
Britannica article.
IV
v
Finally, the Amsterdam Lectures are of special interest to readers of Husserl
in English because in their original form - as the Britannica article - they
were intended for an English-speaking audience. How much this may have
influenced Husserl is hard to say, but certainly he was aware of addressing a
readership unfamiliar even with the term phenomenology. We know Husserl
saw the Britannica article as an important project to which he devoted intense
effort, and yet the article was mutilated in translation, being abridged from
7,000 to 4,000 words, and remained unpublished in German. Thus, the publi-
cation of its original German text in 1962, along with the Amsterdam Lec-
tures, now translated especially for this volume, was an important event in the
publication of Husseri' s writings.
It should be remembered that the Amsterdam Lectures, like the Britannica
article, also reached out to an international audience - albeit one that could
understand Husseri in Gennan. But Husseri is cognizant that Gennan may not
be the native language of many of his audience, in any case. He also knows the
audience will consist of learned people from a range of disciplines, not just
philosophy. So the Amsterdam Lectures, then, are directed not just to philoso-
phers but also and especially to psychologists and by extension to all those
inquiring researchers and practicianers who would find in phenomenology a
transcendental foundation for their methodologies. Furthermore, it is not
without significance for us as readers that, in contrast with the Britannica
article, the Amsterdam Lectures were composed specifically for oral presenta-
tion. The compression appropriate for an encyclopedia article would obviously
not be necessary or appropriate for a scholarly lecture in Amsterdam. Here
Husseri is trying to put the same ideas into a form that can be understood by
persons confronted with these ideas in oral form. His argument becomes more
intelligible and accessible. Husseri the pedagogue, a man with a lifetime of
experience in lecturing, surely must have been on that occasion the lively and
engaging lecturer Shestov depicts in his memoir.
At the height of his career in 1928, when his classrooms were jammed to
standing room only, not just with Gennan students but also Japanese, Polish,
Austrian, Australian, Hungarian, British, and other nationalities, Husseri's
philosophy seemed to be taking hold internationally. He was invited to speak:
in London, Paris, Amsterdam and Groningen. Reassured, energetic, light on
his feet, he held his audience in Amsterdam for two hours on two lecture
occasions, had interviews with interested persons, offered a conversation-
evening for further discussion, and confidently invited Shestov, a critic of his,
to lunch. This was an occasion in which Husseri invited one into his phe-
nomenology and tried to show what it was.
The Amsterdam Lectures clearly do not have the depth, detail, and great-
ness of such masterworks of Husseri as the Logical Investigations, Ideas 1-3,
the Formal and Transcendental Logic, Cartesian Meditations, or the Crisis of
the European Sciences. The strong point of the Amsterdam Lectures is that
they represent an effort by the mature Husseri to address an international
audience, and they sum up in the clearest and most persuasive terms possible
in four hours of intense lectures Husseri's vision of phenomenology and
phenomenological psychology: their definition, their methods, and what they
can offer a listener/reader willing to take them up and work with them. Husseri
wrote many introductions to his phenomenology, but for the reasons presented
here, and perhaps for other reasons, also, the Amsterdam Lectures should be
of continuing interest to English-speaking readers of Husseri.
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES
<ON>
PHENOMENOLOGICAL PSYCHOLOGY
1 The text of this translation is from Husserliana IX: 302-349. The elabomte listing of Hussed's cross-
outs in the manuscript, pp. 615-624, has not been included in this translation, although some contentual
notations or Husser1's marginal comments have been retained as footnotes. All translator's footnotes have
been so indicated. Editorial insertions by the German editor (Walter Biemel) are indicated by triangular
brackets. Otherwise, the footnotes are taken from Hu IX. The pages of the Hu IX German source-text have
also been indicated in this translation as follows: 13031 marks the beginning of p. 303 in the German text.
214 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
pure internal experience and the rigorous description of its data ("Psycho-
gnosia"). It was the radicalizing of these methodic tendencies (which, by the
way, were already quite often characterized as "phenomenological") [303]
more particularly in the sphere of the mental [or psychical, das Psychische]
and in the rational-theoretical sphere which was at that time in general inter-
woven with it, which led to a quite novel method of investigation of the purely
mental2 and at the same time to a quite novel treatment of questions that
concern specific principles of philosophy, out of which there began to surface,
as we mentioned before, a quite new way of being scientific [eine neuartige
Wissenschaftlichkeit] .
In the further course of its development it [the phenomenological] presents
us with a double sense of its meaning: on the one hand, as psychological
phenomenology, which is to serve as the radical science fundamental to psy-
chology; on the other hand, as transcendental phenomenology, which for its
part has in connection with philosophy the great function of First Philosophy;
that is, of being the philosophical science of the sources from which philoso-
phy springs.
In this first lecture, we want to leave out of play all our philosophical inter-
ests. We will be interested in the psychological in the same way as a physicist
is interested in physics. With pure objectivity in the spirit of positive science,
we will weigh the requirements for a scientific psychology and develop the
necessary idea of a phenomenological psychology.
2 Translator's note: Because of associations in English of ''psychic'' phenomena with weird events in
parapsychology, I have here rendered das Psychische as ''the mental." It can also be translated as ''the
psychical," but in English ''psychic ability," again, is generally taken to refer to the ability to see into the
future or read minds, which is decidedly not Hussed's meaning.
THE AMSTERDAM lECTURES 215
If we examine the world of experience in its totality, we find that its nature
is to articulate itself into an open infmity of concrete single realities. Accord-
ing to its nature, [304] to each single particular belongs a physical corporality,
at least as a relatively concrete substratum for the extra-physical characteris-
tics that are possibly layered on it, to which belong, for example, the determin-
ing factors through which a physical body becomes a work of art. We can
abstract consistently from all extra-physical determinations, and that signifies
that we regard every reality and the whole world purely as physical Nature. In
this there lies a structura1law of the world of experience. Not only does every
concrete worldly or real thing have its nature, its physical body, but also all
bodies in the world form a combined unity, a unity which in itself is linked
together into infinity, a unity of the totality of Nature which possesses the
unifying form of spatiotemporality. From the correlated standpoint of method
this is expressed as follows: A consistently abstractive experience can be
continuously and exclusively directed to the physical and on this basis of
physical experience one can practice an equally self-contained theoretical
science, the physical science of nature - physical in the widest sense, to which
thus also belong chemistry, and also physical zoology and biology, abstracting
away from it whatever pertains to the spirit [Geistigkeit].
Now the question obviously arises as to how far it is possible within an
interest one-sidedly directed to the mental in brute animals and in the world as
such, which we grant never emerges autonomously, for there to be an experi-
ence and theoretical inquiry which consistently and continuously moves from
mental to mental and thus never deals with the physical. This question leads,
further, into another: to what extent is a consistent and pure psychology pos-
sible in parallel with a consistent and purely developed empirical natural
science? This latter question is apparently to be answered in the negative:
Psychology in its customary sense as an empirical science of matters of fact
cannot, as the parallel would demand, be a pure science of matters of mental
fact purified of everything physical in the way that empirical natural science is
purified of everything mental.
No matter how far pure mental experience may reach, and no matter how
far by means of it a [pure] theorizing may be effected, it is certain from the
very outset that the purely mental to which it [pure mental experience] leads
still has its spatiotemporal determinations in the real world, [305] and that in
its concrete factualness, like everything real as such, it is only determinable
through local spatiotemporal determinants. Spatiotemporality as system of
places [Stellensystem] is the form [Form] of all actual, factual being, of being
within the world of matters of fact. And so it follows from this that all deter-
mination of concrete facts is founded on spatiotemporal determinations of
place. Spatiotemporality, however, belongs primordially and immediately to
nature as physical nature. Everything outside the physical, in particular every-
216 PSYCHOWGICALAND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
thing mental, can belong to the spatiotemporal situation [Lage] only through a
grounding [Fundierung] in physical corporality. Accordingly, it is easy to
grasp that within empirical psychology a completely psychological inquiry can
never be isolated theoretically from the psychophysical. In other words:
Within psychology as an objective, matter-of-fact science, an empirical sci-
ence of the mental cannot be established as a self-contained discipline. It can
never let go of all thematic consideration of and connection to the physical or
psychophysical.
On the other hand, it is clear that investigation into the purely mental is,
nevertheless, in some measure possible, and has to playa role in any empirical
psychology which strives for a rigorously scientific character. How otherwise
is one to attain rigorously scientific concepts of the mental in terms of its own
essence and without regard to all its concrete interwovenness with the physi-
cal? If we reflect on the fact that to these concepts there must also necessarily
belong concepts which encompass the universal and necessary eidetic form of
the mental in its ownmost essential character - which are concerned with all of
that without which something like the mental would simply not be thinkable -
then there opens up the prospect of a possible a priori science of essences
belonging to the mental purely as such. We take this as our guiding idea. It
would not be parallel to physics as an empirical science of nature but to a
science of the apriori conceivable Nature as such in its own pure essence.
Although one does not [ordinarily] speak of apriori natural science, it is never-
theless very familiar in the form of certain important particular disciplines,
such as the apriori doctrine of time, or as pure geometry and mechanics. [306]
and blocked the path leading to the true tasks of intentional inquiry. Nor was
the period immediately following that any different. The zealous struggle
against "mental atomism" did not mean any actual freedom from naturalism
with regard to the mental, for the modish recourse to "gestalt-qualities" and
"forms of the whole" only characterized a new mode of naturalism. The
foundations [das PrinzipieUe] of a mental naturalism as such (and, included in
this, a most broadly conceived sensualism of the inner and outer senses) only
gets to be truly understood for what it is and emptied of its seductive power
when a pure phenomenological experience is seriously carried through, in
other words, an experience in which the proper essence of intentional life is
thus disclosed in consistent allsidedness and evidence and can accordingly be
brought to a pure description.
. Before my methodical instruction about this experience, which is shortly to
follow, I would like to note as a prior clarification that the deep source of all
our errors lies in the equating of immanent temporality with objective, con-
crete temporality - an equation which initially seems to press itself on us as
self-evident.
Objective time is the extensional form of objective realities, and indeed
primarily and authentically of physical nature, which extends through the real
world as its structural basis. Mental lived experiences or processes [die
seelische Erlebnisse], in and of themselves, do not, therefore, either singly or
combined into wholes, possess any concretely real uniting form [reale Ein-
heits/orm] of coexistence and succession of the type one finds in concrete and
real spatiotemporality. The form of flowing, or of being in flux in the unity of
a stream of consciousness which is proper to their nature is not an actual
parallel form to this spatiotemporality. The image of a stream plays a trick on
us. Intentional analysis of immanent temporality actually destroys this image
and at the same time places its legitimate sense before us. Precisely in so
doing, however, every genuine material analogy between analysis of con-
sciousness and analysis of nature, whether physical, chemical, or even bio-
logical, falls away, as does the whole analogy between [311] the way of being
of consciousness and the "I" of consciousness, on the one hand, and on the
other hand, the way of being of nature. The concepts of physical thing and
attributes, of whole and part, uniting and separating, cause and effect, and the
like, which are logical when applied to Nature, are all of them rooted in the
originarily real, that is, in Nature, ~d therewith in its basic determination, res
extensa. When they are taken over into the realm of the mental [zum Psy-
chischen], i.e., as psycho-logical, these concepts lose what is fundamentally
essential to their meaning, and what remain are only the empty husks of for-
mal-logical concepts of object, attribute, composition, and so on.
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES 221
And now we turn to the other material difficulties which hinder the cultiva-
tion of a consistent and pure phenomenological experience, difficulties which
arise due to its involvement with experience of the physical. We will refrain
from any traditional prejudgments, even the most universally obvious ones of
traditional logic, which already have perhaps taken from Nature unnoticed
elements of meaning. We will hold ourselves resolutely to what phenomen-
ological reflection presents to us as consciousness and object of conscious-
ness, and purely to what comes to actual, evident self-givenness. In other
words, we will interrogate exclusively the phenomenological experience,
clearly and quite concretely thinking into a reflective experience of conscious-
ness, without interest in determining concretely occurring facts. Such
[phenomenological] experience does not have the individual experience [in
view], but the Gestalt most immediate to all as Self-Experience. For only in it
is consciousness and the ego of consciousness given in fully original selfhood,
as when I perceivingly reflect on my perceiving. I as phenomenologist thus
uncover my own living (in the attitude of fantasy, directed toward concrete
possibility), my concrete possible living in this or that concretely actual and
concretely possible forms. One can can easily see that it is there, on the basis
of this immediacy of my self-experience, that all other experience of the
mental (always understood as experiencing intuition) is founded, pure experi-
ence of what is strange or other [Fremderfahrung] as well as of the commu-
nity. So it is quite natural that from the outset the method of taking pure self-
experience is treated as the method appropriate to a consistently conceived
[312] phenomenological disclosure of oneself. How can we manage to refrain
from accepting any components drawn in by experience of what is externally
physical, through which then also everything pertaining to the mental life of
someone else [das Fremdpsychische] would remain eo ipso excluded? The
experience of something "external" (more clearly: of something "physical") is
itself a mental experience but related to the physical through our intentional
experience. Naturally the experienced physical thing itself, which is presup-
posed as what is physically actual in the world - the thingly real with all its
real moments - of necessity does not belong to the inventory of essences
proper to us in our experiencing life-process. The same holds for any and
every consciousness in which the being of something real in the world is
meant and accepted, as well as of every activity of consciousness in my natu-
ral and practical life.
222 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
would constantly be included in the theme of· our description. Now on the
other hand we have said that this act of abstention, this "epoche," changes
nothing about it, and that every consciousness has in and of itself its own
objectivity as such, in which things are appearing and are known in such and
such a way. Or better, we now say that precisely through this phenomenologi-
cal epoche what appears stands out as an appearing thing, what is known in
that particular consciousness stands out as such, as something which itself
belongs to one's mental inventory. The externally experienced thing as such,
the thing we are conscious of in some way as meant, is accordingly not some-
thing that in this instance simply exists, or that is simply possible, probable or
non-existent; rather, it is the specific intuitive or non-intuitive content that is
meant as existent, supposed, or non-existent. This is the meaning of the cus-
tomary talk. in phenomenology about parenthesizing [or bracketing]. Placing
something in parentheses [or brackets] mentally serves as the index of the
epoche. But inside the parentheses there is that which is parenthesized.
One matter that should be paid attention to: The faith we have in our expe-
riencing, which is at work in whatever specific consciousness one is now
having and is precisely there in an unthematized and concealed way, naturally
belongs, along with all its further modes of position-taking, [314] to the phe-
nomenological content of that moment of mental process. But such belief is, as
such, only disclosed and not "participated in" by me as phenomenologist; as a
moment of mental experience, it becomes thematic for me through the fact that
I take up the phenomenological focus, which means that I move out of the
nai've and natural practice of taking this or that position, to one of holding back
from it and I become, as mere spectator, an observing ego.
This describes in substance the necessary and consciously practiced method
of access to the realm of pure phenomena of consciousness, namely that
peculiar change of focus which is called the phenomenological reduction. By
means of it our gaze was directed toward a principal aspect of pure phenom-
ena of consciousness, which is the noematic (and about which traditional
psychology did not know what to say). Through the phenomenological reduc-
tion intentional objectivities as such were first laid open. They were laid open
as an essential component of all intentional processes and as an infinitely
fruitful theme for phenomenological description.
But I must immediately add that the universality of the phenomenological
epoche as practiced by the phenomenologist from the very beginning - the
universality in which he or she becomes the mere impartial observer of the
totality of his conscious life-process - brings about not only a thematic purifi-
cation of the individual processes of consciousness and thereby discloses its
noematic components; it further directs its power on the ego of consciousness,
which it frees of everything concretely human, everything animally real. If all
of Nature is transformed into a mere noematic phenomenon in that its concrete
224 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
reality is suspended, then the ego, which has now been reduced to pure mental
being and life-process, is no longer the concrete, material, creaturely ego we
normally speak of; that is, the human ego of the natural, objective, experiential
focus. Rather, it has now itself become the intended real thing as intended
only; it has become a noematic phenomenon.
Everything meant or intended as such, and this includes my being as a
human creature in the world and my process of living in the world, is, remem-
ber, something intended within an intending life-process; one which, thanks to
the phenomenological focus on the purely mental, the life-process in
"reduced" form, is [315] inseparable from it as its intentional sense. Naturally
this intending life-process is always and continuously to be found in the field
of phenomenological reflection.
The consistent unfolding of the noema, of the intended thing as such in each
separate case, can be redirected into an examination and analysis of the rela-
tively hidden noesis in it - that is, of the particular process of holding some-
thing in consciousness. But still there is something it can call its own: that is
the ego-center, the ego ["I"] in the cogito ["I think"]; I have in mind the ego
that remains phenomenologically identical in all the multiple acts of the ego -
the ego apprehended as the radiating center from which, as the identical ego-
pole, the specific acts [of the ego] radiate forth. For example, when I look at a
thing actively, in experiencing I explicate it, I comprehend and judge it, and so
on.
The ego-pole is, however, not only the point from which my acts stream
forth but also a point into which my emotions and feelings stream. In both
respects the phenomenologically pure ego-center remains a great phenome-
nological theme which is ultimately interwoven with everything else. To me
this is evidence that all consciousness is consciousness belonging to my ego.
This also carries with it the idea that consciousness in all its forms, in all the
modes of active and passive participation of the ego, carries out noematic
functions and therewith ultimately is joined into the unity of a context of
functions; in this, what is already expressed is the fact that all analysis of
consciousness has to do with, at the same time and ultimately even if implic-
itly, the central ego.
Now among the specific themes in connection with studying the ego there
are VermiJgen [ability to do something] and Habitus [tendency to do some-
thing], and really, in ways which cannot be gone into here, these are phe-
THE AMSTERDAM LECfURES 225
disclosure of the horizon and of the levels and dimensions of sense that are
made clear through this disclosure.
This should suffice to make it evident that the truly inexhaustible tasks of
an intentional analysis within a phenomenological psychology have a totally
different sense from the customary analyses in the objective, let us say, natural
sphere. Intentional explication has the unique peculiarity belonging to its
essential nature, that is as an interpretive exegesis [Auslegung] of noesis and
noema. Interpreting [is taken of course] in a broader sense and not in the sense
of merely analyzing an intuited concrete thing into its component traits.
One more corroborating operation should be carried out. Up to this point
the analysis of properties was what we have had in mind. But "analysis" often
and in the literal sense means breaking something down into its parts. [It is
true that] lived experiences in consciousness do have, in their immanent
temporality within the stream of consciousness taken concretely but purely, a
kind of real partitioning and a correlative real connection [with each other].
But it would certainly be foolish to want to look at the connecting and parti-
tioning in consciousness exclusively from the viewpoint of putting parts
together and taking them apart. For example, a concrete perception is the unity
of an immanent flowing along in which each of the component parts and
phases allows of being distinguished from one another. Each such part, each
such phase, is itself again a consciousness-of, is itself again perception-of, and
as this, has its own perceptual sense. But not, let us say, in such a way that the
individual senses can simply be put together into the unitary sense [320] of the
whole perception. In every component of a perception flowing along as a
phase of a whole perception, the object is perceived whose unity of meaning
extends through all the meanings (senses) of the phases and, so to say, nour-
ishes itself from them in the manner of gaining from them the fullfi1ment of
more exact determination - but this is by no means a mere sticking things
together, and it is anything but merely the type of combination into a whole
which is to be found in sensible forms. For not every synthesis in conscious-
ness exists as this type of continuous synthesis (and the substratum for corre-
sponding analyses of phases and parts). But in general it is valid to say that
consciousness as consciousness permits no other manner of linking to another
consciousness than such synthesis, such that every partitioning down into parts
again produces meaning or sense, just as every combining generates a syn-
thetically established sense. Synthesis of meaning or sense - synthesis of an
ideally existent thing - stands generally under quite different categories from
those of real synthesis, and real totality.
