PASEI v.

Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento, J.

(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)

FACTS:

Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1
(1998) of DOLE entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of Deployment of Filipino
Domestic and Household Workers.” It claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with
similar skills, and that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of the
lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be
provided by law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE submitting to the validity of the
challenged guidelines involving the police power of the State and informed the court that the respondent
have lifted the deployment ban in some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the Philippines
and existing mechanism providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.

ISSUE:

Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.

RULING:

“[Police power] has been defined as the "state authority to enact legislation that may interfere with
personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." As defined, it consists of (1) an
imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of
an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive
embrace.

“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is
no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it does not
thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution does not import a perfect Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of
classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane
to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4) they apply equally to
all members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.

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ICHONG VS HERNANDEZ
G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City Treasurer of Manila,
respondents.
Facts:
Driven by aspirations for economic independence and national security, the Congress enacted Act No. 1180
entitled “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business.” The main provisions of the Act, among others, are:
(1) Prohibition against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, among others, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; and
(2) Prohibition against the establishment or opening by aliens actually engaged in the retail business of
additional stores or branches of retail business.
Lao H. Ichong, in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents, corporations and partnerships
adversely affected by the said Act, brought an action to obtain a judicial declaration, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance, Jaime Hernandez, and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacked the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:

 It denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their liberty and property
without due process of law.
 The subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof.
 The Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the Philippines.

Issue/s:
Whether or not a law may invalidate or supersede treaties or generally accepted principles.
Discussions:
A generally accepted principle of international law, should be observed by us in good faith. If a treaty would
be in conflict with a statute then the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police
power which, being inherent could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty.
Ruling/s:
Yes, a law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, the Supreme Court saw no
conflict between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The equal protection of the law
clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be
treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced”;
and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not.”

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LUTZ v. ARANETA 98 PHIL. 145 December 22, 1955 (CASE DIGEST)
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II

FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE

POLICE POWER

WALTER LUTZ, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate of the deceased

Antonio Jayme Ledesma, plaintiff-appellant v. J. ANTONIO ARANETA, as
collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-apppelle

G.R No. L-7856. December 22, 1955

REYES, J.B L., J.:

FACTS:

Appelant in this case Walter Lutz in his capacity as the Judicial

Administrator of the intestate of the deceased Antonio Jayme Ledesma, seeks
to recover from the Collector of the Internal Revenue the total sum of
fourteen thousand six hundred sixty six and forty cents (P 14, 666.40) paid
by the estate as taxes, under section 3 of Commonwealth Act No. 567, also
known as the Sugar Adjustment Act, for the crop years 1948-1949 and 1949-
1950. Commonwealth Act. 567 Section 2 provides for an increase of the
existing tax on the manufacture of sugar on a graduated basis, on each picul
of sugar manufacturer; while section 3 levies on the owners or persons in
control of the land devoted tot he cultivation of sugarcane and ceded to
others for consideration, on lease or otherwise - "a tax equivalent to the
difference between the money value of the rental or consideration collected
and the amount representing 12 per centum of the assessed value of such land.
It was alleged that such tax is unconstitutional and void, being levied for
the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which in plaintiff's
opinion is not a public purpose for which a tax may be constitutionally
levied. The action was dismissed by the CFI thus the plaintiff appealed
directly to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the tax imposition in the Commonwealth Act No. 567 are
unconstitutional.

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RULING:

Yes, the Supreme Court held that the fact that sugar production is one of the
greatest industry of our nation, sugar occupying a leading position among its
export products; that it gives employment to thousands of laborers in
the fields and factories; that it is a great source of the state's wealth, is
one of the important source of foreign exchange needed by our government and
is thus pivotal in the plans of a regime committed to a policy of currency
stability. Its promotion, protection and advancement, therefore redounds
greatly to the general welfare. Hence it was competent for the legislature to
find that the general welfare demanded that the sugar industry be stabilized
in turn; and in the wide field of its police power, the law-making body could
provide that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its
components to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in taxes
that it had to sustain.

The subject tax is levied with a regulatory purpose, to provide means for the
rehabilitation and stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. In other
words, the act is primarily a valid exercise of police power.

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ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V. SECRETARY OF DAR, G.R. No. 78742 (175 SCRA 343),
July 14, 1989

FACTS:
These are consolidated cases involving common legal questions including
serious challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6657 also known as
the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O
Nos. 228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of separation of powers, due
process, equal protection and the constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.

In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this case claim that the power to
provide for a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program as decreed by the
Constitution belongs to the Congress and not to the President, the also
allege that Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229 should be annulled for
violation of the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process
and equal protection. They contended that the taking must be simultaneous
with payment of just compensation which such payment is not contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.

