2017 | REMEDIAL LAW | CASES FALLING UNDER NOS.

46-90 IN THE LIST

Case title: ANTHONY DE SILVA CRUZ VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Principle: The possession and use of a counterfeit credit card is considered access device fraud and
is punishable by law. To successfully sustain a conviction for possession and use of a counterfeit
access device, the prosecution must present not only the access device but also any evidence that
proves that the access device is counterfeit.

Facts:

Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two bottles of Calvin Klein perfume worth from Duty Free
Philippines Fiesta Mall. Wong, the cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the
purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted
the validity of the credit card since the number at the back was not aligned.

Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes. Lim, the cashier on duty, facilitated
the sales transaction. Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name
"Gerry Santos." When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card, Cruz presented a shopping
card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another identification card, and Cruz gave
her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos."

Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for approval. The card was
approved, but the last four (4) digits of the card were not properly embossed and its validity date
started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the credit card. Citibank informed Lim that
the credit card was counterfeit and that the real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud
Risk Management Division. Cruz tried to escape with the help of Atty. Abad Santos. The security
officers, however, were able to close the mall's main gate, which prevented their escape.

Cruz filed a Demurrer to Evidence asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was
presented and offered by the prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC. Cruz that the
corpus delicti or the alleged counterfeit credit card is inadmissible since it was not marked and
identified during pre-trial. But it was denied. He was convicted for violating RA 8484.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Cruz can be held guilty of violating RA 8484

2. Whether the counterfeit access device can still be presented in trial despite not having
been presented and marked during pre-trial

RULING:

1. Yes.

A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or forged,
or an identifiable component of an access device or counterfeit access device." Under Section 9(a)
and (e) of Republic Act No. 8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal. Rather,
what is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore, the corpus
delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves that it is
counterfeit.

Cruz was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos." He
used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo shoes at Duty Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa
credit card as later proven to be a counterfeit access device.

2. Yes
The rule is that no evidence shall be allowed during trial if it was not identified and pre-marked
during trial. As an exception the evidence can still be presented when allowed by the court for
good cause shown. The trial court retains its discretion to allow any evidence to be presented at
trial even if not previously marked during pre-trial.

Here, the trial court allowed the presentation of the counterfeit credit card at trial due to the
prosecution's explanation that during pre-trial, the counterfeit credit card was still in the Criminal
Investigation and Detective Group's custody. The prosecution was able to present and mark
during pre-trial Citibank's certification that the access device used was counterfeit. It is this
certification that makes the possession and use of the access device illegal. Therefore, the trial
court determined that the access device could still be presented at trial since it merely formed
part of an· exhibit that had already been presented and marked during pre-trial.
 People vs Corpuz Y Flores, G.R. No. 208013. July 3, 2017

Principles:
Criminal Law; Rape: If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the
accused remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts.

Criminal Law; Rape: This Court underscores that the date, place, and time of the incidents need
not be accurately established since these are not elements of rape.

Remedial Law; Evidence: An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible
from testifying in court. "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate
what he or she knows." If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is
admissible in court.

Remedial Law; Evidence: Objections as to the reliability of the DNA testing methodology
conducted on the specimens submitted must be raised at the trial, otherwise, the defense is
already estopped from questioning the same for the first time on appeal.

Facts:
Allan was charged with four (4) counts of rape against AAA, 14 years old with a mental age of a 5
year old child. AAA became pregnant as a result.

AAA was 14 years old when she had her neuropsychiatric examination with a psychologist. The
examination revealed that at the time of examination, AAA's Intelligence Quotient was 42 and her
level of intelligence was equal to Moderate Mental Retardation. Also, she had a mental age of a
five (5)-year-and-eight (8)-month-old child.

During the trial, AAA testified and was asked by the prosecution: “what did Allan do to you that
made (him) the father of your daughter?”

A "lniyot nak[,] sir" (he had sex with me).

Q How many times did Allan ha[ve] sex with you?

A Four (4) times, sir.

Q How old were you then when Allan had sex with you?

A I was 13 years old, sir.

AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she was not oriented with place, date, and
time.

Issues:
I.What crime was committed by Allan?
II.Whether AAA is, an intellectually disabled person, eligible from testifying in court.
III.Whether Allan should be acquitted due to AAAs failure to testify when and where she was raped.
IV.Whether the defense may raise the objection on the reliability of the DNA testing for the first time
on appeal.

Ruling:

Allan's acts amounted to rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. - Rape is Committed-

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:
 ....

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.

If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused remains liable
for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. The reason behind the rule "is simply that
if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, it must thereby follow that
carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below twelve years should
likewise be constitutive of rape."

Here, In this case, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were clearly established by the
victim's testimony. Apart from identifying her offender, AAA was also able to recount the sordid
acts committed against her. Also, although AAA was already 19 years old at the time she testified,
her mental age was that of a child aged five (5) to seven (7) years. She is considered incapable of
giving rational consent because she is not yet considered to have reached the level of maturity
that gives them the capability to make rational decisions, especially on matters involving sexuality.

II

AAA is eligible from testifying in court.

To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving, can
make known his [or her] perception to others," Rule 130, ROC. Therefore, an intellectually
disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. "He or she can be
a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows. "If an intellectually
disabled victim's testimony is coherent (i.e. she is capable, logical and consistent in narrating her
experience), it is admissible in court.

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person
with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her
perception to others.

In affirming the finding of the accused's guilt, this Court is aware that "when a woman says that
she has been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to show that she had indeed been
raped." If her testimony withstands the test of credibility, like in this case, "the rapist may be
adjudged guilty solely on that basis."

III.
This Court underscores that the date, place, and time of the incidents need not be accurately
established since these are not elements of rape.

Allan cannot exculpate himself, claiming that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
since AAA was allegedly not oriented to date, time, and place. AANs failure to offer any testimony
as to when and where she was raped does not matter.

IV
No. To emphasize, it is the defense that moved for a DNA testing. It failed to assail the result and
the dependability of the procedure before the trial court. It is only now that it is questioning the
test's accuracy given that the results are not favorable to it. For this reason, this Court agrees with
the Court of Appeals that the defense is already "estopped from questioning, much less, objecting
the reliability of the DNA testing methodology conducted on the specimens submitted."