The life of consciousness constantly flows along as a life that is sense-
constituting in itself and which also constitutes sense from sense. In ever new
levels these objectivities are carried out within pure psychological subjectiv-
ity, a production and a transformation of "objectivities" appearing to the
THE AMSTERDAM LECfURES 229
conscious ego determining itself as so and so, nearer or "other" and accepted
by it as being so, but in the most varied modes of validity. A kind of ongoing
synthesis which is especially close to the essential nature of a coherently
interrelated life of consciousness, and in fact always necessarily belongs to it,
is the synthesis of all experiences into the unity of one experience; and within
this, the synthesis of concordant experience, interrupted to be sure by discords
but always through correction restoring again the form of an all-bracing har-
mony. All the kinds and forms of reason in cognition [erkennender Vemunft]
are forms of synthesis, of accomplishment of unity and truth by cognizing
subjectivity. To shed light on the intentional is a huge task for phenomenol-
ogical-psychological research.
The descriptive phenomenology which we have been speaking of up to now
as in itself first was egological phenomenology. In it we conceived of an ego
disclosing its own pure mental being, its realm in the strictest sense as original
experience of the mental. Only after an egological-phenomenological [321]
inquiry that has been pressed sufficiently far does it become possible to
broaden the phenomenological method in such a way that experience of some-
one else and of the community is introduced into it. Then and only then does
the insight disclose itself that an all-embracing phenomenology is to be car-
ried through in consistent purity, and that only in this way is intentional psy-
chology at all possible - that the unity of synthesis encompasses the individual
subjects as a phenomenology of intersubjectivity.
Not only is the conscious life of an individual ego a field of experience that
is enclosed in itself and needs to be gone through step-by-step in phenomenol-
ogical experience; the all-embracing conscious life which, reaching beyond
the individual ego, also links each ego to every other in real and possible
communication is like this.
Instead of thematizing the psychophysical experience of humankind passing
from man to man and to animals in one's activity and in this way regarding
this experience as mediated by nature and realities connected with nature out
there in the world, one can, rather, start from one's own immanent life-process
and go through the intentionality contained within it in such a way that a
purely phenomenological continuity in experiences from one subject to an-
other subject is produced and purely preserved. It is the intentionality in one's
own ego which leads into the alien ego and is the so-called "empathy," and
one can put it into play in such phenomenological purity that Nature remains
constantly excluded from it.
230 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
What we have discussed so far has dealt with the method by which a pure
psychological sphere of experience reveals itself as a field of purely mental
data, a field that needs to be described, a field that is self-disclosing in con-
tinuous intentional explication. In this connection we will also speak in a
general way of common and essentially fundamental peculiarities which are to
be encountered in this field. Nevertheless, as long as we remain within mere
experience, thus clinging to singular facts and to the empirical generalizations
arising from them as these are formed naturally in the course of experience, as
long as our description retains the character of a mere empirical description,
we do not yet have a science.
[322] We already know that a pure phenomenological psychology as a
science of real facts is not possible. For such a science the purely mental facts
that are revealed through phenomenological method would require a method-
ology that goes after their "real" [external, concrete] meaning, that is to say
takes account of their physical signification, and therewith enters into the
realm of the psychophysical. This lies outside our theme. But, as we predicted,
now, by virtue of our having opened up the realm of pure intersubjectivity,
revealed with phenomenological consistency and purely practiced experience
as a unity, and indeed as a reality and possibility, an apriori science can be
established: a self-contained, pure phenomenological apriori psychology.
But how is a phenomenological apriori arrived at? One must not here think
of an effusive mysticism of logic. Rather, the method of gaining a pure apriori
is a completely sober, well-known method readily available in all sciences,
however much a reflective clarification and final explication of the meaning of
this method may be lacking - a clarification and explication which can only be
brought about for all methods of cognition through a pure phenomenology. It
is the method of attaining to pure universals [Allgemeinheiten, generalizations]
intuitively and apodictically, universals free of all co-positing of concrete fact,
which are related to an infinite range of freely conceivable possibilities as
purely possible facts. Indeed, [it is a method] which prescribes apodictically
the norm of being conceivable as possible fact. Once brought to light these
pure universals, even if they are not generated through strictly logical meth-
ods, are pure pieces of self-evident knowledge which can be tested at any time
by asking whether it is conceivable that they be otherwise without there aris-
ing in insight a contradiction or absurdity. A parallel example in the sphere of
nature is the insight that everything that is intuitively imaginable as pure
possibility, or, as we say, everything conceivable possesses the fundamental
spatiotemporal and causal properties of a res extensa [extended thing]: spatial
and temporal dimensions, spatiotemporallocation, and so on.
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES 231
Now how is it that we come to know such things? Well, we start out from
some exemplary thing or other, perhaps of factual experience, and then, leav-
ing its factuality out of playas irrelevant, we practice free fantasy-variation
with our specific example, producing a consciousness of free optionality
[Beliebigkeit] and a horizon of optionally produceable variations. This is,
however, only a rough beginning, [323] and a more thorough investigation
shows that it is only suitable for regional universals when qualified by more
exact corresponding explication. In this [explication] there will come to the
fore in the constant overlapping or coincidence within the variants an all-
encompassing essential form running through them, an invariant which pre-
serves itself necessarily through all the variations. And not only does it pre-
serve itself as something that is factually held in common in the concrete
variations intuitively produced but also as an invariant in the optionality of
ongoing variation "as such." And every thing-factum in experience, insofar as
it is the theme of such intuitively fulfilled free variations possesses an eviden-
tially emerging, necessary, and simply indestructible formstyle [Formstil]
which emerges in this very natural method of proceeding as the formstyle
belonging to all things in the region of "thing" as such.
In exactly the same way, proceeding from examples of phenomenological
experience or possibilities of experience, obviously we can practice free
variations and, ascending to the pure and necessary as such, delimit the purely
and simply invariant style [Stil] of phenomenological subjectivity, as [the
general forms of] a pure ego and a community of egos as such, a life-process
of consciousness as such, with noesis and noema as such, and so on. And so in
this way the phenomenologist continuously carries out not only the phenome-
nological reduction as method of disclosive experiencing but also an "eidetic
reduction." Phenomenology then becomes an all-encompassing science,
related to the continuously unified field of phenomenological experiencing,
but rigorously focussed on investigating its invariant formstyle, its infinitely
rich a priori-structure, the apriori of a pure subjectivity, both as single subjec-
tivity within an intersubjectivity as well as a single subjectivity in itself. No
'or' [or ego] is conceivable without consciousness of being an "f'
[Ichbewusstsein] and none is conceivable without perception, recollection,
expectation, thinking, valuing, acting, etc.; none without fantasizing in which
all such consciousness is transformed into "as if'. No perception is conceiv-
able that would not again have perception as its formstyle. And this holds
[also] for the other categories of consciousness.
All concepts and propositions that arise in this way are a priori in the same
sense as, for example, purely logical and mathematical truths. A genuine
apriori presupposes here as well as everywhere else, that variation and transi-
tion to the unconditioned generality as such, to free optionality, as mode of
consciousness, does not move into a vague [324] thinking of ideational pro-
232 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
jections fabricated from words but rather into actual intuitions, in constructing
intuitions which are actually examples that must be unveiled within operative
experience exactly to the extent that they can be used for arriving at a pure
universal. In regard to the phenomenological experience with its horizons of
intentional implication, this means that access to the genuine apriori is very
difficult. Phenomenological experience as explicitly such is itself a matter of
accomplishing difficult methodical functions. Practicing the method of varia-
tion in the egological focus produces, first of all, the system of invariants in
one's own ego, unrelated to the question of the intersubjective accessibility,
and validity, of this apriori. If one brings into consideration the experience of
others, then what becomes clear is that it belongs a priori to the objective
sense of that experience (thus, <as it is> to the alter ego) that the other be
analogous in its essence with my ego; that the other, then, necessarily has the
same essence-style <Wesensstil> as I. In this way, egological phenomenology
is valid for every ego whatever, not just valid for me and my fantasy-variants.
Mter the reduction has been broadened to include phenomenologically pure
intersubjectivity, then a universal apriori for communities of subjects becomes
apparent in the reduction of them to their inner-phenomenological and pure
unity.
6 It is theory of theory.
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES 235
The idea of a purely phenomenological psychology has not only the refor-
mative function for empirical psychology which we have just set forth. It can
also, for very deep-seated reasons, serve as a preliminary stage for laying out
the idea of a transcendental base-science [Grundwissenschaft], a transcenden-
tal phenomenology.
236 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
thing whatever. It arose also through the fact that philosophical attention was
directed toward the life of consciousness [Bewusstseinsleben] , and became
aware that the world which for us is "the" world, is on-hand [vorhanden],
exists for us in this or that way, is in this consciousness - as something appear-
ing, meant, legitimated, in that consciousness - that same consciousness. As
soon as we become aware of this, we are in fact in a new cognitional situation
[Erkenntnislage]. Every meaning that the world has for us, we now must say -
both its undetermined general sense as well as its meaning determined accord-
ing to concrete particulars - is "intentional" meaning that is enclosed in the
innemess of our own experiencing, thinking, valuing life-process, and is a
meaning that takes shape within our consciousness. Every acceptance of the
validity of being [Seinsgeltung] of something is carried out within ourselves;
every evidence within experience or theory which grounds that acceptance is
living within ourselves and henceforth is habitually motivating us. This holds
for the world in every determination, even in the most self-evident, where
everything which belongs to the world is "in and for itself' as it is, whether or
not I, or whoever, may be accidentally aware of it or not.
Once the world in its full universality has been related to the conscious
subjectivity in whose conscious life it makes its appearance as precisely "the"
world in its specific meaning at that time, then its mode of being acquires a
dimension of unintelligibility and questionability. This "making-an-
appearance," this "being-for-us" of the world as something that can only
subjectively be brought to acceptance and foundational evidentness, does
require clarification. The first [333] awareness of the radical relatedness of
world to consciousnness does not, in its empty generality, yield any under-
standing at all of how consciousness in its multiplicity, in its restless streaming
and self-transformation, so contrives that, for example, in the structure of
perception there emerges a persisting, real objectivity that belongs to a thing as
bodily existing, and as something transcendent to consciousness, that can
become known as existing in and for itself, indeed that can even be proved in
an evidential way to be there. How can we account for the fact that a presently
occurring experience in one's consciousness called "recollection" makes us
conscious of a not-present event and indeed makes us aware of it as past? And
how is it that in the "I remember" moment, that sense can be included in an
evidential way with the sense: "I have earlier perceived"? How are we to
understand the fact that a perceptual, that is to say, bodily characterized pres-
ent can at the same time contain a co-presence with the sense of a perceivabil-
ity that goes beyond the [immediate] perceivedness? How are we to under-
stand the fact that the actual perceptual present as a totality does not close out
the world but rather always carries within itself the sense of an infinite plus
ultra [more beyond]? Yet our whole life in the world as conscious life in all its
relationships, is not intelligible at all if, instead of engaging in naive praxis, we
240 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfAL PHENOMENOLOGY
also direct our interest toward the "how" of the functioning [Leistung] of
consciousness, in order to live along with it in theoretic practice.
When natural reflection directs its gaze on this "how" in the midst of the
living functions of anonymous consciousness, it still does not make intelligible
this functioning, which appears to lead back into unknown infinities of con-
cealed contexts and connections.
Apparently this problem applies also to every kind of "ideal" world, includ-
ing the worlds which many sciences have disclosed to us in abstractive sepa-
ration from all relationship to the real world; such as, for example, the world
of pure numbers with its peculiar character of being "in itself," or the world of
"truths in themselves."
Unintelligibility enshrouds in an especially painful way the mode of being
of our self. We, individually and in cognitive community, are supposed to be
the ones in whose conscious life-processes the real and every ideal world
should gain meaning and acceptance according to all that they are (as pregiven
to us, at hand, and as existing in and for themselves). We ourselves, however,
as human creatures, supposedly belong only to the real world. In accordance
with the worldliness of our meanings, we are [334] again referred back to
ourselves and the conscious life wherein this special meaning takes shape. Is
another way of clarification conceivable than interrogating the life and proc-
esses of consciousness itself and the world that we become conscious of
through it? Surely it is as something intended by us, and not from any other
source, that the world has acquired and always acquires its meaning and its
validity. On the other hand, however, how are we going to interrogate con-
scious life without falling into a circle with regard to its reality [Realitiit]?
Indeed, before we go any further, here, let's take yet another important step, a
step which raises the level of transcendental problem to that of basic principle.
This step is to recognize that the demonstrated relativity of consciousness [to
the subject] has to do not just with our world as factum but with every con-
ceivable world whatsoever. For if in free fantasy we vary our factual world
and transport ourselves into random conceivable worlds, we inevitably also
vary ourselves, to whom, after all, they are the environing worlds. We trans-
form ourselves each time into a possible subjectivity that would have the
particular fabricated world in question as its surrounding world, the world of
its possible experiences, the world of its possible theoretical evidentness, of its
possible conscious life in every kind of transaction with the world. In this way
the problem of the transcendental world is removed from [the sphere of] fact
and becomes an eidetic problem to be solved in the sphere of eidetic (apriori)
theories.
The same thing holds in a different way for ideal worlds of the type of pure
mathematics; for example, the world of numbers. Such worlds we cannot in
fantasy think as freely transformed; every such effort leads to the cancellation
THE AMSTERDAM LECTURES 241
The task that now arises is how to make this correlation between constitut-
ing subjectivity and constituted objectivity intelligible, not just to prattle about
it in empty generality but to clarify it in terms of all the categorial forms of
worldliness [Weltlichkeit], in accordance with the universal structures of the
world itself. If we accept the premise that the constitutive functions of con-
sciousness, [337] both active and passive, are actually to be brought to light,
functions which make evident to us the meaning and self-verifying being of a
world we accept as there, then this task is manifestly a totally different one
from that of all positive sciences - and, as compared with all of them, is
completely new. For all of these sciences, the intelligible existence [Dasein] of
a world is presupposed, and its fundamental knowability, also, to no less a
degree. Both of these remain outside the topic [of a transcendental phenome-
nology]. The all-embracing question for these sciences is how this world, and
a world as such, is to be determined in objective truth. The question which
already leaps beyond every positivity, namely whether there is a world at all in
objective truth, and the critical question of how this is to be established, may
not be held before us at the outset, no matter how much the latter question
already penetrates into what is primordially transcendental. Rather, the origi-
nal and in itself chief question, as we mentioned, is directed to a clarifying
disclosure of the consciousness that, as such, constitutes all objectivity. And
correlatively it is directed to that which emerges in it (and in the whole objec-
tivizing subjectivity) as a result, the world and a possible world as such as a
meaning of being [Seinssinn] that originates in this way for us.
Like every meaningful question, the transcendental question presupposes a
ground of unquestioned being, in which all the means for its resolution must
be contained. When we pose this question to our factual world,7 we presup-
pose our being and our conscious life, understood as that through whose
unknown productive functioning this world acquires a meaning for us, as well
as all that is determined within the world of these objects of experience, etc. In
eidetic inquiry we have to do with a conceivable world as such in apriori
generality, and indeed as related to a freely conceivable modification of our
subjectivity, again presupposed as constituting that world. Admittedly, as
factual presences in the background we inseparably also play our role, in so far
as we are the ones who have conceived the possible worlds of possible consti-
tuting subjectivities. It should be evident that this unquestioned and presup-
posed ontological ground [Seinsboden], which is also the basis for the presup-
posed possibilities, is not to be confused with what the transcendental
1 Translator's note: Emphases in this paragraph have been added by the translator.
244 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
conscious life can be seen as that unitary sUbjective being and life-process
existing in itself, in which being for us - the being there for me of "the" world
and all the specific existing realities that are there for me - is made, so to
speak:. The world - of which we are always speaking, which we can always
project in fantasy or imagination - along with everything that is intuitively or
logically there for us - is none other than the noematic correlate of this all-
embracing SUbjectivity of consciousness, and the experiential world given
through that all-embracing apperception of the external world. Now how do
things stand in relation to this SUbjectivity? Is it [subjectivity] something that I
or we as human beings experience? Is it something experienceable? Is it what
is before us, available in the world of extension as belonging to the spatial
world? We ourselves as human beings are out there, are present to ourselves,
individually and collectively, within an all-embracing apperception and yet
only present to ourselves by virtue of special external apperceptions. In per-
ceptions of external things I myself am given to myself within the total per-
ception of an open spatial world, a perception that extends still further into the
all-embracing; thus, in external experience I also experience myself as a
human being. It is not merely my outward bodily corporality which is exter-
nally perceived; the merely natural body is the object of an abstractive focus;
but, as concrete person I am in space; I am given in the spatial world as every
other person as such is given, and again as every cultural object, every art-
work, etc., is given. In this focus on external experience (in the world of
space) my SUbjectivity and every other mental subjectivity is a component of
this concrete being as person and consequently it is the correlate of a certain
external apperception within the all-embracing apperception of the world.
It is now evident that the apperceiving conscious life-process, wherein the
world and human being in its particularity within it are constituted as existen-
tially real, is not what is [340] apperceived or constituted [in it]; it is not the
mental which as human mental being or human mental life-process comprises
the apperceptive make-up of the real world. Something [else yet] is necessary
in order to make this distinction between transcendental and worldly, concrete
conscious life (between transcendental and real subjectivity, respectively), as
fully secure as possible, and in order to make transcendental subjectivity
evident as an absolutely autonomous field of real and possible experience
(thus to be called transcendental), and as a further consequence to secure and
make evident an absolute or transcendental science based on it [real and
possible experience]. To this end we will treat the "transcendental-
phenomenological reduction" a little more precisely, the method of access
which leads systematically from the necessarily first given field of experience,
that of external experiencing of the world, upward into all-embracing, consti-
tutive absolute being, i.e., - into transcendental SUbjectivity. In order to make
our ascent easier we will not carry out the transcendental reduction directly;
246 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
8 Rigorous science - of course, this concept is transfonned through the whole undertaking by phenome-
nology of the reduction. The will to ultimate responsibility, in which the universe of possible knowledge is to
arise, leads to a recognition of the fundamental insufficiency of all "rigorous science" in the positivist sense,
etc.
THE AMSTERDAM l1lCTURES 251
new phenomenology and arrange them on the two levels mentioned above:
frrst, the difficulty in understanding the genuine method of [attaining] a pure
"inner experience," which already belongs to making a psychological phe-
nomenology and a psychology as rational science of facts possible; and sec-
ondly, the difficulty in understanding a transcendental questioning standpoint
and method which goes beyond all positivity.9
The transcendental interest, taken in itself, is certainly [349] the highest and
ultimate scientific interest; so much so, that transcendental phenomenology is
not only a philosophical discipline in a specialized sense and a philosophical
foundational science, but also is the all-embracing absolute science which
enables every possible science to be an ultimately scientific science. In its
systematic development it leads to all eidetic sciences, through which then all
factual sciences are rationalized, but at the same time, when transcendentally
established, they are so broadened as to leave no more meaningful problems
open - say, under the heading of philosophical problems that got left out.