In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were
invalidly issued by the President and that the said executive orders
violate the constitutional provision that no private property shall be taken
without due process or just compensation which was denied to the petitioners.

In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim that they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules of the decree.
They therefore ask the Honorable Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to issue the said rules.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the laws being challenged is a valid exercise of Police power
or Power of Eminent Domain.

RULING:
Police Power through the Power of Eminent Domain, though there
are traditional distinction between the police power and the power of eminent
domain, property condemned under police power is noxious or intended for
noxious purpose, the compensation for the taking of such property is not
subject to compensation, unlike the taking of the property in Eminent Domain
or the power of expropriation which requires the payment of just compensation
to the owner of the property expropriated.

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YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 74457. March 20,
1987

FACTS:
Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo,
Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the
slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner
sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of
replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand
pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the
court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the
bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of
the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and
also for its presumed validity.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.

RULING:
Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case
for the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos
and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers
who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with
the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which
is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection
between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing.

The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power

because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is
unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its
authority in behalf of the public, it must be:
1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from
those of a particular class, require such interference;
2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals.

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City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta

City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983

Facts:

An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of
private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private
memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been
residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of
property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives
the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of
police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the
benefit of the public.

Issue:

Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property

Ruling:

No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is
actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who
are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's
exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance
without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to
unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's
benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.

Facts: Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "Ordinance Regulating The Establishment,
Maintenance And Operation Of Private Memorial Type Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within The
Jurisdiction Of Quezon City And Providing Penalties For The Violation Thereof" provides:

Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at
least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so
designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months
from the date of approval of the application.

For several years, the aforequoted section of the Ordinance was not enforced but seven years after
the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council passed a resolution to request the City
Engineer, Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon
City where the owners thereof have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for paupers
burial.

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The Quezon City Engineer then notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that Section 9 of
the ordinance would be enforced.

Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in question.
Respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the
LocalAutonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power.

Held: Section 9 of the City ordinance in question is not a valid exercise of police power. Section 9
cannot be justified under the power granted to Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and regulate
such other business, trades, and occupation as may be established or practiced in the City.

Bill of rights states that 'no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law' (Art. Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). On the other hand, there are three inherent
powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely-. (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.

The police power of Quezon City is defined in sub-section 00, Sec. 12, Rep. Act 537 that reads as
follows:

“To make such further ordinance and regulations not repugnant to law as may be necessary to carry
into effect and discharge the powers and dutiesconferred by this act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, …, and for the protection of property
therein; and enforce obedience thereto with such lawful fines or penalties as the City Council may
prescribe under the provisions of subsection (jj) of this section.”

The power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. The power to regulate does not include
the power to confiscate. The ordinance in question not only confiscates but also prohibits the operation
of a memorial park cemetery, because under Section 13 of said ordinance, 'Violation of the provision
thereof is punishable with a fine and/or imprisonment and that upon conviction thereof the permit to
operate and maintain a private cemetery shall be revoked or cancelled’. The confiscatory clause and
the penal provision in effect deter one from operating a memorial park cemetery.

Moreover, police power is defined by Freund as 'the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property'. It is usually exerted in order to merely
regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property outright, it
is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.

It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a
mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without
due process of law, nay, even without compensation.

PASCUAL VS. SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS [110 PHIL 331; G.R. NO.L-10405;
29 DEC 1960]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

Facts: Petitioner, the governor of the Province of Rizal, filed an action for declaratory relief

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with injunction on the ground that RA 920, Actappropriating funds for public works,
providing P85,000 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement
of Pasig feeder road terminals, were nothing but projected and planned subdivision roads
within Antonio Subdivision. Antonio Subdivision is owned by the respondent, Jose Zulueta, a
member of the Senate of the Philippines. Respondent offered to donate the said feeder
roads to the municipality of Pasig and the offer was accepted by the council, subject to a
condition that the donor would submit plan of the roads and an agreement to change the
names of two of the street. However, the donation was not executed, which prompted
Zuleta to write a letter to the district engineer calling attention the approval of RA 920. The
district engineer, on the other hand, did not endorse the letter that inasmuch the feeder
roads in question were private property at the time of passage and approval of RA 920, the
appropriation for the construction was illegal and therefore, void ab initio. Petitioner, prayed
for RA 920 be declared null and void and the alleged deed of donation be declared
unconstitutional. Lower court dismissed the case and dissolved the writ of preliminary
injunction.

Issue: Whether or Not the deed of donation and the appropriation of funds stipulated in
RA 920 are constitutional.