NOTE: The 3 possible results of DNA testing - “Exclusion”, “Inconclusive”, “Inclusion”

In resolving a crime, an evidence sample is "collected from the scene of the crime or from
the victim's body for the suspect's DNA." This sample is "then matched with the reference
sample taken from the suspect and the victim." DNA testing is made to "ascertain whether
an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample." Hence,
the collected samples "are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile" which may provide any of these three (3) possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources
(exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have
similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including
degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of
the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more
conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).
In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the
statistical significance of the similarity.
Case Title: HEIRS OF CAYETANO CASCAYAN vs. SPS OLIVER AND EVELYN GUMALLAOI
G.R. No. 211947, July 03, 2017
Principle: The factual findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding, or conclusive on
the parties and upon th[e] [Supreme] court" when supported by substantial evidence.

KEY FACTS:
Petitioner Cascayan Heirs filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession, Demolition, and
Damages against the Spouses Gumallaoi, alleging that by virtue of a free patent application, they
were co-owners of a parcel of land denominated as Lot No. 20028. The Cascayan Heirs affirmed
that the Spouses Gumallaoi bought Lot No. 20029 bounded on the Northeast by Lot No. 20028.
But, by way of counterclaim, the Spouses Gumallaoi maintained that they were the true owners
of both Lot Nos. 20029 and 20028. They claimed that the Cascayan Heirs secured a free patent to
Lot No. 20028 through manipulation.
The RTC dismissed the complaint and declared the Spouses Gumallaoi the legal owners
of Lot No. 20028. It ruled that petitioners did not prove that they or their predecessor-in-interest
had been in possession of it. Conversely, noting that the bigger portion of the Spouses Gumallaoi's
residence had been constructed on this land, the RTC found that it was more likely that the
residence was intended to be constructed on Lot No. 20028.
The Cascayan Heirs filed a Motion for New Trial citing mistake as a ground. They claimed
that despite the agreement for the trial court to consider only the Commissioner's Report to
resolve the case, it also examined fraudulent affidavits. However, the motion was denied. The RTC
pronounced that mistake as a ground for new trial under Section 1, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court
must be a mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE:

WON the petition is meritorious

RULING:
NO.
Petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 shall pertain only to questions of law.
The Rules of Court require that only questions of law should be raised in petitions filed
under Rule 45. This court is not a trier of facts. It will not entertain questions of fact as the factual
findings of the appellate courts are "final, binding[,] or conclusive on the parties and upon this
[c]ourt" when supported by substantial evidence. Factual findings of the appellate courts will not
be reviewed nor disturbed on appeal to this court.
In this case, Spouses Gumallaoi presented sufficient evidence to show that the Heirs of
Cascayan obtained their title through fraud and misrepresentation. On the other hand, the Court
of Appeals found that the petitioners' evidence did not sufficiently prove their claims of
possession or ownership over Lot No. 20028
The Court of Appeals' appreciation of the evidence on the possession of Lot No. 20028
and the weight to be given to the parties' Tax Declarations and affidavits, which is consistent with
the Regional Trial Court findings, is binding on this Court and there is no cogent reason to review
it.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSEPH SAN JOSE Y GREGORIO and JONATHAN SAN JOSE Y
GREGORIO [G.R. No. 206916. July 3, 2017]

Principle: The prosecution has the burden to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
If it fails to discharge this burden, courts have the duty to render a judgment of acquittal. Thus,
the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption is proof beyond reasonable
doubt

Facts:

Joseph San Jose y Gregorio and Jonathan San Jose y Gregorio (the San Jose brothers) were charged
with murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Jilito testified that his brother Carlito and his friends were drinking when Jilito saw the San Jose
brothers enter the house. The San Jose brothers then started punching Carlito, who tried to run
to a nearby store. However, his assailants caught up with him. The prosecution presented Jilito's
testimony that Jonathan embraced Carlito from behind and while punching him, stabbed him on
the side of his body while Joseph stabbed Carlito in the front. Thereafter, the San Jose brothers
ran away. Carlito's friends also ran away out of fear. Jilito ran after the San Jose brothers for about
100 meters but failed to catch up to them. When he returned to the vacant lot, he was told that
Carlito had already been brought to the hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

For their defense, Joseph testified that he and his brother Jonathan were at home eating with a
childhood friend, Leo Narito, when a commotion occurred outside the house. People were
shouting and when he went outside, he saw a person running away. He asked that person what
was going on and was told that someone had been stabbed. Joseph returned to his house and
continued eating. Sometime in 2005, while he was at work at a hardware store, police officers
arrested him for the killing of a certain Joselito. He denied the charges against him.

The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Jilito was consistent in his testimony on how
accused-appellants killed his brother, Carlito. It maintains that he was able to positively identify
accused-appellants since all of them were residents of the same barangay. The autopsy report
likewise corroborates Jilito's testimony that Carlito was stabbed at the right side of his torso.

Issue: Whether accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the murder of Carlito
Espino.

Ruling:

It is a basic right of the accused under our Constitution to be presumed innocent until the contrary
is proven. Thus, the quantum of evidence required to overcome this presumption is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Rule 133, Section 2 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an
acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does
not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in an
unprejudiced mind.

The burden of proving the accused's guilt rests with the prosecution. A guilty verdict relies on the
strength of the prosecution's evidence, not on the weakness of the defense. If the prosecution's
evidence produces even an iota of reasonable doubt, courts would have no choice but to rule for
the accused's acquittal.

Proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed to overcome the presumption of innocence. Accused-
appellant's guilt must be proved beyond reasonable doubt otherwise, the Court would be left
without any other recourse but to rule for acquittal. Courts should be guided by the principle that
it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably guilty of the crime charged than to
convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit.
The determination of guilt requires courts to evaluate the evidence presented in relation to the
elements of the crime charged. The finding of guilt is fundamentally a factual issue.