Accordingly, in a system of sciences, or better, in the construction of a univer-
sal science in which each individual science is not a separated and isolated
piece but rather a living branch of the universal [all-encompassing] science,
the right way to go is first to formulate transcendental phenomenology inde-
pendently in its transcendental theories, and next show what it is in itself by
exhibiting the essential nature of the natural focus as over against the essential
nature of the transcendental focus, and through this bring to light the possibil-
ity of making a conversion of the transcendental phenomenological doctrines
into doctrines of psychological positivity .10
9 Historically, transcendental phenomenology developed in such a way that eidetic phenomenology pre-
sented itself first, which in its novelty saw the historical psychology as something set in opposition to it.
From the beginning it [transcendental philosophy] thought of itself as the basic [Grund] science dedicated to
transcendental clarification, but certainly at that point without clarity about its genuine meaning, even
without the most radical grasp of the transcendental problem; thus, still in transcendental ambiguity [or
doubleness of meaning, Doppeldeutigkeit].
10 (Overview of the Planned Third Part:)
Part m. Transcendental Pbenomenology:
PIillosopby as Universal Science Established on an Absolute Ground
§ 17. Transcendental Phenomenology as Ontology.
§ 18. Phenomenology and the Crisis of Foundations in the Exact Sciences.
§ 19. The Phenomenological Grounding of the Factual Sciences and the Empirical Sciences.
§ 20. Complete Phenomenology and Universal Philosophy.
§ 21. The Highest and Ultimate Problems as Phenomenological.
§ 22. The Phenomenological Resolution of All Philosophical Anthitheses.
PART THREE
Thomas Sheehan
Sein und Zeit (hereinafter: SZ) was published in April of 1927 both in the
lahrbuch flir Philosophie und phiinomenologische Forschung, vol. VITI, and
in a separate printing ("Sonderdruck,,).i The indications and comments trans-
lated below were made by Edmund Husserl in his "Sonderdruck" copy of the
work between the spring of 1927 and the fall of 1929.
Husserl's copious notes in the margins of SZ include not only written
comments but also such marks as underlinings, exclamations points, question
marks, vertical, slanted, and wavy lines, and the abbreviation "N.B." ill this
edition underlinings or marks of emphasis are not noted, unless Husserl ac-
companies them with a remark or they are judged to be particularly significant.
Unless otherwise indicated, Husserl's notes are written in shorthand, except
for "N.B.," which is always written in cursive. Most of Husserl's comments
and notations were made in ordinary lead pencil, but some were done in blue-
and green-colored lead pencil.
1 base this English edition on a close examination of Husserl's personal
copy of SZ (I have used both the original text and a photocopy of it), as well as
on various manuscript versions of Husserl' s marginalia prepared by research-
ers in the Husserl-Archives at Leuven. 1 have also referred to the published
version edited by Roland Breeur.2 As regards page-and-line references, the
judgments underlying the present text sometimes diverge from those of Dr.
Breeur and therefore from the French edition that is based on Breeur's and
1 Sein and Zeit, Erste Hiilfte, Sonderdruck aus Jahrbuch jUr Philosophie and phiJnomenologische For-
schung, Band VB [sic], Halle a.d. Saale, Niemeyer 1927 (fonnat: 23 x 17 cm.), pp. xii + 438; also in
JahrbuchjUr Philosophie und phiJnomenologische Forschung, vol. VIII, pages v-ix + 1-438. In English: (1)
Martin Ht.ldegger, Being and Time, translaied by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, New York!
Evanston: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1962, and (2) Martin Heidegger: Being and Time: A Translation of
Sein and Zeit, translaied by Joan Stambaugh, Albany, New York: State Universily of New York Press, 1996.
Hereinafter the Gennan and English editions are abbreviaied as, respectively, SZ and BT. SZ-l (i.e., Sz, first
edition) refers to the Sonderdruck edition, SZ-15 refers to the fifteenth edition. BT-l refers to the Macquar-
rie-Robinson translation, whereas BT-2 refers to the Stambaugh translation.
2 Roland Breeur, "Randbemerkungen Husserls zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit und Kant und das Problem
tier Metaphysik," in Husserl Studies 11 (1994),3-63; for SZ: pp. 9-48.
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 259
2. Text in SZ:
"Rather, in keeping with a kind of being that belongs to it, Dasein has the
tendency to understand its own being in terms of that entity to which, for
essential reasons, it relates directly and constantly: the 'world.' "
3. Husserl underlines:
"tendency to understand its own being in terms of that entity"
Each reference in this edition provides, under the appropriate rubric, all or
some of the following:
Four page references. The four numbers (in this example: 15.36-37,
15.34-35, 36.29-32, and 14.5-8) indicate the page and line/s in Heidegger's
text to which HusserI's comments and notations refer. The four numbers,
moving from left to right, indicate respectively:
• the German text of SZ in the relatively inaccessible first edition that
HusserI used and marked up (the 1927 Sonderdruck, hereinafter abbrevi-
ated as SZ-l);
• the German text of SZ in the readily available fifteenth edition (1979;
hereinafter abbreviated as SZ-15);4
• the English translation by Macquarrie and Robinson (1962, hereinafter
abbreviated as BT-l);
• the English translation by Stambaugh (1996, hereinafter abbreviated as BT-
2).
3 Edmund Hussed, Notes sur Heidegger, Paris: Les Editions de Minuit, 1993: "Notes marginaJes de
Hussed a Etre et temps," trans. Natalie Depraz, pp. 9-38.
4 The pagination of SZ-1 accords generally with that of SZ-15. The two differ by no more than (and usu-
ally less than) five lines. The exception: SZ-1 p. 438.8 = the last line of SZ-15 p. 437.
260 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
The lines that are referenced. Note that the page-and-line numbers refer to
the specific words or lines in SZ that Hussed comments on (with the surround-
ing text), not to the space taken up in the margin by Hussed's remark. The
reader is forewarned that the relation between Hussed' s marginal notes and
Heidegger's own text is not always clear and that the connections made in this
text (and in other editions) are sometimes a matter of guesswork. Whereas
consultation of the original book and marginalia is imperative in adjudicating
such matters, such consultation may not resolve all questions. Moreover, the
line numbers are sometimes approximations.
Counting the lines: The counting of the lines on the pages, both in the
German editions of SZ and in BT, follows these rules:
• The line-count does not include the "header" either in SZ or BT, that is, the
line at the top of the page containing the page number, the name of the
author, the title of the book, and the like.5 The count begins, rather, with
the first line of text on the page after the "header."
• The line-count does account for any footnote material at the bottom of the
page.
• The count also includes the line or lines on which appear any division-,
chapter-, or section-titles, including single lines with only numbers on
them. (An example of the latter is BT-J, p. 67: The Roman numeral "f' at
the top of the page is calculated as falling on line one, that is: 67.1.)
• Empty lines are not counted.
2. THE TEXT IN SZ
The entry supplies an English translation of the text in SZ (often with the
surrounding text) to which Hussed is referring. Heidegger's text is always
placed within quotation marks. 6 In most cases I provide my own translation of
these texts, rather than using the translations of either Macquarrie and Robin-
son or Stambaugh. (Some of the terminological differences between my
translations and those of BT-J and BT-2 are noted at the end of this introduc-
tion.
s BT-1, BT-2, and SZ-1 have such a ''header,'' but SZ-15 does not.
6 The "Errata List" is translated as it appears in SZ-1, but only the text changes appear within quotation
marlcs.
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION 261
3. HUSSERL'S UNDERLININGS
4. HUSSERL'S COMMENTS
The editor's phrases "In the left margin," "In the right margin," and "In the
top [or bottom] margin" refer to the margins in SZ-1, not in SZ-15. Any words
that appear in square brackets ([ ... ]) within Husserl's or Heidegger's texts were
added by the editor. Besides his written remarks, Husserl's exclamation
points, question marks, and "N.B." are duly noted.
Miteinandersein: being-with-each-other
niichst: most immediate
Nichtigkeit: not-ness
Rede: discursiveness, discourse
SeinkOnnen: ability-to-be
Spielraum: lived space
Oberlieferung: freeing-up, liberating·
Umsicht: practical insight
umsichtlich: practical, practically, with practical insight
Umwelt: lived world
verweilen: to hang around
vorhanden: just-there
Vorhandenheit, Vorhandensein: thereness, just-there-ness
Zeug: implement
zuhanden: useful, (rarely [e.g., SZ-15 80.20]) available
Zuhandenheit, Zuhandensein: usefulness
Zukunft:becoming
zuniichst und zumeist (when used as a stock phrase): usually and generally
• See Martin Heidegger, Was ist das - die Philosophie? Pfullingen: Neske, 1956, pp. 8 and 21.
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS
IN
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME
FRONT MATTER
The inside of the bookcover of SZ-1, as well as the very first pages
before the full title page, contain important remarks and materials. We first
give an outline of the front material in SZ-1, and then go into the details of
what they contain.
FRONT MATTER
The book cover of SZ-J Umschlag
Inside of front bookcover Inneseite des Umschlages
(front endpaper)
The first inner page (or: flyleaf) innere Umschlagblatt
recto Vorderseite
verso Riickseite
Half-title page Erstes Titelblatt [Schmutztitel]
recto Vorderseite p. i
verso Riickseite p.ii
Title page Haupttitelblatt
recto V orderseite p. iii
verso Riickseite p. iv
Dedication and printing information Widmungsblatt
recto: dedication V orderseite p.v
verso: printing information Riickseite p. vi
Table of Contents Inhalt
pp. vii-xi
TEXT
Sein und Zeit, first page Sein und Zeit p. 1
Text from the Sophist Text from the Sophist
Two opening paragraphs Two opening paragraphs
etc. etc.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 265
[Husserl's remarks:]
Born 26.IX 1
306,10 314,323,387
thrownness 383 14
fate 38415
= = =
14. See below, SZ-l 383.21 SZ-15 383.20 BT-1435.4 BT-2 351.4.
15. See below, SZ-l 384.11 = SZ-15 384.11 = BT-1435.33 =BT-2 351.29. The word
Schicksal ("fate") appears in cursive.
268 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
A. Recto I Vorderseite
AprilS, 1927.4
M. Heidegger.
2 This is the catalogue indication that Husserl gave the work for location in his own personal library .
3 "Die grosste Deutlichkeit war mir immer die grosste SchiJnheit."
4 This date may, or may not, tell us when Heidegger presented the volume to Husser\. From March 2
until April 19, 1927, Heidegger spent the academic holiday at his cabin at Todtnauberg, in the Black
Forest. He may have visited Husserl in Freiburg for his sixty-eighth birthday, which fell on Friday, April
8, 1927, and, if so, it is possible he gave Husserl the copy of SZ-l, with the inscription, on that date. (See
Heidegger/Jaspers Briefwechsel, p. 74, no. 41, and p. 76, no. 43; also HeideggerIBlochmann, Briefwech-
set, p. 19, no. 13; Husserl, Briefwechsel, IV, p. 140).
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 269
B. Verso I Riickseite
[A smaller page (21 X 16 em) is glued to the reverse side of the flyleaf. On it Hei-
degger has written in ink:5]
" ... for clearly you have long understood what you mean when you use
the word 'being,' whereas we used to think we knew, but now we are at
a loss." Plato, Sophist 244a8
To Edmupd Hussed
in grateful respect and friendship.
S This smaller piece of paper that Husserl glued into SZ-l at this point is the very page that Heidegger
presented to Husserl in Todtnauberg on Husserl's sixty-seventh birthday, Thursday, April 8, 1926. See
Briefwechsel III, p. 230 (April 16, 1926, Malvine Husserl to Ingarden).
6 This title is underscored twice.
7 This phrase, taken from the previous sentence in the dialogue, is inserted here by Heidegger within
parentheses.
8 Heidegger's German translation here, which dates to April 1926, differs slightly from the one he
published a year later in SZ-l, p. 1:
1926: ..... denn offenbar versteht ihr doch schon lange, was ihr damit meint, wenn ihr das Wort
'seiend' gebraucht, wir aber glaubten es vorher zwar zu wissen, jetzt aber stehen wir ratios. "
1927: ..... Denn offenbar seid ihr doch schon lange mit dem vertraut, was ihr eigentlich meint, wenn
ihr den Ausdruck 'seiend' gebraucht, wir jedoch glaubten es einst zwar zu verstehen, jetzt aber sind wir
in Verlegenheit gekommen. ..
For other translations by Heidegger see his Platon: Sophistes, GA 19, edited by Ingeborg SchiiSler,
Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1992, p. 446--447; and his Heidegger, Prolegomena zur
Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs, GA 20, p. 179; History o/the Concept o/Time, p. 129.
270 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
[The half-title page reads: "Sein und Zeit / Erste Hiilfte. " Under that Husserl writes
in cursive:]
9 This half-title page is found in SZ-l, but not in SZ-15. BT-l has a half-title page (the unnumbered
page 1) with only one line: "BEING AND TIME."
10 ("Plato is a friend, truth a greater friend.") The Latin phrase (spoken as if by Aristotle) condenses
the statement in Nicomachean Ethics (A, 6, 1096 a 14--17): "Perhaps it would seem to be better - and,
what is more, a duty - to destroy even what is closest to us for the sake of saving the truth, especially
since we are lovers-of-wisdom; for while both are dear to us, it is a matter of divine ordinance to prefer
the truth." However, the provenance of the Latin phrase is complex:
[A] The Platonic dictum: The anonymous Liber de vita et genere Aristotilis records a similar
statement allegedly made by Plato about Socrates: "et alibi dicit [Plato] 'Amicus quidem Socrates, sed
magis arnica veritas.'" (In Ingemar DUring, Aristotle in the Ancient Biographical Tradition, Studia
Graeca et Latina Gothburgensia, vol. 5, GOteborg: GOteborgs Universitet, 1957, p. 154 [28].) The Liber
de vita itself is a late twelfth-century translation of one of the many Greek lives of Aristotle (YEVO<;
cXP10'tO'tEAOUC;) in circulation at that time, not unlike, for example, the Greek Vita vulgata (cf. its cpiAOC;
J.LEV l:W)(QcX'tT\<;, cXAAeX J.L&AAOV cplAcXTtJ 1i cXA1)it£lIX, DUring, p. 132 [9]; cf. also the Greek Vita
marciana, (ibid., pp. 101-102 [28]).
[H) The Aristotelian dictum: Thomas Aquinas repeated the Platonic dictum of the Liber de vita
(as above) in his commentary on the above passage from Nicomachean Ethics (In decem libros
ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum expositio, ed. Raimondo M. Spiazzi, Turin and Rome: Marietti,
1949, lectio VI, no. 78, p. 21). Sometime thereafter the Latin of the Platonic dictum was changed into the
Latin of the Aristotelian dictum that Husser! inscribed in his copy of SZ.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 271
D-7
In the lower right corner, there is a stamp, with the "No." left blank:]
"EXLIBRIS
- Edmund HUSSERL
--No ........... .
11 Printed on the full-title page of SZ-l is: Sein und Zeit I von Martin Heidegger I Marburg a. L. I
Erste Hiilfte ISonderdruck aus: "Jahrbuch fUr Philosophie und phanomenologische Forschung", Band VII
[sic] I herausgegeben von E. Husserl-- Freiburg i. B.I Max Niemeyer, Verlag, Halle a. d. S. 1927.
272 PSYCHOWGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Dedicated to
Edmund Husserl
12 This printed dedication - which keeps !he date of AprilS, 1926 - drops !he words "dankbarer" (as
well as !he title and !he citation from !he Sophist) from the original handwritten dedication of 1926, and
adds !he word "Baden" (here, as an adjective: "bad.") and "zugeeignet".
13 "Orphanage Printing Firm, Halle (Salle)."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 273
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ERRATA LIST
xi.31-39
Page 15, line 6 from the bottom:
[15.34-35 = 15.32 = 36.28 = 14.4-5]
"Besinnung" instead of "Bestimmung."
IS This is the only one of these errata whose correction is not remarked in a footnote in BT-I.
16 That is to say: the word "aus" had been omitted and was to be supplied.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 275
TEXT
INTRODUCTION
EXPOSITION OF THE QUESTION OF THE MEANING OF BEING
CHAPTER ONE
Necessity, Structure, and Priority
of the Question of Being
§1
The Necessity of an Explicit Retrieval
of the Question of Being
§2
The Formal Stmcture of the Question of Being
§3
The Ontological Priority of the Question of Being
17 "Die sachlichen Formalien treten in der Umschau im Gebiet in der konkret deskriptiven und
eventuell idealisierenden Forschung hervor."
18 "Dessen bedarf es erst in der sachlich formalen Wesensforschung (Mathematisierung im weit-
esten Sinn}." If we take es as referring to das Seiende, it could read: "Which [the entities] require
only.... " Husser! actually writes "Das bedarf es... " The change to Dessen was made in the Gennan
edition. It is not entirely clear what the word "Dessen" refers to (and the gender of the words is no help
here). It might refer (without proper gender agreement) to "preliminary research" (vorglingige ...
Forschung) or, more immediately to "explication" (Auslegung).
280 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§4
The Ontic Priority of the Question of Being
19 At SZ-J 13.16-20 = SZ-J5 13.16-19 = BT-J 33.31-35 = BT-2 11.19-22 Husserl refers back to this
text.
282 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
20 At SZ-J 12.27-28", SZ·J5 12.25-26 = BT·J 33.4-5 = BT-2 10.29-30 Husserl will find "another"
such puzzle.
21 Compare Husserl's note at SZ-J 13.27-28 =SZ·J5 13.27-28 =BT·J 34.6-7 =BT-2 11.27-28.
22 Husserl refers back to this page at SZ-J 13.27-28 =SZ·J5 13.27-28 = BT-J 34.6-7 =BT·2 11.27-
28.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 283
23 Perhaps an allusion back to SZ-l 12.3-7 =SZ-15 12.3-7 =BT-l 32.12-16 =BT-2 10.9-12, an
earlier text that Husser! found "puzzling."
284 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
24 Has Husser! misread Heidegger's "in der ontischen Veifassung" as "in der ontologischen Veifas-
sunf?
2 This is the passage to which Husser! referred above at SZ-1 11.17-19, SZ-15 11.18-20, BT-1
31.25-27 = BT-2 9.27-31.
26 The reference is presumably to SZ-1 12.12-13 = SZ-15 12.11-12 = BT-l 32.21 = BT-2 10.16-17
(ontologisch) and to SZ-1 12.20-21 = SZ-15 12.19-20 = BT-132.29-31 = BT-2 10.23-24 (Existenz).
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 285
27 The principle is found in De anima, r 8, 431 b 21, which Heidegger here cites and translates as: ti
llruxf) 'ta ov'ta 7t6JC; tan: "The soul (of the human being) is, in some way, entities." On February 13,
1952, in his course "Obungen im Lesen," Heidegger told students: "Das 7Uivr:a ist in Sein und Zeit aus
Versehen herausgeblieben" ("The 7t(xv'ta was omitted in Being and Time due to an oversight").