Held: The ruling case law rules that the legislature is without power to appropriate public
revenue for anything but public purpose. The taxing power must be exercised for public
purposes only and the money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals.

In the case at bar, the legality of the appropriation of the feeder roads depend upon
whether the said roads were public or private property when the bill was passed by
congress or when it became effective. The land which was owned by Zulueta, the
appropriation sought a private purpose and hence, null and void. The donation did not cure
the nullity of the appropriation; therefore a judicial nullification of a said donation need not
precede the declaration of unconstitutionality of the said appropriation.
The decision appealed from is reversed.

PUNSALAN VS. MUNICIPAL BOARD OF MANILA [95 PHIL

46; NO.L-4817; 26 MAY 1954]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

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Facts: Petitioners, who are professionals in the city, assail OrdinanceNo.
3398 together with the law authorizing it (Section 18 of the Revised Charter of
the City of Manila). The ordinance imposes a municipal occupation tax on
persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes non-payment of
the same. The law authorizing said ordinanceempowers the Municipal Board of
the city to impose a municipal occupation tax on persons engaged in various
professions. Petitioners, having already paid their occupation tax
under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code, paid the tax under
protest as imposed byOrdinance No. 3398. The lower court declared
the ordinance invalid and affirmed the validity of the law authorizing it.

Issue: Whether or Not the ordinance and law authorizing it

constituteclass legislation, and authorize what amounts to double taxation.

Held: The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupationsshall be

taxed, and in its discretion may tax all, or select classes of occupation for
taxation, and leave others untaxed. It is not for the courts to judge which cities
or municipalities should be empowered to impose occupation taxes aside from
that imposed by the National Government. That matter is within the domain of
political departments. The argument against double taxation may not be
invoked if one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city.
It is widely recognized that there is nothing inherently terrible in
the requirement that taxes be exacted with respect to the same occupation by
both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. Judgment of the lower
court is reversed with regards to the ordinance and affirmed as to the
law authorizing it

LLADOC VS. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE [14

SCRA 292; NO.L-19201; 16 JUN 1965]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

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Facts: Sometime in 1957, M.B. Estate Inc., of Bacolod City, donated
10,000.00 pesos in cash to Fr. Crispin Ruiz, the parish priest of Victorias,
Negros Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Lladoc, for the construction of a new
Catholic church in the locality. The donated amount was spent for such purpose.

On March 3, 1958, the donor M.B. Estate filed the donor's gift tax return. Under
date of April 29, 1960. Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued an assessment
for the donee's gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias of which
petitioner was the parish priest.

Issue: Whether or not the imposition of gift tax despite the fact the Fr.
Lladoc was not the Parish priest at the time of donation, Catholic Parish priest of
Victorias did not have juridical personality as the constitutional exemption for
religious purpose is valid.

Held: Yes, imposition of the gift tax was valid, under Section 22(3) Article VI
of the Constitution contemplates exemption only from payment of taxes
assessed on such properties as Property taxes contra distinguished from Excise
taxes The imposition of the gift tax on the property used for religious purpose is
not a violation of the Constitution. Agift tax is not a property by way of gift inter
vivos.

The head of the Diocese and not the parish priest is the real party in interest in
the imposition of the donee's tax on the property donated to the church for
religious purpose

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Abra Valley College vs. Aquino, 162 SCRA 106 (1988) G.R. No. L-39086
June 15, 1988

Fact: Petitioner, filed a complaint in the court a quo to annul and declare void the
“Notice of Seizure’ and the “Notice of Sale” of its lot and building located at Bangued,
Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties. The “Notice of Sale” was
caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent treasurers for the sale at
public auction of said college lot and building, which sale was held on the same date. Dr.
Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the highest bid which
was duly accepted. the respondent filed through counstel a motion to dismiss the
complaint. Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor
by the Director of petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the
government and rendered the assailed decision. Hence petitioner instead availed of the
instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
Supreme Court. Adrian Avilado Antazo

Issue: Whether the Educational Institution Properties which is not exclusively used for
educational purposes is not eligible for tax exemption.

Held: Yes, Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the
conclusion that the school building as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed,
not because the second floor of the same is being used by the Director and his family for
residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being used for commercial
purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is only fair
that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved. Moreover, the exemption
in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or educational purposes is ‘not
limited to property actually indispensable’ therefor but extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes. But it
must be stressed however, that while the court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase “exclusively used for educational purposes”, reasonable
emphasis has always been made that exemption extends to facilities which are
incidental to and reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the main purposes.
Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for commercial purposes is
neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence, The lease of the first floor thereof to
the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be
considered incidental to the purpose of education

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