In this case, the trial court and the Court of Appeals placed heavy reliance on the testimony of the
prosecution's lone eyewitness, Jilito Espino, and his positive identification of the accused-
appellants as the assailants who murdered his brother. Thus, the review of finding of guilt
necessarily involves a re-evaluation of Jilito's testimony. A review of Jilito's testimony, however,
when placed against the other pieces of evidence, reveals numerous material inconsistencies that
cannot be ignored.

First, it was unclear where the stabbing actually occurred. There were also material
inconsistencies between Jilito's testimony and the autopsy report submitted by the prosecution.
Jilito repeatedly stated to the trial court that his brother was stabbed twice.

The trial court and the Court of Appeals likewise failed to note that the victim's sister was a witness
for the defense and the victim's late father signed an affidavit of desistance in the accused-
appellants' favor. It is consistent with the human experience for the victim's relatives to seek
justice. An unusual detail, such as two (2) immediate family members of the victim testifying on
behalf of the accused-appellants, forces this Court to take a second hard look at the prosecution's
evidence.

The delayed arrests of the accused-appellants likewise cast doubt on their guilt. The crime
occurred on June 2, 2002. Accused-appellant Jonathan was arrested on April 1, 2005 and accused-
appellant Joseph was arrested on August 3, 2005, or about three (3) years after the crime was
committed. Accused-appellants remained residents of Barangay Manggahan, Rodriguez, Rizal
from the occurrence of the crime in 2002 until their arrests in 2005.

Here, both the victim's father and sister are convinced that accused-appellants are not guilty of
the crime. The prosecution's lone eyewitness could not even give a clear and categorical narrative
of the events. There were several unusual circumstances during the prosecution of the case that
he has not adequately explained. The prosecution having failed to discharge its burden to prove
guilt beyond reasonable doubt, this Court is constrained to acquit accused-appellants.
Chinatrust (Phils.) Commercial Bank vs. Turner, 828 SCRA 499, G.R. No. 191458 July 3, 2017

Principle: Courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or in excess of what is being
sought by the party.

Facts:

British national Turner initiated via Chinatrust-Ayala Branch the telegraphic transfer of US$430.00
to the account of “MIN TRAVEL/ESMAT AZMY, on Citibank in Cairo, Egypt . The amount was partial
payment to Turner’s travel agent for his and his wife’s 11-day tour in Egypt.. The amount
was debited from his dollar savings account with Chinatrust.

Chinatrust received Citibank-Cairo’s telex-notice about the latter’s inability to credit the funds it
received because the beneficiary’s name “Min Travel/Esmat Azmy” given by Turner did not match
the account name on file of Citibank-Cairo.

On September 22, 2004, Turner allegedly informed Chinatrust that he was able to contact Esmat
Azmy, who acknowledged receipt of the transferred funds. Turner, however, had to cancel his
travel tour because his wife got ill and requested from Chinatrust the refund of his money.

Turner filed a Complaint against Chinatrust before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City,
demanding the refund of his telegraphic transfer of P24,129.88 plus damages. MTC dismissed
Turner’s complaint for lack of merit. The MTC’s decision was reversed by the RTC and affirmed by
CA.

The Court of Appeals adjudged petitioner liable for negligence: (1) when it did not immediately
refund the telexed funds to respondent upon receipt of the discrepancy notice from Citibank-
Cairo; and (2) when it did not immediately relay to Citibank-Cairo respondent’s demand for the
cancellation of the transaction.

According to petitioner, this was erroneous because the Court of Appeals ruled upon matters not
alleged in the complaint or raised as an issue and awarded damages not prayed for in the
complaint.

Issue:

Whether the subsequent acts of petitioner after compliance with its obligation can be considered
“negligent” to justify the award of damages by the Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court

Ruling:

The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioner was negligent
in failing to immediately address respondent’s queries and return his money and was
consequently liable for the anguish suffered by respondent. They ruled on an issue that was not
raised by respondent in the lower court, thereby violating petitioner’s right to due process.

It is an established principle that “courts cannot grant a relief not prayed for in the pleadings or
in excess of what is being sought by the party.It is elementary that a judgment must conform to,
and be supported by, both the pleadings and the evidence, and must be in accordance with the
theory of the action on which the pleadings are framed and the case was tried.

The bank’s supposed negligence in the handling of respondent’s concerns was not among
respondent’s causes of action and was never raised in the Metropolitan Trial Court. Respondent’s
cause of action was based on the theory that the telexed funds transfer did not materialize, and
the relief sought was limited to the refund of his money and damages as a result of the purported
non-remittance of the funds to the correct beneficiary account.
Title: Bacerra y Tabones v. People

Principles: The identity of the perpetrator of a crime and a finding of guilt may rest solely on
the strength of circumstantial evidence.

Key Facts:

Accused was seen by victim stoning the latter’s house and threatened to burn him. Few hours
later, the accused was again seen passing by the victim’s house and walk towards their nipa hut.
The victim likewise saw the accused walk to and fro in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts
just before it caught fire. The victim’s son testifies that he saw the accused standing at the side of
the nipa hut before it was burned. The trial court convicted the accused of arson based on the
said circumstantial evidence.

Issue/s:

Whether or not the trial court is correct.

Ruling:

Yes.

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b)
the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be
established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a whole and
should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused authored the crime.
The proven circumstances must be “consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis
that the accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is
innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt.”

The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed separately. Instead,
they must be viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial evidence is like a “tapestry made
up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven.” Each strand cannot be plucked out and
scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire picture. The events that transpired
prior to the burning incident cannot be disregarded. Accused's threat to burn occurred when he
stoned private complainant’s house.

Also, there is no other reasonable version of the events which can be held with reasonable
certainty.
Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. ROMALDO LUMAYAG Y DELA CRUZ G.R. No. 181474
July 26, 2017

Principle:

Sec. 13, Rule 124

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the law
involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment
and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for
review.

Key Facts:

On November 30, 1997, at around 2:30 a.m., spouses Eladio Santos (Eladio) and Leonor Santos
(Leonor) were found dead in the garage of their house. The house was in shambles and several
cash, jewelry, bags, and store merchandise were also missing.