28 Parmenides, fragment 3: 'to yap aino voEiv £a'tlv 'te K(Xl £tval.
286 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER TWO
The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being.
The Method of the Investigation, and its Outline
§5
The Ontological Analysis of Dasein as Discovering the Horizon for an
Interpretation of the Meaning of Being in General
29 Husserllater refers back to this note at SZ-J 43.36-38 = SZ-15 43.35-37 = BT-J 69.22-24 = BT-2
41.18-20, where Heidegger writes that average everydayness "always has been, and always will be,
overlooked in the explanations of Dasein."
30 After this sentence the Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously inserts a paragraph break.
288 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
specific kind of being of all previous ontology - the fate of its inquiries,
findings, and failures - has a certain necessity vis-a-vis Dasein."
In the right margin:
N.B.
§6
The Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology
31 The Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously inserts a paragraph break before this sentence.
32 =
Husserl is presumably referring to the next paragraph, SZ-J 20.18-21 SZ-J5 20.18-23 BT-J =
=
41.25-29 BT-2 18.5-9, where Heidegger writes (Macquarrie-Robinson translation): ''This elemental
historicity of Dasein can remain hidden from Dasein itself. But it can also be discovered in a certain way
and be properly cultivated. Dasein can discover tradition, preserve it, and pursue it explicitly. The
discovery of tradition and the disclosure of what it 'transmits' and how it transmits it, can be taken hold
of as a task in its own right."
290 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
33 "Sind die historischen schon aile meine Moglichkeiten und meine Freiheit radikale Fragestel-
lung?" Could this have the sense of: Are all my possibilities now historical (etc.)?
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 291
The next remark by Husserl might apply not just to the text indicated but to the rest
of SZ p. 24 and even some of p. 25.
§7
The Phenomenological Method of Investigation
34 Husserl's lectures on time, dating from 1904-1910, were edited and published by Heidegger in the
summer or fall of 1928, in Husserl's Jahrbuch, volume IX, as: Vorlesungen zur Ph/inomenologie des
inneren Zeitbewusstseins.
292 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
36 This marginal note and the following one are difficult to decipher and interpret. (1) The earliest
transcription of Husserl's marginalia, by Eugen Fink, reads the two shorthand notes as one: "la, aber
dann nur relativ, die Schein offen lassen." Fink applies the note to SZ-l 31.10-17 (= SZ-15 31.10-17 =
BT-l 54.21-28 = BT-2 27.28-35). I am grateful to Professor Burt Hopkins for sharing the Fink tran-
scription with me. (2) Breeur also reads the two notes as one, but transcribes them differently: "la, aber
dann nur relativ, der Schein offen liiflt." (Due to a printer's error the word liiflt appears in Breeur's
German edition as laflt.) Breeur applies the words to SZ-15 31.11-12 (= SZ-l 31.11-12 = BT-l 22-23 =
BT-2 27.29-30. (3) I read Husserl's shorthand as constituting two notes that refer to two distinct
sentences: (a) "la, aber dann nur relativ der Schein." and (b) "Offen liiflt."
294 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Husserl's next three comments are densely located in both the left and right margins
beside the following sentences:
31.20-22 31.17-22 54.28-33 27.35-40
Text in SZ:
"If we understand 'that which shows itself as an entity accessible through
the empirical 'intuition' in, say, Kant's sense, then in this case the formal
conception of 'phenomenon' has a legitimate employment. In this usage
'phenomenon' has the sense of the ordinary conception of phenomenon.
But this ordinary conception is not the phenomenological conception."
In the right margin:
N.B.
Husserl underlines:
"legitimate"
In the left margin:
Why? I still cannot anticipate the entity. 37
Husserl underlines:
"ordinary conception of phenomenon"
In the right margin:
Thus, related to entities.
39 ".die universale Wissenschaft von den Erscheinungen, die notwendig universale von dem Er-
scheinenden als solchen wird, ... " Perhaps: "".the universal science of appearances, which becomes the
necessarily universal [science) of what-appears as such,,,,,"
40 What text is Husserl referring to? Heidegger uses the adjective positiven (and Husserl underlines it)
at SZ-l 29.13 = SZ-15 29.15 = BT-l 51.35 = BT-2 25.32 when he writes '"We shall allot the tenn
'phenomenon' to this positive and original meaning of IjIlXlv61'£vov," namely: that-which-shows-itself.
Or perhaps Husserl is referring to SZ-l 31.21 = SZ-15 31.21 = BT-l 54.32 = BT-2 27.38-39, where
Heidegger speaks of ''the ordinary conception of phenomenon," which Husserl glosses with: "Thus,
related to entities." Husserl's word '"positively''' would then mean "as something posited in the world."
But in the following sentence Heidegger explicitly states that this ordinary conception of phenomenon is
not the phenomenological conception.
296 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
41 See SZ-1 31.34-35 =SZ-15 31.34-35 =BT-l 55.9-10 =BT-2 28.8-9, where Husserl's exclamation
point seems to record his amazement that Heidegger here declares the proper phenomenon of phenome-
nology to be being.
42 This refers ahead to SZ-1 63.18-20 = SZ-15 63.16-17 = BT-l 91.15-16 = BT-2 59.14-15: "We
formally defined 'phenomenon' in the phenomenological sense as that which shows itself as being and
being-structure. "
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 297
43 At this point SZ-15 bears a comma (which is missing in SZ-l) after "Ontologie."
44 Husserl erroneously writes "430" instead of "436." The correct reference is to SZ-l 436.34-38 =
SZ-15 436.27-31 = BT-l 487.8-11 = BT-2 397.19-22, where the present sentence cited is repeated
verbatim and bears Heidegger's footnote referring back to "§7, p. 38," that is, to the present passage. At
SZ-l 436 Husserl underlines Heidegger's sentence and marks it with "N.B."
298 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
PART ONE
DIVISION ONE
PREPARATORY FUNDAMENTAL ANALYSIS OF DASEIN
CHAPTER ONE
Exposition of the Task of a Preparatory Analysis of Dasein
§9
The Theme of the Analysis of Dasein
45 In SZ-J the first sentence is: "Als Seiendes dieses Seins ist es seinem eigenen Zu-sein iiberantwor-
tet" and that is the text we translate here. Beginning with the seventh edition (1953), "Zu-sein" is
changed to "Sein," so as to read: "As an entity with this kind of being, it has been handed over to its own
being." See Bast and Delfosse, Handbuch zum Textstudium, p. 413.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 299
46 Presumably a lapsus for p. "3ISf." At SZ-1 3IS.3-6 = SZ-15 3IS.1-4 = BT-1 365.35-37 = BT-2
293.19-21 Heidegger writes: " .. .if the self belongs to the essential determinations of Dasein -- whose
'essence,' however, consists in eksistence ... ," and in the left margin at that point Hussed writes: "which,
however, is questionable from the beginning."
47 Hussed's comment might apply to the previous sentence, too.
300 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
=
48 This refers to Husserl's extended note above at SZ-J 16.37-41 =
SZ-J5 16.37-41 BT-J 37.38-
38.1 = BT-2 IS.2-{j, where Heidegger ftrst introduced the notion of "average everydayness."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 301
§ 10
Distinguishing the Analysis of Dasein
from Anthropology, Psychology, and Biology
47, note 1 47, note 1 489, note ii (H. 47) 400, note 2
Text in SZ:
'The fundamental orientation of the problematic is already visible in the
treatise "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," Logos I (1910), p. 319.,,49
In the right margin:
?
49 The article originally appeared in March, 1911, and the correct reference for the article is Logos I
(1911), p. 319: in the newer edition: Edmund Husserl, "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" in
Aufsiitze und Vortriige (1911-1921), edited by Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Husserliana XXV,
Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987, pp. 37-38 (see p. 337 for the original publication date); and in the
E.T.: Edmund Husserl, Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy, translated by Quentin Lauer, New
York: Harper & Row, 1965, pp. 117-118. The passage to which Heidegger refers opens a discussion of
the psychophysical attitude.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 303
Underneath that:
However, [they are] indeed investigated after-the-fact, although obvi-
ously not empirically disclosed.
§11
The Eksistential Analysis and the Interpretation of Primitive Dasein.
The Difficulties of Achieving a ''Natural Conception of World"
DIVISION ONE
CHAPTER TWO
Being-in-a-world in General as the Basic Structure of Dasein
§12
A Preliminary Sketch of Being-in-a-world,
in Terms of an Orientation towards Being-in as such
= = =
so Presumably the reference is to SZ-J 43.1-4 SZ-J5 42.40--43.3 BT-J 68.17-20 BT-2 40.25-
28, where Heidegger asserts that authenticity and inauthenticity are detennined by "mineness."
304 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
51 " ... daft die Wand 'fur' den Stuhl begegnen kiinnte."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 305
'2 A vertical arrow in the right margin might indicate that HusserI's remark applies to the remainder
of the paragraph as well.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 307
their being) that Dasein itself is not but that it encounters 'within' its
world."
Husserl brackets from "nothing less" to the end of the sentence.
In the left margin, flowing over into the bottom margin:
This is unclear. The difficulty lies in the constitution of the human being,
as the constitution of a reality that is intrinsically personal, and the diffi-
culty can be overcome only by clarifying both constitution and phenome-
nological reduction.
53 Husserl's remark may apply to the next sentence, too: ''Therefore, knowing the world (voeiv), or
addressing and discussing the 'world' (loyot;), functions as the primary mode of being-in-a-world,
without the latter being conceptualized as such."
308 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§13
Being-in is Exemplified in a Founded Mode.
Knowing the World
55 This second sentence of Husserl's comment could refer to the next two, or even three, sentences in
S2.
56 " ... durch meine Lehre von der Intentionalitat (Geltung) und zunachst der eifahrenden?"
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 311
DIVISION ONE
CHAPTER THREE
The Worldhood ofa World
§ 14
The Idea of the Worldhood of a World
57 This refers back to SZ-l 35.30-35 and .38-40 = SZ-15 35.29-34 and .37-39 = BT-l 59.34-40 and
60.3-5 = BT-2 31.24-28 and 31.31-33, where Heidegger declares the proper phenomenon of phenome-
nology to be the being of entities: its meaning, modifications, and derivatives.
58 Husserl will refer back to this passage at SZ-l 65.12-13 =SZ-15 65.10-11 =BT-l 93.18-19 =BT-
261.10-11.
312 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
59 It is not entirely clear that Husserl's remark is specifically related to the word "being" or even to the
sentence from SZ cited here.
60 The reference is to SZ-164.20-21 =SZ-15 64.17-18 =BT-l 92.29-30 =BT-2 60.23-24.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 313
A.
The Analysis of the Lived World and of Worldhood in General
§ 15
The Being of the Entities Encountered in a Lived World
61 The Macquarrie-Robinson translation erroneously inserts a paragraph break before this sentence.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 315
§ 16
The Worldly Character of the Lived World
Manifests Itself in Inner-worldly Entities
ness.'65 When we notice that something is not useful, the useful enters the
mode of obtrusiveness."
In the right margin (the first word in cursive):
lacking
obtrusiveness
§ 17
Reference and Signs
66 "Das meint wohl theoretisch thematisch. Die Thematik ist eine praktische."
318 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
67 Heidegger had worked as a meteorologist during the last year of World War I.
320 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 18
Involvement and Significance: The Worldhood of a World
B.
The Contrast of Our Analysis of Worldhood
With Descartes' Interpretation of the World
§ 19
The Definition of 'World' as res extensa
§ 20
The Foundations of the Ontological Definition of ''World''
§ 21
Hermeneutical Discussion of the Cartesian Ontology of ''World''
70 The Macquarrie-Robinson translation incorrectly translates ..... nuT eine /undierte Vollzugsform" as:
'1ust a more fully achieved fonn."
324 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 22
The Spatiality of the Useful Within a World
11 "Das Umhafte der Umwelt." At SZ-15 101.38-39 Heidegger defines "das Umhafte der Umwelt" as
"die spezijische Ri1umlichkeit des in der Umwelt begegnenden Seienden" ("the spatiality specific to
entities encountered in the lived world").
326 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 23
The Spatiality of Being-in-a-world
72 "Dieses in besorgenden Umgang umsichtig vorweg im Blick gehaltene Wohin des miiglichen
uughaften HingehOrens nennen wir die Gegend" In this context, "Gegend" should be understood in
conjection with entgegen: in a literalistic translation it would be the "country" of non-theoretical "en-
counters."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 327
§24
Space, and Dasein's Spatiality
DMSIONONE
CHAPTER FOUR
Being-in-a-world as Being-with and Being-a-self.
The El'eryone
§25
The Approach to the Eksistential Question
of the Who of Dasein
§ 26
The Co-Dasein of Others and Everyday Being-with
74 In the present context Erziehung seems to have the active sense of "bringing someone up."
75 Compare OUYYV~IlTJ, Nicomachean Ethics VI, 11, 1143 a 23.
76 Umsicht, Rucksicht, Nachsicht
332 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 27
Everyday Being-a-self and the Everyone
DIVISION ONE
CHAPTER FIVE
Being-in as such
§ 28
The Task of a Thematic Analysis of Being-in
82 Hussed's remark appears at the very beginning of the paragraph and presumably applies to more
than the first sentence.
83 Hussed's remark "Zum Einwand" might apply to the preceding and following sentences as well as
to ~resent one.
4 "Lichtung"; At this point Heidegger's word "Lichtung" carries the metaphoric sense of "clearing"
rather than that of "lighting."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 337
would not be the entity that has this essence; indeed, it would not be at
all. Dasein is its disclosedness."
In the right margin, in cursive:
clearing
350 (section 69)85
§29
Da-sein as Disposition
=
85 The reference is to the first paragraph of §69, which begins at SZ-J 350.28 SZ-J5 350.27 =BT-J
=
401.32 BT-2 321.25. Heidegger has a footnote there referring back to the present passage.
86 Husserl's remark may apply to the rest of the paragraph as well.
338 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
87 "Diese Angiingliehkeit griindet in der Befindliehkeit. als welehe die Welt z.B. aUf Bedrohbarkeit
hin ersehlossen hat." In SZ-15, but not in SZ-l, a "sie" appears after "welehe."
88 Husserl's remark might cover the next two sentences as well. The word "Affektion" ["affect"] here
seems to have the sense of the Latin affeetio: ''the state of being affected by something."
340 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§30
Fear as a Mode of Disposition
89 Heidegger's footnote at SZ-I 341.7 =SZ-15 341.7 =BT-I 391.8 =BT-2 313.28 refers back to this
section.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 341
§ 31
Da-sein as Understanding
90 Heidegger has a footnote here: "Cf. 18. pp. 85 ff." See our next footnote.
91 See the note above at SZ-l 86.1 = SZ-15 85.40 = BT-l 118.24-25 = BT-2 80.18-19.
342 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
92 Twice at SZ p. 336 (which is the first page of §68a, "The Temporality of Understanding") Husser!
= = =
refers back to this page: see SZ-l 336.2 SZ-15 336.2 BT-l 385.11 BT-2 309.14, and SZ-J 336.11-
= = =
'13 SZ-15 336.11-12 BT-l 385.21-23 BT-2 309.23-25.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 343
93 It seems that Hussed misreads Heidegger here. Heidegger is saying that sight allows a separate
entity to be encountered. Hussed seems to identify the encountered entity exclusively with Dasein.
344 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§32
Understanding and Explication
§ 33
Assertion as a Derivative Mode of Explication
94 Husser! is referring to SZ-l 324.1-7 = SZ-15 323.35-324.5 = BT-l 370.34-371.4 = BT-2 297.40-
298.6, where Heidegger, after referring back to this passage, summarizes some of his discussion of
meaning.
95 Cf. SZ-l 314.22-25 = SZ-15 314.21-24 = BT-l 362.20-23 = BT-2 290.24-26.
346 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 34
Da-sein and Discursiveness. Language
96 Husserl's remark may apply more to the latter half of the paragraph.
97 It seems Husserl's comment relates to the word "articulation."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 347
B.
The Everyday Being of the "Open"
and
Dasein's Falling
§ 35
Chatter
§ 36
Curiosity
98 Husser! may have mistakenly written "344" when he meant to write "346." At SZ-1 346.24-25 =
SZ-15 346.24-25 =BT-I 397.11-12 =BT-2 318.11-12 Heidegger has a footnote that refers back to the
present section and Husser! writes in the left margin "curiosity."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 349
§ 38
Fallenness and Thrownness
DIVISION ONE
CHAPTER SIX
Care as Dasein's Being
§ 39
The Question of the Original Wholeness
of Dasein's Structural Whole
§ 40
The Basic Disposition of Dread as a
Distinctive Form of Dasein 's Disclosedness
99 It seems Husser! is referring ahead to SZ-l 342.32-33 = SZ-15 342.31-32 = BT-l 393.2-3 = BT-2
315.1-2, where a footnote refers back to this section.
350 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§41
Dasein's Being as Care
§ 43
Dasein, Worldhood, and Reality
100 Husserl's question mark might be directed to the previous sentence in SZ as well.
352 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
101 It would seem that Husserl here mistakenly wrote "311" when he meant "318." At SZ-1 318.8-10
= SZ-15 318.6-8 = 81"-1 365.40-366.1 = BT-2 293.23-25 Heidegger has a footnote referring back to
this page and section, and in the margin at that point Husserl has written "N.B. 211."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 355
§44
Dasein, Disdosedness, and Truth
102 By "reduced" [reduziert], Husser! may mean something like "deflated" or "cut down to size."
356 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
I DIVISION TWO
DASEIN AND TEMPORALITY
I
§45
The Outcome of the Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein,
and
the Task of an Original Eksistential Interpretation of this Entity
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER ONE
The Possible Wholeness of Dasein
and Being-at-the-point-of-death 103
§47
The Possibility of Experiencing the Death of Others,
and the Possibility of Grasping the Whole of Dasein
§ 50
Preliminary Sketch of the Eksistential-ontological
Stmcture of Death
its being. On the contrary, if Dasein eksists, it has also already been
thrown into this possibility."
In the right margin:
N.B.
§ 52
Everyday Being-unto-the-end, and the Full Eksistential Conception of Death
§ 53
Eksistential Projection of an Authentic Being-at-the-point-of-death
104 Husserl's downward-pointing arrow here in the margin may indicate that this word and the "336"
that follows apply to the entire paragraph.
\05 At SZ-l 336.36-37 = SZ-l5 336.36-37 = BT-l 386.11-12 = BT-2 310.5-6 Husserl refers back to
this page.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 361
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER TWO
How Dasein Gives Evidence of an Authentic Ability-ta-be;
Resoluteness
§ 54
The Problem of How
an Authentic Eksistentiel Possibility Evidences Itself
106 This last sentence might be meant to apply to the following paragraph in SZ.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 363
§ 55
The Eksistential-ontological Foundations of Conscience
107 Husser! refers to this passage on the front endpaper of his copy (see above) where he writes
"unfounded classifying" and "[p.] 271."
1 Husser! refers to this passage on the front endpaper of his copy (see above) where he writes
"staring" and "[p.] 273."
364 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 57
Conscience as the Call of Care
§ 58
Understanding the Appeal, and Guilt
109 Husser! refers to this passage on the front endpaper of his copy (see above) where he writes:
"Critical ... [p.] 278."
110 Cf. below, SZ-J 339.19-20 = SZ-J5 339.18-20 = BT-J 389.5-6 = BT-2 312.9-10, and SZ-J
339.26-29 = SZ-J5 339.25-27 = BT-J 389.11-14 = BT-2 312.16-18.
III " .. .fist] eine Nichtigk.eit seiner selbst."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 365
§59
The Eksistential Interpretation of Conscience,
and the Ordinary Construal of Conscience
113 The subject of the last clause (es) could equally be construed as referring to das Gewissen
(conscience) rather than to das Sein des Daseins.
368 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
114 In the right margin Husser! writes the letter "E" for the German "Einwand," "objection."
115 Husser! is thereby indicating that this "further" objection is the "fourth" one listed at SZ-1 290.17-
19 = SZ-15 290.18-20 = BT-l 336.31-33 = BT-2 267.32-34.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 369
§ 60
The Eksistential Structure of the Authentic
Ability-to-be that is Evidenced
in Conscience
119 Cf. above, Husserl's first comment at SZ-J 297.1-3 = SZ-J5 297.1-2 = BT-J 343.20-21 = BT-2
273.31-32.
372 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
120 In the margin Husser! writes the lettef "E" fOf the German "Einwand."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 373
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER THREE
Dasein's Authentic Ability-to-be-whole
and Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care
§ 61
A Preliminary Sketch of the Methodological Step
from the Delimitation of Dasein's Authentic Wholeness
to the Phenomenal Exposition of Temporality
121 A downward-pointing arrow may indicate that this comment applies to the rest of the paragraph as
well.
374 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 62
Dasein's Eksistentielly Authentic Ability-to-be-whole
as
Anticipatory Resolution
122 On the front endpaper of S2-I Husserl apparently refers ahead to this footnote when he writes
"306."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 375
§ 63
The Hermeneutical Situation Thus Far Achieved
for Interpreting the Meaning of the Being of Care;
and the Methodological Character of the Eksistential Analysis in General
123 With downward-pointing arrows, Husser! indicates that these remarks apply to the entire para-
graph.
376 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§64
Care and Selfhood
115 A bracket in the margin may indicate that this word applies to the rest of the paragraph as well.
378 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
126 Husser! seems to be questioning that Dasein's essence consists in its eksistence. Cf. above SZ-l
42.16 = SZ-15 42.16 = BT-I 67.21 = BT-2 40.1, where Heidegger writes: "Dasein's 'essence' consists in
its eksistence." Husser! glosses the sentence with "Cf. 313f.," which presumably is a lapsus for "318f."
127 Heidegger places a footnote here: "Cf. §43 c, p. 211."
128 This seems to be the sentence indicated by the marginal note at SZ-l 211.31-34 = SZ-15 211.31-
34 =BT-l 254.36--40 =BT-2 195.34-38. Cf. the previous footnote.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 379
§65
Temporality as the Ontological Meaning of Care
129 The reference above, at SZ-l 151.23-25 =SZ-15 151.22-24 =BT-J 192.35-37 =BT-2 141.44-
142.2, is to this and the following sentences.
382 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
130 "Das die ausgezeichnete Moglichkeit aushaltende, in ihr sich aUf sich Zukommen-lassen ist das
ursprungliche Phiinomen der Zu-kunft." Macquarrie and Robinson translate this passage: "This letting-
itself-come-towards-itself in that distinctive possibility which it puts up with, is the primordial phe-
nomenon of the future as coming towards." Stambaugh translates it: "Letting-come-toward-itseif that
perdures the eminent possibility is the primordial phenomenon of the future."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 383
§ 66
Dasein's Temporality and the Task it Entails of
Retrieving the Eksistential Analysis More Originally
Husserl underlines:
"insight into the complications of an original ontology of Dasein."
In the right margin:
?
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER FOUR
Temporality and Everydayness
§ 67
The Basic Content of Dasein's Eksistential Structure,
and a Preliminary Sketch of its Temporal Interpretation
§68
The Temporality of Disclosedness as Such
131 Above at SZ-l 144.28-31 = SZ-15 144.28-31 = BT-l 184.15-17 = BT-2 135.34-36, Husser!
writes "Cr. [p.] 336." See the next footnote.
132 Above at SZ-l 144.28-31 = SZ-15 144.28-31 = BT-l 184.15-17 = BT-2 135.34-36, Husser!
writes "Cf. [p.] 336." See the previous footnote.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 387
= = =
133 Above at SZ-J 262.17-18 SZ-J5 262.15-16 BT-J 306.25-26 BT-2 242.13-14, Husserl refers
ahead to this passage.
134 Below at SZ-J 339.24-26 = = =
SZ-15 339.23-25 BT-J 389.10-11 BT-2 312.14-16, Husserl will
refer back to this passage.
388 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§68
The Temporality of Disclosedness as Such
135 Cf. above, SZ-l 284.3-6 =SZ-15 284.5-7 = BT-l 329.29-31 = BT-2 262.4-6, and below, SZ-l
339.26-29 =SZ-15 339.25-27 =BT-1389.11-14 =BT-2 310.34-35.
136 Husserl is referring to SZ-l 337.28-30 =SZ-15 337.28-29 =BT-l 387.6-8 =BT-2 310.34-35.
137 Cf. above SZ-l 284.3-6 =SZ-15 284.5-7 =BT-l 329.29-31 =BT-2 262.4-6, and SZ-l 339.19-20
= SZ-15 339.18-20 =BT-l 389.5-6 =BT-2 312.9-10.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 389
138 The reference seems to be to all of SZ-l 342.12-21 = SZ-15 342.12-20 = BT-l 392.18-26 = BT-2
314.27-34, even though on p. 342 the corresponding reference back to this page appears only at the last
line of that paragraph.
139 This remark may apply as well to the next two sentences in SZ.
140 The reference is to SZ-l 341.27-29 = SZ-15 341.25-28 = BT-l 391.30-33 = BT-2 314.4-6.
390 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
§ 68
The Temporality of Disclosedness as Such
§ 68
The Temporality of Disclosedness as Such
144 See the footnote above at SZ-J 170.21 = SZ 15th ed. 170.22 = BT-J 214.23 = BT-2 159.32.
Husserl glosses the section title "§36 Curiosity" with "[p.] 344," possibly a lapsus for "346.".
145 Heidegger's text puns on entspringen ("springing from") and nachspringen ("springing after" in
the sense of "pursuing"). Husserl's remark seems to apply as well to the previous two (perhaps three)
sentences in SZ.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 393
§69
The Temporality of Being-in-a-world
and the Problem of a World's Transcendence
146 That is: Husser! writes "theoretisch-" and thereby glosses "thematischen" to read "theoretisch-
thematischen": "a theoretical-thematic grasping."
141 That is: "[a forgetting] of oneself!"
148 Husserl's "Ja, wer sagt das?" possibly has the sense of "And who ever said it did?"
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 395
149 SZ-15 changes this "uns" ("for us") to "nur," so that the sentence then reads: ..... can be conspicu-
ous only in .... "
ISO Although this remark appears opposite the previous sentence, it seems to be directed at the present
text.
396 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
151 It is possible that this remark applies to the previous sentence in SZ.
152 The granunar is problematic: "Ontologische Genesis der -- das theoretische Verhiiltnis zur Welt."
The remark is written in the margin in such a way as to include the following section-title as well.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 397
153 This marginal note may refer not only to these two lines but to the following two sentences as well.
398 PSYCHOWGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
154 Husserl seems to be glossing Heidegger's phrase "of what is just-there" with "physically."
155 Husserl's question mark is pedtaps related to Heidegger's neologism "Entschriinkung," which has
the sense of "unconfining" or "opening the borders of.. .."
400 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
156 "Das Seiende ist fur mich seiend in einem subjektiven Wie, das ich befragen kann. Setzen besagt
fur mich Sein in Gewiflheit und heiflt Setzung, wei! sie aus mir her ein 'Satz' ist. "
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 401
157 In the Husserliana edition (1984), vol. XIXI2, pp. 646.24 ("das Gegenwiirtigen [Priisentieren]")
and 677.11 (gegenwiirtigt). In the E.T., Logical Investigations, pp. 761.16 ("direct presentation") and
789.22 ("gives the object presence").
158 It seems this note is not related to the German words "gmndet exististentiel/" that bear the notation
"1)." Rather, they could be a comment on the previous entry's last words: ''The fact that, and the way in
which, the intentionality of 'consciousness' is grounded in ekstatic temporality will be shown in the next
Division" -- which Husserl marks with a "N.B."
402 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
IS9 On the front endpaper of SZ-1 Husser! writes "thematizing" to call attention to this note.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 403
§70
The Temporality of the Spatiality that is
Characteristic of Dasein
§71
The Temporal Meaning of Dasein's Everydayness
160 Husserl's phrase, "as a rule," picks up the same phrase from the last sentence of the previous
paragraph.
406 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER FIVE
Temporality and Historicity
§72
The Eksistential-ontological Exposition of the Problem of History
161 Heidegger is implicitly adapting St. Augustine's "distentio animi" (Confessiones XI, 26). Cf.
Heidegger's "Des hI. Augustinus Betrachtung iiber die Zeit. Confessiones lib. XI," a conference he gave
at St. Martin's Abbey, Beuron, October 26, 1930 (typescript).
162 The quotation marks have been added by the present editor.
163 Husserl's question mark could apply to only the first of Heidegger's two sentences.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEJNG AND TIME 407
§73
The Ordinary Understanding of History,
and Dasein's Being-Historical
§74
The Basic Structure of Historicity
164 The reference is to SZ-l 389.4 =SZ-2 389.3 =BT-l 440.37 =BT-2 355.21-22.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 409
165 Husserl's reference is to SZ-l 386.28-29. SZ-15 386.27-28, BT-l 438.22-23 = BT-2 353.20-21.
See also the following footnote.
166 This mark appears so close to the previous one that the two may well be meant as a single marginal
note.
410 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
167 The word Wiederholung can mean both "retrieval" and "repetition." Husser! may be taking it in
the latter sense.
168 See the previous footnote. Husserl's remark here seems to recognize that Wiederholung does not
mean "repetition."
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 411
169 Husserl's reference is to SZ-l 384.7-11 - SZ-15 384.7-11 =BT-l 435.29-33 =BT-2 351.26-29.
412 PSYCHOWGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOWGY
§75
Dasein's Historicity and World-history
170 The reference is to SZ-l 381.26-32 =SZ-15 381.24-30 =BT-l 433.13-20 =BT-2 349.24-30.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 413
§76
Dasein's Historicity as the Eksistential Source of Historical Science
§ 77
The Connection between the Foregoing Exposition of the Problem of Historicity
with the Investigations of Wilhelm Dilthey and the Ideas of Count Yorck
DIVISION TWO
CHAPTER SIX
Temporality and Within-time-ness as the Source
of the Ordinary Conception of Time
§79
The Temporality of Dasein
and
Our Concern for Time
§ 80
The Kind of Time that Goes with Concern, and Within-time-ness
§ 81
Within-time-ness and the Genesis of the
Ordinary Conception of Time
171 Of these two sentences of Husserl's, the first clearly relates to the ftrst of Heidegger's two Gennan
sentences. What the second sentence refers to is less clear.
172 See Husserl's note at SZ-1426.19-21 = SZ·15 426.14-16 = BT-1478.32-34 = BT-2 390.22-24.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 419
173 See Hussed's note on the legitimacy of the ordinary view of time, at SZ-l 424.1-4 = SZ-15
423.35-424.2 =BT-1476.11-15 =BT-2 388.17-22.
MARGINAL REMARKS ON BEING AND TIME 421
§82
The Contrast between the
Eksistential-ontological Connection of Temporality, Dasein, and World-time,
and
Hegel's Conception of the Connection Between Time and Spirit
§ 83
The Eksistential-Temporal Analytic of Dasein,
and
the Fundamental-Ontological Question of the Meaning of Being in General
174 At this point in SZ-J the text bears a comma that is absent from SZ-J 38.18-25, from which Hei-
delffier takes the present passage.
S Above, at SZ-J 38.18-25 = = =
SZ-J5 38.18-24 BT-J 62.29-35 BT-2 34.6-12 (where the above
text first appears) a note by Husser! refers ahead to the present passage, while erroneously citing it as p.
"430."
422 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
End of Husserl's
Marginalia to Being and Time
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS
IN
MARTIN HEIDEGGER, KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF
METAPHYSICS
Translated
by
Richard E. Palmer
AN INTRODUCTION TO
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN
KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS
Richard E. Palmeri
1 I wish to thank Roland Breeur of the Husserl-Archives for his gracious help in choosing relevant parts
from my essay, "HusserI's Debate with Heidegger in the Margins of Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,
to introduce my translation here. That essay can be found in Man and World, 30 (April-May 1997): 5-33.
2 "Randbemerkungen HusserIs zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Kant und tins Problem der Metaphysik "
in Husserl Studies 11, 1-2 (1994), 3-63. This text contains only HusserI's remarks and not the Heideggerian
reference texts included here. In it, the marginal remarks on SZ occupy pages 9-48, while the notes on KPM
take up only pages 49-63. A French translation, Edmund Husserl, Notes sur Heidegger (paris: Editions de
Minuit, 1993), is available which also contains the earlier drafts of the Britannica article and an interpretive
essay by Denise Souche-Dagues, "La lecture husserIienne de Sein und Zeit," pp. 119-152.
3 Page references in this introduction will be to the original first edition text. Our translation of the mar-
gina! notes can serve as a guide for corresponding pages in the English translation by Richard Taft and in the
5th edition of the German text.
4 The ''Einleitung'' by Roland Breeur for the "Randbemerkungen" in Husserl Studies cited above, pp. 3-
8, notes that we have no way of knowing whether Husser! ever read these other parts of the text. Breeur
helpfully divides HusserI's remarks in SZ and KPM into three categories, the first of which is basically index
words to tag the content of a passage for future reference. He notes that there are very few notes of this type
in KPM but quite a few in Sz. showing that HusserI read SZ much more analytically than KPM.
INTRODUCTION TO MARGINAL REMARKS ON KPM 425
S For more exact details of the chronology, see the main introduction by Tom Sheehan.
6 Ironically, Heidegger states in the preface to the fourth edition (1973) that he undertook KPM precisely
because he saw by 1929 that the Being-question as put forward in SZ was misunderstood. A little later in the
same preface, he says that the Being-question was also misunderstood as it appeared in KPM, so he aban-
doned the project of using a reinterpretation of traditional metaphysics as a means profiling the question of
Being.
7 Regarding Heidegger's relation to Husserl's phenomenology in the Marburg years, consult the follow-
ing: Walter Biemel, "Heideggers Stellung zur Phanomenologie in der Marburger Zeit," in Husserl, Scheler,
Heidegger in der Sicht neuer Quellen, ed. E. W. Orth (Freiburg: Alber, 1978), 141-223; Franco Volpi,
"Heidegger in Marburg: Die Auseinandersetzung mit Husserl," Philosophischer Iiteraturanzeiger 34
(1984): 48-69; and Karl Schuhmann, ''Zu Heideggers Spiegel-Gespriich tiber Husserl, Zeitschrift fUr
philosophische Forschung 32 (1978): 591-612. Also see Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Being and Time
(Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1993) and John van Buren's The Young Heidegger: Rumor of a Hidden
King (Bloomington: Indiana U. Press, 1994).
8 For a detailed tracing of Heidegger's changing relation to and interpretation of Kant, see Hansgeorg
Hoppe, "Wandlungen in der Kant-Auffassung Heideggers," pp. 284-317 in Durchblicke: Martin Heidegger
zum 80. Geburtstag, ed. V. Klostermann. Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1970. See also the important documents
that were added to the GA publication of KPM: GA 3:249-311.
9 For Husserl's evolving relation to Kant, see Iso Kern's Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung aber
Husserls Verhaltni.s zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 471pp.
426 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
10 There is now, of course, an outstanding edition of the correspondence. See E. Husserl, BriejWechsel. 10
vols. Edited by Karl Schuhmann in cooperation with Elisabeth Schuhmann (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993-1994).
For a number of sometimes frank and salty comments in Husserl's correspondence, see R. Breeur's
"Einleitung" to the Russerl Studies pUblication in German of the marginalia in SZ and KPM: II, 1-2 (1994):
5-6.
11 See Der Denkweg Martin Reideggers, 4th rev. ed. (Pfullingen: Neske, 1994), especially pp. 80-87.
12 Page references here are to the first edition of KPM. The corresponding pages in the English translation
by Richard Taft or in the German 5th edition may be determined by refemng to the comparative pages given
in our translation of Husserl's marginal remarks.
INTRODUcnON TO MARGINAL REMARKS ON KPM 427
13 See his "Kant und die Idee der transzendentale Philosophie (1924)," in Erste Philosophie 1 (1923-
1924), Husserliana vol. VII: 23~287, especially 28~287.
14 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1962), p. 106.
428 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENfAL PHENOMENOLOGY
esses of human knowledge; human existence does not require some kind of
"ontological synthesis" to enable it to take place; one "does not need" ontol-
ogy, period. What Heidegger is doing is ontologizing Kant the epistemologist.
And when Heidegger starts to describe what Dasein needs "in order to exist as
Dasein," Hussed suspects that a good deal of anthropologizing is going on in
KPM and also in SZ
A fourth major issue between Hussed and Heidegger in the margins of
KPM is the nature of the transcendental self. How is such a self to be con-
ceived? According to Heidegger in Being and Time, both Descartes and Kant
wrongly thought of the famous "I am" in terms of a static metaphysics of
presence, while Heidegger wanted to see Dasein as a factical, temporally
existing entity. As Heidegger saw it, Hussed in his 1907 lectures on internal
time consciousness had already taken a step beyond Kant in making time a
definitive factor in consciousness. And now here in the Kantbook, Heidegger
goes further to credit Kant with showing that the shaping power of the imagi-
nation is temporal; indeed, says Heidegger, imagination "must first of all
shape time itself. Only when we realize this do we have a full concept of time"
(167). For Heidegger, time and human finitude, are keys to a more adequate
fundamental ontology, and it is important to make them also the essential core
of the self. For Husserl, the transcendental ego functions as the philosophically
necessary anchor of his phenomenology. In order to be transcendental,
Husserl's transcendental ego would need in a certain sense to transcend at
least ontic time. Interestingly, at this point Husserl instead of differing with
Heidegger on the temporality of the ego seems to be trying hard to understand
what Heidegger is saying. Hussed in the margin refers to "the immanent life of
the ego" and asks: "Is the ego the immanent time in which objective time
temporalizes itself?" (184), as if he were trying here principally to grasp
Heidegger's concept. Later, for instance, he writes in the margin, as if para-
phrasing: ''The immanent life of the ego as, rather, originally temporalizing"
(187). It would seem here he is merely restating what he understands to be
Heidegger's point, for he concedes, "an immanent temporal horizon [of the
ego] is necessary" (186). What Husserl may be saying is: Time is of course an
essential component of the transcendental ego; what baffles me is all this talk
about what time is "primordially"! What is the "primordial essence" of time?