Around 9:00 p.m. of the previous day, November 29, 1997, P02 Paule and SPO1 Eduardo Roderno
(SPO1 Roderno) noticed a man carrying a heavy-looking bag. At the police station, they opened
the bag yielded three (3) reams of Marlboro cigarettes, a lighter, some coins, and a blue denim
wallet with cash. Upon further interrogation, Dela Cruz verbally confessed that he, Lumayag and
Opiniano, "had just killed and robbed an old couple" and was supposed to the bag to his cohorts.
During cross-examination, PO2 Paule affirmed that Dela Cruz was not aided by a lawyer, nor was
his confession reduced into writing. PO2 Paule further testified that when they informed Dela
Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter remained silent.

The RTC convicted Lumayag and Opiano as principals of the crime of robbery with homicide and
imposed upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and Dela Cruz as an accessory. The CA also
affirm the ruling of the RTC in toto. Only Opiano appealed to the SC.

Issue/s:

a. What is the nature of the elevation of the case from RTC to CA to SC, considering that the
penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua?
b. WON the extrajudicial admission of Dela Cruz admissible?

Ruling:
a. It shall be under "intermediate review"

Whenever the Court of Appeals finds that the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment should be imposed in a case, the court, after discussion of the evidence and the
law involved, shall render judgment imposing the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment as the circumstances warrant. However, it shall refrain from entering the judgment
and forthwith certify the case and elevate the entire record thereof to the Supreme Court for
review.

NOTE: People v. Mateo

While the Fundamental Law requires a mandatory review by the Supreme Court of cases where
the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment, or death, nowhere, however, has it
proscribed an intermediate review. If only to ensure utmost circumspection before the penalty of
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the Court now deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of Appeals before the case is elevated
to the Supreme Court. Where life and liberty are at stake, all possible avenues to determine his
guilt or innocence must be accorded an accused, and no care in the evaluation of the facts can
ever be overdone. A prior determination by the Court of Appeals on, particularly, the factual issues,
would minimize the possibility of an error of judgment. If the Court of Appeals should affirm the
penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, it could then render judgment imposing
the corresponding penalty as the circumstances so warrant, refrain from entering judgment and
elevate the entire records of the case to the Supreme Court for its final disposition.

b. No, Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid
waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible
in evidence.93 It is undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his
confession reduced into writing.94 Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his
right to a lawyer, the latter did not say anything.95 Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid
waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article III,
Section 12 of the Constitution states that "[t]hese rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel."
Case Title: People vs. Escobar 833 SCRA 180 , July 26, 2017

Principle: Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case, not in an interlocutory order
in a criminal case.

Key Facts: Escobar filed a petition for bail (first bail) which was denied by the RTC and then by CA.
A subsequent development in the accused's case compelled him to file a second petition for bail
but was denied by the RTC on the ground of Res Judicata.

Issue/s: Is the court correct in denying the application for bail?

Ruling: NO

Res judicata applies only in a final judgment in a civil case, not in an interlocutory order in a
criminal case. An order disposing a petition for bail is interlocutory. This order does not attain
finality when a new matter warrants a second look on the application for bail.

Res judicata applies only when there is a final judgment on the merits of a case; it cannot be
availed of in an interlocutory order even if this order is not appealed.

(Background: Kidnap case + conspiracy. Escobar, Rolando, and Fajardo brothers were alleged to
be the advisers in the kidnapping of Mary Grace. Alleged co-conspirators are already out on bail,
even those who had ACTIVE participation in the kidnapping had been granted bail, except Escobar.
The new matter referred to Rolando’s release on bail. Rolando was granted bail because Cubillas’
testimony against him was weak. “Escobar and Rolando participated in the same way, but
Escobar’s bail was denied.” Escobar’s fundamental rights and liberty are being deprived in the
meantime.)
CASE TITLE: GOTESCO PROPERTIES, INC., Petitioner, vs. SOLIDBANK CORPORATION (NOW
METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY), Respondent,
G.R. No. 209452, July 26, 2017.

PRINCIPLE: Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of Sale be a) physically posted in
three (3) public places and b) be published once a week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation in the city where the property is situated. The crucial factor is
not where the newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being circulated in the city
where the property is located.

FACTS:

Gotesco obtained from Solidbank a term loan of P300 million. To secure the loan, Gotesco was
required to execute a Mortgage Trust Indenture, which obliged Gotesco to mortgage several
parcels of land in favor of Solidbank. One of which was a property located in San Fernando,
Pampanga. Gotesco also agreed to "at all times maintain the Sound Value of the Collateral”. When
Gotesco found it difficult to meet its obligation, Gotesco sent a letter to Solidbank proposing to
restructure the loan, extending the payment period to 7 years with a 2-year grace period.

As there was substantial reduction in the appraised value of the mortgaged properties, Solidbank
required Gotesco to replace or add to the mortgaged properties. However, Gotesco did not heed
Solidbank’s request. Thereafter, Gotesco failed to pay the outstanding obligation. Thus, Solidbank
filed a Petition for the Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the lot in Pampanga. A Notice of Sale was then
published in Remate (based in Metro Manila) and posted on August 15, 2000, while the public
auction was scheduled on August 31, 2000. Solidbank won as the highest bidder.

Gotesco filed a complaint with the RTC for Annulment of Foreclosure Proceedings against
Solidbank, claiming, among others, that since the foreclosed property was located in Pampanga,
the Notice of Sale could only be published in a newspaper printed in the city where the property
was located. Solidbank answered that it never entered into a restructuring agreement with
Gotesco and claimed that it complied with the publication and posting requirements.

ISSUE:
Whether the requirements under Section 3 of Act No. 3135 were complied with.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes.

Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the Notice of Sale be a) physically posted in three (3) public
places and b) be published once a week for at least three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
of general circulation in the city where the property is situated. The crucial factor is not where the
newspaper is printed but whether the newspaper is being circulated in the city where the
property is located.

If notices are only published in newspapers printed in the city where the property is located, even
newspapers that are circulated nationwide will be disqualified from announcing auction sales
outside their city of publication. This runs contrary to the spirit of the law which is to attain wide
enough publicity so all parties interested in acquiring the property can be informed of the
upcoming sale. Verily, there is clear emphasis on the audience reached by the paper; the place of
printing is not even considered. Moreover, the Court of Appeals pointed out that Remate is an
accredited publication by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga.