Why is it so important here? Heidegger's answer to this question comes in the
next section, where he states, "Primordial time makes possible the transcen-
dental power of the imagination (188). But here Husserl underlines "makes
possible" and asks: "What does this 'makes possible' mean?" For Husserl,
Heidegger is not describing the experience of time phenomenologically, or
even accounting for it philosophically; rather, he is doing metaphysics and
bringing Kant along with him. Yes of course there is an immanent temporal
horizon for transcendental subjectivity, says Husserl, but how does that make
430 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCBNDENfALPHENOMENOLOGY
the transcendental ego into "time itself'? Not only is Heidegger's language
strange here, he also seems to be making philosophical assumptions or claims
about the metaphysical nature of Dasein, which raises the issue of the nature
of man, and more pointedly for Husserl of philosophical anthropology as a
basis for philosophy. Maybe Heidegger here is really doing philosophical
anthropology, Husserl thinks; in any case, he is not doing phenomenology,
again not doing what philosophy today ought to be doing.
A fifth issue that arises with regard to Heidegger's interpretation in KPM is
that of interpretive violence. Heidegger asserts: "Every interpretation, if it
wants to wring from what the words say what they want to say, must use
violence. Such violence, however cannot simply be a roving arbitrariness. The
power of an idea that sheds advance light must drive and lead the explication"
(193-194, e.a.). Husserl underlines the words "every interpretation must must
violence" and puts three exclamation points and three question marks - his
maximum. Husserl is astonished, we can assume, at Heidegger's provocative
statement, and even Heidegger hastens to qualify it in the next sentence. In the
margin Husserl writes, "I differentiate between what they wanted to say and
what they untimately aimed at and wanted to say as they were said" (193).
Interestingly, Husserl himself had elsewhere earlier argued that Kant was
constrained by the thought-forms of his time, so he could not carry through the
founding of a truly rigorous transcendental philosophy.IS This claim would
seem to parallel Heidegger's deconstruction in suggesting this was what Kant
really wanted to say.
But the larger issue at stake here is Heidegger's whole project of Destruk-
tion, of uncovering what has been repressed and forgotten in Western philoso-
phy since Plato. In other words, we again have to do with a quite different
vision of philosophy and its mission. For Heidegger, philosophizing meant
seeking out of the "primordial roots" of Western thought, "restoring" to
thought what had been "forgotten" or only preserved in a Latinized distortion,
as in the case of Aristotle's ousia becoming substantia. As Heidegger later put
it, philosophy is really "a thoughtful conversation between thinkers," obvi-
ously an endeavor more hermeneutical and dialogical than rigorously scien-
tific and verifiable. Philosophy for Husserl, on the other hand, was supposed
to involve rigorous logical and scientific reflection, purifying one's thinking of
unreflected presuppositions and establishing a philosophical foundation for
further work, in order to achieve "results" that would be universally acceptable
scientificially. Such a vision of philosophy makes quite clear Husserl's conti-
nuity with the Enlightenment faith in reason as able to overcome religious
dogma and other baseless inherited assumptions.
Among the many remaining issues disputed by Husserl in the margins of
16 These headings are found in the table of contents as well as the beginning pages of Part 4.
17 Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosrrws (1929). Bern: Francke, 7th ed. 1966. In English: Man's Place
in the Cosrrws.
432 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION
The remarks of Husserl published here may be found in the margins of his
copy of Martin Heidegger's Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, Bonn,
Cohen, 1929 (Format 23 x 16 cm) XU, 236pp., which is presently held by the
Husserl-Archives at Louvain, Belgium. The book carries a hand-written in-
scription from Heidegger as well as a monogram from the library of Husser!'
Numerous places are marked with underlinings, vertical or slanted lines,
exclamation marks, and reminder notations, such as NB (nota bene ), or with
question-marks and wavy lines added. Husserl's marks and remarks are mostly
in pencil but sometimes written with a blue pen.
4. Location will be indicated by the page and nearest line number(s) in Hei-
degger's KPM. Locations in three editions will be given: First, the location
of the remark or notation in Husserl's copy of KPM now held in the
Husserl-Archives at Louvain; second, the corresponding page and line
numbers for the fifth [enlarged] edition of 1991, which is identical to Hei-
degger's Gesamtausgabe, vol. 3; and third, the location in the English
translation by Richard Taft (Indiana University Press, 1990). When Husserl
underlines words in a sentence or comments on a sentence (but not in cases
where there is only a question mark), we will quote part or all of the sen-
tence of KPM to which he is referring. Heidegger's emphasis on certain
words will be shown through wide-spacing, which is how he indicated em-
phasis in the original German text. Much of the wide-spacing emphasis was
deleted in the 5th edition and GA 3, but since Husserl is referring to the first
edition, it will be retained. In estimating line numbers, each line of a head-
ing or caption will count as a line as well as each line in the text itself.
5. Information inserted into the text by the editor will generally be given
within pointed brackets < >; square brackets [ ] will generally be used to
supply the reader with the source word, phrase, or pronoun to be found in
the German text.
Note: The pUblication of these marginal remarks of Husserl is carried out with
the permission of the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, and under their direc-
tion. The translator is also grateful to Professor Dr. Dominic Kaegi of the
Philosophisches Seminar, Heidelberg, for his review and corrections of this
translation, as well as Steven Spileers and Ms. I. Lombaerts of the Husserl-
Archives at Louvain for helpful corrections and suggestions. Permission
from Indiana University Press to cite Richard Taft's translation of the KPM
is also gratefully acknowledged, although I have felt free to make minor
changes in wording.
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN
KANT AND THE PROBLEM OF METAPHYSICS
2. Title Page
Part One
The Starting Point for the Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics
§2. The Point of Departure for the Laying of the Ground for
Traditional Metaphysics.
1 <In the 1st edition, Heidegger has "authentic [eigentliches] philosophizing" instead of "authentic
[eigentliche] philosophy" as in the fifth edition.>
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN KPM 439
2 <For reasons of space, where HusserJ does not underline a key word or make a comment, the text in
KPM has not ordinarily been supplied here. The reader may seek out the context, sometimes a lengthy
sentence, by locating in KPM the page and line that are given.>
440 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Part Two
Carrying Out the Laying of the Ground
for Metaphysics
3 <Where Heidegger's German in the first edition used wide spacing for emphasis, this has been
retained in the translation, although in the fifth edition much of this wide spacing is deleted.>
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN KPM 443
26 29.28-30.4 20.2-6
Text of KPM: "Understanding is all the more finite because it
lacks the immediacy of finite intuiting."
In the bottom margin: Better: God needs no explication of intuition,
no step-by-step getting to know things and to bring
them back to himself [in recollection], no
apperceptive transference, no fixation in language,
etc. -but such a God is an absurdity.
27 30.5 20.7
Text of KPM: Same as above.
In the top margin: What is infinity over against finitude? Why talk at
all of finitude rather than receptivity, the grasping of
the thing-as-it-gives-itself in anticipation, a relative
self-giving, depending on the ever new? On the
other hand: absolutely adequate intuition, etc.,
which, however, is an absurdity.
§6. The Ground for the Source of the Laying of the Ground for
Metaphysics
§7. The Outline of the Stages in the Laying of the Ground for Ontology
pp.40-114: No further marginal markings or remarks until near the end of the
last section of Part 2 (§25):
Part Three
The Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics in Its Originality
[§28-§31]
4 <Heidegger here coins a special tenn. Without capitalization dawider does exist as an archaic fonn
of dagegen [against this]. but das Dawider here appears as a noun.>
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN KPM 451
S Heidegger's footnote: A 348FF.• B 406ff. <referring to Kant's Preisschrift iiber die Fortschritte der
Metaphysik seit Leibniz und Woljf(l804).> See Kants Werke. ed. E. Cassirer. Vol. 8 (Berlin: B. Cassirer,
1922). pp. 249ff.>
6 <See Kants Werke, ed. E. Cassirer. Vol 8 (Berlin: B. Cassirer, 1922), pp. 249ff.>
452 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOWGY
§3S. The Originality of the Previously Laid Ground and the Problem of
Metaphysics.
Part Four
The Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics in a Retrieval'
§36. The Previously Laid Ground and the Outcome of the Kantian
Laying of the Ground for Metaphysics
7 <The opening sentence of the section (139.3-4) defines retrieval: "By the retrieval of a basic prob-
lem, we understand the opening-up of its original, long-concealed possibilities, through the working out
of which it is transformed.">
HUSSERL'S MARGINAL REMARKS IN KPM 455
§3S. The Question Concerning the Human Essence and the Authentic
Result of the Kantian Ground-Laying
finitude. "
In the margin: But is this not really self-evident - man lives in the
infinite world, [but] the reach of his consciousness,
including his practice, is finite because infinity is
nothing but satisfiability [Erfiillbarkeit],
determinability in the And-So-On [Und-so-weiter].
APPENDICES
APPENDIX ONE
by
Martin Heidegger
For your students the celebration of this day is the source of a rare and pure
joy. Indeed, we will be adequate to this occasion only if, from first to last, we
let the gratitude that we owe you be the basic mood that suffuses everything.
In keeping with a beautiful custom, we offer you today, as our gift on this
celebratory occasion, a slender volume of some short essays. This can hardly
be an adequate return for all that you, our teacher, have lavished upon us, and
awakened and nourished in us.
In the coming days many will attempt to survey your philosophical work
and to evaluate its impact and effect on a number of different scales. In that
way much will be brought to mind that should not be forgotten. And yet, such
a way of parceling out a person's intellectual impact and calculating the influ-
ence of his writings fails to grasp the essential thing for which we now owe
you thanks.
Nor is that essential element to be found by reflecting instead on the fruit-
fulness of your academic teaching career. Such fruitfulness will be every
professor's prerogative and good fortune, as long as the German university
escapes the fate of becoming a stultifying trade school.
No, the essence of your leadership consists in something else, namely, that
the content and style of your questioning should immediately force one into
intense critical dialogue and should demand at each moment a readiness to
reverse or even abandon one's position.
1 Martin Heidegger, "Edmund Husser! rum 70. Geburtstag," Ak£uJemische Mitteilungen: Organ fur die
gesamten Interressen der Studentenschaft von der Albert-Ludwigs-Universitat in FreiburgIBr., 4. Folge, 9.
Semester, Nr. 14, May 14, 1929, pp. 46-47.
476 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
Of course none of us is sure that it will be ours to find the path to what your
work, quite unobtrusively, has constantly sought to guide us: that calm state of
being mature and ready for the problems. 2
And so too the works we present you are merely a witness to the fact that
we wanted to follow your lead, not proof that we succeeded in becoming your
disciples?
But there is one thing we retain as a lasting possession: Each of us who was
privileged to follow in your footsteps was confronted by you, our esteemed
teacher, with the choice of either becoming the steward of essential things or
working against them.
If, on the occasion of this celebration, we view your philosophical existence
[Dasein] in this way, we also secure fixed points of reference for a true as-
sessment of the value of your philosophical work.
Was it that several decades ago a new movement emerged and gained
influence amidst the trends then dominant in philosophy? Or that a new
method was added to the list of previous ones? Or that long-forgotten prob-
lem-areas got reworked?
Was it that the already available space for philosophical inquiry merely
expanded and became more complex? Is it not, rather, that first and foremost
your research created an entirely new space for philosophical questioning, a
space with new claims, transformed assessments, and a fresh regard for the
hidden powers of the great tradition of Western philosophy?
Yes, it was precisely that. The decisive element of your work has not been
this or that answer to this or that question, but instead this breakthrough into a
new dimension of philosophizing.
But this breakthrough is nothing less than the radicalizing [of how to do]
philosophy, the bending of philosophy back onto the hidden path of its
authentic historical happening as this announces itself in the inner communion
of the great thinkers.
Philosophy, then, is not a doctrine, not some simplistic scheme for orienting
oneself in the world, not at all an instrument or achievement of human Dasein.
Rather, it is this Dasein itself insofar as it happens, in freedom, from out of its
own ground.
Whoever, by dint of research, has arrived at this self-understanding of
philosophy is granted the basic experience of all philosophizing, namely, that
the more fully and originally [philosophical] research comes into its own,4 the
2 " .•. in
die Gelassenheit, reijzu werdenfiirdie Problel1U!."
3 " ... nureine Bezeugung dessen, dqfJ wir lhrer Fiihrerschaft folgen wollten, nicht ein Beweis dafiir, daft
die Gefolgschaft gelungen."
4 The words "comes into its own" translate "sich .. .ins Werk setzt," which in turn refer to i:v't'£Aexela I
£v£Qyela, that is, the act of being gathered into 't£Ao~1 eQYov. See Martin Heidegger, Wegmarken, GA I, 9,
Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976, edited by Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, pp. 284-286, E.T., "On the Being
APPENDIX ONE 477
more surely it is "nothing but" the transformation of the same few simple
questions.
But those who wish to transform must bear within themselves the power of
a fidelity that knows how to preserve. And no one will feel this power grow
within him or her without being caught up in wonder. And no one can be
caught up in wonder without traveling to the outermost limits of the possible.
But no one will ever become the friend of the possible without remaining
open to dialogue with the powers at work in the whole of [human] eksistence.
But that is the comportment of the philosopher: to attend to what has already
been sung, which itself becomes perceptible in every essential occurrence of
world. 5
And in such comportment the philosopher enters the core of what is really
at stake in what is given to him or her to do.
Plato knew about that and spoke of it in his Seventh Letter:
"In no way can it be stated, as can the other things that may be learned [in the sci-
ences]; rather, from out of a full communal eksistential dwelling with the thing it-
self, suddenly - as when a spark leaping from the fire sheds light - it happens in
the soul, so as then to grow there, alone with itself."
and Conception of ~uO\c;." Man and World. 9. 3 (August. 1976).255-258; and his Nietzsche. Pfullingen:
Neske. second edition. 1961. IT. 404-405; E.T. by Joan Stambaugh. The End of Philosophy. New Yode.:
Harper and Row. 1973. pp. 5-6.
S "das Hineinhiiren in den Vorgesang. der in aUem wesentlichen Weltgeschehen vemehmbarwird."
APPENDIX TWO
by
Edmund Hussed
Dear Colleague:
Your letter shook me so profoundly that I was unable to answer it as soon as
I should have. I am continuously concerned with it in my thoughts. Judge for
yourself whether I have not inflicted more pain on myself than on you, and
whether I may not ethically regard this guilt towards you and blame towards
myself as stemming from the best conscience, something I have had to accept,
and still must accept, as my fate.
Clarifing the matter requires that I layout a part of my life history. I had
quickly realized that the project for Parts n and ill of my Ideas was inade-
quate, and in an effort (beginning in the autumn of 1912) to improve them and
to shape in a more concrete and differentiated fashion the horizon of the
problems they disclosed, I got involved in new, quite far-ranging investiga-
tions. (These included the phenomenology of the person and personalities of a
higher order, culture, the human environment in general; the transcendental
phenomenology of "empathy" and the theory of transcendental intersubjectiv-
ity, the "transcendental aesthetic" as the phenomenology of the world purely
as the world of experience, time and individuation, the phenomenology of
association as the theory of the constitutive achievements of passivity, the
phenomenology of the logos, the phenomenological problematic of "meta-
physics," etc.) These investigations stretched on all through the work-filled
Freiburg years, and the manuscripts grew to an almost unmanageable extent.
As the manuscripts grew, so too did the ever greater apprehension about
whether, in myoid age, I would be able to bring to completion what had been
480 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
entrusted to me. This impassioned work led to repeated setbacks and repeated
states of depression. In the end what I was left with was an all-pervasive basic
mood of depression, a dangerous collapse of confidence in myself.
It was in this period that Heidegger began to mature - for a number of years
he was constantly at my side as my close assistant. He behaved entirely as a
student of my work and as a future collaborator, who, as regards all the essen-
tials of method and problematic, would stand on the ground of my constitutive
phenomenology. My ever-increasing impression of his extraordinary natural
talent, of his absolute devotion to philosophy, of the powerful energy of this
young man's thought finally led me to an excessive assessment of his future
importance for scientific phenomenology in my sense of the term. Because I
realized that no one among the phenomenologists of the G6ttingen and Mu-
nich tradition followed me in earnest; and because I had an absolute inner
certitude that the phenomenological reduction and the transcendental constitu-
tive structuring of philosophy would mean a "Copernican" revolution for
philosophy; and because I felt overwhelmed with the burden of responsibility
for securing that, it is understandable how I placed the greatest hopes in Hei-
degger. Yes, that was the great, up-lifting hope: to open up to him - presuma-
bly my one true student - the unsuspected breadth of my investigations, and to
prepare him for his own discoveries. Time and again we talked of working
together, of his collaboration in completing my investigations. We talked of
how he would take charge of my manuscripts when I passed away, publishing
the ones that were fully developed, and in general of how he would carry on
my philosophy as a framework for all future work.
When he went to Marburg, I regarded his enormous success as a teacher as
if it were my own success. His visits during [the academic] vacations were
joyful events, highly prized opportunities to speak my mind with him and to
inform him of my developments. To be sure, in the course of these visits, just
as during the Freiburg years, he was rather vague or silent regarding the devel-
opment of his own ideas. I, as usual, held firmly to my extravagant idea of his
genius; inwardly I was virtually convinced that the future of phenomenologi-
cal philosophy would be entrusted to him and that he not only would become
my heir but also would surpass me.
Certainly when Being and Time appeared in 1927 I was surprised by the
newfangled language and style of thinking. Initially, I trusted his emphatic
declaration: It was the continuation of my own research. I got the impression
of an exceptional, albeit unclarified, intellectual energy, and I worked hard and
honestly to penetrate and appreciate it. Faced with theories so inaccessible to
my way of thinking, I did not want to admit to myself that he would surrender
both the method of my phenomenological research and its scientific character
in general. Somehow or other the fault had to lie with me; it would lie with
Heidegger only insofar as he was too quick to jump into problems of a higher
APPENDIX lWO 481
sake I could not let this happen. Your sponsor could not have been a member
of the commission: In the commission, it is true, mention of you was made by
me; but admittedly you were not considered more closely in further discus-
sions. There was not much discussion among the faculty, since from the
beginning the mood was only for Heidegger and Cassirer. Only Cassirer
presented any occasion for questions (possibly N. Hartmann, too?), which I
had to answer.-
However, I still have to tell you how things turned out later between Hei-
degger and me. After he took over the chair, our exchanges lasted about two
months. Then, with complete amicability, it was over. He removed himself
from every possibility of professional discussion, even in the simplest form.
Clearly such discussion was an unnecessary, unwanted, uneasy matter for him.
I see him once every couple of months, even less frequently than my other
colleagues.
The success of the Paris lectures, along with Formal and Transcendental
Logic, which were wrung from me at the same time (both in the course of four
months) have given me back - and this is a great tum-about - the confidence
in my powers. In looking back over the situation of my works since 1913 I
realized that all the major lines have been sketched out now, more than I ever
would have ventured to hope. [This is] enough for the writing of a concluding
work whose plan has burdened me for a decade. Immediately after the printing
of my last book, in order to come to a clear-headed and definitive position on
Heideggerian philosophy, I devoted two months to studying Being and Time,
as well as his more recent writings. I arrived at the distressing conclusion that
philosophically I have nothing to do with this Heideggerian profundity, with
this brilliant unscientific genius; that Heidegger's criticism, both open and
veiled, is based upon a gross misunderstanding; that he may be involved in the
formation of a philosophical system of the kind which I have always consid-
ered it my life's work to make forever impossible. Everyone except me has
realized this for a long time. I have not withheld my conclusion from Heideg-
ger.
I pass no judgment on his personality - it has become incomprehensible to
me. For almost a decade he was my closest friend; naturally this is allover:
Inability to understand each other precludes friendship. 1 This reversal in
professional esteem and personal relations was one of the most difficult or-
deals of my life. Also in its consequences, among which belongs your changed
relationship to me, owing to the insult I must have inflicted on you. Do you
now understand why I failed to write as frequently as I would have wanted?
It has saddened me deeply to hear that you and your wife had to suffer so
much because of illness. I reiterate my own and my wife's deeply felt best
wishes. Also for the completion of your work. My relation to you is clear.
Nothing will change my feelings of friendship and my high esteem for you.
I urge you to please treat this letter with discretion. How I may stand scientifi-
cally to Heidegger I have plainly expressed at every opportunity. There is now
gossip enough, and my personal disappointment with Heidegger, etc., is
nobody else's business.
APPENDIX THREE
EDMUND HUSSERL
[164] As is well known, over the last decade some of the younger genera-
tion of German philosophers have been gravitating with ever increasing speed
toward philosophical anthropology. Currently Wilhelm Dilthey's philosophy
of life, a new form of anthropology, exercises a great deal of influence. But
even the so-called "phenomenological movement" has got caught up in this
new trend, which alleges that the true foundation of philosophy lies in human
being alone, and more specifically in a doctrine of the essence of human
being's concrete worldly Dasein. Some view this as a necessary reform of the
original constitutive phenomenology, one that for the very first time would
supposedly permit phenomenology to attain the level of authentic philosophy.
All of this constitutes a complete reversal of phenomenology's fundamental
standpoint. Original phenomenology, which has matured into transcendental
phenomenology, denies to any science of human being, whatever its form, a
share in laying the foundations for philosophy, and opposes all related at-
1 Edmund Husserl, "Phiinomenologie und Anthropologie," from Edmund Husserl, Aufsiitze und Vortriige
(1922-1937), Gesammelte Werke, XXVII, ed. Thomas Nenon and Hans Rainer Sepp, Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1989, pp. 164--181 (with text-critical notes at pp. 300--307); this edition supersedes the first German edition
published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2 (1941), 1-14. A translation by Richard G.
Schmitt of the first edition appeared in Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed. Roderick M.
Chisholm, Glencoe, IDinois: Free Press, 1960, pp. 129-142, and was reprinted in Edmund Husserl, Shorter
Works, ed. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston, South Bend, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press,
1981, pp. 315-323.
Husser! delivered the lecture in 1931 to meetings of the Kantgesellschaft in Frankfurt (June 1), Berlin
(June 10), and Halle (June 16). The original manuscript is preserved in two drafts, both written in Husserl's
Gabelsberg shorthand, in Group F of Husserl's papers; thus the catalogue signature of the two drafts is F II, 1
and 2 (in German, Konvolut F II, 1, 2). The second of the two drafts (F II, 2) is the one translated here. Eugen
Fink's typed elaboration of the lecture is archived as M II, 1; that is, it is found with those lectures (Vortriige)
of Husserl's that were typed out by his assistants before his death.
While each translator reviewed the work of the other, Thomas Sheehan is chiefly responsible for the first
half of the present English text, up to " ... the initial moment of the method, the phenomenological reduction"
(p. 172.34 of the German edition; here, p. 493.10), and Richard E. Palmer is responsible for the second half
(from p. 172.35 on, in the German edition).
486 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
the essence of the new dimension, cannot grasp it; rather, they only miscon-
strue it.
Thus the modern epoch of philosophy represents a constant effort to pene-
trate into this new dimension and to arrive at the right concepts, the right ways
of asking questions, and the right methods. The road to this goal is long, and it
is understandable that modern philosophy, in spite of its intense scientific
dedication, has not achieved the one and only philosophy that would measure
up to the transcendental motivation. Instead, we get a plurality of systems,
each contradicting the other. Has this situation changed for the better in our
own times?
Amidst the confusion of our modern philosophies, each one following upon
the other, dare we hope there might now be among them one philosophy in
which modernity's striving for the transcendental might have achieved com-
plete clarity and provided a solidly formed, apodictically necessary idea of
transcendental philosophy? Might it, in addition, lead us to a method for doing
solid, rigorously scientific work, and even to a systematic inception of, and
progress in, this work?
My answer was already anticipated in my introductory remarks. I cannot do
otherwise than see transcendental (or constitutive) phenomenology as the
purely elaborated transcendental philosophy that is already doing real scien-
tific work. It is much discussed and much criticized but, properly speaking, is
still unknown. Natural and traditional prejudices act as a veil that inhibits
access to its real meaning. Far from helping and improving, such criticism has
not yet even made contact with it.
My task now is to layout for you the true meaning of transcendental phe-
nomenology in an evidential way. Then [169] we will have the fundamental
insights in the light of which the problem of the possibility of philosophical
anthropology can be settled.
The easiest place to start is with Descartes' Meditations. Let us be guided
by their form alone and by what breaks through in them: the will to practice
the most extreme kind of scientific radicalism. We shall not pursue the con-
tents of the Meditations, which, as we have frequently noted, is often falsified
by biased judgments. Rather, we shall try to attain a level of scientific radical-
ism that can never be unsurpassed. All of modern philosophy springs from
Descartes' Meditations. Let us transform this historical proposition into a
substantive one: Every genuine beginning of philosophy springs from medita-
tion, from the experience of solitary self-reflection. When it is rooted in its
origins, an autonomous philosophy (and we live in the age when humanity has
awakened to its autonomy) becomes the solitary and radical self-responsibility
of the one who is philosophizing. Only in solitude and meditation does one
become a philosopher; only in this way is philosophy born in us, emerging of
necessity from within us. What others and the tradition accept as knowledge
490 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
2 Three tenns that Hussed uses in this lecture - "ich," "Ich," and "Ego" - are translated respectively as: I,
ego, and Ego. When "ich" appears in lower case (or when capitalized only because it begins a sentence), it is
generally used in the nonnal sense of the first person singular. The other two tenns, however, have special-
ized philosophical meanings. When capitalized, Ich (in our translation: ego) usually refers to the ego of
psycho-physical experience as Hussed understands it, whereas Ego (in our translation: Ego) refers to the
subject of transcendental experience. However, Hussed twice uses Ich and not Ego to refer to the subject of
transcendental experience (see below).
3 It is possible (but improbable) that the sentence means: "In point of fact I can never doubt these realities
[sielorevendenythem."
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 491
4 Here and in the next sentence Husser! uses Ich (capitalized) to refer to the transcendental ego instead of
to the ego of psycho-physical experience, as before.
492 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
being, and hence too regarding its being in this way or that. Or: I am the ego
that certainly continues to live its life within universally available experience
but that brackets the validity of the being of that experience. The same holds
for all non-experiential modes of consciousness in which the world retains its
practical or theoretical validity. The world continues to appear the way it used
to appear; life in the world is not interrupted. But the world is now a
"bracketed" world, a mere phenomenon, specifically a phenomenon whose
validity is that of the stream of experience, of consciousness as such, although
this consciousness is now transcendentally reduced. World, in the sense of this
universal phenomenon of validity, is obviously inseparable from transcenden-
tal consciousness.
With the above we have described what transcendental phenomenology
calls the phenomenological reduction. What this refers to is not some tempo-
rary suspension of belief with regard to the being of the world but one that
continues on by an act of the will, a commitment that is binding on me the
phenomenologist once and for all. As such, however, it is only the necessary
means for the reflective activity of experience and of theoretical judgment, the
activity in which a fundamentally new field of experience and knowledge
opens up: the transcendental field. What now becomes my focus - and this can
happen only through the epoche - is my transcendental Ego, its transcendental
cogitationes, and thus the transcendentally reduced lived experiences of
consciousness in [172] all their typical forms, along with my current cogitata
qua cogitata as well - everything of which I am presently conscious, as well
as the ways in which I am conscious of it, although always within the bounds
of the epoche. All of these make up the region of the Ego's transcendental
consciousness, both as it currently is and as it remains unified throughout
change. Although this is only a beginning, it is a necessary beginning. When
carried through, transcendental reflection soon also leads to the transcendental
peculiarities of the "I can," to faculties that have to do with habits, and to
much more, including the universal phenomenon of validity - the world -
taken as a universal totality that persists over against the multiple ways in
which one is conscious of it.
Against all expectations, what in fact opens up here - but only through the
phenomenological reduction - is a vast field of research. It is first of all a field
of immediate, apodictic experience, the constant source and solid ground of all
transcendental judgments whether immediate or mediate. This is a field of
which Descartes and his successors were oblivious and remained so. To be
sure, it was an extraordinarily difficult task to clarify the pure meaning of the
transcendental transformation and thereby to highlight the fundamental dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, the transcendental Ego (or the transcenden-
tal sphere) and, on the other, the human being's ego with its psychical sphere
and its worldly sphere. Even after the distinction had been noted and the task
PHENOMENOLOGY AND ANTHROPOLOGY 493
of a transcendental science had achieved its pure meaning, as was the case
with Fichte and his successors, it was still extraordinarily difficult to see and
exploit the ground of transcendental experience in its infinite breadth. Because
German Idealism failed on this point, it devolved into groundless speculations,
the unscientific character of which is not a matter of debate and (contrary to
the opinion of many today) is not to be commended. In general, it was ex-
traordinarily hard to completely satisfy the demands of the new problem of
philosophical method as a means for making philosophy a science based on
ultimate accountability. But in the fmal analysis everything depends on the
initial moment of the method, the phenomenological reduction.
The reduction is the means of access to this new realm, so when one gets
the meaning of the reduction wrong then everything else also goes wrong. The
temptation to misunderstandings here is simply overwhelming. For instance, it
seems all too obvious to say to oneself: "I, this human being [dieser Mensch],
am the one who is practicing the method of a transcendental alteration of
attitude whereby one [173] withdraws back into the pure Ego; so can this Ego
be anything other than just a mere abstact stratum of this concrete human
being, its purely mental [geistiges] being, abstracted from the body?" But
clearly those who talk this way have fallen back into the naive natural attitude.
Their thinking is grounded in the pregiven world rather than moving within
the sphere of the epoche. For, to take oneself as a human being already pre-
supposes an acceptance of validity of the world. What the epoche shows us
clearly, however, is that the Ego is the one in whose life-process the appercep-
tion "human being," standing within the universal apperception "world,"
acquires and maintains its sense of being.
Indeed, even if one goes as far as we have now, and holds the new fields of
transcendental experience and judgment in sharp separation from the field of
the natural world, and even if one already sees that a broad area of possible
investigations opens up here, one still does not easily see what it is that such
investigations are supposed to accomplish, or that one is called upon to make a
genuine philosophy able to stand on its own feet.
How are investigations that have consistently and without interruption
maintained the epoche - that is, pure egological investigations - supposed to
have any philosophical relevance at all? After all, it is as a human being
standing in the world that I pose all my theoretical and practical questions, and
also all questions about my fate. Can I give all these up? But must I not do so,
if the being of the world is and remains SUbjected to an epoche? This being the
case, it would seem that I shall never again return to the world and to all those
questions about life for the very sake of which I have philosophized and have
striven for scientific knowledge as a rational and radical reflection upon the
world and human existence.
494 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
this kind of Ego, I assume a position above all worldly being [weltliches Sein],
above my own human being and human living. This absolute position above
everything that holds true for me and that can ever hold true for me, along with
all its possible content - precisely and necessarily this is what must be the
philosophical position. And this is the position that the phenomenological
reduction provides me. I have lost nothing that was there for me in the state of
naivete, and in particular nothing that showed itself to me as existing reality.
Rather: In the absolute attitude [Einsteliung] [175] I now recognize the world
itself, I recognize it for the very first time as what it continously was for me
and had to be for me according to its essential nature: as a transcendental
phenomenon. Precisely in this way I have brought into play a new dimension
of questions never asked before and precisely about this existent reality: Only
through the answering of these questions can concrete, full being and the
definitive, complete truth come to light about this world.
It is clear from the outset that the world - whose acceptance in the natural
attitude was necessarily that of the whole of what simply exists - in fact has its
truth only as a transcendentally relative truth, whereas being in its absolute
form can pertain only to transcendental subjectivity ? But let us be careful
here. Certainly the world that is in being for me, the world about which I have
always had ideas and spoken about meaningfully, has meaning and is accepted
as valid by me because of my own apperceptive performances because of
these experiences that run their course and are combined precisely in those
performances - as well as other functions of consciousness, such as thinking.
But is it not a pieces of foolishness [eine tolie Zumutung] to suppose that
world has being because of some performance of mine? Clearly, I must make
my formulation more precise. In my ego there is formed, from out of the
proper sources of transcendental passivity and activity, my "representation of
the world," my "picture of the world," whereas outside of me, naturally
enough, there is the world itself.
But is this really a good way of putting it? Does this talk about outer and
inner, if it makes any sense at all, receive its meaning from anywhere else than
from my formation and my preservation of meaning? Should I forget that the
totality of everything that I can ever think of as in being resides within the
universal realm of consciousness, within my realm, that of the Ego, and indeed
within what isfor me real or possible?
Although the answer is compelling, it is still unsatisfying. Recognition of
the transcendental relativity of all being, and accordingly of the entire world
that is in being, may be unavoidable, but when it is formally set forth in this
way, it is completely unintelligible. And it will remain so if from the start we
allow ourselves to use the kind of argumentation that has always been the
curse of the so-called "theory of knowledge."
496 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
systematic theory, then, there can be no doubt that there is only one definitive
philosophy, only one form of definitive science, which is the science elabo-
rated by the the originary method of transcendental phenomenology.
***
This implicitly answers the question of whether any anthropology, regard-
less of the meaning its function may have, can ever be a philosophical anthro-
pology, and in particular, the question of whether there can be any legitimacy
to a philosophy whose grounding rests on the essence of human beings in any
form whatever.
For it is immediately clear that any doctrine at all of human being, whether
empirical or apriori, presupposes the existing world or a world that could be in
being. A philosophy that takes its start from human existence falls back into
that naivete the overcoming of which has, in our opinion, been the whole
meaning of modernity. Once this naivete has finally been unmasked for what it
is, once the genuine transcendental problem has been arrived at in its apodictic
necessity, there can be no going back.
I cannot help seeing the decision for a transcendental phenomenology as
definitive, and I cannot help branding all philosophies that call themselves
phenomenological as abberations which cannot attain the level of authentic
philosophy.
[180] The same holds for every objectivism of whatever kind, for every
turning to the object instead of turning back to transcendental subjectivity. The
same holds for every ontological idealism, which like Scheler's, claims that
my Logical Investigations, with its renewed justification of eidos and of
apriori or ontological knowledge gives them licence to pursue a naive meta-
physics instead of following the inner tendency of that book toward investiga-
tions directed to subjective constitution. The same goes for a return to any
kind of metaphysics in the old style. Instead of being a step forward, this
return to metaphysics represents a failure to confront the immense and ines-
capable task of the present age: at last to bring the meaning of modem phi-
losophy to clarity and truth.
Unfortunately, I can only touch briefly on the already mentioned parallelism
between the human being and the [transcendental] Ego, between psychology
of consciousness and subjectivity, interior psychology, and transcendental
phenomenology. The former is a psychology of the subjectivity of conscious-
ness, purely grasped (or a psychology of the personality, the latter taken in the
unique and meaningful form it has in intentional psychology), and a psychol-
ogy that uses the rational, that is eidetic, method.
The actual development of psychology in modem times did not come about
as the unfolding of a specialized positive science. Rather, until well into the
500 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
This is an index of items from the text of the volume; it does not index the footnotes.
Also, simple mentions of Husserl or Heidegger in the text are not indexed, nor are
references to the Britannica article, the Amsterdam Lectures, Being and Time, or Kant
and the Problem of Metaphysics. Authors of books have been referenced but not book
titles. The following abbreviations have been used in this index:
Hu = Husserl
H. =Heidegger
phen. =phenomenology or phenomenological
phil. = philosophy or philosophical
psych. = psychology or psychological
a priori, the 116, 152ff., 186, 192, 230, 233, 235, intersubjectivity 248;
399f.,440 all-embracing phen. 229, 234f.
a priori concepts 231£.,243; insights 153; all-embracing phil., phen. as 158, 177, 192
knowledge 487, 499 all-embracing psych. of reason 235; science of
a priori of a possible world 99; of the factual empirical fact 176; self-reflection 177; theo-
world 156; of the world 153 retical interest 239
a priori ontology 99, 123 all-embracingness of intersubjectivity 252; of
a priori phen. 149,218,233,241 subjectivity 249
a priori psych. 95, 123, 233, 241 analogy 276
a priori research, the need for 122 anthropological-psych. knowledge 471
a priori scienceJs 95, 98f., 149, 151£., 155, 159, anthropologism 456f., 485f.
165, 175f., 19lf., 216, 230, 233f., 281 anthropology 284, 455, 485, 500; affinity with
a priori truths 216, 232 transcendental phil. 500; as ground for meta-
absolute ego/s 52, 132, 139 physics 430, 454, 469; as ground for method
absolute existence 497, 498 487; as ground for philosophy 485, 499
absolute foundations 173, 175, 204f., 249f. anthropology, eksistential 372
absolute idea of a genuine human life 177 anthropology, philosophical 287, 336, 429f.,
absolute knowing 444 456f.
absolute nonns 193 anti-Semitism 31
absolute science 150, 245, 253 anticipation and becoming 387; of death 360
absolute self-experience 128 anticipatory resolution 374
absolute subject 98, 248, 494f. See also transcen- antipsychologism See psychologism
dental Ego antitheses, resolution of 67, 101, 178
absolute truths the goal of phil. 487 apodictic insight 487
Absolute, the 444 apperceiving conscious life-process 245
absolutely universal ontology 152, 156 apperception 129f., 244, 246, 378
absolutism 193 Aquinas 285
accident, concept of 372 Aristotle 3f., 20, 148, 275f., 291,355, 438f., 459,
all-embracing absolute science 253; apperception 463
244f.; eidetic ontology 175; epoche 172; Augustine 300
502 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
authentic ability to be 361; disclosedness 370; 164, 170. 173.218, 233, 240f.. 247, 249
historicity 411; present 387 community experience 67, 160. 184,221
authentic phil. 459, 463; as anthropological 485; community life, personal 89
as transcendental phen. 499 community of intersubjectivity 94; of selves 111;
authenticity 37lf.; of Dasein's eksistence 369 of transcendental life 498
autonomous ego/subjects 490, 494 concept of Being, not needed 463,465
average everydayness 287, 300 concepts and the self-giving of entities 464
concepts, a priori 231
Bacon 151,497 concern 305f., 396f; experiencing and knowing
Baumgarten 150 310; temporality of practical c. 394; time that
Becker, C.H. 19 goes with 416
Becker, O. 25,104, 195 concern-for-others 330f.
being, absolute form of 495; clarification of 108; concrete wholeness of the human being 138
concept of 431; constitution of 425; disclo- Conrad-Martius 104, 195
sure of 297; finitude of 408; ground of un- conscience 363f., 366ff.; as an intentionality 362;
questionable 170f.; meaning of 276, 291, 422; the call of 374; ontological analysis of 362
object's kind of 112; question of 138, 278, conscious life 243, 245; allsided horizon of 218;
459f., 462; rules all there-being 470; relativity hiddenness of 497
of 495; sense of 170; as transcendentally conscious subjectivity 148
disclosed 498; understanding of 398, 426,438 consciousness 163, 171; the all-embracing
being and the constitution of world 138 subjectivity of 237; as performative 461;
Being as such seldom in question 466 categories of 231; coherently interrelated 229;
being of an implement 314, 315 constitutive functions of 242f., ego-pole and
being of Dasein as care 350 224; field of 148; functions of 234. 250; her-
being of entities 108f., 296 meneutic of 497; horizonal466; life of219,
Being of the being or thing, the 459 222, 239f.• 245; life of 168, 228; need for a
being of the world 491 ff. subjective tum toward 461 ; of being an "r'
being with others 409 231; ontologically undefined 303; phen. re-
being-historical, the structure of 406 flection on 221; problem of 488; pure analysis
being-in 308, 336 of 219; science of 149; subjectivity of 242.
being-in-a-world 309, 311, 313, 315, 329, 338, 488; synthesis in 228; synthetic character of
354,379,393 209; synthetic cosmos of lived experiences in
Being-question, the 459 226; the entire sphere of 496; the reification
being-with 329 of 422; the return to 108f.; transcendental
belief in being, universal 222f., 490 492; transcendental subjectivity of 250; two-
Bergson 291, 301 sidedness of 225
Berkeley 187, 236 consciousness in itself 378,
BiemeI36f., 65, 68, 80, 145,207 constitutes. what does it mean? 395
blindness, Hu's 481 constituting subjectivity 464
Blochmann 25, 140f. constitution 47,138,154,189; getting at the real
Bolzano 123 problems of461; of being 425, 439; of world
bracketing 246; see also epoch!! 245
Breeur258 constitutive analysis of time inadequate 418
Brentano 3f., 45, 94f., 97, l2lf., 213, 219, 500 constitutive intentional operations 194
constitutive phen. 355.415,460, 485f.