In addition, as to Gotesco’s argument that the Notice of Sale was posted less than the required
20 days, the Court ruled that the alleged defect with the posting requirement is superficial. The
Notice of Sale was posted on August 15, 2000, while the auction sale took place on August 31,
2000. The Notice of Sale was posted for 16 days, only four (4) days less than what the law requires.
The object of a Notice of Sale in an extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding is to inform the public of
the nature and condition of the property to be sold and the time, place, and terms of the auction
sale. Mistakes or omissions that do not impede this objective will not invalidate the Notice of Sale.
TITLE: Securities and Exchange vs. Price Richardson Corporation
CITATION: GR. No. 197032, July 26, 2017

PRINCIPLE: The determination of probable cause for purposes of filing an information is

lodged with the public prosecutor. It is not reviewable by courts unless it is
attended by grave abuse of discretion.

FACTS:

Petitioner prays for the filing of an Information against Price Richardson Corporation,
Consuelo Velarde-Albert, and Gordon Resnick (respondents) for violating Sections 26.3 and 28 of
the Securities Regulation Code.

Respondent Price Richardson Corporation (Price Richardson) is a Philippine corporation

duly incorporated under Philippine laws on December 7, 2000. Its primary purpose is “to provide
administrative services which includes but is not limited to furnishing all necessary and incidental
clerical, bookkeeping, mailing and billing services.”

On October 17, 2001, its former employee, Michelle S. Avelino, (Avelino) executed a
sworn affidavit at the National Bureau of Investigation’s Interpol Division, alleging that Price
Richardson was “engaged in boiler room operations, wherein the company sells non-existent
stocks to investors using high pressure sales tactics.” Whenever this activity was discovered, the
company would close and emerge under a new company name.

Upon application of the NBI Interpol Division and the SEC, the Regional Trial Court issued
three (3) search warrants against Capital International and Price Richardson for violation of
Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code. The RTC ordered the seizure of Price Richardson’s
and Capital International’s office equipment, documents, and other items that were connected
with the alleged violation.

Subsequently, the SEC filed before the DOJ its complaint against Price Richardson, et al.
for violation of Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code and Sections 26.3 and 28 of the
Securities Regulation Code. In defense, the incorporators and directors denied knowing or
agreeing to the offenses charged.

State Prosecutor Reyes issued a Resolution, dismissing the SEC’s complaint “for lack of
probable cause.” On the allegation of conspiracy, he held that because the facts failed “to
establish the alleged unauthorized trading, or the fraudulent investments that constitute the
crime charged, there can be no basis in determining collective criminal responsibility.” Finally, he
ruled that there was no sufficient evidence to show that Price Richardson, Velarde-Albert, Resnick,
and the incorporators and directors deceived investors that would constitute the crime of Estafa
with abuse of confidence.

In the meantime, individuals claiming to have agreed to purchase securities from Price
Richardson and have been defrauded surfaced and executed sworn statements against it. They
claimed that Price Richardson engaged in illegal trade of securities, and filed complaints against
the respondent before the DOJ for the same charges filed by the SEC.

The SEC moved for reconsideration which was denied by State Prosecutor Reyes. So the
SEC filed before the DOJ a Petition for Review but was denied, and then they filed for
reconsideration, however, was still denied. Subsequently, the SEC filed a petition for Certiorari to
the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court held that there was no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of Secretary Gonzalez when he affirmed State Prosecutor Reyes’ Resolutions, which
found no probable cause to file an information. Hence, this Petition for Review.

ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not courts may pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable
cause; and
 (2) Whether or not there is probable cause to indict respondents for violation of Sections
26.3 and 28 of the Securities Regulation Code and Article 315(1)(b) of the Revised Penal Code.

RULING:
1. (REMEDIAL Topic)

It has long been established that the determination of probable cause to charge a person
of a crime is an executive function, which pertains to and lies within the discretion of the public
prosecutor and the justice secretary. The general rule is that the determination of probable cause
is an executive function which courts cannot pass upon. As an exception, courts may interfere
with the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause only when there is grave abuse of
discretion.

Courts may pass upon the prosecutor’s determination of probable cause only upon a
showing of grave abuse of discretion. Probable cause, in relation to the filing of an information,
was explained by this Court in Villanueva v. Secretary of Justice, 475 SCRA 495 (2005): Probable
cause, for purposes of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such facts are sufficient
to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the private
respondent is probably guilty thereof. It is such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe or entertain an honest or strong
suspicion that a thing is so. The term does not mean “actual or positive cause”; nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a
conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the
offense charged. The definition of probable cause was lifted from Rule 112, Section 1, paragraph
1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

2. (MERC Topic)

Petitioner provided sufficient bases to form a belief that a crime was possibly committed
by respondent Price Richardson.

An examination of the records reveals that probable cause exists to file an information
against respondent Price Richardson for violating the laws. Based on the Certification issued by
the Market Regulation Department of the Securities and Exchange Commission, respondent Price
Richardson “has never been issued any secondary license to act as broker/dealer in securities,
investment house and dealer in government securities.” Petitioner also certified that respondent
Price Richardson “is not, under any circumstances, authorized or licensed to engage and/or solicit
investments from clients.”

However, respondents Velarde-Albert and Resnick cannot be indicted for violations of the
Securities Regulation Code and the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner failed to allege the specific acts
of respondents Velarde-Albert and Resnick that could be interpreted as participation in the
alleged violations. There was also no showing, based on the complaints, that they were deemed
responsible for Price Richardson’s violations.

A corporation’s personality is separate and distinct from its officers, directors, and
shareholders. To be held criminally liable for the acts of a corporation, there must be a showing
that its officers, directors, and shareholders actively participated in or had the power to prevent
the wrongful act.

HELD:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Court of
Appeals’ Decision dated May 26, 2011 and Department of Justice Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez’s
Resolutions dated April 12, 2005 and July 5, 2006 are AFFIRMED insofar as they find no grave
abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the complaints for lack of probable cause against Consuelo
Velarde-Albert and Gordon Resnick.
 Case Title: Power Generation Employees Association-NPC v. National Power Corp.,

G.R. No. 187420, August 9, 2017

Principles:

Provisional reliefs, such as a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction, are
ancillary writs issued by the court to protect the rights of a party during the pendency of the
principal action.

To issue an injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be protected.

Actions must be instituted by the real parties-in-interest. Otherwise, the action may be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. A real party-in-interest is defined under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court as: Section 2. Parties-in-Interest.—A real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Unless otherwise authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended
in the name of the real party-in-interest.

Facts:

EPIRA was signed into law which aimed to privatize NAPOCOR assets. Hence, PSALM was created
to manage the orderly sale, disposition, and privatization of NAPOCOR's generation assets, real
estate and other disposable assets, and Independent Power Producer contracts with the objective
of liquidating all its financial obligations and stranded contract costs in an optimal manner. In
2008, PSALM drafted the Operation and Maintenance Agreement for NAPOCOR's acceptance
which provides that NAPOCOR would perform all functions and services necessary to successfully
and efficiently operate, maintain, and manage power plants, generation assets, or facilities until
its transfer or turnover to PSALM. It further provided that NAPOCOR must submit its proposed
budget to PSALM for review and approval. All revenues related to the maintenance and operation
of power plants, generation assets, or facilities would be considered as PSALM's properties.

In 2009, the Operation and Management Agreement was signed by PSALM and by the new
NAPOCOR President. This Agreement was confirmed and ratified by NAPOCOR's Board of
Directors on the same day.

The Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order or
Preliminary Injunction seeking to restrain the implementation of the Operation and Management
Agreement for contravening the provisions of EPIRA. They argue that PSALM's ownership extends
only to net profits, and not to all revenues, of NAPOCOR under Section 55(e) of EPIRA. Hence,
NAPOCOR's revenues should not be billed for PSALM's account; that PSALM merely holds
NAPOCOR's assets as its naked owner for the purposes of disposing these assets and use the
proceeds thereof to liquidate NAPOCOR's liabilities. They assert that since EPIRA did not give
PSALM the authority to generate and sell electricity, it should not have entered into the Operation
and Maintenance Agreement over the sale of the undisposed generation assets; and that it was
not granted with power to control and supervise NAPOCOR, thus the provision in the Operation
and Maintenance Agreement requiring NAPOCOR to submit its proposed budget to PSALM
violates EPIRA since NAPOCOR's Charter grants the NAPOCOR Board of Directors the authority to
adopt a budget without prior approval from PSALM.

Respondent argued that the Operation and Maintenance Agreement merely recognized PSALM's
ownership of NAPOCOR's generation assets and facilities, consistent with the mandate of EPIRA;
that PSALM became the owner of NAPOCOR's generation assets, real estate, IPP contracts, other
disposable assets, residual assets, and its net profits; that there is nothing in EPIRA that qualifies
or limits PSALM's ownership of these assets; that petitioners are not entitled to injunctive relief
since they are neither the real parties in interest nor have they shown that they will suffer a grave
and irreparable injury with the implementation of the Operation and Management Agreement;
that that since petitioners were not privy to the Operation and Management Agreement, they are
not the real parties in interest who could assail its validity; that contrary to petitioners' allegation,
the Operation and Maintenance Agreement does not require NAPOCOR to submit its entire
corporate budget for approval, but NAPOCOR is required to submit only its budget proposal
concerning the undisposed generation assets, IPP contracts, real estate, and all other disposable
assets consistent with its exercise of ownership over these assets.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to injunctive writ.

2. Whether or not the petitioners are real-parties- in interest in this case.

Ruling:

1. No, they are not entitled to an injunctive writ.

Rule 58, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

SECTION 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. – A preliminary injunction may be

granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during
the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

Here, to issue an injunctive writ, the applicant must establish his or her right sought to be
protected. Petitioners allege that while they were not privy to the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement, they will be affected by its implementation as NAPOCOR employees since they are
the ones engaged in the operations and maintenance of the unsold generation plants. The
Petition, however, fails to show how NAPOCOR employees will be affected by the Operation and
Maintenance Agreement's implementation. While a provision of this Agreement mentions the
status of NAPOCOR's employees upon its implementation. Petitioners have not shown how, as
NAPOCOR employees, they will be affected by respondent NAPOCOR's submission of its budget
for respondent PSALM's approval. If there was indeed an encroachment of the NAPOCOR Board
of Directors' prerogative under its Charter to approve its own budget, the Board of Directors
would be the proper party to question the validity of Article XVI of the Operation and Maintenance
Agreement.

Petitioners have likewise failed to show how they, as NAPOCOR employees, will be affected by
the remittance of respondent NAPOCOR's revenues to respondent PSALM. None of them has
alleged how the remittance would affect their wages, salaries, and benefits or their working
conditions. Otherwise stated, petitioners have not claimed any right sought to be protected or
any direct injury they will suffer if the revenues are remitted.

2. No, they are the real parties- in- interest in this case.

Actions must be instituted by the real parties in interest. Otherwise, the action may be dismissed
for lack of cause of action. A real party in interest is defined under Rule 3, Section 2 of the Rules
of Court as:

Section 2. Parties in interest. A real party in interest is the party who stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless otherwise
authorized by law or these Rules, every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.

Petitioners have not established how they will benefit by enjoining the implementation of the
Operation and Maintenance Agreement. They have not established the injury they will suffer if
this Agreement is not enjoined. Thus, this Petition is dismissed for lack of cause of action.
People of the Philippines vs. Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado

G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017

Principle: Inconsistencies between the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court
do not necessarily discredit the witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes
incomplete and is generally regarded as inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court.

FACTS:

The is an appeal filed by Rene Boy Dimapilit y Abellado from the decision of the CA which affirmed
the trial court’s ruling that he was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Magdalena Apasan
testified about Diego Garcia's death. On cross-examination, she asserted that she did not know
any personal grudge between Rene Boy and Diego. She did not mention anything about Simeon
in her sworn statement. She just stated that she hid behind a mango tree out of fear. She admitted
failing to ask for help. On direct-examination, she narrated that Simeon asked Rene Boy to stop
beating Diego. From their position, Magdalena and Simeon saw Rene Boy beat Diego as there was
no obstruction to their view. However, she did not also bring this up in her sworn statement.
Moreover, she admitted saying in her sworn statement that she saw Junnel box Diego's jaw but
in her direct examination, she said that it was Junnel and not Joel who ran after Diego. However,
it was really Joel who pursued Diego. Diego's unexpected demise and the similarity in the names
allegedly confused her. Rene Boy underscores the material inconsistencies in Magdalena's
testimony and insists that they cannot serve as a basis for finding him guilty. Rene boy argues that
it cannot be equated the idea that Magdalena could have no other motive than to ensure justice
to the conclusion that a witness is credible because the defense has not shown any ill motive that
would motivate her to falsely testify.

ISSUE:

Did the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of Magdalena affect
her credibility as a witness?

RULING:

No, the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of Magdalena did not
affect her credibility as a witness.

As explained in People v. Nelmida, G.R. No. 184500; September 11, 2012, inconsistencies between
the sworn statement and direct testimony given in open court do not necessarily discredit the
witness. An affidavit, being taken ex-parte, is oftentimes incomplete and is generally regarded as
inferior to the testimony of the witness in open court. In addition, an extrajudicial statement or
affidavit is generally not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language
in writing the affiant's statement, hence, omissions and misunderstandings by the writer are not
infrequent. Indeed, the prosecution witnesses' direct and categorical declarations on the witness
stand are superior to their extrajudicial statements.

In this case, whether Magdalena was alone or with Simeon does not really matter. Also,
Magdalena's confusion with the names of the accused also does not affect her credibility as a
witness. It is possible that she might have interchanged the names due to their vivid similarity.
Moreover, the fact that Magdalena did not ask for help is not contrary to human experience.
Probably, out of fear for her life, Magdalena was constrained to be mum and helpless.

Therefore, the minor inconsistencies between the sworn statement and testimony of Magdalena
did not affect her credibility as a witness.
Case Title: CE CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. ARANETA CENTER INC.,
RESPONDENT. G.R. No. 192725, August 09, 2017

A tribunal confronted not only with ambiguous contractual terms but also with the total absence
of an instrument which definitively articulates the contracting parties' agreement does not act in
excess of jurisdiction when it employs aids in interpretation.

Principle/s:
The Supreme Court’s (SC’s) primordial inclination must be to uphold the factual findings of arbitral
tribunals.
By the parties’ voluntary submission, they acknowledge that an arbitral tribunal constituted under
the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC) has full competence to rule on the dispute
presented to it.

Facts:
Petitioner CECON was a construction contractor, which, for more than 25 years, had been
doing business with respondent ACI, the developer of Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. With
many changes to the project and ACI's delays in delivering drawings and specifications, CECON
increasingly found itself unable to complete the project. It noted that it had to file a total of 15
Requests for Time Extension, all of which ACI failed to timely act on.
Exasperated, CECON served notice upon ACI that it would avail of arbitration. On January
29, 2004, it filed with the CIAC its Request for Adjudication. It prayed that a total sum of
P183,910,176.92 representing adjusted project costs be awarded in its favor. CECON and ACI filed
before the CIAC a Joint Manifestation indicating that some issues between them had already been
settled. Proceedings before the CIAC were then suspended to enable CECON and ACI to arrive at
an amicable settlement. In the meantime, CECON completed the project and turned over
Gateway Mall to ACI.
As negotiations seemed futile, CECON filed with the CIAC a Motion to Proceed with
arbitration proceedings. ACI filed an Opposition. After its Opposition was denied, ACI filed its
Answer. It attributed liability for delays to CECON and sought to recover counterclaims totalling
P180,752 297.84. This amount covered liquidated damages for CECON's supposed delays, the cost
of defective works which had to be rectified, the cost of procuring permits and licenses, and ACI's
other advances.
On February 8, 2005, ACI filed a Manifestation and Motion seeking the CIAC's clearance
for the parties to enter into mediation. Mediation was then instituted. After mediation failed, an
arbitral tribunal was constituted through an Order of the CIAC. The CIAC Arbitral Tribunal
rendered its Decision on October 25, 2006. It awarded a total of P229,223,318.69 to CECON,
inclusive of the costs of arbitration.
ACI filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeals held as inviolable the lump-sum fixed price arrangement
between ACI and CECON. It faulted the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal for acting in excess of jurisdiction as
it supposedly took it upon itself to unilaterally modify the arrangement between ACI and CECON.

Issue/s:
Whether the CIAC has jurisdictional and technical competence and of its arbitral tribunals;

Ruling:
The Construction Industry Arbitration Commission was a creation of Executive Order No.
1008, otherwise known as the Construction Industry Arbitration Law. At inception, it was under
the administrative supervision of the Philippine Domestic Construction Board which, in turn, was
an implementing agency of the Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines (CIAP). The CIAP
is presently attached to the Department of Trade and Industry.
The CIAC does not only serve the interest of speedy dispute resolution, it also facilitates
authoritative dispute resolution. Its authority proceeds not only from juridical legitimacy but
equally from technical expertise. The creation of a special adjudicatory body for construction
disputes presupposes distinctive and nuanced competence on matters that are conceded to be
outside the innate expertise of regular courts and adjudicatory bodies concerned with other
specialized fields. The CIAC has the state’s confidence concerning the entire technical expanse of
construction, defined in jurisprudence as “referring to all on-site works on buildings or altering
structures, from land clearance through completion including excavation, erection and assembly
and installation of components and equipment.”
The most recent jurisprudence maintains that the CIAC is a quasi-judicial body. This
Court’s November 23, 2016 Decision in Fruehauf Electronics v. Technology Electronics Assembly
and Management Pacific, 810 SCRA 280, distinguished construction arbitration, as well as
voluntary arbitration pursuant to Article 219(14) of the Labor Code, from commercial arbitration.
It ruled that commercial arbitral tribunals are not quasi-judicial agencies, as they are purely ad
hoc bodies operating through contractual consent and as they intend to serve private, proprietary
interests. In contrast, voluntary arbitration under the Labor Code and construction arbitration
operate through the statutorily vested jurisdiction of government instrumentalities that exist
independently of the will of contracting parties and to which these parties submit.
Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure standardizes appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies. Rule 43, Section 1 explicitly lists CIAC as among the quasi-judicial agencies covered by
Rule 43. Section 3 indicates that appeals through Petitions for Review under Rule 43 are to “be
taken to the Court of Appeals . . . whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law.”
Consistent with this restrictive approach, this Court is duty-bound to be extremely
watchful and to ensure that an appeal does not become an ingenious means for undermining the
integrity of arbitration or for conveniently setting aside the conclusions arbitral processes make.
An appeal is not an artifice for the parties to undermine the process they voluntarily elected to
engage in. To prevent this Court from being a party to such perversion, this Court’s primordial
inclination must be to uphold the factual findings of arbitral tribunals.
ACI and CECON voluntarily submitted themselves to the CIAC Arbitral Tribunal’s
jurisdiction. The contending parties’ own volition is at the inception of every construction
arbitration proceeding. Common sense dictates that by the parties’ voluntary submission, they
acknowledge that an arbitral tribunal constituted under the CIAC has full competence to rule on
the dispute presented to it. They concede this not only with respect to the literal issues recited in
their terms of reference, as ACI suggests, but also with respect to their necessary incidents.
Accordingly, in delineating the authority of arbitrators, the CIAC Rules of Procedure speak not only
of the literally recited issues but also of “related matters”.
Jurisprudence has settled that even in cases where parties enter into contracts which do
not strictly conform to standard formalities or to the typifying provisions of nominate contracts,
when one renders services to another, the latter must compensate the former for the reasonable
value of the services rendered. This amount shall be fixed by a court.
Consistent with the Construction Industry Arbitration Law’s declared policy, the CIAC
Arbitral Tribunal was specifically charged with “ascertaining the facts in each case by every and
all reasonable means.” In discharging its task, it was permitted to even transcend technical rules
on admissibility of evidence.
Case Title: Cortal vs. Inaki A. Larrazabal ENTERPRISES; 838 SCRA 255; GR No. 199107, August 30,
2017

Principle: Verification; Jurisprudence has considered the lack of verification as a mere formal,
rather than a jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal.

Facts: Private respondent, Inaki A. Larrazabal Enterprises owned three parcels of land, these lands
were placed under Compulsory Acquisition Scheme of Presidential Decree of 27, as amended by
E.O.228. Pursuant to the scheme, emancipation patents and new transfer certificates of title were
issued to farmer-beneficiaries, petitioners included.
In 1999, Larrazabal Enterprises filed its Action for Recovery of these parcels against the
Department of Agrarian Reform and the petitioners before the Office of the Regional Adjudicator,
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). It assailed the cancellation of its
transfer certificates of title and the subsequent issuance of new titles to petitioners. It alleged
that no price had been fixed, much less paid, for the expropriation of its properties, in violation
of the just compensation requirement under Presidential Decree No. 27, as amended. Thus, it
prayed for the recovery of these lots and the cancellation of petitioners’ transfer certificates of
title.
In their Answer, petitioners denied nonpayment of just compensation. They presented
certifications issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) that the amounts of
P80,359.37 and P95,691.49 had been deposited as payments in the name of Larrazabal
Enterprises. They added that since they had paid, the cancellation of Larrazabal Enterprises’
transfer certificates of title, the subdivision of the parcels, and the issuance of emancipation
patents in their favor were all properly made.
In his October 15, 1999 Decision, Regional Adjudicator Diloy noted that there was nothing
in the records to show that just compensation was fixed or paid for the parcels. Hence, he ruled
in favor of Larrazabal Enterprises and ordered that it be restored to ownership of the lots.
Petitioners appealed to the DARAB. In its September 16, 2008 Decision, the DARAB
reversed the Decision of Regional Adjudicator Diloy. It ruled that Larrazabal Enterprises' action,
which was filed in 1999, was already barred by prescription and laches, as the assailed
Emancipation Patents were issued in 1988. It likewise gave credence to the certificates issued by
Landbank, which confirmed the payment of just compensation.
Larrazabal Enterprises filed a Motion for Reconsideration. In its September 30, 2009
Resolution, the DARAB reversed its own decision and granted Larrazabal Enterprises' Motion for
Reconsideration. It justified its ruling by saying that Larrazabal Enterprises had been denied due
process when the parcels were taken from it without having been given just compensation.
Petitioners then filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals. In its assailed
September 30, 2010 Resolution, in one of the basis of its dismissal, the Court of Appeals found
out that the counsel for the petitioners, Atty. Norjue I. Juego did not indicate the place of issue of
his Integrated Bar of the Philippines number.
Hence, this appeal.
Issue/s: Whether or not the lack of verification is a fatal defect as a mere formal requirement.
Ruling: NO, An affiant verifies a pleading to indicate that he or she has read it and that to his or
her knowledge and belief, its allegations are true and correct and that it has been prepared in
good faith and not out of mere speculation.58 Jurisprudence has considered the lack of
verification as a mere formal, rather than a jurisdictional, defect that is not fatal. Thus, courts may
order the correction of a pleading or act on an unverified pleading, if the circumstances would
warrant the dispensing of the procedural requirement to serve the ends of justice.
Through Bar Matter No. 287, this court required the inclusion of the number and date of
lawyers' official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the current year; in lieu of this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime
membership number
Effective August 1, 1985, all lawyers shall indicate in all pleadings, motions and papers
signed and filed by them in any Court in the Philippines, the number and date of their official
receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the current year; provided, however, that such official receipt number and date for
any year may be availed of and indicated in all such pleadings, motions and papers filed by them
in court up to the end of the month of February of the next succeeding year.
Indicating the place of issue of the official receipt is not even a requirement. While its inclusion
may certainly have been desirable and would have allowed for a more consummate disclosure of
information, its non-inclusion is certainly not fatal. As with the other procedural lapses considered
by the Court of Appeals, its non-inclusion could have very easily been remedied by the Court of
Appeals' prudent allowance of time and opportunity to petitioners and their counsel.