Cairns 27, 30 Copernican revolution 246, 252, 441, 491
care 306,350,364,373,375,377,381,471 Copernican tum 235
Cassirer 424, 482 correlation-research 497; see intentionality
categorial intuition 5,132, 424 cosmos, place of man in 456
Catholicism, H.'s 8f. creative intuition, infinite 427
causalistic conceptions 101, 193 curiosity 348, 392
certitude about being, questioned 491
Chisholm 65 Dasein 205, 277f., 282f., 287. 289f. 299, 301,
circle, transcendental/vicious 244, 345 305ff., 309, 326. 328, 336, 365. 374, 403f..
circularity, belongs to understanding 376 409,411.414,416.432, 446,468-72, 485f.
co-existence of a concrete subjectivity 115 death anticipation of 360f.; existential conception
cogito/cogitatalcogitatum 89, 91, 236. 492. 496, of 359f.; inevitability of358; Hu's remark on
500 359; structure of 358
cognition 236, 488 deconstruction 425, 429
communities of egos/minds/subjects 96, 150, deliberation 398f.
INDEX 503
Descartes 45, 66f., 89, 96f., 108, 117ff., 123, 138, eidetic synthesis 225; theory 166, 240; universal-
148,158, 167f., 179, 187f., 193f., 204f., 219, ity 169, 170; variation 206
236f., 290f., 301, 322, 325f., 353, 421, 424, eidetic-psychological phen. 233
428,488, 491f.; all modern phil. springs from eidetically universal question 278
489; D. according to H. 323; his idea of being eidetics of phen. intersubjectivity 248f.
324; his transcendental turn 167, 236 eksistence 298f., 354
descriptions, H. 's d. unfruitful 450 eksistential anthropology 372
descriptions of psych. exper. 132 Eksistential constitution of the open 337
Destruktion 289f., 425, 429 eksistential interpretation 357; method of 373
Deutschbein 19 eksistential structure of Dasein 138
Dilthey 205,209,301,415,430,455,485,500; eksistentiality 283
his goal of understanding life 414; pioneering eksistential1y understanding gaze 381
work on historicity 407; empathy 115, 229, 33lff.
directionality 145,327 empiricism lOlf., 193f.
disclosedness 346; and Dasein 336f.; as under- encounter, ego can 305
standing 341 ; resolution and 370; temporality enigma of being 414; of motion
of 386, 392; of the world 338 entities as such 108f., 147
disclosive entrance into realm of beings 468 entities, the being of 296
disclosive experiencing 231 entity in which "world" is constituted 138
disclosure, original 340 epistemological circle 98
discoveredness 321 epistemology, as not in Critique of Pure Reason
discursiveness 294, 346f., 392, 294 469; versus ontology 426
disposition 339, 347 epoche 91, 97, 163, 184ff., 191,206, 222f., 235,
doubling, semblance of 243f. 491,493; all-embracing 172; of existing
dread 349, 358, 389ff. world 128; meaning and function of 494;
Duns Scotus 8 phenomenological 246, 252; transcendental
171ff., 244, 247; a universal 491
ego 15, 17, 166,214,218,233,305,428,444, Ereignis 16
45lf., 490; as apodictic and prior to the world essence 146; of the being 431
491; as center of acts 209; as immanent time essence of Being the essence of Dasein 469
450; as pure mind-substance 237; in H. 284; essences, knowledge of 153
life of 428; of the other 250; of pure psych. essential element in Hu according to H. 475
46; psych. 132; study of 224; transcendental essential form, grasping the 488
130ff., 250; see also transcendental Ego essential forms of lived experiences 496
ego similar to a substance for Kant 450ff. essential probs. of phil. traceable to man 456
ego cogito 89, 97, 120, 148, 187, 224, 290, 353, essential types 241
421,491; in Descartes and Kant 428 essentiality of essence for H. and Hu 460f.
ego-consciousness 496 everydayness, analytic of 470; temporal meaning
ego-pole 224 of 384f., 404f.
ego-subject 217f. Everyone 362f.; eksistential character of 334f., is
egoic being 246; endless e. community 250; life- intersubjectivity, says Hu 419
processes 92, 246 everyone-self, the 380
egological investigations 493 everyone/everydayness 329
egological phen. 93, 229, 232 evidentness of the world and trans. Ego 494
egological reductiion 93, 115 exactuess and exact psych. 233f.
egological transcendental reduction 133 experience: field of 230, 245; of community 221;
eidetic analysis 112, 114, 116, 166,243 of others 162, 164, 185; of the self 111; of
eidetic essences 242, 246 something internal 222; phenomenological
eidetic intuition 177, 193, 210, 289 231 ; pure phen. 221
eidetic laws 166; meaning 24lf.; experiencing as form of concern 310
eidetic ontology 175 explication 344
eidetic phen. 156, 170, 186, 190, 192, 194,234, extension 407
242,251,253 external world, provability of351
eidetic phen. psychology 204, 206, 249, 252
eidetic phen. research 242 factical self 143
eidetic reduction 30, 66f., 84,92,165,174,186, facticity 305f.
205,230ff. faculties are intentional faculties 467
eidetic research needed 279 fallenness 349, 379; temporality of 392
eidetic science 165,186,230,233,244,249,253 fantasy variation 231; see also imaginative
eidetic sig. ofphen.-psych. structures 248 variation
504 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY
mental life as such 217 ontological genesis of the theor. attitude 397
mental lived experiences 220 ontological ground 243; of idealism 499; idealism
mere looking, meaning of 315 of Scheler 499; knowledge 438, 440, 499;
metaphysica generalis 446 sense of any entity 118; structure 284; syn-
metaphysics 101, 157, 193,425,429,439,458; thesis 427f., 445; understanding of historicity
and problem of foundation-laying 471; an- 406
thropology and 469; Critique of Pure Reason ontologism 101; and transcendentalism 178, 193
as 469; of metaphysics 425; mythical 250; ontology 67,150,175, 280f., 297, 313; funda-
traditional concept of 438 mental question of 422; Hu's o. as traditional
method 375; of eksistential interpretation 373; of 326; fundamental 211; Kant as laying the
transcendental phen. 486; of transcendental groundwork for 450; Kant wants to replace o.
phil. 487 with transcendental phil. 447; medieval 275;
methodological clarity for H. 356 of Dasein 287, 289; of the whole human being
methodological grounding for phil. in anthropol- 138,143; of world, Cartesian 323; phen. 421;
ogy487 phen. as means of access to 297; universal
mind as cognitive substance 237 positive 123
minds 242; see also communities of minds openness of being free 409
Misch 141 ordinary concept of time covers it up 417
mode of being: of constituting 138; of Dasein original essence of time 452
143; of an entity with "world" 138; of originating intuition 426, 443
mathematics 242; of what constitutes 143 other: analogous to my ego 232; ego of 229;
mode of experiencing, a change of 252 subjectivity of the 245; transcendental 498
modernism 8 others are others for me 494;
modes of appearance Ill, 126f., 227 Otto 9,13
modes of being 278
modes of consciousness 496 parallelisms: human being & transcendental Ego
mood 337f., 391 499; intentional psych. & transcendental
phen. 500; interior psych. & transcendental
National Socialism 32 phen. 499; psych. of consciousness & subjec-
Natorp 7,9, 13 tivity 499
natural apprehension of the world 287 paralogism of substantiality 451
natural attitude 168, 172f., 225, 444 parenthecizing 246; see also epoche
natural focus of consciousness 238 Parmenides 108, 148
natural focus of empirical psych. 242 passive genesis 166, 194, 495
natural science and psych. 67, 183, 189 pedagogical significance of pure psych. 133
naturalism, of mental life 220 perception 145f.; ofextemal things 245; of the
nature, spiritualization of 157; the being of 313 just-there 310
nearby, the 325 perceptual present, analysis of 239
negativity of Dasein 365 perennial phil. 179
NeoKantianism 424 personality of H. incomprehensible 482
new beginnings in Hu and H. 43If. Pfander 23,29,104,195, 203f.; letter to Hu 203,
noein 355 479-483
noetic-noema 235, see intentionality phenomenalism 207
not-ness, obscurity of 365f. phenomenality 218
Nothing as correlatum 446 phenomenological analysis of perceptions 114;
now as always-already-now 418 attitude 110, 444; constitution 154; correla-
tion-research 99; disclosure ISS; epoche 223,
object: always just-thereness in H. 403; constitu- 246,252;experienceI64,186,218,221,
tion of the being of 308 231f., 234; focus 223; grounding of the fac-
objectification 32Of. tual sciences 100; interpretation of history
objective time 220 100; intuition 246; living 16; method 291 ;
objective truth 242 ontology 100,421; phen. 95,117,120; phi-
objectivism 10 If. 193f., 499 losophy 178; philosophy and empirical psych.
objectivistic idea of phil. 487 209;
Ochsner 9 phenomenological psychology 46-49,54,57,60,
Odebrecht 104,196 66,92,117,134,161,165,170,174,183-
ontological 282; analysis of Dasein 285ff., 289; 188,200,202,210, 213f., 228, 230, 233-236,
comprehension of being 426; definition of 238, 242, 248, 250; as descriptive 114; as
world 322; disciplines 152 eidetic science 67; of reason 235; essential
ontological foundation, absolute 249f. function of 232; history of 94
INDEX 507
philosophy 252; universals 230 ality of 378; Everyone-self vs. authentic 334f.;
purely mental, the 160, 163, 184,216,221 habituality of 112; in community 112; is time
purely psychological phenomenology 94, 98 itself 452; ontological structure of 380; the
purely transcendental science 252 problematic of 379; the transcendental 428;
purity, concept of 218 transcendental experience of 247f.; time and
finitude in the 428; unintelligibility of the 240
question of being 275, 459, 462; and authentic self-affection: idea of 449; time as pure 448, 452
philosophizing 463; as such, the 465; onto- self-apperception 130, 248
logical priority of 278 self-consciousness 286
questioning as a mode of being 278 self-experience 67, 88f., 160, 162, 164, 184, 185,
221; absolute 128; transcendental 173, 191
radical self-justification 177 self-givenness, evidential 221
radically grounded phil. and trans. tum 498 self-giving ofthings/entities 461, 464
ratio of the world 487 self-justification, radical 177
rational insight 494; science of 500; ideal of phil. self-reflection 102; all-embracing 177
488 self-understanding as the manifesting break-in to
rationalism and empiricism 101, 178f., 193 being 468
realism 101; H. on 351; problem of 237 selfhood 377; authentic 362, 380; conceived
reality: as an ontological problem 351; meaning existentially 377; horizon of 451
of 353f. sense of being 243; of subjectivity 250
reason, finitude of 441; problematic of 117; sensualism 220
structural system of 242 shared fate as being with others 409
reduction: means of access to the new realm 493. Shestov 201
to pure subjectivity, Descartes' method 118; sign 319ff.
psychological 172, 191; psych.-phen. 247; significance 320f., 323
transcendental 172, 190f.; transcendental- signs 317f.
phenomenological 171 ; see also epoch<! solitude, human and transcendental 491
reductions, several 235 somatology, one-sided 143
Rees 10, 13, 14 soul-substance, objection 330
reference, analysis of 317f. spark leaping forth from the fire 477
referential totalities 317 spatiality 326, 328; to be spatial in a certain way
Reinach 103,105,195 403f.
relationship to H. explained by Hu 479-83 spatiotemporality 215
relativism and absolutism 178, 193f. Spiegelberg 65, 68, 203, 206
relativity of all being 495; of every conceivable Spileers 259, 435
world 240 spiritualization of nature 157, 215
religion, phen. of 196 Spranger 13
remembering 388 starting-point intuition 145
representation 378 Stavenhagen 105, 196
res cogitans 108 Stein 14, 26, 27, 105, 195
resolution 361, 369, 372, 410;' authentic 371, step back to consciousness 107, 147
409; anticipatory 374; disc10sedness and 370 structural forms of a possible transcendental
respect 331 subjectivity 248
retrieval of an inherited possibility 410 Stumpf 201
reversal of gaze 497 style-form 232
Richardson 211, 426 subject: ontological concept of 378f.; the
Richter [the Minister of Educationl 137, 139 ontologically eksisting Dasein 402
Rickert 4, 8, 27 subjective conscious life 96; genesis 189; modes
right time 387 of appearance 127; reflection 431
Rosenberg 201 subjective-transcendental idea of phil. 487
subjectivism and objectivism 101, 178, 193
Salmon 37, 59, 62ff, 66, 71ff., 77,103,182,195, subjectivity 96ff., 125, 169, 171,231,239,245,
206 309,432; absolute 25; all-embracing 248; as
Schapp 104 such 124; constituting 243; even H. uses the
Scheler 103ff., 141, 195f., 302, 455, 499; his taboo word 456; functioning of 234, 242; H.
phil. anthropology 430 presupposes 428, 446; its sense of being 250;
Schelling 141 Kant falls back into 457; of consciousness
Schreier 105 168,190,237,488; of the subject 447, 454;
scientific character of phen., H.' s loss of 480 originaliter 115; possible 169f. 240; psycho-
self 111,115,496; as individua1112; eksistenti- logical and transcendental 237
INDEX 509
substance: ego similar to as for Kant 450, 452 world 287; attitude 123, 496; base-science, a
substantiality, paralogism of 451 235; bestowal of meaning 249; circle 129,
surrender of method of phen. research 480 169, 188,244; community of egos 173,247;
syntheses 112, 229; kinds of 225; concern 134; conditions of knowledge 426;
synthesis: a priori 440; general law of 166; of consciousness, the Ego's 492; world insepa-
identity 496; of meaning in consciousness rable from 492; transcendental constitution
228; veritative 426 25,52, 143; constitution of entities 138; di-
mension of scientific inquiry 488
Taft 436 transcendental Ego 49, 52,132,173,205, 246ff.,
teleological and causal interp. of the world 178, 432,491, 492ff., 496f.; as absolute subject
193f. 494f.; centrality of 46; not an abstraction from
teleological conceptions 101 concrete human being 493; time a component
teleological notion of philosophy 487; problems in 428
193; structure oflife 193 transcendental epoche 172f., 244, 247f.
teleological-tendential structure 177 transcendental experience 132, 177, 190, 246,
temporal horizon, immanent 428 250,252
temporality 374, 38lf., 393, 402, 406, 416, 421; transcendental field 492; focus 238, 248, 252f.;
as ontological meaning of care 373; as foundation 248; idealism 98; idealism of
"outside-of-itself' 383; Dasein's 421, 384f.; phen. 102; inquiry 248
immanent versus objective 220; living 244; of transcendental intersubjectivity 133, 173, 177,
practical concern 394; originally finite 384 192, 249f., 498
temporalizing life of the ego 452f. transcendental knowledge 297
thaumazein 487 transcendental life 173, 177; community of 498
thematizing 400, 414; Hu's note on 401 ; of transcendental logic a nonconcept 471
entities presupposes Dasein 402 transcendental mode of inquiry 242
theoretical activity as praxis 397 transcendental naivete 244; in pure psychology
theoreticaVatheoretical, boundary of 397 130
theorizing 16; H. on 15 transcendental phenomena 132
theory 15f.; of knowing, transcendental 250; of transcendental phenomenology 46, 48f., 57, 60f.,
knowledge 234; Kant's First Critique not a 66f., 95, 98ff., 117, 119f., 135, 150, 167,
425, 440, 469; of reason 235 173ff., 187f., 194, 209f., 213f., 235, 238, 243,
Thomas Aquinas 285 248, 250, 253,489,499; as the one definitive
Thomism285 phil. 499; constructing a 251; H. gave it up
thrownness 337, 349, 408; existential meaning of 480; not anthropological 485f.; path of 498;
364; structure of 365 true meaning of 489
thrownness of ego is not its finitude 444 transcendental philosophy 45-49,61,66, 96ff.,
thumbscrews to consciousness, putting the 497 117, 122f., 134, 167, 170, 175f., 187,211,
time: and horizon 417; and the transcendental 238, 244, 251 f., 447, 500; apodictically nec-
power of the imagination 453; as pure intui- essary 489; as universal ontology 98; the
tion 448; as pure self-affection 448, 452; as building of a 250f.; method of 486f.; in Des-
pure, finite intuition 448; becomes public in cartes 120; task of 124;
concern itself 416; Hegel's concept of421; transcendental philosopher 172
immanent 45 If.; objective 220; ordinary transcendental power of the imagination 428
representation has a natural legitimacy 420; transcendental problem 96, 124, 128, 139, 168,
ordinary view of 418f.; original 453; original 188,190,206,235,238, 24lf., 251,496,499;
essence of 452; passes and comes 420; phen. in relation to SZ 136; the genuine 250
description of 429; public 417; temporalizing transcendental problematic 137, 148; making it
in world-time 448; the self-constitution of 25 palpable 252
time-character of being 290f. transcendental psychologism 119, 251
time-consciousness 26f. transcendental psychology in Descartes 120
time-determinedness 288 transcendental purification 132
tradition 289, 440 transcendental questionling 170f., 243, 244
traditional interpretation of Dasein 289 transcendental realm of consciousness 497
trancendental Ego as "time itself' 429 transcendental reduction 46, 49, 52, 54f., 97f.,
trancendental problem 240 122, 130, 132f., 135, 172, 174, 190f., 205,
transcendence 47; finite 426; grounded in the 235, 242, 246, 249f., 252, 493f.
imagination 471; of Dasein 471 transcendental relativity of all being 495
transcendens 275 transcendental revolution 252
transcendent, the 109 transcendental science 245; a purely 252; the task
transcendental, the 172, 446; apprehension of the ofa492
510 PSYCHOLOGICAL AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY